LETTER TO FRANK FROM C .D. JACKSON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000100004-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 27, 1954
• Content Type: LETTER

NSC review(s) completed.
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Dear Frank:
COPT
February27, W4
Tho followieg is lee attempt to imt somewhat more specific r...4
the post-Berlin discussion we had on Friday.
use as my basing point ry memorandum of February 22 to the
President, wherein I attempted to spell out what I believe we aiact -;er-
in fierlin with respect to Soviet foreign policy intentions for thy in me-
diate future.
In that mexnora.ndun, I concluded that we now have a size per
of time -- at least a year -- ia which to step up the general tempo
our cold war activities and indulge in pia-point barasement of yule
spots.
1954 ie a yesr when the chances of 'provoking' the Soviet..4 intx, a o a.roa
military reaction are as low as they have ever been since the war.
If this thesis is acceptable as general policy, then what is 'waded I a
series of action decisions on the kaolin Soviet soft spots.
To get the thinking started, here is a brief list of targets which
are vulnerable.
1. Berlin
2. East Germany
3. Widespread pmsivC resistance in European eatellit,ec,.
4. Stepped-up encouragement of defection by Soviet
military and Soviet Pific4111?
. Preparing criminal indictment brief for use in Geneva
to prove that the Chinese People's Republic is not the
voice of the Chinese people, but is the product of an
incredible conspiracy dating bock to 1919-20. (I issue a,
stand en the authority of OCB' s Ray McNair that the
complete documentation cm this exists here in Atisehl.rigtoo ;
SECRET
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D* ciur t ?
U.S. stock was *ever higher in *sr
Coale:soca as far as Geru.say was cm. .
have to make political opposition. noises. and there wilt be sin
speech**. and Como:moist-inspired demonstrational,
But uaderaeatk any or all of this U. a solid concrete bass of AncieT
standing, courage, sod hope.
There is at low* ese big Wag thai could be dso. in Berlin Itsbich
have tiflinoSihmt* impact4 and that to the annessaconaeat of A pias.
the first atomic plower reactor vissior tke Eisenhower propeeal in E.
211341k -
tftit
There are very practical as well as propaganda reasons for demi ti s.
Every *ewe of fuel, liquid or **Lida need in Berlin has to Ise lAr
into tbe laity acre*. Soviet territory. is spite of the reserve necks- a*
Save accumulated a sew blockade wools% be very seriatim, particsliwiy
as the Soviet rail and calla Berlin by-passes new off,ake itimohaible
for se to impose a coaster-blockade.
An atemk power pleat ***Id be completely indepaagest et sa
esuergency into Berlia, assll while the first istetallatioa or 444 "km
be able to supply one hundred perces' enough power for nerwtai psalt
iissAiso it wea/4 be able to supply the hook wiainews aeodod to ta1/4* tars
el the city ulster stego cesmittiono. The prepaipaada aspects vtw-s-vi tb
Chermass and the ieviets ass obvious.
There is aeskiag in the Prisitinnt's proposal sor Is the talks bet
Secretary *ad Molotov is Be rits4 nor the oPemmiail, talk. ""lk "
Washiation ea the Presideat's preposta, to littortoro 'oak sow takilkii
unilateral action. As a matter of tact, such settee might isis***4 %evil
acceptant* of the Premideat's proposal.
Semmes* will be sure to raise the ohjectisa that this pelt* ttrstaaabL.
rriaterial assilor atomic secrets bete the very hands of the tiessianis. Fb
answer to that is that a "tick check with lotrots Strauss will its, yew i4s
answer as the siegliglble aw oust of -material" seeded. Further or4*
the Magi Si triaterial to be wed is not "beech type. Aad 11a41'y thai ?!'
as suilitary secret involved la a power matter.
Tnp Rrr,ipitFT
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I have talked to Ambassador Conant about this idea, and be ext, sm.*
enthusiastic -- so much so that just before I left Berlin he wrote i a
letter on the subject which I have given to Lewis Strauss z,o that if me
project is to be carried further it can be directly between Strauss and
Conant without going through the extra and unnecessary Ja.ckson lop.
I would like to point out that to get impact from this idea, it
necessary for the U.3. to make the final decision as to the actual
erection of the power plant. The idea could be leaked simply as at iie
A survey group could wander arouad Berlin looking for a suitable
a rubble area could be fenced off and put under guard with znysterl-ias
signs; sad the project for the time being could be limited to toe rut -or
stage, which from the standpoint of the Berliners and the Soviet ob
is almost as good as actual getting on with the work.
Besides this big thing, there are a lot of smaller things that -,,!.an lrn
The Tripartite communique issued after we left Berlin stated that v,e
concern ourselves immediately with all the different ways in. which the
of the Berliners might be ameliorated.
This must not be allowed to drop into the limbo of endless meeting, of
the Western High Commissioners with no action emerging. 'the nu. so
called for is et least some symbolic evidence of activity on our par . I
this work, as you know, thi emotional and psychological impact of
small and relatively unimportant piece of action is as groat, and fr equt -.
greater, than a vague realisation that something tremendous beii 4
cooked up behind closed doors wield% might be unveiled moothi.- hone
Ambassador Conant who is very receptive, should be instruct ed tt get
going on the implementation of the Tripartite communique will resy dct
to Berlin as fast as possible, and he should be told not to allow aim ielk
or tha British and French iigb Consmissioners to get bogged down :IL
Interminable hassling over big projects while passing over all the s
ones that could be decided upon mind put into operation quickly.
The language of the communique states that the three Western High
Commissioners will study this problem and then make that: rzcountr,en
dation, to the Soviet High Commissioner for Quadripartite ops-ru.fel
Obviously we are not going to get Soviet approval on very much.
The Soviet veto should be used by us as a weapon, by making sure tat
the inh.abitants of Berlin know at all time what we want to do, and teu
let them be aware of the Soviet "levet' . For purposes of sustained *ripe,
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it would be better to dribble out these proposals one by one over tie
coming days and weeks rather thaa take a let of time until we have ene
great big beautiful package for the Soviets to turn down.
2. EAST GERMANY.
Through the use of leafleting and radio work over RIAS, mud a C %Lai
of the "W" campaign, the themes of German unification end free ecti
should be kept alive -- subtle hints that the amelioration ,xf their
condition. will come rilliC3 more from their own pressure than tro4 an
thing that can be done in the immediate future through diplow,stie *neer.
Valkspolitsi defection should be stimulated as muck as possible fin /95
2500 llopee defected in Berlin alone, and not just at an aftermath t th.
Jima riots. The figures for the month of June were hardif env- bigker
than for the other mouths.)
We should be ever alert for opportunities to use food, which houU be
stored in Germany in advance and not require an act at Cougre.is taco
a decision is mad* to go ahead.
Adequate infiltration and organ/Intim of factory cells should be user.
taken immediately as a major project, with the idea of spreading a er..
of flash strikes and demonstrations in separated areas over an exiles:del
\ '1(1, ,3 period of time -- the ogiAne techniqve that the Commies have from time
to tiane used in France ausd
rya), Salmetate of industrial and agricelteral ship/mesas out of the East Zane
destined for Russia ehauld be ()remised and undertaken os a major seals.
tor' j.
Clandestine terroristic pressure should he organised against tug
of the Soviet regime in riast Geriutatty, awl if an Ulbricht or two disla't
show up at the office some morning. few would weep.
.1212.000.1010.1ipaimmtWid jaiwisimmaliammummsmoimiammaimp.....ES &LAD PASSIY14 CE IN E UMW S V.1401:CES.
the treatment shouisi be stroller to the treatment under 42 abo, e,
a selective basis. depsuating woo the special vulnerability 04
a particular country. Possibly Csecheelevakia should be eingled I.
As tar as the satellitea are concerned, if our measures produce Sot 1
military occupation of these cousitries, that fact should not be view
sp,R,
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the alarxri that was trident ilk the summer of 1953. actiit
oviets would merely confirm the ruthless military irvertalio
that they put into words LI Berlin, and could be turned to our advasitagt
4. STEPPED UP ENC0fRAGEMENT OF DEFECTION BY SCVn7..
MILITARY AND SOYUT OFFICIALS.
Self-evident.
S. CRIMINAL INDICTMJNT RE CHINESE PEOPLE'S JIThLkC
-4/12 IgeMOWINICM Alt=1
Self-evident.
b. DETACHMENT TRY It.
This will have special treatment outside this mit.111107
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