[SECTION 202 OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 1, 1947
• Content Type: SPEECH

DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO TS S 0 ~ 7 7
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: R. JGJ
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THLA~ Y1EWEIL
MY APPEARANCE BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE THIS MORNING IS IN
SUPPORT OF SECTION 202 OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 19k7. THIS SECTION OF THE BILL WOULD PROVIDE THE UNITED
IN
STATES, FOR THE FIRST TIME/HISTORY, WITH A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE CREATED BY ACT OF CONGRESS. OUR PRESENT ORGANIZATION,
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP -- WHICH I HAVE THE PRIVILEGE
OF DIRECTING -- HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE SINCE JANUARY 1946, BY
AUTHORITY OF AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT.
SINCE THE DAY THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WAS
ESTABLISHED, THE DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -- MY PRE-
DECESSOR, ADMIRAL SOUERS, AND I -- HAVE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE
TIME WHEN WE COULD COME BEFORE THE CONGRESS, AND REQUEST PER-
MANENT STATUS THROUGH LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT.
I SINCERELY URGE ADOPTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS
OF THIS BILL. SECTION 202 WILL ENABLE US TO DO OUR SHARE IN
MAINTAINING THE NATIONAL SECURITY. IT WILL FORM A FIRM BASIS
ON WHICH WE CAN CONSTRUCT THE FINEST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN
25X1
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THE WORLD.
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IN MY OPINION, A STRONG INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IS EQUALLY
IF NOT MORE ESSENTIAL IN PEACE THAN IN WAR. UPON US HAS FALLEN
LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS. THE OCEANS HAVE SHRUNK, UNTIL TO-
DAY BOTH EUROPE AND ASIA BORDER THE UNITED STATES ALMOST AS DO
CANADA AND MEXICO. THE INTERESTS, INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE VARIOUS NATIONS ON THESE LAND MASSES MUST BE FULLY KNOWN
TO OUR NATIONAL POLICY-MAKERS. WE MUST HAVE THIS INTELLIGENCE
IF WE ARE TO BE FOREWARNED AGAINST POSSIBLE ACTS OF AGGRESSION,
AND IF WE ARE TO BE ARMED AGAINST DISASTER IN AN ERA OF ATOMIC
WARFARE.
I KNOW YOU GENTLEMEN UNDERSTAND THAT THE NATURE OF SOME
OF THE WORK WE ARE DOING MAKES IT UNDESIRABLE -- FROM THE SE-
CURITY STANDPOINT -- TO DISCUSS CERTAIN ACTIVITIES WITH TOO
MUCH FREEDOM. I FEEL THAT THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY, HAVING
EXPERIENCED THE DISASTER OF PEARL HARBOR AND THE APPALLING
CONSEQUENCES OF A GLOBAL WAR, ARE NOW SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED
IN THEIR. APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERSTAND THAT AN ORGANI-
ZATION SUCH AS OURS, OR THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS OF THE ARMED
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SERVICES, OR THE F.B.I., CANNOT EXPOSE CERTAIN OF THEIR
ACTIVITIES TO PUBLIC GAZE. I THEREFORE ASK YOUR INDULGENCE --
AND THROUGH YOU THE INDULGENCE OF THE PEOPLE--TO LIMIT MY RE-
MARKS ON THE RECORD THIS MORNING TO A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE
SUBJECT OF A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
I THINK IT CAN BE SAID WITHOUT SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE THAT
BEFORE PEARL HARBOR WE DID NOT HAVE AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN
THIS COUNTRY COMPARABLE TO THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN, OR FRANCE, OR
RUSSIA, OR GERMANY, OR JAPAN. WE DID NOT HAVE ONE BECAUSE THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT. IT WAS FELT
THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING UN-AMERICAN ABOUR ESPIONAGE AND EVEN
ABOUT INTELLIGENCE GENERALLY. THERE WAS A FEELING THAT ALL THAT
WAS NECESSARY TO WIN A WAR -- IF THERE EVER WERE TO BE ANOTHER
WAR -- WAS AN ABILITY TO SHOOT STRAIGHT. ONE OF THE GREAT PRE-WAR
FALLACIES WAS THE CON]MON MISCONCEPTION THAT, IF THE JAPANESE
SHOULD CHALLENGE US IN THE PACIFIC, OUR ARMED SERVICES WOULD BE
ABLE TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM IN A MATTER OF A FEW MONTHS AT MOST.
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ALL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT SINISTER NOR IS IT AN INVIDIOUS
TYPE OF WORK. BUT BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR, OUR INTELLI-
GENCE SERVICES HAD LEFT LARGELY UNTAPPED THE GREAT OPEN SOURCES
OF INFORMATION UPON WHICH ROUGHLY 80 PER CENT OF INTELLIGENCE
SHOULD NORMALLY BE BASED. I MEAN SUCH THINGS AS BOOKS, MAGA-
ZINES, TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC SURVEYS, PHOTOGRAPHS, COMMERCIAL
ANALYSES, NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO BROADCASTS AND GENERAL INFORMATION
FROM PEOPLE WITH A KNOWLEDGE OF AFFAIRS ABROAD. WHAT WEAKENED
OUR POSITION FURTHER WAS THAT THOSE OF OUR INTET~LIGENCE SERVICES
WHICH DID DABBLE IN ANY OF THESE SOURCES FAILED TO COORDINATE
THEIR RESULTS WITH EACH OTHER.
THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK REACHED MANY PERTINENT CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE
SHORT-COMINGS OF OUR INTELIGENCE SYSTEM AND MADE SOME VERY
SOUND RECOMVIE'NDATIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT. WE ARE INCORPORATING
MANY OF THESE INTO OUR PRESENT THINKING. THE COMVI_ITTEE SHOWED
THAT SOME VERY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTLY
EVALUATED.
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IT FOUND THAT SOME OF THE EVALUATED INFORMATION WAS NOT PASSED
ON TO THE FIELD COMMANDERS. BUT, OVER AND ABOVE THESE FAILURES
WERE OTHERS, PERHAPS MORE SERIOUS, WHICH WENT TO THE VERY STRUCTURE
OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. I AM TALKING NOW OF THE
FAILURE TO EXPLOIT OBVIOUS SOURCES; THE FAILURE TO COORDINATE
THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE; THE FAILURE
TO CENTRALIZE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF COMMON CONCERN TO MORE
THAN ONE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH COULD MORE
EFFICIENTLY BE PERFORMED CENTRALLY.
IN THE TESTIMONY WHICH HAS PRECEDED MINE IN SUPPORT OF
THIS BILL -- BY THE SECRETARIES OF WAR AND THE NAVY, GENERAL
EISENHOWER, ADMIRAL NIMITZ, AND GENERAL SPAATZ, AMONG OTHERS --
THERE HAS BEEN SHOWN AN AWARENESS OF THE NEED FOR COORDINATION
BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND OUR FOREIGN POLITICAL POLICIES
ON ONE HAND AND OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AND ITS
POLICIES ON THE OTHER. SIMILARLY WITH INTELLIGENCE, THERE MUST
BE COORDINATION AND SOME CENTRALIZATION, SO THAT NO FUTURE CON-
GRESSIONAL COMMITTEE CAN POSSIBLY ASK THE QUESTION ASKED BY THE
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PEARL HARBOR COMMITTEE: "WHY, WITH SOME OF THE FINEST INTELLIGENCE
AVAILABLE-IN OUR HISTORY -- WHY WAS IT POSSIBLE FOR A PEARL
HARBOR TO OCCUR?"
THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED THAT INTELLIGENCE WORK HAVE
CENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY AND CLEAR-CUT ALLOCATION OF RESPONSI-
BILITY. IT FOUND SPECIFIC FAULT WITH THE SYSTEM OF DISSEMINATION
THEN IN USE -- OR, MORE ACCURATELY, THE LACK OF DISSEMINATION OF
INTELLIGENCE TO THOSE WHO HAD VITAL
OF IT. IT STATED THAT
"THE SECURITY OF THE NATION CAN BE INSURED ONLY THROUGH CONTINUITY
OF SERVICE AND CENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THOSE CHARGED
WITH HANDLING INTELLIGENCE." IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE
FOR IMAGINATION AND RESOURCEFULNESS ON THE PART OF INTELLIGENCE
PERSONNEL, AND THAT PART OF THE FAILURE IN THIS RESPECT WAS
"THE FAILURE TO ACCORD TO INTELLIGENCE WORK THE IMPORTANT AND
SIGNIFICANT ROLE WHICH IT DESERVES." THE COMMITTEE DECLARED THAT
"EFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ARE JUST AS ESSENTIAL IN TIME OF
PEACE AS IN WAR."
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ALL OF THESE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE MY HEARTY
CONCURRENCE. IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP, AND IN ITS
SUCCESSOR WHICH THIS BILL CREATES, MUST BE FOUND THE ANSWER TO
TILE PREVENTION OF ANOTHER PEARL HARBOR.
AS THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF SUDDENLY PROJECTED INTO
A GLOBAL WAR, IMMENSE GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE BECAME READILY
APPARENT ? THE WORK "INTELLIGENCE" QUICKLY TOOK ON A FASHIONABLE
CONNOTATION. EACH NEW WAR-TIME AGENCY -- AS WELL AS MANY OF THE
OLDER DEPARTMENTS -- SOON BLOSSOMED OUT WITH INTELLIGENCE STAFFS
OF THEIR OWN, EACH PRODUCING A MASS OF LARGELY UNCOORDINATED
INFORMATION. THE RESULTANT COMPETITION FOR FUNDS AND SPECIALIZED
PERSONNEL WAS A MONUMENTAL EXAMPLE OF WASTE. THE WAR AND NAVY
DEPARTMENTS DEVELOPED FULL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTE1,LIGRNCE
STAFFS, AS DID THE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIVISION OF THE O.S.S..
THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE AND ITS SUCCESSOR, THE FOREIGN
ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO DELVED DEEPLY INTO FIELDS OF
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE.
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NOT CONTENT WITH STAFFS IN WASHINGTON, THEY ESTABLISHED
SUBSIDIARY STAFFS IN LONDON AND THEN FOLLOWED THESE UP WITH
OTHER UNITS ON THE CONTINENT.
WHEN, DURING THE WAR, FOR EXAMPLE, OFFICIALS REQUESTED A
REPORT ON THE STEM., INDUSTRY IN JAPAN OR THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, THEY HAD THE REPORTS OF THE
BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE, G-2, O.N.I. AND THE O.S.S. FROM WHICH
TO CHOOSE. BECAUSE THESE AGENCIES HAD COMPETED TO SECURE THE
BEST PERSONNEL, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR EACH OF THEM TO BACK UP ITS
EXPERTS BY ASSERTING THAT ITS PARTICULAR REPORTS WERE THE BEST
AVAILABLE, AND THAT THE OTHERS MIGHT WELL BE DISREGARDED.
AS GENERAL MARSHALL STATED IN TESTIFYING ON THE UNIFICATION
BILL BEFORE THE SENATE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE LAST YEAR,
rr,.. PRIOR TO ENTERING THE WAR, WE HAD LITTLE MORE THAN WHAT A
MILITARY ATTACHE COULD LEARN AT A DINNER, MORE OR LESS OVER THE
COFFEE CUPS." FROM THIS START, WE SUDDENLY HAD INTELLIGENCE
SPRINGING UP EVERYWHERE. BUT NOWHERE WAS ITS COLLECTION,
PRODUCTION OR DISSEMINATION FULLY COORDINATED -- NOT EVEN IN THE
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ARMED FORCES.
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GENERAL MARSHALL POINTED THIS OUT IN HIS TESTIMONY WII HE
MENTIONED "THE DIFFICULTY WE HAD IN EVEN DEVELOPING A JOINT
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE. THAT WOULD SEEM TO BE A VERY SIMPLE
THING TO DO, BUT IT WAS NOT AT ALL."
THERE ARE GREAT MASSES OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US IN
PEACE AS IN WAR. WITH OUR WAR-TIME EXPERIENCE BEHIND US, WE
KNOW NOW WHERE TO LOOK FOR MATERIAL AS WELL AS FOR WHAT TO
LOOK. THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE DOES NOT CHANGE THE
NECESSITY FOR COORDINATION OF THE COLLECTION, PRODUCTION AND
DISSEMINATION OF THE INCREASINGLY VAST QUANTITIES OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT ARE BECOMING AVAILABLE. THIS
COORDINATION THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WILL SUPPLY.
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ESTABLISHED THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
SERVICES FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHERING TOGETHER MEN OF EXCEPTIONAL
BACKGROUND AND ABILITY WHO COULD OPERATE IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL,
RATHER THAN DEPARTMENTAL, INTELLIGENCE. IN WEIGHING THE MERITS
OF-THE O.S.S., ONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT IT CAME LATE INTO THE FIElD.
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IT WAS A STOP-GAP. OVERNIGHT, IT WAS GIVEN A FUNCTION TO
PERFORM THAT THE BRITISH, FOR INSTANCE, HAD BEEN DEVELOPING
SINCE THE DAYS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH. V ONE CONSIDERS THESE FACTS,
THE WORK OF THE O.S.S. WAS QUITE
LE AND ITS KNOWN FAILURES
MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST ITS SUCCESSES. MOREOVER, IT MARKED A
CRUCIAL TURNING POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES INTEL-
LIGENCE. WE ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO PROFIT BY THEIR EXPERIENCES
AND MISTAKES.
HAVING ATTAINED ITS PRESENT INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF
IMPORTANCE AND POWER IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD, THE UNITED STATES
SHOULD NOT, IN MY OPINION, FIND ITSELF AGAIN CONFRONTED WITH THE
NECESSITY OF DEVELOPING ITS PLANS AND POLICIES ON THE BASIS OF
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED, COMPILED, AND INTERPRETED BY SOME FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT WE FOUND OURSELVES IN
JUST THAT POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II. FOR MONTHS
WE HAD TO RELY BLINDLY AND TRUSTINGLY ON THE SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM OF THE BRITISH. OUR SUCCESSES PROVE THAT THIS TRUST WAS
GENERALLY WELL PLACED. HOWEVER, IN MATTERS SO VITAL TO A NATION
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HAVING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A WORLD POWER, THE, UNITED STATES
SHOULD NEVER AGAIN HAVE TO GO HAT IN HAND, BEGGING ANY FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT FOR THE EYES, - THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, - WITH
WHICH TO SEE. WE SHOULD BE SELF SUFFICIENT. THE INTERESTS OF
OTHERS MAY NOT BE OUR INTERESTS.
THE NEED FOR OUR OWN COORDINATED INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM HAS
BEEN RECOGNIZED IN MOST QUARTERS. THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER
DRAMATIZED THAT NEED AND STOP-GAP MEASURES WERE ADOPTED. AS THE
WAR DREW TO A CLOSE, THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF TO STUDY THE PROBLEM AND DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
FUTURE. THE SOLUTION OFFERED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WAS
REFERRED TO THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR AND THE NAVY. THE
PROGRAM WHICH THEY EVOLVED RESULTED IN AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN DATED 22 JANUARY 1946. WITH YOUR PERMISSION,
MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THAT EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE
INTO THE RECORD AT THIS POINT:
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THIS EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL INTES,LI-
GENCE AUTHORITY. IT CONSISTS OF FOUR VOTING METERS -- THE
SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR AND THE NAVY, AND THE PRESIDENT" S
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AT THIS TIME HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, FLEET
ADMIRAL LEAHY. A FIFTH MEMBER -- WITHOUT A VOTE -- IS THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITY WAS DIRECTED TO PLAN, DEVELOP AND COORDINATE ALL FEDERAL
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SO AS "TO ASSURE THE MOST
EFFECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION RELATED
TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY." THESE FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY'
COUNCIL UNDER SECTION 202 (c)(1) OF THE BILL.
THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE ALSO PROVIDED FOR A CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP AS THE OPERATING AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE AUTHORITY. THE FUNCTIONS, PERSONNEL, PROPERTY AND RECORDS
OF THE GROUP ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE NEW CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY BY SECTION 202 (c)(2) OF THE BILL.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS PRESENTLY CHARGED
WITH THE FOLLOWING BASIC FUNCTIONS:
1. THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
OF CERTAIN TYPES -- WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH OR DUPLICATING THE
NORMAL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL INTELLI-
GENCE SERVICES, OR THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.
2. THE EVALUATION, CORRELATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
FOREIGN INFORMATION COLLECTED, IN ORDER TO PRODUCE THE STRATEGIC
AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED BY THE PRESIDENT AND
OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
THE DISSEMINATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED.
4. THE PERFORMANCE OF SUCH SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN TO
THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AS CAN BE
MORE EFFICIENTLY ACCOMPLISHED CENTRALLY.
5. PLANNING FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SO AS TO SECURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES.
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AS WE PROGRESS AND DETERMINE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, THE
FUNCTIONS OF THE C.I.G. WILL BE AGGRESSIVELY, ECONOMICALLY AND
EFFICIENTLY EXECUTED TO THE BEST. INTERESTS OF ALL AGENCIES. WE
FEEL CONFIDENT THAT IF SECTION 202 OF THIS BILL IS ENACTED INTO
LAW, THE RESULTS WILL BE EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.
CONTRARY TO SOME CRITICISM WHICH HAS APPEARED IN THE PUBLIC
PRESS, THE FULL OPERATION OF A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WILL
NOT INTERFEREWITH THE LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES OF THE SEVERAL
DEPARTMENTS AND THEIR AGENCIES, NOR WILL IT DUPLICATE THEIR WORK.
I CAN SAY THAT THE SEVERAL COORDINATING PLANS AND PROGRAMS ALREADY
IN EFFECT OR IN PREPARATION HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE AGENCIES.
THEY SEE IN THESE PROGRAMS PROSPECTS FOR ORDERLY OPERATIONS AND
ELIMINATION OF WASTEFUL DUPLICATIONS. WHEN EVERY INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY KNOWS EXACTLY WHAT IS EXPECTED OF IT IN RELATION TO ITS
DEPARTMENTAL MISSION AND TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION,
AND WHEN IT CAN COUNT, AS THE RESULT OF FIRM AGREEMENT, ON
BEING SUPPLIED WITH WHAT IT NEEDS FROM OTHER FIELDS, EACH AGENCY
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CAN CONCENTRATE ON ITS OWN PRIMARY FIELD AND DO THAT SUPERIOR
JOB WHICH WORLD CONDITIONS REQUIRE.
BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF PRIMARY FIELDS OF INTELLIGENCE
RESPONSIBILITIES, WE ARE -- IN THE FIELDS OF COLLECTION,
PRODUCTION, AND DISSEMINATION -- PREVENTING OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS --
THAT IS, ELIMINATING DUPLICATE ROLES AND MISSIONS, AND ELIMINATING
DUPLICATE SERVICES IN CARRYING OUT THESE FUNCTIONS.
IN ORDER TO-PERFORM HIS PRESCRIBED FUNCTIONS, THE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST KEEP IN CLOSE AND INTIMATE CONTACT
WITH THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVER10TT.
TO PROVIDE FORMAL MACHINERY FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PRESIDENT'S
DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHED AN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD TO ADVISE
THE DIRECTOR. THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THIS BOARD ARE THE
DIRECTORS OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS
AND THE AIR FORCE. PROVISION IS MADE, MOREOVER, TO INVITE THE
HEADS OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO SIT AS MEMBERS OF THE
ADVISORY BOARD ON ALL MATTERS WHICH WOULD AFFECT THEIR AGENCIES.
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IN THIS MANNER, THE BOARD SERVES TO FURNISH THE DIRECTOR WITH
THE BENEFITS OF THE KNOWLEDGE, ADVICE, EXPERIENCE, VIEWPOINTS
AND OVER-ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND THEIR INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCIES.
ONE FINAL THOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S
DIRECTIVE. IT INCLUDES AN EXPRESS PROVISION THAT NO POLICE,
LAW ENFORCEME T OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS SHALL BE EXERCISED.
THESE PROVISIONS ARE IMPORTANT, FOR THEY DRAW THE LINES VERY
SHARPLY BETWEEN THE C.I.G. AND THE F.B.I.. IN ADDITION, THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST POLICE POWERS OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
WILL ASSURE THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP CAN NEVER BECOME
A GESTAPO OR SECURITY POLICE.
AMONG THE COMPONENTS OF ANY SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATION ARE THREE WHICH I WISH TO DISCUSS -- COLLECTION,
PRODUCTION, AND DISSEMINATION. COLLECTION IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE CONSISTS OF SECURING ALL POSSIBLE DATA PERTAINING
TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF
THE UNITED STATES.
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THE COLLECTION OF THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN OVER-DRAMATIZED,
AND UNFORTUNATELY OVER=PUBLICIZED. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD
FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE
FOR AND PROVIDE THE MEANS OF COL-
LECTING THAT INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED BY
CLANDESTINE METHODS. IN THIS WE ONLY FOLLOW, LATE BY MANY YEARS,
THE..POLICY AND EXAMPLE OF EVERY FOREIGN NATION. WHEN PROPERLY
PROVIDED FOR AND ESTABLISHED, THESE OPERATIONS MUST BE CENTRALIZED
IN ONE ORGANIZATION. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BRITISH SECRET
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OVER HUNDREDS OF YEARS PROVES THIS. THE
GERMANS VIOLATED THIS PRINCIPLE, -- AS DID THE ITALIANS AND THE
JAPANESE -- WITH DISASTROUS RESULTS FOR THEMSELVES.
FAILURE ALWAYS MARKS A MULTICIPLICITY OF INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATIONS. STUDY OF MANY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD, TALKS WITH THOSE WHO HAVE OPERATED IN THE FIELD OF
SECRET INTELLIGENCE FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME, AND POST-WAR
INTERROGATIONS OF HIGH INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS IN THE AXIS COUNTRIES,
HAVE SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY THAT WHEN THERE ARE SEPARATE SERVICES.,
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THE RESULT IS CHAOS SO FAR AS PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION IS
CONCERNED. INTERNAL BRICKERING, WITH CONTINUAL SNIPING, DEVELOPS
BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SERVICES. THERE WERE TOO MANY GERMAN SPY
ORGANIZATIONS, EACH OF THEU! JEALOUS OF THE OTHER. THEY ALL
DEVELOPED A POLICY OF SECRECY, SO THAT EACH MIGHT BE THE ONE TO
PRESENT SOME JUICY TIDBIT OF INFORMATION TO THE LEADERS.
COORDINATION WENT OUT THE WINDOW.
IF THE UNITED STATES IS TO BE FORCED BY CONDITIONS IN THE
WORLD TODAY TO ENTER CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS ABROAD, THEN SUCH
OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CENTRALIZED IN ONE AGENCY TO AVOID THE
?MISTA:KES INDICATED,AND WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PROVEN
SUCCESSFUL IN THIS FIElD.
HOWEVER, I FEEL IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT IN PEACE TIME
APPROXIMATELY 80 PER CENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO SUCCESSFUL OPERATION CAN AND SHOULD BE COLLECTED BY
OVERT MEANS. BY OVERT MEANS I MEAN THOSE OBVIOUS, OPEN METHODS
WHICH REQUIRE, BASICALLY, A THOROUGH SIFTING AND ANALYSIS OF THE
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MASSES OF READILY AVAILABLE MATERIAL OF ALL TYPES AND DESCRIP-
TIONS. INTO THE UNITED STATES THERE IS FUNNELLED SO VAST AN
AMOUNT OF INFORMATION FROM SO MANY VARIED SOURCES THAT IT IS
VIRTUALLY STAGGERING. IT ENCOMPASSES EVERY FIELD OF ENDEAVOR --
MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, AGRICULTURAL,
MINERAL, LABOR, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AMONG OTHERS --AN ENDLESS
AND INEXHAUSTIBLE SUPPLY.
THERE EXISTS A MISCONCEPTION IN THE MINDS OF SOME PEOPLE
REGARDING THE TASK INTELLIGENCE IS TO PERFORM IN TIME OF PEACE,
AS CONTRASTED WITH ITS TASK IN, TIME OF WAR. THIS MISCONCEPTION
IS THAT IN WARTIME INTELLIGENCE IS MORE IMPORTANT AND MORE
DIFFICULT THAN IN TIME OF PEACE. THIS IS A FALLACY. IN THE
MIDST OF A WAR, OUR ARMED FORCES, WITH THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES,
GATHER VAST AMOUNTS OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL INFORMATION. THIS
MAY BE SECURED THROUGH THE UNDERGROUND, OR RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS.,
RECONNAISANCE, PRISONER-OF-WAR INTERROGATION, AND AERIAL PHOTO-
GRAPHS TAKEN IN SPITE OF ENEMY RESISTANCE -- TO
ION A FEW.
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BUT THESE SOURCES ARE DRASTICALLY REDUCED AS OUR FORCES RETURN
HOME. SUCH INFORMATION, WHICH CAN BE COLLECTED DURING ACTUAL
COMBAT, IS LARGELY DENIED W IN PEACE-TIME. IN TIMES OF PEACE,
WE MUST RELY ON THE PAINSTAKING STUDY OF THAT AVAILABLE OVERT MATERIAL
I MENTIONED A MINUTE AGO, IN ORDER TO REPLACE THE MATERIAL READILY
AVAILABLE DURING COMBAT.
IF WE FAIL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE VAST MASSES OF OVERT
MATERIAL, WE ARE DELIBERATELY EXPOSING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A POLICY DICTATED BY A LACK OF INFORMATION.
WE MUST REALIZE ALSO THAT WE ARE COMPETING WITH OTHER NATIONS WHO
HAVE BEEN BUILDING THEIR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS FOR CENTURIES TO
KEEP THEIR LEADERS INFORMED OF INTERNATIONAL INTENTIONS -- TO
INFORM THEM LONG BEFORE INTENTIONS HAVE MATERIALIZED INTO ACTION.
AMONG THE PRIMARY COLLECTING AGENCIES IN THE FIELD OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ARE THE MILITARY, AIR AND NAVAL ATTACHES OF
THE DEFENSE ESTABLIST, AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS OF
THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP CAN NOT AND
WILL NOT SUPPLANT THESE PEOPLE. THEY DO MOST VALUABLE' WORK IN
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THE FIELD OF OVERT COLLECTION. AS NATIONAL AIMS AND NEEDS IN
THIS FIELD ARE ESTABLISHED, THEIR VALUE WILL BE INCREASINGLY
APPARENT. THIS WILL BE PARTICULARLY TRUE AS THE BOUNDARIES OF
DEPARTMENTAL COLLECTION BECOME FIRMLY DEFINED, AND WASTEFUL
DUPLICATION AND OVERLAP ARE ELIMINATED OR REDUCED.
AS I STATED, IT IS NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE GROUP TO TAKE OVER DEPARTMENTAL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.
THIS IS THE TYPE OF COLLECTION WHICH CAN BEST BE DONE BY THE
EXPERTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS IN THEIR VARIOUS FIELDS.
THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP IS TO COORDINATE
THIS COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND TO AVIOD
WASTEFUL DUPLICATION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD COLLECT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE IN ITS BASIC FIELD. THE
NAVY DEPARTMENT SHOULD DEVOTE ITS EFFORTS PRIMARILY TO THE COL-
LECTION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. THERE SHOULD BE NO REASON, FOR
EXAMPLE, FOR THE MILITARY ATTACHE TO FURNISH THE WAR DEPARTMENT
WITH DETAILED POLITICAL AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSES. THIS
MATERIAL SHOULD BE COLLECTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT.
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IF A MILITARY ATTACHE SHOULD RECEIVE POLITICAL INFORMATION, HE
SHOULD HAND IT RIGHT ACROSS THE DESK IN THE EMBASSY TO THE
APPROPRIATE MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE, AND VICE VERSA.
WE ARE ENGAGED IN MAKING CONTINUAL SURVEYS OF ALL GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO ASCERTAIN THEIR REQUIREMENTS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGEATCE.
WHEN TWO OR MORE AGENCIES HAVE SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL RDBUIREMNTS,
THE COLLECTION EFFORT FOR ONE CAN BE MADE TO SATISFY ALL OTHERS.
THE ONLY ADDITIONAL ACTION NECESSARY IS THE ADDITIONAL
DISSEMINATION.
IN DETERMINING, APPORTIONING AND ALLOCATING THE PRIMARY
FIELD OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG THE VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, IT IS USEFUL TO NOTE ONE ADDITIONAL FACTOR. AFTER THIS
MASS OF MATERIAL HAS BEEN STUDIED AND EVALUATED, CERTAIN GAPS IN
THE OVER-ALL PICTURE WILL BE READILY APPARENT. A CENTRALIZED
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, INTENT'ON COMPLETING THE NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE PICTURE, MUST HAVE THE POWER TO SEND OUT COLLECTION
DIRECTIVES AND REQUEST FURTHER MATERIAL TO FILL THESE GAPS.
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ONCE THE INITIAL FIELD OF COLLECTION IS DELINEATED, THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURING THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CAN BE
PROPERLY CHANNELED AND APPORTIONED. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, HOWEVER,
NEEDS THE AUTHORITY GRANTED ORIGINALLY BY THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE,
AND NOW BY THIS PROPOSED IMISIATION, TO COORDINATE ALL THIS FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. BEYOND THAT, WE MUST HAVE THE AUTHORITY
TO COLLECT IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL, AS OPPOSED TO DEPARTMENTAL,
INTELLIGENCE, WHERE WE HAVE THE MEANS TO FILL THE GAPS, BY
CLANDESTINE OR SEMI-COVERT MEANS IF NECESSARY. THUS WE CAN COME
NEARER PRODUCING THE WHOLE CLOTH. AT THE SAME TIME IT MUST BE
REMEMBERED THAT ANY CENTRALIZED CLANDESTINE SERVICE WOULD BE
AVAILABLE TO EACH OF THE DEPARTMENTS FOR ITS SPECIALIZED NEEDS.
THE SECOND MAJOR COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL CENTRAL INTEILI-
GENCE AGENCY IS THAT COMING UNDER THE BROAD GENERAL HEADING OF
PRODUCTION. THIS INVOLVES THE EVALUATION, CORRELATION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION GATHERED
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE. IT INVOLVES THE PROCESS OF
SYSTEMATIC AND CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
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FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ITS USEFULNESS, CREDITABILITY
AND ACCURACY. IT INVOLVES THE PROCESS OF SYNTHESIS OF THE
PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH ALL AVAILABLE RELATED
MATERIAL. IT INVOLVES THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE PROBABLE
SIGNIFICIANCE OF EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE FIELD IS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT
RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS COLLECTION. THIS MATERIAL IS NECESSARY TO
THAT DEPARTMENT, IN THE COURSE OF ITS DAY-TO-DAY'OPERATIONS. EACH
DEPARTMENT MUST HAVE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO DIGEST THIS INFORMATION
AND PUT IT TO SUCH USE AS IS NECESSARY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. THE
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES MUST BE CONSTANTLY
INFORMED OF THE SITUATION WITHIN THEIR OWN FIELDS TO DISCHARGE
THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THIS COUNTRY. WITH THIS DEPARTMENTAL NECESSITY,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WILL NOT INTERFERE. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST
EVALUATE AND CORRELATE AND INTERPRET THAT IN'T'ELLIGENCE INFORMATION
WHICH IS WITHIN ITS OWN EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND WHICH IS NEEDED
FOR ITS OWN DEPARTMENTAL USE.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BECOMES EVIDENT WHEN WE START TO DEAL WITH INTELLIGENCE ON A
NATIONAL AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL. THE RESEARCH
PROVIDED BY THE CENTRAL AGENCY MUST BE TURNED TO THE PRODUCTION OF
ESTIMATES IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE IS THAT COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE, INTERDEPARTMENTAL IN CHAR-
ACTER, WHICH IS REQUIRED BY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS
AND STAFFS TO ASSIST THEM IN DETERMINING POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO
NATIONAL PLANNING AND SECURITY IN PEACE AND IN WAR, AND FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF BROAD NATIONAL POLICY. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS
IN THAT BROAD POLITICAL-ECONOMIC-MILITARY AREA, OF CONCERN TO
MORE THAN ONE AGENCY. IT MUST BE OBJECTIVE, AND IT MUST TRANSCEND
THE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE OF ANY ONE DEPARTMENT.
ONE OF THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY MAKES IS THE PREPARATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.
PREVIOUSLY, IF THE PRESIDENT DESIRED AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE OF A
GIVEN SITUATION, HE HAD TO CALL, FOR EXAMPLE, UPON THE WAR
DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD FURNISH HIM WITH THE MILITARY AND AIR
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PICTURE; THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD PRESENT AN ESTIMATE
OF THE NAVAL POTENTIALITIES AND CAPABILITIES; AND ON THE STATE
DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD COVER THE POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
PICTURE. BUT NOWHERE WOULD THERE BE AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE. NOWHERE
WAS THERE SUCH AN ESTIMATE BEFORE PEARL HARBOR. EACH DEPARTMENT
WOULD, OF NECESSITY, PRESENT AN ESTIMATE SLANTED TO ITS OWN.
PARTICULAR FIELD. NOW IT FALLS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TO PRESENT THIS OVER-ALL PICTURE IN A BALANCED, NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE ESTIMATE, INCLUDING ALL PERTINENT DATA. FROM THIS THE
PRESIDENT AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS CAN DRAW A WELL-ROUNDED
PICTURE ON WHICH TO BASE THEIR POLICIES, AND IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY
BORNE IN MIND THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DOES NOT
MAKE POLICY.
THE ESTIMATES FURNISHED IN THE FORM OF STRATEGIC AND
NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
FILL A MOST SERIOUS GAP IN OUR PRESENT INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE.
THESE ESTIMATES SHOULD REPRESENT THE MOST COMPREHEQTSIVE, COMPLETE
AND PRECISE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT.
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WITHOUT A CENTRAL RESEARCH STAFF PRODUCING THIS MATERIAL, AN
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WOULD MERELY RESEMBLE A COSTLY GROUP OF
FACTORIES, EACH MANUFACTURING COMPONENT PARTS, WITHOUT A CENTRAL
ASSEMBLY LINE FOR THE FINISHED PRODUCT.
THE THIRD COMPONENT OF THE SUCCESSFUL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IS THAT DEALING WITH DISSEMINATION. JUST AS THERE IS NO
PURPOSE IN COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION UNLESS IT IS
SUBSEQUENTLY ANALYZED AND WORKED INTO A FINAL PRODUCT, SO THERE
IS NO SENSE IN DEVELOPING A FINAL PRODUCT IF IT IS NOT DISSEMINATED
TO THOSE WHO HAVE NEED OF IT. THE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE
IS MANDATORY TO THOSE OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHO NEED IT
TO MAKE THEIR DECISIONS.
A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PROPERLY COGNIZANT OF THE
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES,
IS BEST EQUIPPED TO HANDLE THE DISSEMINATION TO ALL DEPARTMENTS
OF THE MATERIAL TO MEET THESE REQUIRT'S.
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THE COMPLEXITIES OF INTELLIGENCE, THE INTSITIES OF
INFORMATION AVAILABLE VIRTUALLY FOR THE ASKING, ARE SO GREAT
THAT THIS INFORMATION MUST REACH A CENTRAL SPOT FOR ORU= AND
EFFICIENT DISSEMINATION TO ALL POSSIBLE USERS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT.
IN ADDITION TO THE FUNCTIONS MENTIONED, IT IS NECESSARY FOR
A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO PERFORM OTHERS OF COMMON CONCERN
TO TWO OR MORE AGENCIES. THESE ARE PROJECTS WHICH IT IS BELIEVED
CAN BE MOST EFFICIENTLY OR ECONOMICALLY PERFORMED CENTRALLY. AN
EXAWLE OF SUCH A SERVICE IS THE MONITORING OF FOREIGN BROADCASTS.
THERE ARE MANY DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT VITALLY INTERESTED
IN THIS MATTER. NO ONE DEPART
SHOULD SHOULDER THE BURDEN OF
ITS OPERATION AND EXPENSE. NOR SHOULD TWO OR MORE AGENCIES BE
DUPLICATING THE OPERATION. IT SHOULD REST WITH A CENTRAL AGENCY
TO OPERATE SUCH A SERVICE FOR ALL. SIMILARLY, WE HAVE CENTRALIZED
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE VARIOUS FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCHES WHICH
WERE OPERATED BY SOME OF THE SERVICES INDIVIDUALLY OR JOINTLY
DURING THE WAR.
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I WOULD CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE KIND OF
MEN WHO ARE ABLE TO EXECUTE THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION SUCCESSFULLY
ARE NOT TOO FREQUENTLY FOUND. THEY MUST BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY
TO BECOME A PART OF A SECURE AND PERMANENT AGENCY WHICH WILL
GROW IN ABILITY WITH THE CONSTANT EXERCISE OF ITS FUNCTIONS IN
THE FIELDS OF OPERATIONS AND RESEARCH. WE MUST HAVE THE BEST
AVAILABLE DPI', WORKING IN THE BEST POSSIBLE ATMOSPHERE, AND VTITH
THE FINEST TOOLS THIS GOVERNMENT CAN AFFORD.
DURING THE WAR, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WERE ABLE TO ATTRACT
A GREAT NUMBER OF EXTREMELY INTELLIGENT, WIDELY EXPERIENCED,
ABLE MEN. SOME ARE STILL AVAILABLE AND MIGHT BECOME MEMBERS OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SHOULD IT BECOME POSSIBLE TO
INSURE THEM THAT CAREER WHICH WAS RECOMMENDED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE REPORT I CITED PREVIOUSLY. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO
RECRUIT SUCH MEN BEFORE THE WILL OF CONGRESS IS MADE KNOWN.
I DO NOT WISH TO BELABOR THIS POINT, BUT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT.
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IN CONCLUSION, I RESPECTFULLY URGE THE PASSAG8 OF SECTION
202 OF THE BILL UNDER DISCUSSION, TOGETHER WITH SUCH ADDITIONAL
LEGISLATION AS IS NEEDED TO MAKE FOR OPERATIONAL
EFFICIENCY. I URGE YOUR INCREASED AND CONTINUED INTEREST IN AN
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WHICH CAN DO SO MUCH TOWARD SAFEGUARDING OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY.
SUCH A SYSTEM INDICATES THE NECESSITY FOR A CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY TO AUGMENT AND COORDINATE THESE INTELLIGENCE
MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMED SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE. SUCH AN AGENCY SHOULD BE GIVEN THE AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,
TO COVER THE GAPS IN EXISTING OVERT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
TO PROVIDE FOR THE CENTRAL OPERATION OF CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE
IN THE FOREIGN FIELD. WE KNOW THAT THE PASSAGE OF SUCH LEGISLATION
WILL ENABLE US TO ESTABLISH A FIELD ATTRACTIVE TO MEN OF OUT-
STANDING BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE IN INTELLIGENCE. THESE
INDIVIDUALS WILL MEET THE CHALLENGE OF THE TASK BEFORE THEM -- THE
MOST STIMULATING IN WHICH MEN CAN SERVE THEIR COUNTRY -- BY THE
roved PRODUCTION OF F A POSITIVE3SAF' UAHD `x080 7 8 (15q~~I ?