SPECIAL STATUS REPORT ON PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000070005-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 13, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
September 1~, 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD ASSISTANTS
SUBJECT : Special Status Report `n Pakistan
In connection with the Status Report for the meeting
of the OCB on August 25, reference was made to a number of
recent developments in connection with Pakistan. Following
discussion, the Board requested that the working group
prepare Ila special progress report for the early attention
of the Board". There is attached a special status report
dated September 10. It is suggested that this report be
noted by the Board Assistants in behalf of the Board
members. In the meantime parts of the report will be
reported to the Board through the weekly status report*
Elmer B. Staats
Attachment:
Executive Officer
Special Status Report
on Pakistan, dated Sept. 10, 1954.
NSC review(s) completed.
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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25,, D, C.
September 10, 1954
SPECIAL STATUS REPORT ON PAKISTAN
Political Situation
In the past few months the Government of Pakistan under its
dominant clique of western-minded leaders has warded off a serious
threat to the countryts stability and integrity. Elections in
East Bengal (East Pakistan) last March ended Muslim League control
of the province's government which passed into the hands of a
"United Front" party heavily infiltrated with communists andj in
.spite of its overwhelming, victory at the polls, beset by incompetent
and divided leadership. Following serious disorders in tome of East
Bengal's industrial establishments and other signs of deterioration
in provincial government effectiveness.* the central government at
Karachi ousted the province's chief minister and cabinet on May 30,
placing all powers in the hands of a newly appointed governor. The
latter, General Iskander Mirsa, a key member of the ruling clique in
Karachi, has taken forthright action to assure the maintenance of
law and order and suppression of communist activity while he has
recognized that the basic problem is the need to bolster the provinc-a`s
sagging economy.
The other provinces and the central government remain under
control of the Muslim League? Party of the Prime Ministers although
the party is faction-ridden and lacks organization and adequate
leadership. Opposition parties are, however1 even more ineffectivea
We continue to believe that Mohammed Ali and the group supporting
him constitute the best hope for Pakistan's own progress and for ful-
fillment of its role in area defense;
Military Aid to Pakistan
In implementation of the formal military aid agreement signed
with Pakistan May 19, a MAAG mission arrived in Pakistan in early
Augusta The group has commended consultations with Pakistani military
and civilian officials preparatory to ready incorporation into existing
forces of initial flow end items. Formal approval hne.been given to
a figure of $29.5 million as the FY 1955 progrhm for P kibtan4.? These
funds provide the first step toward the force goal outlined by the
JCS S equipping four infantry and 1j armored divisionei We estimate
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that 0130 million will be required for equipment and training only
in order to complete Phase I of the Pakistan expansion plan (adequate
armament of the-Army at its present strength with modest additions to
Navy and Air Force strength),
Pakistani dissatisfaction with a number of aspects of the program
has emerged in discussion with U.S. officials:
1) It is evident'that a number of high Pakistani officials have
assumed from the outset that general economic assistance to help
Pakistan support an increased military machine was implicit in the
MDAP. While pointing out'that'the Heinz Mission would give considera-
tion:to means of strengthening the Pakistan economy to'carry heavier
military burdens, we have at the same time tried to make it clear
that we do not envisage a military machine any greater than can be
supported by a healthily expanding Pakistan ecconomy.
2) There has been disappointment of exaggerated Pakistani hopes
for 'the size of the program and expressions of irritation at our
inability to reveal long-range plans for their role in Middle East
defense.
'3) At the same time we have been surprised to learn that the
Pakistanis are saying they cannot absorb our equipment without raising
the existing level of their army forces,, a course which'they say'is
prevented by internal budget stringencies. -If special economic'assist-
ance in the form of commodities is sent to Pakistanr-it may be neces-
sary to use some rupee counterpart proceeds to supplement Pakistan-i-9
internal military budget, Alternatively we might consider assuming
the cost of some $8 million of still undelivered military equipment
which Pakistan has purchased in this country.
In general we believe'that the present deficiencies in Pakistanis
existing military establishment must be overcome before we can under-
take more ambitious programming. However, during this initial phase
it should be possible through continuing consultation to obtain a
clearer picture of the long-term military and economic requirements
needed to permit Pakistan to play a significant role in area defense.
Special Economic Assistance to Pakistan
The Heinz Mission has returned from Pakistan after'surveying that
country's essential economic needs and its own abilities to meet those
needs in the near future, The Mission's summary report gives a review
of Pakistanis present economic difficulties,. It state's that there are
visible signs of severe economic strains* These strains far exceed
those anticipated by the Pakistan Government when it decided to devote
its available financial resources to rapid economic development (with
limited outside assistance) and to maintaining a heavy defense budget.
Deteriorating foreign exchange availabilities have had their full impact
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on commercial imports for industries and consumers, resulting in
critical shortages of goods needed to maintain industrial production
and to avert disease, unrest, and collapse of morale among the people.
The mission believes that the continuance or worsening of the
aforementioned strains could be expected to weaken the entire fabric
of Pakistan's political and economic stability. Also, it would dis-
credit the present pro-American government and its policy of cordial
association with the United States in efforts to bolster regional
strength against communist imperialism and subversion.
Members of the Mission are now engaged in the work of finalizing
their report, which is expected to recommend that the United States
provide commodity import aid costing about $76 million in addition to
the existing aid program for Pakistan in fiscal year 1955 and future
substantial development programs. The recommended aid figure takes
account of possible Canadian commodity aid to Pakistan, current U.S.
flood relief in East Bengal, and possible IMF drawings. The incremental
U.S. aid would include, but not be limited to, U.S. surplus agricul-
tural commodities and items processed from surplus commodities: these
aggregate $18.8 million and $18.3 million, respectively. Other needed
commodities-.such as petroleum--total $39.l million. No funds were
specifically appropriated by the Congress for emergency economic assist
ance to Pakistan. An inter-agency study is now under way to determine
the manner in which any requirements for such assistance could be
financed.
U.S. Flood Relief for East Bengal
East Bengal, with more than half of Pakistan's population, has
been visited with its worst floods within living memory. ?-/aters in
East Bengal's rivers began to rise in late July 1954 as a result of
an early monsoon and very heavy rains in East Bengal, India, Sikkim
and Nepal. The East Bengalis are accustomed to "ordinary" floods at
about this time of year. This time the waters rose gradually but
steadily; nearly 10 days passed be.ore it was generally realized that
a major disaster was at hand, involving widespread destruction of the
major crops, jute and rice, loss of lives from drowning and threatened
disease, and destruction of homesteads. It is still impossible to make
accurate assessments of fatalities, because of the dearth of surface
transportation and communications, but there have been reports that
50,000 persons have been drowned.
The chief concern of the authorities and the people affected
has been the flood's aftermath' the present danger of major epidemics.
On learning of the imminence of disastor, the Department of State
and the Foreign Operations Administration cabled the Embassy at Karachi
on August 6 for urgent advice as to the nature of the problem and as
to whether U.S. Government emergency aid was needed. This cable crosses
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with a cable from Karachi, of the same date, containing recommendation
from the Heinz Mission, the Embassy and. the F04 Mission for anemergen~.y
flood relief program in the form of drugs and medicines,' and needed
commodities. such as cottonseed oil and cotton piece goods.
In due course Washington was advised as to specific requirementu
of medical cor
psmen medicines andlifli
, ree suppes and equipment.
'inter-agency `meetings in Washington among officials of State,
FOA, the Department of Defense, the Public Health Service, and other.
interested agencies, resulted in rapid coordinated action, The first
U.S. Air Force relief plane arrived at Dacca on August 16 bringing; me
cal supplies from the U.S. The Pakistanis who.trzessed its arrival
expressed admiration for the efficiency of the U.S. armed services
personnel, 'Much of the personnel involved had been mobilized for the
mercy flights on a few hours' notice.
Dr. Alexander Langsmir, Chief of the Epidemiology Service of the
U.S. Public Health Service, was selected as the top flood relief
coordinator, and arrived at Dacca on August 19. About 100 U.S. Army
medical corpsmen teamed up with members of the Pakistaq Army Medical
Corps to carry out mass inoculations in affected areas. By late August
these combined teams were averaging about !40.,O00 immunizations a day,
..On August 12) Governor Stassen authorized an emergency allotment
of 05,5 million to cover the necessary costs:of the program. Vaccines
and$medical..supplies .flown out to the afflicted area cost an estimated
$554 thousand. - Cotton piece goods, valued at an estimated $2 million
are being procured in India by an Emergency. Procurement : Staff of the
General Services Administration, Nine hundred tons of refined cotton..
seed oil for cooking purposes should arrive in East Bengal by ship
early next month, Three hundred tons of dried milk were borrowed From
UNICAf in India and sent to Pakistan, In addition. to U.S. supplies*'
U.S. "flying boxcar" planes have brought in_eupplies from Geneva sup-
plied by the International Red Cross, Canada, Switzerland and Luxeribour_g.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a lini3 sho ;i be di vr, a.. e< t
and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should init. l 3 ,heck -,ark i? =r =)
before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.
1?APR 55 610
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