LETTER TO MR. STEPHEN J. SPINGARN FROM J. LAWTON COLLINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000900090025-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: December 22, 1952
• Content Type: LETTER

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UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
22 December 1952
Dear Mr. Spingarn:
Thank you very much for your letter of 3 December advising me
of your work and interest in the Counter Intelligence Corps. I regret
that my extended absence out of the country has prohibited me from
replying as soon as I would have liked, and I am grateful for the op-
portunity to furnish the following information.
You are correct in assuming that some of the points outlined in
the resolutions you submitted in 1948 have been implemented, but that
certain other features have not. I can assure you that these latter
features have not been overlooked, but that the operational structure of
the Army and the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps have pro-
hibited their adoption. In this connection, I know that, through your
4 continuing association with the CIC Center, you are well aware of the
progress made by the CIC from the standpoint of both operations and
organization.
Among these ideas advanced by you in your resolutions, the follow-
ing, -- either in whole or in part -- are now in effect:
Establishment of a Central CIC File.
Authority for civilian status of GIG personnel.
Improvement of the CIC T/O&E.
Improvement of the CIC training program.
This progress is the result of considerable research, planning
,
and implementation on the part of the Counter Intelligence Corns_ The
fact that they coincide with many features outlined in your resolutions
ox 11)48 is a tribute to the sound thinking of both yourself and the staff
01 the Counter Intelligence Corps Center.
I hope that the foregoing will be valuable to you in your future work
in tipis vital matter, and I want you to know that your continued interPCt
in the activities and future of'the Counter Intelligence Corps is deeply
JCS review(s)
completed.
Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
Commissioner
Federal Trade Commission
Washington 25, D. C.
Sincerely yours,
STEPHEN J, SP!NGARP!
IVED
RECa'[1952
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Dear General Collins:
In the Spring of 191.8, I submitted to General Gruenther,
who was then Staff Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a
lengthy paper making extensive recommendations for improving
the organization and operations of military counter intelligence.
On July 19, 1948, a staff subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff held a iiearing on my recommendations at which I t es ti-
fied. As Sr recall, a Colonel Tracy was the chairman of that
subcommittee. On October 7, 1948s General Gruenther sent me a
letter, a copy of which I attach, aaying that the study of my
recommendations had been completed by the Joint Intelligence
Committee and would now be considered by the individual
services. He stated, "I am confident that a material improve-
ment will result which will add significantly to our national
set-up."
I have continued my interest in counter intelligence since
the war. I am a member of the Board of Governors of the
National Counter Intelligence Corps Association, which is an
alumni group of some 5,000 CIC veterans. That Association's
National "rogram in the Counter Intelligence Policy Field was
drafted by me and approved unanimously by the Association at
its 1948 convention. It re-endorsed this program at its
August 1952 convention.
I contemplate doing some more study and work in this field,
but in order to do so, I need an authoritative statement from
you indicating to what extent the recommendations made by me in
1918 through General Gruenther are now In effect.
I personally feel that the recommendations which I made
with respect to the establishment of a central file, the recom-
mendation with respect to a better table of organization, the
recommendation as to how CIC instruction and indoctrination could
be Improved and perhaps some of the other recommendations made
by me have, at least to some extent, been adopted and put into
effect. However, this is only speculation on my part based on
occasional visits to CIC Headquarters at Mort Holabird, Maryland.
 Genehplf dare&rt riRelease 2003104125r -r.'eIA-RDP80RO173i bmCLb25J195 2.
I would Croatly appreciate an as thoritative statement
an this subject since it would be of much value to me in
connection with my future work in this Hold.
nor your information, I an attaching, a personal history
statement, the latter part of which covers my military record.
incerely,
itephen J. wp ingarn.
General J. Lawton Collins,
Chief of : taff,
Department of the Army,
Pentagon building,
Waahirton 25, D. C.
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.
7 October 1948
Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
Assistant General Counsel
Department of the Treasury
Room 2000, Main Treasury Building
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. Spingarn:
I want to express to you the deep appreciation of the services for
your interest in the counter-intelligence field and for the time which you
have given in an endeavor to improve the organization in that activity.
The study of your recommendations has been completed by the Joint In-
telligence Committee and the conclusions of the Committee will now be con-
sidered by the individual services. You have given us much food for thought,
and I a_m.confident that a material improvement will result which will add
significantly to our national set-up.
I hope to have an opportunity to have you for lunch in the not too
distant future. As soon as the current pressure ends I shall give you a
ring.
Sincerely,
/s/ Alfred M. Gruenther
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
Major General, U. S. Army,
Director, The Joint Staff
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A BASIC PROGRAM FOR THE VITALIZATION OF. THE NATLONAL
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT ORGANIZ ION JAND ITS LOWER
ECHELON$) RELATING TO OVERSEAS COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
IN TIME OF WAR, AND FOR THE CORRECTION OF SERIOUS
DEFICIENCIES IN THIS ORGANIZATION A5 DZNONSTRAT .- BY
WORLD WAR
Stephan J. S~pfngarn
Lt. Colonel, Mx-Reserve
(Commanding Officer, Counter Intelligence Corps,
Fifth Army, 1943-1945)
April 1948
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 WORLD WAR II.*
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Ap_ri l 8, 1948
f
A BASIC PROGRAM FOR TJTR 'V'TTALiZAT20A CT' M -NATItNAL
rEFEl S 'A L SMM R A 7M ER
-ION ` j LONSj' `ffSE70 ANT INTELLIGENCE
IN TIME =,7=-TOR TRT f OF SERIOU6
75EF~M1N MT37MG. ZA EM NM= BY
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOkkE~DATIO
The purpose of this paper is to summarize ~rie `ly (ii) the serious
need for more effective military overseas coun~er intelligence
(counter espionage, counter sabotage, counter subversion) in any pos-
sible war with the USSR (a war which it is earnestly hoped can bel
avoided)--a need far greater than the corresponding one of World
War II; (2) the striking inadequacy of the Department of the Arm'
central? lligence organization, and (3) basic recommendations for
correcting this situation.
These recommendations are summarized as follows:
(1) Take the dead hand of G-2 off counter intelligence and
make it a Special Staff Section all the way from Division level
up to the National Defense Establishment. Such a Section would
also logically include secret intelligence, and, o~ course,
(2), At the top directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
CIC would operate under it as it has operated under G-2.
establish an omnibus counter intelligence 'and secret intelligence
organization with a non-Regular officer of high rank (Lt. General)
in charge (and a non-Regular Major General in charge of its
counter intelligence arm) to direct counter intelligence and
secret intelligence in all three services. Such an organization
would be like OSS with this important difference - it would
`~ I I
This program does not include domestic counter inter. igence since
7
all significant phases of that work are handled by the=FBI rather than
the Defense Establishment (which has only the fairly pedestrian work
of the security of its own personnel and establishment).
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 be tied in with the military services through the Species
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sot-up recognizing the fac~ that CIC' should give security
its own radio channels to the theaters; (e) a theater
would make sure reports from
file in Washington with a well-policed directive that.
I f I'
be commissioned and top CI 'and CIC ranks In tie theaters'
to run up through Brigadier General.
(4) Couple the above with (a) a sound recruiting program,
I
together with provisions for ruthlessly wading cut men who
do not measure up to CIC standards; b) a realistic
training program largely based on overseas CI CIC, and
SCI experience; (c) a firm directive according to CIC
personnel the right to civilian status whether or not
commissioned, but holding them responsible for confining
the use of their privileges'to opera. Tonal necessities
and not self-gratificationf (d) a good central CI
CIO agents (other than clerks and servic`e personnel) to
CI and SCI, as well as CIC)
(3) Raise the level of counter ante ligence including
(not above the rank of Colonel or aJa1 C pta ri in second
or third flight positions (but not first) atm each echelon.
jl #I
I ~ ~ Vie. .. , ::
a policy of having some Regu ar career service officers
Staff Section at each echelon, rather than operating on
I I j, ? !1- 1214.1
the outside as did OSS. It would be further tied in by
should be extremely flexible ints pers onn el dis-
position
service to geographical areas rather than to 'troop units,
possibilities in ordor to meet shiftng patterns
of enemy espionage,
and (f)' encouragement of Old
to-use imaginative and
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irregular methods as necessary, being held responsible for
results and the exercise of good judgment.
II. THE SERIOUS NEED FOR BETTER COU! Ei INTELLIGENCE.
Although in World War II, U. S. Army Counter Intelligence
received little training or direction worthy of the name from War
Department, it was usually able to do its job in the field with a
reasonable degree of adequacy for two main reasons: (1) It had the
benefit of British CI knowledge overseas (all top European and
Mediterranean theater CI officers we're British) and the excellent
British CI publications; and (2) it 'had the tremendous advantage of
having no consequential enemy underground to cope with on its own
side of the lines coupled with a large and vigorous prb-allied under-
on the enemy's side. This latter was of immense help to both
ground
allied intelligence (espionage, sabotage, subversion) and counter
intelligence. By radio pre-arrangethent, allied officers and men,
as well as our espionage and sabotage agents, were dropped at under-
ground rendezvous points in enemy territory, and they directed and
coordinated underground personnel and military formations, or worked
with or through them. On the other hand, an enemy spy or saboteur'
who reached allied occupied territory could find few bases of support,
so overwhelmingly pro-allied were the people of occupied Europe,
including those of Italy, a former Axis-partner. Even' in Germany and
Austria there was no anti-allied underground of any consequence.
This happy situation cannot bey expectedto exist if we should
have a war with the Soviets and their satellites. It'is true that
r
the British will again probably be on' our side, although I do not
think it is either safe or wise to'assiumA-that (nor does It seem
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right that the most powerful nation in the world today'should have
to depend so heavily on another country in this vital rield).
But the underground situation will ~e quite changed. It will be
remembered that the Italian underground in German territory was
largely led and dominated by Communists, or extreme lei`t wing
Socialists of-the Nenni variety who'now make common cause with the
Communists. They were the stronges~, ablest, and most courageous
leaders. In varying degrees, this tags true o~ all the occupied
countries of Europe. Moreover, although the proportions
a large number of the rank-and-filelwere also Communists
wing Socialists.
l
were les
s,
or left
The present situation in Europe, and elsewhere mPes
that this situation would, to a large extent, be reversed
it clear
if we
should go to war with the USSR. Whi?e there wouj.cd, no doubt, be a
pro-allied underground on their side, it would be puny indeed in
comparison with the pro-Soviet underground and sympathizers on our
side. The consequent potentialities of enemy espionage, sabotage
and subversion behind our lines arelery grew
To the foregoing should be added ithe Pact that we
today with a centrally directed, world)-wide espionage
are confronted;
sabotage, and
subversion network which is perhaps unparalle'ed'in'htstory.
A
counter intelligence officer is (at least professions .y) compelled
_-'_,.L.J
r
si
to admire the espionage, sabotage, and subve
the Soviet-CoMinform set-up with its 'ready-made
and fifth columnists in the form of the loca
H
of 'the g'.o
virtually every nation on the face
mmunlst Party in
Couple this wi h
I ~ 1. - , I- 111' If
he Soviet military
the secret intelligence services of
establishmerit
and the MVD (as highlighted by the l946 Report of the Canadian
Royal
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5-
Commission on the Gouzenko cases) and it is clear that we are con-
fronted with a clandestine, centrally directed, world-wide intelli-
gence organization of massive proportions.
The efforts of the German Abwehr' and thek-SD, both in this
country and overseas, during the last war seem puny it comparison.
Indeed, it does not seem to be an overstatement to say that the
H C
counter intelligence job of World War III (if such a war should take
place) will make the corresponding job in World War IT look like
child's play.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF UNITED STATE MILITARY C0?NTE1 INTELLIGENCE.
To deal competently with the j;o that may lie ahad, U. S.
Military Counter Intelligence will have to be well-trained, strong,
alert, intelligent and imaginative. This will require good central
leadership and planning by top men who thoroughly understand counter
intelligence, its principles and its practices, as well as its
possibilities and its impossibilities, and who know agood deal
about the secret intelligence services (espionage, sabotage, subs
version, MC)counter espionage, etc.) of other powers both enemy and
allied -- as much for example as we knew in *4orld War'II about the
.Abwehr; the SD, and the RSHA (the German military and party secret
intelligence services). Top Counter Intelligence leaders should!
not (as at present is the case) be career military men, since exper-
ience has demonstrated that able career officers regard Intelligence
only as a waypost to top commands example: General Vandenberg), and
less able career officers cannot do the job.
Do we have such military counter intelligence leadership today?
It is believed that the answer is clearly "No". This answer could
be documented at considerable length, but in an outline of this
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(4) The fact that counter intelligence operated under G-2 andl
II,
that G-2s haa received no consequential training in counter intelli-
gence and for the most part quite understandably very little interest
--combat intelligence being its majorh old of interest.
The last item really poses the dilemma of counter intelligoncc:.
It is a small and rather poorly regarded unit under G-2.1 The G-2 is
trained in combat intelligence in staff and command schools.
Obviously he gets no CI training of any consequence since there isl
none to be had. (And there is as much diffurence between combat
intelligence and counter
engineers and the signal
is the G-2"s daily broad
and Chief of Staff press
naissance, combat patrol
understands and values.
intelligence as there; is between the
corps, for example.) Combat intelligence
and butter in action. His Commanding General
him hard for it. Air photographic recon-
information, MW interrogation these he!
F
But counterintelligence is to him something
vague and incomprehensible; necessary, of course, but not to be com-
pared with a good solid piece of information on enemy dlspositionsl
or movements. The only phase of CI and CIC which the average G-2
really understands (and I am talking about competent, hard-working
G-21s who do a good job otherwise), is its most pedestrian side, the
r
I t
security of military headquarters, installations, and information.
Counter espionage (or counter subversion) he thinks of as something
out of E. Phillips Oppenheim. But itlis not, it is a hard-working
job with the usual quota of 99% perspiration and 1% of inspiration.
Thus the CIC in the field frequently gets'along quite nicely
with its G-2 in a sense because it is likely to be left' pretty much
f
alone while the 0-2 focusses on his more important problems of combat
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intelligence. But in a more valid sense, the bIC lacks the top-level
I,
understanding and support which willbe'necessary for t to accomplish'
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its job when the going gets tough. hi's set-up was good enough for
World War II. It is quite clear that it will not be good enough or
I
World War III for the reasons indicated under ~I above.
The lowly status of counter inteil'igence Is #ilusErated by the
fact that there was no CIC or CI staf officer above
I am not overstating things when I say th t la moat? a `l! TC r know'
(and I am speaking particularly of the mosts ntel gen , thinking
most part wish to return to their civil. fobs Jhcxia at ends. But
they will need some signs of top-level und'erstanci`ng "and interest in
-.1 ? { VF
their organization and work if they are tobe ox pecte- tb do a jo .
be staffed and manned largely by civilian solders, who will for he
want a CIC or CI assignment except Isla temporary ace`-time waypost.
11 t
By its very nature then (I think), CI and CIC will continue to
It is still pretty much of a dead-end. 4 dou't A ether a
regular who aspired to two-, three-, four or five-star rank would
training of general value for other assignments.
Chief of Counter Intelligence plannin and thin king in `he Department
of the Army is still only a Colonel (the same officer who has held
this post for the last 5 or 6 years).
There were no regular Army officers in C? or CI uring Worl
War II as far as I am aware (with possibly one or two isolated
exceptions). This was true because 'it was a dead-end or the regular
Army man -- no possibilities of advancement wove Colonel and no
tAo end of World
a trigadier
l 'Moreover, the
General but it is only a step in the right direction.
Colonel in either War Department, ETOI' or ITO, as of
War II. It is encouraging that the CIC Chief is now
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members of the outfit) believe that tqp counter intelligence leader-
ship during World War II was incompetent.
(5) Possibly the most seriousrc against War De artment
Counter Intelligence during World Wa III was 1F8 fai lur to create,a
central counter intelligence file, such as thelBritish Fpunter
intelligence kept.
Most of our CI and CIC reports never roac,ed Washipgton during
the war because of unfortunate theater, restric ions and because ofI
lack of imagination or interest on the, part of War Department CI.
I now find that field CIC files are apparently scattered and lost.,
War Department itself does not know where theyIare. Asa fine
British handbook on CI put it, files are the bupllets of the counter
I
intelligence Army. A piece of information on espionage in Argentine
may tie in with information from Portugal and Egypt (we had instances
like that at Fifth Army CIC). Under our World War II military
counter intelligence setup, there was no chance, for such information
to be put together, evaluated, and proper dissemination,and action,
taken.
There must be a central file where such information, goes
expeditiously,
information and
There should be
file checks and
British counter
and is collated, evaluated, and disseminated for
for necessary further investigations ar!und the world.
direct-channel radio access to this central file (for
information) by CI and 010 all Aver the world.
t
intelligence had
such a set-up during the war. Our
own OSS also had it to a limited extent; the limitation being that
their central CI files were of negligible value. To setup such a
file would require two things: (i) a directive to all theaters that
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 a copy of every CI. CIO. SCI, and other counter intellia-
once report
central CI file in Washington; such a directive would3*have to be
II
policed since G-2's and Commanders are aller& c to his ecause they
fear that reports will thus go to Washington w ich n :some manner
may embarrass them; and (2) highly qualified personnel of college
graduate'school caliber (and with actual experience in operational
counter intelligence) to set up and operate the central file
effectively.
`
ce must be on
Today more than ever before, our counter nteli en
a centrally-directed world-wide basis if it is to cope with its
centrally-directed world--wide antagonist. A central `i e is the
i
heart and brain of such a counter inte,l],igence organization.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Procedural
G ~
A serious and objective appraisal study conducted by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff or other appropriate agency in the Executive
Branch of the Government (made through persons who are not currently
members of the intelligence divisions of their respective services)
of the adequacy and competence of the intelligence organizations of
all three services, and of the extent to which they,,b planned ?or
and are ready to meet their indicated responsibilities in another war
if it should occur. Such a study should include cor
substantive recommendations below. As,a preliminary to this study,
selected CI, CIC, and SCI veterans with extensive overseas experience
on the one
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hand and top War Department CI and intelligence
personnel on
the
the other should be invited to present the
counter intelligence
set-up and how it can be
improved.
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program incorporated in this paper relates essentially to counter
intelligence; it would be most desirable to include in connection
with any such study a similar appraisal of the adequacy and competence
of the projected military secret intelligence organization which
would carry on this type of work in any future war. As already
f
indicated, secret intelligence (espionage, sabotage, MO, etc.) is
much more closely related to counter intelligence than it is to combat
intelligence.
B. Substantive
(1) A single three-service military counter intelligence organi-
zation should be set up under an able non-Regular officer with the
rank of Major General(and with extensive experience in foreign counter
intelligence as distinguished from G-2 combat intelligence) as one
major arm of an omnibus secret intelligence service (somewhat similar
to OSS) which would operate under the,Joi,nt Chiefs of St.ff and which
would also handle espionage, sabotage, subversion, MO, and intelligence
research and analysis, as distinguished from G-2 and its combat
intelligence. This omnibus organization should be headed up by a
vigorous, intelligent, and imaginative non-Regular officer of out-
standing general competence. The job should carry the rank of
Lt. General, and the man selected for it (like his principal sub-
..... I ~ I
ordinates) should go into it with the understanding that that was his
job for the duration (if he made good) and not a steppin stone to
a major combat or other command. In brie of ward th,.s organization
should take over all the operational work of the Central1Intelligence
Agency. On the counter intelligence side, this organization should,
be staffed almost exclusively with CI,.CIC, and SCI personnel with
extensive overseas service during World War II.
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In each of the three services, all counter intelligence and
secret intelligence should be taken out of the intelligence Organiza-
tion and set up at all levels from the Defense Establishment on dowi
as a Special Staff Section on a level'with G-2, A-2, an ONI. (Compare
in this connection the war-time French Military Intelli once set-upg,
in which counter intelligence (Securete Militaire (or SM) was a
Special Staff Section on a level with and not under G- (Deuxieme
Bureau)).
This Special Staff Section arrangement at all echelons would
correct what was probably the major flaw in theOSS setup: OSS was
virtually outside of the regular military establishment. While this
was a great advantage at the Washington level (where OSS operated
c
as a serious disadvantage in the
under the Joint Chiefs of Staff),
44
theaters of operation. Thus, while i~iis necessary to p tch a counter
intelligence and secret intelligence organization at a h gh level ilf
at all levels of the counter intelligence and secret intelligence
there should be a substantial number of Regular career service officers
4
the regular military establishment in time of war. The pecial Staff
Section described above would accomplish this. 'Coupled with this
it is to be effective, it is also necess4
organization. These Regulars should hold second and third echelon
n
ization= carry .ng =rank not
posts at different levels in the orga
above that of Colonel or Naval Captain. The:
be a steady rotation of these officers in and out of the new
14
Intelligence organization. They woul consttu e a bridge between
j
n
' be top me
should no
Being Regulars, of course it would be expected that there would
at any echelon.
it and the Regular Military Establishment.
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(la) This is an alternative tol} above,lrestricted to the
Army. This recommendation would involve taking1Counter 1Intelligence
Bence in
and Secret Intelligence out of Intell he Department of the
Army and setting it up as a Special Staff Section (withthe same
scope as in (1) above) under an able and imaginative non-Regular
officer not below the rank of Major General, who as in'(1) above
would go into the job with the definite understanding that this was
his post for the duration (unless he failed), and who would be sup-
ported by an experienced CI, CIC, and CI staff, with some Regular
military personnel in the second and third echelon posts. Lower
echelons of the Army would be similarly reorganized. CtA personnei
in theaters of operation would work under this Special ttaff Section
during time of war.
(2) The whole level of CI, CIC, and SCI rank should be raised
with a view of attracting top-notch non-Regular personnel who would
be content to make their permanent military career in this field
alone and -- in some cases -- remain there in time of peace as well
as war. Such a lift should begin at the bottom. All CIC personnel
(except clerks and service personnel) should be commissioned officers.
A man who-is not of officer caliber is (with rare exceptions) not
worth having in CIC. Generally speaking, CIC enlisted agents were
basically much better qualified than their officers at'the beginning
of World War II (and I speak as a man who won' into World War II as
an officer). Thus, one not infrequently saw the ludicrous spectacle
of a highly qualified CIC sergeant (A.B., M.A., Ph.D.,Rhodes Scholar;
5-languages, brilliant intellect, to cite an actual case) under the
command of 'a CIC officer of only average intelligence and ability.,
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Fortunately, late in the war it was possible ;o commission (battle-
field or direct) a good many of the better d ends e men- However,
because of the long tie-up in CIC's Table of Crganizat on, the; men
'
who were thus commissioned were not able to rise above't e company
11 1 k E t
grades and the vast majority of them ended the war as psi and 2nd
lieutenants.
Counter intelligence staff officers shouldbe sel?ced from men
with extensive overseas experience ei hei
staff work, in CIC, in SCI, or in comparable work.
l' job it another waIr
If counter intelligence is to do an adequae ,
the whole system of recruiting personnel for CIC (the operational arm
of counter intelligence) should be recanvassed L the light of World
War II experience. My information from personLl overseas counte'
intelligence sources is that recent C? replacements have been far
below the caliber of the men who were brought in duringthe last war,
and even during the last war at least ~5 percent of the personnel
brought in were inferior and unsatisfactory. it is natural that there
should be a slump in the caliber of personnel recruitedsince the
war ended, but the time has come to co'rrect this situation.
Generally speaking, first emphasis in recruiting should be
based on general, all-around intelligence, knowledge, and judgment)
Normally speaking, college graduate caliber personnel snould be sought
but the recruiting pattern should be sufficiently flexile to admit
men whose educational background is riot college level but who have!
other special qualifications (such as linguistic ability coupled with
for example, as a 'crack member of the Alien and Subversive Squad of
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the New York, Police Department).
Major but secondary emphasis should be ?laced on linguistic
ability and knowledge of foreign countries. A good man can learn
a language but a linguist without intelligence or ability will never
be of much value except as a mouthpiece for an abler man. However,
at least 50 percent of all operating counter intelligence personnel
should be linguists.
There should be express provisions for ruthlessly weeding out
counter intelligence personnel who demonstrate that they do not
measure up to standards. In World War II there was no such provision,
and inferior, unsatisfactory personnel had to be carried because they
could not be gotten rid of by CIC. In some instances, this resulted
in CIC receiving a black eye from the activities of such men. There
is probably no organization in the Army which is under greater'
corrupting pressure overseas than CIC. Men ~f'character and integrity
are needed to resist these pressures.
One thing should be made very clear in recruiting'CIC and.that
is that operating counter intelligence overseas in a war is a hard-
working, 12 or 14 hours a day, 7 days a week job, a great deal of'the
time. It is no place for hedonists, grandstand players, or men who
join CIC because they have read E. Phillips 0ppenheim and think that
their work will be carried on at champagne suppers in luxurious
apartments under the ministrations of luscious blondes. There were
I I A
perhaps too many men of this character in CIC during World War II,
but to some extent this was the fault of some of their officers
because many a good man could work hard or play hard depending on the
example which was set him. As indicated below, CIC must have certain
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special privileges which the rest of the Army does not enjoy if it is
to cope effectively with the unorthodox techniques of enemy agents.
But it must never forget that those privileges are for operational
purposes and not for its own self-gratification.
The top as-well as the bottom level of counter inte ligence ranks
should be lifted. Thus, it should be possible ror some '0I and CIC
officers to make Brigadier General and Iin major1 theater s of operatilon,
the top counter intelligence staff officer coul~ well be a Major
General.
(3) CIC personnel, whether commissioned or enlisted, should be
1! 1 accorded civilian status, assimilated' to officer status, and be
entitled to wear either the civilian uniform or civilian clothes asp
necessary for their current operation. Since c vilian status cannot
be turned on and off like a water faucet, it must be protected con-
sistently and it should not be jeopardized by c nflicting arrangements
f nr mr.aai na P.nrl hi l l Pt1 nc, f:ra.ve1 orders. morning' i, -00 ' S . Or Othe wise.
Even if all CIC were commissioned; t would still urge civilian
status for them since during World War It we found this status more
useful than commissioned rank, (at least through the company grades)
in a combat theater. The civilian status of CIb withth Army was
one of the major reasons for any successes which that organization had
in Italy. Actually, it was an admission by the1Army' thaat all CIC
should be commissioned but that a proper Table of Organ nation just
~
he previous recommendation
t ,
couldn+t be worked out. In line with
CIC should be made responsible for not abusing hepriveges that
go with civilian status.
Civilian status and the right to
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~ a
clothes as operationally necessary should be made a matter of firm
ii i
Department of the Army directive to all theaters. This directive
should specify the exact nature of tie civilian uniform (U. S.
insignia on the collar lapels, officer-style cap, shirt, etc., no
insignia of rank) and should also specify the various ways in which
the civilian status should be p7
military orders, in connection with messing, billeting; morning
reports, etc.).
(4) By directives and otherwise, the Department of the Army
should exercise greater control over CIC and dI in theaters of
.operation than was done in World War II. This would (a) prevent
misuse of CIC by combat commanders or G-2s not familiar with the CIC
mission (as for example was the case with respect to tie 34th Division
CIC under Fifth Army throughout most of the Italian campaign); and
(b) result in a better CIC and CI training program in the U.S.
(5) The CI and CIC training program should be realistic, should
be based largely on overseas work and not domestic CIC' investigating,
and should be given by the pick of the available CI, CiC, and SCI'
officers with extensive overseas experience, plus experienced counter
intelligence officers from England and other Friendly powers. dIC
should also receive the equivalent of three months basic infantry
training with special emphasis on map wore and knowledge of Army
line and staff set-ups, but not commando or equivalent training.
Brains, judgment and knowledge are hat good CIC need `and there is
little enough time to teach them the CIC job without trying to niake
commandos out of them. Specifically, in addition to language
training and foreign service style area training (which would give
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I
counter intelligence personnel the story of the geograpy, history,
people, politics, customs, and econo.,A66 of the country to which they
t
were going) counter intelligence persohriel should receive instruction
:
others
in the following things, among
(a) All known details about the 'organization and operations
of both enemy and allied secret intelligence and counter intelligence
services and other related organizations. In he case of the enemy
organizations, this should include such material as we got in the
excellent British handbooks on the German Abwenr, SD, and the RSHA',
supplemented with any known information on their actual operations
and personalities in specific countries. With respect to allied
organizations, (examples : SCI, SI, So, MOB and _nd :>, branches -)f
OSS; MI-5; FSS; MI-6; SOE; "A" Force; SM; TR; iST; SR;?PWB; Civil
Censorship; IPW; CSPIC; MII; SIM; (CS); AMG; Military ~olice; etc.',)
counter intelligence personnel should know not only what each organi-
zation does butits relationship to the work of the others is, and
this should be true with respect to T.S. intelligence and counter
intelligence outfits as well as others. It has been startling some-
times to discover how little many CIC knew about such matters as the
penetration and deception aspects of counter espionage. It was not
their fault. They were simply never taught it, although they should
have been.
(b) Since files are all-important in counter intelligence,
CIC and CI training should include instruction In how to set up
counter intelligence files and how to use them. This s not a simple
matter and should not be treated in Lh+_-- off-hand fashion in which
il~s ar ,11 to-) oft n trk.;atud. Good fibs ar_ thv heart of counter
a
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intelligence. In several instances, Fifth Army CIC caught spies
right out of its files without any investigative work.` File training
should include instruction on the theory and practice of information
dissemination.
(c)
Operating counter intelligence should be taught by ex oer-
ienced personnel the various aspects of the counter intelligence
mission at various levels, Division, Corps, Army, Army Group, Theater,
Base Section, Border Control, etc.
(d) CIC personnel should be taught th,: practical aspects of
such problems, as how to go into Ia newly captur?d city or area and
set up a CIC office, establish a network of official and unofficial
informants and get into operation within a matter of hours, and they
should also be taught what the various types of counter intelligence
controls are and how to operate them. how to set up and operate an
"S" Force or "T" Force, how to set up a coast watching service, how
to prepare good, lucid, complete, but boiled.-down reports (not the
CI-RI), and not least of all how to billet., mess, move, and otherwise
handle a separate detached unit like CIC.
(e) As a very important part of their training they should be
taught by persons who have interrogatod spies the theory and practice
of successful counter espionage interrogation. This is an art all of
its own and requires a lot of practice, training, and most of all
detailed knowledge. It is the cornerstone of operational foreign
counter intelligence in time of war. In this respect counter intel-
ligence is just the reverse of criminal investigation work. In the
latter case you have a crime and try to find the criminal. In the
typical counter intelligence situation, you have your suspected
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criminal and are trying to prove that there has been a irime (i.e,,
espionage, etc.).
~
(f) Perhaps most important of all, counter intelligence
personnel should be taught what the basic theory of all counter
intelligence is. Summarizing this in oversimplified fashion, one
can state that the whole theory of all operational counter intelligence
is to create the maximum number of co-~rols possible with available
personnel and resources in the light of the existing conditions and
terrain, coupled with the most
sible, with the objective that
troll or otherwise engaging in
enemy agents must necessarily
activity), though they may not
will nevertheless be picked up
extensLye informational 9Qtwork pos-1
I
persons attempting to evade such con-
irregular patterns of activity (and
engage in irregular patterns of
be immediately detected and captured,
eventually by the counter indigence
radar-style network of controls and info'mants. Tbi,,a involves in
effect, a series of controls and gradually narrowing screening pro-
cesses principally designed as the end result to bring major suspects u
against the counter espionage service's best trained an best informed
CE interrogators.
I 11,
(6) A central counter intelligence file should be established
in the manner and for the purpose indicated in III, Item (5), above.
There should also be a theater counter irte],Uence file in each
theater. By Department of the Army directive, rovision should be
made for rapid and direct transmissio of CI iorz4e i9 ithin
h
theaters and across theater lines Wit
out gof
n up thro h s e verA1
Igl
echelons in one theater and down the olt~jr. t;,o
should have its own radio networjc tied)x} w.b.
theater and Washington central CI files
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The basic concept entertained by War Department CI during
(7)
the last war that CIC give security service toy troop units (rather
I
than to geographical areas) should be sharply revised.' Some security
service to troop units is necessary 'but this its unimportant work from
the CI standpoint and should be held) to a minimum so that the bulk
of the always inadequate number of available C can be moved about
I
and sabotage penetration.
ging patterns of enemy espionage
The need for highly flexible disposition, of CIC was never
better illustrated than with Fifth Army in Italy between October 10,
1944, and May 2, 1945 -- a period of '200 days of German mass
espionage attack during which approximately 31O Germans agents were
caught in Fifth Army area, about 90lpercent by CIC. During this
period over half of all our available CIC were tied up by permanent
attachments to II Corps and its Divisions, although IV Corps and its
Divisior6were covering an area 6 or'8 times the size of the II Corps
area, and through this thinly-held Corps area (naturally) came
some 95 percent of the 300 enemy agents who were caught, since it
was very difficult to cross the lines in the tightly-Yield, hard-
fought II. Corps area which was the axis of Fifth Army I's attack then.
I
It was obvious that the need for CIC was in the large, thinly-held
holding-front area, and not where the sharpest fighting was going
on, but the inflexible arrangements for attac ment of CIC to troop
units and the objections of their Division and Corps d-2s to their
removal made it impossible to put CIO of II Corps andbits Divisions
where they were most needed.
To correct this situation, Corps and , CIC units should'be
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 II i
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II
out to the bone, and the majority of aii tactical tIC sfiould operate
under Army or even Army Group, forminge yob d C " agents with
which to cover flexibly Division, Corps, ana Army are , .s most
needed at any given time.
It should always be remembered that an eiem" g does not
recognize arbitrary military jurisdictional compartments as delimited'
by Division, Corps, Army, Army Group, or oven'heafer boundaries.
If the counter spy is hampered and restrictea ty these 'ooundaries,'
his effectiveness is heavily cut.
Behind Army Group boundaries (that is to say in ase Section
areas), and in occupational Zones, CTC should Eoperate under the top
headquarters (theater or Zone), rattier than beIing parblled out to
troop units or subordinate commands.i''the reasons for this are the
I I: ~
same as above.
(8) CIC should be encouraged to use imaginative and irregular
methods as necessary. They should be held responsible'only for
results and for the use of good judgment. Enemy agents operate in
unorthodox ways and they cannot be caught in quintuplicate "through
channels". GI-minded officers should not be permitted to cripple,
CIO. A GI CIC is not worth the space it occupies or the food it'eats.
$tcp~en 1. Spingarn
lit. Colonel, --Reserve
(COO., CIO, 'iftfi Army, 1943-1945)
(Note: The views expressed are personal andare bases on three years
i 1:
overseas service, and two invasions in three countries as a
CIC officer (October 1942-Oc'c
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2-1/2 years were with Fifth Army CIC, the last two years,
including the Italian campaign from Salerno to renner Pass
(with waystops at Cassino, Anzio, the Arno, and the Apennines),
as commanding officer of that unit. Division, Corps, and Army
components of CIC with Fifth Army captured overt500 trained
German spies and saboteurs launched by'the Abwehr, the SD,
and the RSHA, the largest number, it is believed, captured by
any allied Army. These figures do not' include such small fry
as Gestapo informants, household help and mistresses of the
various enemy intelligence services, or German collaborators.
Several thousand security 'suspects were arrested and interned
by CIC with Fifth Army in addition to the actual bona fide
enemy agents. During my service withlFifth Army I also worked
with and at different times commanded,' supervised and
coordinated British, Canadian, New Zealand, French, Brazilian,
and Italian counter intelligence officers and men. At the
request of British intelligence, I lectured inia British
counter intelligence training school.)
ADDENDUM OF AP IL 16, 1948:
The substance of this paper up to this point was' completed on
April 8, 1948, which was the day prior to the events at Bogota,
Co bia, which temporarily broke up the Pan-American conference.
Those events have certainly highlighted "the serious need for better
counter intelligence" which is the heading of Part II of this paper.
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I
On April 12, Secretary Marshall publicly indicated his belief that
the USSR and the Communists were responsible or the Bogota uprising.
He stated among other things: "This situation'must not1"be judged on
a local basis, however * * * this is a world affair--not merely
Colombian or Latin-American". On the same day Governor Dewey, ofl
New York (according to an AP despatch), in a radio address stated'
that the Colombian revolution was "a shameful example of unbelievable
incompetence * * *. We apparently had no Idea what was going on in
a country just 2 hours bomber flyingtime from the Panama Canal".
It is interesting to note in this connection that the Washington
Post of April 9, 19k8, reported that'Mr. SohnlFoster Dulles, leading
foreign policy expert and a principal adviser' of Uovernor Dewey, shad
outlined to Secretary Marshall just before he left for$ogota a plan
which would "include detection of subversive activities., s, espionage
and country espionage, counter-propaganda and1assistanCe to democlratic
movements, including aid to any organization of underground movements
in nations already controlled by Coinmunistsf'.
On April 15 a Subcommittee of the Housebommittee on Expenditure:
in the Executive Departments, composId of I ep esentatve Brown of
'. I
I, ~.V!
Ohio, Chairman; Representative Hoffman of k1cigan Cwho is Chairman
of the full Committee); and Representative M'cbormack or Massachusetts
if :
tR F W F i 30
that a revolution was impending in Colombia. Theirs witness
began an investigation of the CIA to learn whether or not t e
Secretary of State and other high officials were`proi iy warned
The newspapers of April 16 report Achmlra 11en0etter 's
Director of CIA.
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scheduled at these hearings was bear Admiral.
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testimony (the hearing was in executive session, but fo'lowing it
Chairman Brown read the Admiral's testimony to'reliortors). According
to the press reports, the CIA Director told tie Subcommittee that'
beginning at least as far back as January 2, 1~k8, CIA `ad sent a
series of reports to the State Department indicating the "possibility
of violence and an outbreak aimed primarily at embarrassing officials
of the U. S." He said that on March 3 (only a week before the
Conference was to start) CIA agents in Colombia found out that
Communists were planning "manifestations and personal molestations"
against the U. S. delegates. He indicated that this report did not
.reach Washington, however, because a State Department an in Colombia
(to whom it was given by CIA agents) blocked it because he did not
want to alarm the U. S. delegates who were about to arrive.
This paper has been addressed'to United'States Military Counter
Intelligence overseas in-time of war. The April 9 uprising in
Colombia certainly suggests the possible desirability of placing under
careful and objective scrutiny our peacetime"' counter intelligence
and secret intelligence organizations as well as our 4artime organiza-
tion in'this field to determine whether or not the United Stateslis
adequately prepared for all eventualities in!this vital area. Such
scrutiny should include not merely its ability to collect information,
but also its ability to get that information rapidly to Washington,
and its ability there to properly evaluate the information received
and to get it into the hands of the top officials (including the
President) who will need it in order to plan and act intelligently
in every field of foreign relations and policy.
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The Pan-American Conference in g'o ;ota has een'sc e uled for a
long time, perhaps a year. The importance whic i t'hie l' n ed States
placed on this conference is evident from the i4act` hal" he Secretary.
of State and two other Cabinet officers were to attenc It. It is
obvious that the CIA does not have sIfficient persoine1tto spread
them in any quantity across every country on to globe, but it would
seem good intelligence generalship would indicate that he enemy or
possible enemy should be confronted in force a the most critical
points. It would thus seem worthwhile inquiring how many topnotch
CIA agents (whose background and experience qualified them for
intelligence work in Colombia -- notably fluency in Spanish, know-
ledge of the politics and people of the country, and the knowledge
and personality necessary to make effective contact with the anti-
Communist liberal and labor groups in Colbie who might be expected
to have the best information on the!Cbmmunist'situation there) have
been drifting down toward Colombia during the~past 6 months or so:
Moreover, it is axiomatic in secretlintelligence that the point
from which information is desired is'not necessarily tie only good
point, or even the best point, from which to obtain it Revolutionist'
dissidents, and expatriates in other countries frequently have their
own secret pipelines to undergroundiorganizations in the country of
their origin. Thus, it might well be' that good information on sub-
versive movements in Colombia could'be collecked not only in Colombia,
but in, let us
say, Cuba, Chile, Bolivia, and1Paragua
It is not too much to expect that an alert
intelligence organization would know where
of information ran and where they could be
and effective
and how these
best tapped.
I
for examrle.
central
pipelines
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It would similarly seem worthwhile for the appropriate Execut ve
Branch authorities to examine the CIA'ls operational plans for, letlus
say, the next year to determine what 'C'II regards as the1 critical
points in the Intelligence and Counter Intelligence "war" during the
period and how it plans to handle them, particularly in terms of what
CIA personnel (how many and who) will go where'(or are already there)
to do the necessary work on the ground.
In the same connection, it wouiaibe worthwhile determining what
exploitation CIA (not to mention the~ational ~efense Establishment)
is giving to numerous excellent sources of information currently
available in the form of ex-Premier, ex-Cabine
former officials and nationals of potential enemy countries.
It would also seem desirable to'determine what are the qualifi-
cations of the men who collate and evaluate d reports in Washington,
Most important of all perhaps would be an examination of CIA's
ability to get information rapidly from the point of collection to
Washington, there evaluate it proper3.y, and then place t in'the
hands of the top policy-making officer or officers to Aom it should
go.
The reports of Admiral Hillenkoetter's testimony suggest that
CIA may have competently discharged itscollec ion of nformation
function in Colombia. It is not clee.r' how goon its- evaluation of
i properly evaluate. form
the ability to get its information i
I
r
ned.
rapidly to the top policy-making officer conce
In this lest connection, note the comments in the %ody of this
ups
ep
a central
artment o set
paper about the failure of the War D
certain that n' did not have
1' i
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Counter Intelligence File during World~War IT, and the observation
that the establishment of such a file trould require a w .l-policed
directive to all theaters that copies of CI, CiC, and 361 reports be
sent directly to Washington by the most expeditious meas. I
indicated that policing of such a directive was necessa because
Commanders and their G-2s always feared that reports of this char-'
acter going out of their theaters (or commands) might somehow
embarrass them.
The events of Bogota suggest that Ambassadors are no different
than Generals in this respect.
From personal knowledge I know that at the spade-work level
(that is, the men who are doing the job on the ground overseas) the
CIA is recruiting some very high-caliber personnel. Tfius, three out-
r anding CIC agents who served two to'three years with me overseas
in Italy, North Africa and Austria are now working for'CIA abroad.
These three men between them have 7 college degrees, including
2 M.A.'s and a Ph.D., speak an average of 6 languages apiece, and
have had an average of over 4 years actual experience 'overseas in
several' countries in performing counter espionage, coiinter sabotage,
and counter subversion functions. tach one of them has personally
captured and interrogated large numbers of enemy agents and each is
thoroughly familiar with the business of setting up an intelligence
informational network. They are also familiar with both the theory
and practice of all major aspects of counter intelligence and secret
intelligence and they are keen students of Communism and its many
subversive manifestations in different countries.
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On the other hand, the Director of CfA is a 1re61ar3 avy Rear
re Iar Army $rigacier eneral.
Admiral and the Deputy Director a ~
In the light of recent events it seems~ertinent toIinquire about
the extent of their knowledge and experience in the'fiell'of counter'
intelligence and secret intelligence, both theory aYi pr dice; and
whether or not they plan to remain in is field indefin ely or hope
to move on to other assignments in their respective serCr ces.
One further footnote. The body of this paper dealslprincipally
with military overseas
counter intelligence in time of war. However,
it should be remembered that in neutral countries in time 'of war,
and, in time of peace, in all foreign countries that are1not actually
unfriendly, as well as in occupational zones, secret intelligence and
counter intelligence -- espionage and counter espionage i- to a large
extent tend to merge and to lose their separate identities. For
present purposes, therefore, the ques~ion as to the adequacy of our'
secret intelligence and counter intelligence orianizations (whether
military or civilian) is largely indivisible.
Finally, we should never overlooitlone terrible truth. A highly
competent top-level central secret intelligence and counter intel-'
ligence organization is an essential need of any major power that
expects to survive in an atomic age in time'of peace as well as'
war. But any such organization has great potentialities for evil
Witness the Police 'States: Russia with its MVD
good.
as well as
(once the NKVD and before that the OdPti); and dermany with its RSHA
(under which operated the Gestapo and the SD, as well as -- at the
end -- the Abwehr),
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intelligence and counter intelligence agencies of the trn ted States
i
should be selected not only for their'qualifications in this field,
but also for their known devotion to this country add its constitu-t
tional traditions and liberties -- men who are not extremists either
of the left or right. In consonance frith these constitutional
traditions, such agencies should be headed by civilians,~and should
be under direct civilian control except during the period of an
actual "shooting" war.
To sum up: A careful examination'(* appropriate xeeutive
Branch authorities) is needed of our whole secret intel3gence ands
counter intelligence machine to determine its adequacy' n the vital
field of national intelligence and security. Such an examination
should be made by well-qualified persons without doctriinaire biases.
It should be carried on in well-guarded secrecy. But (and this is an
important caveat), the agencies under scrutiny must not be permitted
to raise the bar of "secrecy" and "security" to preventtor obstruct
effectively their assigned functions.
It is imperative, therefore, that the men who head up secret
atence to perform