STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 29, 1947
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
Statement of
LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Director of Central Intelligence
Before The
Armed Services Committee
of the
United States Senate
On S. 758,
'lThe National Security Act of 1947!' .
FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
(756)
DOCUMENT NO.
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Ivir. Chairman and members of the Committee:
My appearance before your Committee this morning is in support
of Section 202 of the proposed National Security Act of 1947. This
section of the bill would provide the United States, for the first
time in its history, with a Central Intelligence service created by
Act of Congress. Our present organization, the Central. Intelligence
Group -- which I have the privilege of directing -- has been in exis-
tence since January 1946, by authority of an Executive Directive of
the President.
Since the day that the Central Intelligence Group was established,
the Directors of Central Intelligence -- my predecessor, Admiral Souers,
and I -- have looked forward to the time when we could come before the
Congress and-request permanent status through legislative enactment.
I sincerely urge adoption of the intelligence provisions of this
bill,, Section 202 will enable us-to do our.share in maintaining the
national security. It will form a firm basis on which we can construct
the finest intelligence service in the world.
In, my opinion, a strong intelligence system is equally if not
more essential in peace than in war. Upon us-has fallen leadership
in world affairs. The oceans have shrunk, until today both Europe
and Asia border the United States almost as do Canada and Mexico.
The interests, intentions and capabilities of the various nations on
these land masses must be fully known to our national policy makers,
We must have this intelligence if we are to be forewarned against
possible acts of aggression, and if we are to be armed against
disaster in an era of atomic warfare.
I know you gentlemen understand that the nature of some of the
work we are doing makes it undesirable -- from the security standpoint to discuss certain activities with too much freedom. I feel that the
people of this country, having experienced the disaster of Pearl Harbor
and the appalling consequences of a global war, are now sufficiently
informed in their approach to intelligence to understand that an orga-
nization such as ours -- or the Intelligence Divisions of the Armed
Services, or the F.B.I. -- cannot expose certain of their activities
to public gaze: I therefore ask your indulgence -- and through you
the indulgence of the people -- to limit my remarks on the record
this morning to a general approach to the subject of a Central
Intelligence Agency.
.I think it can be said without successful challenge that before
Pearl Harbor we did not have an intelligence service in this country
comparable to that of Great Britain, or France, or Russia, or Germany,
or Japan. We did not have one because the people of the United States
would not accept it. It was felt that there was something Un-American
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about espionage and even about intelligence generally, There was a
feeling that all that was necessary to win a war -- if there ever were
to be another war -- was an ability to shoot straight. One of the
great pre-war fallacies was the common misconception that, if the
Japanese should challenge us in the Pacific, our armed services would
be able to handle the problem in a matter of a few months at most.
All intelligence is not sinister, nor is it an invidious type
of work. But before the Second World War, our intelligence services
had left largely untapped the great open sources of information upon
which roughly 80 per cent of intelligence should normally be based.
I mean such things as books, magazines, technical and scientific
surveys, photographs, commercial analyses, newspapers and radio broad-
casts, and general information from people with a knowledge of affairs
abroad. What weakened our position further was that those of our
intelligence services which did dabble in,any of these sources failed
to.coordinate their results with each other..
The Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor
Attack reached many pertinent conclusions regarding the short-comings
of our intelligence system and made some very sound recommendations
for its improvement. We are incorporating many of these into our
present thinking. The Committee showed that some very significant
information had not been correctly evaluated. It found that some of
the evaluated information was not passed on to the field commanders.
But, over and above these failures were others, perhaps more serious,
which went to the very structure of our intelligence organizations.
I am talking now of the failure to exploit obvious sources; the failure
to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence; the
failure to centralize intelligence functions of common concern to
more than one department of the Government, which could more efficiently
be performed centrally.
In the testimony which has preceded mine in support of this bill
by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, General Eisenhower, Admiral
Nimitz, and General Spaatz, among others -- there has been shown an
awareness of the need for coordination between the State Department
and our foreign political policies on one hand and our National
Defense Establishment and-its policies on the other. Similarly with
intelligence, there must be coordination and some centralization, so
that no future Congressional Committee can possibly ask the question
asked by the Pearl Harbor Committee: "Why, with some of the finest
intelligence available in our history -- why was it possible for a
Pearl Harbor to occur?"
The Committee recommended that intelligence work have centraliza-
tion of authority and-clear-cut allocation of responsibility. It found
specific-fault with the system of dissemination then in use -- or, more
accurately, the lack of dissemination of intelligence to those who had
vital need of it. It stated that "the security of the nation can be
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insured only through continuity of service and centralization of
responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence." It
found that there is no substitute for imagination and resourceful-
ness on-the part of intelligence personnel, and that part of the
failure in this respect was "the failure to accord to intelligence
work the important and significant role which it deserves." The
Committee declared that "efficient intelligence services are just
as essential in time of peace as in war."
All of these findings and recommendations have my hearty concur-
rence. In the Central Intelligence Group, and in its successor which
this bill creates, must be found the answer to the prevention of
another Pearl Harbor.
As the United States found itself suddenly projected into a global
war, immense gaps in our knowledge became readily apparent. The word
"intelligence" quickly took on a fashionable connotation. Each new
war-time agency -- as well as many of the older departments -- soon -
blossomed out with intelligence staffs of their own, each producing a
mass of largely uncoordinated information. The resultant competition
for funds and specialized personnel was a monumental example of waste.
The War and Navy Departments developed full political and economic
intelligence staffs, as did the Research'and Analysis Division of the
O.S.S.. The Board of Economic Warfare and its successor, the Foreign
Economic Administration, also delved deeply into fields-of economic
intelligence. Not content with staffs in Washington, they established
subsidiary staffs in London and then followed these up with other
units on the continent.
When, during the war, for example, officials requested a report
on the steel industry in Japan or the economic conditions in the
Netherlands East Indies, they had the reports of the Board of Economic
Warfare, G-2, O.N,I. and the 0.5.S. from which to choose. Because
these agencies had competed to secure the best personnel, it was nec-
essary for each of them to back up its experts by asserting that its
particular reports were the best available, and that the others might
well be disregarded.
As General Marshall stated in testifying on the unification
bill before the Senate Military Affairs Committee last year, "...Prior
`to entering the war, we had little more than what a military attache
could learn at a dinner, more or less over the coffee cups." From
this start, we suddenly had intelligence springing up everywhere.
But nowhere was its collection, production or dissemination fully
coordinated -- not even in the armed forces. General Marshall pointed
this out in his testimony when he mentioned "the difficulty we had in
even developing a Joint Intelligence Committee, That would seem to
be a very simple thing to do, but it was not at all."
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There are great masses of information available o us in peace
as in war. With our war-time experience behind us, we know now where
to look for material, as well as for what to look. The transition
from war to peace does not change the necessity for coordination of
the collection, production and dissemination of the increasingly vast
quantities of foreign intelligence information that are becoming .'
available. This coordination the Central Intelligence Agency will supply.
President Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services
for the purpose of gathering together men of exceptional background and
ability who could operate in the field of national, rather than depart-
mental, intelligence. In weighing the merits of the O.S.S., one should
remember that it came late into the field. It was a stop-gap. Over-
night, it was given a function to perform that the British, for instance,
had been developing since the days of Queen Elizabeth. When one con-
siders these facts, the work of the O.S.S. was quite remarkable and its
known failures must be weighed against its successes. Moreover, it
marked a crucial turning point in the development of United States
intelligence. We are now attempting to profit by their experiences
and mistakes.
Having attained its present international position of importance
.and power in an unstable world, the United States should not, in my
opinion, find itself again confronted with the necessity of developing
its plans and policies on the basis of intelligence collected, compiled,
and interpreted by some foreign government. It is common knowledge that
we found ourselves in just that position at the beginning of World War
Two. For months we had to rely blindly and trustingly on the superior
intelligence system of the. British. Our successes prove that this, trust
was generally well placed. However, in matters so vital to a nation
having the responsibilities of a world power, the United States should
never again have to go hat in hand, begging any foreign government for
the eyes -- the foreign intelligence -- with which to see... We should
be self sufficient. The interests of others may not be our interests.
.The need for our own coordinated intelligence program has been
recognized in most quarters, The Pearl Harbor disaster dramatized that
need and stop-gap measures were adopted. As the war drew to aclose,
the President directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the problem
and draft recommendations for the future. The solution offered by the-
Joint Chiefs of Staff was referred to the Secretaries of State, War,
and the Navy. The program which they evolved resulted in an Executive
Directive from President Truman, dated 22 January 1946, With your
permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that Executive
Directive into the record at this point.
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This Executive Directive established the National Intelligence
Authority. It consists of four voting members -- the Secretaries of
State, War and the Navy, and the President's personal representative,
at this time his Chief of Staff, Fleet Admiral Leahy. A fifth member --
without a vote -- is the Director of Central Intelligence. The
National Intelligence Authority was directed to plan, develop and
coordinate all federal foreign intelligence activities, so as "to
assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission
related to the national security." These functions of the National
Intelligence Authority are transferred to he National Security
Council under Section 202 (c)(1) of the, bill.
The President's Directive also provided for a Central Intelligence
Group as the operating agency of the National Intelligence Authority.
The functions, personnel, property and records of the Group are trans-
ferred to the new Central Intelligence Agency by Section 202 (c)(2) of
the bill.
The Director of Central Intelligence is presently charged with
the following basic functions:
'1. The collection of foreign intelligence information of certain
types -- without interfering' with or duplicating the norhal collection
activities of the military and naval intelligence services, or the
Foreign Service of the State Department.
2. The evaluation, correlation and interpretation of the foreign
information collected, in order to produce the strategic and national
policy intelligence required by the President and other appropriate
officials of the Government.
3,, The dissemination of the national intelligence produced.
4. The performance of such services of common concern to the
various intelligence agencies of the Government as can be more effi-
ciently accomplished centrally.
5. Planning for the coordination of the intelligence activities
of the Government so as to secure the most effective accomplishment
of the national intelligence objectives.
As we progress and determine the primary responsibilities of the
various intelligence agencies within the Government,, the functions of
the C.I.G. will be aggressively., economically and efficiently executed
to the best interests of all agencies. We feel confident that if
.Section 202 of this bill is enacted into law,_the results. will be
efficiency and economy.
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Contrary to some criticism which has appeared in the public press,
the full operation of a Central Intelligence Agency will not interfere,
with the legitimate activities of the several departments and their
agencies, nor will it duplicate their work. I can say that the sev-
eral coordinated plans and programs already in effect or in prepara-
tion have the support of the agencies. They see in these programs
prospects for orderly operations and elimination of wasteful duplica-
tions. When every intelligence agency knows exactly what is expected
of it in relation to its departmental mission and to the national
intelligence mission, and when it can count.-as the result of firm
agreement, on being supplied with what it needs from other fields,
each agency can concentrate on its own primary field and do that
superior job which world conditions require.
By the assignment of primary fields of intelligence responsibi-
lities, we are -- in the fields of collection, production and dissemi-
nation -- preventing overlapping functions -- that is, eliminating
duplicate roles and missions, and eliminating duplicate services in
carrying out these functions.
In order to perform his prescribed functions, the Director of
Central Intelligence must keep 'in close and intimate contact with the
departmental intelligence agencies of the Government. To provide
formal machinery for this purpose, the President's Directive estab-
lished an Intelligence Advisory Board to advise the Director. Thee
permanent members of this Board are the Directors of Intelligence of
the State, War and Navy Departments and the Air Force. Provision is
made, moreover,_to invite the heads of other intelligence agencies to
sit as members of the Advisory Board on all matters which would affect
their agencies. In this manner, the Board serves to furnish the
Director with the benefits of the knowledge, advice, experience,
viewpoints and over-all requirements of the departments and their
intelligence agencies.
One final thought in connection with the President's Directive.
It includes an express provision that no police, law enforcement or
internal security functions shall be'exercised. These provisions are
important, for they draw the lines very sharply between the C.I.G.
and the F.B.I.. In addition, the prohibition against police powers
or internal security functions will assure that the Central Intelli-
gence Group can never become a Gestapo or security police.
Among the components of any successful intelligence organization
are three which I Wish to discuss -- collection, production,-and dis-
semination. Collection in the field of foreign intelligence consists
of securing all possible data pertaining to foreign governments or
the national defense and security of the United States.
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The collection of this information has been over-dramatized, and
unfortunately over-publicized. However, I believe we should frankly
acknowledge the need for and provide the means of collecting that
intelligence which can only be obtained by clandestine methods. In
this we only follow, late by many years, the policy and example of
every foreign nation. When properly provided for and established, these
operations must be centralized in one organization. The experience of
the British Secret Intelligence Service over hundreds of years proves
this. The Germans violated this principle -- as did the Italians and
the Japanese -- with disastrous results for themselves.
Failure always marks a multiplicity of intelligence organizations.
Study of many intelligence systems throughout the world, talks with
those who have operated in the field of secret intelligence for long
periods of time, and post-war interrogations of high intelligence offi-
cials in the Axis countries, have shown conclusively that when there
are separate services, the result is chaos so far as production of
information is concerned. Internal bickering, with continual sniping,
develops between the various services. There were too many German spy
organizations, each of them jealous of the other. They all developed
a policy of secrecy so that each might be the one to present some
juicy tidbit of information to the leaders. Coordination went out
the window.
If the United States is to be forced by conditions in the world
today to enter clandestine operations abroad, then such operations
should be centralized in one agency to avoid the mistakes indicated,
and we should follow the experience of the intelligence organizations
of other countries which have proven successful in this field.
However, I feel it is safe to say that in peace time approximately
80 per cent of the foreign intelligence information necessary to suc-
cessful operation can and should be collected by overt means. By overt
means I mean those obvious, open methods which require, basicly a
thorough sifting and analysis of the masses of readily available mater-
ial of all types and descriptions. Into the United States there is
funnelled so vast an amount of information. from so many varied sources
that it is virtually staggering. It encompasses every field of endeavor--
military, political, economic, commercial, financial, agricultural,
mineral, labor, scientific, technical, among others -- an endless
and inexhaustible supply.
There exists a misconception in the minds of-some people regarding
the task intelligence is to perform in time of peace, as contrasted
with its task in time of war. This misconception is that in wartime
intelligence is more important and more difficult than in time of peace.
This is a fallacy. In the midst of a war, our armed forces, with their
intelligence services, gather vast amounts of strategic and tactical
information. This may be secured through the underground, or resistance
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movements, reconnaisance, prisoner-of-war interrogation, and aerial
photographs taken in spite of enemy resistance -- to mention a few..
But these sources are d_.7as t._cal'.y r. educes. as our f o: c.es return home.
Such infurm