ARTICLE IN NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE BY ARTHUR KOESTLER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003100040105-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 105
• Publication Date: February 25, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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25 February 1951
25X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT:
Article in New York Times Magazine
by Arthur Koestler
2. The idea has some merit but runs into the obvious
difficulty that many people in Europe are afraid to enroll
publicly in a Legion of Liberty on the theory that this would
be an "execution roster" if the Communists should come in.
Many people who will vote against the Communists in a secret
ballot are unwilling to add their names to a list which the
Communists might use.
25
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Toward European unity-Officers f France, Holland, Italy, 4areur,e, MorWc3i'
ESTERN Europe is a patient
in an iron lung. American
economic and military aid
- provide it with oxygen, but it cannot
live and breathe by itself. The sickness
which paralyzes it is not of an eco-
nomic nature. Nor is it social creed.
nor the Communist phantom Those are symptoms of the disease,
but not its cause. The cause is both
deeper and simpler: Europe has lost
faith in itself.
In all serious discussions with
F enchmen, Italians, or Western Ger-
mans, there arrives a moment of truth
jhen this fact is admitted. Tan-
ner of admission may be cynical,
bitter, or resigned. The explanations
and excuses vary according to case.
Some say that Europe is bled out by
its wars; others, that its will to survive
has been sapped by the Communist
cancer; still others put the blame on
the capitalist system, the decline of
Christian faith, on British insularism,
or "the agents of Wall Street." Only
on one point do all views agree: that
in its present condition, Europe cannot
survive.
In the larger part of. Europe the
ARTHUR KOESTLER, noted novelist and
former foreign correspondent, is perhaps best
known as the author of "Darkness at Noon."
MAGAZINE, OCTOBER 8, 1950.
and A m a ,e'sv "'ructions *rn:11 an American ?er on the operation of a U. 5. tank.
s.sf~e
Out of
c United IS of ura ,
inally, social progress may enter
a misshapen alliance with na-
tional egotism. The British people, un-
tial gains
der Labor rule, made substan
in social security, old-age pensions, na-
tional health services and so on; but
these gains have been nullified on the
European balance sheet by the Labor
party's refusal "to accept any supra-
national authority dominated by non-
Socialist governments."
ET us repeat, then : the struggle
for social progress is necessary, but not
sufficient to save Europe; just as vita-
min tablets are he lthf a frombut
to save a paient
tal disease.
The second wrong answer is related
to the first. It says: 'The Communist
creed has the immense emotional ap-
peal of a secular religion, whereas
democracy, freedom of the individual,
etc., . have become stale cliches. If we
want to counter the Communist ~threaa ,
gy ABTKiE KOESTLER
civilization that made its greatness has
already been destroyed, and human life
degraded to the routine of the peni-
tentiary. The remaining, truncated
part is likewise doomed-unless there
is a radical change in its political-..and
moral climate. This change, this spir?
itual revival, is the only export whici
America cannot provide. It mud
come out of Europe itself. In wha
form? And what policy must Ameriat
pursue, apart from continuing materitl
assistance, to create the favorable con-
ditions for a European resurrection?
the landless Italian peasants, higher
wages to the French workers, abolish
poverty, create prosperity and social
justice-and Europe will automatically
recover its will to live.
It is a beautiful dream, yet a dream,
for it confuses the desirable with the
possible. The fight for social reform
and economic progress is vitally nec-
essary for the peoples of Europe. But
it is not sufficient to insure their sur-
vival against Russian aggression, and
it is not sufficient to bring forth, in
the measurable future, that moral re-
surgence which alone can save them.
II
;FORE we can hope to find the
right answer to this question, cer-
tain wrong answers must be eleminated.
These fall mainly into two types of
popular fallacies. The first is gen-
erally voiced by well-meaning progres-
sives on both sides of the Atlantic. It
holds, roughly, that the best and only
means of resisting Communist expan-
sion, both military and ideological, is
through social progress. Give land to
For one thing, the fight for so
and economic justice has been going
on ior
-
w
years, and it is unlikely that the UlUGli
will arrive just in time to stop ideology or creed of a aynam e r~
t
t B
o
age
are again faced with the
the next Russian move against Berlin equal
or Yugoslavia. Secondly, as long as Here we
Communist-controlled trade unions in confusion possible. coursed f ira le a a
France and Italy deliberately sabotage the P banner over us, like early
the economic recovery of their own flowing
countries, any quick, spectacular im- Christianity or the tricolor in 1789, all
provement in the living standards of futht oublesr w(Continued ould be get Page a
the people is ruled out.
9
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two or tnree
rev'"
e must invent some
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TOWARD MILLTARY IN7( EGM"PION-1n. the eorr-bined fall 'rineneuv'ers of 0. S., $ritish
and French occupation tro' opv;m Germany, a G.L. demonstrated the American bazooka.
"British Overseas Airways Corp.-110x2'/2-AII Rote
For a European Legion of Liberty
(Continued Iron b Page 9)
religious or secular, , cannot be synthe-
tized in a laboratory. : socialism, in one
form or another, s seemed the most
promising secular re lig ion until its at-
mosphere became corrupted and? its
forces sapped by Stsdiriism. In France
?
?
32
and Italy the wore shit Viers of tyranny
and terror usurp tbse :rightful place of
a truly progressive )party, and cun-
ningly divert the energies of the pro-
gressive-minded into "`anti-fascist" cru-
sades against Coca-Cola and General
Franco-as if the great threat to Eu-
rope came from S:pairs, not Russia, and
the world had staid still since 1936.
As long as this encroachment lasts,
there is no room. on the French 'arid
Italian Left for the growth of a healthy
progressive_n2vemenr, and no chance
for e development orf anew, dynamic
creej. The same is true, for different
~"f ~'zea54ns; o'# Srlti:3li L}rt~~~'s 'oociaiIsm in
one country' policy. o set one's hopes
on a European reviva from these quar-
ters means to.indutgc. in wishful think-
ing of a,. honorable, but unrealistic
kind.
III
V WE conclude that the Communist
expansion in Europe cannot be
halted either by economic progress-
however desirable in itself-nor by ? the
invention of some miraculous patent
ideology. Our time has no economic or
spiritual panacea to offer to the dis-
heartened masses in Europe. How, then,
can we expect them to recover faith
in themselves?
There is only one way, the obvious
way: to replace their shattered national
consciousness and tottering loyalties to
their rulers by a European conscious-
ness and a European loyalty.
According to a recent poll conducted
in twelve Western European countries,
54 per cent of the people questioned
were in favor of a Union of European
nations, 38 per cent were undecided,
and only 8 per cent against. In isola-
tionist Britain, 51 per cent were in
favor of Union and only 9 per cent
against. Thus the answer to our ques-
tion is given by the people of Europe
themselves. They know by instinct
that unification means infinitely more
than a pooling of coal and steel, or the
arithmetical additicm of military forces.
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They know and feel that, almost re-
gardless of immediate material bene-
fits, the unification of Europe would
provide precisely that emotional appeal
and dynamic uplift, that return of ?self-
?confidence and resurrection of the
European spirit, which is required to
counter and defeat the Communist
phantom creed.
IN 1940, after the fall of Paris, Win-
ston Churchill proposed the unification
of the French and Britisn Empires by
a simple stroke of the pen. When the
'danger was past the lesson was for-
gotten. In 1948, after Stalin's seizure
of Czechoslovakia, Ernest Bevin de-
clared that Europe must unite or
perish. Since then he and his colleagues
have a as if they had chosen the
second rnative. Political federation,
we were told, is premature; it must be
preceded by economic integration. But
when chuman plan for economic
integra was presented it was de-
clared inacceptable because it would
entail a sacrifice in political sover-
eignity. And so it goes on.
Where can we break this vicious
circle? Again the answer seems fairly
obvious. The only political reality which
has emerged after years of sterile
haggling and prostration, is the At-
lantic Pact. To the people of Europe
this is still an abstract reality. A mili-
tary alliance in itself is not a factor
likely to ignite public imagination, but
it could be made into such a factor.
A united European army could be>
the leaven which ultimately gives rise
to a united Europe. It could be the'
means to by-pass the difficulties, real
or imaginary, which at present block
the road to political and economic in-
tegration. But on one condition only:
that the problem of the European army
should be approached not from a purely
military, but from a psychological
angle.
An army can reflect itself in the
public mind as an abhorrent war ma-
chine, or as a symbol which arouses
the political libido and evokes fervent
emotions. The armies of the French and
American Revolutions and the Interna-
tional Brigades in Spain were such
(Continued on Following Page)
1HE NEW Y.ORK TIMES
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(Continued from Preceding Page)
sy r. tea .e, arouse.$ ;ahe
l
t
po
i
ical
f
ervent moth
of the
- Mre:
symbols. Is it very para
doxical to suggest that a.
European army of this type
would be the most direct and
logical means to restore Eu
rope's faith in itself; to make
it reconquer its pride and.
Weiss & Beserman-170xl dignity; and to fill its people
All Roto- with a new, European con
sciousness ?
IN the first world war it took
four years until the West-
ern Allies achieved unified
command. In the second World
War it again, took more than
four ~7ears. Last month, though
the third world war has not
yet started and may never
start, the North Atlantic" for-
eign ministers accepted Dean
Acheson's\.proposal of a single
military command, with au-
thority to organize an "effec-
tive integrated force" of the
twelve Western nations. Thia
i$ an important step which
seems to prove that, under th.e
imoact of the common' danger,
integration in the military
field may be less difficult to
achieve than in the economic
and political field.
Naturally, there is still a
very long way from a paper
resolution to practical reality.
o But here again a possible
short cut offers itself. It does
not represent a solution to the
problem of how to create an
a. my out of units with differ-
ent national allegiances, nor to
the problem of French anxie-
ties regarding German rearm-
ament-to mention only two
of the obvious difficulties.
What proposed here is
mereI experiment; but
~n
exper relatively eaay to
carry which does not run
count e~ any vested national
interests, and which, if suc-
cessful, may produce far-
reaching and unexpected re-
sults.
3>; proposal aims at the
creation of an elite force, with-
in the framework of the At-
lantic Pact and under the di-
rect authority of its supreme
command, called the Legion of
Liberty. The Legion of Lib-
erty (abbrev. "LL") is to con-
sist of individual volunteers
from the eleven West Euro-
pean nations, and is to be so
composed that the various na-
tionalities are mixed together
on the lowest level-i.e. that
each platoon shall comprise
soldiers from several, and if
possible all, nationalities. In
other words, instead of being
"integrated from above" by
the coordination of units from
different national armies, the
LL would be a force "inte-
grated at the base." It would
represent Pan Europa in a
nutshell.,
The value of such a force
would be both practical and
(Continued on Following Page)
MAGAZINE. OCTOBER 8, 1950.
British Travel & Holidays Assn.-170x3-Ali Rofo-
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Yardley-110 x 3-All Roth.
Corps. integrated European army,,
(d) Whereas the bui and thus the pioneer of a Unit-
up of the European ed Europe. Every squad, pla---
34
,(Continued-from. Preceding Page)
symbolic. Let us take the
practical aspect first.
(a) The conventional units
of the national armies which
:are to be "allocated" to the Eu-
ropean command will have to
'be handled with due regard to
the susceptibilities of the var-
ious powers concerned; fric-
tion, jealousies and resent-
ment are unavoidable in such
cases. The LL units, on the
other hand, would be at the
immediate and direct disposal
of the supreme command, and
all diplomatic considerations,
with their deleterious effects
on strategy, would be short-
circuited.
(b) The examples of the
French Foreign Legion, the
Spanish Tertio, and the Inter-
national Brigades tend to
show that the fighting morale
of such mixed units is excel-
lent and often superior to that
of normal units. The reason
for this may be that the het-
erogeneous nature of such
forces leaves less scope than
in homogeneous units for the
development of collective
grudges and adverse political
currents.
(c) The language of com-
mand in the LL would be
French. The language barrier
presents no difficulties, as ex-
perience shows that the lim-
ited technical vocabulary of
the army is picked up by the
alien recruit almost as quick-
ly as if he had to learn the
terms in his own language.
This the present writer can
confirm from personal experi-
ences as a soldier in the
French Foreign Legion and
the British Aliens' Pioneer
of the "allocated" national
tingents will require diff
negotiations and considerable
time, the recruitment of one
or several LL regiments could
start immediately. The only
condition required is that the
various governments con-
cerned should consider service
in the Legion of Liberty as
equivalent to military service
at home. It is hard to see
what valid objection could be
raised to such an arrange-
ment.
(e) The creation of the LL
force would not interfere with
existing official projects, such
as the Acheson plan, nor with
unofficial suggestions such as
Churchill's Strasbourg propo-
sal of a European Ministry of
Defense, or the Culbertson
proposal of a United Nations
Police Force, or the proposal
of Senator Lodge for a Bri-
gade composed of refugees
from Eastern Europe.
(f) The LL force would be
modeled on the pattern of the
U. S. A. "Regimental Combat
Team." That is to say, the
LL . regiment, or regiments
(depending on the number of
volunteers) should be to a
large extent self-supporting,
with their own infantry, tank
and engineer battalions, field
artillery, and a small air arm.
(g) The Legion would have
American equipment and Eu-
ropean manpower. Its non-
commissioned officers and
subalterns would be selected
according to ability; its offi-
cers from the rank of captain
upward should be citizens of
small nations. It would be
stationed anywhere in Europe
-e.g. in Western Germany, or
in the Franco-German border
provinces.
V
iE psychological aspect
TT of the project, 'which is
its very essence and raison
d'@tre, does not need to be dis-
cussed at length. The very
name, "Legion of Liberty,"
expresses its symbolic value
and emotional significance.
At its least, the LL would
remain a small elite corps of
a few thousand men-say
4,000 to 5,000, the strength of
a_single regiment. It is hard.
to imagine that this number of
volunteers would not be forth-
coming. Even on this limited
scale its symbolic value would
be considerable. The young
men of various nationalities
would, through mutual con-
tact, gain an inestimable ex-
perience and enlarged horizon
-much more effectively than
through all sorts of summer
schools, student exchange
projects and holidays abroad.
They would acquire a Euro-
pean consciousness and spread
it in their home countries after
their return.
At its most, the Legion of
Liberty would become the
catalyzing agent for a truly
toon an company would act
as an incubator of the new Eu-
ropean spirit. The condition of
being a soldier would lose its
odious associations with wars
of national jealousy and impe-
rialist conquest. The Legion of
Liberty would discard the
worn-out flags which have long
ceased to represent the reali-
ties of our shrinking planet.
The French poilu and the Ger-
man Soldat would no longer
regard themselves as the help-
less victims of archaic chau-
vinism, or the sinister machi-
nations of bankers and poli-
ticians. They would be soldiers
of Europe, marching under'the
flag of Europe, to the beat of a
European anthem.
iG
HY," wrote the Presi-
dent of the European Assem-
bly, Henry Spaak, a few days
ago, "why should the respon-
sible statesmen who signed the
Brussels Pact and the North
Atlantic Treaty be incapable
of drawing the logical conclu-
sions from their texts? The
defense of Europe means, to
be sure, a good army; but it
also means, and perhaps above
all, the consciousness that Eu-
rope exists and that it de-
serves to exist."
THE NEW YORIC TIMES
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