REPORT ON ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY IN THE GUATEMALAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000030004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 2, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
August 2, 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
SUBJECT: Report on Actions Taken by the U. S. Information
Agency in the Guatemalan Situation.
The attached report dealing with USIA activities with respect
to the recent armed action in Guatemala is submitted to the Board
for its information at the request of the Acting Director of the
U.S. Information Agency.
It is believed that this report is pertinent in connection
with recent discussions by the Board of the desirability of having
a common approach to information activities in connection with the
Guatemalan revolt.
Elmer B. Staats
Executive Officer
Attachment:
Subject Report dated 7/27/54.
STATE review(s) co pleted SECRET
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UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
Washington
July 27, 19:4
REPORT ON ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
IN THE GUATEMALAN SITUATION
In concert with other departments and agencies and for the
purpose of supporting specified foreign policy objectives, the Agency
began last November-December 1953 to regroup its limited resources
in an effort to meet the growing crisis conditions in Guatemala and
neighboring countries. Unfortunately, the sharp cutback in Agency
funds and personnel during the summer and fall of 1953 had forced
reduction of the already small operations in the area, especially
in various smaller countries where the programs amounted to one-man
holding operations. Actions taken by the Agency to remedy these
deficiencies and to carry out an effective operation may be grouped
under three time-periods: the six months prior to the communist
arms shipment; the crisis period of May-June; and the current post--
crisis period.
I. Pre-Crisis Pero
A. Policy - Up to the 10th Inter-American Conference at Caracas
in March much Latin American opinion refused to concern itself with
the communist issue in Guatemala, either regarding the Arbenz regime
as a "home-grown" revolutionary movement dedicated to improving the
lot of the exploited Guatemalans, or preferring to dwell on the United
Fruit issue and speculate as to United States motives of economic
imperialism.
In this context our principal information effort was directed
toward creating greater awareness throughout the Hemisphere of the
real threat to peace and security posed by the verifiable communist,
penetration of the Guatemalan government. In accordance with estab-
lished policy at that time, this effort stopped short of accusations,
directly attributed to the Agency, against the Arbenz regime as
communist-dominated but did include the preparation and placement of
unattributed articles labelling certain Guatemalan officials as
communists, and also labelling certain actions of the Guatemalan
government as communist-inspired.
Even though Guatemala alone voted against the anti-communist
resolution at Caracas, public attention in Latin America did not
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begin to focus on the issue of communist penetration and resultant
threat to peace and security. With this in mind, the Agency inten-
sified its efforts to get irrefutable evidence publicized throughout
the Hemisphere, again short of directly labelling the Arbenz regime
as communist but using its actions as self-evident proof.
B. Operations - In November and December, 1953, the information
program in Guatemala was reviewed with Ambassador Peurifoy, the
Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. A new Public
Affairs Officer was appointed and provisions were made for such internal
strengthening of personnel and. funds as events might require. In
order to give direct support to the Guatemalan program, long seriously
handicapped in operations through Guatemalan government restrictions,
and to help meet the problem of communist penetration in the Central
American area, a regional servicing operation was developed whereby
USIS Mexico could give program support to Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. This servicing concen-
trates on anti-communist materials produced by USIS Mexico in direct
collaboration with the other posts and tailored to meet specific needs
in individual countries. A third phase of organizational build-up
was a considerably expanded 1955 budget projection, parts of which
were to be initiated with 1954 funds, especially the strengthening
of the one-man holding operations in the smaller countries.
Eleswhere in the Caribbean, and related to the Central American
plan, a new office was established in Port-of-Spain for the Trinidad-
British Guiana-Barbados area. The existing small operation for the
French West Indies, based in Martinique, was re-examined and provision
made for selected expansion.
Media and field operations were directed to intensify their efforts
in the collection, preparation, and placement of materials demonstrating
communist design on, and penetration of, the Hemisphere. A successful
project in January, for example, was the preparation here of a series
of articles exposing Guatemalan communists Fortuny and Gutierrez;
these were planted in a Chilean newspaper and later reprinted in selecte,
other countries with Chilean attribution.
Throughout this period and on through the crisis itself emphasis
was placed on cross-reporting Latin American opinion which opposed
the Arbenz regime and supported the U.S. stand as taken at Caracas.
The Agency's speical coverage team at the Caracas Conference
fed out a continuous flow of news, backgrounders, photos, and tape
recordings, concentrating on the anti-communist resolution and
Guatemala's lone opposition. Through direct Wireless File to all
missions and fast pouch these materials were disseminated by all
field offices throughout the conference with good placement, backed
up by frequent background briefings and conversations with editors,
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commentators, and public opinion leaders. Film coverage was arranged
for newsreel and TV outlets and, for future continuing use, full film
documentation was developed on the anti-communist resolution, including
speeches by Secretary Dulles and Assistant Secretary Holland.
II. Crisis Period
A. Policy - The communist arms shipment to Guatemala in mid-May
marked a definite turning point: first, among the small neighboring
countries fearing intervention or aggression; second, elsewhere in the
Hemisphere a mixture of surprise, concern and even alarm at this
unexpected development; third, elsewhere in the world as the issue
became headline news and the communist propaganda network openly took
up Guatemala's cause. Especially significant was the attention given
to the problem in Moscow radio broadcasts which from the beginning
had been high and became a continuous clamor, so that by June 23 one
PRAVDA article was broadcast thirty separate times.
As part of the basic U.S. decision to see the issue through to
an emergency OAS meeting of consultation, the Agency immediately embarked
upon an aggressive information effort, utilizing all available resources,
to expose and discredit the Arbenz regime as communist-dominated, to
dramatize the threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, and
to encourage positive action by other American Republics. This effort
included use of direct attribution but continued to emphasize cross-
reporting of desirable Latin American opinion. Strong advantage was
taken of key developments which helped swing Latin American opinion
to our side, such as the Soviet arms delivery and the Guatemalan--Sovie-
maneuver in the U.N.
Output was directed not only to the hemisphere but also to other
parts of the world where, because of public unfamiliarity with the
Latin American scene, communist propaganda found ready acceptance.
Content was aimed at such attitudes as: skepticism or outright dis-
belief regarding the U.S. position, ranging to public acceptance of
allegations that the U.S. engineered the revolution and that U.S.
officials had strong financial interests in the United Fruit Company;
public rejection of the premise that international communism had in
fact subverted the Guatemalan government; reaction in principle to
the U.S. stand on searching vessels in American waters and to the
U.S. opposition to U.N. Security Council consideration of the
Guatemalan request.
Information treatment was complicated by censorship within Guate-
mala which, for a period, gave the communist side a distinct advantage
in getting out its story first; also by the marked tendency of eertaiforeign news agencies to cross-report reactions adverse to the V.S.
and to select comment out of context.
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B. Operations - Benefitting from the previous organizational
build-up, an emergency working party under the leadership of the
Assistant Director for American Republics was established in the
Agency, with special liaison officer assigned to Assistant Secretary
Holland in the Department of State. Specialists were reassigned
within the Agency to the Policy and Programs Staff for Latin America,
the intelligence-research staff, and the press, radio, and films media.
A series of directives was issued formulating the various tasks to be
undertaken by media and field operations.
Despite the lack of lead time in the policy decision to change
from a largely unattributed effort to an aggressive labelling campaign,
more than 200 articles, backgrounders, and scripts were prepared and
transmitted by Wireless File, cable, and fast pouch during four weeks
beginning the end of May for press and radio placement abroad. These
were developed partly from public sources and partly from declassified
intelligence from State and CIA. Content ranged from coverage of daily
developments in Guatemala, Washington, the UN, and.elsewhere in the area.
to original verified exposes of communist penetration. Illustrative of
numerous pamphlets prepared, a "chronology of Communism in Guatemala",
written here and printed in Habana in 100,000 copies, was distributed
to all posts. in Latin America. In addition some 27,000 pieces of
anti-communist cartoons and posters were expedited to the field for
selective placement. Based on Agency materials WRUL broadcasts were
stepped up throughout the crisis period. Newsreel coverage of Guate-
mala's action in the U.N. and the emergency OAS meeting were released
worldwide. Three special film subjects, including the film "Caracas:
Resolution and Reality," were sent to all posts in the area.
Not only posts in this area but selected posts around the world
regularly filed back useful stories for cross-reporting togehter with
analyses of local opinion trends. When it became clear from these
reports and other sources that censorship inside Guatemala was pre-
venting foreign correspondents from reporting the story, while at the
same time Guatemalan and allied sources were pushing their own version
of the revolt, the Agency detailed an experienced press officer to
Tegucigalpa in Operation Berry. This consisted of assembling daily,
from intelligence sources, a succinct account of events within
Guatemala and forwarding by cable to Embassy Tegucigalpa. The press
liaison officer informally passed this information along to selected
correspondents. Coverage immediately began to improve, helping also
to offset cross-reporting by foreign news agencies of anti-U.S. comment
Field reports now coming in show effective use of materials
produced here and by the field posts themselves. Wireless File
materials were well received by both metropolitan and provincial
papers as timely and effective and were widely printed, frequently
without attribution to USIS. This was also true of the anti-communist
cartoon prints and plastic plates. Through well-organized mailing
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lists the various pamphlets and posters were put into the hands of
selected individuals and groups. Local radio outlets likewise were
successfully brought into play. For example, the important CMQ net-
work in Cuba early in June agreed to use all hard-hitting commentaries
on Guatemala at peak listening hours, without USIS attribution. Selectee:
films were redirected to key groups throughout the area, including films
exposing communist activities in other countries clearly paralleling
the Guatemalan situation.
III. Post-Crisis Period
At the present time, the information treatment of the Guatemalan
problem has entered the phase of disseminating the documentation only
now becoming available from within Guatemala, which confirms the com-
munist nature of the Arbenz Government and demonstrates the truth of
the representations previously made by the United States. In this task.
the Castillo Armas Government can be expected to help by exposing the
atrocities and the tactics of the previous administration. Since this
is the first time a communist government has been overthrown, a full
case history of "rise and fall" is available, pointedly useful on a
sustained basis in arousing Latin America to the methods and dangers
of communist penetration. This line is also being carried worldwide
to offset the large measure of skepticism which characterizes public
reaction to the Guatemalan situation.
As part of the basic job of getting verified facts on communist
penetration in Guatemala, the Agency detailed two camermen to Guatemals
as soon as it was possible to enter the country. A considerable quantity
of sound film documenting communist atrocities is already on hand.
Together with other film materials this footage will be developed into
two permanent film records on communism in Guatemala, one short subject:
for immediate theatrical release worldwide and one longer subject for
continuing use. A similar effort is being made with regard to still
photos and recorded interviews. These and other efforts are in adtitic;r.
to publicizing official statements or reports as they become available
for public use.
The Agency will continue to give high priority to Guatemala during
what undoubtedly will be a long period of rehabilitation. A long range
effort of re-orientation seems indicated, at government levels and
particularly in the interior areas where land has been distributed and
doubts about the future persist. The Agency desires to play its part
in a coordinated multi-Agency effort and has informally exchanged views
with the Department of State on the type and size of resources that
might be employed.
In addition to efforts within Guatemala, there is urgent need for
a marked step-up in the information program for the hemisphere, for the
two-fold purpose of aggressively exposing communist penetration ant
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bolstering democratic forces. As in efforts directed toward Guatemala,
this should be part of a multi-Agency plan of action, bringing to bear
on the hemisphere greater attention and larger resources than the
U.S. government has given it in the years since the war.
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