LETTER TO REAR ADMIRAL JEREMIAH A. DENTON, JR. FROM VERNON A. WALTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001900090003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 21, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Rear Admiral Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr.
Corn. ndant
Ar: red Forces Staff College.
Norfolk, Virginia 23511
21 Janu .ry 1976
Dear Jerry:
Thanks for your letter of 13 January and I am most
pleased to accept your invitation to address. the 59th
Class of the Armed Forces Staff College on Mlonday,
29 March 1976 at. 10:00 A. M.
My office will be in touch with your Guest Speaker
Office to complete arrangements for the day's activities.
I, too, saw RM and found him in good and improving
shape. Looking forward to see you,
Faithfully,
STAT
V n A. IV ers
Lieuten eneral, USA
Deputy Direc of Central Intelligence
VAW :me : 21Jan76
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DDCI Chrono
1 - DDCI Subj File
1.- ER
1 - OTR
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ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
7800 HAMPTON BOULEVARD ? NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
13 JAN ig76
The 59th Class of the Armed Forces Staff College will begin in
February, and I sincerely hope that you will be able to join us
to give another presentation on the National Intelligence Com-
munity. The subject of the lecture for this class will be "The
Role of the Intelligence Community in Support of National
Strategy." Your visit would be an outstanding contribution to
our course of study.
We have tentatively scheduled your address for Monday, 29 March
1976, at 1000 hours. The normal procedure, you will recall, is
for the lecture to last about 45 minutes, followed by a 15-minute
break and a 45-minute question period. I hope that your schedule
will permit you to remain for lunch with a few students and
faculty members.
Your lecture topic is a key segment of our curriculum. In order
to plan joint and combined operations, a joint staff officer must
have a firm understanding of the role our intelligence community
plays in the national security process. While the basic intelli-
gence organization and functions are studied and taught through-
out the course of instruction at AFSC, this particular lecture
serves as the introduction and broad overview of United States
intelligence resources. During this introduction, there are
several areas that are most germane to the curriculum and of
special interest to the student body. The students, in seminar,
will receive instruction on the basic organization of the intelli-
gence community, and on the statutory interrelationships among
its various agencies. Of significant interest here are your
personal views on this organization from an historical perspective
of American intelligence efforts. The contribution of the in-
telligence community to the national policy-making process and
its role in overseas operations would also be of interest. A
broad discussion of collection capabilities and limitations would
serve to complete the picture of U.S. intelligence at the national
level.
v \\? .V m
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While the school is capable of outlining the organizational frame-
work and functions of the intelligence community to the student,
your personal experience and insights will flesh-out this skeletal
framework and allow the student to develop a greater understanding
of the importance and contribution of the national intelligence
effort.
As you know, we have a strict nonattribution policy, and you may
be assured that your remarks will not be discussed outside the
College. This permits a frank discussion of controversial issues
and greatly enhances the learning experience of the student body.
My Guest Speaker Office (Phone: [phone]) will complete the
arrangements for your visit.
I look forward to welcoming you back to the College.
Very respectfully,
"JEREMIAH A. DENTON, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Atch. Commandant
1. Class Composition
2. Course Summary
3. Information Sheet - Mission
4. Information Sheet - Administrative
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59th CLASS COMPOSITION
AND SECURITY CLEARANCE INFORMATION
Class composition is as follows: Officers, both male and female, are in the grade of major/
lieutenant colonel or lieutenant commander/commander. Civilians are of equivalent grade.
Average age of the students is 36 years.
U. S. military officers Women officers
82 Army 1
80 Air Force 1
62 Navy
18 Marine Corps
2 Coast Guard
1 Defense Mapping Agency
1 Department of State
2 CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
1 DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
4 NSA - National Security Agency
1 DSA - Defense Supply Agency
2 Department of the Air Force
2 Department of the Army
1 Department of the Navy
Allied Officers
2 Australia
2 Canada
1 France
6 United Kingdom
5 West Germany
TOTAL 275
All students are cleared for access to Top Secret material -- the foreign students by their own
governments. Although these allied officers are authorized access only to such U.S. classified
information as has been approved for release by appropriate disclosure authorities in accordance
with National Disclosure Policies, it is desirable that they participate in the course of instruction
to the fullest extent practicable. They are excluded only when the application of the National
Disclosure Policies would require such modifications in the presentation as to nullify its
effectiveness for U.S. students.
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COURSE SUMMARY
Course I Administration and Orientation: Contains the necessary background information
for orderly conduct of the curriculum; it includes scheduled events such as lectures on
College policies and procedures, special Allied student activities and ceremonies. There is
an additional orientation program of 71 hours for the Allied students. Approximately 30
reserve officers join the student body during the 7th and 8th weeks of each class for a
70-hour program.
Course II U. S. Military Forces: It is designed to establish a fundamental understanding
of the doctrine, organization, and capabilities of U. S. military forces as a prerequisite
to the study of joint and combined topics. The focal point of Course II, the three Service
Weeks, occur during the second, third, and fourth weeks of the schedule. Also included
are field trips and the very essential series of lectures by the members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Course III Defense Management: Focuses on the planning, programming, and budgeting
processes practiced within the Department of Defense and the Service departments and on
the problems of allocation of resources, choices among alternatives, and trade-offs.
Additionally, an overview of management thought and theory, and how they impact on De-
fense Management, is included. The military decision-making process is examined with
particular emphasis placed on: analysis techniques, automatic data processing, personnel
resources, and managerial control methods. An exposure to creative thinking is provided
to expand and stimulate thinking toward the formulation of innovative problem-solving
techniques.
Course IV Organization and Command Relationships: Involves a study of the U. S. unified
commands and the NATO military organization. In the associated lecture program, many
of the CINC's present their personal views on the present unified command relationships
and the functions of a joint staff. This course provides a brief but important basis for the
studies conducted in Course V and VI.
Course V The U. S. Joint Planning Procedures: Is the core curriculum of the Armed Forces
Staff College and encompasses a large portion of the scheduled hours. The phases of the
Joint Planning Process are studied in the step by step development of a common scenario.
Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) procedures and automated data processing systems
are utilized throughout the course. The final block in Course V is an exercise in crisis
management where the students demonstrate their newly acquired knowledge and skills in a
real-world scenario. Development of self-expression skills and research techniques is
stressed.
Course VI Environment and Strategy: Covers a wide-ranging spectrum of several blocks of
instruction. Included are several lectures scheduled throughout the curriculum in the
United States Environment and the International Environment blocks. The lectures familiarize
the students with the broad national and international environment in which joint and combined
forces operate. Major societal problems confronting contemporary leaders are explored by
the students in seminar activity. A NATO exercise, supported by a guest lecture, examines
some of the military, psychological, economic, political, and geographical problems of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Course VII Communicative Arts: Starts early in the curriculum and focuses on improving
essential communications skills largely through individual efforts; continues throughout the
academic period. The Research Program begins with a short introduction covering its ob-
jectives and options. Each student selects one of three options: An article for publication, an
individual research report or group research; conducts orderly research and prepares a
written product during research and unscheduled time. The Staff Study will also be addressed
as a part of this program, but will not be a major research effort. The Staff Action Paper is
the vehicle for the second writing program, which devotes 20 hours toward preparing typical
"short fuze" staff papers of several types. Selected students are required to brief their papers
orally as they would in an actual action-officer role. Speaking skills are further refined
through the presentation of oral book reports or leadership case studies in the 12-hour Pro-
fessional Reading Program that focuses on individual professional reading. It includes a brief
introductory seminar session aimed at encouraging and assisting students in the development
of sou' g Fo x201 ~u d' ~~ 1 O ~b o in-
clude student-led question discussion periods.
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MISSION
The Armed Forces Staff College was established on 13 August 1946 as a joint institution under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The mission of the College is to conduct a course of study in joint and combined organizations and operational planning, to
include the supporting organizations and operations of the U.S. Military Services, and in related aspects of national and international
security, in order to enhance the preparation of selected military officers for duty in joint and combined operations and planning in higher
echelons of the Department of Defense and international military organizations.
T H E C L A S S A N D S E M I N A R I N F O R M A T I O N
Two 5-month courses are presented each year, terminating in January and June. In addition to approximately 250 U.S. officers of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, the student body includes civilian representatives from several U.S. government
agencies and normally allied officer students from Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. The
average age of the students is 35 and they are either majors or lieutenant colonels, or the military or civilian grade equivalent.
The students are grouped into seminars for the conduct of certain major units of instruction by the conference method. It is the policy
of the College to provide seminar membership in multiples of 3 (Army, Navy/Marine Corps, Air Force) with allied officers and civilian
students apportioned equally to all seminars as numbers permit. The composition of the seminar is designed to assure maximum range of
rank, experience, and Service specialization. However, the extent to which seminar representation can reflect Service specialization must
be kept compatible with the degree of individual participation desired in seminar work and possible only in small discussion groups. It is
an important facet of instruction that students share thinking in a personal way, that fellowship be cultivated, and that individual responsi-
bility for the group's efficiency be stressed. To foster its academic principles most effectively and to derive maximum benefit from
conference-type instruction, the College holds that the optimum number of students per seminar is no fewer than 12 and no more than 18.
Faculty officers, of different military Services, are detailed to each seminar as permanent advisers. The responsibility of the permanent
faculty adviser is to provide guidance and assistance to his assigned students, and the relationship is necessarily a close one.
From time to time temporary seminars are formed by interchanging students among seminars. One faculty adviser is delegated responsi-
bility for each temporary seminar for the purpose of conducting a single unit of instruction; upon completion of the unit another set of
temporary seminars may be formed or the students may return to their permanent seminars. This procedure assists in accomplishing College
objectives by giving students the opportunity to exchange ideas with the maximum number of other officers.
S T U D E N T S E C U R I T Y C L E A R A N C E
All U.S. students are cleared for Top secret information; each allied student is cleared by his own government for information of a
classification equivalent to U.S. Top Secret. Essentially the College respects the clearance afforded the students by their governments
insofar as is permitted by U.S. security regulations contained in the National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military
Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (NDP-1).
THE GUEST SPEAKER PROGRAM
The guest speaker program is one of the most interesting and important features of the Staff College curriculum, for it provides the
students with an opportunity to personally hear and question distinguished men and women whose contributions have made them leaders in
their fields. Guest lecturers are encouraged to present their views in an environment of academic freedom, while students are urged to
conduct responsible intellectual inquiry in the question and answer period.
Guest lectures usually support specific seminar instruction and are scheduled with the associated block of instruction; however, the
Staff College also supports or participates in several special lecture series which complement the curriculum as a whole and are scheduled
throughout the course. The General Delos C. Emmons series, which was inaugurated on 23 October 1969 to honor the first Commandant of
the Staff College, highlights speakers of special. eminence. The Art of Command Lectures, established in 1970 and also part of the Delos
C. Emmons series, present the personal views of some of the most successful commanders of our time. Lectures of current interest are
interspersed throughout the course, and annually the Staff College participates in the Kermit Roosevelt Lecture Program, a British-U.S.
supported exchange lecture series.
A U D I T O R I U M P R O C E D U R E S
All guest lectures are presented in the College auditorium in Normandy Hall. The auditorium seats approximately 700 persons, but
audiences do not normally exceed 300. Attendance is limited to the faculty, staff, and student body of the College and to senior officers of
the Armed Services from adjacent commands. The speaker's rostrum is equipped with a lapel microphone to permit freedom of movement on
the platform. The public address system is regulated to conform to the speaker's voice for audibility throughout the auditorium.
It is customary for guest speakers to give a 45-minute address. After a short break, which affords the students an opportunity to formu-
late questions on the subject presented, there is a discussion period during which the speaker answers questions from the audience. A
member of the faculty monitors this period; student assistants handle microphones, which are passed to prospective questioners in the
audience. Students are encouraged to participate in accordance with their education, training, and experience. The speaker can expect
them to be a receptive audience, asking timely and stimulating questions which may touch upon controversial aspects of the subject, delve
further into it, or call for clarification of certain points raised by the speaker. Since the real value of the guest speaker program is the frank
discussion of classified or controversial subjects by eminent speakers, the College safeguards this privilege of free expression. The audi-
torium is secure and intellectual freedom is a fact. The speaker can be assured that his words will carry no further than his audience.
No notes are taken, but the lectures and informal question periods are recorded; however, if the guest speaker requests, no recording
will be made. A tape recording of the lecture can be provided the speaker, if required. Transcripts of guest lectures are not made available
to agencies or persons outside the College.
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ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
FUR VISITORS TO AFSC
Commercial
Norfolk Regional Airport, which is approximately 30 minutes from the Staff College, is served by four commercial airlines: United,
National, Piedmont, and Allegheny.
Military
Norfolk NAS (Chambers Field)
Located 15 minutes from the Staff College by automobile. Norfolk NAS is the most convenient arrival point. Aircraft will be directed to
taxi to Base Operations where the AFSC escort officer will meet the guest speaker and accompany him to the Staff College.
Langley AFB (Hampton, Virginia)
Langley AFB is approximately 30 minutes from the Staff College by automobile.
Oceana NAS (Soucek Field)
Located in Virginia Beach, Oceana is approximately 35 minutes from AFSC by automobile.
E S C O R T
Upon arrival in Norfolk, guest speakers are met by a member of the faculty who will provide any assistance, including storage of class-
ified material. The speaker should inform the Guest Speaker Office of his method of travel and time and place of arrival as soon as
practicable.
QUARTERS AND MEALS
There are a few military facilities which can accommodate families should the guest or a member of his party be accompanied.
Additionally, there are many motels in the area, and the AFSC Guest Speaker Office will be happy to make all quarters arrangements for
the speaker and his party.
The Norfolk area boasts a number of fine restaurants and, with the many military installations, offers a number of officers' clubs with
excellent dining facilities.
4&a Iic
Ocecus
HAMPTON
ROADS AREA
Armed Forces Staff College Dispensary
dial 444-5052
(After duty hours a duty corpsman is on duty and can
contact the On-call Medical Officer.)
Autovon
Toinake Autovon calls dial 444-7861 (Naval Communications
Center) and give the Autovon number to the operator.
AFSC Duty Officer - 444-5132
GuestSpeaker Office - 444-5422/5109
Motor Pool
duty hours - 444-5529
non duty hours - 444-5542
The AFSC Autovon number is 690 plus the extension (i.e., 690-5302). AFSC BOQ
Desk - 444-5311
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21 MAY 1976
DDCI ADDRESS FOR
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
26 MAY 1976
THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY
ADMIRAL DENTON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN;
I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO TALK THIS MORNING ABOUT HOW
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTES TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS. I WILL ALSO COMMENT
ON THE SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL CHANGES NOW UNDER WAY.
LET US UNDERSTAND, AT THE OUTSET, THAT INTELLI-
GENCE OFFICERS DO NOT MAKE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONS;
INSTEAD, THEY TRY TO PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE INFORMA-
TION AND JUDGM NTS TO THOSE WHO ARf. GOING TO MAKE THE
DECISIONS.
INTELLI ENCE AND THE PO ICY MAKER
OUR POLICY MAKERS -- THE PRESIDENT AND THE MEMBERS
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- ARE FREQUENTLY
CALLED UPON TO MAKE GRAVE DECISIONS REGARDING THE IN-
TERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AS THEY ARE AFFECTED BY
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EVENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. YOU CAN IMAGINE THAT
THEY COULD MAKE THESE DECISIONS IN SEVERAL WAYS -- IN
IGNORANCE, ON HUNCHES, OR IN THE LIGHT OF THE BEST
JUDGMENTS TRAINED PROFESSIONALS CAN BRING TO BEAR UPON
THE PARTICULAR SITUATION. OBVIOUSLY, THE LAST ALTER-
NATIVE IS HIGHLY PREFERABLE, THIS IS WHERE THE INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY COMES INTO THE PICTURE. OUR JOB
IS TO PROVIDE THE AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION AND JUDG-
MENTS ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON ABROAD TO THOSE WHO ARE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.
INTELLIGENCE IS 1101 MERE INFORMATION, OR RAW FACTS,
ALTHOUGH THESE ARE OF COURSE THE FIRST NECESSARY IN-
GREDIENT. BUT THE SOURCES OF THE INFORMATION MUST BE
EVALUATED, THEIR REPORTS AND ALLEGED "FACTS" ANALYZED
FITTED IN WITH OTHER FACTS, AND FILTERED THROUGH THE
MINDS OF THE BEST EXPERTS POSSIBLE BEFORE THEY BECOME
INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A LENGTHY PROCESS) M?4 --
f-6Rp4A T--I &t 1#AS- TO-B E A-NALY Z-ED BY PHOTO- I--N T E R P R ET E R S,
-Po T- I-C*L--EXPERTS, ECONOMISTS, AND -=- AS ALWAYS I N
At4Y EAttCRAOY- - 1`HEI1 -CONCLUS I ONS-HAVE- TO BE REVIEWED
BY-flFPLCE-CHIEFS AND EVEN HIGHER SACHEMS, INEVITABLY,
SOME OF THESE PEOPLE ARE SICK, ON LEAVE, OR JUST PLAIN
BUT WHEN THE CHIPS ARE REALLY DOWN,
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TFFE- Gom wi T i SE-E _ -rn ? A 1 ' Y_ R-OU-ND, A L) THE ANALYSIS
DOES GET DONE QUICKLY ENOUGH TO BE OF USE TO THE POLICY
MAKERS. THERE IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT DISTINCTION. INTEL-
LIGENCE,, IF IT IS TO SERVE THE HIGHEST POLICY MAKERS,
MUST BE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE -- THAT IS, THE SYNTHESIS
OF ALL INFORMATION KNOWN TO ALL DEPARTMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT, AND THE BEST JUDGMENTS OF ALL KNOWLEDGEABLE
OFFICIALS -- liDI THE PAROCHIAL VIEWS OF ANY SINGLE
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT. I'M SURE THAT YOU HAVE BEEN
REMINDED THAT THE PEARL HARBOR EXPERIENCE SHOWED THE
NECESSITY FOR THIS KIND OF INTELLIGENCE ALMOST AS
MANY TIMES AS YOU HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT INTELLIGENCE
IS THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION. THE POINT IS NEVER-
THELESS A CRUCIAL ONE. THE VARIOUS SERVICES HAD PLENTY
OF FACTS POINTING TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF A JAPANESE AT-
TACK -- BUT NO ONE WAS MAKING IT HIS BUSINESS TO BREAK
THROUGH THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL BARRIERS, TO PUT ALL
THESE FACTS TOGETHER, AND COMMUNICATE THEM TO THE
PRESIDENT CLEARLY, SUCCINCTLY, AND QUICKLY. "THE WAR,"
SAID PRESIDENT TRUMAN LATER, "TAUGHT US THIS LESSON --
THAT WE HAD TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE IN A MANNER THAT
WOULD MAKE THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE WHERE IT WAS
NEEDED, IN AN INTELLIGIBLE AND UNDERSTANDABLE FORM."
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CERTAINLY PLAYED -- AND IS
CONTINUING TO PLAY -- AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC
ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AND AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION. COULD YOU CONCEIVE OF THE PRESIDENT NEGOTIATING
ABOUT ARMS LIMITATIONS UNLESS HE HAS PRETTY SOUND AN-
SWERS TO THE 64 DOLLAR QUESTION OF LIMITATION FROM
WHAT? IN OTHER WORDS, HE HAS TO KNOW WHAT STRATEGIC
WEAPONS THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE, WHAT NEW WEAPONS ARE
ACTUALLY UNDER DEVELOPMENT, AND WHAT STILL MORE AD-
VANCED ONES MIGHT BE ON SOVIET DRAWING BOARDS AND
SOVIET MINDS -- AND WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITIES TO
PRODUCE. AT NEGOTIATING SESSIONS THE RUSSIAN DELE-
GATES HAVE GAPED IN AMAZEMENT AT WHAT THEY ADMIT ARE
OUR EXTREMELY ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET WEAPONS.
PR?-r I
GLEANING INFORMATION FROM THE RUSSIANS' CLOSED
po 1iA4d ,h~d~~' , b VA4.o(,'ZD 7c-cHN14)uS , _0A AA1N-rAi /NC- CcVP:A
SOCIETY NATURALLY POSES A CONSTANT CHALLENGE.& BEYOND
THAT, THE RUSSIANS GO TO SOME LENGTHS TO CONCEAL WHAT
MIGHT BE OBSERVED BY PHOTOGRAPHY OR TO DECEIVE. SOME-
TIMES THEY TRY TO THROW OFF OUR UNIT COUNT BY BUILD-
ING BOGUS EQUIPMENT. THEY SOMETIMES SLIP, HOWEVER,
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST ADVISE
THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE
EXTENT TO WHICH VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION WOULD CREATE MONITORING PROBLEMS. OB-
VIOUSLY, SOME TYPES OF AGREEMENTS WOULD BE EASIER TO
MONITOR THAN OTHERS
~IN VIEW OF THESE
VARYING CAPABILITIES, THE DCI WOULD HAVE TO ADVISE
THE PRESIDENT AS TO FORMULATIONS AND PROVISIONS THAT
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN AN AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO BE
SURE WE COULD MONITOR IT.
ONCE AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED, THE PRESIDENT AND
HIS ADVISERS NEED TO KNOW IF THE SOVIET UNION IS LIVING
UP TO THE TERMS. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SAN AND ,p,OES
MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND THE
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INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH CONFIDENCE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT
VIOLATIONS WOULD BE DETECTED. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMS THE PRESIDENT OF ANY ACTIVITY OR
AMBIGUOUS SITUATION THAT COULD BE. CONSTRUED AS NON-
COMPLIANCE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRESI-
DENT AND HIS POLICY MAKERS TAKE IT FROM THERE, AND
DECIDE WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE SITUATION THAT INTELLIGENCE
HAS UNCOVERED.
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT DOES NOT STOP
WITH THE MILITARY AND SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS APPLICA-
BLE TO SALT, SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO EVEN IRY TO LIMIT
STRATEGIC ARMS MUST BE VIEWED IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF
US-SOVIET RELATIONS. HERE THE QUESTIONS THAT INTEL-
LIGENCE MUST ANSWER ARE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC. HOW
FIRMLY COMMITTED IS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO WHAT HAS
BEEN KNOWN AS "DETENTE?" COULD INTERNAL POLITICAL
STRESSES, CAUSED BY LAST YEARS DISASTROUS HARVEST OR
THE INEVITABLE SUCCESSION PROBLEM, CAUSE THE SOVIETS
TO LOSE ENTHUSIASM FOR, OR EVEN ABANDON IT? IT IS
NO SECRET THAT THE RUSSIANS' NEED TO CLOSE THE TECH-
NOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST STEERED THEM TOWARD "DE-
TENTE." BUT JUST HOW PRESSING ARE THEIR ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS? HOW ARE THEY TRYING TO SOLVE THESE PROB-
LEMS, AND WHAT ARE THEIR CHANCES OF SUCCESS?
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WHEN ASKED HOW HIS POTATOES CAME OUT LAST YEAR,
A FARMER REPLIED THAT THEY DIDN'T COME OUT -- HE HAD
TO DIG 'EM OUT. LIKEWISE WITH THE ANSWERS TO ALL
THESE MILITARY, SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC
QUESTIONS. THEY HAVE TO BE DUG OUT OF MASSES OF RAW
INFORMATION, COLLECTED BY VARIOUS AGENCIES AND BY MANY
DIFFERENT MEANS. THIS INFORMATION BECOMES NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ONLY AFTER IT HAS BEEN CAREFULLY ANALYZED
AND COORDINATED, IN A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EFFORT BY THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
INTELLIGENCE MUST PRODUCE OVER A BROAD RANGE OF
QUESTIONS. SOME ARE RIGHT-NOW QUESTIONS, SUCH AS
WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE SENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO
THE MIDDLE EAST. OTHERS ARE GENERAL AND COMPLEX, SUCH
AS THE LONG-RUN OUTLOOK FOR
AS IT PRODUCES ACROSS THIS
RANGE, HOW DOES INTELLIGENCE COMPARE WITH, AND DIFFER
FROM, THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO A REGULAR READER
OF THE COMMERCIAL AND SCHOLARLY PRESS?
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT RESTS ON ALL AVAILABLE
SOURCES. WHILE THE FINAL PRODUCT MAY NOT ALWAYS CARRY
AN EXOTIC CLASSIFICATION, THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST HAS
TAKEN PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM ALL THE SPECIAL SOURCES
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INTO ACCOUNT IN REACHING HIS CONCLUSIONS. SOMETIMES
THIS DOES NO MORE THAN SAVE HIM FROM AN ERROR INTO
WHICH A JOURNALIST WOULD EASILY FALL; SOMETIMES IT
LEADS HIM TO CONCLUSIONS WHICH A JOURNALIST COULD NOT
REACH.
IN THE SECOND PLACE, BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL SOURCES,
INTELLIGENCE CAN INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS INACCESSIBLE IQ
Q ISIDE EXPERTS. OUR VIEWS ON THE LIKELY POLICIES OF
A NEW FRENCH PREMIER MAY BE NO BETTER THAN THAT OF AN
EXPERIENCED PARIS-BASED NEWSPAPERMAN
THUS IT IS IN THE MILITARY,
SCIENTIFIC, AND TECHNICAL FIELDS THAT INTELLIGENCE
MAKES ITS UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION.
IN THE THIRD PLACE, INTELLIGENCE IS RESPONSIBLE.
IT DOES NOT HAVE TO COMPETE WITH HEADLINES ABOUT HOWARD
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HUGHES' WILL, OR MILLION-DOLLAR TV CONTRACTS. NOR DOES
IT, IN A FACELESS SORT OF WAY, MERELY LIST OUT ALL THE
"REPORTS" AND THE "FACTS." INSTEAD, IT DRAWS CAREFUL
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN WHAT IS KNOWN FOR SURE, WHAT IS
ALMOST CERTAINLY TRUE, WHAT IT JUDGES TO BE PROBABLY
TRUE, WHAT IS POSSIBLE ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY. IT TELLS
ITS READERS WHICH OF ITS ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS ARE FIRMLY
BASED AND WHICH ARE SIMPLY THE BEST GUESSES OF EXPERIENCED
ANALYSTS CONFRONTED WITH FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION ON A
COMPLEX PROBLEM. SINCE IT IS ONE OF THE BASES FOR OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, IT CANNOT BE MERELY SENSA-
TIONAL; IT MUST BE SERIOUS.
IN THE FOURTH PLACE, INTELLIGENCE IS RESPONS.IY_E..
IT IS A SERVICE WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT AND CAN BE
DIRECTED TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE ON THE PROBLEMS WHICH
POLICY MAKERS SPECIFY, WHETHER THESE ARE OBVIOUS FRONT-
PAGE MATERIAL IN THE OPEN PRESS OR DEEPLY HIDDEN QUES-
TIONS.
BEFORE INTELLIGENCE CAN BE OF USE IN THE NATIONAL
SECURITY PROCESS, IT MUST REACH THE PRESIDENT, THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND OTHER TOP POLICY MAKERS.
PART OF THIS CHALLENGE IS A DAILY, OR EVEN HOURLY
MATTER -- TO BE USEFUL THE INTELLIGENCE MUST BE CURRENT.
IN ORDER TO KEEP THE TOP OFFICIALS UP TO DATE ON MAJOR
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FAST-BREAKING STORIES -- LIKE THE LATEST SOVIET ARMS
SHIPMENTS INTO SYRIA AND THE NEW THAI GOVERNMENT'S
ATTITUDE TOWARD RETAINING ANY US FACILITIES -- WE
PRESENT THE TOP OF THE DAILY INTELLIGENCE TAKE IN AN
ATTRACTIVE, NEWSPAPER FORMAT. DEEPER ANALYTICAL AR-
TICLES ALSO APPEAR, UNDER THE AUTHORS BY-LINE. SORRY,
'THERE'S NO ROOM FOR "STEVE CANYON."
ON MATTERS OF HIGHEST IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE, THERE
ARE TWO MECHANISMS. ONE, THE VITAL AREA OF POSSIBLE
SOVIET OR OTHER COMMUNIST AGGRESSIVE INTENT, IS THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DCI's STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF.
LOCATED IN THE PENTAGON, THE STAFF IS SUPPORTED AND
MANNED BY THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. VIRTUALLY INSTANT COMMUNICATIONS COME
FROM ALL POINTS THAT MIGHT FORETELL HOSTILE ACTIONS.
THE STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF HAS NO OTHER JOB. KEY
ELEMENTS IN THE WHOLE COMMUNITY ALSO CONTINUE TO FOL-
LOW THIS MOST CRITICAL CONCERN. FOR OTHER SITUATIONS
THAT MIGHT SUDDENLY DEMAND A MAJOR HIGH-LEVEL POLICY
DECISION, LIKE, SAY, A POSSIBLE COUP IN ITALY, THE DCI
ISSUES AN ALERT MEMORANDUM OUTLINING THE PROBLEM SUC-
CINCTLY.
ANOTHER ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL WAYS IN WHICH WE
REACH THE TOP POLICY MAKERS IS A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
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ESTIMATE. MANY ESTIMATES COVER FAIRLY STANDARD TOPICS,
SUCH AS THE OUTLOOK FOR ARGENTINA OR PROSPECTS FOR
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THEY TAKE OFF FROM THE COM-
MUNITYI S PRESENT KNOWLEDGE, AND TRY TO PREDICT BROAD
TRENDS OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS. OTHERS ARE
MORE SPECIALIZED PAPERS SUCH AS THOSE ON THE SOVIET
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THEY MAY INVOLVE SUCH POINTS
AS THE EXACT EQUIPMENT ON SOVIET REGIMENTS. THIS
PHOTOGRAPH OF A MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION SHOWS ENOUGH
DETAIL TO HELP WITH THAT, (PHOTO: Motorized Rifle
Pw07a -3
Division I __T OR THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW SO-
VIET AIRCRAFT CARRIER, THE KIEV. (PHOTO) THESE ESTI- pfc-ro
MATES ARE BUILT ON A SOLID BASE OF EVIDENCE; THEY GO
INTO GREATER DETAIL AND GENERALLY LOOK AHEAD FOR PERIODS
OF FIVE YEARS OR SO. THE PRINCIPAL ONES FOCUS ON THE
USSR's STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES, AIR DEFENSE CAPABILI-
TIES, AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. WE TIME THE ANNUAL
PRODUCTION OF THESE ESTIMATES TO ASSIST IN THE PLANNING
OF DEFENSE FORCE LEVELS AND BUDGETS.
IN ORDER TO BE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ESTIMATES
MUST REFLECT THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, AND RECORD -- ACCURATELY AND FULLY -- ANY
MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OR JUDGMENTS WITHIN THE
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COMMUNITY. ALL APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTE FACTS,
ANALYSES, AND JUDGMENTS IN OFTENTIMES STORMY DRAFTING
SESSIONS, AND DEFEND THEIR POSITIONS VIGOROUSLY WHEN
THE ESTIMATE GOES BEFORE THE TOP INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
THERE HAVE BEEN HEATED WORDS EXCHANGED ABOUT WILL OR
WONT THE SOVIETS USE THEIR NEW BACKFIRE BOMBER FOR
INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK. (PHOTO: Backfire)
WE ALSO WORK THROUGH THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL APPARATUS, AND THE STUDIES OF POLICY QUES-
TIONS CALLED FOR IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMO-
RANDA -- COMMONLY CALLED NSSMS. MORE THAN 200 OF
THESE NSSMS HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONED. THEY HAVE SET
IN MOTION STUDIES RANGING FROM HIGHLY SPECIFIC PROJECTS
SUCH AS US OCEAN POLICY, OR US POLICY TOWARD GREECE,
TO SMALL ENCYCLOPEDIAS ABOUT CHOICES FOR THE US STRA-
TEGIC POSTURES. THE COMMUNITY SUPPLIES THE FACTS AND
THE INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS CONCERNING THE POLICY OP-
TIONS WHICH A NSSM PRESENTS TO THE PRESIDENT, AND BY
SO DOING CARRIES OUT ITS ADVISORY AND POLICY SUPPORT
ROLE AT A HIGH LEVEL.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ALSO PARTICI-
PATES IN THE MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
APPARATUS. THE SENIOR REVIEW GROUP, FOR INSTANCE, RE-
VIEWS NSSM STUDIES, AND IN CRISIS SITUATIONS THE WASH-
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INGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP -- A SORT OF CRISIS MANAGE-
MENT TEAM -- MEETS TO COORDINATE TIMELY ACTIONS. THE
DIRECTOR OFTEN BEGINS THESE MEETINGS WITH A BRIEFING
OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND
OF THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION. HE ALSO BRIEFS THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF ON THE INTELLIGENCE
ASPECTS OF ISSUES WHICH COME BEFORE IT,
BENEATH THIS EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE DCI AND SENIOR
POLICY MAKERS, THERE IS A FLOW OF INFORMATION AT LOWER
LEVELS. SE _ -THr "SOUNDS- =LIKE ONE ANALYST COOING-
fl41 S
4TfANOTHE.R, BUT ACTUALLY= ASHARPENS JUDGMENTS AND
CREATES A RESERVOIR OF INTELLIGENCE. ANALYSTS WHO
HAVE BEEN POOLING THEIR RESEARCH ON SOVIET AGRICULTURE
OR GLOBAL ENERGY ISSUES COME OUT OF THE WOODWORK WHEN
WORLD EVENTS TAKE SUDDEN NEW DIRECTIONS, AND WE ARE
GLAD TO HAVE THEM.
THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
THIS, THEN, IS WHAT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS AND HOW
IT CONTRIBUTES TO NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING. THE
NEXT QUESTION, OF COURSE, IS J1 DOES IT GET PRODUCED?
OBVIOUSLY NOT BY CHANCE -- BUT BY THE EVOLVING STRUC-
TURE WHICH HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. SINCE THIS IS A TERM MUCH DISCUSSED TODAY,
AND WAS THE SUBJECT OF TWO SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL IN-
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VESTIGATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE THE REST OF MY
REMARKS TO EXPLAINING WHAT IT IS, WHERE IT CAME FROM,
AND WHERE IT MAY BE GOING.
LIKE FAUST TRYING TO TRANSLATE THE BIBLE, WE N
EASILY GET BOGGED DOWN ON THE FIRST WORDS. E VERY
TERM "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY" IS AT ONC LUSIVE, MEANS
DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPJLE; AND IS A FERTILE
SOURCE OF CONFUSI6N. IN THE V RIY' BROADEST SENSE, IT
REFERS TO THOSE COMPONENT F THE US GOVERNMENT RE-
SPONSIBLE FOR THE COL CTION PROCESSING OF IN-
TELLIGENCE INFORM ION, THE PRODUC N OF FINISHED
INTELLIGENCE HE PROVISION OF VARIOUS DS OF IN-
TELLIGENCfz SUPPORT TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH LUDING,
FOR EXAMPLE, COVERT ACTION), AND SOME MEASURE OF S
PORT (LARGELY IN THE SUBSTANTIVE FIELD) TO THE CONGRESS
,MORE BROADLY-,--IN -THE__NSE, THE INTELLI5EENCE
SERVICES OF THE US GOVERNMENT FORM A COMUN-ft__Y OF
SCHOLARS, OR CERTAINLY OF HIGHLY RAINED EXPERTS BUT
WE ARE NOT A COMMUNE CH M MBER HAS HIS OWN SUPERIOR,
TO WHOM HE MUST REPORT AI W -B NEEDS HE MUST MEET --
THE SECRETARY OF ''ATE, THE SECRETA Y OF DEFENSE, AND
IN CIA's CAS THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF BU T E SYSTEM
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OPERATING TOGETHER ON COMMON PROBLEMS, AND BY A FEEL-
ING THAT, IF ONE OFAUS FAILS, NONE OF US CAN REALLY
SUCCEED.
THE RIGINs?OF THE INTELLIGENCE-.COMMUNITY
AS A CONCEPT, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GOES
BACK TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947. THE ACT
HAS BEEN FLESHED OUT BY A NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE OR-
DERS -- AND TODAY IS ON THE VERGE OF ITS FIRST MAJOR
OVERHAUL. MORE ON THAT LATER. FIRST, LET'S LOOK AT
THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY AS IT IS NOW.
BY PRESIDENTIAL ORDER, THE DCI IS THE GOVERN-
MENTI S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. HE ACTS AS THE
PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND
AS COORDINATOR OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RELATING TO US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. THIS
MAKES HIM THE HEAD OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
IT MIGHT AT FIRST SEEM THAT ONE COULD DESCRIBE
THE I NTELLIGENCE COMMUNTY SIMPLY BY LISTING OUT ITS
VARIOUS MEMBERS. AS DEFINED IN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
11 `7&
OF d FEBRUARY, THEY ARE THOSE SHOWN ON THIS CHART.
THERE ARE, HOWEVER, MANY CONSIDERATIONS THAT CUT
ACROSS THIS SIMPLE ROLL-CALL. SOME MIGHE LIKEN IT TO
A COUNTRY CLUB -- FOUNDING MEMBERS, SOCIAL MEMBERS,
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AND HONORARY MEMBERS. THERE ARE MANY SHADINGS.
THUS WE CAN NOTE THAT THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCING
ORGANIZATIONS ARE CIA, THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU
OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DIA, AND THE SERVICE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES -- BUT BEYOND THIS SINGLE STATE-
MENT IS A VERITABLE SWAMP OF QUALIFICATIONS.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, FOR EXAMPLE, IS
A MAJOR COLLECTOR AND PROCESSOR OF INTELLIGENCE IN-
FORMATION AND HAS AN ASSOCIATED ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY.
BUT THIS CAPABILITY I S NOT APPLIED TO AN "ALL-SOURCE"
ENVIRONMENT, SINCE NSA IS PRIMARILY KEYED TO COMMU-
NICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
THE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRA-
TION (FORMERLY PART OF AEC) IS UNIQUE IN A DIFFERENT
WAY. ERDA NEITHER COLLECTS INTELLIGENCE NOR DOES ANY
SIGNIFICANT ANALYSIS. IT OWES ITS COMMUNITY MEMBER-
SHIP TO THE FACT THAT IT REPRESENTS A UNIQUE AND EX-
CLUSIVE BODY OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION, AND TO THE
LANGUAGE OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY
ACT OF 1946.
THE FBI IS CONSIDERED A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNITY,
BECAUSE OF ITS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, COUNTERESPIONAGE,
AND PTO A LESSER EXTENT) LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
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IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY FIELD, THE FBI DOES NOT
PERFORM ANY SUBSTANTIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS,
HOWEVER, NOR DOES IT PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN COLLECTING
POSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.
THOUGH TREASURY IS DESIGNATED A COMMUNITY MEMBER,
MANY STILL CONSIDER IT PRIMARILY A CONSUMER OF IN-
TELLIGENCE. HOWEVER, THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS AS KEY INGREDIENTS OF MANY MILITARY
AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS IS MAKING TREASURY'S
ROLE LOOM LARGER EVERY DAY.
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADDS A FEW MORE COMPLEXI-
TIES TO OUR PROBLEM. ITS SMALL BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH IS ENGAGED LARGELY IN ANALYSIS AND PRODUC-
TION. ALSO WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT IS THE FOREIGN SER-
VICE. THE COMMUNITY REGARDS THE FOREIGN SERVICE AS A
PRIME COLLECTOR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION.
E _T E WORST"THE NEXT TIME YOU-TELL -A,
OFFI R 'rT-HE`-18 A MEMBER OF -THE "IN-
-- --&M-I
C~UN i-T'f~__ ' $E
TZL LT r, F ti " LING J
DEFINING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT AND
PRODUCTION COMMUNITY HAS POSED SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE
PAST. A REALIGNMENT ORDERED EARLIER THIS MONTH
PROMISES TO RESOLVE MANY OF THESE. I WILL OUTLINE
THEM LATER.
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ARE YOU BEGINNING TO SEE WHY IT IS NOT EASY TO
PIN DOWN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY? IT MIGHT BE
FUL TO CKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST FOUR 'COM-
MUNITIES ,TH INTELLIGENCE-RELATED RESPONSIB CITIES
AND INTERESTS,~ALL OF WHICH INTERLOCK AND 96ERLAP.
THESE INCLUDE:
THE COLLECTQRR OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND
PROVIDERS OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. /THIS COMMUNITY
WOULD OF COURSE INCLUb'FE CIA's DIRE'TORATE OF OPERA-
STAT TIONS, PLUS THE CIA OFFICE OF EL $VT AND
SA,AAND THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE. STA :1'S FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER
CORPS, TREASURY, AGRICULTUjRE%,ND COMMERCE ATTACHES, AND
THE MILITARY SERVICE AT "CHES WOULD ALSO BE PART OF THIS
COMMUNITY, ALONG WITH HE COLLEC 'ING ELEMENTS OF DIA,
THE SERVICES, AND T FBI.
THE ANAL ODUCERS OF 8JJBSTANTIVE_LRIE1J_1-
GENCE CAN BE TH GHT OF AS ANOTHER CO,TUNITY. THESE PEO-
PLE ARE FOUND IN CIA'S DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND
CERTAIN PART OF ITS DIRECTORATE OF SCIEi4qE AND TECH-
NOLOGY, A WELL AS IN DIA AND THE THREE SERVICE INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCIES. OTHER DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MPONENTS,
AN 000ASION-
NSA (OMETIMES, IN SOME FIELDS), STATE/INR,
AL ERDA AND THE TREASURY MUST ALSO BE INCLUDED.
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~`~,THEN THERE ARE THE RESOURCE MANAGERS. HERE THE
NEW COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE HAS RESPONSIBILITY.
I WILL RETURN TO THIS GROUP SHORTLY.
FINALLY:, THERE ARE THE CONSUMERS. THE CONS,6MER
COMMUNITY IS ITSELF COMPLEX, AND INCLUDES MANY'PEOPLE
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THE PRESIDENT THE MEMBERS
OF THE NSC, AND THEIR SENIOR STAFF AND SORDINATES HEAD
THE LIST, BUT THE S'CRETARIES OF THE TfASURY, COMMERCE,
AND AGRICULTURE AND THEIR SENIOR STAFS AND SUBORDINATES
ALSO FIGURE IN. THE ECONOMIC POLIp"' COMMUNITY -- SUCH AS
THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIFNHL EONOMIC POLICY, THE SPECIAL
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, GOVEROR,S'OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE,
AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXPQF'I"7IMPORT BANK -- ALSO FORMS
PART OF THIS CONSUMER COMMUNITY\
WELL -- SURELY I HA-VE SAID ENOUGH
NTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY"
TO CONVINCE YOU
WHAT WE CAN $'EE I S THAT TIME, THE I1,NCREAS I NGLY
COMPLEX NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE ITSELF, ANbA CHANGING CLI-
MATE OF PUBLIC OPINION HAVE MADE THE INTELLIGENCE PRO-
VISIONS \
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT EITHER OIkSOLETE OR
TOO WEAK,/ FOUNDATION FOR THE SYSTEM THAT HAS EVOLVED
OR GROWN LIKE TOPSY -- OVER THE 29 YEARS.
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IN 1947 CONGRESS THOUGHT IT WAS CREATING A SMALL
INDEPENDENT AGENCY, NOT SUBORDINATE TO ANY CABINET DE-
PARTMENT, TO "CORRELATE AND EVALUATE" THE PRODUCT OF
THE EXISTING, LARGELY MILITARY, AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE
FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE. THE CONGRESS PLACED ON
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES
THOUGHT TO BE MODEST, AND PROVIDED HIM WITH WHAT IT CON-
SIDERED COMMENSURATE AUTHORITIES. AFTER ALMOST THREE
DECADES, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE
ENORMOUS, WHILE THE AUTHORITIES WERE LESS THAN ADEQUATE.
RAVIN `JUST~k -dl'TTL U T , HO 1TY AWES/ T A-
T I TSN\7_7 I~ B E I J U S _L-I TT LE\,P~F.CrNANJ-
THOSE WHO DRAFTED AND ENACTED THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ACT OF 1947 NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR COULD HAVE FORESEEN:
-- THAT BY 1976 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
WOULD BECOME A MAJOR PART OF GOVERNMENT, LARGER IN THE
PEACE OF 1976 THAN IN THE WAR OF 1945.
-- THAT THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
WOULD EXPAND TO COVER DIPLOMACY, COMMERCE, ECONOMICS,
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL TRENDS WORLDWIDE, AS
WELL AS THE MORE TRADITIONAL MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.
-- THAT THE EXTRACTION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM
CLOSED SOCIETIES CAPABLE OF THREATENING MAJOR US
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INTERESTS, OR EVEN SURVIVAL, WOULD REQUIRE THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF LARGE, COMPLEX, AND EXPENSIVE COLLEC-
TION SYSTEMS; AND THAT EFFICIENT EMPLOYMENT OF
THESE SYSTEMS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST WOULD RE-
QUIRE CENTRAL, UNIFIED MANAGEMENT.
-- THAT THE ACT WOULD NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR
RESOLUTION OF IMPORTANT MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL PROB-
LEMS, PRIMARILY INVOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
INHERENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE MAJOR SYSTEMS.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAD RESPON-
SIBILITY WITHOUT AUTHORITY AS MUCH IN PRODUCTION AS
IN MANAGEMENT. THE OLD USIB PRODUCTION MACHINERY WORKED,
BUT IT DID SO IN PART BECAUSE THE PARTICIPATING AGEN-
CIES KNOW THEY NEED NOT HAVE BEEN INHIBITED BY IT WHEN
THEY DID NOT WANT TO BE. A DCI WHO INDEPENDENTLY HAD
ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT COULD EXTRACT A SERIOUS PRODUCT
FROM USIB, AND COULD PERSONALLY ENSURE THAT THE PRODUCT
WOULD BE READ BY THE RIGHT PEOPLE. BUT SIMPLY BEING
NAMED DCI DID NOT GIVE HIM THIS STANDING.
THE FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESS OF THE DCI's STATUTORY
POSITION SHOWED UP ACROSS THE WHOLE RANGE OF HIS PRO-
DUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT MOST SERIOUSLY IN HIS
INABILITY TO ESTABLISH THE PRIMACY OF NATIONAL PRODUCTS
OVER DEPARTMENTAL ONES. -T -A'
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AUThOR Z{- --THE---VA-R-+OU-S-DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES TO CON-
T-NUE--TO--PRODUCE--A D__DI-SSEMI-NAT? DEPARTMENTAL- INTELLI
GE-NCEr THIS-CREATED A MORASS IN WHICH THE DCI IS RESPON-
SI-B :E-FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE
A{ --Sf-FE-N-SE--A=S~BERS OF THE NSC, BUT I-NR AND DIA COULD-
-S--Fit-t-----iNffEt--NfiE-L -IGENC-E TO THESE---S-ECRETARIES AS THEIR
RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENT HEADS. --THIS PROVIDED THE DEPART-
MENTS AND T-HE- S-E-RV LCES- A- CHANNEL-- O-R DISSEMINATION OF THEIR
RREH}UCT-T(1 THEIRTTE HOUSE MOREOVER, WHILE BOTH AGENCIES
IS-1-S-T THAT CIA'S NATIONAL PRODUCT BE COORDINATED WITH
TUEIYLAND E-XE-RCISE VIGOROUSLY -- AS THEY SHOULD -- THE RIGHT
TO--DISSENT,--NEITHER HAS-HESITATED TO ISSUE UNCOORDINATED
VIEWS, SOME-Of-WNI-CH--MAY CONFLICT WITH A NATIONAL INTEL-
LVG_ENCE =PDS I T I ON
AT LEAST EQUALLY AMBIGUOUS WAS THE DCI'S RESPON-
SIBILITY IN REGARD TO MANAGEMENT OF THE ENTIRE COM-
MUNITY -- NOTABLY THE BUDGET. To PUT IT SIMPLY, HE WAS
CHARGED WITH MANAGING AND COORDINATING, BUT ONE ELEMENT
OF THE COMMUNITY, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, HAD MOST OF
THE MUSCLE -- THAT IS, ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF THE BUDGET.
THE DCI COULD ADVISE ON THIS, AND DID, BUT ULTIMATE DE-
CISIONS ON CUTTING DOWN OR ADDING INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
RESTED ELSEWHERE.
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CHANGES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
THESE PROBLEMS RECEIVED GROWING ATTENTION BOTH IN
THE WHITE HOUSE AND ON CAPITOL HILL, EVEN AS PUBLIC
ATTENTION FOCUSED ON MORE SENSATIONAL MATTERS. THE
EXECUTIVE WAS FIRST TO ACT. ON FEBRUARY 18,,.PRESIDENT
FORD TOOK THE INITIATIVE BOTH TO STRENGTHEN UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT, AND TO DEAL WITH SOME
PAST ABUSES THAT HAD BEEN IN THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT.
HE ISSUED AN OMNIBUS EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING
POLICY GUIDELINES AND RESTRICTIONS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES, AND A NEW COMMAND STRUCTURE AND OVERSIGHT
MECHANISM FOR THE COMMUNITY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE PRO-
POSED NEW LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THE SECRECY OF PARTI-
CULARLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, AND MET WITH CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERS TO DEVELOP LEGISLATION CONCERNING ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE AND TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED OPENING OF
MAIL. THE PRESIDENT ALSO ENDORSED LEGISLATION TO PRO-
HIBIT ASSASSINATIONS OF FOREIGN LEADERS, AND PROPOSED
A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH CONSTRUCTIVE CONGRESSIONAL OVER-
SIGHT COULD BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DISCLOSING INTEL-
LIGENCE SECRETS.
THE PRESIDENTS ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO ENSURE
THAT THE UNITED STATES STRENGTHENS ITS CAPABILITY TO
GATHER AND EVALUATE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND CONDUCT
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NECESSARY COVERT OPERATIONS ON THE ONE HAND, AND THAT
THESE ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED IN A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND LAWFUL MANNER AND NEVER AIMED AT OUR OWN CITIZENS,
ON THE OTHER.
HdW WILL THIS BE DONE? FIRST OF ALL, THE PRESIDENT'S
ORDERS SET FORTH POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCIES'WHICH DEFINES BOTH WHAT THEY A$E.
EXPECTED TO DO AND WHAT THEY ARE NOT. PERMITTED TO DO. L
SECOND, THE ACTIONS CREATE A STREAMLINED COMMAND STRUCTURE
FOR THE COMMUNITY WHICH MAKES SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED
INDIVIDUALS ACCOUNTABLE. THIRD, IN THE AREA OF OVER-
SIGHT, THEY REQUIRE THE NSC TO CONDUCT SEMI-ANNUAL
REVIEWS OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCT, AND ESTABLISH A NEW MECHANISM, THE INTELLIGENCE
OVERSIGHT BOARD, TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPE-
CIFIC RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE COMMUNITY'S ACTIVITIES.
I WOULD LIKE TO SPELL OUT SOME OF THE CHANGES.
AT THE TOP OF THE PYRAMID, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL CONTINUES TO EXERCISE OVERALL POLICY CONTROL OVER
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(CHART) THE NSC's SEMI-
ANNUAL REVIEW, ACCORDING TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, IS TO
BE FOCUSED ON THREE TOPICS:
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-- THE NEEDS OF POLICYMAKERS, AND THE RESPON-
SIVENESS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE TO THESE NEEDS;
-- THE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES
IN THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION; AND
-- THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ONGOING COVERT OPERA-
TIONS AND SENSITIVE COLLECTION MISSIONS. CL'\ e
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AFFAIRS, NOW GENERAL SCOWCROFT, HAS STAFF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE REVIEWS. HE IS TO CONSULT
HEADS OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WHICH J E FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE, IN OTHER WORDS, THE CONSUMER COMMUNITY
A PIVOTAL BODY IN THE NEW SETUP IS THE THREE-MAN
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, WITH RESPONSIBILITY
FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCE CONTROL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
C ART
COMMUNITY. (CHART) CONTROL OF RESOURCES, YOU RECALL,
HAS BEEN A MATTER OF CONTENTION FOR YEARS. THE CFI RE-
PORTS DIRECTLY TO THE NSC. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE CHAIRS IT, OTHER MEMBERS ARE THE DEPUTY SECRE-
TARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, ROBERT ELLSWORTH,
REPRESENTING THE DEPARTMENT THAT CONTROLS THE BULK OF
THE RESOURCES, AND THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, WILLIAM HYLAND, FOR POLICY
INPUT.
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THE CFI's SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS ARE:
-- CONTROLLING BUDGET PREPARATION AND RESOURCE
ALLOCATION FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PRO-
GRAM (THAT IS, EXCLUDING TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE),
-- ESTABLISHING MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR THAT
PROGRAM, AND
-- CARRYING OUT NSC POLICY DECISIONS, ESPECIALLY
ON COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION.
IN CASE OF DISAGREEMENT, WHICH IS NOT UNKNOWN ON
SUCH MATTERS, THE DCI OR ANY MEMBER OF THE NSC MAY
APPEAL TO THE NSC. SO FAR THIS CFI HAS BEEN ILLEGIB
T E'P' CLY'_AC A , MEETING ABOUT ONCE A WEEK.
ONE INNOVATION REFLECTS A GROWING RECOGNITION
THAT THE DCI'S RESPONSIBILITIES FALL INTO TWO MAIN
SLOTS -- ONE, ADMINISTERING CIA; THE OTHER, LEADING
THE COMMUNITY. ACCORDINGLY, THE DIRECTOR NOW HAS
TWO PRINCIPAL DEPUTIES, ONE FOR EACH OF THOSE FUNC-
TIONS. THE MAN FOR THE COMMUNITY IS
I
KNOCHE, A VETERAN CIA OFFICER FROM THE ANALYTICAL
SIDE OF THE HOUSE. PROSPECTS LOOK GOOD FOR CONGRESS
TO WRITE THIS CHANGE INTO THE STATUTES, INCIDENTALLY.
UNDER HIS RESTATED AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH NECES-
SARY BOARDS AND COMMITTEES, THE DCI ON MAY 6 FORMALLY
ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD
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(NFIB) AS A REPLACEMENT FOR USIB. WITHOUT DETAILING
ITS FULL LIST OF FUNCTIONS, I'D JUST CALL ATTENTION
TO A COUPLE OF ADDITIONS. THESE ARE (1) TO MAINTAIN
EFFECTIVE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS
AND CONSUMERS AND IDENTIFY CONSUMER NEEDS FOR INTEL-
LIGENCE; AND (2) TO DEVELOP POLICIES REGARDING AR-
RANGEMENTS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE
MATTERS -- AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX SUBJECT.
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NAT ONALF, R J L AUL1j
GENCE BOARD, AS SHOWN ON THIS CHART, IS THE SAME AS
L/+M`T
THE OLD USIB, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE DCI's DEPUTY
FOR THE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN ADDED, AS THE VICE CHAIR-
MAN. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE DCI's DEPUTY FOR ADMIN-
ISTERING CIA ALSO IS A MEMBER, TO VOTE CIA's STOCK,
SO TO SPEAK; AND THAT THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE
REMAIN AS OBSERVERS -- AND FAR FROM SILENT OBSERVERS
I MIGHT ADD.
DEFENSE REALIGNMENT
SPEAKING OF THE SERVICES, THIS IS PROBABLY THE
PLACE TO TAKE NOTE OF REALIGNMENTS THAT SECRETARY
RUMSFELD ANNOUNCED ON 14 MAY FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.
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LET ME SUMMARIZE WHAT WAS DONE.
FIRST, A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE WILL BE ESTABLISHED. HE WILL
REPORT DIRECTLY TO DEPUTY SECRETARY ELLSWORTH IN
REGARD TO THE LEGALITY AND PROPRIETY OF DEFENSE IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, AND WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH
THE PRESIDENT'S NEW INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD.
I WILL DISCUSS THIS. GROUP LATER.
SECOND, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (IN-
TELLIGENCE) IS DESIGNATED AS DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE, OR DDI. AS SUCH, HE WILL EXERCISE
BOTH STAFF AND LINE AUTHORITY ON BEHALF OF THE SECRE-
TARY OVER DOD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THIS STEP IS
IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL BACK IN 1970, AS WELL AS IN
LINE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER. THE DI-
RECTORS OF BOTH NSA AND DIA REPORT TO SECRETARY
RUMSFELD THROUGH THE DDI. THE DIRECTOR OF DIA, FUR-
THERMORE SERVES AS ONE OF THE DDI'S DEPUTIES, BUT
ALSO REPORTS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF IN REGARD TO THE SERVICES' SPECIAL RESPON-
SIBILITIES.
THIRD, DIA HAS BEEN STREAMLINED SO THAT ONLY TWO
VICE DIRECTORS -- ONE FOR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION, AND
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ONE FOR PLANS, OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT -- REPORT TO THE
DIRECTOR, GENERAL SAM WILSON, INSTEAD OF THE TWELVE
ELEMENTS THAT DID BEFORE, THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE FUNC-
TIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, INCIDENTALLY, CONTINUE
TO BE COORDINATED BY THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE,
BUT ARE NOT OTHERWISE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THIS RE-
ORGANIZATION,
FOURTH, AND LAST, A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BOARD
CONSISTING OF SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS
HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ON A TRIAL BASIS, THE BOARD'S
PURPOSE IS TO IMPROVE THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT QUALITY
AND RESPONSIVENESS THROUGH MORE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS
WITH OPERATIONAL USERS,
OVERSIGHT
Now, A FEW WORDS ABOUT OVERSIGHT, AND THEN A
LOOK INTO THE CLOUDY CRYSTAL BALL. THE INTELLIGENCE
OVE.Ba, THAT I MENTIONED BEFORE GETS THE RE-
SPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST THE PRESIDENT, THE NSC, AND THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL IN SEEING THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COM-
MUNITY FOLLOWS THE VARIOUS NEW RESTRICTIONS. (CHART) CHAR r
THE THREE MEMBERS OF THE OVERSIGHT BOARD ARE
ALSO MEMBERS OF THE LONG-STANDING PRESIDENT'S FOR-
EIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB); THEY ARE
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VETERAN DIPLOMAT ROBERT MURPHY, ECONOMIST LEO CHERNE,
AND ROBERT AILES, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.
COVERT ACTION AND OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS
WHAT ABOUT COVERT OPERATIONS IN THE NEW ERA?
THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVISE
THE PRESIDENT IN THIS AREA TO THE OPERATIONS ADVISORY
GROUP, SUCCEEDING THE OLD "40 COMMITTEE," AND UPGRADED.
L HAV'
(CHART)
IN BRIEF, THE OAG IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT ON ALL PROPOSALS
FOR COVERT ACTION AND CERTAIN SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION MISSIONS, AND SUBMITTING TO THE NSC A
PERIODIC REVIEW OF SUCH ONGOING OPERATIONS AND
COLLECTION MISSIONS.
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FUTURE CHANGES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
NOTWITHSTANDING ALL THESE CHANGES, CONGRESS BE-
LIEVES THAT THE DCI`S RESPONSIBILITY OVER INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE ENHANCED, AND SPELLED
OUT CLEARLY AND IN DETAIL IN STATUTE, As YOU WILL SEE,
MOST OF THEIR IDEAS FIT WITH ACTIONS-ALREADY TAKEN, BUT
ACCORDING TO CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE SHOULD NOT CON-
TINUE DEFINING THESE RESPONSIBILITIES ALONE, AS IT HAS
DONE SINCE 1947. IN SUMMARY, HERE ARE A FEW OF THE
RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL SELECT COMMIT-
TEES HAVE MADE THAT WILL CHANGE THE ROLE OF THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY:
-- By STATUTE, THE DCI WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS
THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AD-
VISER, WITH EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRODUCING
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS.
FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE DCI WOULD BE EMPOWERED TO ESTAB-
LISH A STAFF DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO HIM TO HELP PRE-
PARE HIS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS AND TO CO-
ORDINATE THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AS A GROUP OF 11 NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE OFFICERS DO NOW. THE DCI WOULD ALSO BE EM-
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POWERED TO DRAW ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY AS NEEDED TO HELP HIM DO THIS.
-- By STATUTE, THE DCI WOULD BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY
AND AUTHORITY FOR ESTABLISHING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RE-
QUIREMENTS, PREPARING THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET,
AND PROVIDING GUIDANCE FOR UNITED STATES;-NATIONAL IN-
TELLIGENCE PROGRAM OPERATIONS.
THE DCI WOULD BE GIVEN THE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW
ALL. FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS, INCLUDING TACTICAL
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE WHICH IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE ARMED FORCES. AND TO SETTLE ANOTHER POINT OF
CONTENTION, THE STATUTE WOULD MANDATE STEPS TO INSURE
THAT IN TIME OF WAR THE'RELEVANT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS COME UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE. IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE DCI BE LIMITED TO
TEN YEARS IN OFFICE, AND THAT HE BE SEPARATED FROM
DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY OVER THE CIA.
THESE ARE ONLY A FEW OF THE CHANGES BEING SERIOUSLY
CONSIDERED.. THE LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR INDICATES THEY
WILL NOT BE ENACTED INTO LAW UNTIL 1977, SO WE CAN EX-
PECT MANY REFINEMENTS BY THEN.
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CONCLUSION
I CLOSE WITH TWO OBSERVATIONS.
FIRST, HOWEVER EXTENSIVE THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY IN THE PAST, PRESENT, OR FUTURE IN SUPPORT OF
NATIONAL STRATEGY, WE HAVE SEEN IN RECENT YEARS THAT
INTELLIGENCE DOES NOT OPERATE IN A VACUUM. AND SO I
WOULD LIKE TO CITE ONE OF MR. BUSH'S -INJUNCTIONS TO THE
REORGANIZED COMMUNITY. HE CALLED FOR CONTINUING ATTEN-
TION TO IMPROVING PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF US INTELLIGENCE.
WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIRE-
MENTS, HE SAID, THE COMMUNITY SHOULD STRIVE TO BETTER
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MISSION AND OF OUR PRODUCT.
SECOND, I ECHO MR. BUSH'S TRIBUTE TO THE DEDI-
CATED MEN AND WOMEN WHO STAFF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS
OF THE COMMUNITY. AS HAS OFTEN BEEN POINTED OUT,
OUR FAILURES GET WIDE PUBLICITY, AND OUR SUCCESSES
FREQUENTLY GO UNHERALDED. I ONLY HOPE THAT, WHATEVER
CHANGES IN THE COMMUNITY ARE IN FACT FINALLY MADE, THEY
WILL STILL PERMIT THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS TO
SERVE THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE AS WELL AS, OR PREFERABLY BETTER THAN, THEY HAVE
IN THE 29 YEARS SINCE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WAS
CREATED.
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