RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001100100006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 16, 1951
• Content Type: MF

0
PY
Approved For Release 2p3 IT, *'PA-RDP80R01731 R001100100006-7
THE JOINT CHIEFS (3F STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.
SPDM-108-51
16 march 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK G. WISNER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR POLICY COORDINATION:
Subject: Resistance Movements in Eastern Europe.
1. As indicated at the consultants, meeting of 14 March 1951, I
am increasingly disturbed because of the difficulties in establishing
networks of indigenous personnel in Eastern Europe behind the Iron
Curtain, and believe that I should clarify and extend my viewpoint.
It may well be that the difficulties are insurmountable within any
reasonable period of time, yet the evidences of discontent and unhap-
piness among the populations of those countries, including Russia
after thirty-odd years of bolshevism, are so impressive that it would
be a bitter thing to reach that conclusion. I am inclined to believe
that a fundamental step in examining the problem is to take another
look at our accepted philosophy regarding Resistance movements with
a view to determining whether the discouraging time elements may not
result from that philosophy rather than from the problem itself.
2. As you know, the greatest element of urgency derives from the
real possibility of global war within the near future. My own views
on that possibility are also well known to you. On balance, I do not
believe that the Soviets will seek an early aggressive global war as
a solution, but I do not exclude the possibility that this view may
well be wrong. In any case, the national policy of being prepared for
it if it should come is very clear and mandatory on us all. The mil-
itary have a major responsibility in preparations for war, and OPC's
operations and plans are subject to joint guidance from the military
and from the Department of State. This in itself creates an urgency
in attempting to reach a solution to the time elements of the problem,
which the military should represent and press. On the other hand,
State, which is responsible for political guidance, quite properly
represents and presses the wisdom of adequate political solutions
from a long-range viewpoint. Fortunately, there seems to be little
or no compartmentation of this sort in the present consultative ar-
rangements for OPC, and I believe that both viewpoints can be taken
into consideration and possibly met. The important thing at the
moment is an acceptance of the possibility of early war and an effort
to reconcile maximum preparations for it with broad political consid-
erations.
JCS and NSC review(s) completed. fa-11,3K
Approved For Relea 0 tjIA-RDP80R01731 R0011( }MOM-7
T" Mitt :"I- vies
 Approved For Release 1Qq,/03/17: CIA-RDP80R01731 R001100100006-7
3. A convenient point of departure is the philosophy expressed
in excellent paper, "Of Resistance." It points out
that Resistance movements wage war for political ends, and that "those
ends are not, despite all propaganda, 'Victory' or 'Liberation,' but
the recovery or the gaining of political power." A distinction is
made between "haves" and "have-nots," and the role of each in both
passive and active resistance is discussed. The statement is made
that in case of a war with Russia, Resistance will follow the familiar
pattern with respect to these two elements. In the last war, the So-
viets excelled in Resistance organization and propaganda, thanks to
careful preparation over many years, whereas the British, who were
quite unprepared with organizations, were definitely superior in the
control of supply. The fundamental lesson that he draws is that suc-
cessful Resistance cannot be improvised, and he holds that the first
task should be to train a relatively large cadre of liaison officers
and technicians who should serve as the nucleous of our wartime Resis-
tance organization. "They should then be sent, like the Communist
agents whose counterparts they would be, to help build up Resistance
movements behind the Iron Curtain." He concludes, "The vital need is
to build up a powerful Resistance network behind the Iron Curtain and
in the threatened areas. Exactly how that network should be used
would be, of course, a matter of high policy. But in face of the
challenge of the Russian 'cold war' we can only postpone its creation
at our peril." OPC's philosophy seems to be accurately expressed in
the foregoing. I am not sure, however, that we have really thought
out the application of its political aspects.
14. 0 paper seems to me to reflect experience acquired in
non-bolshevized countries, and to be completely applicable only to
such countries as are threatened by the Soviets. When we consider
Eastern Europe behind the Iron Curtain, where bolshevism has already
taken over, we are confronted with a degree of control which seems
to make the distinction between "haves" and "have-nots" rather un-
realistic. Entire populations can be viewed either as "haves" or as
"have-nots", and, as the regime becomes consolidated, increasingly
effective measures are taken to expressly prevent anyone from finding
a way of life or a means of livelihood in any manner of non-conformity
in peacetime. There is still a real possibility, however, that even
in Russia proper and in Siberia, significant numbers of the completely
dispossessed have gone outside the law and still manage to survive.
The only way to really find out is to go there, and this is, of course,
the function of our peacetime cadre. When it comes to actual or-
ganizing behind the Iron Curtain, the difficulties increase enormously
with the degree of development of the police-controlled informer
system. Again, the only way to find out is the extremely dangerous
one of trying it. There seems to be general agreement that only the
native-born can survive in at least the earlier missions of this sort,
- 2^?
S.5-1v
Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R00110010QOOi
OP SE
 ? Approved For Release 2006/03/17 :1.CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1100100006-7
and a crucial test will have been applied when we determine, first,
whether or not anyone who has been in his homeland recently is ac-
tually willing to undertake such missions, and second, if we ever
hear from him again in case he does accept the assignment. This
sort of test is much simplified in the cases of the numerous emigres
groups which claim to already have something more than potential
er-
sonnel behind the ron
5. Although the ends for which Resistance movements wage war
are, as 0 says, for the recovery or the gaining of political
power, and not for Victory or Liberation, it seems to me that this
conception has, and perhaps wrongly, been considered by us as gov-
erning in a period like the present which is prior to the waging of
war by Resistance movements. discussion refers to operations
in war, and he also remarks tha en the broad alliance of which
they are a part is in danger, the Resistance leaders will concentrate
on military objectives to stave off the common ruin." The real point
he is making is that when the overt armies are not too hard pressed,
Resistance tends to leave the fighting to the overt armies and to
concern itself with the political issues.
6. In bolshevized countries, the distinction between "haves"
and "have-nots" not only becomes confused, but conditions tend to
reach a common denominator in terms of general dissatisfaction and
disillusionment, and specific dislike or fear of police state methods.
The unhappy Russians I have known have seldom had much interest in
either details or broad outlines of anything other than relief from
interference, oppression, and the bad government of the Bolshevik
party. Unlike the inhabitants of countries which have not yet been
taken over by bolshevism, they are under the yoke now, and know what
oppression and disillusionment are from bitter experience. They are
the ones who are willing now to wage war for Liberation alone. In
general, the interest in what comes after Liberation seems to be a
characteristic of the emigrees--those who have already been liberated.
Moreover, even among the liberated, there are believed to be individ-
uals, particularly in the professional military class, who are pri-
marily interested in the mechanics of Liberation.
7. Our own government has generally taken a position of non-
interference in the future pattern of foreign countries, and limited
itself to an effort to see that positively known evils are prevented,
if possible. Beyond that point we try to "influence" at most but do
not apply real pressure. The trend of our policy towards a liberated
Russia is consistent with this viewpoint. All that we can wisely
commit ourselves to is the provision of a framework under which self-
determination can be honestly achieved. Our legitimate interest is
definite and specific in the Liberation as a means of weakening or
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 ;, CI4,RDP80R01731 ROO1100100~'9 8
IUD "`.1..0....x.., .
-3-
 Approved For Release 2006iO3Ii7 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R001100100006-7
destroying the great power of a self-proclaimed enemy, and becomes
rather vague and general as regards a world of law and justice as a
suitable framework for our own security and prosperity.
8. I believe we are all agreed that idealistic motivation of
Resistance, whether it be Liberation or political, is far more valid
than mercenary motivation. There is nothing in Ibhilosophy,
however, which indicates that successful Resistance is dependent on
completely unified movements, or that a common political motivation
must operate on everyone. The emigree groups and organizations with
which we try to deal are notoriously irreconcilable, and it seems
clear that it is not our real function to reconcile them. Even in
China, the real issue for us between the Nationalists and the non-
Nationalist anti-communists seems to be one of power rather than of
social and moral issues which cause a division of power and unwilling-
ness to provide mutual support against a common enemy. In the case of
Eastern Europe, our national interests require us to get on with the
vital job of building up, if possible, a powerful Resistance network
behind the Iron Curtain. We must use foreigners to do this, but the
fact that those foreigners cannot agree on the policies, for whose
free resolution we are willing to provide a framework, should not con-
stitute any serious barrier to our progress. The pattern of using
emigrees as individuals rather than as representatives of organiza-
tions, even organizing them especially for such use, which is now
being worked out for Russia, may work for other areas.
9. To make a full test of the validity of any means which may
e main arguments against limited support for special Eastern
European groups have been that those groups would proclaim their sup-
port and so alienate other groups, and that they might engage in ac-
tion behind the Iron Curtain against our friends. I should think that
so long as the support was in actuality limited and spread over more
than one or two groups, the true policy of the United States would be
explainable and obvious even to disgruntled emigrees. This could, if
necessary, be done overtly, although of a mrsa Aar+ra+l._
V"41 09-.r, LIV OWI-.LVUO reason y one private U.S. group cannot give
limited support to NTS while another private U.S. group gives limited
support to SBONR, etc.
-4-
Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R00110010 fa
E
 Approved For Release 200'610311 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1100100006-7
10. To sum up, it seems to me that OPC is on a sort of dead-
center in investigating, testing, and extending resistance networks
behind the Iron Curtain, and that this is largely due to a casting
around for political solutions which will be acceptable to us. I
suggest that, while this is being done, OPC should vigorously con-
tinue its efforts under multiple frameworks on a basis of limited
support. It would appear that such limited support could be given
to any group which undertakes to work against bolshevism and not to
work behind the Iron Curtain against other anti-bolshevik groups,
and that, until the chosen instrument appears or a united front is
achieved, no political commitment should be made beyond the ultimate
provision of a framework in which the political problems can be
freely resolved.
/s/
L. C. STEVENS,
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief.
Approved For Release 2906/03117 r, CIA-RDP80R01731 R001100100006y7s
L u A L "`1??,? i,Aa F,, [=ti n
 Approved For Release 2J3SCRETA-RDP80R01731 R001100100006-7
SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
apC.
DOC. NO.
DOC. DATE
RECEIVED
SIGNATURE DATE
ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each top secret document received by the central intelligence agency or classified top secret
within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of
CIA. Access to top secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assist-
ant top secret control officer who receives and/or releases the attached top secret material will sign this form and indicate period of
custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the top secret document and the date of han-
dling should be indicated in the right-hand columns.
25X1
CIA CONTROL NO.
DATE DOCUMEIT RECEIVED
o-~ S /
1~3
4e
/:tea
7 A1611
DAi'EA_- 1901
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from top secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and
transmitted to central top secret control for record.
THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:
a.,
JANh1950 38-13
Approved For ReleaseTJW6 =AMTCIA-RDP80R01731 R0011001 1