INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001300120001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 22, 1946
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2007/03106 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8001300120001-8
s ~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21sF and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
.~Et.~i0R1~NDUI~i I'OR 1^Hb,' DIR,CC~R OF Cr~TTRAL INTELLIG NC%
Subject; Intelligence at Pearl Harbor
22 August 1946
1. Pursuant to ;Renate Concurrent Resolution No. 27, Seventy-ninth
Congress, (September 1945), a Joint Congressional Committee on the Investiga-
tion of the Pearl Harbor Attacl{tiaras established to investigate the attack,
and events and circumstances relating thereto.
2. In July 1946, the Committee Report was published, together
~ntith the additional vievTS of one Congressman and the Minority Report of two
senators .
3. A study of the Committee Report has been made by the under-
signed from the vievapoint of ascertaining the role, achievements, and short-
comings of intelligence in connection vri.th the attaclc on Pearl Harbor. This
intelligence study is attached heret~ith. No attempt has been made to examine
i;he Committee Report from a military or diplomatic standpoint. Rather,
this paper is restricted solely to the problems of intelligence.
For convenience, this study of the Committee Report has been
divided into four tabs as follotivs:
TAB A -- Collection
TAB B -- Research and ,~raluation
TAB C -- Dissemination
TAB D -- Deficiencies, Conclusions and Recommendations of
~ia~~:C]F r~:~~~~'~: iii ~I!'
~:~~ r=at rr~ i ~ ~ i r-~ ~~ F' ~ r ~ ~:~
AtiTK o 8~y~
neTS $EYIEWEBG
?~~16~~Eb1T gym,
~ IIgrL~?~~F~?I~
4'LG,Ss"s. a9.^.R~~?? ~~~ 75 5 G
d~fEX'f ?iEVlEW Q~3I~; --
 Approved For Release 2007/03106 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8001300120001-8
?
5. The following are among the major coziclusions and recommenda-
tions reached by the Co~nittee:
a. Intelligence vuork. requires centralization of authority
and clear-cut allocation of responsibilities.
b. The armed servicea should:
(1) Select officers for intelligence ~rork who possess
the background and capacity for such ^~ork;
(2) Retain those officers on intelligence duty for an
extended period of time;
(3) Insure that officers T^ith an aptitude for intelli-
Bence receive such assi;~nments and do not have their
r~ro~ess impaded or their promotions affected.
c. The restrict~_on of highly classified information to a
;ninir^.um number of off-_cials, ~Thi1o often necessary, s~_ould. not be carried to
the point of pre judici n~ the vrork of an orbanization.
d. `T'here should be completo inteb?ration of Array sand T1avy
intelligence agencies.
e. Cor.~ress should consider legislation fully protecting the
.>ecurity of classified matter and amending the Corn~r_unications Act of 1y3~.
insofar as it handicaps our intelligence agencies ti?rith regard to wire tapping.
6. Nothing in t'rle a~~ditional views of ~ngressms.n Keefe or the
?si:inority T;.oport of Senators i'~re~nster and t~Prguson materially changes the
T!:ajority Report insofar as intelli;ence is concerned. All dates, unless other-
wise indicated, are in the ye~x 191.Y1. 25X1
lam. L. r i:~,H~~,,~!-t
Chief, Legislative Liaison Branch
 Approved For Release 2007/03106 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8001300120001-8
?
1;OLLECTION
A considerable amount of information regarding Japanese plans,
intentions, and capabilities was collected by the military and naval in-
telligence services, both in ~~?rashin~ton and in the field, prior to Pearl
Harbor.
The greatest source of intelligence information concerning Japan-
ese plans ;eras provided by the interception and decoding of messages from
Japan to its diplomatic establishments. 't'hese intercepts were known byr
the code name T,~agic, and were provided by a joint operation of the Army
,~rrd Navy. This operation was characterized by the Congressional Committee
as "meriting the highest commendation's because of the "exercise of the
+reatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness" by the services.
To protect the security of Magic, it was necessary to pursue a
policy of extremely limited distribution of the material. Thus it was
possible to avoid alerting the Japanese to the fact that their diplomatic