LETTER TO(Sanitized) FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000700270007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 6, 1956
• Content Type: LETTER

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EYECtEfiVg R
6 April 195
Dear Roger:
Many the for sending me the copy
of your Jonathan Peterson Lecture which
I final both interesting and instructive.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
The Exorable Sir Roger Mak
An*"sa4 rr of Great Britain
Washington, D. C.
AWD:hea
DCI - 1 cc
ER - I cc (w/basic)
Reading - 1 cc
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,.U,
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.
PIERS NAL
Ye. - , 6 e&. -
March 30, 1956.
J
You asked me to send you a
copy of the Peterson Lecture which I
gave in New York on March 7.
The full text has finally become
available, and I enclose a copy.
The Honorable
Allen W
Dulles
.
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.
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BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES
A N A G E N C Y O F T H E B R I T I S H G O V E R N M E N T
OFFICIAL TEXT
THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN A
MODERN DEMOCRACY
T. 16.
March 26, 1956
New York, N. Y.
Text of the Jonathan Peterson Lecture delivered
by His Excellency Sir Roger Makins G. C G.
K. C. B., British Ambassador to the United States,
at the Town Hall, New York City, on March 7, 1956.
CHAIRMAN D ,VIES:Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen: I am
happy to say tf 9t7t1TT-E'morning we are having one of the top events
of our regular season, the Jonathan Peterson Lecture.
The Jonathan Peterson Foundation was founded by members
of Mr. Peterson's family to memorialize a man who was an outstand-
ing leader not only in business but in civic and national life,
who was also very deeply interested in Anglo-American relations.
So it is altogether appropriate his life and memory should
be commemorated here in Town Hall. The first Jonathan Peterson
Lecture was presented in 1935, and some of the most important
figures in the English-speaking world have been Jonathan Peterson
Foundation lecturers.
The general purpose of these lectures is to promote a
better understanding among the English-speaking people and to
further advance those principles upon which modern English-
speak-ing civilization rests; namely, respect for human rights and
civil liberties with justice for all and individual freedom under
the law.
We are most fortunate this morninf in having as our
Jonathan Peterson Lecturer one of Britain s foremost diplomats,
Sir Roger Makins, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to the United
States.
After a brilliant career at Oxford, and after the study
of law, Ambassador Makins entered the field of law, but very soon
felt himself called into the Foreign Service. His first assignment
in the Foreign Service was to the Embassy in Washington. So he has
been in this country many times, and on very important missions.
This material Is filed with the Department of Justine, where the required registration statement of B. I. S. under 56 Stat. 248-258 as an agency of the
British Government is available for Inspection. Registration does not Imply approval or disapproval of this material by the United States Government.
New York Offices, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y. Telephone Circle 6-5100
Chicago 11, 720 N. Michigan Ave. : Washington 4, D. C., 903 National Press Building
San Francisco 15, 2516 Pacific Ave. Los Angeles 13, 448 South Hill St.
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He spent a great deal of time ' i n the London Foreign
Office. During the war, World War II, he was with the Allied
Mediterranean Command where he worked very closely with General
Eisenhower.
After the war he came 'back to the British Embassy in
Washington, and then vent back to be Director of the Economic De-
partment of the Foreign Office in London, He then became Deputy
Secre`tar;y of State, and in 1953, in. January, he came here as
Ambass-&dor.
I think that Ambassador Makins' - I might say, "love" of
this country his indefatigability as an Ambassador of Goodwill
as-well as an official ambassador i.s. represented by the fact that,
in the' three years he has been in this country he has been on
official missions to 30 out of the 43 states in this country.
He is pacing to speak to us this nor,>rnin on a particularly
appropriate topic, ,,The Conduct of Fo e gn Psi:icy in a Modern
Democracy.,"
Mr. Ambassador, it is a pleasure and a privilege to wel-
come you hero,
AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Mr.- Davies, Ladies and Gentlemen: The
last timed-vva o i 7 .s platfarm I was supported y two, if not
three, beautiful film stars. I know that iylZ Davies is doing his
best to substitute for them this morning.
I am very glad to see raalpeople here today. You know, .30 'when I was asked to give this e re, I co d_l~.` t think who could
po6sibly want to come and,hear. an Ambassador lecture at eleven o'
clock in the morning. :I suppose, however, the happy conjuncture
of, a British Ambassador and British weather has brought a few of
you out to try the experiment.
When.I looked at the names of my predecessors as Peterson
Lecturers, I realised what an honor it is to be invited to come
here today.. ,noted lord Fed .ii1- and Sir A_exander Cagogan under
both of whorl I ave served, ar.d ray fr-_end Lester Pearson with
-whom I. have participated in so ina iy dip _omatic negotiations in
various parts of the world. I feel that I am, indeed, following
in distinguished compary
This morning thovgh. I vr,:,uid offer you some reflections
on the formulae _on azd. execuci-rin of rore.Lgn pol_cy in the contem
porary world, and. I :intend, after saying .few words about the
transformati.o.n of dip mnc i in the 1~.s- two generations, to
examine the way in when ztexnati al a.'_ poi.-'_,:;y s derided and exe-
cuted in democratic. and toi.al .tariuo stato(s, And I shall. try to
assess the advantage- and dised-vantages iherent in our Western
democratic way, of doing :,.
But I must first -make a point tl?.at is fundamental to the
foroign. policy of all cou?nrrier~., whe~;he.r democracies or not.
Those who hold power anychare i c tA_c ,orJ__"_ are theoretically free
to formulate their foreign policy as their' rhoosa. But in
practice there is usually only a limited room for argument about
what the needs of a country are and about where its interests lie.
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Foreign policy is largely dictated by almost unalterable
consideration of geography, economics and of history, by the need
for security, by the need for access to raw materials, by the
need to safeguard foreign markets, and by the need to adapt poli-
tical actions to the abilities and, to some extent, to the aspira-
tions of the people.
I needn't belabor this point. It is a familiar one. But
perhaps in many countries it is a source of frustration to some of
the citizens that a political party has far less choice in its
international than in its domestic politics, and far less control
over events. International politics even more than domestic poli-
tics, is the art of the possible, and the possibilities are quite
often very limited.
Moreover, changes in international situations when effect-
ed by negotiations and not by war, normally take place very slow-
ly. Those changes can, of course, be accelerated by the action
of"individual governments if the-.r position in a particular nego-
tiation or situation is suddenly strengthened or weakened, or if
they decide for one reason or another to make concessions. And,
of course, the growth and development of a country's resources
Will gradually increase or diminish its influence and'interest in
world affairs. But broadly speaking, a government's freedom of
maneuver in foreign policy at any given moment is very much less
than is popularly supposed.
Since the fundamental objectives of a country's foreign
policy are controlled by permanent or semi-permanent factors,
they change very slowly. Of course, circumstances can and do alter
policies in the long run. For example, the advancement of science
has led to the shortening of communications and the development of
aviation which has contracted the world; changed the scale of
political action; and caused a revolution in strategic concepts.
In all countries foreign policy is still primarily in the
hands of government leaders aided by a small group of professional
advisers. I draw a distinction here between policy making, where
the decisions are taken by political leaders and politicians, and
diplomacy, which is the carrying out of these decisions, and which
is usually left to the professionals. But the border lines. between policy formulation and execution are often blurred just
as the lines between tactics and strategy are blurred in war.
I will talk this morning about the problems that beset
the. diplomatist and the political leader almost equally; for in a
modern democracy both alike have to take into account public
opinion and emotion to a much greater extent than in the days
when the man in the street was content on the whole to leave the
determination of policy to the professionals according to their
judgment of the national interest.
The changes that have taken place in the last two genera-
tions are much less marked in the formulation of policy than in
its execution; that is to say, in the conduct of diplomacy. In
the days before the First World War the conduct of foreign
affairs was left very largely in the hands of the rulers or lead-
ers. A few officials, kings and :presidents, premiers and foreign
ministers made and executed policy. They negotiated treaties
themselves`or sent ambassadors with very full plenipotentiary
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powers, and under the system which then prevailed of economic
liberalism and laissez faire, economic and financial diplomacy
was in general left to private bankers and merchants.
Certainly there has been a great change. since pre-1914
days, and to a large extent the change can be traced back to the
impact of the First World War. The destruction and desolation
left by that conflict led to a demand for much more public parti-
cipation in the shaping of foreign policy and for more informa-
tion about the conduct of diplomacy.
These demands found a prophet in a man who, for a short
time, was perhaps the most-popular and most powerful man in the
world,' President Woodrow Wilson. In his Fourteen Points and to
a lesser extent in the conduct of negotiations at Versailles in
1919, he enunciated the doctrine, which perhaps later was misin-
terpreted, of "open covenants openly arrived at."
The new conditions of the post-1918 world made ever
greater demand on diplomatic versatility. Before the First World
War the questions with which the diplomatist was most concerned
were primarily political, but, when the ability as well as the
desire of governments to intervene, as a matter of general policy,
in new fields increased, he - that is to say, the diplomatist -
had to deal far more than before with a wide range of economic
and financial matters and to break virtually new ground in coping
on the international plane with social and technical questions.
The League of Nations, and later the International Labor
Organization, did much to promote these new fields of interna-
tional endeavor. And the tendency to diversify the areas of in-
tergovernmental cooperation and, therefore, the task of the
diplomatist, was greatly accelerated after the Second World War by
the establishment of the United Nations Organization and its
specialized agencies. And the so-called "cold war" with its
sequel of regional pacts and associations has carried the pro-
cesses still further.
At the same time, the spread of education and the univer-
sal demand for political independence and diplomatic equality
have added to the size and complication of international organiza-
tions and international conferences. This growth, this demand for
popular independence, has combined with the improvement of com-
munications to encourage the conduct of diplomacy by means of
large-scale conferences in which the delegations, the members of
the international secretariat, and the press, tangle indiscrimin-
ately together in the process of negotiation, which is at the
same time illuminated and obscured by a welter of contradictory
information and rumors.
From being mainly concerned with bilateral relations
between pairs of states, foreign policy became more and more con-
cerned with multilateral negotiations, and the sum total of ne-
gotiation was enormously increased. Individual countries have be-
come progressively less able to stand aloof from affairs with
which in a less closely-knit world they might have regarded as
having `little to do.
The simultaneous broadening both of the field of foreign
affairs and of public interest in them - and Bismarck would pro-
bably have said "public interference" in them - changed the
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conditions in which diplomacy was carried on. The thirst for
popular information about the conduct of foreign policy, the con-
stant questioning of an eager and vigilant press, the critical
supervision of legislators,,. mean that governments are constantly
forced to explain their policies ,more fully than may be desirable
from the point of view of effective negotiation.
Diplomacy has some resemblance to a game of chess or
cards. Nobody thinks of playing these games by explaining the
moves in advance or placing the cards face upwards on the table.
In discussions between countries similarly situated and, there-
fore, playing more or less the same rules, this state of affairs
has the -disadvantage of forcing declarations of intent and pur-
pose and therefore, of obliging the negotiators to take a posi-
tion from which they cannot subsequently retreat without loss of
fate or'public criticism.. And in negotiations between countries.
which are not playing the same riles the disadvantages are of a
different kind and are indeed self-evident.
Of course, the people and their elected representatives
have the right to information so that they can judge whether
those to whom they have given political power have been exercising
it Wisely. The difficulty is that the press and the political
opposition often demand the facts about policies and form opinions
upon them before a full judgment can be made and when mere publi-
cation may jeopardize the success of a policy before it can ever
be implemented.
There is a related point which even in the year 1956-1 do
not hesitate to mention; namely, the inhibiting effect of elec-
tions, the handicaps, which their preliminaries, their conduct and
their aftermaths can impose upon the smooth development of policy
and its execution. Elections may delay or distort the formulation
of policy. They may produce results which disturb its continuity,-
and interfere with the conduct of diplomatic negotiations. When
a number of countries are trying to coordinate policy, the fact
that elections take place in different countries at different
times introduces an almost continuous factor of disturbance in the
cooperation between members of the group.
I don't want to make too much of this point because the
leading western nations have already managed to find means of
mitigating the effects of this factor, and the relations between
the United States and.. Britain are deeply enough rooted not to be
disturbed,by political controversies or changes in either country.
'Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, dictatorial and totalitarian
governments are free from these civilized handicaps. They are
not constrained to explain and defend their actions in general
and in detail to inquiring pressmen or politicians - or.for that
matter, to inquiring audiences.
Hitler, Stalin, and the present rulers in the Kremlin have
this in common, they are able to lay down a party line which will
be followed without question in all public utterances and
writings, in the press and broadcasts, and they are able to sup-
press as well as to invent news.
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An interesting example was the recent correspondence
between Marshall Bulganin and President Eisenhower concerning the
Soviet offer of a treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union
and the United States. President Eisenhower's.reply was concealed
from the Soviet people for an entire week while the Soviet re-
.joinder was prepared and the two were then published together,
thus enabling the Soviet leaders to blanket the effectiveness of
the-American reply. At a later stage in the correspondence a
letter from the President was published in Moscow immediately on
receipt.
Or take the recent visit of the Soviet leaders to South-
east Asia. Western statesmen on a similar errand would have been
pursued by a chorus of criticism and advice from home. The
Russian leaders were unhampered by any such restraints, and,.'with
a home base secure, could take the initiative without hesitation.
Finally, to cover any tactical or other change in foreign
policy which circumstances may dictate, they are able to use their
complete control of the intellectuals and their printing presses
to rewrite history in order to suit the needs of the moment. And
the current denunciation of Stalinism by Stalin's once devoted
followers is a classic example.
Now, of course, totalitarian systems pay a heavy price in
many ways for their falsification of news and their suppression
'of criticism, but from the diplomatic point of.view i.t does give
them the advantage of maximum flexibility and surprise and makes
for freedom of maneuver.
The fact must be faced that in the rough hard-headed
business of international politics the democratic governments are
handicapped not only by having to play so much in the open, and
by the denial of so many of the possibilities of maneuver' and sur-
prise, but also - and I put this in inverted commas - by "having
to play like gentlemen."
Moral considerations assume a very large part in the
policies of the democracies. In any country with Christian tradi-
-t'ions'and democratic ideals there is an overwhelming public demand
that'for'eign policy and its execution conform to reasonable stand-
ards of justice and fair play. It has often been claimed. that
the United States more than any other country demands that high
principles and moral considerations should guide its relations
with other nations. And there is a lot in this, although; I. must
say there is no foundation for the corollary which is sometimes
drawn that, by contrast, other western countries are guided purely
by expediency.
Now, a topical illustration of this point can be found in
your present, though not always in your past, practice of.the di-
plomatic recognition of foreign governments. We.in Br.it,ain are
inclined to recognize governments when we are satisfiQd..tha.t they
,are in'fact effectively exercising power and, therefore,ab.le,.
t ,ugh perhaps not always willing to fulfill their international
obligations, You are inclined to demand that they should also be
exercising their power in a decent and civilized manner.
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Consistency and integri',y in formulating policy, loyalty
to international obligations and allies, these are the principles
which western peoples demand that their leaders should never for"
sake. It is, for example, generally taken for granted that we can
never launch an aggressive war or use a thermonuclear weapon
except in retaliation. Totalitarian regimes, however, are not under
such inhibitions at any stages In negotiations. They are free to
subordinate means to ends. At he conference table they can alter-
nate between blandishments and abuse, between affability and in-
transigence, just as it suits them. Away from the conference
table they can engage in subversion and intimidation, without any
fear of being repudiated by a gust of moral indignation at home,
and in the pursuit of their needs and ends they can ruthlessly con-
demneven their own people to seemingly unnecessary privation as,
for example, when war-ravaged Czechoslovakia and Poland were forced
to deny themselves the benefits of the Marshall Plan by a diktat
from Moscow.
They can make defenseless individuals pawns in the game in
a way that no democratic people would tolerate, as their treatment
of German, and now of American -crisoners has shown. Nor can it be
taken for granted that they will not initiate an aggressive or
thermonuclear war.
Another advantage which,in the short run at least, a
totalitarian regime can have in the world struggle lies in the use
of economic resources in support of foreign policy, a very topi-
cal subject nowadays. In a country where the government fully
controls every detail of the national economy, it is possible for
it, at any time, to take resources away from home production and
offer them to the other states where they may prove an effective
bribe or bargaining counter. But in a country where private
enterprise is the normal rule, the government has either to obtain
legislative authority for the use of public funds, or to convince
private enterprise and private contractors of the advantages of
undertaking operations in areas of the world where there are grave
uncertainties and this is necessarily a slow process. If public
money is involved, a democratic government is compelled by tradi-
tion and by loyalty, too, and perhaps by fear of the taxpayers, to
lay down conditions and to enforce an accounting which may sub-
1 diminish the appeal and the political effectiveness of
the assistance that is being offered.
There is another important factor implicit in the democrat-
ic conduct of foreign policy. Today more than ever before a
nation can on':y achieve its objectives by working in alliance or
in association with other states, but a democratic government
cannot easily align itself with whom it will or break its obliga-
tioxzs when it will., The repudiation of an obligation between
western democracies, western democratic associates, is unthinkable
except for some necessity which is recognized to be overriding by
'the other parties such as, for example, defeat in a war or for
some' action by one state of such a grave and unfriendly nature as
to force repudiation. In our concept an alliance is not merely
a treaty. It is, if it is to mean anything, a day-to-day working
relationship.
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Totalitarian governments, on the other hand, regard such
alliances. as matters of convenience and have no hesitation in de-
nouncing or repudiating them and in changing sides if there seems
to be clear advantage in doing so. What the French call "renver
Bement des alliances"was a fairly common practice among authoritar-
ian regimes down to the 19th Century. As far as the Soviet Union'
is concerned, a notable example occurred in 1939 when it made a
pact with'Hitler. Another example of the same sort of thing
occurred, recently when the Soviet Union denounced its treaty of
friendship with Britain and France, on the grounds of the inclu-
sion of Germany'in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of which
they were members, but soon after offered a treaty of friendship
to the United States whi'ch'was the architect of the same policy
and a member of the same organization; they even offered to recon
elude treaties with France and Britain. Such actions are not in-
consistent by totalitarian standards.
Perhaps totalitarian regimes cannot have allies in the
western sense, only satellites. This hypothesis may be born out
by the breach between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948,
And some further light may be thrown upon it by the future course
of relations between the Soviet Union and China. Alliances
between dictatorships can only be secure when one side has the
whip-hand, and this is a potential weakness.
Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, in spite of this qualification,
I may by this time have put you in a state of some despondency
about the prospects of the western democracies, and so I will now
proceed'.to..redress the balance,, for I assure you that even in
diplomacy.. the assets of the democracies outweigh their handicaps.
(Applause)
It is a capital maxim, whether in war or in politics,
never to be so conscious of the weaknesses of one's own position
that the weaknesses of the adversary are overlooked. Totalitar-
ian regimes are apt to present a monolithic front to the outside
world, and it is difficult to define the nature of the stresses
and strains, the personal rivalries and the controversies which.
are assuredly a handicap to the formulation of policy and hinder
its execution. But every now and then a head rolls, or the
minister falls, or the regime is shaken to indicate a ferment,
just as the occasional eruption of a seemingly quiescent volcano
indicates the hidden pressures beneath.
In the first place, democratic governments are apt to have
a better understanding of the outside world not only through per-
sonal contacts but also because their representatives are free to
report things as they see them rather than the things their
superiors want to hear. I am sure that in general our policies
are based on far more accurate and objective reports than are
those of the totalitarian states. In the Berlin Blockade and in
the invasion of Korea, we had two examples of major Communist
miscalculation about the West's willingness to resist.
In the second place, of course, democratic governments
benefit because their policy is under the constant scrutiny of a
vigilant public. By contrast the mistakes made by dictatorships
can be disastrous. Absolute power is so easily able to corrupt
good judgment.. One has only to think of the gross miscalculat,i:ons
of Mussolini and the catastrophic blunders of Hitler and the mis-
reading by Stalin of German intentions in 1941 to illustrate this
point.
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Thirdly, though in th is practice,
and often in
acy of a dictatorship or totalitarian regime diplom-
moreactice,
flexible, it
can paradoxically enough be subject to great rigidity in that it
is controlled by certain dogmas or fixed ideas and because its
agents have no discretion to va:^y whatever the party line may be
on particular issues.
The fact that the policies of democracies are subject to
constant public and-parliamentary control with elections at fre-
quent intervals means that they are kept broadly in harmony with
the popular will. Premature publicity and premature criticism
may be a handicap, but an educated citizenry which weighs up the
issues, discusses alternatives and freely supports the conclu-
sions is fundamentally a source of strength.
In a totalitarian country the mass of the people is
neither for nor against the policies of the government. They
merely have to accept them as "none of their business." Conse-
quently they have no sense of responsibility for and no feeling
of being committed to these policies at any given time, and the
caucus at the summit; can veer in any direction.
In the same way, the fact that democratic action has to
have the moral sanction of the people is also a source of strength
in the long run, although it may appear immediately and superfi-
cially as a disadvantage. It may interfere with tactics but not
,with strategy.
For example, Britain was handicapped in the conduct of
the Boer War in 1899 by the fact that an appreciable number of
British citizens thought the war was unjust and said so, but
this turned to our advantage a decade later when many of those
who had deplored the South African struggle fully supported our
entry into the First World War. 'When shown
that
they were not afraid to reject the doctrine eofh~MyaCountry Right
or Wrong," supported our armed intervention in Europe, it did
much to reenforce the conviction of the rightness of our cause
not only at.home but also in the eyes of the world.
Let us not forget, Ladies and Gentleman, that the essen-
tial struggle in the world.today :Ls for men's minds, and
Lincoln's dictum about not fooling all the people all the time is
applicable to world as well as to domestic opinion, however much
this truth may 'be obscured for shorter or for longer periods by
intensive propaganda.
the cynicalhallliancemStalinbsuddernly madeunist Hitler in than
1939 after six years of declarations y t eh Nazis were thhereal
enemies of Russi&. For many naive people who hadnotbeen ill-
disposed toward Communism this came as a devastating revelation
of the opportunism, the lack of principle of its adherents, and
Communist politicians and newspapers the world over became a laughing
stock with their abrupt change of line in slavish imitation of
Moscow.
Take another example, the Czech coup-d'etat of 1948
brought within the Communist orbit a strategically 12 million strong, but the price ofthat rutthlesstrilaced umph was nary
heavy one for the Communists.: Every other smaller nation in
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Europe was alerted to the menace. Some who might otherwise have
been neutral joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It
becamefar_harder for individual Communists all over the world to
get away with their. pretensions of being decent and loyal citi-
zens. If the Soviet leaders had to answer to an electorate with
=a consciehcee they would never have made that mistake in
Czechoslovakia.
h think? that. Communist leaders are apt to be inhibited
in their opportunism by their dogmas. Under pressure.'they have
no hesitation in changing their line dramatically, but nonethe-
less the men ' who' are: making policy in the Kremlin today once
believed in and still pay lip service to Marxist theories about
the inevitable decadence of capitalist countries They have
never fully freed themselves from the involutions of Marxist
thoughts.
In the conduct of negotiations, too, good faith and fair
dealing eventually bring their own reward.. The opportunism,and.
the inconsistency which the Communists have shown in the past .in
the United Nations and elsewhere is one of their greatest handi-
'maps today in their efforts to capture the sympathy of the un-
,',committed peoples of the world..
After the events of the last eleven years only the.un-.
believably naive could take for granted the good faith of'Commun-
ist negotiators. On the whole we find that most countries, not
only our,-closest allies, accept our good faith.
Now, Ladies and. Gentlemen, as is, I hope,proper in.a
lecture, I have treated my theme from an academic. rather than a
topical point of view. Nevertheless, I cannot pass without com-
ment.overthe new phase in the relations between the Western
democracies and the Communist bloc which has of late become
clearly established.
There has been an unmistakable change in Soviet policy, a
'change of the kind which,.as I have tried to explain, they are
able to-make so easily and so. arbitrarily., They have turned their
attention much more intensively than before to the uncommitted
and under-developed countries'of the world and endeavored to gain
new footholds by offering military and economic aid.
I will not here with you enter into, the question of
whether this change is merely a switch of tactics or something
more, except' .to say. the strategic objective of Soviet policy is.,
.certainly not altered. This remains quite avowedly the establish-
ment''of a 'world Communist society.
But we in the free world have plainly to adjust ourselves
to a long period of competitive co-existence. It presents us:.
with a.serious. challenge. Some,.countries may be inclined, some
countries are all too ready to take Soviet protestations at.face
value and't.o accept the Trojan horses of their aid. There. is. no
doubt that the progress in.Soviet industrial development and the
presumed improvement., in Soviet economic conditions'will hence-
forth enable the .,Soviet Union.to compete with the West to an`
'increasing degree in the economic as well as in the purely. politi-
cal. and propaganda fields.
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We must keep our- balance about this. ,,The Soviet economy
; t h a t - .West, and her pre.s,ent allies and
satellites are still further, behind. "Many"of the re.ce:nt -Soviet
overtures. represent token gestures. rather than.large-scale offers
of aid. It is:- a matter of skillful: propaganda on their side,
sometimes unwitti: gly aided by over-anxiety ; on ours,. that elevates
them to disturbing pr. oportions.
But the challenge is likely to become more genuine and 11 more substantial. as the years..go by A Soviet policy, Which is
,.at the same time more flexible and superficially more reasonable,
such,:as.that d?isplayed in the words of.the.Soviet leaders at the
r.e.centom'nanist congress in Moscow, ?requires us to reassess our
111
own. external policies particular ly in the field of economics and
..re.gard to those countries i.i which the Soviet Union has been
in'
displaying special interest,
This kuviet ..approach-, raore subtle and more deceptive
.than the.blunder inn method3 of the Stalinist era, may for' the
reasons that I ,have given . be more difficult for us. to deal with.
Nonetheless,. tic a d ea.ying. that times change and we change with
t'h'e'm applies in tha S.cviet,.TJnion as elsewhere. This new develop-
ment in Soviet poll icy must surely be related to changes now-;taking
place in econom:'.c and social conditions inside the Soviet Union
which, if continued, '.nay themselves impose a different series of
r.'strai.n-i,s- and exercise new influences on the formulation as well
as on the execuvion of Soviet -colic,. Though the transmission
may be very slow, it may well change the meaning of co-existence
in the Soviet lexicon pe:'haps in such a way as to make possible
a genuine cc-exi ste.ice, i.n our sense, between the two rival
systems of society,. But the essential proviso to ,this
higi ly s~eeulAti re hy?nothesis is that the western democracies,
should. be alert; enough, well organized enough, and united enough
to ?de.al wit-.E t'ee, rcater 'becauso less obvious, dangers which
this transition already holds for us.
Nor Lade =:s an d -entle?nen., I arm led,: as you see, to a con-
*cl.usionwhich -1 s fa-., ,rcr-1 pecsimistic- As.I said at the beginning,
;a c.ount;ry` s. foreign policy is largely. dictated by circumstances,
by. national intcr:sts? and conditions which powerfully affect
policies of t -e ent of the day.: Since the last war both
our countries have displayed, generally speaking, a marked degree
of bi-?pertisanship t.n ,he cor.ducl; cf foreign policies. But you
cannot have something o~ no,hin;, There is quite `a heavy price
to be paid di.p?L ab ?caJ ly the advantage of our democratic
system. We would, if ?n:;ces,sar.y, cf, sour se pay a far heavier price,
but there is .no n cl to be ext ?avag ant , and we should see whether
We cannot through l+rd rsto.nding our. Nandi caps, reduce the price as
far as possible.
There are various ways in which.- this can be done.- The
first Js .by: more er.ucattlon and information about the questions.
,which I have touched n oon. All, of us who are c_:.ncerned with or
.are interested in world affairs should ace-ept responsibility for
spreading _knowled?ge a-r d uaders sanding. of :them. among` a wider:..:public
so that opLa. on is our countries.rnay be as little em.c.ti:onal,, as
little .su;b;ject,:ye and as realist c. ads possible, and I am sure that
,this is one of the uvays in which tl is. institution, :Dr, Davies, is
performing a notdhiee service,,
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In this way what is perhaps already implicit can become
explicit. Diplomatic action is not an end in itself but a means
of giving effect to national policies, and national policies have
to deal with things as they are and not as the democratic majority
would like them to be.
Then there is the question of responsibility. Under our
system numbers of people in politics, in journalism, in business,
obtain information about government policies and intentions, in
many cases scarcely less complete than that possessed by the offi-
cials who are actually dealing with them. And it should perhaps
be recognized that it is the possession of the information rather
than the position or function of the individual which imposes re-
sponsibility in regard to its use. If this sense of responsibility
were generally spread, as it is already partially spread through
our countries, the impediment to the smooth conduct of our diplo-
macy would tend to be diminished.
And so the seeming diplomatic advantages of a totalitarian
state are largely illusory, or at best short-run. In the long run
the advantages of public discussion outweigh the advantages of
surprise. In the long run the advantages of straight dealing out-
weigh the advantages of sharp dealing. In the long run the example
of consistency and decency pays off. And in the long run let us
hope the people in our democracies will become so educated to the
nature of foreign affairs that by wise criticism, and still more
by wise forbearance from criticism, they will deprive our totali-
tarian rivals of even those short-term diplomatic advantages which
flow from their monolithic systems. (Applause)
.CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Sir Roger, I don't think I need to tell
you that we are deeply grateful to you for having brought us this
interesting, important and significant statement. I think it is
something that we are all going to want to give a great deal of
thought to.
I think we can also see what good work as an ambassador
you do as you go about the country. And I think we are also very
glad to know that this lecture has been recorded and will be pub-
lished so that it will be available for all of you to study
(Applause),
And now for some questions. I would like to ask the first
question. It isn't along the line you touched on in your lecture
although I think it is cognate to it. You spoke a great deal
about the change in the way diplomacy has worked over the past
forty years.
Would you comment on the quality of young men coming into
the Foreign Service at the present time? Is it designed to be
good enough to. continue the things we have been doing? Is it
better? Or is it worse? Would you comment on it?
AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, of course, I can only speak
about the British Foreign Service. I think that we have been
fortunate in maintaining the standards which we have always tried
to set in our Service. Since the war we have altered the examina-
tions, the method of entry, to try and tap a wider group. We have
insisted always on maintaining the highest intellectual standard;
that is to say, a very good university degree as a condition of
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entry. So far, I am glad to say, we have managed to maintain
that standard very well, and I hope we shall continue to do so.
CHAIRMAN DAVIES: It is very difficult for the United
States to carry on the task that England did so well in the Near
East, as we are so far away, and Britain had the advantage of
centuries of stabilizing all parts of the world. Is there any
chance that England will again take on this great task?
AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, I think that in the Middle East,
as elsewhere, we 7-e-73 work together, we and you, to uphold
our interests, and to maintain the peace. Of course, it is true
that in the past Britain has carried almost the entire burden of
maintaining stability in that region, but gradually, of course
with your expanding influence and resources you have found that
you cannot disinterest yourselves from the affairs of the area,
and I am sure that will continue. I don't think there is any
question of going backwards. You can't go backwards in politics.
You can't reoccupy political positions from which you have with-
drawn. You have to adopt new policies. Our policy in the Middle
East must continue to be one which is coordinated between us.
That is the precept which we are following today.
CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Ambassador, would you care to comment on
the dismissa o Six- john Glubb?
AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, I mustn't depart too far from
the theme of my Tecture and stultify my own words. So I will say
simply that it is a serious matter which is being studied at the
moment. I shan't say more in public today, or I will have to
:tear up my own lecture.
CHAIRMAN DAVIES: What better incentive do you think we
can offer Ana towara the kind of behavior we want than the sub-
sequent possibility of United Nations membership, what subsequent
control of her behavior than to commit it to the principles of
the United Nations?
AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, I don't know whether the question
should be approached on the basis of incentive. This is an Anglo-
American occasion and I shall confine myself to our two govern-
ments. There is, of course, as everybody knows, a difference of
approach toward the problem of Communist China although there is
no difference of judgment as to the meaning and the effect of its
emerging power.
Now, we have gone on the basis that the realities of the
situation required us in 1950 - which is some time ago now - to
recognize the fact that the Peking regime had acquired control
over the mainland of China and its nearly 600 million inhabitants,
We recognized that fact, we accorded to the regime diplomatic
recognition, we established a diplomatic mission in Peking, and
proceeded to deal with that regime diplomatically without, of
course, modifying our judgment as to what the regime stood for or
its policies. And we have also been inclined to trade with China
in non-strategic goods; that is to say, commodities which are not
defined as strategic by international agreements and arrangements.
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Now, we think. that by.de.aling with China, by trading with
them in innocuous-ways, we may gradually get on some so.rt.of terms
with them -and:- perhaps loosen the ties, particularly the economic
ties,.by which they are increasingly bound to the Soviet Union.
That is the approach which we have adopted toward this problem.
I wouldn't call it an incentive "because, after all,, we
are no handing. out carrots. What we are doing~is t,his:. we are
pursuing'?.a policy. which we regard as 'the best policy in our own
interest and in the interest of our associates and in. the inter-
est of the'West. That is our judgment. You may think it is
wrong, but that., is the way in which we are. approaching this prob-
lem.
CHAIRMAN DAVIES: ']gyp you ..feel that ;the Soviet is :prepared
to jump into Central Africa 't.f and when the British and other
`white, 'group.s, are forced 'out?
AMBASSADOR MA INS: Well, I think that Soviet Communism
' s rather like the tide which comes in and moves .into 'inletas or
wherever the water can flow. And there is, of course, the old
truism that you can` t. have a vacuum anywhere in.the world. If
you.' create a vacuum, something else is going to die 'drawn into it.
So that I think that if we so conduct ourselves as tc
give Communism a chance to flow into Africa, it will flow in, and
we must conduct, and indeed are so conducting, our policies as to
make that impossible, or _at., least very difficult.
There is a conflict here between the demand for complete
independence and the ability to stand on one's own feet in the
modern world. We have to try and balance out all these considera-
tions. Our problem is peculiarly difficult at the moment because
we are trying to pay every regard to the desire of the countries
to stand on their own feet, to be independent, to be free and so
on, and at the same time to have regard to the dangers which
menace those countries if they are insufficiently stable economi-
cally, not viable, not strong enough to stand on their own feet.
That is the main problem and I think we are dealing with it to
the best of our ability.
CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Do we western nations not suffer from
some disadvantages with the totalitarian regimes to the extent
that aggressive politicians secure backing of office holders for
the promotion of only one political viewpoint?
AMBASSADOR MAKINS: As an Ambassador and a public servant,
I am never rude about politicians.
CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Your talk closed with the idea that in
the long run our way of diplomacy will win out. Do you feel that
time is with us or is running out?
(Applause?
CHAIRMAN DAVIES: And now a final question which has come
from several of our audience,
AMBASSADOR MAKINS: I think that we have no time to lose.
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What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the United
Nations in world politics? And do you feel that a'stronger
United Nations would help all' countries ,wi-th their foreign poli-
cies?
AMBASSADOF. MAKINS: Well, it is here, of course, `that the
United Nations ia-s-not quite fulfilled the purpose for which it
was founded, It h.as not been able to do so because the basis of
the Charter was Great Power harmony, and since the United Nations
was founded we have unfortunately had Great Power. discord.
Nevertheless, we- should never lose faith in the United
Nations, We'must continue to Support it. It is itself changing.
It has just acquired sixteen new members, It is and will in-
creasingly be the mirror of the world, as President Eisenhower
called it. It is a place 'where the points of view of all nations
can come together. And while it may. not have developed exactly
as was hoped in 1945, nevertheless it is progressing. It has
great possibilities for good, and I am sure we must continue to
support it. '(Applause)
CHAIRMAN DAVIE Thank. you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
We now stand adjourned.
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