[POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION, EPSILON 72 SIMULATION DOCUMENTATION]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002400130002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 148
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 3, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

S E C R EI 4*0fo0 Ns02N615 1: CIA-RD l'Y3 0 bO -
POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION
EPSILON" 72
SIMULATION DOCUMENTATION
STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND GAMING AGENCY
ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
OSD REVIEW COMPLETED
JCS and DOS review(s) completed.
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3 COPY-OF-225 COPIES
DECLASSIFA(pfplMvPrl For Release 900d/10/91
N DISSEM
crucni n r nc cyrri ITI\/G nQniI 11l,S7 1 181
CLASSIFIED BY CHIEF, SAGA
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
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THE TITLE -- EPSILON 72 -- IS UNCLASSIFIED.
ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SIMULATION ARE APPROPRIATELY
CLASSIFIED AND ARE NOT FOR FOREIGN DISSEMINATION. THE
CLASSIFICATION USED IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT SECURITY
INFORMATION AND TO ENSURE THAT THE FACT THE SIMULATION
WAS PLAYED DOES NOT BECOME A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF EMBAR-
RASSMENT TO THE UNITED STATES OR ANY GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.
POLICY OF STRICT NON-ATTRIBUTION.
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POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION
30 October - 3 November 1972
SIMULATION DOCUMENTATION
Prepared By
STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND GAMING AGENCY
ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington, D. C. 20301
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Simulation Documentation is the second of three volumes
documenting EPSILON 72, a senior-level interagency, politico-
military simulation, which examined United States/NATO secu-
rity policies in the mid-1970s. EPSILON 72 was conducted in
the Convention Hall, Sheridan Barracks, Garmisch, Germany
from 30 October - 3 November 1972. This volume contains the
initial scenario, team move messages, scenario projections
of the Control Group, and an edited transcript of the Cri-
tique proceedings.
Participants were divided into two teams -- BLUE and
GREEN -- and a Control Group. The two teams represented the
National Command Authority of the United States; the Control
Group represented other nations, international organizations,
and other influencing factors. In the course of three meet-
ings-(moves), the teams considered an initial scenario and
two scenario projections. Following each team meeting, the
Control Group interfaced the decisions reached by the teams
and prepared scenario projections portraying a new, but re-
lated, crisis situation. Following the three moves, a Cri-
tique was held. Team motivations and actions were discussed
and general observations and conclusions, were summarized.
The material contained in this document does not neces-
sarily represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency; or any other Gov-
ernment agency.
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Title Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Initial Scenario, Part I, Control to Both
Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al-A17
Initial Scenario, Part II, Control to Both
Teams . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bl-Bll
Move I Message, BLUE Team to Control . . . . . C1-C9
Move I Message, Green Team to Control . . . . . Dl-D1l
MOVE II
First Scenario Projection, Control to Both
Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . El-E9
Move II Message, BLUE Team to Control . . . . . Fl-F8
Move II Message, GREEN Team to Control . . . . Gl-G12
MOVE III
Second Scenario Projection, Control to BLUE
Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hl-H7
Move III Message, BLUE Team to Control . . . . I1-I6
Second Scenario Projection, Control to GREEN
Team . . . . . . . . . Jl-J7
Move III Message, GREEN Team to Control . . . . Kl-K6
Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ll-L29
Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ml-M5
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FROM CONTROL
MESSAGE NO.
101
TO BLUE
MOVE NO.
I
GREEN
DATE
31 DEC 75
The situation described in this scenario is hypotheti-
cal and is intended to provoke thought and to stimulate
discussion. It does not necessarily represent the views
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Studies, Analysis, and
Gaming Agency; or any other government agency.
All scenario times are Washington time.
Al SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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INITIAL SCENARIO - PART I
THE WORLD OF 1976
The dawn of 1976 broke on a hopeful world. With few
exceptions, international peace had reigned since the end
of United States involvement in Vietnam in early 1973.
Israel and Egypt had nearly clashed in mid-1973 and though
the world had held its breath, the crisis ended with a
compromise solution to the Sinai dispute. Southeast Asia
simmered, but remained docile under the watchful eyes of
the major powers. The multipolar world which emerged in
the early seventies -- the United States, the Soviet Em-
pire,. the European Community, China and Japan, and the
Third World -- apparently had committed itself to military
detente and was engaged in peaceful, but fiercely competi-
tive, political and economic rivalry to achieve its goals.
Not since the Congress of Vienna had the world enjoyed
such outward appearances of peace and accommodation.
In this atmosphere, some statesmen alluded to the grow-
ing,obsolescence of post-World War II military structures.
The weights of balance had changed, they claimed, and so
must attitudes which unquestioningly supported the perpetu-
ation of costly security alliances. Facades remained,
however, and only'a few keen observers could discern that
the alliance system of World War II was moribund.
In many nations economic pacts took precedence over mil-
itary treaties; and, energies once devoted to security were
being redirected to commercial competition. The European
Economic Community (EEC), numbering 11 regular members and
10 associate states, dominated the trade and monetary
transactions of the continent. It not only kept pace with
the ambitious goals set for it in the early seventies but
also functioned as the,-stimulus for a growing network of
institutions politically European in character. The impe-
tus of the Community added fuel to the drives for economic
survival in most other nations of the world. By 1976, this
competition produced a vastly complicated, intertwining
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skein of bilateral, multinational and regional enterprises
which transcended governments and ideologies.
In the midst of this "new era," few observed the omi-
nous crests lowering on the horizon.
THE INTERVENING YEARS, 1972-1976
The United States.
In his 1973 State of the Union address, President Nixon
set the direction for his second term in office by propos-
ing wide ranging, long-term measures to deal with the chronic
issues of welfare reform, environmental protection, unem-
ployment, and law and order. He cautioned Americans that
these programs would require money, alluding to likely tax
increases, and demanded belt tightening within the govern-
ment itself.
The President's speech was praised by Congress and the
nation; however, as the year progressed, it became obvious
that his declarations meant many things to many people.
Congress shared the President's basic concepts but acted
on its own bills, carefully tailored to suit an electorate
it would soon face. Opposing any tax increase and respond-
ing to the rising popular clamor for military reductions,
lawmakers reduced the 1974 Defense Budget to $74 billion
and cut foreign aid by 4 percent.
The Chief Executive berated such actions, but it was
clear that the nation, preoccupied with burgeoning domes-
tic crises, supported its legislators. Heedless of the
growing fiscal deficit, a restless public applauded Con-
gress and demanded even more action to cure unemployment
and to arrest inflation which had grown to an annual rate
of 6 percent by the end of 1973.
The New York Times, on January 27, 1974, chastized the
protectionist trade and tariff attitudes growing in Con-
gress and lamented, but understood, the antagonistic
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reactions of Europe and the EEC to this creeping retalia-
tion. It pleaded for a more reasoned and cooperative ap-
proach to international monetary reform and observed that
"political irresponsibility could soon climax in a reces-
sional of despair for the United States -- and the world."
This gloomy prediction was underscored as third quarter
national and business indicators showed unemployment rising
to 6.8 percent and the wholesale price index up by 3 per-
cent. Publicly, government economists blamed the "Indian
Summer slump"; but privately, they admitted an interna-
tional recession was in the making.
In contrast to the disappointments experienced on the
domestic scene, the Administration moved quickly, in 1973,
to maintain its carefully cultivated momentum in the field
of foreign affairs. In short order it was announced that
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would be welcomed by
the United States into the United Nations and that recog-
nition would soon be extended to Pankow. In late fall,
1973, diplomatic relations were established with the
People's Republic of China (PRC), accompanied by a con-
current extension of US/USSR bilateral trade agreements,
technological exchanges and the granting of most favored
nation status.
Such fast-paced international play allayed some un-
spoken world anxieties that the United States was becoming
increasingly isolationist. But an undercurrent persisted.
With Vietnam largely a bitter memory, congressional and do-
mestic pressures forced the Administration to reduce the
armed forces to 2,150,000 men. Even though US commitments
in Europe were unaffected, most European statesmen nodded
their heads knowingly. Only French Minister of Defense,
Debre, openly voiced latent European sentiments by noting,
"It is inevitable that the United States will soon leave
Europe, and Europeans must assume responsibility for them-
selves. For these reasons, we must act in a concert of
peaceful coexistence as Europeans and accommodate both
East and West to the extent that it is in the interests
of an united Europe."
Sensing a growing challenge to the credibility of its
commitments, Washington sought to assuage Allied fears by
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reaffirming US determination to adhere to its security ob-
ligations while expanding the role of its European partners
in NATO's decisionmaking processes. Included in a series
of dramatic announcements, was a public admission by US
military spokesmen that the United States is committed to
consult with NATO partners prior to selective release and/
or employment of nuclear weapons in Europe during wartime --
time and circumstances permitting. As a further conces-
sion, the United States reaffirmed that as the structure
of Europe changed so would that of NATO. Despite these
declarations, Europeans remained doubtful. Their doubts
culminated two months later when, at the December Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Minis-
terials, Moscow announced -- "in the interests of world
peace" -- the immediate unilateral withdrawal of three So-
viet divisions from East Germany and called upon the United
States to likewise reduce its European forces as a "demon-
stration of good faith and sincerity."
By February, 1974, the Administration, under duress of
a euphoric Congress and in the context of a thinly veiled
measure to stimulate torpid Mutual and Balanced Force Re-
ductions (MBFR) negotiations, announced the initial with-
drawal of 60,000 troops from Europe. Government spokesmen
privately admitted to their European counterparts that ad-
ditional cuts might not be far distant if the pressures of
an increasingly introspective public continued. By the
end of 1975, as predicted, American forces in Europe had
been reduced to 150,000 men. In efforts to offset the im-
pact of these moves, Washington emphasized improvements
for the remaining forces, expanded REFORGER/CRESTED CAP
units, and insisted that the relative strategic parity
achieved by SALT I would not be depreciated in the on-
going SALT II talks.
The Soviet Empire.
The Soviet Union was not immune to the forces of change.
Under General Secretary Brezhnev, Moscow altered its modus
operandi, and, by early 1973, was in the forefront of the
drive toward detente, peaceful coexistence, and economic
competition.
The Soviet "Charter for Peace in Europe," presented at
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the 1973 CSCE Ministerials, acknowledged the current trend
in world affairs and anticipated that problems, hitherto
unresolved, could be settled in a framework of negotia-
tions. "Since a lasting, peace in Europe demands that all
nations adhere to certain basic principles," the Soviet
representative declared, "the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics takes the first step. It renounces the threat
or use of force in Europe; espouses non-intervention in
the internal affairs of others; and, acknowledges the
right of national self-determination. As proof of its sin-
cerity, the Soviet Union will, immediately, withdraw three
Army divisions from the German Democratic Republic (GDR),
with the hope that others will follow her example." He
concluded, amid cheers, by calling for permanent machinery
in the CSCE to work out the preliminaries for an accord in
which all Europe would be guaranteed lasting security.
Throughout 1973, the Soviet Union acted as a benign --
even cooperative -- power, and openly advocated expanded
relations between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CEMA). At the same time, the United
States and the USSR contracted extensive bilateral economic
commitments, met in MBFR sessions -- but agreed on little
except minor confidence building measures --, and pursued
SALT II negotiations. At the close of the year, world
hopes for peace mounted as Moscow announced new initia-
tives to lessen tensions with the PRC. In restrained, but
positive language, Peking agreed. to seek all possible ways
to "reconcile past. misunderstandings." Early 1974 was set
for initial consultations.
Whatever the carefully controlled appearances indicated,
all was not well within the Soviet Empire. By 1974, the
two-edged sword of detente had caused serious wounds within
the Pact. Not unaffected by Western Europe's elation,
Eastern Europe cautiously tested the current. Motivated
by "consumerism," bilateral economic arrangements with the
West and with the Third World grew while discreet forays
were made into independent foreign affairs. National
identities began to resurface and following the publica-
tion of the Soviet "Charter for Peace," Pact nations were
partially persuaded that the Soviet Union would tolerate
further expansion.
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The first test of Moscow's sincerity came in early 1974,
when long-subdued nationalist groups called for a reduction
of Soviet troops stationed in Poland. Underground news-
papers reasoned that "if troops could be removed from the
GDR, they could also be withdrawn from Poland." Demonstra-
tions resulting from this movement were widespread but,
initially, not serious. The "new age" of Polish freedom,
however, seemed doomed from the beginning as press censor-
ship and the activities of the Military Internal Service
(WSW) increased following a Kremlin visit by First Secre-
tary Edward Gierek, in February. Anti-Soviet and govern-
ment activity went underground once again.
Despite international concern over the "Polish problem",
the USSR continued to impress the world with its "new
image." On April 16th, Borba reported that President Tito
had died of a cerebral hemorr age, and announced that Marko
Nikezic had assumed the reins of government. Almost im-
mediately, as expected, Yugoslavia was thrown into bloody
factional struggles. The Soviets watched anxiously -- but
did not interfere. By mid-May, order had been restored and
a pro-West, nationalist-minority, coalition government was
firmly entrenched with Nikezic at its head.
The significance of the Polish and Yugoslav incidents
was not lost on the Pact countries or Moscow. The atti-
tude of the Soviet Union encouraged both East and West
that the Brezhnev Doctrine had been discarded from the
Soviet repertoire. But, within the Kremlin, there were
individuals who recognized the dangers of tolerance.
As the world economic situation worsened in 1974, the
Soviet Empire became restive. By fall, discontent had
again surfaced in Poland. Workers demanded higher wages,
more foodstuffs, and an end to the increased quotas ex-
acted on industries by CEMA regulations. Unobtrusive as-
sistance by Soviet military police units was required in
quelling the most serious violence in. Poznan. Other East-
ern European nations were not spared similar disturbances.
The GDR, hurt seriously by the poor economic situation,
was kept busy quieting the increasing demands of its in-
flation-plagued workers and the ever louder harangues of
underground reunification organizations.
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In November 1974, the world indirectly learned of the
Kremlin's changing attitudes as Premier Kosygin announced
his retirement. He was replaced by Kirill Mazurov -- a
long-time critic of Brezhnev policies. Shortly thereafter,
Communist Parties throughout the world were informed that
the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Union of
Soviet Republics (CPSU), originally scheduled for 1976,
would be held in October 1975.
As though by design, when the 25th CPSU convened, Polish
disaffection erupted in a wave of anti-Soviet rioting and
terrorism. In a cable of 24 October 1975, the US Ambassa-
dor reported that dissident actions were reaching critical
proportions, particularly in the northern urban areas, and
that the Polish Government was markedly concerned over re-
cent terrorist bombings of Soviet military installations.
Describing the situation as serious, the ambassador com-
mented that it posed a grave challenge to Moscow's leader-
ship and control of the Pact countries. In his opinion,
the Soviets would react positively in order to preserve
their empire. Just six days later, the Eveninn Star head-
lined, "Brezhnev resigns, Polyansky Secretary."
Despite its "new look," much of the world regarded the
Soviet Empire with uneasy suspicion. Although Moscow had
adhered to her SALT I agreements, was negotiating offensive
weapons limitations in SALT II, and had removed troops from
East Germany, Soviet conventional superiority in Europe
had not measurably declined nor had Russia's relative par-
ity in strategic nuclear weapons been altered. In fact,
lessening of Sino-Soviet tensions had resulted in a re-
deployment of Soviet divisions to positions within easy
reinforcement distance of Central Europe.
The Red fleet continued to expand to the point that
the 1975 Janes' identified it as "the most powerful and
flexible navy in the world." One nuclear-powered air-
craft carrier was to be launched in 1976 and was planned
to be operational by mid-1977. Bunkering and repair fa-
cilities were established worldwide and US strategists de-
cried the maritime facility permitted by the Icelandic
Government in Dyra Fjord, following the "Cod Wars" of
1972 and 1973.
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Soviet defense spending rose to an annual rate of 9
percent of the GNP. Spending for strategic and general
purpose forces remained at 1972 levels. Research, Develop-
ment, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds increased signif-
icantly each year, and rumors persisted that the Soviets
had surreptitiously developed radically new weapons systems
of frightening potential -- to include "clean" tactical
nuclear weapons, nuclear shells, and an operational Multi-
ple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) system.
The European Community.
Convinced that detente was an increasing reality in the
first years of the decade, whereas war was a declining prob-
ability, Western Europe devoted itself to economic enhance-
ment and European integration. Accepting the divisions of
World War II, Europeans sought a "new Europa."
By late 1972, it did not take a gifted political observ-
er to sense that Western Europeans "expected" reductions
of US forces in Europe. Searching for a rationale, Le
Monde observed editorially in 1973 that:
Politically, the US presence was divisive; as it
decreased, Soviet attitudes became more amenable. Eco-
nomically, the United States needed European trade no
less and with US troops reduced, European governments
paid less to assist in offsetting the balance of pay-
ments. Militarily, if the United States could not de-
fend Europe conventionally, it would do so with tacti-
cal nuclear weapons; in that case, Europe, not America,
would be destroyed. But if US troops were reduced to
a "hostage-level," war in Europe would, of necessity,
escalate to the strategic level; thus, better the two
of them than us.
The first fruits of this new outlook appeared in an ex-
panding EEC. The Community's growth had not been without
problems, but it had been steady. Individual products
still created intra-community antagonism; the common com-
mercial policy for trade with the Pact nations -- signed
in 1975 -- was ineffective in halting bilateral arrange-
ments; and, monetary problems still existed. Generally,
however, the EEC welded Free Europe together.
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The evolving configuration of an economically oriented
Europe presented particular problems to the United States
and to the USSR. The United States found itself being cut
off from competitive trading with Europe. Protectionist
countermeasures implicit in such incidents as the "sugar and
cheese" war of 1972 and recalcitrance in the stormy General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) sessions of 1973,
served only to congeal European defensiveness, reduce US
influence in Europe, and drive the United States into com-
petition for other mutual markets. Soviet Russia, by the
same token, once it had swallowed the EEC pill, found. it
disruptive to CEMA arrangements and a catalyst for nation-
alist, separatist, and realignment tendencies within the
Bloc.
With the entry of Ireland, Denmark, and the UK into the
EEC in 1973, a complex, historically predictable order was
established in Europe. Joseph Kraft, in his Washington
Post column of April 26, described it as "a galactic peck-
ing order, with the FRG, France and the UK at its center,
the EEC in the first planetary belt and the rest of Europe
and the Atlantic Alliance revolving elsewhere in the gravi-
tational field." "The trouble," he commented, "as with all
developing galaxies, is that, eventually, only one sun must
provide order to the constellation."
The truth of Mr. Kraft's observation was soon borne out.
President Pompidou, sensing an historic opportunity for
French leadership, sought European hegemony by taking up
the US challenge to seek new meanings for NATO. The first
move, following bilateral approaches, was at a Deputy
Foreign Ministers' meeting in early 1974 where France pro-
posed a reorganization of NATO. Coordination of national
forces, nuclear and conventional, rather than integration,
was advocated. A two-headed SHAPE was proposed; that is,
a European Defense Force Commander and a counterpart.US
Commander. Though national forces were to be loosely in-
tegrated under these commanders, they remained under the
ultimate direction of their individual nations. France
further urged that a French/UK and US nuclear force be es-
tablished on the same principle, with the FRG to be in-
cluded in the FR/UK force in an advisory capacity. As the
French explained, "Thus the realities of the European situ-
ation would be harmonized without destruction. of history's
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greatest alliance." The French proposal was formally sub-
mitted for consideration in the spring of 1975 -- without
prior coordination with the United States -- at the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministerial.
Throughout 1975, France continued her "special rela-
tions" with the Soviet Union. Acting as the "main link"
between the USSR and Europe, particularly in the CSCE,
Pompidou sought to realize De Gaulle's vision for France.
Relations with the United States were cool, but calcu-
lated not to wholly alienate the United States from France
-- or Europe -- in spite of increasing politico-economic
differences.
The FRG position in the new Europe was unique. Its spe-
cial relationship with the United States, through NATO, had
been severely weakened in 1973 by US diplomatic and economic
ventures. Reluctantly, Germany'recognized this; however,
her position remained uncomfortable.
In order to extricate herself from the dilemma, caused
by US withdrawals, and preserve some vestige of the US/FRG
special relationship, Germany supported the US rationale
that strategic and tactical deterrence was important --
not numbers. At the same time, in the context of a commit-
ment to the European community, Germany indicated her inde-
pendence from the United States. The Bundeswehr was re-
structured -- at 1972 levels -- with emphasis on equipment
modernization, anti-tank defenses, military terrain improve-
ments, air defense and mobilization. In mid-1975, a new
concept of "point resistance" -- defense of vital areas as
opposed to extended border defense -- was instituted and
the Bundeswehr redeployed primarily to areas surrounding
major cities. The defense budget, adjusted for inflation,
remained at its 1972 GNP percentage level.
Politically, the FRG accommodated with the East, but
German strategy attempted to effect a neutral buffer in
Central Europe. By recognizing Hungary and Czechoslovakia
in 1974, and admitting the existence of the GDR (following
the admittance of both states to the United Nations in
1973), Germany was vigorously building a strong link with
the east. Although particular emphasis was focused on co-
operation with East Germany, which responded with popular
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enthusiasm, the Honecker regime remained wary of the grow-
ing closeness of the two nations.
Britain, although formally committed to Europe, found
it difficult to abandon its traditional ties with the
United States. Characteristically, the Economist observed
in June 1974, "Britannia remains at anchor, sails furled,
sawing to-and-fro on the tides of the Atlantic." The ap-
praisal was accurate as, for the most part, Britain's ven-
ture in Europe was an economic affair.
Militarily, the UK did keep its hand in both Europe and
NATO by maintaining its defense budget at 4 percent of the
GNP. Though numbers fluctuated, at the end of 1975, Brit-
ish troop commitments in Europe were one and a half divi-
sions. Britain also agreed to consider the French initia-
tive for a French/UK/FRG nuclear force, but awaited a US
nod before making a bona fide commitment.
In foreign affairs, London cautiously hoped that the
FRG would eventually emerge as the dominant European power,
but was careful not to alienate French favor. Preferring
to let others deal with the USSR, London concentrated on
intra-European affairs, acting, in particular, as Europe's
ear to the United,States.
Predictably, the actions of the minor powers of free
and neutral Europe were governed by those of France and
Germany. In general, the Southern Flank aligned itself
with France in community matters and foreign affairs,
while the Northern Tier, and smaller central states, cast
their lots with the FRG. Largely, however, economics and
domestic problems engaged their attentions. Since most
were swayed by detente to reduce their defense budgets,
none of the NATO countries had met their 1970 European
Defense Improvement Plan (EDIP) targets by the end of
1975.
As for the Northern Tier -- Norway, Denmark, Sweden,
Finland, and Iceland -- careful political observers noted
indications for possible future alarm. A National Intel-
ligence Estimate, entitled, "Nordic Survey 1974," summa-
rized the causes:
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The politico-military importance of the Nordic
countries and the northern sea lanes to US security
policy has long been undisputed. Although Scandinavi-
ans have strong Western leanings, they have generally
shown tendencies to "Nordic isolationism" since Norway
opted against EEC entry in 1972. This is best exem-
plified by growing interest in reviving the NORDEK
Union. Unsatisfactory EFTA arrangements have added
strength to this movement. Norway, Denmark, and Ice-
land still support NATO, but Norway and Denmark have
failed to meet EDIP schedules, and have chronically
complained that NATO has neglected their defenses.
Iceland, though formally adhering to NATO, has had
continuing differences with its members over fishing
rights and with the United States over basing rights
-- which they have periodically threatened to cancel.
Iceland has demonstrated increasing trends toward
neutralism and has made known its willingness to "co-
operate,. impartially, with all peaceful nations."
Sweden and Finland have, pragmatically, kept their
Western orientation in low profile.
Soviet pressures are not new to the Nordic coun-
tries. Indications since mid-year are that a partic-
ularly subtle campaign of intimidation has been re-
instituted. The Icelandic Government, in return for
economic assistance and credits, has acceded to a So-
viet request for ship bunkering facilities on its
west coast. Finland, which has had to look increas-
ingly to the USSR for economic and technical assist-
ance (failing to achieve fully effective European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) solutions), has been
forced into closer and more binding ties with CEMA
and the Kremlin. The Soviet Union has requested,
and been granted, military overflight rights by the
Finnish Government. The Norwegian Government has
privately complained to the United States that the
Soviet Union has expressed concern over intelligence
activities in the North Cape area. In addition, the
Soviet Union has made claims to Barents Sea oil ex-
ploration rights and to perennially disputed claims
in the Svalbards.
A13 SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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China and Japan dominated the Far East during 1972-
1976. The new power center, created by President Nixon's
"shocks and summitry of '72," burgeoned rapidly. Japan pos-
sessed economic power and military potential, while China
garnered military power and economic potential. Necessity,
therefore, compelled a modus vivendi which dictated mutual
cooperation for the developmenttoo` Asia.
By the end of 1975, Japan was the number two economic
power of the world with an adjusted defense budget two
and a half times the 1972 level. China, on the other hand,
preferred to concentrate on domestic and economic develop-
ment and, for the most part, qualitative defense spending.
Within Asia, there was rapid adjustment to the new order.
Following Japan's abrogation of the Taiwan Treaty, General-
issimo Chiang Kai-Shek resigned and turned the government
over to his soft, Chiang Ching Kuo,. Tradition was assuaged
by suitable recriminations and Taiwan quietly eased into
the stream of economic competition and international cooper-
ation. By the end of 1973, Japan had signed a peace treaty
with the USSR.
The two Koreas had agreed to cooperative arrangements
leading to eventual confederation; in fact, both were ad-
mitted to the UN in 1974. China, Japan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and both Koreas entered into
an "Asian economic development association" in 1975. Aus-
tralia, Taiwan, Burma, and the Republic of Vietnam were
expected to enter by the end of 1976.
Asian foreign affairs were largely those of Chinese
and Japanese making and predominantly of an economic na-
ture. Japan cultivated markets throughout the world with
particular attention directed to the United States and the
USSR. The former was to ensure that Japan remained a
member-in-good standing of the US security commitments;
the latter was insurance against the Chinese. While con-
sultations conducted throughout 1974 and 1975 did not re-
sult in dramatic changes between the two giants, the re-
sultant atmosphere brought about a relaxation of tensions
throughout the Far East.
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The Third World.
Egypt and Israel continued their dispute, occasionally
coming to the brink of armed hostility. Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, Yemen, Oman, and South Africa experienced in-
ternal wars or rebellions. In each case, the major powers
isolated or ignored the crises, leaving the individual
states to settle their own disputes.
Though the aura of detente extended to military engage-
ment, no holds were barred in economic enterprises. The
lesser developed Third World was flooded with proposals
for developmental assistance in exchange for trade in re-
sources. Competition for allegiance to the United States,
USSR, China or Europe was keen, but never firmly won. The
Third World had learned that it could enjoy the best of
all worlds by overcommitment to none.
A15 SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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INITIAL SCENARIO - PART I
JANUARY 1973: EEC expanded to include Ireland, Denmark
and the UK.
MARCH 1973: US announces willingness to admit GDR to
UN.
US announces intention to recognize GDR.
MBFR preliminary meetings convene.
SEPTEMBER 1973: US grants MFN to USSR.
US defense budget/foreign aid cut.
US recognizes PRC.
OCTOBER 1973: Chiang Ching Kuo assumes ROC leadership.
FRG and GDR admitted to UN.
NOVEMBER 1973: US armed forces reduced to 2,150,000 men.
US announces NATO consultation agreement.
Russo-Japanese peace treaty.
DECEMBER 1973: CSCE Ministerials; Soviet "Charter for
Peace".
USSR announces withdrawal of 3 divisions
from GDR.
Permanent CSCE committees established.
US inflation 6 percent per annum.
USSR initiates consultations with PRC.
FEBRUARY 1974: US announces withdrawal of 60,000 troops
from Europe.
MARCH 1974: USSR/PRC consultations begin.
French propose NATO reorganization.
Polish demonstrate for USSR troop with-
drawals.
President Gierek visits Moscow.
APRIL 1974: Tito dies; Nikezic assumes government.
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MAY 1974: Iceland allows USSR bunkering rights.
SEPTEMBER 1974: World economic situation deteriorates.
Pact unrest grows; Polish demonstrate.
US unemployment 6.8 percent; recessionary
atmosphere.
OCTOBER 1974: Two Koreas enter ON.
NOVEMBER 1974: Mazurov replaces Kosygin.
MAY 1975: French present NATO reorganization pro-
posal to NAC.
JULY 1975: German defense reorganization.
OCTOBER 1975: EEC common commercial policy for trade
with Pact signed.
25th CPSU convenes; Polish rioting.
Polyansky replaces Brezhnev.
DECEMBER 1975: US troops in Europe number 150,000.
A-17 SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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FROM CONTROL
MESSAGE NO. 102
TO BLUE
MOVE NO.
I
GREEN
DTG
200400 MAY 76
The situation described in this scenario is hypotheti-
cal and is intended to provoke thought and to stimulate
discussion. It does not necessarily represent the views
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Studies, Analysis, and
Gaming Agency; or any other government agency.
All scenario times are Washington time.
B1 SECRET'-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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INITIAL SCENARIO - PART II
PORTENTS OF DISASTER
JANUARY 1976
The gravity of Poland's internal situation increased.
Rioting, strikes, and terrorism were widespread with the
most serious incidents occurring in the urban centers and
areas surrounding Gdansk, Warsaw, Stettin, and Poznan. Un-
confirmed reports indicated that First Secretary Gierek
had urgently requested Soviet troops as reinforcements for
the Polish Army, if that organization was incapable of re-
storing order. On 23 January 1976, US intelligence con-
firmed that secret alert orders were being issued to Soviet
commanders in Eastern Europe and the Russian Western Mili-
tary Districts.
Polish Army units were dispatched to Gdynia and Gdansk
during the last week of January to quell the most serious
disorders. Their arrival touched off increased violence
and prompted the dispatch of three additional Soviet di-
visions to Warsaw. Concurrently, intelligence sources re-
ported the massing of large numbers of Soviet troops along
the Russo-Polish border and the arrival of a Baltic Fleet
naval task group in the Bay of Danzig.
Despite these warning Soviet gestures, resistance ac-
tivities throughout Poland increased and the nation tee-
tered on the brink of open insurrection. By the end of
March, five more Soviet divisions from the Northern Zone
of East Germany had crossed the Oder River and taken up
positions in the West-Central and Northwestern areas of
the nation.
The harsh settlement of the Polish insurrection became
the subject of international concern as its borders were
sealed and the flow of news ceased. Anger over Moscow's
reported "Cossack tactics" led to anti-Russian demonstra-
tions in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and most Western
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European capitals. Large-scale sympathy strikes erupted
throughout the GDR with particular virulence in Rostock,
Guestrow, and Schwerin.
As the situation in the GDR worsened, Secretary Honecker
appealed for order in the Northern Laender and deplored
the subversion of the militants. Accompanying his entreat-
ies, GDR army units were placed on full alert and diverted
to the most troubled areas to assist police units. Con-
currently, a vitriolic press campaign was instituted in
which blame for the unrest was placed upon the revanchist
and subversive activities of the FRG. Honecker warned of
severe penalties for terrorists and alluded to possible
travel and commerce restrictions between the GDR and FRG
unless Bonn terminated its "blatant attempts.to undermine
the People's Democratic Republic."
Honecker's increasingly repressive measures were un-
successful in stemming the rising tide of violence. The
April 4th issue of the East German underground newspaper,
Der Angriff, reported that a "liberation bomb squad" had
attacked the Soviet airbase at Putnitz -- 15 miles outside
Rostok -- resulting in damage and the death of four Russian
officers. Der Angriff cited Soviet charges that the GDR's
8th Infantry Division had failed to provide adequate se-
curity for the base. Four members of the bomb squad, who
had been captured, were hailed as "heroes" and a general
strike was called in tribute to their sacrifices.
On 26 April, the date set for the strike in Rostok, the
8th Infantry Division, under a new commander, was again
assigned to maintain order and to return workers to their
jobs. When faced with the necessity of using force against
their countrymen, however, large numbers of soldiers re-
fused to carry out orders. Hastily formed companies of
Soviet airmen were used as replacements to assist the re-
maining loyal GDR troops and police.
By the end of April, Moscow had lost faith in Honecker's
ability to maintain internal order and the mutinous conduct
of the 8th Division raised serious doubts as to the "polit-
ical dedication" of the East German Army. Accordingly,
with the Polish situation temporarily under control, two
Soviet divisions (earlier moved from the GDR) were returned
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to Neustrelitz and Schwerin, while an additional division
was deployed to the Putnitz area. The Soviet naval task
group in the Bay of Danzig was reported to be under way
for Rostock, and "usually reliable" sources stated that
other forces were being readied in the USSR for movement
to East Germany.
On 3 May, White House intelligence briefers painted a
bleak picture. The US Ambassador to Moscow reported al-
most continuous Politburo meetings and a major increase
of military activity throughout the country. In addition
to 15 Soviet divisions already located in the GDR, six
more were being readied for movement to that beleagured
nation and Exercise OKEAN, slated to commence in the Nor-
wegian Sea on 19 May, had been rescheduled for 10 May.
Rumors had reached the Embassy that the Soviet Foreign
Minister had requested permission from. the Finnish Govern-
ment to conduct maneuvers in the Lake Inari region. AMEMB
Oslo confirmed the rumor and added that the Finnish Ambas-
sador to Norway had stated his government had no choice
but to grant permission. In addition, the Oslo report
noted that the Norwegian Prime Minister had informed the
US Ambassador that a Soviet note to the Norwegian Govern-
ment "requested" a shutdown of the radar sites at Vardo,
Mageroy, and Berlevaag during OKEAN -- to preclude inter-
ference with shipboard navigational systems. The somber
briefing concluded with a quote from the Norwegian Ambas-
sador's report: "Moscow's request, coming on the heels of
the unexpected presence of Soviet troops in Finland, has
caused serious apprehension within the government and
created widespread popular anxiety over Soviet intentions."
Feverish activity in the East, and fretful anxiety in
the West, marked the next two weeks. Reports from Finland
and Norway confirmed that two divisions.of a Soviet Army
had crossed into Finland and were maneuvering in the
Ivalo/Kaamanen area. On 10 May, OKEAN units departed
ports in the Baltic, Barents, and Black Seas and by 12
May, six Soviet divisions had redeployed to the northern
GDR. Unconfirmed intelligence rumored other troop move-
ments within the USSR.
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Accompanying these dramatic events, Honecker declared
a state of national emergency. All inter-Germany travel
was suspended; vehicular traffic from Berlin was monitored
-- and slowed --, air traffic into Berlin noted a marked
increase in "escorts," and some pilots reported periodic
jamming of radios and radars. In daily press releases and
official communiques, Moscow reiterated that its primary
concern was the internal stability of Poland and the GDR
-- and the safety of Soviet lives and property. While
Western officials hoped that this was true, continued So-
viet troop movements toward the GDR border were not re-
assuring and precautions were taken. On 14 May, as a re-
sult of NAC meetings the previous week, SACEUR declared a
state of Military Vigilance.
Early on 18 May, Bundeswehr border patrols observed in-
creases in the numbers of refugees in the Luebeck frontier
area. Interrogation of one escapee revealed large-scale
Soviet involvement in GDR attempts to crush the rebellion.
A clandestine East German radio station announced that dur-
ing the trials of the "Putnitz Bombers," an attempt had
been made to free the prisoners and that Soviet guards had
randomly fired into East German crowds. The broadcast
further reported that "battalions" of East German troops
and police were engaged in pitched battles with Soviet
troops. Later, the same day, Bonn received word that hun-
dreds.of fleeing refugees and East German troops were at-
tempting to cross the border into the FRG near Luebeck.
Soviet and loyal GDR army units were reported in hot pur-
suit. Subsequent communiques indicated that FRG border
units, ignoring standing orders, had crossed the frontier
in several locations to assist wounded refugees in making
their way to the border. Major General Ernst Streicher,
Commander of the FRG 6th Armored Infantry Division, was
ordered to move his division to the Luebeck area and take
charge of the situation.
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By evening of the 19th, The Sixth Division closed into
positions along the frontier and established headquarters
five kilometers southeast of Luebeck. Shortly thereafter,
Division headquarters was notified that Soviet forces had
sealed the border and that civilian refugees, FRG border
police, and deserting GDR troops were being "slaughtered"
as they tried to escape. Appalled by reports of "unre-
strained and barbaric Soviet massacre of fellow Germans,"
a battalion of the division crossed the frontier to assist
the refugees. Although temporarily surprised by the move,
Soviet units quickly reacted by counterattacking and sur-
rounding the relief column. By 2200 hours, communications
with the battalion were lost.
During the early morning hours of 20 May, Washington's
worst fears over the deteriorating European scene were re-
alized. A FLASH message from Bonn reported that, despite
orders to the contrary, major elements of the 6th FRG
Armored Infantry Division had crossed the GDR border near
Stronau and penetrated to a depth of six kilometers to
establish an "escape corridor for their brothers to flee
the Soviet terror." Within hours a follow-up message re-
vealed that these elements had been surrounded by Soviet
units and that the remainder of the 6th FRG Division was
committed in an attempt to extricate them.
While Washington officials contemplated the awesome im-
plications of'the FRG's move, messages from Norway and
Denmark deepened the growing fears of impending disaster.
Following inconclusive queries on the Hot Line to clar-
ify Moscow's intentions, President Nixon called a meeting
of the National Security Council for 0400 hours. As meet-
ing time approached, Washington officials anxiously scanned
incoming reports for information upon which to base recom-
mendations to the President.
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American Embassy, Bonn, 200010 MAY 76.
The Luebeck incident is out of hand. Unauthorized
border crossing by Bundeswehr has resulted in serious en-
counter with Soviet troops. Soviet Ambassador has told
Barzel that this is overt act of war; he demands immediate
cease fire and surrender of FRG troops engaged in GDR and
no further assistance to GDR army rebels or civilian ref-
ugees. Barzel is alarmed. He has repeated an order to
6th Division Commander to withdraw immediately but, to
date, no answer. Soviet Ambassador informed of this. At
same time, Barzel has ordered an armored division to Lue-
beck area for contingency support while tactical air units
at Husum have been placed on alert. I have just received
report that the 6th Division is being severely mauled and
is attempting to retire to the border in company with
large numbers of GDR troops who have joined them against
Soviets.
Comment: Situation is extremely grave. If Soviets do
not believe Barzel's protestations, they may act irration-
ally -- even to the point of pursuing FRG troops across
the frontier. As a result of the widely distributed re-
ports of Soviet brutality in the GDR and Poland, I also
have some doubts that FRG Army can be completely restrained,
if this situation is not resolved quickly. The atmosphere
within military circles here is electric. I have advised
Soviet Ambassador that this incident must be kept in per-
spective and must not lead to impulsive reactions on either
side. Urgently request further instructions.
American Embassy, Moscow, 200030 MAY 76.
I have just returned from a scathing meeting with
Polyansky. He curtly informed me that an FRG division has
crossed into the GDR in support of rebellious East German
military units and that FRG and GDR troops are now fully
engaged against Soviet forces. He demanded that I make
clear the Soviet position and asserted that the action of
the FRG has created an intolerable situation for the se-
curity of the GDR and the Soviet Union. He bluntly stated,
that in his opinion, he did not feel that the "Bonn Fas-
cists" would stop in this attempt to reunite the two Ger-
manies and that this action left the USSR no choice but
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to assist the GDR. When I attempted to explain that the
FRG incursion had been undertaken without the sanction of
the Bonn Government, he cut me off sharply and stated that
the FRG action constituted a "clear" act of aggression
against a sovereign member of the Warsaw Pact. Though
this matter could easily lead to war throughout Europe,
Polyansky stressed that it was a situation created by the
FRG and should not involve the rest of Europe, NATO, or
the United States.
Comment: I have the impression that Soviets know FRG
incident can be handled without war but I am not sure that
they want to -- if the crunch can be limited to FRG. I
admonished Polyansky that an immediate cease-fire is in
order so that situation can be sorted out and settled am-
icably. He replied that he would agree to cease-fire, but
only if FRG/GDR combatants unconditionally surrender. In-
formation here indicates that full mobilization might be
put into effect. Request guidance.
American Embassy, Oslo, 200100 MAY 76.
Prime Minister is in receipt of a protest from Mos-
cow warning that the surveillance sites at Vardo, Mageroy,
and Berlevaag are creating serious navigational interfer-
ences for Soviet ships and hampering the safe and unmo-
lested conduct of forces engaged in legitimate exercises.
While still in consultation, PM-received further informa-
tion that Soviet units are proceeding toward Norwegian
border in areas of Karasjok, Norway, and Utsjoki, Finland.
Comment: I do not believe that USSR will invade Norway
unless it feels a full-scale conflict is in the making;
however, my information is scant. PM ties Soviet move
with FRG problem and is contemplating mobilization. He
called for immediate NATO reassurances of support in the
event of an overt Soviet move against Norway, and warned
that if these assurances were not forthcoming, "Norway
might be better in an uncommitted position." I believe
that PM is serious about this. He is meeting with Ambas-
sadors from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in four hours.
Request immediate guidance.
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American Embassy, Copenhagen, 200130 MAY 76.
Danish Government is in receipt of Soviet note pro-
testing electronic activity on Bornholm Island. Fonmin
has told me Denmark will not reply to Soviet note pending
consultation with Norway, Finland, and Sweden; and, pend-
ing discussion of the matter in the NAC. Request instruc-
tions.
USNATO, 200200 MAY 76.
FRG has requested immediate NAC meeting. German and
Nordic situations have created utmost consternation. Sen-
timent is overwhelmingly pessimistic. FRG is being branded
as culprit and I have heard talk that some allies are ill-
disposed to support her in this critical confrontation.
Consensus on Norway and Denmark situation is that protests
are a Soviet move to divert attention from center. Re-
quest guidance re USG position both issues.
It is now 200400 May 1976.
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MARCH 1976:
MAY 1976:
3 May -
10 May -
12 May -
13 May -
14 May -
18 May -
18 May -
19 May -
Polish uprisings intensify.
Soviet eastern European/Western Military
District Commanders put on alert.
Polish Army units dispatched to Gydnia/
Gdansk.
Soviet Naval Task Group moves to Bay of
Danzig.
Five Soviet Divisions move from GDR to
Poland.
Poland sealed off.
Sympathy strikes/demonstrations in,GDR.
GDR dissension increases.
GDR Army units placed on full alert.
Soviet installation at Putnitz bombed by
terrorists.
General strike in Rostok: GDR military
units refuse to obey orders.
Three Soviet divisions deployed to GDR.
Soviet Task Group in Bay of Danzig moved
to Rostok.
Soviets "request" shutdown of Norwegian
radar sites.
Exercise OKEAN commences.
Six additional Soviet divisions deploy
to GDR.
All inter-Germany communication ceases.
SACEUR declares state of Military Vigi-
lance.
GDR military/police clash with Soviet
Army units.
FRG border guards cross GDR frontier to
assist fleeing refugees.
GDR border sealed.
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19 May -
FRG 6th Division attempts to open GDR
border
to assist refugees.
20 May -
Soviets
Danish
protest activity of Norwegian/
surveillance sites.
20 May -
Soviets
demand FRG cease-fire.
20 May -
President Nixon calls emergency NSC
meeting.
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FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO. 101
TO CONTROL MOVE NO. I
REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 10.1 & 102 DTG 200400 MAY 76
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.
a. US and NATO objectives are to contain the situa-
tion, restore the status quo and hold the Alliance together.
There is some uncertainty as to FRG/Soviet motivations and
objectives, but:
(1) Assume the FRG is not attempting reunification.
Assume also the FRG 6th Division is out of hand, and the
FRG is really trying to get the situation back under control.
(2) Assume no clear Soviet offensive intentions;
moves are essentially reactive and defensive; tentative ini-
tial assumption is that Soviets wish to reestablish the
status quo -- however, there is considerable uncertainty on
latter point.
2. Implications to US.
a. A real danger of war exists, even though it is im-
probable from the evidence so far that the Soviets have a
clearly aggressive intent.
b. A serious challenge -- at least politically -- is
presented to NATO and we consider that NATO continues to be
important to US interests. If Germany and Northern Flank
countries, particularly, feel abandoned, the entire NATO
structure could face disintegration.
3. US Domestic Reaction.
a. Assuming the situation has resulted from one FRG
division going berserk, there would be little support in
any quarter for US military action.
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b. Assuming this is simply a quarrel between the two
Germanies, the probable reaction will be "a plague on both
your houses" -- the US is too much involved in domestic
problems to intervene. Anticipating that Soviet moves will
be simply defensive, the US public would probably be as re-
laxed about suppressing rebellion in East Germany as it was
in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
c. Finally, assuming that this is not a crisis gener-
ated through inadvertence, but rather Soviet aggression mo-
tivated by their desire to destroy NATO, the American public
would certainly be more concerned and would support stronger
reaction.
4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.
a. There is general agreement that the situation was
brought on by the unauthorized action of German Sixth Divi-
sion.
b. The assumption at this point is that Soviet moves
are defensive and rational, but there are ominous signs in
the north.
C. A principal Soviet objective may be to isolate the
d. Certain prudent alert measures are in order --
stopping short of provocative moves.
e. The US position will set pace for the rest of NATO.
~. Short Range.
a. Urge the USSR to do everything necessary to keep
the situation contained, stressing that the FRG Sixth Divi-
sion activity is unsanctioned.
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b. Make clear that NATO is prepared, for its part,
to do what is required to keep situation under control.
c. Seek clarification of Soviet intentions.
d. Reassure Norway and Denmark of our intention to
live up to our NATO obligations, including military support
in the event of aggression.
e. Prepare to react militarily if we find that the
USSR has wider objectives, without yet moving new forces to
Europe.
f. Explain to the US public that the incident appears
to be local but that it may be more and that US may have to
respond militarily if Soviets strive to take advantage of
the situation.
g. Avoid a world war and do what we can within NATO
framework to achieve this end.
h. Permit acceptable courses of disengagement open to
both sides.
2. Long Range.
a. Continue to deny domination of Europe by the USSR.
b. Regard a strong NATO as an essential instrument in
this objective and deter war in Europe.
c. Deplore the continued USSR repressive moves in
Eastern Europe. After the current situation is resolved,
initiate political and economic actions vis-a-vis the USSR
designed to induce it to adjust its repressive policies
and allow self-determination by Eastern European nations.
d. Continue most-favored-nation relationship with the
US dependent upon Soviet abandonment of military supported
repression.
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Our strategy is fourfold:
i.. We will move quickly and clearly but in an obviously
restrained manner to achieve our principal short-range ob-
jective, i.e., contain the confrontation between the USSR
and the FRG in the Luebeck area.
2. Consequently, we must leave acceptable courses of ac-
tion open both to the USSR and to the FRG.
3. Simultaneously, we will take positive steps to support
the Northern Flank as a separate but related issue to the
central confrontation on the FRG/GDR border.
4. In carrying out this strategy, we will attempt to con-
vince the USSR that they cannot isolate the FRG from its
Allies.
1. Political.
a. Send our Ambassador to deliver to the USSR Chief
of State a Presidential letter giving the USG assessment
that the situation is local and should be treated accord-
ingly. We will emphasize to the Soviets that the whole
texture of US-USSR relations -- economic -- political --
would be jeopardized by continuation or worsening of the
present situation. Inform Soviets that continued military
moves and reinforcements on their part will make it inevi-
table that NATO will do the same and lead to escalation of
the crisis.
b. Have our Ambassador tell FRG that we recognize the
situation has gotten out of hand and that we stand behind
their effort to bring matter under control. We assume FRG
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already has directed FRG troops to stand down and they have
so informed the USSR.
c. Discuss situation with NATO -- give them whole
scenario and tell them what we think should be done to
confine the situation. Get agreement on course of action.
d. In NATO, and bilaterally, tell Norway and Denmark
of our assessment and provide reassurances that we support
them in not making concessions regarding radar sites.
e. Give Eastern European countries our assessment
and obtain theirs as well as Yugoslavia's and Finland's
-- compel them to think what their courses of action should
be.
f. Tell PRC what we have told USSR and seek PRC views
on the situation.
g. Inform UN through our UN Ambassador about our per-
ception of the situation (for info only, not for action).
h. Have every US Ambassador advise the foreign office
how we assess the situation and what course of action we
have or are taking. (Purpose of notifying and keeping all
these other nations informed is to avoid any action on their
part which would complicate situation -- and to solicit their
efforts in cooling the situation -- if necessary.)
i. Tell USSR that we have discussed situation with FRG.
FRG is ordering cease-fire and FRG troops in GDR should be
turned over for immediate repatriation.
j. We have asked Soviets that the OKEAN exercise be
curtailed -- stopped -- and that reinforcement of ground
forces be halted as evidence of a Soviet desire to keep
situation contained.
2. Military.
a. We will take the following actions at once:
(1) Alert REFORGER forces in CONUS, assemble air-
craft, increase fleet operational readiness, raise alert
level of air defense and strategic forces.
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(2) Increase intelligence collection efforts.
(3) Assure adequate monitoring of OKEAN.
(4) Recommend NATO forces move to stage of Simple
(5) Recommend NATO assemble ACE mobile force for
possible deployment to Norway.
b. Allow 24 hours for Soviet response to Presidential
letter delivered by our Ambassador in Moscow. If response
is unsatisfactory, take such other actions as are consistent
with bringing US and NATO forces to a higher level of read-
iness, e.g.:
(1) Move available US forces to Europe to fill out
divisions.
(2) Improve readiness and posture of all US ground,
air and naval units (short of mobilization).
(3) Be prepared to implement higher levels of NATO
alert if required.
(4) Depending upon nature of evolving confronta-
tion, consider higher DEFCON level.
Actions by Others. Actions by US.
L. If our assessment is 1. Maximize alert con-
correct, and Soviets seek dition of forces. Move
opportunity to destroy al- forces from CONUS to
dance and to extend hege- Europe. Apply economic
.pony over FRG. sanctions to Soviets.
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Actions by Others. Actions by US.
2. If Danes and Norwegians 2. Take whatever uni-
give in to Soviet demands. lateral military action
is necessary to deter
Soviet attack or occupa-
tion of these countries.
3. If our assessments are 3. We reject Soviet de-
correct but Soviets respond mands. (Sharp division
in ways to maximize discomfort of view within team as
to alliance, split alliance, to degree of domestic
etc. support for continued
support of NATO in these
circumstances.)
4. If FRG troop disaffection 4. Cooperate with other
spreads. NATO members, including
FRG, to get FRG rebels
under control (seizing
ammo, supplies, etc.)
5. If FRG overtly or covertly 5. Cut off supplies and
supports action of rebellious support to FRG forces.
forces. Propose plan to Soviets
to neutralize Germany.
If Soviets refuse, use
force to prevent Soviet
military conquest of
West Germany. (Serious
question whether US and
domestic support could
be gained for this
course of action given
genesis of fighting,.
i.e., FRG initiative.)
6. If East European uprising 6. US should be prepared
spreads. to provide all possible
moral and economic sup-
port for East European
populations, short of
direct use of US mili-
tary forces unless this
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Actions by Others. Actions by US.
could be done with high
probability of success,
i.e., avoidance of war
with Soviets.
(Question raised as to
-whether, given wide
magnitude of uprising,
3S position could or
should be so contained.)
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Ref.: Blue ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, US Domestic Re-
action, paragraphs 3a and 3b.
If presented properly as a temporary difficulty which we
are trying to contain and solve quickly, it should be pos-
sible to obtain US public support for the modest measures
we are proposing.
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FROM GREEN MESSAGE NO. 101
TO CONTROL MOVE NO. I
REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 & 102 DTG 200400 MAY 76
1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.
a. Soviet Long Range Objectives.
(1) Extend hegemony in Europe -- whenever possible
through Finlandization and neutralization, and extend influ-
ence throughout the rest of the world.
(2) Remove NATO as an obstacle to the pursuit of
the above interests.
(3) Maintain the power base currently jeopardized
by events in Poland and East Germany.
(4) Eliminate the threat of Pan-Germanism.
b. Soviet Motivations.
(1) Unrest in Eastern Europe obliges USSR to take
military action to deal with serious internal security situ-
ation.
(2) Spontaneous action by FRG troops engages.USSR
in direct action against FRG troops which have entered GDR.
(3) Soviet intentions unclear in that they may be
interested only in maintaining status quo in their area of
influence, or, they may feel required to destroy FRG.
2,. Implications to US.
The US has an enormous stake in the evolving situation.
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There may be a rapidly developing direct military threat
against the US, e.g., the Soviet request for shutdown of
Norwegian radar sites and other moves in the northern zone.
Soviet intentions are unclear and further information is
urgently needed. In any case, there is a most serious in-
direct threat. We want a gradual evolution in Central and
Eastern Europe, which we envision over a period of time,
perhaps a generation, but 1976 is too soon to force events.
We still must support the existence of two Germanies. Given
our internal and world situation -- and the present set of
circumstances -- it is both untimely and unwise to force an
exploitation of Soviet difficulties now. We must maintain
the integrity of Norway, Denmark -- and of NATO. We must
not allow the Soviets to maneuver West Germany out of NATO
and "Finlandize" Europe. The Soviets must be reassured
insofar as their sense of security and interests in Eastern
Europe are concerned. The current situation must be recog-
nized as a test of our commitment to the defense of Western
Europe and of the protection of US military units in Europe.
We must avoid a resulting unfavorable security tilt against
the US and we should eschew setting in train a chain of
events leading inevitably to a major military and, perhaps,
nuclear confrontation.
3. US Domestic Reaction.
The mood of the country is assessed as nervous, fear-
ful, and uncertain. A full spectrum of opinion is being
expressed in strident, emotional terms in Congress and the
communications media. The stock market, already depressed
by unfavorable economic news, takes a further nosedive. On
the eve of bicentennial celebrations and quadrennial politi-
cal conventions, the need for strong decisive leadership is
called for from all quarters. Some say to ignore Europe
and its problems while others contend that we cannot retreat
from our commitments to NATO and Western Europe without a
collapse of the entire structure for peace in the world.
All eyes will be on Washington -- what will the President
do? And can an anxious, divided country be united to sup-
port him in his decisions?
4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.
Within NATO, the crisis is assessed as deeply threat-
ening to vital allied interests relating to NATO territorial
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integrity, to a stable peace, and to the continuation of
the process of detente and the development of a web of im-
proved relationships between the Communist nations and the
West. There is consensus that failure to prevent Soviet
invasion of West Germany would be fatally damaging to the
solidarity and continued existence of the NATO Alliance.
At the same time, the feeling is strong that detente
must be achieved through peaceful means, and strong opposi-
tion exists to being drawn into armed conflict connected
with the unrest in East Germany and Poland.
There is, also, a strong sense of condemnation of
the Soviets for the failures on their part which have re-
sulted in the eruption of this crisis.
While there is sympathy with the deep emotions being
felt in West Germany, there is a strong consensus that West
Germany should withdraw its forces from East Germany and re-
establish border control.
Although there is concern over the reduced level of
NATO military capabilities resulting from the reductions of
the past few years, there is a feeling that the Soviets
must still respect NATO's ability to exact a significant
"price of admission" in case of Soviet attack, and also
should recognize the uncertainties and the risks of further
escalation to all-out war that would inescapably attend any
outbreak of NATO-Soviet hostilities. Several of the nations
stated that they were taking measures to improve the readi-
ness and combat-effectiveness of their forces.
There is agreement within NATO that active, high-level
communications should be undertaken with the Soviets, con-
veying to them the following:
- NATO stands behind the Norwegian and Danish Govern-
ments in refusing to accede to Soviet demands to close
down the surveillance radar sites. The Soviets are
warned that any military threat or action against either
of these countries will bring them immediately into con-
flict with NATO as a whole.
- The conflict in the border, area around Lubeck should
be brought to a halt immediately. On their side, the
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Soviets, in dealing with the unrest that is occurring,
should limit themselves to methods which do not involve
widespread bloodshed. On the NATO side, efforts must
be made to achieve the earliest possible withdrawal of
West German military forces now in East Germany and to
reestablish control of the border.
- The NATO nations retain their strong interest in
preserving and continuing to extend the improved rela-
tionships that have been developing with the Soviet
Union. The gains that have been made must not be lost
to the present crisis.
1. Short Range.
a. Reestablish SACEUR's control over West German
forces and effect removal of those FRG forces presently
engaged in the GDR.
b. Maintain the territorial integrity of NATO --
preferably by peaceful means.
2. Long Range.
a. Restore the era of negotiation and detente thereby
creating an environment in which this type of crisis is un-
likely to occur.
b. Promote a gradual evolution of independence within
East European countries on a peaceful basis.
c. Toward "b," seek resolution by the Soviets of the
underlying issues in East Europe which brought about this
crisis.
d. Create a growing web of common interests between
the Soviet world and the Western World, in order to reduce
the prospects that such a .crisis could occur in the future.
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e. Maintain balance of power -- US, Europe, USSR,
Japan and China.
Diplomatic.
a. Seek to continue policies of beneficial change as
in arms control and economic relations,consistent with CSCE
obligations and those of SALT II and MBFR.
b. Regard move in Norway as a grave threat to US and
NATO and a departure from the foregoing era of negotiations.
The Soviets should withdraw request to shut down the sur-
veillance radars.
c. Assure the USSR that NATO has no intention of inter-
vening or upsetting status quo in Eastern Europe.
d. Request the USSR to exercise full control over their
forces and those of GDR.
e. Assure Moscow that we will restrain West Germans
and return FRG forces to full control of SACEUR.
f. Inform the Soviets that they must not threaten
peace of world; that we will honor our commitments and that
they must control Eastern Europeans in a way so as not to
evoke such emotional reactions in the FRG.
2. With NATO: Reaffirm basic commitments.
3. With Red China:
a. Convince Peking that situation is dangerous.
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b. Ask Chinese Communists to tell Soviets that they
would consider imbalance of power in Europe as a threat to
iced China.
4. With UK and France:
a. Determine their positions and coordinate.
b. Ascertain views of France regarding events in FRG.
what diplomatic approaches will France make to USSR? Will
France consider any Soviet move against West Germany as a
L.hreat to France?
c. Attempt to concert a joint US-UK-French-FRG posi-
d. Also reassure smaller NATO countries and try to
4et their acceptance of US, UK, French positions.
5. In US:
a. Alert people to serious situation.
b. Reaffirm solidarity of Atlantic Alliance.
C. Downplay economic difficulties with Europeans.
Military. Discreetly increase alert status while reas-
suring Soviets we are not threatening -- allow Soviets margin
of operations; don't threaten escalation and don't force them
"to the wall."
SPECIFIC MOVES
1. Political.
a. All ambassadors to our NATO allies will inform host
governments of our strong commitment to NATO, a Free Europe,
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and our determination to stand by them and West Germany.
Without this continuing reassurance, some of our allies
(especially in the North) might. move closer to "Finlandiza-
tion" or attempt a deal with the Soviets while there is
still time -- assuming that the US will not protect them
following frictions of the trade wars of 1973-76, and CSCE
I, II, III.
b. Call on our Ambassador to France to urge the French
to rejoin the NATO Military Committee and to permit US use
of the French LOC.
c. Hot Line: Notify Polyansky of our determination to
stand by West Germany west of the Iron Curtain, and to make
every effort leading to the withdrawal of the German divi-
sion from the GDR.
d. Secretary of State will contact Soviet Ambassador
and inform him of same. Threaten also to break off CSCE,
SALT talks, return troops to Europe, etc.
e. Inform China of our intentions.
f. Keep subject out of UN for the time being so as to
preclude the precipitious formation of hardened positions.
2. Military.
a. Order immediate increased intelligence collection
effort not only against Soviet forces but also against
Soviet homeland in order to ascertain order of magnitude
Soviets seem prepared to exert in present situation.
b. Alert discreetly, and in non-provocative manner,
Strategic Air and Naval Strike Forces as well as forces of
US Readiness Command. Open military talks with French on,
possibility of using LOC facilities across France during
such a crisis.
c. Have SACEUR prepare and alert non-German units for
possible move to Lubeck area to interpose them between So-
viets and Germans. (West Germans and defecting East Ger-
mans.)
d. As an alternative to interposition of non-German
troops, consider use of Third World or Latin American forces.
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e. Prepare NATO-committed Air and Naval Forces in US
for movement to Europe.
f. Study possible later withdrawal of units of FRG
Army from immediate contact with GDR border and replacement
in such positions by non-German forces.
g. Recommend SACLANT position forces vicinity of
Norway.
h. Recommend SACEUR move AMF forces to Norway.
i. Consider move of certain USAFE forces to Norway
under bilateral arrangements.
j. Recommend NAC consider implementing certain Simple
Alert measures, possibly all.
k. Start "filling out" US units in Europe and readying
forces to open up LOCs.
1. Do not put selected SAC units in orbit at this time.
3. Economic.
No immediate overt economic moves. Initiate internal
review of oil situation (particularly security of North Sea
sources), stockpiling, trade situations vis-a-vis USSR.
4. Psychological.
Speech by President or Secretary of State "pouring
oil on troubled waters and calling on German and Soviet
Governments to restore situation peacefully. Have US media
and Radio Free Europe (RFE) publicize above speech heavily.
5.. Other.
Persuade Japanese and Chinese Governments to make
statements along lines of US position.
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Actions by Others.
1. Directs full mobilization
of Warsaw Pact forces (in-
cluding strategic) and deploys
naval units to "battle area."
Actions by US.
We will:
la. Place US forces on full
alert, deploy augmentation
forces to Europe, deploy
naval forces.
b. Recommend NATO. declare
higher state of alert for
ACE and LANT units.
c. Keep all diplomatic
channels open fully to pre-
vent misinterpretation or
miscalculation.
2. Assuming FRG's inability
to restrain elements of the
Bundeswehr from crossing in-
to East Germany, announces
that it considers this act-
ion as an invasion and a
clear move by German
Fascists toward German
reunification and that it
will take necessary action
against FRG to prevent re-
unification.
2. In this event we will:
a. Exert strongest possible
representation at every
level (political and mili-
tary) to FRG and Bundeswehr
of need for withdrawal from
GDR and placement of all
military units under con-
trol of SACEUR.
b. Deploy augmentation
forces (implicit in this
action is an increased
capability to help control
dissident Bundeswehr units).
c. Announce to FRG we in-
tend to withdraw direct
support to Bundeswehr un-
less they can immediately
restrain/regain control
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Actions by Others.
3. introduces major elements of
Soviet and GDR forces into West
Germany in "hot pursuit" in
order to "punish an aggressive
FRG".
4. Destrpys Norwegian and/or
Danish surveillance stations.
5. And/or GDR take actions
which have direct impact on
US forces but fall short of
actual military attack (most
probable would be blockade of
Berlin).
Actions by US.
over dissident elements
(e.g. , withdrawal of nu-
clear weapons from FRG
military units).
3. We announce our inten-
tion of not standing by
while Warsaw Pact forces
invade NATO territory.
US forces are placed on
full alert and augmenta-
tion of European units is
accelerated. Strongly
recommend to NATO that all
ACE and LANT forces be
placed on General Alert.
Provide direct support of
Bundeswehr forces that are
under the control of SACEUR.
4a. Shore up surveillance,
(air/naval surveillance as
necessary to preserve move-
ment/order of battle intel-
ligence).
b. Make strongest possible
declaration in concert with
NATO partners that this
action constitutes unsup-
portable aggression against
the entire NATO.Alliance --
that further action will
be met with appropriate
response.
5a. Conduct quadripartite
consultation (US, UK, French
and FRG) to establish common
position and unified action.
b. Increase state of alert,
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Actions by Others.
Actions by US.
especially in FRG.
c. Airlift resupply of
Berlin (to the extent
possible, recognizing that
Berlin's requirements in
1976 cannot be met solely
by airlift).
d. Tell the Soviets in
strongest possible terms
that international agree-
ments must be respected
and guaranteed access to
Berlin must be restored or
whatever action necessary
to achieve access will be
taken.
e. Explore areas of counter-
pressure (outside Berlin) to
exploit Soviet vulnerability
(e.g., Turkish withdrawal of
passage through Bosporous/
Dardanelles).
6. If Norway and/or Denmark:
Capitulate to Soviet demands
to shut down surveillance
stations and announce "un-
committed positions" (due
either to lack of assurance
of support by NATO or ques-
tion of credibility of such
assurance as is given).
6a. Same as 4a.
b. Encourage reassociation
with NATO through diplo-
matic/military channels.
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FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO. 201
TO BLUE AND GREEN MOVE NO. II
REFERENCE BLUE & GREEN MSGS 101 DTG 220200 MAY 76
United States.
Following the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on
the morning of 20 May, anxious Washington officials labored
feverishly to defuse the portentous crisis. Messages were
dispatched to major world capitals stating the US position
and assessment of the situation. The US Ambassador to
Moscow was instructed to personally inform the Soviet For-
eign Minister that the United States desired "most urgently"
that the crisis in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
should end. It was pointed out that any escalation of the
already explosive situation might well end the fragile de-
tente which had been so carefully nurtured over the past
five years.
US Ambassadors to Norway and Denmark were instructed to
reassure those nations of US support in the event of overt
Soviet aggression and to reiterate the North Atlantic Coun-
cil (NAC) decision to support both nations in resisting So-
viet pressures against northern Norway and Bornholm Island.
Despite this affirmation of support, dispatch of the ACE
Mobile Force was not considered. Simultaneously, embassies
in East European states, Japan and the People's Republic of
China (PRC) were urged to sound out those nations' leaders
as to their evaluation of Soviet intentions in Europe.
US military commanders, on orders from the White House,
alerted REFORGER/CRESTED CAP units in the United States,
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increased worldwide intelligence collection efforts, and
readied CONUS-based forces for possible higher alert phases
in the immediate future. Selected naval units were dis-
patched to the North Atlantic. Additionally, the Commander
in Chief, European Command, was urged to press for the maxi-
mum readiness posture possible within the selected alert
measures -- short of complete Simple Alert -- authorized
by the NAC earlier in the day. As an additional measure,
queries were proffered to France in an effort to clarify
the French position and solicit increased support for NATO,
including availability of the French LOC.
Late on the same day, President Nixon (after conferring
with congressional leaders) addressed a concerned nation
to state that the rash incursion of West German troops into
East Germany, and their subsequent involvement with Soviet
troops, had created an inflammatory situation of major pro-
portions in Europe. He stressed that although the crisis
was still controllable, there was danger that it could
change at any moment. The Chief Executive emphasized that
the earlier meeting of the NAC had revealed an unanimous
Allied desire to localize and cool the conflict as quickly
as possible.
The President further informed the public that he had
been in direct contact with Secretary Polyansky and had
urged him to cooperate with the United States in effecting
a cease-fire in order that involved nations could decide
upon rational steps to restore order and preserve peace.
Mr. Nixon asserted that he had assured the Soviet Union
that the United States Government (USG) would do everything
possible to restrain further Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) military actions, and that Chancellor Barzel had ten-
tatively agreed to a cease-fire in return for immediate
repatriation of the entrapped FRG forces. The President
indicated his belief that the leaders of the Soviet Union,
in the interests of world peace, would be amenable to this
proposal. Concluding his statement, he called on the heads
of all governments to join with the United States in taking
prompt actions to "prevent the spectre of war from again
engulfing the world."
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Activity in the Kremlin continued unabated as fighting
raged within the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Soviet
Ambassadors worldwide received carefully worded instruc-
tions to notify their capitals that the Soviet union had
no intentions of destroying the era of peace which detente
had brought to the world and that Moscow's sole objective
was to restore order between the two Germanies. The Honecker
Government was directed to call for an emergency meeting of
the United Nations Security Council and to request condem-
nation of the FRG's illegal acts.
During the morning of 21 May, the Soviet Foreign Minister
informed the United States that the Soviet Union did not in-
tend to enlarge the conflict. Stating that his country
would agree to an immediate cease-fire, he requested that
the United States act as intermediary with the FRG and, that
if a cease-fire were enacted immediately, all prisoners'
would be returned to their homeland as soon as order could
be restored in the area of conflict.
Later that day, the United States and the Soviet Ambas-
sadors to Bonn were informed that the Barzel Government
officials had agreed to the Soviet terms but insisted that
United Nations teams be allowed to supervise the cease-fire
and ensure that no harm came to the GDR rebels, refugees or
entrapped West German units.
Follow-on reports from the US Ambassador to Moscow con-
firmed that the Kremlin had received the West German re-
quest and was taking it under advisement. The Ambassador's
note summarized the day's activities as confused and stated
that he had been unable to determine Soviet intentions be-
yond those already reported in official communiques. He
added, however, that informed sources had notified him of
large-scale Soviet troop movements along the railheads lead-
ing through Poland toward the GDR; and of orders to Soviet
military commanders in the GDR to begin movement westward
as precautionary measures.
By evening of the 21st, the world learned that the Soviets
had rejected FRG conditions for the cease-fire.
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European Community.
The NAC meeting which had convened earlier on the 20th,
presented an expression of solidarity to the world. Public
response of the Allies unanimously decried the conflict
which had broken out and vociferously pledged their intent
to localize and resolve it. Within the confines of secrecy,
however, stormy debate raged. The FRG was berated and
branded irresponsible. France denounced the FRG action as
a "German problem." UK sentiments echoed similar views
but urged the Allies to stand ready to support their un-
fortunate sister state if it were not able to solve the
problem without direct NATO involvement. Only the United
States, Norway, Denmark and Belgium maintained that what-
ever the causes, the issue was already a NATO problem.
Startled by its lack of support, the FRG undertook -- un-
willingly -- the unilateral approach forced upon it. The
Soviet Ambassador to Bonn was informed that communications
had been reestablished with the surrounded Sixth Division
and that it would be ordered to cease-fire if the Kremlin
would agree to its safe passage back into the FRG.
The Soviet refusal to accept Chancellor Barzel's cease-
fire conditions during the following night created conster-
nation among the Allies -- and the world. By noon of 21
May, it was clear that Moscow had no intention of accepting
less than an unconditional surrender of the beleaguered FRG
forces. FRG fears of a Soviet invasion mounted as intelli-
gence sources confirmed that Soviet reinforcements were
moving toward positions along the GDR border and FRG mili-
tary`commanders prepared for redeployment of forces to posi-
tions in northern. Germany.
In late afternoon of the 21st, Chancellor Barzel bitterly
informed a hushed Bundestag of the Soviet refusal to repa-
triate members of the trapped FRG units. He solemnly noted
that as the duly elected Chancellor of the Bundesrepublik,
"he neither could nor would expose these men to the proven
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horrors of Soviet imprisonment." Accordingly, he declared,
"I have ordered General Fritz Kraemer's Ninth Armored Divi-
sion to proceed into the GDR and extract the remnants of the
Sixth Division." Shouts of dismay and anger interrupted
Barzel's announcement but members were left with little
choice but to support the fait accompli.
Within hours, reports from the field acknowledged that
the Ninth Armored Division was heavily engaged with Soviet
and GDR forces. Intelligence reports from the frontier in-
dicated that Soviet troop strength in the border area had
been greatly reinforced. By 2200 hours, General Kraemer
reported that his units were in full retreat, pursued by
superior Soviet forces. Kraemer further revealed that he
had been unable to make physical contact with the main ele-
ments of General Streicher's Sixth Division. Shortly after
midnight of 21 May, a subsequent report noted that the Ninth
Division was establishing a defensive line south of Luebeck
in the Krummesse area, approximately eleven kilometers west
of the border and that these positions were already under
intense.assault by elements of at least five Soviet tank
and rifle divisions.
At 0100. hours on the 22nd, President Nixon was informed
that Secretary Polyansky had instituted Hot Line communica-
tions. Frantic translators relayed the Secretary's message
to the President:
"I have, with deep regret, instructed my Ambassador
to the Federal Republic of Germany to inform the leader
of that criminal nation that Soviet army units have been
ordered to pursue and destroy all aggressive forces who
have openly violated the territory of the GDR. Since
that state has chosen to reverse its decision to agree
on a cease-fire -- ardently desired by the Soviet Union
-- and has deliberately ordered additional Fascist troops
into battle-against the Soviet comrades of the GDR, the
Soviet Union has no choice but to ensure the total de-
struction of these piratical forces. In order to end
once and for all the insatiable appetite of the German
Government to impose war on the free nations. of the
world, the Soviet Union demands the demilitarization
and the immediate beginning of negotiations leading to
the perpetual neutralization of both Germanies."
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The Secretary's message closed with a reassertion that
Soviet immediate objectives were limited solely to the de-
struction of those "revanchist" forces which had invaded
the sovereign territory of the GDR. He stated that the
Soviet Union intended no territorial aggrandizement nor
contemplated extension of the conflict to any nation other
than West Germany. He informed the President that he in-
tended to notify the other capitals of the FRG's latest
act of revanchism and would make clear to all the "totally
justifiable reactions" of the Soviet Union which were to
restore order in Europe and to ensure future peace for the
world.
By 0200 hours, the NSC again convened and White House
aides summarized the President's Hot Line conversations
with Secretary Polyansky. Concurrently, the nation's lead-
ers scanned the most ominous of the messages which had be-
gun flooding the communications channels.
AMEMB BONN 220130 MAY 76.
I lodged strong protests with FRG concerning Barzel's
order to Ninth Division. Barzel was adamant and would not
rescind order. All possible pressures to restrain Barzel
have been ineffective. Less than one hour ago Barzel again
summoned me and stated that Kraemer's force is in retreat
with Soviet units in hot pursuit. He also indicated he was
fully aware of Polyansky's desire to destroy FRG units, and
his demands for FRG demilitarization. Barzel has threaten-
ened to order the redeployment of three additional divisions
to the Krummesse area and undoubtedly will request US divi-
sions in central region to relocate north to the Fulda area
to assume positions vacated by German units. He is also
contemplating demanding a NAC emergency session to stress
the Soviet threat and to request movement of UK and Belgium
forces closer to FRG/GDR border areas. He will ask USG
to support latter request at this session. Request guid-
ance.
AMEMB COPENHAGEN 220140 MAY 76.
I have just returned from a meeting with the Prime
Minister who has informed me of a Soviet ultimatum to cease
all surveillance activities on Bornholm Island. I am not
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aware of either the specific details of the ultimatum or
the time limitations associated-with it. However, I have
in the past half-hour received two alarming -- but as yet
unconfirmed -- reports: (1) that a Soviet naval contingent
is proceeding toward the Bornholm area; and, (2) that a
Soviet attack has taken place on similar-type sites in
Northern Norway. The Prime Minister is in a virtual state
of shock over these developments and could offer no assur-
ance that his government would resist the Soviet ultimatum
without unqualified guarantees of US and/or NATO military
support. I am to meet with him within the next two hours
and urgently request guidance.
AMEMB OSLO, 220150 MAY 76.
Soviet Union has informed Norwegian Government that
it has landed naval infantry units at the surveillance sites
located at Mageroy, Berlevaag and Vardo.
The note, of which I have copy, informs the Norwegian
Government that the "provocative presence of these spy
stations" and the Norwegian Government's "refusal to con-
sider the safety of Soviet naval and air units exercising
at sea has made it necessary for the USSR to take extreme
measures."
The Soviets have stated that they intend to dismantle
the electronic sites at these locations and then withdraw.
On the other hand, the note further states that if remain-
ing surveillance sites in Finnmark do not cease operations,
Moscow may be forced to take additional appropriate mea-
sures.
Prime Minister regards these notes as most serious. He
understands that the Danish Government has received a simi-
lar note concerning Bornholm Island. The Prime Minister
asked me bluntly: "Are the United States and NATO going to
assist us now or not?" When I attempted to assure him that
they would, he interrupted to say that he would accept no
less assistance than. immediate deployment of the ACE Mobile
Force, to be reinforced shortly thereafter by those NATO
naval and ground forces normally earmarked for such contin-
gencies. He further stated that the time for words had
passed and that he must have immediate military support.
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He added that unless NATO and the US assured him of this
help, he would recommend that Norway comply with the Soviet
request and abrogate its commitments to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
COMMENT: There is no question but what the Prime Minis-
ter is under tremendous political pressure and anti-NATO/
Left Wing groups have been increasingly vocal in their de-
mands for Norway's immediate withdrawal from the Alliance.
Unless a positive response to this open Soviet challenge
is forthcoming, I am convinced that the neutralism of Norway
is assured. Urgently request guidance.
The time is now 220200 May 1976.
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CHRONOLOGY
FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION
MOMENTUM OF EVENTS
20 May
NAC supports Norway/Denmark
against Soviet protests.
President Nixon addresses
nation.
21 May
21 May
22 May
(AM) Soviets agree to cease-fire.
(AM) Barzel agrees to cease-fire
supervised by Red Cross.
(Early PM) Soviets reject Barzel cease-
fire conditions.
(Mid PM) Intelligence reports Soviet
troop movements.
(Mid PM) FRG threatens military move-
ment to north.
Barzel orders Ninth Division
into GDR.
Ninth Division in retreat.
Polyansky orders Soviet troops
to pursue Ninth Division.
Barzel orders reinforcements
to assist Ninth Division:
Barzel requests US/NATO
assistance.
Soviets issue ultimatum to
Denmark.
Soviets land at Mageroy,
Berlevaag, Vardo.
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FROM BLUE
MESSAGE NO.
201
TO CONTROL
MOVE NO.
II
REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 201
DTG 220200 MAY 76
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.
a. Soviet Objectives:
(1) There is less ambiguity now than there was
yesterday surrounding Soviet's intentions--it seems rea-
sonably clear that the USSR at least wants to take advan-
tage of situation to separate Germany and the Northern
Flank from NATO.
(2) If USSR interprets NATO reaction as weak,
then Soviets will be tempted to press for neutralization of
Germany and to create feeling among other nations that the
USSR can't be stopped in its de facto domination of Europe.
b. US-NATO Objectives: US and NATO objectives remain
to bring about an immediate cease-fire in Germany and. make it
quite clear to the US:R that it must withdraw from the North-
ern Tier immediately--that we cannot tolerate Soviet pres-
ence on Northern Flank.
2. Implications to US.
a. If we don't react militarily and politically, we
can kiss NATO goodbye.
b. If we do, we risk war.
3. US Domestic Reaction. The National Security Council
experienced some difficulty in assessing US domestic reac-
tions. However, from its discussion, the NSC concluded that:
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a. The President's speech of 20 May tended to create
in the minds of the public the view that the situation in
FRG/GDR was an FRG responsibility to be resolved between FRG
and USSR with US,assistance short of military involvement.
b. The subsequent actions involving the FRG 9th Divi-
sion and its pursuit onto FRG territory by Soviet troops
would undoubtedly initiate a shift of public opinion in
favor of FRG and also tilt it more sharply against the USSR.
c. The foregoing tilt of public opinion against the
USSR would be reinforced by Soviet actions in Norway.
d. The nation is deeply concerned, but feelings are
mixed and subject to being coalesced by Presidential leader-
ship.
4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.
a. Alliance waiting on US initiative.
b. So long as US assumes its role of NATO leader-
ship with decisive and sensible proposals designed to limit
the confrontation, the alliance will follow the lead--prob-
ably including the French.
c. If the US is indecisive, the Allies will make
their own accommodations with the situation and NATO will
no longer be a viable alliance.
1. Short Range.
a. To restore peace in Europe on the basis of the
status quo ante.
b. To keep military action as contained as possible.
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c. To press for Soviet withdrawal from Germany
(FRG) through political and limited military action.
d. To deter any further Soviet military action
against the Northern Flank and press for Soviet withdrawal
(if they remain) through combined political and military
action.
e. To deter any further FRG independent military
action outside its own territory.
f. To stimulate further popular dissension in Eastern
Europe.
2. Long Range.
a. Continue to deny domination of Europe by the
b. Regard a strong NATO as an essential instrument
in this objective and deter war in Europe. Achieve a
strengthening of the political consultative process and an
improved military posture.
c. Deplore the continued USSR repressive moves in
Eastern Europe. After the current situation is resolved,
initiate political and economic actions vis-a-vis the USSR
designed to induce it to adjust its repressive policies
and allow self-determination by Eastern European Nations.
d. Continue most-favored-nation relationship with
the US dependent upon Soviet abandonment of military sup-
ported repression.
1. Contain the military action, taking necessary mili-
tary measures on our own side.
2. Launch all-out major political action to gain world-
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wide support for the necessary moves including the UN,
Third 'World, etc.
3. Through strong leadership in NATO, project an image
of strength and resolve.
4. Do all possible to convince the USSR our goal is only
re-establishment of the status quo ante.
J?olitical.
a. The President of the United States will address
a joint session of Congress on May 22 in order to inform
America and the world that the situation has changed con-
siderably since his message of May 20th--in that there are
now clear indications of Soviet aggressive interests. He
would conclude that the situation is so critical that he
has declared a state of emergency and will begin taking
precautionary military actions.
b. Inform the Soviets that we still do not condone
the actions of the 6th Division but find the rescue efforts
of the 9th Division more understandable. Also, that we
view their landing troops in Norway and issuing an ulti-
matum regarding Bornholm Island as unjustified and a clear
threat to NATO. Propose that there should be an immediate
cease-fire in Germany and the return of all Soviet troops to
their own territory. This communication to be couched in
such, forceful terms that it could be assumed by the Soviets
that we are prepared to meet force with force.
c. Request a meeting of the UN Security Council and
submit resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal
of Soviet troops.
d. Send an important highly visible delegation to
.eking for consultation with the Communist Chinese.
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e. Hold very frank high level talk with the Germans
including military participants, pointing out the grave
dangers in present situation. Insist on full German sup-
port to achieve cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. Warn
FRG that we will not tolerate any further military actions
beyond their borders.
f. Inform all NATO governments, particularly Oslo
and Copenhagen, of the specific US political and military
moves in process. Seek full NATO support including Rein-
forced Alert.
g. Seek French support, including the EC, NATO and
bilateral military channels.
h. Approach the Norwegians concerning the deployment
of nuclear weapons (see military moves).
2. Military.
a. Set DEFCON II; seek NATO Reinforced Alert and
institute movement of Belgian and Netherland troops for-
ward while moving nuclear weapons to field positions. Addi-
tional national instructions will be issued for security
of weapons in area of combat operations.
b. Call up 1,000,000 Reserve and Guard forces under
declaration of National Emergency including deployment of
fillers.
c. Deploy REFORGER/CRESTED CAP forces to Germany and
Norway (2 USAF squadrons with nuclear weapons, assuming
Norwegian government approval). Alert 2 plus 10 and LOCPORT.
d. Alert services for need to deploy forces from the
Pacific.
e. Deploy ACE Mobile Force to Bornholm Island.
f. Deploy US Army battalion as adjunct to UK force in
Germany. Ask UK to deploy division behind FRG 9th Division
and allow it to withdraw through the combined US-UK force.
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Q. Direct Strike Fleet LANT (with embarked marine
Amphibious Brigade) to proceed to northern Norwegian Sea.
h. Assemble and target US Special Forces.
i. Deploy submarine forces to northern Norwegian Sea.
3. Economic.
a. Assuming that there is a significant level of
US/USSR trade essential to USSR, stop US trade immediately
pending satisfactory outcome.
Request Allies to do same.
cl. Freeze Soviet assets in US -- seek Congressional
action, if necessary.
:. P hological.
a.. Exploit political moves.
b. Through RIAS, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe,,
inform people of GDR, Poland and USSR of Russian aggression
and repression. Feed the fires of rebellion.
u. Initiate controlled leaks from Washington and the
field on further moves by US.
=1ctions by Others. Actions S-
1. If military action 1. Respond with appropriate
:.escalates. military action.
2. If Soviets agree to 2. Accept or reject.
accept cease-fire in place.
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Actions by Others. Actions by US.
3. If Allies refuse to 3a. We continue with such
positively react to US Allies as are prepared to
leadership. join us.
3b. Disengage.
3c. Attempt to develop
Allied consensus for a
political solution, e.g.?
acceptance of neutraliza-
tion of FRG.
4. If Soviets launch 4. We take appropriate
broader campaigns of measures to counter.
intimidation on southern
flank, Iceland, Berlin
or at sea.
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1. Ref.: Blue ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, US Domestic
Reaction, paragraph 3: More than a third dissented believing
that is the circumstances postulated, i.e., given FRG troop
initiative and the Presidential statement laying blame on
the FRG -- and the US domestic attitude would be strongly
opposed to taking vigorous action in support of the FRG.
2. Ref.: Blue ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, NATO/Allied
Views and Attitudes, paragraph 4: See Dissenting Opinion,,
paragraph 1 above, US Domestic Reaction. Allied attitudes
also expected to be very negative to supporting the FRG.
:3. Ref.: Blue OBJECTIVES, Short Range, paragraph lf:
Paragraph if is inconsistent with la and lb. Further, the
US is asking the USSR to abandon its repressive tactics in
Eastern Europe. Stimulation of more dissension would exacer-
bate the situation and cause more Soviet military repressive
actions.
i1. Ref.: Blue OBJECTIVES, Long Range, paragraphs 2 and
a. A minority view held that there should be post-
hostilities negotiations to create a sanitized zone on
either side of the FRG/GDR border in which there would be
no stationed or indigenous military forces allowed.
b. About one third dissented believing that this
objective (paragraph 2d) should be dropped in the light of
increasing evidence of USSR aggressive intent. At a later
time the most-favored-nation relationship with the USSR
would be reconsidered.
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FROM GREEN
MESSAGE NO. 201
TO CONTROL
MOVE NO.
II
REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 201
DTG
220200 MAY 76
1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.
In the past 24 hours, our ambassadors have reported
an intense Soviet diplomatic initiative branding FRG as an
"aggressor" and demanding neutrality in this situation to
weaken NATO support of this "isolated FRG invasion." In
several capitals this is having a major impact, particular-
ly because of internal dissension, and exaggerated reports
by US media of political dissension in US. At least some
Soviet intentions are clear:
a. To fragment NATO by selective pressures, hopefully
short of armed conflict where feasible; to neutralize Nor-
way and Denmark; to disarm FRG.
b. Full scope of Soviet objectives may extend beyond
Norway, Denmark and FRG.
c. However, the extent of risks the Soviets are pre-
pared to take is not yet clear.
d. The Soviets are carrying out a pre-planned program,
as revealed by the chronology of events, for which the FRG
incursion into the GDR has provided an opportune pretext.
e. The Soviet move against Bornholm may have some
association with the Soviet incursion into the FRG; however,
it serves as a possible means to neutralize Denmark.
f. Large scale moves in USSR, in spite of Soviet
forces in GDR more than adequate to handle the local FRG
incursion, indicate the current situation in FRG is not ad
hoc.
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g. In view of the unstable situation in rear of Soviet
frontal forces, Soviet intentions appear to be more far-
reaching than just maintaining hegemony in Europe.
h. The USSR moves create a two-dimensional problem
for NATO and US:
(1) The landing on Norwegian soil and threat
against Bornholm reveal a broad aggressive tendency, and
(2) While it has acted with irresponsibility in
invading West Germany, its actions there have some plausi-
bility because of the indefensible West German troop move-
ment into the GDR.
:2. Implications to US.
a. The Soviets are now confronting us directly and
challenging US leadership of NATO and the free world.
b. They are attempting to deal a deathblow to NATO,
which is essential to US security.
c. It is contrary to US interests to have a demili-
tarized Germany in light of the high probability of its
eventually being brought into the Soviet sphere from the
vacuum its demilitarization would create.
d. The Soviets are abandoning, at least for a time,
their policy of detente with the West; and
e. They'are forcing a test as to which of our allies
are really with us and how far these allies -- and we --
are prepared to go.
:3. US Domestic Reaction.
The past forty-eight hours have seen an intensifica-
tion of feeling and public expression about the crisis in
Europe.. The President's speech calmed the nation tempo=
rarity,, but the Soviet movement into the FRG has prompted
large scale demonstrations in Washington and other major
US cities -- both for and against a strong US and NATO re-
sponse to the Soviets.
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4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.
a. NATO has reached a point of decision on its via-
bility. In assessing reactions of the US public and those
of our NATO allies, it should be remembered that few of the
NATO national governments have the political leverage of
those of Adenauer, De Gaulle or Roosevelt. A decreasing
proportion of the population remembers World War II while
increased numbers of the electorate remember Vietnam. Re-
flecting the 1972 situation, government majorities are thin
or depend on coalitions to govern. Thus, the US and Allied
governments have greater challenges in leading their publics
to the consensus necessary to support the risky course upon
which the alliance is embarked.
b. The US restatement of faith in, and support of the
NATO Alliance and the strong US position in the present cir-
cumstances gives promise of obtaining the full support of
our NATO allies. Over the past 25 years, they have backed
strong US leadership.
c. The President's action in putting US armed forces
in Norway and asking the UK to do the same in Bornholm; his
recommendation to the MAC to declare a state of Reinforced
Alert; his placement of USEUCOM forces under SACEUR Opera-
tional Command; and other US measures addressing the situa-
tion, reflect US leadership and responsibility and have
given courage and stiffening resolution to the NATO Alliance.
d. NATO will undertake to have France associate and
harmonize its military actions with those of other Alliance
members, as a minimum, and to come under the military struc-
ture again.
e. There is strong pressure on SACEUR to specify ac-
tions he would propose with assessments of their likely
effectiveness.
f. The NATO Military Committee and the Defense Plan-
ning Committee will have before them an assessment from
SACEUR -- including his actions, intentions and recommenda-
tions. Contained in this assessment are specific measures
requiring consideration and decision -- to include the
actions listed under Political Moves.
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OBJECTIVES
In addition to those listed in Message 101:
1. Short Range.
a. To clarify the intentions of individual allies
and to promote NATO solidarity and resolve.
b. By NATO, UK, and US deployments and other positive
political and military actions, encourage Norway and Den-
mark to remain in NATO, thus to put USSR on notice that
further aggression will be against the US as well as the
full NATO Alliance.
By positive NATO actions discourage the USSR
invasion of FRG.
2. Long Range. No change.
The underlying presumptions of US strategy are the
reliability of our society, the responsiveness of our
armed forces, and the viability of our deterrent powers.
Keeping the situation as cool as consistent with our
objectives, we recognize that a new global situation
has been created; we cannot return to the status quo
ante. We must separate the issues of Norway and Denmark,
where no provocation has occurred from the German situa-
Lion, where an excuse for Soviet action occurred.
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Our actions will fall into two categories:
1. Blocking Actions:
a. Appropriate alerting of US and other NATO forces.
b. Landthg,of 'US forces in North Norway, not in
confrontation with USSR troops, with mobile radars to take
the place of those captured by the Soviets; thereby assert-
ing a direct US interest and concern for US security.
c. Landing of US or UK forces in Denmark (includ-
ing Bornholm) to require the Soviets to face the decision
whether to directly confront allied forces there.
2. Exploiting actions:
a. President alerts the world to the present grave
challenge, calls on world to draw conclusions from circum-
stances described; states world has become too small for
such 19th Century power politics and "salami strategy."
b. Using forums of the UN (not however to cut off
Soviet lines of retreat) and in CSCE, inform Soviets that
they may jeopardize economic relations.
c. We will use the Norway-Denmark situations to give
earnest of US leadership in NATO, to hold the two nations
in NATO and to encourage the Alliance solidarity necessary
to deal with situations on - the. northern flank and the FRG
on a solid NATO basis.
1. Political.
a. Submit following proposals/requests to the North
Atlantic Council (the Military Committee and Defense Plan-
ning Committee) for their consideration and decision:
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(1) That the Allied Mobile Force (Land) be formed
and deployed to Northern Norway; that the Allied Mobile
Force (Air) be formed and elements moved into Northern
Norway and Denmark (including Bornholm); and that mobile
radars be moved into both North Norway and Bornholm.
(2) That Reinforced Alert be declared throughout
(3) That steps consistent with (2) above be taken
on a unilateral or bilateral basis pending definitive action
in the NATO DPC (including, for example, the move of UK
forces into Norway and Bornholm).
(4) That SACLANT, under his MARCONFORLANT plans,
deploy a Marine battalion with its air support to North
Norway; and plans and prepares to provide military support
to SACEUR for closure of the Baltic Straits.
(5) That an approach be made to the French to com-
mit the II French Corps (in Germany) to ACE operational
control and to ask for dispersion of Allied aircraft to
France.
(6) That, regarding the situation in the Luebeck
area, NATO take action to achieve a cease-fire and a stand-
still followed by the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces
to the GDR, and the relief in place of FRG units in the area
by Canadian, French, and other allied forces.
b. US Ambassador will inform host governments that
the situation is a clear test of NATO solidarity; that US
reguarantees the integrity of FRG and all other NATO terri-
tory, that US support is complete and can best be measured
by US actions -- to include those in Norway and in placing
our forces under SACEUR's operational command.
c. US Ambassador to USSR will inform Foreign Minister
that we will not stand by while integrity of NATO is threaten-
ed; NATO has value to US; we cannot allow the precedent for
such Soviet action to be established.
ci. Drawing from the President's speeches, US Ambassador
to UN will. present the US-NATO case to the UN Security Council
and to the world.
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e. Request the British and Danes to send UK Marine
Commando forces to occupy Bornholm with radars (and air-
craft).
f. President on Hot Line and in speech to world re-
jects Soviet demands for demilitarization of Germany and
demands that Soviets withdraw "immediately" from all in-
vaded territory. In private., President specifies things
the Soviets must do: (1) "immediately " and (2) later.
g. Continue to press Soviets not to export their in-
ternal troubles in East Europe to NATO territory.
h. Demand FRG return its forces to SACEUR control,
cease independent FRG military actions; prepare for a cease-
fire, standstill, and the relief in place of FRG units in
the crisis area by other allied forces.
i. Explore with French, Canadians, Brazilians and
Italians the need for forces to be interpositioned between
the West German and Soviet troops.
j. Consult with UK and France on the US-UK-French
Tripartite responsibility for Germany as basis for re-
approach to Germans (h above) and Soviets -- proposing to
Soviets: Cease-fire, standstill, disengagement, and inter-
position between FRG and GDR/Soviet forces of other forces.
These may be (as determined in discussion with allies)
Canadian Air Mobile Group (moved in advance to a nearby
area, as presently practiced); French forces, or perhaps
Brazilian or Italian,
2. Military.
a. Place SAC on highest alert short of orbit; mobilize
Reserve forces, CRAF, Reserve fleet; prepare to reinstate
Selective Service; intensify all sources of intelligence/
surveillance of USSR/Warsaw Pact.
b. Order all SSBN to sea on stations.
c. Order CINCLANT to land Marines with mobile radars
in the Finnmark area of North Norway and to restore radar
coverage as feasible. Do not chop these forces to SACLANT
unless NAC approves proposal outlined in la(4).
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d. Chop USECOM forces to operational command of
SACEUR.
e. If NAC fails to declare a state of Reinforced
Alert, have SACEUR declare Orange or Scarlet Alert which-
ever he deems most appropriate, taking no steps incon-
sistent with execution of operations plans.
f. If Denmark agrees, move an Allied airborne or air-
mobile battalion-size unit to Bornholm to show additional
flags; alternatively, if UK agrees to go, support the move
of UK force (about a battalion) with radar and with air
elements, to Bornholm.
g. Start actual movement of US specialists and fillers
as well as some NATO-committed units to Europe (all Services),
including REF'ORGER/CRESTED CAP.
h. Conduct intensive troop information campaign through-
out US forces to explain nature of crisis and need for action.
The purpose of this campaign would be to counter what would
undoubtedly be a major Soviet effort against not only US
public opinion but against US Armed Forces.
i. Approach French on use of French airfields for dis-
persion and land areas for stockpiling.
j. Further prepare to open LOC in France or Belgium
as determined by results of negotiations with both.
k. Take actions to reposition US nuclear forces con-
sistent with defense plans but avoiding any measures which
would exacerbate the crisis.
1. Review tactical nuclear planning in contemplation
of actions: Cl) under SACLANT and SACEUR operational com-
mand; and; (2) by the US with only a few allies.
m. Assist SACEUR in continuing assessment of southern
flank through use of USECOM integral theater intelligence
capability.
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3. Economic.
a. Suspend all trade with USSR and urge same course
on the EEC.
b. Institute monetary exchange controls and urge
same for EC.
c. Reinstitute wage and price controls in the US and
urge same course in EC.
d. Approach OPEC governments with the aim of preparing
for controlled petroleum purchasing agreements.
e. Initiate stockpile purchasing consistent with (c)
f. Seek agreement with EC to suspend tariff and non-
tariff barriers between US/Canada/EC.
g. Consider imposing full margin requirements on stock
exchange trading.
4. Psychological.
a. Presidential statement calling on FRG and Soviet
Governments to act responsibly, cease-fire, disengage
forces, etc.; highlight danger to peace; focus on Soviet
moves in Norway (and Bornholm) and announce dispatch of US
and allied forces to Northern Norway and Bornholm to
establish and protect electronic capabilities; stress ap-
parent regression in Soviet policy, call for NATO unity
and concerted action.
b. All US Government media to stress Soviet responsi-
bility for posing dangers to peace through failure to deal
with problems in Eastern Europe in an enlightened manner.
c. Use the UN as a psychological forum to explain
the US-NATO position to the world.
d. Take steps to explain to the public and our Armed
Forces the need and justification for US and NATO actions
taken and contemplated.
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5. other. None.
Action by Others.
1. Refuses to cease actions
in Northern Germany and re-
iterates its demand for de-
militarization and neutrali-
zation of Germany, stating
it will not settle for any-
thing less.
Actions by US.
1. Make a clear and
credible threat of es-
calation. First, by
involving other nations
in the fight in North-
ern Germany. (US partici-
pation will be essential.)
Massive air support will
be provided to retreating
forces to include attacks
against all Soviet units
in the FRG. Initially,
the attacks would be
restricted to FRG terri-
tory. If our actions
do not have the desired
effect, the air attacks
would be expanded to in-
clude GDR territory.
Immediate consideration
will be given to use of
tactical nuclear weapons
on a very controlled
and selective basis to
achieve both a military
effect as well as to
demonstrate resolve.
Such immediate consider-
ation is necessary in
order that we are fully
prepared to prevent over-
run of Northern Germany
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Action by Others.
2. Declares that deployment
of US forces to Northern
Norway is a clear threat to
the Soviets and announces
movement of Soviet units
into Finnmark.
Actions by US.
and the inevitable d
struction of NATO.
2. Face the reality of
the situation, i.e., we
cannot prevent the in-
vasion of Northern Nor-
way (Finnmark). Any
force the US can bring
to bear in the near
term would be relatively
small. Large deploy-
ments would take time
and would fragment our
military capability.
US forces are needed in
other more critical
places. However, the
invasion of Norway can-
not be isolated from
larger issues. It must
be considered as part
of the larger problem
of an invasion of NATO.
The President will signal
to the Soviets that we
consider the invasion of
Norway an attack on the
US and that our response
will not necessarily be
in kind nor limited to
the specific area (Finn-
mark) under attack. In
this regard, we will
examine carefully areas
of Soviet vulnerability
particularly in the North
with a view towards
exerting countermeasures.
3. Expands the conflict to
other parts of Germany where
3. Take action to bring
NATO forces to bear,
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Action by Others.
FRG forces are deployed and
to other areas such as the
Mediterranean.
Actions by US.
under NATO control, to
repel invasion; and take
those actions outlined
in Contingency 1. The
Soviet action should
demonstrate to all nations
that the Warsaw Pact is
attacking the NATO Al-
liance and that cohesive-
ness is essential to the
survival of all.
4. Takes Hamburg and announces
it has accomplished its im-
mediate military objective and
now will take only defensive
actions. States further that
it will withdraw its forces
as soon as agreement is reached
on measures to prevent a recur-
rence. Takes no further action
in northern areas.
4. Reject Soviet state-
ments. Will continue
military operations as
long as Soviets refuse
to withdraw their military
forces from NATO territory
(Norway and the FRG).
The Soviet action is
designed to present US
Allies with a fait
accompli, and to con-
vince them that they are
better off not escalating
war on broad front. If
the US/NATO accepted the
Soviet terms, the Soviets
and our Allies would be
convinced that the
Warsaw Pact can take
action with impunity.
The result would be the
dissolution of NATO. We
must reestablish the in-
tegrity of NATO territory.
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FROM CONTROL
MESSAGE NO. 301
TO BLUE
MOVE NO.
III
REFERENCE BLUE MSG 201
DTG
232200 MAY 76
During the 22nd of May, the juggernaut of war gathered
momentum as the tempo of fighting increased along the.Ger-
man frontier. Soviet divisions struck westward in pursuit
of the battered and retreating FRG 9th Division while all
contact with the ill-fated FRG 6th Division had been lost
and fleeing refugees reported that it had been cruelly an-
nihilated. Brushing all opposition from their path, Soviet
forces engulfed Luebeck and advanced on a wide front into
West Germany to a depth of thirty kilometers. US and UK
units, with the consent of Chancellor Barzel, were franti-
cally preparing to move northward and interpose themselves
between FRG and Soviet forces in the frail hope that the
disaster could be halted without further bloodshed. Soviet
and FRG tactical fighters carried out sustained close air
support missions on an around-the-clock basis in the areas
of heaviest fighting. Adding to the already desperate sit-
uation, ominous intelligence reports cited the massing of
great numbers of Soviet troops along the entire GDR and
Czechoslovakian borders.
In Norway, Soviet naval infantry units dug in around
the surveillance sites which they had so recently overrun.
Valiant groups of stunned Norwegian troops hopelessly at-
tempted to retake the lost installations. Mobilization
was ordered by the King and available forces were rushed
northward to man the pre-selected Tromso Defense Line. As
US tactical air units -- without nuclear ordnance -- were
enroute to Bodo, Canadian and United Kingdom air forces
were preparing for deployment to Norway.
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As hopes for peace faded, dissension deepened among the
Allies. The NAC, which had been in continuous session,
seemed paralyzed by indecision. The United States Ambas-
sador to NATO, in an unusual plea to the Council, expressed
the deepest fears of his government by stating, "If the Al-
lies did not act unanimously in this most critical test of
NATO, the entire Alliance would become meaningless." In
unequivocal terms, he assured the Council that the Alliance
had the total support of the United States. He urged that
all members employ all means to press the Kremlin into ac-
cepting a cease-fire and withdrawing to their antebellum
positions. With the obvious reference to the German dele-
gate, he closed his remarks by stressing, "Every member of
the Alliance must act immediately, at whatever national
cost, to end the conflict that might well, within hours,
bring the world to war."
Though the United States had made known the action it
intended to take, it could rally little enthusiasm and less
support for them in the Council. The motions to declare a
Reinforced Alert and to deploy the AMF to Norway were taken
under advisement in an obvious attempt to forestall approval
which would commit the Alliance to a crisis that many still
felt might not involve them. In further moves, the United
States urged both unilateral and bilateral actions while
the Council debated its willingness to live up-to its treaty
obligations.
France was entreated to join its sister states, to pro-
vide forces, and again put its lines of communications into
the common cause of Europe -- but to no avail. With the
exception of British and Canadian air units, no nation was
willing to support Washington's call for military commit-
ments. Norway, in a concession to US desires (following
SACEUR's declaration of State SCARLET for US forces), de-
clared State SCARLET for that country; Denmark declared
State ORANGE. Further US motions to donduct mining opera-
tions in the Baltic and to deploy mobile radars to Norway
were flatly rejected by the NAC.
At 2100 hours on the evening of 22 May, the President,
as he had done two days previously, after conferring with
the Congress, addressed a deeply divided and distraught
nation by television. "My fellow Americans, the situation
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in Europe has changed dramatically since I last spoke to
you. The crisis which we had hoped to contain and bring
to a swift conclusion has become even more serious. The
Soviet Union has failed to heed the pleas of the world.
In spite of all gestures of goodwill, it has continued to
challenge the peace of the Free World. I have been in con-
stant communications with the leaders of that intransigent
nation. I have called upon them -- and the leaders of
other concerned nations -- to consider the devastation and
misery that war inescapably brings to mankind. Repeatedly,
I have urged an immediate cease-fire and an immediate res-
toration of the status quo ante. I have offered every con-
cession honorable for the United States, but to no avail.
Consequently, to prove our resolve to the world, I am
forced to declare a,state of national emergency. With the
consent of Congress, I have directed that our reserve units
and National Guard units report for active duty. I have
further ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to deploy our continental NATO-committed forces to the
Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, I have directed
that a naval carrier task group, accompanied by Marine
units, be deployed to the Norwegian Sea. I have further
instructed our nation's military commanders to move our
submarine forces to sea and to ready our nuclear and con-
ventional forces' throughout the world in preparation for
any contingency. In order to demonstrate further our re-
solve, I have directed the cessation of all trade with the
Soviet Union and the freezing of all of that nation's as-
sets in this country. Additionally, I have called for
stringent domestic and international economic and trade
measures to take effect immediately.
I am well aware of the concern and reluctance of our
citizens to commit ourselves to such involvements, but the
strength of America has been.in its willingness to uphold
the rights of free men everywhere and to honor its treaty
obligations in the cause of freedom. I know of no better
way to convince our enemies and to reassure our allies
than demonstrating by such measures that, however abhor-
rent, we are prepared to stop aggression, and, by force,
should that become necessary."
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Throughout the night of the 22nd and.23rd the sense of
futility and foreboding grew as diplomatic efforts to stem
the conflict failed. US and Soviet ambassadors worldwide
vied with one another to rally support for their country's
positions. The Soviet Union incessantly repeated protesta-
tions that it sought no more than the demilitarization and
neutralization of the two Germanies in the interests of
world peace. At an emergency session.of the United Nations
Security Council, the United States deplored Moscow's
actions, recommended an international peacekeeping force,
and applauded a PRC resolution denouncing the USSR and the
GDR as "aggressor nations." Shortly thereafter, France
proposed an immediate cease-fire and establishment of a
fifty kilometer "force free" zone between the two Germanies.
Neither resolution was accepted and the Security'Council
became mired down in a morass of bitter harangues, charges
and countercharges.
THE CRISIS
Events on the morning of the 23rd of May did little to
relieve the Free World's anxiety. Although the New York
Times had reported widespread rioting and terrorism in the
GDR and Poland, there was no evidence that this unrest had
caused any hesitation in the Kremlin's relentless westward
drive into the FRG.
Soviet units were reported to be in the Bad Bramstedt
area, remaining north of Hamburg, but still pursuing the
routed 9th Division. Rumors circulated that Chancellor
Barzel had ordered the 1st Armored Division from Hanover
to assist his retreating forces. Governments were relieved,
however, when the FRG reported to the NAC that the Federal
Republic of Germany was committing its military forces to
SACEUR's operational control. Their optimism was short-
lived, however, when shortly after noon, US intelligence
sources reported tank elements of the 1st Division were
approaching the Hamburg area on Autobahn-E4. By mid-
afternoon, the lst Division commander reported to Bonn
that he had made contact with flank elements of two Soviet
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divisions. By 1700 on 23 May, UPI verified the new FRG
clash. Stunned diplomats contemplated the awesome impli-
cations as Europe slipped closer to war. Events in the
"Northern Tier" did little to allay their fears that NATO's
once-formidable image was crumbling. The Norwegian Prime
Minister informed the US Ambassador that he had delivered
a note to the Soviet Government officials informing them
that all surveillance sites in the Finnmark area were being
closed and evacuated. However, the note stated that the
Norwegian Government had no intention of capitulating to
the Soviet Union and would continue to fight to the last
man so long as the invading troops remained on Norwegian
soil. The US Ambassador was further advised that Norway
had no intention of reestablishing the sites which had
been evacuated in Finnmark unless the US Government would
agree to use its air units in Bodo to assist the Norwegian
military forces in dislodging the Soviets from their strong-
holds in Mageroy, Berlevaag and Vardo.
Denmark, after consultation with the Norwegian Prime
Minister, informed the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the
surveillance site on Bornholm Island had been closed and
would remain inoperative. At the same time, the US Govern-
ment and NATO members were informed that although Denmark
had mobilized its military forces, it did not desire mili-
tary assistance and that any consideration of using Allied
military units to thwart Soviet pressure on Bornholm Island
would not be approved by the Danish Government.
Wearied and near-disheartened Washington officials again
awaited latest reports from the field in the effort to pre-
pare new options for presentation to the NSC:
AMEMB BONN 232000 MAY 76.
I have been in constant touch with Barzel. He demands
immediate NATO and/or US assistance. I have advised him of
folly of attempting to repulse Soviets and have stated in
strongest terms that he should call off FRG forces and de-
clare immediate cessation of all FRG military action.
COMMENT: FRG is in upheaval; political opposition,
parties and populists may openly rebel against Barzel and
form government willing to grant Soviets extensive conces-
sions for sake of peace. Request advise.
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AMEMB MOSCOW 232100 MAY 76.
I have just learned of FRG insanity. Polyansky in-
formed me of 1st FRG Division's venture when I went to re-
lay US demand for cease-fire. Although he is concerned
over FRG action, and the fact that NATO will not tolerate
a violation to its territory, he appeared to be calm and
confident. He indicated that FRG action is futile and can-
not deter Soviets from their firm and only goal of final
demilitarization and neutralization of the two Germanies.
Satirically, he asked whether I thought Allied responses'
to US appeals were really sufficient to back our demands
for a cease-fire and withdrawal.
COMMENT: I am appalled at FRG move and must agree
with Polyansky that I cannot see advantage in it. Although
Radio Free Europe (RFE) and others have reported dissension
in Pact, I see no signs that this is having adverse effect
on Soviet intentions -- or available military strength.
Polyansky is committed to emasculation of Germany and has
Pact in enough control to carry it out. In short, I be-
lieve that our demand for amicable settlement of crises,
which would be agreeable to all, is no longer valid. Re-
quest instructions.
SACEUR 232130 MAY 76.
:I have received confirmed report that a US nuclear
storage site (SAS) has been overrun by the Soviets. Ex-
act disposition of weapons unknown. Last communications
with site indicated emergency destruction procedures begun.
No report of successful completion. Will advise if further
contact established. An expediting movement of US/UK forces
into position between FRG/Soviets,, but believe this objec-
tive infeasible in light of latest FRG engagement with So-
viets. I have assumed OPCON of FRG forces. Request advise.
The time is now 232200 May 1976.
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CHRONOLOGY
22 May
Soviets penetrate 30 km into FRG
Luebeck engulfed
Soviet-FRG close air support committed
Soviets reinforce GDR and Czech borders
Norway mobilizes
US air units arrive Bodo
NAC refuses AMF deployment; rejects
resolution for reinforced alert
SACEUR declares SCARLET alert
Norway declares SCARLET alert
Denmark declares ORANGE alert
23 May
President addresses nation; declares
state of national emergency
Soviets advance to Bad Bramstedt
(Noon)
Barzel orders 1st Division against Soviets
(Early PM) -
German forces chop to SACEUR
(PM)
Norway shuts down all Finnmark sites
(PM)
Denmark rejects Allied assistance
(PM)
SAS site overrun
(Late
PM)
Barzel requests US/NATO assistance
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FROM BLUE
MESSAGE NO. 301
TO CONTROL
MOVE NO.
III
REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301
DTG
232200 MAY 76
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
1. Protagonists' Objectives/Motivations.
a. Soviet: To achieve, at least, the neutralization
of Germany, but probably in the context of the wider objec-
tive of establishing Soviet domination of all of Western
Europe.
b. US-NATO: To obtain a cease-fire and withdrawal
of Soviet forces in both Germany and the north in order to
frustrate Soviet domination of Western Europe.
2. Implications to US. No change.
3. US Domestic Reaction.
Faced with the fact of continued Soviet aggression,
the consensus of US opinion will be to support the Presi-
dent -- especially if Congress is consulted and concurs with
each major step.
4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.
a. NATO does not accept the situation as being a
basic threat to the Alliance.
b. National self-preservation is an overriding factor
and it seems clear that there will be no concerted NATO re-
action regardless of future Soviet moves.
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Short Range.
a. Restore peace in Europe.
b. Keep military action as contained as possible.
c. Test Soviet willingness to use force against US
d? Press for Soviet withdrawal from Germany ;FRG)
-through political and limited military action.
Deter further Soviet action in the Northern Tier.
C. Take advantage of the PRC hostility towards the
USSR to pose a threat to the USSR's eastern flanks.
g. '.sake advantage of fortuitous PRC resolution in UN
to provoke a debate on USSR repressive policies in Eastern
Europe,.
Long Range.
a. Continue to deny domination of Europe by the USSR.
are. Strengthen the consultative process and military
posture of the Alliance.
pitalize on the PRC resolution at the UN which
condemned USSR and GDR by using it to shape public opinion
against the repressive policies of the USSR in Eastern
Europe.
c. Condition American public opinion to permit the
maintenance of a credible US military structure on the
continent and at home.
e. Stimulate further popular dissension in Eastern
Europe.
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STRATEGY
No change.
SPECIFIC MOVES
1. Political.
a. By moving US and UK troops into the path of the
Soviets, we make them face a political as well as a mili-
tary choice. If US troops should come under fire, a
nuclear war could eventuate.
b. Simultaneously, we should bring the strongest
pressure on NATO to react to the crisis.
c. Make high-level approaches to governments of
members of the European communities pointing out once again
the gravity of the situation. Important emphasis would be
put on implications of the Soviet demand for neutralization
of Germany. Such a development would undermine the achieve-
ments and future progress toward. European Union. Thus, the
Europeans themselves have a major stake in achieving a
solution to the current crisis which will restore the status
quo ante. This objective can be achieved without full-scale
war only if the Americans and Europeans put up a strong,
solid front against Soviet moves and demands.
d. Instruct our ambassador in Peking to suggest how
Chinese communists' interests could be served by strength-
ening their forces on the Soviet border.
2. Military.
a. Move US and UK ground forces into positions which
Soviets must engage if they are to continue military opera-
tions.
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Position US forces for early counterattack if So-
v.cts do not accept a cease-fire or withdraw rather than
engage non-German forces.
Order US air and naval forces to use force against
any further Soviet landings in Norway.
Order US air units in Norway to provide air cover
for Norwegian air forces.
=economic. None.
A. Psychological.
Continue world-wide effort to make clear our peace-
ful motives and objectives and expose Soviet moves as un-
dermining stability and detente.
ti.ons by Others.
Actions by US.
1. 1.11 Soviets stop attack and la. Negotiate.
hold present positions.
lb. Counter attack.
Ii Soviets continue advance. 2a. Attack with all con-
ventional weapons avail-
able.
Use tactical nuclear
weapons in salient.
3. Mf Warsaw Pact commences 3a. Execute USCINCEUR
general attack in Europe. War Plan.
. Give up defense of
continental Europe.
I
4
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Actions by Others. Actions by US.
4. If European Allies agree 4a. Continue fighting
to neutralization of both with Canadian, UK and
Germanies. FRG forces.
4b. Agree and stop
fighting.
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DISSENTING OPINION
I. Ref.: Blue SPECIFIC MOVES, Military, paragraphs 2
and 2c.
a. One member of the Blue Team took the position that
by Move III, Soviet motivations strongly suggested an in-
tent to destroy NATO, preferably by political means, but
probably not stopping short of use of military means. In
order to demonstrate absolute US resolve to meet Soviet
force with force and then to confront the Soviets, without
further delay, with a choice of pulling back or taking on
a full scale war, this member would have brought maximum,
available conventional force (air and ground) to bear
against Soviet salient in FRG. He would not have waited
for further repositioning of US and UK forces. He would
not have surrounded the Soviet force, thus giving it the
opportunity to fall back, if it chose not to reinforce
for a full scale invasion.
>. This move is not consistent with the tactics of
positioning US forces so that USSR is faced with decision
to directly attack US units.
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FROM CONTROL
MESSAGE NO. 302
TO GREEN
MOVE NO.
III
REFERENCE GREEN MSG 201
DTG
232200 MAY 76
During the 22nd of May, the juggernaut of war gathered
momentum as the tempo of fighting increased along the Ger-
man frontier. Soviet divisions struck westward in pursuit
of the battered and retreating FRG 9th Division while all
contact with the ill-fated FRG 6th Division had been lost
and fleeing refugees reported that it had been cruelly an-
nihilated. Brushing all opposition from their path, Soviet
forces engulfed Luebeck and advanced on a wide front into
West Germany to a depth of thirty kilometers. US and UK
units, with the consent of Chancellor Barzel, were franti-
cally preparing to move northward and interpose themselves
between FRG and Soviet forces in the frail hope that the
disaster could be halted without further bloodshed. Soviet
and FRG tactical fighters carried out sustained close air
support missions on an around-the-clock basis in the areas
of heaviest fighting. Adding to the already desperate sit-
uation, ominous intelligence reports cited the massing of
great numbers of Soviet troops along the entire GDR and
Czechoslovakian borders.
In Norway, Soviet naval infantry units dug in around
the surveillance sites which they had so recently overrun.
Valiant groups of stunned Norwegian troops hopelessly at-
tempted to retake the lost installations. Mobilization
was ordered by the King and available forces were rushed
northward to man the pre-selected Tromso Defense Line. As
US tactical air units -- without nuclear ordnance -- were
enroute to Bodo, Canadian and United Kingdom air forces
were preparing for deployment to Norway.
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As hopes for peace faded, dissension deepened among the
Allies. The NAC, which had been in continuous session,
seemed paralyzed by indecision. The United States Ambas-
sador to NATO, in an unusual plea to the Council, expressed
the deepest fears of his government by stating, "If the Al-
lies did not act unanimously in this most critical test of
NATO, the entire Alliance would become meaningless." In
unequivocal terms, he assured the Council that the Alliance
had the total support of the United States. He urged that
all members employ all means to press the Kremlin into ac-
cepting a cease-fire and withdrawing to their antebellum
positions. With the obvious reference to the German dele-
gate, he closed his remarks by stressing, "Every member of
the Alliance must act immediately, at whatever national
cost, to end the conflict that might well, within hours,
bring the world to war."
Though the United States had made known the action it
intended to take, it could rally little enthusiasm and less
support for them in the Council. The motions to declare a
Reinforced Alert and to deploy the AMF to Norway were taken
under advisement in an obvious attempt to forestall approval
which would commit the Alliance to a crisis that many still
felt might not involve them. In further moves, the United
states urged both unilateral and bilateral actions while
the Council debated its willingness to live up to its treaty
obligations.
France was entreated to join its sister states, to pro-
vide forces, and again put its lines of communications into
the common cause of Europe -- but to no avail. With the
exception of British and Canadian air units, no nation was
willing to support Washington's call for military commit-
ments. Norway, in a concession to US desires (following
SACEUR's declaration of State SCARLET for US forces), de-
clared State SCARLET for that country; Denmark declared
State ORANGE. Further US motions to conduct mining opera-
tions in the Baltic and to deploy mobile radars to Norway
were flatly rejected by the NAC.
At 2100 hours on the evening of 22 May, the President,
as he had done two days previously, after conferring with
the Congress, addressed a deeply divided and distraught
nation by television. "My fellow Americans, the situation
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in Europe has changed dramatically since I last spoke to
you. The crisis which we had hoped to contain and bring
to a swift conclusion has. become even more serious. The
Soviet Union has failed to heed the pleas of the world.
In spite of all gestures of goodwill, it has continued to
challenge the peace of the Free World. I have been in con-
stant communications with the leaders of that intransigent
nation. I have called upon them -- and the leaders of
other concerned nations -- to consider the devastation and
misery that war inescapably brings to mankind. Repeatedly,
I have urged an immediate cease-fire and an immediate res-
toration of the status quo ante. I have offered every con-
cession honorable for the United States, but to no avail.
Consequently, to prove our resolve to the world, I am
forced to declare a state of national emergency. With the
consent of Congress, I have directed that our reserve units
and National Guard units report for active duty. I have
further ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to deploy our continental NATO-committed forces to the
Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, I have directed
that a naval carrier task group be deployed to the Norwe-
gian Sea to cover debarkation of accompanying Marines
charged with the mission of restoring surveillance by means of
mobile radars. I have further instructed our nation's mil-
itary commanders to move our submarine forces to sea and to
ready our nuclear and conventional forces throughout the
world in preparation for any contingency. In order to dem-
onstrate further our resolve, I have directed the cessation
of all trade with the Soviet Union and the freezing of all
of that nation's assets in this country. Additionally, I
have called for stringent domestic and international eco-
nomic and trade measures to take effect immediately.
I am well aware of the concern and reluctance of our
citizens to commit ourselves to such involvements, but the
strength of America has been in its willingness to uphold
the rights of free men everywhere and to honor its treaty
obligations in the cause of freedom. I know of no better
way to convince our enemies and to reassure our allies
than demonstrating by such measures that, however abhor-
rent, we are prepared to stop aggression, and, by force,
should that become necessary."
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Throughout the night of the 22nd and 23rd the sense of
futility and foreboding grew as diplomatic efforts to stem
the conflict failed. US and Soviet ambassadors worldwide
vied with one another to rally support for their country's
positions. The Soviet Union incessantly repeated protesta-
tions that it sought no more than the demilitarization and
neutralization of the two Germanies in the interests of
world peace. At an emergency session of the United Nations
Security Council, the United States deplored Moscow's
actions, recommended an international peacekeeping force,
and applauded a PRC resolution denouncing the USSR and the
GDR as "aggressor nations." Shortly thereafter, France
proposed an immediate cease-fire and establishment of a
fifty kilometer "force free" zone between the two Germanies.
Neither resolution was accepted and the Security Council
became mired down in a morass of bitter harangues, charges
and countercharges.
Events on the morning of the 23rd of May did little to
relieve the Free World's anxiety. Although the New York
Times had reported widespread rioting and terrorism in the
GDR and Poland, there was no evidence that this unrest had
caused any hesitation in the Kremlin's relentless westward
drive into the FRG.
Soviet units were reported to be in the Bad Bramstedt
area, remaining north of Hamburg, but still pursuing the
routed 9th Division. Rumors circulated that Chancellor
Barzel had ordered the 1st Armored Division from Hanover
to assist his retreating forces. Governments were relieved,
however, when the FRG reported to the NAC that the Federal
Republic of Germany was committing its military forces to
SACEUR's operational control. Their optimism was short-
lived, however, when shortly after noon, US intelligence
sources reported tank elements of the 1st Division were
approaching the Hamburg area on Autobahn E4. By mid-
afternoon, the 1st Division commander reported to Bonn
that he had made contact with flank elements of two Soviet
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divisions. By 1700 on 23 May, UPI verified the new FRG
clash. Stunned diplomats contemplated the awesome impli-
cations as Europe slipped closer to war. Events in the
"Northern Tier" did little to allay their fears that NATO's
once-formidable image was crumbling. The Norwegian Prime
Minister informed the US Ambassador that he had delivered
a note to the Soviet Government officials informing them
that all surveillance sites in the Finnmark area were being
closed and evacuated. However, the note stated that the
Norwegian Government had no intention of capitulating to
the Soviet Union and would continue to fight to the last
man so long as the invading troops remained on Norwegian
soil. The US Ambassador was further advised that Norway
had no intention of reestablishing the sites which had
been evacuated in Finnmark unless the US Government would
use its air units to assist the Norwegian military forces
in dislodging the Soviets from their strongholds in Mageroy,
Berlevaag and Vardo.
Denmark, after consultation with the Norwegian Prime
Minister, informed the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the
surveillance site on Bornholm Island had been closed and
would remain inoperative. At the same time, the US Govern-
ment and NATO members were informed that although Denmark
had mobilized its military forces, it did not desire mili-
tary assistance and that any consideration of using Allied
military units to thwart Soviet pressure on Bornholm Island
would not be approved by the Danish Government.
Wearied and near-disheartened Washington officials again
awaited latest reports from the field in the effort to pre-
pare new options for presentation to the NSC:
AMEMB BONN 232000 MAY 76.
I have been in constant touch with Barzel. He demands
immediate NATO and/or US assistance. I have advised him of
folly of attempting to repulse Soviets and have stated in
strongest terms that he should call off FRG forces and de-
clare immediate cessation of all FRG military action.
COMMENT: FRG is in upheaval; political opposition,
parties and populists may openly rebel against Barzel and
form government willing to grant Soviets extensive conces-
sions for sake of peace. Request advise.
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AMEMB MOSCOW 232100 MAY 76.
I have just learned of FRG insanity. Polyansky in-
formed me of 1st FRG Division's venture when I went to re-
lay US demand for cease-fire. Although he is concerned
over: FRG action, and the fact that NATO will not tolerate
a violation to its territory, he appeared to be calm and
confident. He indicated that FRG action is futile and can-
not deter Soviets from their firm and only goal of final
demilitarization and neutralization of the two Germanies.
Satirically, he asked whether I thought Allied responses
to US appeals were really sufficient to back our demands
for a cease-fire and withdrawal.
COMMENT: I am appalled at FRG move and must agree
with Polyansky that I cannot see advantage in it. Although
Radio Free Europe (RFE) and others have reported dissension
in Pact, I see no signs that this is having adverse effect
on Soviet intentions -- or available military strength.
Polyansky is committed to emasculation of Germany and has
Pact in enough control to carry it out. In short, I be-
lieve that our demand for amicable settlement of crises,
which would be agreeable to all, is no longer valid. Re-
quest instructions.
SACEUR 232130 MAY 76.
I have received confirmed report that a US nuclear
storage site (SAS) has been overrun by the Soviets. Ex-
act disposition of weapons unknown. Last communications
with site indicated emergency destruction procedures begun.
No report of successful completion. Will advise if further
contact established. Am expediting movement of US/UK forces
into position between FRG/Soviets, but believe this objec-
tive infeasible in light of latest FRG engagement with So-
viets. I have assumed OPCON of FRG forces. Request advise.
The time is. now 232200 May 1976.
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CHRONOLOGY
22 May
23 May
(Noon)
(Early PM)
(PM)
(PM)
(PM)
(Late PM)
Soviets penetrate 30 km into FRG
Luebeck.engulfed
Soviet-FRG close air support committed
Soviets reinforce GDR and Czech borders
Norway mobilizes
US air units arrive Bodo
NAC refuses AMF deployment; rejects
resolution for reinforced alert
SACEUR declares SCARLET alert
Norway declares SCARLET alert
Denmark declares ORANGE alert
President addresses nation; declares
state of national emergency
Soviets advance to Bad Bramstedt
Barzel orders 1st Division against Soviets
German forces chop to SACEUR
Norway shuts down all Finnmark sites
Denmark rejects Allied assistance
SAS site overrun
Barzel requests US/NATO assistance
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FROM GREEN
MESSAGE NO.
301
TO CONTROL
MOVE NO.
III
REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301
DTG
232200 MAY 76
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
Objectives/Motivations.
a. Objectives: Possibly to their own,surprise, the
Soviets have found NATO less unified than expected and
military non-nuclear resistance weak. They are striking
for the North Sea to control Schleswig-Holstein and the
Kiel Canal, thereby bypassing the.Danish Straits. The
Soviet action threatens the Bremerhaven LOC as well as the
LOC through Belgium. Soviet objectives in North Norway
remain unclear but see assessments in Messages 101 and 201.
b. Motivation: It appears that the Soviet intent is
to swing through and take Germany, and neutralize and
conquer the bulk of NATO forces before we have the resolve
to use tactical nuclear weapons. Later a defenseless
neutralized Europe will fall easily into the Soviet orbit.
Their motivation can be expressed in a quote from Churchill:
"They seek the fruits of victory without the cost of war." --
or all-out war.
2. Implications to US. Same as Msg 201 plus:
a. Soviets continue to challenge US leadership and
security interests throughout Europe. We have no expectation
that Denmark will successfully defend against the Soviets
either in the south or on Bornholm Island.
b. In FRG, position of NATO partners is clarified,
although unfavorably.
c. The initial range of US actions has failed to stop
Soviet aggression.
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d. US is confronted by need to take action outside of
NATO context, that is, bilaterally or multilaterally.
te. The President is prepared to proceed with US mili-
tary actions to gain maximum support of Alliance members.
E. Gravest implication resides in the fact that if
Soviets do not become realistic and do not desist from rash
adventurism, the world faces nuclear war.
c The President has made it crystal clear that this
unwarranted aggression by the USSR must be repelled at any
cost.
.3. US Domestic Reaction.
a. Congress and people rally to the strong leadership
revealed by the President.
b. Demonstrations against US involvement in the war are
violent in many areas but are met and controlled by resistance
at local levels. Americans recognize Soviet actions for what
they are -- sheer and brutal aggression.
4. NATO/Allied Views and Attitudes.
See Message 201. At the moment, NATO is not function-
ing as an organization to meet the crisis. From a military
standpoint it has failed. Although the position of France
is not clear, France is keenly concerned over the threat to
its security by the invasion of the FRG and in the crunch
will support US actions. The FRG and the UK although resist-
ing the US in its specific actions to meet the crisis will
also support the US in the crunch.
1. Short Range.
a. Restore territorial integrity of FRG.
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b. Deny Baltic exits to USSR.
c. Secure Iceland.
d. Keep NATO together for such future values which,
may be derived from it.
e. Continue to seek a cease-fire on terms consistent
with foregoing objectives.
f. Make a cease-fire more attractive to the Soviets
by political and military actions against USSR interests.
2. Long Range.
These actions of the Soviets have brought into question
the entire basis of US policy toward the USSR over the last
fifteen years. This policy needs to be reformulated and the
full range of Soviet and US options needs to be considered.
We will combine a series of worldwide moves to make it
absolutely clear to the USSR and the world that the US will,
if necessary; use any appropriate level of military force
rather than allow a Soviet conquest of West Germany or its
demilitarization and neutralization.
1. Political.
a. Renew demand to USSR for cease-fire and withdrawal of
troops; otherwise, US air forces will forthwith begin action
against Soviet forces on FRG territory and other Soviet forces
and installations, wherever located, which appear to be in-
volved in or supporting Soviet actions.
b. Inform FRG that allied forces are joining FRG forces
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in North Germany and that the inter-allied commander of
forces engaged is directing operations aimed at restoring
territorial integrity of the FRG.
c. Inform Norwegian Government that US, UK and
Canadian forces are enroute to join Norwegian forces in
defense of Norway.
d. Inform Danish Government that unless it is prepared
to secure approaches to the Baltic, US and other forces will
move to do this forthwith.
e. Face NATO with aforementioned US actions and pose
specific requirements and proposals for NATO actions in
support thereof.
f. Concert action with other governments, particularly
Japan and China, to increase pressure on USSR.
g. Consult with Allied governments to close Mediterranean
and Bosphorous passages.
h. Inform Austrian Government that we will not be the
first to violate Austrian neutrality.
i.. Approach Pact governments and urge them, in their
own interests, to counsel restraint on the part of USSR.
2. Military Moves.
a.. Obtain concurrence of UK and FRG to have US/UK and
FRG officers, who command NATO headquarters, take control in
a tripartite role, using the mechanism of these headquarters
with or without the support of the staff offices from other
NATO nations. Designate SACEUR/CINCEUR as the Inter-Allied
Commander in Chief. These three nations provide the lion's
share of the military forces in Central Europe and all of
the nuclear weapons in the Allied Command.
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b. Move combat units out of Casernes and into their
wartime locations.
c. Overtly increase the alert posture of nuclear units
in the FRG and the UK.
d. Use available air reconnaissance aircraft to
reconnoiter Soviet forces in FRG to demonstrate intention
to provide better intelligence on situation in the battle
areas and to obtain information on lucrative targets in
event air support is subsequently provided.
e. Take necessary actions to protect our forces.
(Deploy Hawk battalions to combat locations, disperse air
units to standby bases, etc.).
f. Evacuate US dependents from Europe.
g. Request French make airfields available for dis-
persion and French land areas for stockpiling, and allow
US to use the French LOC.
h. Mine the Baltic approaches.
i. If cease-fire is not achieved, action will be taken
as outlined under Contingencies in Message 201.
3. Economic. Same as in Message 201 and:
a. Institute excess profits tax.
b. Expedite stockpile purchasing of all critical
materials not available in North America.
c. Institute a substantial increase in all income
tax rates.
4. Psychological. Same as in Message 201.
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CONTINGENCIES
Actions by Others. Actions by US.
If USSR:
US Will:
1. Initiates preparations Insufficient time prohibited
for nuc:Lear preemptive strike. team members from addressing
this aspect of the contingency
2. Announces it will not use equation.
nuclear weapons first.
3. Launches a mass Soviet air-
borne attack in the North
German plain or South of Paris.
4. Conducts an airborne landing
in Iceland and Svalbards.
5. Sets up a puppet West German
Government which appeals to them
for help.
6. Issues an ultimatum to Turkey
demanding free passage through
the Dardanelles into the
Me di to rr. anen an .
7. Produces Communist provoked
insurrections in NATO countries
or at least widespread civil
disturbances with attacks on
SAS sites.
8. Agrees to a cease fire but
demands retention of occupied
FRG territory as punitive
damages.
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EPSILON CRITIQUE
The following is a transcript of the EPSILON 72 Cri-
tique. The text has been edited for minor changes in syn-
tax and the deletion of non-substantive phrases in conso-
nance with SAGA's policy of non-attribution and estab-
lished classification restrictions.
GEN STRACK. Good afternoon, gentlemen. I want to take
this opportunity to thank everyone who has been involved
in the support of EPSILON 72. I would particularly like
to single out the Conference Director and the Team Cap-
tains for their fortitude and efforts.
DIRECTOR. I speak for all of us -- when I express ap-
precia on for the fine staff work which has made this
whole thing possible. I particularly appreciated the ef-
forts and interest shown by the Control Group.
Control decided to do everything we could to paint a
sobering picture; I don't think we totally succeeded, but
we tried hard. I'd like to run through quickly Control's
philosophy. We did not worry too much about plausibility;
but tried to make each situation a challenge. However, we
didn't want to become so implausible that people would have
a mental block about playing the game. Challenge versus
ambiguity -- we had a bit of an argument in Control as to
whether we would pose more difficulty by making an obvious
challenge or an ambiguous situation. I hope we achieved
a happy medium. Our objectives, of course, were to cre-
ate some difficulties for you leading to the kind of team
dialogue which would be most useful.
We talked about bringing in the tactical nuclear weapons
question early in the game but decided that it wasn't that
kind of exercise in the initial stages. We chose to wait
and see what happened. We were interested to find today,
however, that both groups did discuss nuclear weapons.
What were some of the impressions Control received?
First of all, the threat and the need for firm US action
were recognized pretty clearly by both teams. In the
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discussion this morning, one member of the Control Group
suggested that maybe the word "action" was wrong and may-
be what, we should have said was US "statements." But in
the team messages this afternoon, the word "action" is
probably the right word. There was remarkably little un-
productive discussion. One of the Control members sug-
gested we ask, "How much unilateral US action would be
necessary, feasible or likely to cope with the crisis sit-
uation?" -- again this morning's 'session addressed that
question. One member suggested that one lesson from the
game was that we should be doing more contingency thinking
and holding more open discussions on these types of ques-
tions -- Is the NATO structure adequate for the present
day under the kinds of stress that we tried to play? Is
Norway really worth defending?
I'd now like to call on Blue and Green Teams for a
brief resume of their approaches and rationale.
BLUE. Let me say a few things about the scenario in
terms of how our team reacted to it. At the outset, it's
fair to say that most of us felt that the NATO/Soviet re-
action was really not that unreasonable. A German force
-- which was not authorized to do so -- was provoked into
crossing into Eastern Europe. The Blue Team, and we as-
sumed our Allies, were as upset about this action as were
the Soviets. It didn't surprise us that the Soviets en-
gaged this German group in force. Of course, we had grave
uncertainties about Soviet intentions. Some of us ques-
tioned whether, in the circumstances postulated, we would
have either domestic US or Allied support to do very much
in response to the German moves -- even though the Germans
were getting clobbered. We tried, however, to hedge a
little bit until the extent of Soviet actions and motiva-
tions was more clearly determined.
We intended our Presidential statement to portray the
hopeful assessment that the Soviets probably had no agres-
sive intentions. However, this statement also was to
warn the Soviets clearly that if they attempted to capi-
talize on the situation, we would react vigorously. The
second half of the message apparently was lost somewhere
in Control -- maybe it was our fault for not making it
clear enough. As a result, the President's statement
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almost certainly would have crystallized US public opinion
against doing anything to help the Germans.
As the scenario progressed, it became-clear that the
Soviets were going to move aggressively into Western ter-
ritory. Accordingly, a key move on our part was to at-
tempt to interpose British and US forces in the line of ad-
vance of the Soviet units. By this action we thought that
we could test the real motivations of the Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, Control decided that they did not want that
to happen. By the Third Move, we came to another critical
juncture in our deliberations prompted by the ambiguity
of Soviet motivations. We repeated our attempt to inter-
pose British and US forces to clarify Soviet intentions.
There was one minority view, however, that held that
Soviet aggressive intentions were pretty clear by that
time. This faction would have been willing to exercise
immediately whatever conventional capability we had
against the Soviet salient into West Germany -- not with
the intent of cutting it off, but rather, driving it back.
Under this particular view, we should hit them as hard as
we could with whatever conventional capability we had . . .
but not with nuclear weapons. The remainder of the team,
however, felt that it was much too dangerous to adopt this
tactic at that point. In their opinion, the Soviets had
not really disclosed just how serious they were about driv-
ing forward militarily and to take the action just de-
scribed would be the equivalent of inviting the full in-
tervention of Soviet units mobilizing on the Czech border.
Even by the Third Move, there were still some differ-
ences as to how the team should react. Some concluded
that the Soviet motivation was, at a minimum, the neutral-
ization of Germany. On the other hand, some viewed the
Soviet move as a punitive action to get rid of the 6th
FRG Division. All of our team felt that to agree to the
neutralization of Germany was tantamount to ending the ef-
fectiveness of NATO. It would not only have taken the
Germans out of NATO but it would have demonstrated clearly
our inadequacy in terms of applying military force against
Soviet pressure.
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I would like others to talk a little about the Norweq-
ian excursion. I felt we acted much too mildly in this
instance. Granted, it was a small exercise, relatively
speaking, and diversionary from the main thrust in the
center of Europe, but there were Norwegians getting killed
and there were Soviet troops occupying Norwegian terri-
tory. Trying to figure out when to send a couple of air-
craft squadrons and, once we got them there, trying to de-
cide whether we would commit them or not took a long time.
Under actual circumstances, I believe we would have done
both much more rapidly.
Here are a few of the lessons learned with regard to
the game: We concluded that a unilateral military reduc-
tion of forces will lead, first, to political instability
and, secondly, to a sharp reduction in the availability
of military alternatives to the Alliance. This was per-
fectly obvious for those of us who have been working on
this problem before the game, but surely underscored by
the game. The second point was that wars can start by in-
advertence. In this circumstance, it's the war-fighting
capability rather than deterrence that counts. All of us
think of NATO totally in terms of a deterrent posture.
There could be circumstances, perhaps those postulated by
the game, where initial deterrence breaks down and you had
better have something to cope with the threat or you are
in a very difficult situation.
We really did not go into the question of tactical nu-
clear weapons in great detail. However, none of our mem-
bers, military and civilian alike, projected any real role
for nuclear weapons in the limited action with which we
were confronted. We certainly didn't consider initially
employing them; in fact, we did just the opposite. We
moved our nuclear forces out of the area of Soviet advance
so they would not get mixed up in the action. Beyond that,
the discussion demonstrated some grave uncertainty about
the willingness of the political leadership to use nuclear
weapons even in a larger military engagement, giving ques-
tion, first, about escalation and, secondly, about the ulti-
mate utility. We waltzed around this question. We could
not get anybody to stand up and tell us that if you apply
nuclear weapons: (1) the conflict will not escalate; and,
(2) if it did escalate to higher levels that we would end
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up with achieving any political objectives which were
worth a damn.
As far as the Alliance structure is concerned, we did
not see any alternative to NATO in Europe -- not just as
a political association but as a military association as
well. We contemplated the alternatives for defending Eu-
rope but really did not see any. If you don't have your
Allies with you, you don't have a prayer of defending that
continent. We concluded that the Allies were likely to
react on their own interests; but it was questionable that
they would perceive their interests in the way the sce-
nario suggested -- i.e., as not needing to stand together
and each going his own way. Generally, we believed that
the scenario portrayed a much lower level of Allied co-
operation than would be the case in real life -- given
the 25 years of political/economic cooperation that had
occurred in Europe. But at least this was a question
which warranted further study.
Regarding Eastern Europe, there was unanimity that you
don't go monkeying around in Eastern Europe unless you are
really prepared for all-out war. In every move, we con-
sidered stirring up unrest in these nations. The scenario
provided us lots of opportunities. However, we thought
that such action would have signalled an attempt or willing-
ness on our part to go all out to tear down the political
structure that existed in Europe over the last two and a
half decades. Clearly, so far as the Northern Flank is
concerned, the vulnerability which we all have known to
exist was readily demonstrated.
Two final points: Alliance solidarity could certainly
be adversely affected, and seriously so, by a series of
actions such as US force reductions; reduced defense bud-
gets; US preoccupation with internal problems; and a peri-
od of extensive US-USSR bilateral dealings to which the
Allies were not a party. Finally, we might consider the
utility of either a different deployment of Allied mili-
tary forces or of contingency plans which would bring
Americans and other forces like the British into a very
quick confrontation with the Soviets in the event a
Soviet-German conflict developed.
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DIRECTOR. To defend Control, I'll comment only that
we were just trying to be as ambiguous as possible. Blue
made a very valid point that nobody has been able, cer-
tainly in this game and so far as I know in real life, to
ever guarantee that there will not be an escalation if
tactical nuclear weapons are ever employed. I am also
glad to hear Blue say that they surfaced no alternatives
to NATO. Control did not come up with any good alterna-
tives either except, as suggested, a form of multilateral
force that could be moved quickly. We wondered why some
multilateral moves or multilateral forces weren't employed
earlier while you were trying to guess Soviet motivations.
GREEN. I'd like to summarize our approach and actions
quite independently of Blue's discussion rather than noting
points of commonality.
We affirmed that the Soviets' long-term objectives in-
cluded extending their hegemony in Europe. By neutraliz-
ing and "Finlandizing" portions of Europe, always at the
lowest possible risk, the USSR desired to create a vacuum
in Europe. By demilitarizing West Germany, the Soviets
could hope that it would fall into their sphere of influ-
ence. The FRG incursion was a convenient pretext with
which to begin the removal of NATO as an obstacle to their
objectives and to export their problems of unrest in East-
ern Europe to West German cities. Neither the extent of
the Soviets' objectives nor the extent of the risk they
were prepared to take in pursuit of the objectives became
clear to us. However, the chronology of events and the
rapid pace of Soviet moves showed that the Soviets were
not engaged in an ad hoc action but rather were taking ad-
vantage of an opportunity to carry out portions of a pre-
pared program.
We believed that NATO and Allied views at the outset
would endorse statements and promise actions which sup-
ported Norway and Denmark. In regard to the FRG incident,
a feeling persisted that NATO members would view the FRG
as being at fault for providing the Soviets the pretext
for their adventure. Based upon this fact, many NATO mem-
bers would decline to provide support to the FRG. When
the time came for concerted NATO action -- that is by
providing SACEUR with the means and authority to expel
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the Soviets from FRG territory -- unanimity was not
achieved. NATO, as a collective entity, failed to take
up the gauntlet thrown down by the Soviets.
Our short-range objectives were to establish control
over the German forces and restore the territorial integ-
rity of NATO. We had to clarify the intentions of our Al-
lies. We had to encourage Norway and Denmark to stick with
NATO not only by assurances but by actions. We had to dis-
courage by all means, both military and political, further
USSR moves into the FRG and Norway and had to seek a cease-
fire on conditions consistent with NATO objectives and the
North Atlantic Treaty. Later, we had to focus on the neces-
sity of denying the Baltic Straits to the Soviets and se-
curing Iceland.
Long-term objectives were to restore, as much as pos-
sible, the era of detente and, through negotiations, achieve
an environment in which this type of crisis would not re-
occur. We also sought to continue the promotion of a
gradual evolution of independence in Eastern Europe and
the resolution by the Soviets of the underlying issues
which had triggered the crisis. We sought to increase
the common interest of the Soviets to reduce the prospects
of recurrence of such crises. The Soviet actions called
into question the entire basis of the United States policy
toward the USSR for the past 15 years. This policy must
be reexamined and reformulated to provide the United States
with a full range of options.
Our strategy on the diplomatic side was twofold: First,
to seek the support of our Allies in concerted NATO action;
to keep them steadfast by assurances of US support, includ-
ing the offer of US and UK forces to Denmark and Norway;
and to bring France into the military actions and structure
of NATO. Second, to inform and warn the Soviets of US re-
solve and to use the various world forums to fix responsi-
bility and develop pressures on the Soviets to pull back.
To the Soviets, we proposed a cease-fire and a standstill
followed by a disengagement through the interposition of
Allied and Third nation forces. We were prepared to dis-
cuss with our Allies the interposition of Canadian, French
and Brazilian forces, in that order, to cool the situation.
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We took a series of military moves as companion pieces
to assure preparatory actions to meet the threat on a NATO-
wide basis. We turned over operational control of US forces
to SACEUR and ordered the independent US commitment of Mar-
ines with mobile radars to North Norway to reestablish the
radar surveillance interrupted by the Soviets. US inter-
ests were directly involved, since these radars in North
Norway provide a capability to detect attacks upon the
CONUS. We placed SAC on a high state of alert and ordered
SSBNs to their sea stations. We repositioned our nuclear
forces in Europe and reviewed our nuclear plans and alert
procedures for use either under the NATO command, if it
should be activated, or by the United States with selected
Allies. US forces were ordered out of their kasernes, and
as the incursion progressed in the Third Move, air recon-
naissance was initiated over North Germany to assist our
units. Concurrently, evacuation of US dependents from Eu-
rope was commenced. We sought to carry out these moves in
such a manner as not to exacerbate the situation. The
French were again asked for the use of dispersal airfields
and support for LOC positioning and movements. We ordered
mining of the Baltic Straits.
If a cease-fire were not achieved, we were prepared --
if necessary -- to provide massive air support to include
an attack on all Soviet units in the FRG. If the drive
was not halted by these air actions, in conjunction with
the ongoing US/UK movements north, we would consider the
use of tactical nuclear weapons on a selective basis to
halt the drive and expel the Soviets from the FRG. We also
began preparations for other contingencies such as: Soviet
pre-emptive nuclear strikes; a possible major Soviet air-
borne attack in the North German Plains; and, the estab-
lishment in West Germany of a puppet government which might
call for help of the USSR.
Basically, we separated the two problems which were
posed to us. First, the Norway/Denmark problem -- we
wanted to keep these nations in NATO, or to encourage. them
to take those actions unilaterally which NATO was not pre-
pared to take. We proposed to the British that they put
a UK commando battalion with mobile radars on Bornholm Is-
land. Second, we wished to encourage unified NATO action
to resolve the German problem. We initiated a series of
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blocking actions as described for Norway and used the world
forums to bring pressure on the Soviets. Since the NAC
failed to act, the creation of a combined inter-Allied com-
mand of somewhat tripartite nature, US/UK and FRG forces,
was proposed. We hoped also to bring France into this ar-
rangement. Our team sought to use the basic structure of
the NATO command organization, giving different hats to the
existing commanders, such as the US Commander who is also
the SACEUR. Since he could not act as SACEUR, he would be
given another appropriate title to exercise control over
the forces contributed by individual allies. We also acti-
vated US plans to deal with the situation if SACEUR were
delayed in his assumption of the operational command by
inaction or failure of agreement within the NAC.
As for lessons learned, the principal ones which our
team brought out were that, perhaps, we should take more
account of the opponent's options, not limiting our con-
sideration to the most likely courses of action. Our ini-
tial long-range objectives seemed inadequate. In the end,
we reexamined the basis of US policy over the last 15
years and concluded that disillusionment in the United
States had encouraged Soviet adventurism. The loss of
Western Europe, or its passage to Soviet influence, was
intolerable to the United States. The NATO organization,
even as a cosmetic, is very important regardless of the
weakness and disrepute with which its mechanism may oper-
ate. One of our Ambassadors brought out that he has been
encouraged to go back to his colleagues in the NATO nations
and urge more effort on their part to buck up their de-
fenses in light of the serious implications revealed by
this exercise. Three other Ambassadors concurred. One
quarter held that there was no real evidence today of any
change in the Soviet intentions or operations and thus the
United States should not act as though Soviet motivations
and objectives are different. Likewise, it was reaffirmed
that the United States is the glue of NATO -- the flexible
force or power required to sustain the viability of the
alliance. US force structures for the future should in-
clude forces that can be applied to many places in concert
with similar NATO systems so that there are no weak links
which would assist the USSR in fragmenting the Alliance.
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The scenario moved fast, and pointed out that political
elements must take cognizance that we no longer operate in
the age of steamships. In this exercise, diplomacy did
not work and surfaced the question: "How may we improve
our diplomatic processes under such circumstances?" The
scenario provided an example of the failure of the NATO
structure and processes, and indicated the need to shore
up bilateral arrangements as a counterbalance. It was
conceded, however, that NATO continues to provide a useful
forum in which we may exert our influence and advance our
views. The exercise clearly demonstrated the need for
firm and quick US response in crises. Further, it exposed
the risks of the detente strands of our security policy,
and demonstrated that we do not know in advance which in-
terests will motivate our Allies. As a final point, it
also demonstrated the limitations of the NATO machinery
in providing instructions, particularly in the military
arena.
DIRECTOR. Control also took up the question of alter-
natives to NATO. Several people commented that the eco-
nomic aspects of European integration are perhaps a way
to begin to achieve more cohesion in NATO. Others weren't
sure that the European Common Market would necessarily con-
tinue to pledge support to NATO. I wonder if before we
discuss the military aspects of the crisis, somebody might
comment on some of these increasingly important economic
factors.
GREEN. I would like to summarize four basic economic
points which will have a great bearing on the military
side. Beginning in 1973 through 1976, we are negotiating
conditions which might deteriorate relations between the
United States and the Common Market. Just this week the
US Defense Department announced they won't buy any more
steel alloys from non-US sources. The Europeans have re-
taliated by enormous protest. These frictions are going
to become more numerous in the future and, if the scenario
is correct, we'll be in a crisis situation by 1976. This
would mean a very substantial amount of lobbying on the
part of Western investors.
Secondly, the web of East-West trade deals will cement
o t of relationships between Europe and she Soviets.
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This will further serve to weaken the resolve on the part
of NATO Allies for continued major military expenditures.
Our NATO Allies may, regretably, place welfare expendi-
tures ahead of defense expenditures. This also may become
true in the United States. In this way, economics can
play a vital role in laying the groundwork for adventurism
on the part of the Soviets.
As a third point, in the scenario projection of May
1976, the Soviets have moved into Norway and are threaten-
ing Allied interests in the North Sea. By this time,
fields in the Norwegian sector will be producing 10 per-
cent of Europe's oil needs, and the overall North Sea will
be producing 20 percent of Europe's oil needs. This ca-
pacity will be achieved by only four to fifteen rigs which
could be easily destroyed by a few submarines. The Middle
East oil pipeline -- coming up by ships -- will supply Eu-
rope with 70 percent of its oil needs by 1976, and will
also be extremely vulnerable. Economics plays another
major role there.
Finally, if Europe falls into the Soviet orbit, it will
mean that a tremendous economic and technological capacity
will be turned against the United States and the Free
World. On the other hand, the Soviets also will be vul-
nerable because they cannot support their own consumer
needs for grains, vegetables, and crops. In the long-
range, this deficiency could hurt them.
DIRECTOR. If I remember correctly, it was you who sug-
gested that maybe a more realistic scenario would have been
to have the Soviets go in and do whatever was necessary to
take over the Middle East oil -- the spigot -- and then
just tell NATO what they want them to do.
BLUE. Green has painted a pretty complete picture on
the economic problem. I don't necessarily want to argue
that we won't have continued economic problems between the
United States and the European Community. What discouraged
me more was that no matter how hard we tried, Control de-
cided the Europeans had no interest in their own future as
a community. I, and some teammates, felt that this may
have been an unrealistic assumption -- but then again, it
may not have been. If all the economic problems that were
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just outlined are with us, and there's a fair chance that
they will be, then there will be.no political interest
among the European countries in terms of support for NATO.
I guess we are in a pretty dismal situation. I would hope
for a little more success in getting support from the Eu-
ropeans for their own program of integration.
GREEN. There's no doubt that economics is becoming and
will become over this period a much more important matter
which will affect relationships. We see it developing in
the Common Market -- pressures building in trade, etc.
Also at the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE),
economics may provide another avenue through which the So-
viets could divide us. We saw this when Dr. Kissinger and
the President went to Moscow. There was great concern that
US/USSR bilateral trade agreements might adversely affect
our Allies' best interests. We're also seeing this in our
NATO discussions with respect to military equipment. Now
these are factors that are very, very serious. They're
not necessarily just in this scenario, they're in any sce-
nario. This is one of the lessons we have to take out of
this conference. The United States in 1976 will be strong
but Europe will be turning away from us. We've got to
provide the economic resources to preserve the military
strength necessary for our leadership of the Free World or
else we're in trouble. Whatever the scenario is, it is
going to be a major task to find the economic equation that
will keep the United States in the forefront. European
states no longer rely on us for all the equipment and sup-
port required for their national well-being. We may find
Prance and other nations pursuing their own economic gauge
and making individual arrangements with Russia -- or any
other country -- if they think it would benefit them in-
dividually as opposed to the whole community. They're not
so community-minded yet that they will give up their sov-
ereign rights when it comes to a deal.
GREEN. May I ask for a clarification? Does Blue sug-
gest that greater economic cooperation -- as shown in the
EEC -- would inspire a greater European military alliance
and military actions?
BLUE. Well, I think it's a combination of economic co-
operation and commitments. The present Treaty of Rome
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furthers development of political interest and cooperation
among the Europeans. I wasn't suggesting that they will
go as far as having a European military community.
GREEN. The only thing to be expected out of a greater
European economic cooperation is a stronger European eco-
nomic situation. It is a mistake to believe that a stronger
economic situation stimulated by economic cooperation is
going to result in some political development to create a
United States of Europe. This is ridiculous. It is also
a mistake to believe that this economic state will create
an incentive for members to ally militarily. They may
be stronger individually but that doesn't necessarily lead
to any stronger military commitment.
BLUE. To the extent that you need economic resources
to do both, the community and the military may increase
their resources through economic integration.
GREEN. Yes, if they are stronger individually as a
result of economic cooperation, they could be stronger
together militarily.
BLUE. But, it doesn't follow automatically. . . There
have to be some political decisions on the use of economic
resources.
GREEN. And it doesn't follow that they will be willing
to give up their separate sovereignty just because they
are economically stronger.
BLUE. Well, I made predictions as to where we are going
to bein 1976. I also made a different assessment on the
basis of a very recent summit meeting in which Europeans
declared as their objective, a unity, a European union --
although nobody defined that term. Presumably they were
going to be moving in a direction of more political consul-
tation and cooperation. I'm not suggesting that they're
going to end up with the United States of Europe parallel
to the United States of America. That was a part of the
original thesis but nobody expects that now. There's no
reason, however, why bigger economic interests and cooper-
ation within the European community couldn't also lead to
political and ultimately military advantages.
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GREEN. Does economic cooperation between the United
States and Russia lead to a military uniting of the two
countries into one political situation?
BLUE. It reduces the tension between the two.
GREEN. And also militarily, I guess, if we work it
right well also be able to get Russia into the EEC.
DIRECTOR. If I interpret correctly, there is obviously
some difference in views. The general theme is that if
the United States takes firm leadership, and makes the
Problem clear, we have a better chance of stimulating the
kind of actions required. Does anyone want to touch again
on the economic aspects or to explore any other questions?
GREEN. I just have one thought on the economic issue.
.I belong to the generation that was told that neither
,Japan nor Germany could conduct a prolonged war because
of economic considerations. (LAUGHTER)
GREEN. Turning away from the economic side, I would
like to make a point concerning NATO's overall posture
during the game. Its true that NATO's reaction or in-
action was rather impressive. A situation of this kind,
even with the relatively-limited build-up which was posed,
would require a complete shift of the philosophy and at-
titudes that the Alliance members have prized for many
years. This adjustment would take time. If nothing were
done unilaterally, bilaterally, or trilaterally, the situ-
ation could be irretrievably lost. By taking decisive ac-
tion, we (United States) would provide an opportunity for
the realities of this situation to be brought to bear on
our European Allies. The point is that we should not think
of the NATO reaction that we have painted here as being a
static and a permanent thing. Action is required until
the Europeans pull themselves together and see that indeed,
like it or not, their basic interests are deeply challenged.
its not being unduly critical to suggest that their first
thought would be to evade those responsibilities and to
hope the problem would go away, or that somebody else would
deal with it. But if they see that the United States is
seriously concerned, the prospects that they would get wor-
ried are perhaps greater than our game here has suggested.
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GREEN. Your observations certainly open-the way for
the discussion of several related questions -- one of the
most crucial being: "Are US mid-range security interests
in Europe best served through NATO? Can we find a way
in which a multilateral force of some sort could be formed
and inserted -- at an appropriate early time -- to involve
NATO directly in the crisis? Would anybody like to ad-
dress that issue or any related part of it?
GREEN. Periodically we propose coordinated military
actions which might be taken by those NATO members who
wish to do so. Invariably, however, this concept gets
fouled up in the dedication of NATO to the theology of una-
nimity. Generally, opposition is led by the "Doves."
These individuals want to make sure that no NATO aegis or
command structure can be utilized by those who want to
take a stronger line, without the whole policy issue being
subjected to NATO consideration and thereby to the veto of
any single country. We have come up against this repeat-
edly. Generally, the consensus has been not to depart
from the tradition of unanimity. What this implies is
that a multilateral military approach would have to be or-
ganized and employed outside the structure of NATO itself.
GREEN. Isn't the only real answer to the theology of
unanimity strong and bold leadership by the United States
in a crisis?
GREEN. Well, that leadership cuts two ways. There are
times when leadership is absolutely essential, there are
other times when an attempt to exercise that kind of leader-
ship means that NATO members will just bow their necks or
back up on you.
GREEN. That's why I said in crisis only.
GREEN. I wouldn't have confidence that leadership
could be depended on to do this job in every case. You
have to bolster yourself, with either unilateral capabil-
ities or as our discussion here as suggested, by some kind
of bilateral or reduced multilateral activity.
GREEN. I didn't feel that strong US leadership would
be in contradiction to any of those. You've got to cover
all your bets.
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BLUE. Haven't we been able to get more than one NATO
country to work together and adopt a NATO banner for an
exercise even though they were reluctant to cooperate with
the US forces separately? i am thinking particularly in
terms of Greece.
GREEN. You're thinking of the NATO on-call force in
the Mediterranean -- but to bring that force together still
requires unanimous, favorable action in NATO. To the best
of my analysis, that is just about always the case. The
only departure from this concept comes in some of the con-
sortiums formed for the development of military materiel.
In that. instance, only those nations interested join in
the activity.
DIRECTOR. I'm going to bring this discussion around
to the northern region, since some representatives from
that area will be departing soon.
BLUE. The Norwegian situation is not the important one;
the central region is. No matter if we send or don't send
troops up there, the reaction of the Soviets isn't as im-
portant as moving US and United Kingdom troops between the
Soviets and the Germans. In that case, if the USSR at-
tack us, "that's a horse of a different color." What hap-
pened to a few radar stations in Norway was not really
very important to the whole game.
GREEN. I would like to differ with my distinguished
colleague from the Northland. Psychologically and morally,
-.he Soviets put themselves in an absolutely indefensible
position when they moved into Norway. They had a reason
for moving against the Germans because Federal Republic
troops had made the mistake of going into the GDR -- but in
Norway and Denmark there's no defense in the world for the
Soviets., We should have smeared them all over the place,
the newspapers, the UN, and any other debating club where
we could get to them.
BLUE. Would you fire on them?
'r
GEEN. You bet your boots I'd fire on them. They had
nothingto stand on up there. They had no reason in the
world for going up there. If you are going to exercise
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force, you're going to have to be willing to use it once
in a while. You can't continue to run a big country like
ours and always exercise leadership in the world on the
basis of debates, committees, and UN sessions.
BLUE. Well, we agreed on our team that we would send
troops in there to meet the Soviets.
GREEN. We're obliged to maintain and restore the ter-
ritorial integrity of NATO using individual and collective
means, including the use of force, if necessary. Now there
are some questions unstated as to when and how you do that,
but our treaty commitment obliges us to defend that area.
GREEN. We have to hit them when they are in an inde-
fensible position -- and here they were in one.
BLUE. In Norway?
GREEN. Yes, in Norway -- and in Denmark. They were
moving into Denmark (Bornholm Island) on the last report
that we had. You don't often get them that nicely off
base.
GREEN. What more do you need in Norway? It's like
putting a chip on your shoulder and saying, if you knock
that off, it means you want to fight. After he does hit
you a couple times, you say, I'm not sure you really mean
it, I want to put a chip on my shoulder again.
CONTROL. It seems to me that the game illustrated the
fragility of the Northern NATO countries. Most people
agreed that Norway and Denmark were both nervous and saw
NATO not as firm with them as with other countries. What
could we do to remedy that situation? What steps could we
take to strengthen their relationship to NATO and what
might we do in the next four or five years to make less
likely the situation in this game?
BLUE. They (Norway) have an army of 14,000 men. I
don't know how they can increase the army much. There are
only three million people.
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GREEN. In this case, both NATO and the United States
have troops which could be flown there in a hurry. It's
not the question, as suggested, "Is Norway worthwhile?"
We're all a part of the same world. They're a fine peo-
ple; they're NATO Allies; they're free people; of course
they're worthwhile!
CONTROL. No one suggested that they weren't worth-
while.
BLUE. It appears to have been suggested by the comments
made here.
GREEN. The point is, and there isn't any question about
it, that this now is an invasion. NATO responsibilities
make it necessary to react -- not to try and determine
whether or not it's an invasion, or to go back to them and
say, "Well, let's do something to create some further in-
cident." The point is, from now on, it's strictly a mili-
tary matter in Norway and pretty soon in Denmark. Now you
are going to have to do what military circumstances dic-
tate. Isn't that correct?
BLUE. This is an alliance that is based upon an as-
sumption that each nation will stand with the other if they
are attacked. Presumably, this is the whole lesson we
learned out of World War II. If you begin making choices
as to who's important and who isn't important, you obvi-
ously make some judgment in terms of what you do or don't
do. When it comes to a question of a nation being under
attack and their territory occupied by Soviet troops, the
opportunity to make those sorts of value judgments is not
present. Norwegian territory is of equal importance to
the vitality of the Alliance as that of Germany.
GREEN. I'd like to comment from the military point of
view. Norway is important to our control of the Atlantic,
nor a couple of reasons. One, if based in Norway, Soviet
submarines would not have to sail all the way out of Mur-
mansk. Various bases in Norway have access to vital lines
of communication to Europe and allow subs a lot more time
on station. The other thing is that the airfields which
are in Norway could provide the Soviets bases from which
to neutralize Iceland. This indeed would be a very serious
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thing if we lost both Iceland and Norway. Our ability to
get supplies to Europe would be seriously in question; re-
member 95 percent of all supplies to Vietnam went by ship
and the same thing would occur in the event of war in Eu-
rope. There's no question of Norway being important.
BLUE. Could we get enough stuff up there (Norway). to
hold it for more than one or two days?
GREEN. If we could air-land troops, a small number of
determined people, like the US Marines, might be able to
hold the country. (LAUGHTER)
GREEN. In the Finnmark area, it would be very hard to
organize any effective defense. Once you get into the
Tromso area, however, a pretty tough, time consuming de-
fense could be organized. What you are doing, of course,
is "upping" the Soviet's price of admission. This is a
significant part of our deterrence. Our tactics should
not be to recover the three bases lost to the Soviets;
but to establish a strong point in the Tromso area which
would represent a positive response and significantly tip
the military balance.
While I'm speaking, I would like to say one word on the
attitudes of Norway and Denmark. They do, of course, have
a great deal in common but there is an awful lot to differ-
entiate the views of those two countries. The Norwegian
determination to fight for their country and the strength
of the Norwegian sense of association with NATO goes con-
siderably beyond that found in Denmark.
;SLUE. A great deal beyond it, no question that they
would fight. My only point is that it would be a pretty
quick operation . . . two Soviet divisions across the Kola
Peninsula, half a battalion on our side of the border.
GREEN. If you are talking Finnmark -- yes.
BLUE. I am. That's where the radar stations are and
the fighting will be at the radar stations.
GREEN. But our proposal was to build up and put mobile
radars in the Tromso area. . .
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BLUE. Could we hold out a little longer there?
GREEN. It took the Germans six weeks against an even
smaller Norwegian Army.
BLUE.. Yes, but the Norwegian war was over in a very,
very short time.
GREEN. Norwegians in Narvik think that had the British
forces not pulled out, they would still be there.
BLUE. Some do; right . . . and they would fight; no
question about it.
BLUE. Could someone remark on the strategic utility of
those radar stations in Northern Norway?
GREEN. They are vital to the early detection of Soviet
long-range aircraft which conceivably could be flying the
Iceland Gap.
BLUE. But by 1976 won't we have other means of detec-
tion, surveillance, and intelligence gathering? Aren't
these radar sites more political than military in their
utility?
GREEN. SACLANT recently conducted a study which noted
that the first indication of Soviet long-range air opera-
tions directed against the Atlantic Fleet would come from
the Narvik radars.
BLUE,. That same long-range air could go out by the
same door toward CONUS too. . .
BLUE.. That's not the determining factor! Berlin has
an absolutely zero strategic significance but we almost
went to war over it once because we recognized the politi-
cal and psychological significance of not standing and
fighting for it. I'm not equating Northern Norway to
Berlin but you simply can't cut off a piece of Alliance
territory and say, "It simply doesn't make a damned bit
of difference."
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BLUE. Neither team considered that Norway was of no
significance to the Northern borders. It was a matter of
timing as to what action should be taken. Both teams moved
forces to Norway.
BLUE. As long as you didn't fight.
BLUE. We didn't stage an attack.
GREEN. That isn't entirely so. . .
BLUE. You permitted them to fly combat air patrol (CAP),
that's as far as you went.
BLUE. We agreed that the forcep involved at the radar
sites were minor and recommended that the Norwegian air
forces begin ground attacks and we would cover for them.
If the Soviets reacted to that we had them engaged.
BLUE. We also told our fleet units to sink any ships
which tried to reinforce the land action -- this would
tend to isolate and localize the conflict until we felt
we had a viable option.
BLUE. Could I raise a question which I think is of ex-
treme importance? In the Blue Team, we made lots of effort
to get US/UK forces involved in the attack in the Central
region so that the Soviets did not have the excuse that
their action was directed only against the Germans. In
that respect, two questions surface: "Are our force de-
ployments right? Should we mix up US/UK German forces
along the whole frontier to sharpen up our sensitivities
and reactions? One of our major concerns was to involve
US forces in the action. We tried to move them in but
Control said it wasn't feasible. Would someone remark on
that?
DIRECTOR. Control was open. . . but the messages only
noted that SACEUR had requested movement of those troops.
CONTROL. Green opted for a somewhat similar move. They
wanted to put in other forces -- Italy, France, Brazil and
so forth. . .
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BLUE. Brazil?
CONTROL. Yes, they have been involved in somewhat sim-
ilar UN operations and, consequently, have some experience.
However any attempt to have used Brazilian forces would
have resulted in an even greater delay in the interposition.
GREEN. Would Blue comment on the mixed forces concept?
BLUE. We weren't talking about a multinational force
but, rather, about the two or three NATO battalions in the
area. These forces don't have to be mixed in terms of
commanders. They just have to be available.
BLUE. The problem with the mixed deployments of NATO
unitss is that the forces still remain a national responsi-
bility -- beyond that you have the practical problem of
housing the troops as you change their deployments. Even
with the nationally homogeneous deployments now in NATO,
we are not really satisfied with the positioning of our
troops. If we had sufficient money, we would certainly
change the deployment.
BLUE. Blue felt that the game would have been much,
much different had there been US forces engaged.
BLUE. This capability exists right now. In fact, our
contingency plans provide for multinational forces to be
employed in specific contingencies. What we were trying
to do was simply project one of these existing contingency
plans into this particular situation. The Soviets then
had the very difficult decision of deciding whether or not
they wanted to broaden the conflict beyond simply a pur-
suit of the intruding FRG forces or make it a specific at-
tack against the United States.
BLUE. It would have reduced the ambiguity to zero.
GREEN. A lot is being made on this particular point.
Did you consider that by putting American forces with Ger-
man forces or interposing them, it might in itself appear
to the Soviet Union to be the next stage of a "put up"
deal with the United States having the initiative and urg-
ing the Germans to move into East Germany? This was the
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reason we suggested Canadian forces in the first instance,
and, hopefully, French forces.
CONTROL. We assumed in Control from the beginning that
the key action would be an interposition of other than Ger-
man forces -- probably Americans. We might have been dis-
posed to work it differently in the Second Move, if, for
example, these forces had been put in before the Soviet ex-
cursion into West Germany or, if they came in during the
next move. Maybe we misread it but we saw Blue's move in
the second round as follows: Deploy a UK Army battalion
as an adjunct to UK force in Germany, ask the UK to deploy
a division behind the FRG 9th Division and so on. We con-
cluded that the time involved in arranging this (gaining
British approval and supporting the operation logistically,
etc.), wouldn't be allowed in the short period that we pro-
jected between moves. I think Control very likely would
have said, "All right, you have got US/UK forces there
and the Soviets stop." The Soviets would then say, "Let's
negotiate now on the question of neutralization." In this
case, you would still have the problem of removing the sa-
lient.
BLUE. You make a very good point. In fact, if that
had happened and if Control decided that the Soviets had
stopped at that point, I think that you would have lost
the war. You have a Soviet force sitting there; you have
no apparent way or will to expel them; and, you are pre-
pared to now sit and talk to them about the neutralization
of Germany. That's a pretty tough situation.
CONTROL. I agree and that is just one of the courses
that Control might have taken.
BLUE. You know, the best the interposition of US forces
could have done was to stop the immediate crisis and then
you would lose by negotiation what you might otherwise have
lost by fighting. . .
CONTROL. Suppose your action would have been to move
American forces up to the border before the Soviets ever
crossed it and before the Second FRG Division had been com-
mitted. . .
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BLUE. That certainly would have been a possibility.
Our team felt that Soviet motivations were still ambiguous
but basically justified up to that point. Isn't that cor-
rect?
BLUE. I think that's absolutely correct. The Soviets
had temlDered their operations considerably. They hadn't
moved except in that one area -- to a depth of about 18
miles - - and had confronted no one but Germans. They had
a rationale for fighting the West Germans. By moving a
non-FRG force in there, we would really test Soviet inten-
tions. I disagree that if they stopped and didn't proceed,
we had :Lost the war. Our short-term objective was to ter-
minate, localize, and to prevent this border incident from
spreading into a conflagration.
BLUE. Except that by Move Three we were prepared to
negotiate the neutralization of Germany. . .
BLUE AND GREEN. No, no!
BLUE. I thought that was certainly implied.
DIRECTOR. We can spend quite a bit of time arguing
whether it would or it wouldn't. This discussion, though,
on the slowness of NATO procedures and on bilateral pro-
cedures is a good lessons-learned point.
BLUE. We should exercise bilaterally and multilateral-
ly, hopefully with, but possibly without, NATO aegis,
rather than relying solely on NATO to take action.
DIRECTOR. Well, maybe we have the germ of a construc-
tive idea here which should be considered for the future.
BLUE. We have unilateral contingency plans which con-
form as far as possible to our NATO plans. But to try and
get around this rule of unanimity by adopting a unilateral
approach, I think, would have a gravely damaging effect
within NATO. We have some of this in our Berlin contin-
gency planning that is conducted on a tripartite basis,
but NATO accepts Berlin as a special and separate respon-
sibility. To push this very far, the incidental cost or
the side, effect would have to be weighed against what you
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really gain in operating efficiency. It would be my guess
that the balance would turn out the wrong way.
GREEN. At this stage it would be very serious. The
best that we can do, and we have that power and option in
the United States, if you have a crisis develop, is to
move US forces quickly under a US Command as opposed to a
NATO one.
DIRECTOR. Control noticed that at least one team was
quite certain of rather prompt and substantial French sup-
port in making lines of communications available through
France. I know some people back in Washington and other
places who have a little more doubt than that. Would any-
one address this?
GREEN. The whole French defense posture is designed
for war with the Soviet Union and nobody else. They want
to maintain independence as long as they can, but I'll
never forget what a very senior French officer said in a
national war game when we tried to run it without SACEUR.
The military went to the political authorities and said
this thing makes no more sense. Frence is trying to get
the best of both worlds by being in NATO and by being out
of NATO. But in the crunch, and the two crunches of which
we have knowledge -- the U-2, and the Cuban crisis -- the
French were not among those dragging their feet.
DIRECTOR. I recall General DeGaulle was the first,
wasn't he, to say, "Bully, go to it."
GREEN. The fact that we didn't do it was one of the
reasons for General DeGaulle's subsequent attitudes.
BLUE. How about the willingness of the French to en-
gage the Soviets militarily as opposed to their willing-
ness to accept, in this scenario, a neutralized Germany?
GREEN. French public opinion is divided on this. They
would not be more willing or happier than anybody else,
but the French have got an idea in their heads that we Amer-
icans can survive the loss of Western Europe for at least
a while, but they can't.
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GREEN. I am less confident than my teammate that the
French would respond that way. It is conceivable that by
1976 or during the intervening years, there will be politi-
cal direction in France that will continue to hold them
back from any action along our side. Although the military
organization in France might be much more disposed to act
in concert with us. A situation like this could bring
about a serious crisis in France and perhaps a change in
government forced by the military.
GREEN. A French general once answered the question as
to what he would do in case of war by saying, "Cut the
telephone lines to Paris and fight." (LAUGHTER)
DIRECTOR. We have at least partially answered the
question that the game was designed to ask, "Are US mid-
range security interests in Europe best served by NATO?"
The gist of the response is yes, because there really isn't
any good substitute that people see at the moment. Cer-
tainly, a general agreement is that whatever eventuates,
US leadership is essential. An equally forceful point is
that the NATO nations, based on experience in Brussels,
pretty much fall in line when they get a firm indication
of what the United States wants to do. However, it's also
been brought out that US leadership in itself is not neces-
sarily the answer in all cases. Sometimes the United States
gets a little far out with its leadership and this might
have an adverse rather than a favorable effect. Quite a
point has been made that we're obligated to take action to
defend other NATO nations under attack. I don't suppose
anybody here is unfamiliar with Article V of the Charter,
which says, in effect, that an attack on one will be re-
garded as an attack on all, and each will take the action
it deems appropriate under the circumstances. It was
heartening to see that the general opinion is that we must
respond in this vein if we hope the keep the Alliance firm.
GREEN. Article V does not say the action deemed appro-
priate but the actions deemed necessary to maintain and
restore the territorial integrity of NATO.
GREEN. Specifically, including the use of our forces,
if necessary. . .
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DIRECTOR. So, is the continued existence of NATO and
the perpetuation of its current concepts and strategies
vital to the security of Europe and the achievement of US
objectives in that region? I'm not sure that we have
really addressed that particular question, but our discus-
sions appear to indicate a pressing need to reassess, re-
vamp, or possibly change some aspects of NATO strategy if
it is to be compatible with the changes that currently
are taking place in Europe and the United States.
With that, I would like to thank each of you, the Con-
trol Team, and the staff for your participation and ef-
forts. I would now like to turn the floor over the Gen-
eral Goodpaster.
GEN GOODPASTER. One of the purposes of an exercise
like this is to highlight some of the problems, potential
and present, which affect our security situation. The in-
teresting thing to me about the scenario was that each of
the driving elements contained in that scenario really
exists as a problem today -- although we don't know how
far that problem will develop or whether it will combine
with others as has been depicted in the simulation. What-
ever you look at -- the reduction in forces, the shift to-
ward the EEC as the focus of action away from NATO, the
fact that the Soviet position in Eastern Europe is mili-
tarily strong and politically weak -- all of these possi-
bilities do exist and the exercise has highlighted them
in a very useful way.
The second purpose is to trace the impact of these
problems on possible defense and policy relationships in
a way that develops the interrelationship of the military,
the political, the economic, and the psychological factors.
We did that and one thing that impressed me was the ex-
tent of continuing ambiguity, uncertainty, and on some
occasions, the lack of intelligence. Someone stated we
would have a lot more intelligence than was provided here,
but I would still feel that the margin of ambiguity and
uncertainty would still be great, partly because much of
that intelligence would be conflicting. (LAUGHTER)
GREEN. It depends on which agency was providing it.
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GEN GOODPASTER. If you got it from two agencies, you
could be sure of a conflict. (LAUGHTER) We have had a
look at some of the policies, a look from perhaps a little
different vantage point. We are moving down the highway of
detente with a broad awareness of the risks that are in-
volved. Particularly the risks that can be accentuated -if
out of this, through euphoria or whatever we call it, come
unwarranted reductions of strength. NATO itself has adopted
as its policy a combination of defense and detente. The
two are not contradictory but complementary. If out of a
mistaken perception of detente, the defense strength were
to be reduced, the security which is now being furthered
by detente -- by a sensible and sober detente -- could be
endangered and weakened. We only began to scratch the sur-
face of how the specific NATO organizational mechanisms --
the specific procedures that exist, such as alert proce-
dures, etc., and the condition and limits of action -- op-
erate in circumstances such as this. Also, we saw that in
NATO the precise interests and positions that would be
taken by individual countries are very hard to estimate.
Even the American Ambassadors in those countries, as well
informed and attuned as they are, can be caught by sur-
prise and find themselves unable to anticipate in precise
detail just what the position of a country will be. We
have to allow for that degree of uncertainty and along with
that allow for some degree of response to the American lead-
ership of which we spoke. What the European nations will
initially tend to do need not necessarily be what they will
finally do, after we have had the opportunity to consult
and work with them. Our discussions have highlighted how
sensitive certain features of our security situation are
to the limits of response that the various nations might
be prepared to make. To the participants we hope that you
have indeed found value in these discussions. Speaking
for myself, the conference did illuminate important as-
pects of our security.
On behalf of Admiral Moorer, I want to express thanks
to all of you who made the effort to come and participate
in this exercise. On behalf of the participants, I would
like to express thanks to the team which prepared and sup-
ported us throughout the conduct of this exercise. It is
obvious that a lot of work went on, some of it preparatory
work, some of it stockpiled before we got here, but there
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/21 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002400130002-4
was a lot of real time work that also went into the con-
duct of the exercise. Finally, I express appreciation to
our hosts who have made the arrangements here which are
delightful in every respect. All the more so at a time
when all the rest of Europe is in fog and rain and we
have days of sunshine and pleasant activities. Unless
someone knows some major points that I omitted uninten-
tionally, we wish all of you safe journeys home.
L29 A~T,O,~,~RYIGN DISSEM
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DISTRIBUTION
White House (National Security Council)
2
Department of State
15
Department of Treasury
3
Department of Defense
7
Agency for International Development
3
Atomic Energy Commission
3
Central Intelligence Agency
7
National Security Agency
3
Office of Emergency Preparedness
1
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
3
US Information Agency
3
American Embassy, Ankara
American Embassy, Athens
American Embassy, Belgrade
American Embassy, Bern
American Embassy, Bonn
American Embassy, Brussels
American Embassy, Bucharest
American Embassy, Budapest
American Embassy, Copenhagen
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American Embassy, The Hague
American Embassy, Helsinki
American Embassy, Lisbon
American Embassy, London
American Embassy, Madrid
American Embassy, Moscow
American Embassy, Nicosia
American Embassy, Oslo
American Embassy, Paris
American Embassy, Prague
American Embassy, Rome
American Embassy, Reykjavik
American Embassy, Sofia
American Embassy, Stockholm
American Embassy, Valletta
American Embassy, Vienna
American Embassy, Warsaw
US Delegate to the Military Committee, NATO
2
US Mission to the European Communities
1
US Mission to NATO
2
US Mission to the organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
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US Mission to the United Nations 1
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Defense Advisor, NATO
Defense Atomic Support Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Supply Agency
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
USEUCOM
USCINCEUR
CINCLANT
USLO SACLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCSAC
CINCREDCOM
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAFE
M3 UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
USDOCO AFNORTH 1
USLO AFCENT 1
USDOCO AFSOUTH 2
US ELEMENT CENTO 1
USNMR, NATO 1
COMSECONDFLT 1
COMSIXTHFLT 1
USCOB 1
Defense Attache, Paris 1
JSTPS 1
National War College 1
Armed Forces Staff College 1
Industrial College of the Armed Forces 1
Army War College 1
Army Command and General Staff College 1
Naval War College 1
Air University 1
Air War College 1
US Marine Corps Command and Staff College 1
US Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis
Group 1
Weapons Support and Evaluation Group 1
Institute for Defense Analyses 2
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Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant to Chairman, JCS
Chairman's Staff Group
Director, Joint Staff
Vice Director, Joint Staff
Deputy Director, Joint Staff
Secretary of the Joint Staff
Director, J-1
Director, J-3 2
Director, J-4 1
Director, J-5 5
Director, J-6 1
NMCC 1
Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency 1
General Purpose Forces Division, SAGA 1
Strategic Forces Division, SAGA 1
M5 UNCLASSIFIED
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