'THE COMMUNIST ATTACK ON PARLIAMENTARY' GOVERNMENT ADDRESS GIVEN BY ALLEN W. DULLES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW DINNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001700030005-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 4, 1956
• Content Type: SPEECH

.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
"THE COMMUNIST ATTACK ON PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT
ADDRESS GIVEN BY ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW DINNER
4 MAY 1956
It may be appropriate and possibly timely, in addressing it, group
of eminent lawyers, to discuss the techniques which the Communist
leaders boast they intend to adopt to undermine the structure of free
government based on the rule of law.
I have always been impressed at our seeming reluctance to give
credence to official statements which are made by political leade -s in
other countries when we disagree fervently with-what they say or whir,
their statements seem at the time to be bombastic or unrealistic.
Take for example, Hitler's Mein Kampf. Written in 1924, it had
"wide circulation in Germany and left a deep impression on the Germany
people. Over here it received little attention until after the outb: eat' of
World War II. Yet in this book was the blueprint of the Hitlerian policy
.of the superiority of the Herrenvolk, of the manifest destiny of the
German Reich, of the anti-semitic campaigns, and of the whole trend of
Hitlerism. If we Americans had really paid attention to that book in the
decade or more after its publication, we would .have been far better
alerted to the dangers which Hitler represented for our own cour_try
and our civilization.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
Much the same can be said about the writings of Lenin a--td Stair..
We were too inclined to laugh off their theories of world revolution .anti
of the inevitability of conflict between Communism and the Free Wo_ri1
Yet Stalin's writings on the Problems of Leninism and the Short Eiistuu jr
of the Communist Party were circulated in tens of millions of conies
throughout the Soviet Union and the Communist World and finally
received some slight attention here in this country.
Now we are told that the cruder forms of Stalinism are to be
buried and we have the somewhat cold comfort of learning that we mu._
look to Marx and Lenin and their teachings for guidance as to Soviet
behavior.
Lenin's theories have never really been codified into a dofma
which is as readily available as, for example, "Das Kapital. ?t Lenin
was very prolific in his writings. One can find many inconsistencies
and paradoxes which today give a wide choice to the somewhat puzzled
leaders in the Kremlin. It is no easy job, they find, to quietly bury
history and the memory and the record of their late dictator and hero,
Stalin. Now they are groping through the Marxist-Leninist philoscphir*e=i for
precepts to give a new cloak to their present policy.
Some of these have taken form in the pronouncements of the rec ;,i
20th Party Congress. This was an extraordinary affair. Over a period
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 ? Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
of 12 days the Soviet leaders poured out a cascade of verbiage -- the
length of the speeches corresponding roughly to their respective posit; kc'rs
in the present Soviet hierarchy. From Khrushchev we had an 8-hour ate !ech
and roughly 56, 000 words, from Bulganin 4 hours and 27, 000 words: 'r(=nn
Mikoyan 2 hours and 14, 000 words, and so on. For whatever si~;nificauc e
length may have, Kaganovich and Malenkov were next in the standings
with Molotov reduced to a mere 8, 000 words. The total amounted to E ci_ie
5 - 600, 000 words which the patient party faithful had to.endure.
Apparently, however, the Soviet have found some practical uses
for the oratorical achievements of the 20th Party Congress. Th -- re:
de-Stalinization program has rendered obsolete practically all o' the
history books and many standard textbooks used throughout the Soviet
Union. Something has to replace these books and until the new historias
can rewrite a proper Soviet history, the speeches of the Party Congres 3
can serve as a textbook.
We have recently come across a directive issued by Mar?=hal
Zhukov to the Soviet Armed Forces which deals with the "historical"
decisions of the Congress and accepts them as the basis for the 1iolitical
indoctrination of Soviet military personnel. This directive prescribes
that the writings of the Congress are to serve the purpose of mi ltarv
indoctrination and discipline.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
A further directive to the Soviet forces in the occupied areas
issued a couple of days later indicates that Marshal Zhukov has taien
action to withdraw from children's and officers' schools all the textbookn
on World War II which attribute the victory to the military genius of Stall.
This directive ordered that the class hours previously scheduled for the
study of such books were to be devoted instead to a study of the decision.i
of the Party Congress,. Further, examinations were not to be given on
those portions of the offending histories praising Stalin which had alread'i
been taught to the students.
Possibly like the students of the Soviet Union we should spend bo- Ic-f
time on what the Soviet leaders at the Party Congress have just bern tei.king
us. Tucked away in all this oratory are the statements of the policy whict
we may expect to see the present Kremlin leaders follow for the irimediatti
future. They have told us in no uncertain words what they propose to do .
us. It is better not to ignore this.
While we read in these speeches that war is no longer inevitable,
and that some kind of co-existence is possible, it is clear that Soviet
objectives remain basically unchanged, but they. say, can be achie"ed
by new methods. For example, this is what Khrushchev said in his
speech of 14 February 1956:
"The right wing bourgeois parties and their governments are
suffering bankruptcy with increasing frequency. In these circumstances.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
the working class, by rallying around itself the toiling peasantry, t ie
intelligentsia, all patriotic forces, and resolutely repulsing the opporturu it
elements who are incapable of giving up the policy of compromise with
capitalists and landlords, is in a position to defeat the reactionary :orce
opposed to the popular interest, to capture a stable majority in the
parliaments, and transform the latter from an instrument of bourgs.=ois
democracy into a genuine instrument of the peoples' will. " "In sut 11 at
event," he adds, "this institution, traditional in many highly developed
capitalist countries, may become an organ of genuine democracy
democracy for the working people. "
Translated into a little less flamboyant language, this meax.s that
the Communists propose to infiltrate our free legislative systems, to tatif.
over our parliamentary governments, and to use the freedom whic"L our
system of government gives to destroy all vestiges of that system. Tho ;z
they did not quote it specifically, we can be sure that the Soviet leaders Still
accept the view announced most vividly in Lenin's own heyday, in `.-he btatutes
of the Third Communist International in 1920 -- that "The Commixrdst Ytir y
enters such institutions / as Parliaments/ not for the purpose of orgar3:3ation
work, but in order to blow up the whole bourgeois machinery and i he
parliament itself from within."
Speaking in February a few days after Khrushchev, Mikoyan waL-
bit more precise. He told how the Soviet Government had accomFlishetL
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
these objectives in the past, and cited particularly the revolution isi
Czechoslovakia. This is how he put it:
"By force of the favorable postwar situation in Czechoslovakia
the socialist revolution was carried out by peaceful means. Comrunist::
came into power after having allied themselves not only with the parties
of the working people which were close to them but also with the bcurgeoi;
parties which supported the common national front. The Czechoslovak
people won by way of a peaceful development of revolution. " And, Miko ar,
concluded that, "In their own way, yet also without civil war, the workin
class of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, and other People's
Democracies arrived at the victory of the socialist revolution. "
Of course, I do not wish to leave with you the impression that
even for the immediate future the Soviet proposes to limit their sutver3i~.~
techniques to the single policy of infiltrating Western parliamentary syrt msr~.s
and then taking over and destroying these systems. The weapons o=
subversion and of contrived civil war will still be used wherever th=>y think
they can get away with them. And there will be no abandonment of the use
of strikes and such forceful tactics, especially through labor unioru.
Since the end of the war, they have ruled with an iron hand the
largest labor unions in France and Italy and they have substantial ir.fluer_.cc;
in a very large number of trade unions in other countries. They have shown
great ability to foment strikes for political Communist ends in countries
where their parliamentary representation is non-existent or negligi dle;
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 ` Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
as for example, recent strikes in the Scandinavian countries and even ttie
1954 dock strike in England bore the marks of Communist initiative a-.-,I
control. Even here in the United States we are not immune to this Tv_,!
of sinister Communist penetration.
Tonight, as there is no time to discuss all the program,., of ac is_)n
the Soviet outlined at the Party Congress, I shall deal only with their clearly
announced policy of manipulating our free parliamentary systems to ttz: it
own ends.
First, it may be useful to review briefly some past exarrnple:3
their attempts to use the techniques of subverting free governments
Here it is interesting to note that there is no instance where the
Communists have taken over a country by free elections or have obt.3irt ?~d
a parliamentary majority by free elections. Unfortunately, it is also
true that the Communists have moved in without having a majority stat.4.f}.
Past Communist takeovers of free countries have generally
featured most, if not all, of these four elements:
1. The use of force from outside, or the overhanging threat of
force.
2. The obtaining by the Communists through popular vote of ar
least an effective minority position.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
3. The willingness of other parties, most often the part-es to
the left, but in some cases even parties of the extreme r rid,
to join in political alliances and to admit Communists to kc:
positions in the government.
4. Communist manipulation of key ministries so that non-
Communist elements were driven out of positions of influence.
The best example of this process is, of course, that of Czechoi:livakia.
Mikoyan pointedly and ominously boasted of this Soviet "feat". Aidditio nal
variants are found in the cases of Hungary and Poland, Rumania and
Bulgaria.
In all of these cases, except for Czechoslovakia, the acti:.al
presence of Soviet forces on the spot played a decisive role. In :3zecheslovakia
some of the same effect was obtained by the presence, just across the t order,
of strong Soviet forces and by the fact that the Soviet had previously oc zpied
Prague and many other important Czech centers and had been ab-e, by
their terrorist and infiltration methods, to gain a position of str?:ngth
which far exceeded the numerical representation in the population at large.
In fact, they prepared the way for the coup before they evacuates their
troops in 1945.
Beginning in 1945, Moscow exercised heavy pressure on t.e free
Czech Government headed by President Benes. Hoping to be able to w,::?
with the Kremlin and anxious to insure the quick withdrawal of Russian
troops, Benes went to Moscow in March of that year. lie sought agreement
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
on the forming of a coalition Government :scceptable to the Jovit:t:. wlii ;-
wuu1a include uuuio or them, pru-Uoiiimuuist emigres who had been collected T1,
Moscow during the war and who flooded back to their home country to p:Oiy
roles preassigned to them by the Kremlin.
When the parliamentary government of President Benes was actually
reconstituted, the anti-Communist forces were badly divided among four
or more parties. The Communist Party, as usual, presented a mon+Jlitiic
front. Under these conditions, the elections of 1946 gave the Coreamunn 3t
38% of the votes. Thus they became the largest single party, their loader
Gottwald was named Prime Minister, and the Communists were :.ble to
take over certain key Ministries, including Interior, Information and Ftiance,
with a crypto-Communist in charge of Defense.
During all this period, Stalin had cultivated President Beres anc
lulled him into a feeling of security as to Moscow's intentions. 1.1eanwr_._le
they were building up their control of the Czech military forces, he
trade unions, and the internal security policy. Finally, one of Moscow*o
principal "expediters, 11 Valgrian Zorin, now Soviet Ambassador to Bonn. was
sent to Prague, and, the minority Communist Party seized power in
February 1948 without firing a shot.
The principal Czech anti-Communist leaders either escaped abroad.
committed suicide or were eliminated by arrest. Non-Communis : par. t .e
were liquidated by the armed seizure of their headquarters and newspapers.
A purge commission dealt with all so-called unreliable political leadere
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
President Benes was forced to resign in June 1948, and the Communists
took over and ever since have maintained supreme control.
There are many lessons to be learned from this historical
precedent. When the Communists obtain an effective minority posit--O--.
in any parliamentary body, it is a sign of serious if not critical danger
If in addition to that, they have important places in the Government and
in particular control the Ministries of Defense and Interior. then that
danger is greatly augmented and the country in question is ripe for tai.,
over.
The situation in Hungary as the war was coming to a close w;.is,
as I suggested above, dominated by the Soviet military occupation.
Nonetheless, the Hungarian non-Communist political leaders brEve1?,r
started out to form a free government and in the first post-war vlecticrlf.
in November 1945, the anti-Communist parties had over 300 seats to abcut
70 for the Communists.
Then the trouble started. The Soviet military authorities pros _ ?ied
to arrest, to drive from the country or terrify and blackmail the leaders of
these non-Communist parties so that in the next elections in 1941. the
Communist substantially increased their representation and became the
largest single party, although the opposition groups still had a n-ajort=,.
The latter, however, were badly divided and facing the pressure tactic!
of the Communists supported by the Soviet military, they were reduce,a to
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001700030005-0
impotence and the Communists took over. By 1948 most of thf anti-
Communist leaders were dead, jailed or had fled.
Rakosi, one of the Hungarian renegade artisans of all this ter >:r,
still maintains a very precarious hold over the Hungarian Government as
the stooge of Moscow. Today he is trembling in his boots since as v^t
can well imagine he represented the Stalinist line and the Stalinist t' _Iniques,
and sooner or later the new anti-Stalinist look may mean his downfal's. In
February of 1952, however, he was in fine fettle and described with :c,e
and in the utmost detail the entire history and techniques of the destx r ction
of the free government of Hungary.
I recommend the study of his speech of February 29, 1952 by L_i se
who are interested in understanding what Khrushchev and Mikovan n?.i i
today when they tell us that one of their main weapons is to und -?rminc3
our democratic institutions. Rakosi points out how the presence in ,,,,
country of the Soviet Army prevented any attempt to defend witl_, ford= tine
security of the anti-Communist government and served to prote::t ti e
Communists from "imperialist intervention. "
Meanwhile the Soviet Union, he states, shielded the Communist !Aotters
in Hungary from "diplomatic interference of the great Western --'ow-=r
Rakosi frankly admitted that Soviet interference in Hungary's internal
affairs was both "quite frequent and of great help in the strengtbenir w
'the Communist Party'. " He then describes step by step the suc teas o
the Communist intrigue and points out that the Smallholders parry, the
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
strongest anti-Communist party, was constantly compelled to expel or-
discard individuals discredited by Communist blackmail. This ,racru..
day-by-day slicing off of hostile elements; i. e. , non-Communist lead; rs,
he described as "Salami" techniques. In other words, he boasted tha-:
democracy in Hungary was cut away, piece by piece, just as we slice i_p
a sausage.
These two illustrative examples, Czechoslovakia and Hu:igar v,
could be further emphasized by tracing the Communist take-over in
Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. But two examples may serve the ptr_?o,e.
It is useful to have the ballots but there are situations, and the Soviet (Nion
is adept in bringing them about, where bullets prevail.
So much for our past experience with Soviet project "Tal.e-ove- z . "
Does the Kremlin now see fresh opportunities where the clearly annot ced
program of Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin might now be put into
operation?
First, a word on the element of force. There are few places
the world where a free country is so at the mercy of Soviet or Comratrist
Chinese force as the Satellites stood in 1945-47. Thanks to NATO ia
Europe, to SEATO in the Far East, to the Baghdad Pact in the Middle last,
and to individual commitments of the US in other areas, the Free W
umbrella of strength extends almost all the way around the periphery
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We sometimes think of this great effort, in w=hi:
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
the US has played the leading part, as designed only to meet force.. R it
we must never overlook that it also has vital importance in meeting inure
subtle Communist tactics.
Of course the blunting of the element or threat of force doe: rx+'
do the whole job. It does tend to channel Soviet activities into the struggle
for power by other means.
In this struggle, the Communists must see their greatest oppc-rtunities
where they now have the strongest penetrations into the parlian .entar i
machinery of free governments.
In several countries these penetrations are serious.
In the Italian parliament of 590 members, there are now 14?
Communist members. To these must be added 75 Nenni fellow, trait"".': nq
Left Wing Socialists or a total of 218, who consistently vote and act vk;::1
the Communists. Together in the last elections in 1953 their to'':al poitiiar
vote was 9. 5 millions or 35. 5% of the total.
The French Chamber of Deputies presents another situation the
Kremlin may be studying. There are today about 150 Communist members
in the Chamber out of a present total of about 600.
In Indonesia, the Communist Party received 6 million votes or 17%
of the total electorate in the elections of September 1955 and the +r have a
representation of 39 members or 16% of the total of the Indonesian As:~f~ ni~ly.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
In some 35 countries of the world, the Communist Party is f.tegal.
Here their rank and file, though seriously large in several cases, rruust
work through underground channels and the more obvious fellow-tray :1 ling
front organizations, without direct political representation in parliamentary
bodies. However, in such areas as Singapore, Communist-infauencedi
parties have an important position and serve as effective vehicles for
Communist activity.
Once established as a party to be reckoned with, the next cruical
factor is the ability of Communist Parties to enter into alliances witt-~
other parties so as to increase their electoral strength and abo're aft 14)
participate in governments formed by the alliance. The prospe-ts and
partners for such alliances -- United Fronts or "popular fronts' -- r V
greatly between countries.
. In Italy, the Communist could hardly aspire to an early parttr.:: tion
in any Italian government, but there are some supporters for that idea o
an "opening to the left" to admit the Nenni Socialists to the Governrnent.
This would be about the same as admitting the Communists themselyr> j
In France, the dominant wing of the Socialist Party is op~aoseri .
any dealing with the Communists. Of course Communist readiness to dc
business with anyone is wholly consistent with the Communist re orc
back to and beyond the time when the Communists joined with the Nazi i
to destroy democratic government in Germany.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
A few years ago I would have thought that Communist Parties
in Europe would have great difficulty ever again in obtaining alli2ts
among any non-Communist parties. Then the experience of 1939-41
was still vivid when the Communists tried to sabotage the war ediort
against Hitler up until Moscow itself became involved. Today,
however, the danger of parliamentary compromises with the Cosnmun Sts,
even in Europe, is not to be ignored.
In Asia, this threat is even greater because it is general y less
well understood. A recent Indonesian government permitted Communst
influence to reach far into the Ministry of Defense. Mbre than n Eur 1=e,
the Communist Parties have managed in many countries to acquire a
dangerous degree of "respectability" and of acceptance as "just anotbe*
political party. 11
On the other hand, despite the relatively solid basis for action
which they have in many countries and the preparations for this -ampaign
which they have been making over the past ten years or more, the
Communists face real obstacles.
First of all, they have alerted us to their program. Whi.e people
worldwide sometimes seem dangerously complacent and even skeptical,
it may yet be possible to rouse them to their dangers.
Secondly, the Communists do not have any acknowledged party
members in high government positions, of cabinet rank for example,
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
any of the free countries even there where they have large par_iarr.enlary
representation. In both France and Italy in the immediate posh-war >>er od
they did have such representation but were thrown out in the early ve:!t.rs
following the war.
While undoubtedly in many free countries they have infi itrate i
sensitive positions, this has been done on a clandestine basis and tigee
and there vigilant steps are being taken to ferret them out. In oartiular
today they do not have positions of control in the Army or in the intertral
security services of any free country. Naturally they are looking fors>iard
to any chance of improving this situation.
Finally, the Free World has had a real assist from Khr-ashche?r
Not only was his dinner with the executive of the British Labor 'Party
somewhat less than cordial in atmosphere, but he rejected out of hanci the
request of the British Laborites -- in which, by the way, Gaitskell ant".
Bevan joined forces completely -- for the freeing of certain Social :Dfetr.ocrats
known to be imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain. On his return to Ru4:3 ia,
Khrushchev has continued the attack and accused the Laborites 7f trvir t
to "curry favor with reactionary circles" by raising the questio-1 of tlL
Social Democrats. This episode is not likely to incline the Euiopean socialists
in the direction of a "ride on the tiger.
All in all, the Communist must, however, see some prospec-is cf
success by their so-called "parliamentary means." It is worthwhi1-v ~_-tt
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
note that the Communists have made some very sophisticated s udit!s
the government structure of free countries. They have learned how I
manipulate their parliamentary representation once elected and als,D ltaw
to get elected. Further, they know quite well what types of pax liarnenttry
systems are most vulnerable to their type of subversive action-
They endeavor in every way possible to influence the coitstitutio ial
structure of free countries so as to eliminate a strong Executive, 'I`hC z
themselves have collective or one-man dictatorships, reserving all ulv,.r
in the hands of the few with their Party Congresses represented by lar't-
picked impotent and powerless stooges. Presumably they judge thic tta )e
the most secure form of government, the least subject to outside atta.:?z..
They consider that the: governments which are most vulnerable to their
tactics are those at the other extreme, where all power is given to the
people's representatives with as little delegation as possible to the E'-wwwi-utive.
In connection with the formulation of the French Constitution in 1945,
the Communists made a strong attack on the idea of a powerful Lxecut:: i .
They fought to divide up the authority between various elected bodies IFI
fact, the first draft of the post-war constitution went so far in t is direction
that the French people repudiated it and a less Communist-oriented
constitution was then voted.
In Italy in 1946 they voted as a bloc to destroy the institution zf Ilie
monarchy.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
When issues of this nature arise one always can tell where
Communist influence will be thrown.
Then insofar as the electoral procedures are concerned they
ar}, ything in the nature of a two-party system and majority rule which by
and large has been a bulwark of free institutions. Their effort is to fa-icr
a multiplicity of parties. This opens the door to intrigue and helps to
build up the minority and weaken the majority, ruic W c-la-by-aid- 1"t
uMp-lieity of-p-a-rties. This 4 - ntrig a sn~ h lpt~ ?t - wild
y- -rity
In general, they like the idea of the voting systems under which
even small minorities have a chance of gaining deputies in parliament.
In fact, they have often found that the proportional system of voting ccsulc
serve them .as, a secret weapon.
In certain free countries where the proportional system prev .ah4.
the non-Communist parties have tried to introduce various mean- of
defeating this Communist maneuver. In France, for example, they 13av=;
the system of electoral alliances -- apparentement.s -- and in Italy
somewhat the same system has prevailed. Under this system linked
tickets of several parties are presented. The French electoral 1.iw of
1951 which is still in effect provides that if the linked parties gather an
absolute majority in a given constituency, they gather in all the seats
for that district. In the 1951 French election, this system workef! quite
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
19.
well and reduced the Communist representation from 164 seats to 97, w~u?eas
under the pure proportional representation the Communist would have h;t6
172.
.But these tactics do not always work. In the 1956 French election3, fnilf-'t
out under the same system, the failure of the non-Communist parties to
join as they had done in 1951 resulted in the Communists obtaining ap z?=?=-i'n3
P tely
the same proportion of the seats as they would have had under the 4traiht
proportional system.
As a New Yorker, I well recall that we introduced proportional
representation in voting for the New York City Council shortly before
World War II. As a result of this, two Communists were elected to the
City Council on an open Communist ticket. Under a majority system the
Communists would not have elected anybody.
I may add that New York City learned a lesson and the proportional
system was abolished.
The Communists do not restrict their activities to manipulating
electoral laws in their favor or to appealing to groups of minority int ere it
who like the Communists would get nowhere without the proportional s
They also do not hesitate to take strong action to frustrate the will. of the
voter after the ballot boxes have been closed.
An important case of this kind occurred in Italy in the 1953 ele,itior
Here the non-Communist Italian parties tried to graft onto their prop -rtieral
system an element of the direct majority type voting system by providing
that any party or coalition of parties which achieved more than 5O% of the
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001700030005-0
vote would automatically receive a bonus bringing the total seats to at lean
The vote in this election was very close and in'fact the affiliated anti- Jorrrru-T ist
Italian parties appeared to have obtained a scant margin over the 50%4. Btu :: ver
post-election tactics and catching the authorities napping, the Communist were
able to contest and fraudulently throw out a sufficient number of votes - several hundred
thousand - to reduce the non-Communists just below the 50% mark. Ihey g:,-?: away
with it. The system for handling challenged votes was just too archaic:.
These examples show the skill and adroitness of the Communists in
manipulating our free institutions and the mechanisms of fre elections
These are complicated, often imperfect.
We have had our own election frauds. At least they were not. attrti t.table
to a foreign power. The Communists try to use our shortcomings to promote. their
own ends hopefully looking forward to the day when they can successfully maneuver
themselves into a position of such power that they can destroy the entire fret!
electoral system.
Of course, as I have suggested, the Communists now hope tl.at petqii=e
more and more will come to look at them as just another political part;, a bit 4o
the Left but still of surFitient respectability so as not to cause any lifting of r: throws
against those who are members of it. They openly boast that just as in the LE.lian
situation they will soon make peace with Socialists elsewhere and that togeth.,?- they
will go forward to organize what is generally known as the Popular Front.
The Kremlin still hope for this despite the fact that Communist [inite?d
Fronts have been rudely rejected by the 5-pcialist Parties in France, Germane.
Austria and elsewhere. Also, they find themselves in some embarrasSme.it
here because of Khrushchev's crude anti-Socialist remarks in London and Mitt, ow
to which I Approverd oryRe~ease 1003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
In concluding, I wish to say a word about the ability of parliamentary
systems in the Free World to meet and turn back the offensive which the
Soviet has announced against it.
On my desk in Washington, I keep handy a series of letters which
a century ago Lord Macaulay exchanged with a Mr. H. S. Randall, an
American citizen, who had just published a life of Jefferson and engaged
in considerable correspondence with Macaulay with regard to the
Jeffersonian philosophy of government which he, Randall, was defexidin
against Macaulay's attacks.
In the letter of May 23, 1857, Macaulay in writing to Randall expr: lied
the view that "institutions purely democratic must sooner or later destroy
liberty, or civilization, or both. " He went on to say, "I have not the
smallest doubt that, if we had a purely democratic government here,
/ England/ the effect would be the same. Either the poor would pluxider
the rich, and civilization would perish, or order and property would be
saved by a strong military government, and liberty would perish. "4Tou may
think that your country, " says Macaulay to Randall, "enjoys an exemption.
from these evils. I will frankly own to you that I am of a very different
opinion. Your fate I believe to be certain, though it is deferred by a physi-zal
cause. As long as you have a boundless extent of fertile and unoccupied land,
your labouring population will be far more at ease than the labouringb
population of the old world; and, while that is the case, the Jeff ersonian
polit:y may continue to exist without causing any fatal calamity. "
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
Then Macaulay goes on to say that when New England will be as
thickly populated as Old England, when we have Manchesters and Birminzhams,
our institutions will be put to the test, distress will make laborers inutir,ow.r;
and discontented, the demagogue will take over from the statesman, "spoliation.
will increase the distress" and "distress will produce fresh spoliatian." }iither
a Caesar or Napoleon will take over, he writes, or "your republic will be as
fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century Z:F,
the Roman Empire was in the fifth; - with this difference, that the Duns r4:?~1
Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without, and that your
Huns and Vandals will have been engendered within your own countr= by
your own institutions." The most pungent phrase in this pungent letter is
Macaulay's conclusion: "Your Constitution is all sail and no anchor. 11
In the hundred years that have elapsed since these words were wr1tit n,
we have proved that even as wise a man as Macaulay can be wrong. We Iave
found an anchor not only in the Constitution given us by the wisdom of our
forefathers but even more than that in the development of a sound elt-ctorcee
whose common sense has protected us from the evils which Lord MlcauLvr
predicted.
We must recognize, however, that we are far more fortunate- thart
most of the peoples of this earth. True, in this century, we have gone rhxtragh
two World Wars, but our land was virtually untouched by any enemy 111+ t > i ve
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
a vast economic base, plenty of room for expansion, food in super:aburd3:rve.
We have had few of the grave economic, political, and population Frobiems-
that face so many other countries. Many of these countries, particularlu
those which have a new-found freedom, have yet finally to prove that the
bases of their representative governmental systems are firmly anchored
and that they will not be threatened by some of the dangers which Maca.t.a V
so vividly describes.
Furthermore, in addition to the internal stresses and strains of
the democratic processes, we are now definitely alerted by the official
pronouncements of the Kremlin that the Communists working from the
outside propose to do everything they can to aggravate the difficulties of
constitutional government in the Free World. Hence, many countries cu.it
have to face not only the domestic problems of the type which MacEulav bits
cited, but also serious road blocks interposed by an international trouhif!.-
maker, to the achieving of Lincoln's great dream of Government oj' the
people, by the people, for the people.
In the troubled political atmosphere prevailing in many parts of th
world today, we are told that a great foreign power with vast resources to
back a program of subversion and cajolery, proposes to do everything tr.-it
it can to see to it that free governments shall perish and that dictaiorsnic=3
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
 ? Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0
of the proletariat, allied with Moscow, shall be established throes,hoizt
the length and breadth of the lands.
Thus, Communism bred out of the ravages of World War anc
strengthened by the devastation of World War II is attempting to guide the
sails of the ships of state of many free countries, particularly these ,w} re
free institutions are either in their infancy or have been weakener- by th+>
stresses of two World Wars.
It is well to recognize the danger. There is no ground for panic
I have suggested, nowhere outside of the USSR, with the qualified exct:ntgc~ns
of Czechoslovakia and Guatemala, have the Communists succeeded in sint+verting
a Free Government except with the aid of armed force.. This is true for China,
North-Vietnam, and the other Eastern European Satellites. Meanwhile t-ru
Soviet Communists themselves are having no easy sailing. They have
thrown over their pilot of the last two decades and have taken on some
apprentices trained in the old school but who may find themselves more
and more out of line with many of their crew.
Fortunately, good charts and a knowledge of where the shoftls lie L-e
a mariner's best guide. The Kremlin leaders have told us what thoy pr(,:( se
to do; their course has been charted. It is up to the leaders of the free tc,,rid,
working together as allies and friends, to help to uncover and to frastratf'
this Communist design which otherwise could threaten to wreck the free
institutions of many countries and even endanger our own.
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001700030005-0