LETTER TO(Sanitized) FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 99
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 17, 1957
• Content Type: LETTER

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7 =, 1957
General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, N. Y.
Dear David:
I'm sorry that you won't be able to join us next Monday at the
University Club but perhaps we shall be able to arrange another meeting
some time in the not too distant future.
I've reread your speech and. again. I was most interested in
your comments on the need for continuing efforts to consider and exploit
those internal tensions within Communist societies which develop from
the hunger of the individual for freedom and human dignity as well as
from the forces of discontent and despair to which you refer. I should
be interested in your ideas as to the most important vulnerabilities
indicated by these elements of tension. You also state that we have
failed to translate the battle of ideas into potent action and policy. Where
would you suggest that the battle be enlarged, in what areas, and on the
basis of which particular aspects of the contest might we be able to better
identify ourselves to the victims of the Communist efforts as participants
in a common cause?
What specific steps would you suggest to bring about the failure
of what you term the Soviet strategy of nibbling and the Communist
strategy of intimidation? I would be interested in your ideas as to specific
weaknesses, if any, inherent in these principles, both within the context
of an expansion of NATO operations andittother realme of activity, which
are capable of meeting the challenge.
Oti(C/
nopriv
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STAT
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And last, and perhaps most important of all, how can the lethargy of
the West1 if there is in fact such a lethargy, be replaced by a dynamism
of mind and spirit sufficient to meet the imperative of the Cold War and the
challenge offered by the nibbling successes of World Communism? What
further steps can be taken to demonstrate that we lead from a strength
not only in the field of modern war and technology, but in matters of the
spirit?
Sin,- :rely,
It11171.1
Allen W. Dulles
Director
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And last, and baps moat isportan of all, hos can the
lethargy of the West, it there Is, in fact, 8406 a lethergy,
be replamed bye dynamism of mind and spirit iufficient to meet
the imperative of the Cold Wer and the chi nge offered by the
nibbling successes of World Casniat W?further steps can
be token to demonstrate that vs lead foa strength, net only
in the field of modern liar and tecbz r1 but in matters of the
spirit?
Signature Recommended:
5 December 1957
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RADIO COR ORATION ? F
RCA BUILDING
30 ROCHE:FEU/AM PLAZA
L?
AVIII0 SAHNOPV
CELAIRMAN OP TIED BOARD
W 'YORK 20. N. Y.
Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, North West
Washington, D. C.
Dear Allen:
ICA
November 26, 1957
21,
Thank you for inviting me to join you at your private
dinner at the University Club in New York on Monday evening,
December ninth. It is a matter of deep disappointment to me that I
.UT , ? t a?abtoo,ev.s.,,
cannot be witli?yuu. Unfortunately, I had previously accepted an
invitation from a rather active member of Congress to be his guest
at a dinner on the same evening, to which he attaches some importance
and to which he has already invited a number of persons.
I am, as you know, at your service and will be glad to
visit with you in Washington or New York at any time that may suit your
convenience.
When we met at the White House a few days ago I was
encouraged by your reaction to my recent address before the
Association of the United States Army. If my recollection serves me
correctly, you were to write me a letter selecting those of my
recommendations which appealed to you and on which you would like my
thoughts as to how they might be implemented.
When I receive your request I shall be glad to undertake
the preparation of a memorandum containing my further thoughts on the
subject.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
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STAT
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DEC 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Mr. David Sarnoff's Letter to
the Director, dated 26 November 1957
Attached is a proposed reply from the Director to
David Sarnoff.
DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief
Psychological and Paramilitary Staff
Attachment
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STAT
..111?111.0.011.4,
--*
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December 20, 1957
General David Sarnoff
Chairman of the Bcitid
Radio Corporation of America
RCA Building
30 Rockefeller Plass,
New York 20, New York
Dear David:
0,13/%1
I spent last evening going over with the utmost care your
thoughtful letter of December 16, outlining and expanding your
program for a political offensive against world communism.
I wish you to know that I feel this supplement to your earlier
statements on the subject is of the utmost use to us and I am having
it carefully studied here. It was good of you, with all you have on
your bands, to give this quick and effective response to my letter,
and I *hall be in touch with you later.
With all best wishes for Christmas and the New Year. We
can share the wish that in this year we will be able to develop our
resources more effectively for the common objectives we have in
mind.
Sincerely yours,
AWD:at
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Allen W.
Director
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Dulles
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RADIO CcatrocutAiracitm OP AMERICA
It CA BUILD INGF
30 ROCIELEIPELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.
DAVID SSAHRTOPIP
CHAIRMAN 02. TER BOARD
Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, North West
Washington, D. C.
December 16, 1957
12131i)
Dear Allen:
I acknowledge, with thanks, your letter of December 7.
The questions you pose are so fundamental and sweeping
that I can hardly hope to answer them adequately in this communication.
But, as you know, I have tried to ovide some of the answers in the
past. On April 5, 1955, I submitted to the White House a Memorandum*
titled -- "A Program for a Political Offensive Against World Communism, "
which you were generous enough to commend at the time. I returned to
the subject thereafter ti several speeches.
More than two and a half years have intervened, but whatever
validity the Memorandum had at that time, it seems to me, has been
underlined by events since then. Let's take a look at the record.
* Copy of the Memorandum attached hereto.
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2.
As you are aware, I have always contended that effective
conduct of the Cold War, on dimensions geared to victory, cannot be
superimposed on national policy which is not geared to the same.objective.
It makes logic only as it reflects or implements a basic national policy.
Political warfare on a scale to match the enemy's requires,
first of all, a far-reaching decision: to undermine the power of world
communism to the point where it ceases to be a threat to freedom on
this earth. The enemy operates on the equivalent decision, made long
ago. His inflexible purpose, to weaken and ultimately to dominate the
world, is inherent in Communist dogma. As I put it in the Memorandum:
"We must be quite certain of our destination
before we begin to figure out means of transportation.
There is little point in discussing the how of it until
a firm decision for an all-out political-psychological
counter-offensive is reached."
The gist of that new policy or dedication (and its formulation
i
is a critical first step), I wrote, ns that America has decided, irrevocably,
to win the Cold War; that its ultimate aim is, in concert with all peoples,
to cancel out the destructive power of Soviet-based Communism. "
To which I added:
"Once that decision is made, some of the
means for implementing it, will become self-evident;
others will be explored and developed under the
impetus of the clear-cut goal. Agreement on the
problem must come before agreement on the solution."
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In scientific and technological research, the goal is clearly
envisioned long before we know how it will be reached. Establishment
of a clear objective is what forces us to think and plan in the direction
calculated to reach our objective.
The decision to make a new, ambitious free-world
commitment is, I believe, the indispensable condition for its
fulfillment. A true Cold War offensive is foredoomed to futility if,
on other levels, the free world remains obsessed by negative policies
of compromise, accommodation, modus vivendi, stalemate -- in
short, purposes inherently at variance with the strategy and posture of
a serious offensive.
Our guiding objectives, I wrote in the Memorandum, would
have to include the following:
1. To keep alive throughout the Soviet empire the
spirit of resistance and the hope of eventual freedom and
sovereignty. If we allow that hope to expire, the Kremlin
will have perpetuated its dominion over its victims.
2. To break the awful sense of isolation in which the
internal enemies of the Kremlin live?by making them
aware that, like the revolutionists in Tsarist times, they
have devoted friends and powerful allies beyond their
frontiers.
3. To sharpen by every device we can develop the
fear of their own people that is already chronic in the
Kremlin. The less certain the Soviets are of the alle-
giance of their people, the more they will hesitate to
provoke adventures involving the risks of a major show-
down.
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4. To provide moral and material aid, including
trained leadership, to oppositions, undergrounds, resist-
ance movements in satellite nations and China and Russia
proper.
5. To make maximum use of the fugitives from the
Soviet sphere, millions in the aggregate: now living in
free parts of the world.
?
6. To appeal th the simple personal yearnings of
those under the Communist yoke: release from police
terror, ownership of small farms and homes, free trade
unions to defend their rights at the job, the right to
worship as they please, the right to change residence
and to travel, etc.
7. To shatter the "Wive of the future" aura around
Communism, displacing the assumption that "Commu-
nism is inevitable" with a deepening certainty that "the
end of Communism is inevitable."
8. To inspire millions in the free countries with a
feeling of moral dedication to the enlargement of the
area of freedom, based on repugnance to slave labor, co-
erced atheism, purges and the rest of the Soviet horrors.
To compass objectives of this order calls for a revision
of thinking and attitude that will enable us to accept at least the
following points (and again I am citing the Memorandum):
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1. The struggle by means short of general war is not
a preliminary bout but the decisive contest, in which the
loser may not have a second chance.
2. It must therefore be carried on with the same
focused effort, the same resolute spirit, the same willing-
ness to accept costs and casualties, that a Hot War would
involve.
3. In order to establish credence and inspire con-
fidence, our conduct must be consistent. Our philosophy
of freedom must embrace tkztole of mankind; it must
not stop short at the frontiers arthe Soviet sphere. Only
this can give our side a mOragr.An deur, a revolutionary
elan, a crusading spirit not only equal to but superior to
the other side's.
4. We must learn to regard the Soviet countries as
enemy-occupied territory, with the lifting of the occupa-
tion as the over-all purpose of freedom-loving men every-.
where. This applies not only to areas captured since the
war, but includes Russia itself. Any other policy would
turn what should be an anti-Communist alliance into an
anti-Russian alliance, forcing the Russians (as Hitler
forced them during the war) to rally around the regime
they hate.
5. The fact that the challenge is global must be kept
clearly in view. Red guerillas in Burma, Communists in
France or the U. S., the Huks in the Philippines, Red
agents in Central America ? these are as much "the
enemy" as the Kremlin itself.
6. We must realize that world Communism is not a
tool in the hands of Russia ? Russia is a tool in the hands
of world Communism. Repeatedly Moscow has sacrificed
national interests in deference to world-revolutionary
needs. This provides opportunities for appeals to Russian
patriotism.
7. Though the Soviets want a nuclear war no more
than we do, they accept the risk of it in pushing their
political offensive. We, too, cannot avoid risks. (It might
become necessary, Mr. Dulles said recently, "to forego
? peace in order to secure the blessings of liberty.") The
greatest risk of 'all, for us, is to do less than is needed
to win the Cold War. At worst that would mean defeat
by default; and at best, a situation so menacing to the
survival of freedom that a Hot War may become in-
evitable.
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Having formulated these bedrock principles, I added a
warning which, alas, is more pertinent today than it was in April 1955:
Our present lead in the possession of nuclear weapons
and the ability to use them may be matched by the Com-
munists in the next few years. This is the view expressed
by competent statesmen, scientists and military experts.
If and when nuclear parity is reached, the enemy's fa-
natics (and there may be a powerful madman ? a Hitler
? among them) might be tempted to use them against
us by throwing a sneak punch. Since our policy is not
to throw the first nuclear punch but only to retaliate if
it is thrown against us, we may find as more horror-
weapons are unfolded, that to yield to the enemy the
initiative of the first offensive punch, is tantamount to
national suicide. All this further emphasizes the vital
need for winning the Cold War and preventing a Hot
? War.
About nine months later (January 26, 1956), in an address to
the National Security Industrial Association, I tried to underline that
point:
"It would be folly for us to take too lightly the
warning by Soviet Premier Bulganin, only a few weeks
ago, that 'rocket missiles which have been developed,
particularly over the past few years, are becoming
intercontinental weapons. I This long-range missile --
the so-called ICBM -- carrying a cargo of nuclear
devastation, is expected to be able to leap the
Atlantic in a matter of minutes.
"For the sake of our own security and the survival
of our civilization, we dare not permit the Kremlin to
acquire even a temporary monopoly of such horror
weapons. The Moscow leaders would not hesitate to
exploit the advantage in order to blackmail the rest of
the world. Not necessarily the use of these weapons,
but the mere threat of their use could serve the
Soviets purposes in the Cold War they wage so
relentlessly."
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And again on that occasion, I stressed the urgent need to
fight and win the political struggle, and quoted from
President Eisenhower's State of the Union message his impressive
statement about --"The waging of peace with as much resourcefulness,
with as great a sense of dedication and urgency, as we have ever
mustered in defense of our country in time of war."
Advocacy of intensified political-psychological warfare,
I am sure you understand, implies no criticism of existing agencies.
In the nature of the case, U. S. I. A. , V. 0.A. , C. I. A. , the State
Department itself must operate within the limitations of current
policy -- not only American but free-world policy. No matter how
brilliant the successes of this or that agency, they still remain
within the bounds of the dominant policy and therefore short of the
larger goal.
In this connection I italicized the following passage about
methods and techniques in the Cold War:
"We should recognize that many of them are
already being used, and often effectively. Nothing
now 1...Eicir vval_leeds to be abandoned. The problem
is one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing,
coordination and continuity -- all geared to the
long-range under takiag1he
expanded offensive with non-military weapons must
be imbued with a new awareness of the great oal
and the robust will to reach it.
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8.
Anyone who has followed carefully Mr. Khrushchev's
frequent expressions of view in talking to outsiders must be
impressed by one element that runs through them. I refer to his
anxiety that we "call off the Cold War" -- by which he means, of
course, that we stop broadcasting behind the Iron Curtain, stop
appealing over his head to his subjects, et cetera, thereby giving
the Kremlin, through its world-wide apparatus, a monopoly of
such activities.
A recent issue of NEWSWEEK alludes to a talk with
Ambassador Thompson in which Khrushchev made three conditions
for improved relations with the U.S.A. The third was normalized
trade. But the other two were (1) recognition that his frontiers are
unchangeable, and (2) the end of "capitalist interference in the
affairs of Communist states."
Bob Considine, who was with William Randolph Hearst on
his recent visit to the USSR, wrote from Moscow on November 24, 1957,
"Khrushchev offered to give the plans of Russia's sputnik-launching
ICBM to the United States if America ends what he calls the
prosecution of the Cold War." On an earlier occasion Khrushchev
emanded that the United States recognize the "historic changes" in
Eastern Europe and stop relying on some "internal forces" to change
the situation.
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This persistent note leaves no margin for doubt that internal
security and internal oppositions are the over-riding preoccupations of
the Soviet regime. It means that even our inadequate and unsystematic
Cold War measures have the Kremlin deeply worried; that Moscow would
pay, or pretend to pay, a high price for an American undertaking to
"lay off" his subjects and acknowledge the Communist empire as
permanent and irreversible.
It seems to me that Khrushchev's revealed anxiety is the
best evidence we could have on the importance of our intensifying
Cold War measures. I am fully aware, of course, that such a basic
decision and its implementation if it were made, are largely outside
the responsibility of your particular agency. I call attention to it,
however, because the broad scope of the questions in your letter
obviously go beyond the direct responsibility of the C.I.A.
Let me address myself now to your specific questions.
The first asks for "the most important vulnerabilities'? indicated by
"elements of tension" within Communist societies. Here is what I
previously said under this head in the Memorandum:
The free world, under the impact of Moscow's Cold
War victories, has tended to fix attention on Soviet
strengths while overlooking or discounting Soviet wea
n sses.
The Communists expertly exploit all our intern 1
teiisions, injustices and discontents. Yet wit14, the
Soviet empire the tensions are imcomparably greater, the
injustices and discontents more vast. Our opportunity,
which we have failed to use so far, is to exploit these in
production. Nations which used to be exporters of bred
(Iiiiiriary, Poland, Russia itself) now lack bread for
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10.
The nature of a m1dcan be-d-educed from the
medicine applied. In its fourth decade of absolute power,
the Soviet regime is obliged to devote a major portion
of its energies, manpower and resources to keep its own
subjects and captive countries under control, through
ever larger doses of terror. There we have the proof
?that the Communists have failed to "sell" their system
to their victims.
Even a ruthless police-state does not maintain
gigantic secret-police forces, special internal security
armies, colossal networks of forced-labor colonies just
for the fun of it. These are measures of self-defense
against actual or potential internal oppositions. After
all discounts are made for wishful thinking and error,
ample evidence remains that in the Soviet sphere the
West has millions of allies, tens of millions of potential
allies.
Whether the potential can be turned into actuality,
whether the will to resist can be kept alive and inflamed
to explosive intensity, depend in the first place on the
policies of the non-Soviet world. Our potential fifth
columns are greater by millions than the enemy's. But
they have yet to be given cohesion, direction and the
inner motive power of hope and expectation of victory.
No one knows whether, let alone when, the internal
Soviet stresses can _reach a climax in insurrectionary
breaks. It would be frivolous to count on such a climax.
But we have everything to gain by promoting a spirit of
mutiny, to keep the Kremlin off balance, to deepen exist-
ing rifts, to sharpen economic and empire problems for
them.
For the purposes of our Cold War strategy it suffices
that the potential for upAngs exists. Soviet economic
conditions are bad, particularly in the domain of food
production. Nations which wed to be exporters of bread
(Hungary, Poland, Russia itself) now lack bread for
themselves. As Secretary of Agriculture Benson said
recently: "Failure of the Soviet system to provide for
the basic needs of its own people could be one of the most
important historical facts of our time."
4 The Soviet peasants, still the overwhelming majority
of the Kremlin-41ct populations, are everywhere bitter
and restive. The Politburo knows that it cannot count
implicitly upon the loyalty and allegiance of its subjects.
At the same time it has failed utterly to assimilate the
captive countries, so that it has no allies but only sullen
colonial punts
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In the last war the USSR fought on two fronts?
against the foreign invaders and against its own people.
There is reason to believe that Hitler's psychological
blunders, in insulting and alienating the Russian peoples,
helped save the Stalin regime from destruction by ts
o n subjects. In the present Cold War, too, the US R
ust maintain its fight against the Soviet citizenry, thud
at the same time deal with seething dissidence in the
subjected countries.
The basic conditions for successful Cold War
counter-strategy thus exist.
This was written, of course, before Khrushchev's "secret
speech" against Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress; before the
Poznan riots; before the Polish and Hungarian revolutions; before
the striking evidence of intellectual ferment in all the other satellite
states and in Soviet Russia itself. Those events have underscored
my statement and, I feel, given it more weight. In any case, it's
possible today to sharpen the inventory of vulnerabilities. At the
risk of some duplication, let me list a few, without detail, since you
will know at once the factors I have in mind:
1. The monolithic unity of the Soviet empire has been
? damaged biTond repair by Polish and Hungarian events, restlessness
in other satellites, the ambiguity of Tito's conduct. Moscow's
?
political authority is no longer taken for granted; it must be
reasserted (as in the recent Moscow statement which Yugoslavia didn't
sign), patched and defended. Even the Kremlin's ideological primacy
is challenged at points by Red China.
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12.
2. Nationalist sentiment has intensified among the
non-Russian minorities -- the Ukraine, Georgia, et cetera -- in
Soviet Russia proper. Moscow's increasing attacks on what it
calls "bourgeois nationalism" in the non-Russian areas amount to
an admission of this weakness.
3. The ferments among Soviet youth, especially the
students, have increased and found more open expression.
Traditionally in Russia, movements of popular revolt have had their
focus in the universities and the pattern seems to be repeating itself.
4. Soviet intellectuals are demanding more mental and
creative freedom. Again its in the traditional Russian pattern; the
intelligentsia is once more the conscience of the country, compelled
by subjective pressures to come to the aid of the oppressed populace.
5. The new technical and m.ana erial personnel are
pressing for more initiative and autonomy. This is generally
recognized as a vital element in the struggle for power: Malenkov
has tried to make himself the spokesman for that class. Malenkov
failed but that doesn't cancel out the class and its potential.
6. Peasant resistance to the Communist system is as
strong as ever. The peasantry remains sullen and uncooperative,
resisting every attempt to turn it into "farm proletarians." The
Kremlin does not even pretend that it commands the loyalty of the
village masses.
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13.
7. Soviet econom is unbalanced and in a constant state of
unacknowledged crisis. Even while Sputniks circled our globe, Khrushchev
has had to admit acute inadequacy of food, clothes, housing, consumer
goods generally -- the admission implicit in his promises that these things
will be available by 1960, in a decade, depending on his temperature of
optimism.
8. The struggle for power within the dictatorship remains
as sharp and as debilitating as ever in the past. The much touted
"collective leadership" has proved a dud. In the absence of legality,
intrigue and plotting - - the kind that ousted Marshall Zhukov recently --
in the final analysis decide the shape of the leadership.
9. Both inside the Soviet sphere and in the world at large,
Communism has lost its original glamor and appeal. In your own recent
words: "The initial ideological fervor is seeping out of the international
Communist movement, particularly in the Soviet Union." Non-Soviet
intellectuals by the thousand have been deserting the Communist fold.
Books like Milovan Djilas' "The New Class" and Howard Fast's "The
Naked God," aside from their direct vale, are telltale symptoms of a trend,
10. Most important, after 40 years, the Soviet regime has
failed to win the allegiance of its subjects. It dare not, in a genuine
sense, relax the inner tensions, let alone dismantle the machinery of
secret-police control. It must continue to divert major manpower and
energy to endless internal propaganda and indoctrination. In short, it
cannot count on the automatic loyalty and obedience of its people.
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Woo'
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11. There are striking contradictions between Soviet
Russia's modern technology and its medieval political despotism;
between the need to create an educated class for its technology and
the compulsion to impose thought control; between the spectacular
achievements in science and the continuing wretchedness in everyday
living standards.
This, of course, does not exhaust the inventory. Every
one of these vulnerabilities and all of them taken together provide
endless opportunities for exploitation in terms of the Cold War, in
line with the bedrock principles I cited earlier. No one would claim
that we have made the utmost use of those opportunities or, for that
matter, that we have developed the organizational mechanism for
exploring and implementing such potentials.
Still in the context of vulnerabilities, let me quote a
pertinent passage from the brilliant article by John Foster Dulles
(Foreign Affairs, October 1957). Having summed up Russia's
hostile and mischievous policies, he added:
"We need not, however, despair. International
Communism is subject to change even against its will.
It is not impervious to the erosion of time and
circumstance. Khrushchev's speech of February 1956,
the July 1957 shake-up in the ruling clique at Moscow,
and Mao's speech of February 27, 1957, indicate that
even in Russia and the China mainland Soviet and Chinese
Communist regimes are confronted with grave internal
pressures and dilemmas. The yeast of change is at work,
despite all the efforts of 'democratic centralism' to
keep matters moving in a strictly Leninist pattern.
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15.
The rulers of Russia do not find it possible to combine
industrial and military modernization with the personal
repressions of the Middle Ages; and the rulers of China
will not find it possible to fit the richly diversified
culture of the Chinese into a Communist mold of conformity."
In recent years the free world has reaped a good many vital
Cold War successes -- among them those to which the Secretary of
State refers. But candor compels us to recognize that we did not do
the plowing and the sowing. In no instance are they the direct result
of our policies and actions. Often, as in the Polish and Hungarian
events, they came despite us and as complete surprises.
On the other hand, the Cold War failures -- such as the
psychological blow struck by the Sputniks, our tragic lack of readiness
to aid the Hungarians, the frustrations deriving from our inability to
give even token aid in that crisis -- are the direct consequence of
free-world inadequacy in the understanding and prosecution of the
Cold War.
The Kremlin clearly foresaw the psychological impact of
being first with an earth satellite and it planned accordingly. Had we
been committed to fighting and winning the ideological contest, we too
would have foreseen it and channeled effect accordingly.
In relation to Poland, Hungary, et cetera, we were
consistently too pessimistic in estimating possibilities of internal
resistance and revolt. Press and official comments on those countries in
the preceding year proves too clearly that we underestimated the potentials.
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6.
It was universally assumed that all sources of resistance had been
eliminated by terror; that a new, indoctrinated and loyal generation
was being raised; that the Army and the Communists would defend the
regimes to the bitter end. And we were wrong on all these counts.
The same kind of defeatism today prevails vis-a-vis Soviet
Russia. The forces of potential resistance are recognized but in
general undervalued. Yet a study of the Hungarian experience yields
significant lessons, of immense value in planning Cold War strategy
and tactics. Hungary established:
1. That revolution against a Totalitarian Communist
regime is possible. It is no longer the figment of wishful thinking.
2. That such a revolution can be successful. The
uprising in Hungary, let it be remembered, did succeed. It had to be
crushed by an external force. There is no such external force
capable of saving the Soviet regime when and if there is a revolt.
3. That a Communist regime's vast military establishment
would not save the Kremlin in a similar crisis. Hungary showed that
when the hour for popular uprising is ripe, the soldiers too become people.
The size of military forces is irrelevant -- only its mood counts.
4. That the Communist reliance on the indoctrinated
young generation, heretofore a fixed point in Leninist dogma, has been
washed out.
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5. That a new Communist intelli entsia, no matter how
carefully shaped in terms of the "new Soviet man," tends to turn
against the regime which created it. The traditional role of the
educated minority -- to express what the masses feel -- applies under
a Communist tyranny no less than it did under a Tsarist autocracy.
I have given so much space to a discussion of vulnerabilities
because the answers to your other questions are implicit in every one
of them. The existence of a weakness determines the kind and the
quantity of strength that should be brought against it.
For example, you ask: "Where would you suggest that the
battle be enlarged, in what areas, and on the basis of which particular
aspects of the contest might we be able to better identify ourselves to
the victims of the Communist efforts as participants in a common cause?"
My answer would be: on all the aspects indicated in the analysis
of vulnerabilities. For instance, the intellectual and cultural leaders
of the free world should be enabled to make manifest their understanding
of and sympathy for the Soviet and satellite intelligentsia. All media
of communications should be made available for this purpose, and our
best brains brought to bear on the problem of creating new channels of
contact. The knowledge that their plight is appreciated, that their
strivings are in line with civilized opinion in the outer world, that they
are not wholly isolated, will tend to raise the morale of these elements
in the Soviet world and fortify their courage to resist.
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13.
At this point let me direct your attention to Chapters V and
VI of the Memorandum, where some of the answers to your questions
are spelled out in detail. The specific proposals seem to me even more
pertinent today than they were in 1955.
V
TOWARD COLD WAR VICTORY
1. ORGANIZATION:
An organizational framework for fighting the Cold
War already exists. It needs to be adjusted and strength-
ened in line with the expanded scale and intensity of
operations.
A Strategy Board for Political Defense, the Cold War
equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military
side, is suggested. It should function directly under the
President, with Cabinet status for its Head. Top repre-
sentatives of the State Department, the Defense Depart-
ment; the Central Intelligence Agency, the U. S. Informa-
tion Agency, should sit on this Board. Liaison on a con-
tinuous basis should be maintained with all other agencies
which can play a role in the over-all effort.
There will be various operations which the Board
would undertake in its own name, with its own facilities.
But its primary function should not be operational. It
should be to plan, initiate, finance, advise, coordinate and
check on operations by other groups and agencies, whether
already in existence or created by the Board for specific
undertakings.
One cannot, however, be too specific at this point
about the organizational forms. John Foster Dulles wrote
in 1948:
"We need an organization to contest the _Com-
miinist Party at the level where it is working and
winning its victories. . . . We ought to have an organ-
ization dedicatedto the task of non-military defense,
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just as the present Secretary of Defense heads up
the organization of military defense. The new depart-
ment of non-military defense should have an adequate
personnel and ample funds."
2. FINANCING:
On the matter of funds, likewise, one cannot at this
stage offer specific estimates. But let us recall that appro-
priations over the past four years for our Military De-
fense averaged approximately 45 billion dollars annually.
In contrast, it is significant to note that for the fiscal
year 1955 the total appropriation for the U. S. Informa-
tion Agency was 79 million dollars, of which 17 million
dollars is available for the world-wide activities of the
Voice of America.
As a working hypothesis it is sugges.ted that a specific
and more realistic ratio between military and non-mili-
tary appropriations be worked out: say an amount equiv-
alent to 5 or 71/2 per cent of Military Defense appropria-
tions to be granted to the Strategy Board for Political
Defense ? this, of course, without reducing the military
budget and not counting foreign military aid and Point
Four types of expenditure.
I am convinced that if the American people and their
Congress are made fully aware of the menace we face,
of the urgent need for meeting it, and the possibility of
doing so by means short of war, they will respond will-
ingly as they have always done in times of national crisis.
They will realize that no investment to win the Cold War
is exorbitant when measured against the stakes involved,
and against the costs of the bombing war we seek to
head off.
3. IMPLEMENTING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE:
We must go from defense to attack in meeting the
political, ideological, subversive challenge. The imple-
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*me'
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mentation of the attack would devolve upon specialists
and technicians. In gearing to fight a Hot War, we call
in military strategists and tacticians. Likewise, we must
have specialists to 'fight a Cold War.
This implies in the first place the mobilization of?
hard, knowledgeable anti-Communists who understand
the issues and for whom it is not merely a job but a
dedication. The specialist in communications is impor-
tant; but the message to be communicated is even more
important.
The main weakness of our efforts to date to talk to
the masses ? and even more so to the elite groups (Army,
intelligentsia, etc.) ? in the Soviet camp is that we have
not always been consistent in what we had to say to them.
Our message has been vague and subject to change with-
out notice. As long as we regard Communist rule as
permanent, we can have no strong psychological bridges
to those who are under its yoke. The only free-world goal
that is relevant to them is one that envisages their event-
ual emancipation.
With the formulation of a message, we will at last
have something to say that interests them, not only us,
and can devote ourselves to perfecting the means of
delivering the message.
Before essaying a breakdown of Cold War methods
and techniques, we should recognize that many of them
are already being used, and often effectively. Nothing
now under way needs to be abandoned. The problem is
one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, co-
ordination and continuity ? all geared to the long-range
objectives of the undertaking. The expanded offensive
with non-military weapons must be imbued with a new
awareness of the great goal and a robust will to reach it.
No outline such as follows can be more than indica-
tive. Operations are necessarily related to current de-
velopments and opportunities opened up by events.
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In all categories the arena of action is the whole
globe. Our Cold War targets are not only behind the
Iron and Bamboo Curtains, but in every nation, the
United States included. In. thebattle for the minds of
men, we must reach the Soviet peoples, our allies, and
the uncommitted peoples.
The agencies involved will be both official and private.
The objectives must aim to achieve dramatic victories as
swiftly as possible, as a token of the changed state of
affairs. Valle the Kremlin has suffered some setbacks
and defeats, its record in the Cold War has been strikingly
one of success piled on success. This trend must be
reversed, to hearten our friends, dismay the enemy, and
confirm the fact that Communist Power is a transient
and declining phenomenon.
4. PROPAGANDA:
If the weapon is our Message, one of its basic elements
is propaganda. It is the most familiar element, but we
should not underestimate its inherent difficulties. Hot
War is destructive: the killing of people, the annihilation
of material things. Cold War must be constructive: it
must build views, attitudes, loyalties, hopes, ideals and
readiness for sacrifice. In the final check-up it calls for
greater skills to affect minds than to destroy bodies.
Propaganda, for maximum effect, must not be an end
in itself. It is a preparation for action. Words that
are not backed up by deeds, that do not generate deeds,
lose their impact. The test is whether they build the
morale of friends and undermine the morale of foes.
No means of communication should be ignored: the
spoken word and the written word; radio and television;
films ; balloons and missiles to distribute leaflets; secret
printing and mimeographing presses on Soviet controlled
soil; scrawls on walls to give isolated friends a sense
of community.
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5. COMMUNIST TARGETS:
The Communist sphere must be ringed with both
fixed and mobile broadcasting facilities, of a massiveness
to overcome jamming. The Voice of America will acquire
larger audiences and more concentrated impact under
?the new approach. Its name, it is suggested, should be
expanded to "Voice of America? for Freedom and
Peace." This slogan added to the name will, through
constant repetition, impress the truth upon receptive ears.
Besides the official voice, we have other voices, such
as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation. There are
other popular democratic voices that should make them-
selves heard: those of our free labor movement, American
war veterans, the churches, youth and women's organiza-
tions.
Already there is a minor flow of printed matter
across the Iron Curtain, especially aimed at the Red
occupation forces. The volume and effectiveness of this
effort can be enormously enlarged. Magazines and news-
papers which outwardly look like standard Communist
matter, but actually are filled with anti-Communist
propaganda, have brought results.
greater hunger for spiritual comfort, for religion,
is reported from Soviet Russia and its satellites. Pro-
grams of a spiritual and religious character are indicated.
They should preach faith in the Divine, abhorrence of
Communist godlessness, resistance to atheism. But in
addition they can offer practical advice to the spiritually
stranded ? for instance, how to observe religious occa-
sions where there are no ordained ministers or priests
to officiate.
The enslaved peoples do not have to be sold the idea
of freedom; they are already sold on it. The propaganda
should wherever possible get down to specifics. It should
expose the weaknesses, failures, follies, hypocrisies and
internal tensions of the Red masters; provide proof of
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the existence of friends and allies both at home and
abroad; offer guidance on types of resistance open even
to the individual. It should appeal to universal emotions,
to love of family, of country, of God, of humanity.
6. FREE-WORLD TARGETS:
The fighting front is everywhere. The program of
the U. S. Information Agency should be reappraised
with a view to improvement and expansion. "The Voice
of America ? for Freedom and Peace" has tasks to per-
form in many nations of the free world second in im-
portance only to those in the unfree world.
Merely to point up the inadequacy of our present
effort, consider Finland ? a country on the very edge of
the Red empire and under the most concentrated Soviet
propaganda barrage. Soviet broadcasts beamed to Fin-
land total over 43 hours weekly. A television station is
now being built in Soviet Estonia which will be directed
to a million potential viewers in nearby Finland. To
maintain their morale under this pressure, the Finnish
people, still overwhelmingly pro-West and pro-American,
have desperate need of our encouragement. Yet the
Voice of America in 1953 was compelled to discontinue its
daily half-hour broadcast to Finland to save $50,000
annually.
We need in every country, newspapers; magazines;
radio and TV stations, consciously and effectively sup-
porting our side. Those that exist should be aided ma-
terially to increase their range and vitality; others should
be started with our help. The strongest individual anti-
Communist voices must be provided with better facilities
for making themselves heard in their own countries.
Mobile film units are already penetrating backward
areas. The operation should be enlarged, its message
and appeal perfected. In addition, mobile big-screen
television units in black-and-white and in color can carry
our message. Their very novelty will guarantee large
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and attentive audiences,lkst regions in Asia and else-
where, where illiteracy bars the written word and lack
of radios bars the spoken word, could thus be reached.
To quote the Chinese saying: "One picture is worth ten
thousand words."
The so-called backward parts of the world, particu-
larly Asia, are under the most concentrated Communist
psychological attacks. Of necessity the counter-offensive
must take this into account, and develop special tech-
niques for reaching both the masses and the elite of
those areas.
.7. RADIO RECEIVERS AND PHONOGRAPHS:
Mass production of cheap and light-weight receivers
tuned to pick up American ignals are now feasible. They
should be made available by the million at cost or gratis,
as expedient, to listeners in critical areas and behind the
Iron Curtain.
There are millions of persons in the world who do not
have electric power receptacles, electron tubes, batteries
or any of the electrical and mechanical marvels which
the free world has and takes for granted. A simple, hand-
operated phonograph device costing no more ,t4n a loaf
of bread, could be produced in quantities and supplied
gratis to millions of persons living behind the Iron and
Bamboo Curtains and in other critical areas.
An unbreakable and intelligible record, made of card-
board and costing less than a bottle of Coca-Cola, could
carry our messages to these people. Such records could
be dropped from the sky like leaflets and the messages
they carried could not be jammed.
8. USE OF FACILITIES IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES:
Nearly all European and many Asian countries
possess broadcasting facilities. We should seek to enlist
their use to supplement and intensify American broad-
casting on a world-wide scale.
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In some cases this could be negotiated on a quid pro
quo basis where we are providing military or economic
aid; in other cases we may have to buy the necessary
time for transmitting our message. Our friendly allies,
such as Great Britain, have vast short-wave facilities of
world-wide scope and range and have the same reasons
as we have for seeking to win the Cold War. We need
their help in this field. We are fully justified in asking
for such help and ought to receive it.
Propaganda is a large concept. In a sense it includes
and exploits all other activities. Its successful use calls
for imagination, ingenuity, continual technical research
and, of course, effective coordination with all other opera-
tions that bear on the problems of the Cold War.
9. PASSIVE RESISTANCE:
Pending the critical periods when active resistance
in one or another Soviet country is possible and desirable,
full encouragement and support must be given to passive
rcOtance. This refers to the things the individual can
do, with minimum risk, to create doubt and confusion in
the ranks of the dictatorship, to gum up the machinery
of dictatorship government.
The worker in the mine and factory, the farmer, the
soldier in the barracks, the office worker are able to do
little things that in their millionf old totality will affect the
Ilational economy and the self-confidence of the rulers.
It is the method that comes naturally to captive peoples,
especially in countries with a long historical experience
in opposing tyrants.
Our opportunity is to give the process purposeful?
direction. In this concept the individual opponent of the
regime becomes a "resistance group of one." He receives,
by radio and other channels, specific suggestions and
instructions. The tiny drops of resistance will not be
haphazard, but calculated to achieve planned results.
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Special action programs of the type that do not re-
quire large organization ? or at most units of two or
three ? would be worked out and transmitted. Our
sympathizers in the Soviet orbit would feel themselves
part of an invisible but huge army of crusaders. Symbols
of protest would appear on a million walls. The rulers'
morale would be deliberately sapped by a multitude of
actions too small, too widespread, to be readily dealt
with.
The special value of passive resistance, aside from its
direct effects, is that it nurtures the necessary feeling of
power and readiness for risk and sacrifice that will be
invaluable when the passive stage is transformed into
more open opposition.
10. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE:
Pockets of guerilla forces remain in Poland, Hungary,
the Baltic states, China, Albania and other areas. There
is always the danger of activating them prematurely.
But their existence must be taken into the calculations
and, in concert with exiles who know the facts, they must
be kept supplied with information, slogans and new lead-
ership where needed and prudent.
Many of these resistance groups are so isolated that
they do not know of each other's existence. The simple
realization that they are not alone but part of a scattered
network will be invaluable; methods for establishing
liaison, for conveying directions, can be developed.
11. INSURRECTIONS:
The uprisings in East Germany, the strikes and riots
in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, the dramatic mutinies inside
the concentration camps of Vorkuta in the Soviet Arctic,
are examples of revolutionary actions that failed. But
they attest that insurrection is possible.
We must seek out the weakest links in the Kremlin's
chain of power. The country adjudged ripe for a break-
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away should receive concentrated study and planning.
A successful uprising in Albania, for instance, would be
a body blow to Soviet prestige and a fateful stimulus to
resistance elsewhere. (That little country is geograph-
ically isolated, ruled by a handful of puppets; able leader-
ship is available in the Albanian emigration.)
Eastern Germany is among the weakest links. Its
revolt would ignite neighboring Czechoslovakia and
Poland. The time to prepare for such actions is now ?
whether the time to carry them out be in the near or
distant future. Meanwhile we must not allow the Soviet
propoganda to make unification appear as the Com-
munist's gift to the Germans. It is a natural asset that
belongs to West Germany and her allies.
12. COLLABORATION WITH EMIGRES AND ESCAPEES:
Tens of thousinds aself-exiled fugitives from Com-
munist oppression emerge eager to plunge into move-
ments for the fr4ing of their homelands. When they
fail to find outlets for their zeal, disillusionment and
defeatism set
Maximum exploitation of this manpower and moral
passion is indicated. They must be drawn into specific,
well-organized, well-financed anti-Communist organiza-
tions and activities; utilized for propaganda and other
operations; enabled, in some cases, to return to their
native lands as "sleeper" leaders for future crises.
Officers' corps of emigres can be formed: perhaps
groups of only a score to a hundred, but available for
emergency and opportunity occasions. The existence of
such nuclei of military power ? a fact that will be widely
known ? should help generate hope and faith among
their countrymen back home.
13. PLANNED DEFECTION
Escapees have cofne, and will continue to come, spon-
taneously, now in trickles, other times in rivers. Beyond
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that the need is to stimulate defection on a selective
basis. Individual "prospects" in Soviet missions and
'legations, in Red cultural and sports delegations, can be
carefully contacted and developed. Types of individuals
needed to man Cold War undertakings will be invited to
escape, assured of important work. Special approaches
can be worked out to encourage defection of border
guards, Army officers, secret-police personnel disgusted
by their bloody chores, scientists, important writers, etc.
Escapees today are often disheartened by their initial
experience. They are taken into custody by some foreign
Intelligence Servic-e, pumped for information, and some-
times then left to shift for themselves. Their honest
patriotism is offended by the need to cooperate with for-
eigners before they are psychologically ready for it.
It is suggested that emigre commissions be set up,
composed of trusted nationals of the various countries.
The fugitive would first be received by the commission
of his own countrymen. Only when found desirable and
prepared for the step, would he be brought into contact
with American or British agencies.
14. TRAINING OF CADRES:
The immediate and prospective activities of the Cold
War offensive will require ever larger contingents of
specialized personnel for the many tasks; to provide
leadership for resistance operations; to engage in propa-
ganda, subversion, infiltration of the enemy; even to
carry on administrative and civic work after the collapse
of Communist regimes in various countries, in order to
stave off clips.
Already, limited as our political efforts are, there is
a shortage of competent personnel. Meanwhile thousands
? of younger men and women among the emigres are being
lost to factories, farms, menial jobs. This amounts to
squandering of potentially important human resources.
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We need a network of schools and universities de-
voted to training cadres for the Cold War. The objective
is not education in a generic sense, but specific prepara-
tion for the intellectual, technical, intelligence and similar
requirements of the ideological-psychological war.
This training, of course, should not be limited to
people from the Soviet areas. A sort of "West Point" of
political warfare ? analogous to the Lenin School
of Political Warfare in Moscow ? might be established.
Staffed by the ablest specialists obtainable, it would seek
out likely young people willing to make the struggle
against Communism their main or sole career.
The present "exchange of persons" program is clearly
valuable. Hundreds of foreign students go back home
with a better and friendlier understanding of America.
But beyond that, it is possible and necessary to educate
invited young people from abroad, carefully selected,
along lines of more direct and specialized value to the
Cold War effort.
In a sense these shock troops of democracy would be
like the "professional revolutionaries" on the Communist
side. They would be equipped to operate openly or as
secret infiltrees wherever the enemy's assaults need to
be neutralized. Trained anti-Communists from Asian
areas, dedicated and knowledgeable, would be available
for countries under Red pressure, as today in Southeast
Asia; Latin Americans, Europeans, would serve similar
functions in their respective regions.
Thus, from a largely amateur enterprise, our counter-
offensive would gradually be transformed into a pro-
fessional undertaking.
15. CAMPAIGNS BY SPECIAL GROUPS:
An American trade union in the clothing field played
a major role in preventing Communist victory in the
Italian elections in 1948. The International Confedera-
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tion of Free Trade Unions (in which both the A. F. of L.
and the C.I.O. are active) is conducting important psy-
chological drives in many countries and offsetting the
mischief worked by the Moscow-controlled labor inter-
national.
Speaking as workers to workers, trade unionists
have a legitimate approach to the laboring masses in the
Soviet sphere. They have a special justification for ex-
posing and publicizing forced labor, onerous laboring
conditions and laws, phony totalitarian "trade unions."
In many countries ? France and Italy, for instance
-- there are competing Communist-controlled and demo-
cratic unions. Free labor of all countries can throw its
moral and material support to the anti-Communist fed-
erations. It can take the lead in breaking Moscow's grip
on influential segments of world labor.
Corresponding political campaigns should be mounted
on a telling scale by other non-official, popular groups:
farmers' organizations and peasant unions would con-
centrate on the evils of Red collectivization; great church
groups on 'the immoral and atheistic aspects of Com-
munist theory and practice; youth organizations on the
perversion of youth under Communism, etc.
The scope of such focussed group and class appeals is
enormous. Some of them are being made already, but
withput the coordination of effort and continuity of
impact that is called for.
What a specialized group can achieve has been demon-
strated by the society of Free Jurists in West Berlin,
which indicts and condemns in absentia persons guilty of
Communist crimes. Its work is sowing the fear of retri-
bution in East Germany. Radio Free Europe has made
successful forays of the same order ? identifying brutal
officials, exposing Red agents, etc. But the surface has
only been scratched in this type of psychological pressure.
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VI
DIPLOMACY IS A WEAPON
The Kremlin treats foreign affairs as a primary arena
of ideological and psychological effort. It makes moves
on the diplomatic chessboard for their propaganda im-
pact: to rally its friends in the outside world, to win over
a particular element in some country, to embarrass its
opponents. In the measure that democratic diplomacy
fails to do likewise, it is defaulting in a vital area of the
Cold War. Let us bear in mind:
1. Day to day conduct of foreign affairs is pertinent
to the struggle for men's minds. The rigid observance
of protocol, in dealing with an enemy who recognizes
none of the traditional rules, can be self-defeating. We
must make proposals, demands, expos? publications of
official documents,, etc. that are carefully calculated to
show up the true motives of the Kremlin, to put a crimp
in Moscow political campaigns, to mobilize world opinion
? against Soviet crimes and duplicities.
For ten years we have made one-shot protests against
Soviet election frauds in satellite countries, against
violations of treaties and agreements, against shocking
crimes in the areas of Human Rights, .as defined by the
U.N. Charter. The archives are packed with these docu-
ments. These should be followed up through consistent
publicity, renewed protests, etc.
Even when nothing practical can be immediately
accomplished, the facts of slave labor, genocide, aggres-
sions, violations of Yalta, Potsdam and other ggreements
must be kept continually before the world. Diplomacy
must champion the victims of Red totalitarianism with-
out let-up. At every opportunity the spokesmen of free
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nations should address themselves to the people in the
Soviet empire over the heads of their masters; to the
people of free countries in terms of universal principles
of morality and decency.
2. The measures of reciprocity should be strictly
applied to Soviet diplomats, trade and other representa-
tives. These should enjoy no more privileges, immunities,
access to information than is accorded to free-world
representatives in Communist lands. Even socially they
should be made aware of their status as symbols of a
barbarous plexus of power. The desire to belong, to be
respectable, is by no means alien to Red officialdom.
3. Economic leverages, too, must be applied. Trade
can be turned into a powerful political weapon. The
stakes are too high to permit business-as-usual concepts
to outweigh the imperatives of the Cold War. Where
acute distress develops in a Communist country, our
readiness to help must be brought to the attention of the
people as well as their bosses. If and when food and other
relief is offered, it must be under conditions consistent
with our objectives ? to help the victims, not their rulers.
4. In virtually all countries outside the Communist
sphere there are large or small organizations devoted to
combatting Communism, at home or abroad or both.
There is little or no contact among such groups ? no
common currency of basic ideas and slogans, no exchange
of experience. Without at this stage attempting to set
up a world-wide anti-Communist coalition, or Freedom
International, we should at least facilitate closer liaison
and mutual support among anti-Soviet groupings al-
ready in existence.
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The above presentation, directly and by inference, is no less
relevant to your request for "specific steps... to bring about the failure
of what you term Soviet strategy of nibbling and the Communist strategy
of intimidation. "
An all-out Cold War offensive would of necessity aim to seize
the initiative. The "nibbling" and "intimidation" would then increasingly
be directed against the Communist world. The Soviet sphere, by
reason of increasing internal tensions, would be kept off balance. The
more that its energies and preoccupations are turned inward, the less
will remain for application outward in their operations of nibbling and
intimidation.
The actual loss of some part of the Soviet empire -- if no more
than a peripheral satellite like Albania - would be a major psychological
victory for our side and for the people in Russia who are against the
Soviet dictators. A High Command for political operations, such as I
proposed, would determine the most vulnerable portion of the Communist
territorial anatomy and concentrate major forces against that segment.
The attitudes summed up in the word "containment" still
prevail although the word itself has been abandoned. The battles of
the Cold War are either lost by default or fought on our own terrain.
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We have left the Communists substantially undisturbed in their own
sphere, merely reacting when they act. The task is to initiate actions
that oblige the enemy to react, to go on the defensive. We must
deepen the tensions already existing in the Soviet orbit, and seek to
create new ones. We must convey to the opponents of Communism inside
the Communist world a sense of comradeship and moral allies outside.
Finally you ask: "How can the lethargy of the West, if there
Is in fact such a lethargy, be replaced by a dynamism of mind and
spirit sufficient to meet the imperative of the Cold War and the
challenge offered by the nibbling successes of World Communism."
Once more, it seems to me, the answers inhere in the policy I
am suggesting. There are enormous potential and actual anti-Communist
forces in the free world. But their aggregate dynamism has never been
mobilized and applied. The very realization that the major nations,
under American leadership, have really accepted the Soviet political
challenge would activate those forces, imbue them with a sense of mission.
It would cancel out the defeatism that today weighs on those most
interested in frustrating the Communist bid for total ascendancy.
Consider, for instance, how much could be achieved if
the religious and moral potentials of the free world -- in the
first place the churches of all religions - were mobilized and
systematically directed against Communism, atheism and amoralism.
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A veritable crusading spirit could be generated that would not only
splinter existing lethargy but could not be kept from reaching the
millions on the other side of the curtain who hate and are guilt-ridden
because of Communist crimes, terror, slave labor, Godlessness.
Communists, we are told, are spending over two billion
dollars a year on Cold War propaganda, and certainly billions more on
other phases of their assault on our civilization. They maintain great
universities for the training of full-time "agitators" for operations at
home and abroad. They invest more on jamming our voices than we
spend on those voices.
The very minimum called for is saturation broadcasting of
roughly the same dimensions as the enemy's. No war has ever been
won by purely defensive strategy -- and the cold struggle is a war.
Defeat in that struggle, as I have said repeatedly, "would be as
catastrophic and as final as defeat in a shooting war. Whether we freeze
to death or burn to death, our civilization would be equally finished."
Professor Robert Straus-Hup recently wrote -- "The very
gravity of the decision of making war in the nuclear age enhances the
role of ideological warfare." Our obligation, he went on, is "to break
down the false images of Communism, to expose its inherent
contradictions, to reveal its fraudulent contentions and, on the other
hand, present the overwhelming positive sides of our society."
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*Now'
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36.
But, coming back to my starting point, that kind of
assignment cannot be carried out unless the free-world makes it a
matter of urgent policy, entitled to priorities in every department
of life. It implies the renunciation of pleasant self-delusions about
some magical "liberalization" of the Soviet beast; of some clever
gadget that will end the Cold War and freeze the world permanently
into half-free half-slave sections. It calls for leadership through
organization of top-level authority, and for coordination of
anti-Communist forces outside government in all free nations.
A thirty-six page letter should end with an apology for
its length. But your questions are so broad in character and scope
that I am conscious as I am about to sign off, that I have not covered
the subject as fully as it deserves. So, I offer you instead my
apologies for its brevity.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
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PROGRAM FOR A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE
AGAINST WORLD COMMUNISM
A MEMORANDUM BY DAVID SARNOFF
APRIL 5, 1955
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01111110 Oa 11110.1
PROGRAM FOR A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE
AGAINST WORLD COMMUNISM
A MEMORANDUM BY DAVID SARNOFF
APRIL 5, 1955
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CONTENTS
Page
Introduction 3
I How the Communists Wage Cold War 4
II We Dare Not Lose the Cold War 13
III To Prevent a Hot War, We Must Win the
Cold War 15
IV The Message of Freedom 22
V Toward Cold War Victory 25
VI Diplomacy Is a Weapon 38
VII Summary 40
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.0.4111Milk
INTRODUCTION
Our best and surest way to prevent a Hot War is to
win the Cold War. Individual democratic leaders have
long been aware of this truth, but it has not yet been fully
grasped by the free world.
Because the label is of recent coinage, many people
assume that the Cold War is a new phenomenon. Actu-
ally it has been under way ever since the Bolsheviks,
entrenched in Russia and disposing of its resources,
launched the Third or Communist International.
World Communism has been making war on our
civilization for more than three decades. And the term
"war" is not used here in a merely rhetorical sense. It
has been a war with campaigns and battles, strategy
and tactics, conquests and retreats. Even the postwar
years, it should be noted, have seen Red retreats?in
Greece, Iran, Berlin, for instance?as well as victories;
but such retreats have occurred only when the West asted
awarely and boldly.
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HOW THE COMMUNISTS
WAGE COLD WAR
There have been intervals of truce in the Cold War
but not of true peace. Periods of seeming Communist
moderation have been used as a cover for frantic build-
ups and deployments for the next big push. There has
not been a single year when the Kremlin did not, with
single-minded concentration, make the most of its oppor-
tunities by methods short of general war.
Not a single country today under Communist rule
was conquered by outright military assault. Russia itself
fell to the Bolsheviks through a political coup, after other
parties had overthrown the old regime. The East Euro-
pean satellites were placed behind the Iron Curtain by
cunning diplomacy and brute extortion. China was joined
to the Soviet sphere by "rear operations" performed from
inside.
It is useful to break down Moscow's political-psycho-
logical techniques for easier observation. But it should
be remembered that they are all inextricably intermeshed,
that they are stepped up or soft-pedalled as required,
that they are supplemented with physical force and the
menace of such force according to circumstances. The
listing that follows is therefore overlapping.
1. PROPAGANDA:
The massive use of all media of communications by
the Soviet Government, its puppet governments, local
Communist parties, and by ostensibly independent groups
under Moscow control or influence, is vast but impossible
to measure.
In 1948 Soviet broadcasting to foreign targets totalled
528 hours per week. By 1954 this figure was increased
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to 1,675 hours. In addition, the Soviet news agency
"Tass" broadcasts 121 hours daily to the foreign press.
By comparison, the Voice of America broadcasts only 716
hours a week.
It is estimated that over 1,000 Soviet transmitters are
engaged in "jamming" our signals. The Kremlin spends
more for jamming it than we spend on all operations of
the Voice of America. The Soviet and satellite expendi-
tures in all types of foreign propaganda cannot be accu-
rately gauged?nearly everything Communists do has a
propaganda content?but these costs run into billions of
dollars annually.
Printed matter in tremendous quantities pours out of
the USSR into the non-Soviet world. Several large pub-
lishing houses in Moscow and elsewhere do nothing else
but feed this flood. Besides, the Kremlin operates a chain
of large publishing enterprises on foreign soil. Their
Red tide of books, pamphlets, reports, posters, etc. inun-
dates the world.
In nearly every non-Soviet country and region there
are newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations, either
overtly under pro-Communist control or in "liberal"
disguises. These speak in local tongues?but the voice
is Moscow's. In addition, thousands of Kremlin-oriented
individual writers, commentators, editors, and trained
propagandists are smuggled into strategic non-Commu-
nist spots to plug the current Moscow lines.
All available forums, from the United Nations to
cultural and sports gatherings, are exploited to advance
the battle for men's minds.
Special emphasis is given in Communist plans to what
is called the "propaganda of acts"?strikes, riots, dem-
onstrations, mass meetings in support of Soviet objectives
or in protest against local policies distasteful to the
Soviets, and contrived events of every kind.
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Soviet films are rated high in the Communist propa-
ganda plans. Pure entertainment in films, of course, is
almost non-existent. The result is that any and all pic-
tures made in the Soviet sphere, however disguised as
art, contain a "message" which contributes to their
cumulative effort to brainwash the non-Soviet world.
2. INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION:
Through Communists, fellow-travelers and assorted
sympathizers, there is a systematic "colonization" of
governments, labor unions, educational and scientific in-
stitutions and social organizations. The goal is to weaken
the infiltrated bodies or to use their leverage to influence
public opinion and official policy in the Kremlin's direc-
tion; to undermine traditions and subvert loyalties which
block the road to Communist thinking.
In the infiltration of government agencies, espionage
is by no means the chief purpose. Far more important
to the Soviets is the subtle pressure an infiltree can bring
to bear upon the shaping of national policy and the in-
fluencing of national moods. The theft of secret docu-
ments is routine. The subversion of a government's self-
interest, the sowing of disunity, the careful sabotage of
policies unfavorable to Soviet interests?these require
and receive more polished methods.
3. FIFTH COLUMNS AND FALSE FRONTS:
Communist Parties, whether legal or proscribed, are
the primary fifth column. They function under direct
instructions from Moscow headquarters, usually under
leaders assigned from outside.
But this is the beginning, not the end, of the ap-
paratus of power reaching into every corner of the free
world. Innumerable committees, congresses, leagues are
set up?outwardly devoted to legitimate and even noble
causes like peace, race equality, anti-fascism, but actu-
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ally controlled and manipulated by Communists for
strictly Communist objectives.
These false-front outfits are spawned continually,
discarded when their purpose has been served. In the
United States, where this technique has been widely
practiced, they have run into scores. Every new situation
produces its organizational instrument. At times a front
started for one purpose is shifted overnight to its op-
posite: thus fronts for keeping America out of the war
during the life of the Moscow-Berlin pact were converted
into fronts for putting America into the war after the
Germans attacked Soviet Russia.
Besides creating these fifth-column devices, the Com-
munists also are expert at "capturing" organizations
started by others. By joining some existing society or
committee, acting as a disciplined minority bound by
caucus decisions, a dozen persons have frequently suc-
ceeded in taking effective control of organizations with
thousands of members.
4. SABOTAGE AND TERROR:
The use of these weapons in time of war is familiar,
but its systematic use in peace-time is the great Com-
munist innovation. In all free countries the main targets
of infiltration are defense industries, communications,
transport and police systems?all of which offer ample
opportunity for mischief affecting a nation's security.
Strikes at strategic points and strategic times, as well
as overt physical sabotage, can slow up a country's
preparations for defense or actual war-making capacity.
In regions where it is useful and feasible, the Com-
munists do not disdain raw terror: incendiarism, kid-
napping, assassination. A special research section of the
MVD (Soviet secret police) is devoted to developing
murder weapons, poisons and the like.
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5. CIVIL STRIFE:
Internal discontents and economic crises are stimu-
lated and then systematically exploited to produce inner
disunity, chaos and actual civil insurrection. Guerilla
forces under professional military leaders are frequently
reinforced by "volunteers" from outside.
Para-military formations, underground organiza-
tions of every variety in line with local conditions and
opportunities, are standard techniques. Genuine griev-
ances are channeled and exploited through local "nation-
alist" or "anti-colonial" and "anti-imperialist" move-
ments, either started by the Communists or infiltrated
and captured.
6. PREPARATION OF "CADRES":
In Soviet Russia and now in its colonial states there
are schools and universities of revolution. Students,
drawn from all countries, are taught the theory and
practice of political warfare, sabotage, guerilla opera-
tions, propaganda methods.
Virtually all heads of Red Satellite states and insur-
rectionary movements in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin
America are products of such institutions. Tito, Dic-
tator of Jugoslavia; Ho Chi Minh, number one Com-
munist of Indo-China; Rakosi, the top leader in Red
Hungary; Bierut, President of Red Poland; Liu Shao-
Chi, Vice President of Communist China, and General
Liu Po-Cheng, one of the foremost military leaders of
Red China. The same is true of many leaders of Com-
munist Parties in non-Soviet countries.
The job of preparing cadres to implement the Cold
War and to provide generalship for civil conflicts and
other revolutionary actions has been going on since the
1920's. Even during the last war, while t& Kremlin
ostensibly was on terms of friendship with its allies, the
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training of leaders for revolutions in the allied countries
was not slackened.
7. PREPARATION OF RESERVES:
The Communist high command does not depend only
on the faithful Communists. It attaches great value to
its peripheral "reserves"?groups of sympathizers or
innocent collaborators willing to travel along the Com-
munist road part of the distance. These are mobilized
and brainwashed through the false-front organizations,
United and Peoples Fronts, the spread (as required) of
pacifist or neutralist sentiment, doctrines of class strug-
gle, belief in the "inevitable" collapse of capitalism and
free societies.
In advanced countries like the United States, Britain,
France, some segments of the so-called "intelligentsia"
have proved especially vulnerable to Communist indoc-
trination. Not only their self-doubts and frustrations
but their most generous idealistic instincts have been
canalized and perverted to promote victory for the Soviets
in the Cold War.
The turnover in these "reserves" is of course high.
Fellow-travelers by the thousand are likely to become
disillusioned with every new Soviet policy zigzag. But
expert manipulation of public opinion serves to retrieve
such losses.
8. TREACHEROUS DIPLOMACY:
In its Cold War operations the Kremlin enjoys the
advantage of working on two levels?as a conventional
State dealing with other states and as a conspiratorial
movement embracing the whole globe. In its guise of
"just another government" the Politburo can make prom-
ises and engagements which world Communism is under
orders to violate.
Soviet diplomacy takes full advantage of the moral
code and "political naivet?of some free countries and
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especially of their eagerness for peace, sometimes peace
at any price. It uses the threat of war as a species of
blackmail, and is past master at playing off one country
against another. It appeals to the profit motives of com-
petitive economies, and in general exploits what it refers
to as the "inner contradictions" of the free world.
It can make the most of amorphous slogans like
"peaceful coexistence"?a phrase coined by Lenin, re-
peatedly used by Stalin and candidly defined in Commu-
nist literature as a "tactic" or "stratagem" to gain time,
deploy forces, undermine enemy vigilance.
In the arena of foreign relations the Kremlin can
blow hot or cold, inflame our fears or our hopes to any
required temperature, and use trickery to induce its
enemies to drop their guard. Its announcements of policy,
negotiations and talk of negotiations, tourists to Red
areas, artistic and cultural missions abroad?everything
is grist for the Cold War mills.
The Communist high command recognizes no re-
straints, no rules of fair play, no codes of civilized be-
havior. It regards its great "historical mission" as a
mandate which cancels out traditional values in the rela-
tions between man and man or country and country. In
pursuance of that commitment it considers any cost in
life and substance to be justified. A system of power
which has not hesitated to "liquidate" millions of its own
citizens cannot be expected to hesitate to wipe out lives
anywhere else.
Moscow has brought one-third of the human race
under its iron control by means short of a Hot War?by
shrewd diplomacy, deception, propaganda, the blackmail
of threats, fifth-column subversion, guerilla forces and,
where expedient, localized shooting wars. These political
and psychological methods?the Cold War?have paid off,
at smaller risk and infinitely lower cost than a Hot War
would entail.
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Accordingly they are being applied without stint to
the conquest of the rest of mankind. For world Com-
munism, with its high command in the Kremlin in
Moscow, the Cold War is not a temporary or holding
operation, nor a prelude to a Hot War. It is the main
bout, the decisive offensive, conducted on an unlimited
scale, with total victory as its goal.
In a decision of the U. S. Supreme Court (Vol. 339,
May 8, 1950) an opinion written by the late Justice
Robert H. Jackson stated the case against Communism
in language that is clear and penetrating. He said:
"The goal of the Communist Party is to seize
powers of government by and for a minority rather
than to acquire power through the vote of a free
electorate. . . .
"... It purposes forcibly to recast our whole social
and political structure after the Muscovite model of
police-state dictatorship. It rejects the entire relig-
ious and cultural heritage of Western civilization, as
well as the American economic and political systems.
This Communist movement is a belated counter-revo-
lution to the American Revolution, designed to undo
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution,
and our Bill of Rights, and overturn our system of
free, representative self-government.
"Goals so extreme and offensive to American tra-
dition and aspiration obviously could not be attained
or approached through order or with tranquility. If,
by their better organization and discipline, they were
successful, more candid Communists admit that it
would be to an accompaniment of violence, but at
the same time they disclaim responsibility by blaming
the violence upon those who engage in resistance or
reprisal. It matters little by whom the first blow
would be struck; no one can doubt that an era of
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violence and oppression, confiscations and liquidations
would be concurrent with a regime of Communism.
"Such goals set up a cleavage among us too fun-
damental to be composed by democratic processes.
Our constitutional scheme of elections will not settle
issues between large groups when the price of losing
is to suffer extinction. When dissensions cut too
deeply, men will fight, even hopelessly, before they
will submit. And this is the kind of struggle projected
by the Communist Party and inherent in its program.
it
? ? ?
"Violent and undemocratic means are the calcu-
lated and indispensable methods to attain the Com-
munist Party's goal. . . . In not one of the countries
it now dominates was the Communist Party chosen
by a free or contestable election; in not one can it be
evicted by any election. The international police state
has crept over Eastern Europe by deception, coercion,
coup d' etat, terrorism and assassination. Not only
has it overpowered its critics and opponents; it has
usually liquidated them."
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II
WE DARE NOT LOSE THE COLD WAR
If we ignore these facts, or do not counteract them
effectively in good time, we shall lose the Cold War by
default. For the United States and other free nations,
defeat of this sort would be as catastrophic and as final
as defeat in a shooting war. Whether we freeze to
death or burn to death, our civilization would be equally
finished.
Were the Communists willing to settle for a perma-
nently divided world, each half pledged not to interfere
with the other, they could readily arrange it. But they
are not interested in a stalemate. In the nature of their
ideology and world-wide apparatus of action, they must
continue to drive relentlessly toward their ultimate
objective. They are irrevocably dedicated to winning
the Cold War. They prefer to attain world dominion
by non-military means because:
(a) They consider themselves masters of Cold War
techniques pitted against those whom they regard as
amateurs; their chances of victory seem to them incom-
parably greater than in a conventional military show-
down.
(b) Political warfare does not directly endanger
their own territories, industry, manpower and above all,
their mechanism of dictatorial power.
(c) Clear-cut victory in the Cold War would give
them access to our technology and resources, our great
cities and treasures, intact and ready for exploitation;
whereas a military victory would give them only the
ruins of nuclear devastation.
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Now as in the past, they proceed in the conviction that
they can gain world hegemony by methods that, in the
phrase of Leon Trotsky, constitute "neither war nor
peace." For Moscow, the real alternative to a nuclear
showdown is not "peace" but political-psychological war-
fare of a magnitude to weaken, demoralize, chip away
and ultimately take over what remains of the free world.
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III
TO PREVENT A HOT WAR, WE MUST
WIN THE COLD WAR
Political psychological offensives are not new. They
have frequently been employed in war-time, to supple-
ment ordinary military action. We used them ourselves
in both world wars. Their purpose has been to soften up
the enemy's will to resist, to win friends and allies in
hostile areas, to drive wedges between belligerent gov-
ernments and their citizenry.
The democracies are familiar with war-making in the
normal military sense and hence do not hesitate to make
huge investments and sacrifices in its name. They do
not shrink from the prospect of casualties. All of that
seems "natural." But they are startled by proposals for
effort and risk of such dimensions in the life-and-death
struggle with non-military means.
Under these circumstances it has become incumbent
upon our leadership to make the country aware that non-
military or Cold War is also terribly "real"?that the
penalty for losing it will be enslavement.
Hot War is always a possibility. It may come through
force of circumstances even if no one wants it. Limited,
localized wars are also a continuing threat. Nothing in
this memorandum should be construed as a substitute
for adequate military vitality. On the contrary, superior
physical force in being is the indispensable guarantee
for effective non-military procedures.
We must maintain our lead, and accelerate the tempo
of progress, in the race for ascendancy in nuclear
weapons, guided missiles, air power, early warning sys-
tems, electronic know-how, chemical and bacteriological
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methods of warfare. We must maintain adequate and
well balanced forces for the ground, sea and air. These
conventional military forces must be ready and capable
of deterring or meeting an outbreak of peripheral or
small-scale wars this side of a general showdown. They
will be indispensable in a general war, if one should be
fought without nuclear weapons. We must stockpile and
protect the sources of vital strategic materials.
But short of a blunder that ignites the Third World
War which nobody wants, the immediate danger is the
debilitating, costly, tense war of nerves that is part of
the Cold War. Because there is no immediate sense of
overwhelming menace, no thunder of falling bombs and
daily casualty figures, we are apt to think of this period
as "peace." But it is nothing of the sort.
The primary threat today is political and psycho-
logical. That is the active front on which we are losing
and on which, unless we reverse the trend, we shall be
defeated. Its effects are spelled out in civil wars in parts
of Asia, legal Communist Parties of colossal size in some
European countries, "nationalist" movements under
Communist auspices, "neutralism" and rabid anti
Americanism in many parts of the world?in pressures,
that is to say, of every dimension and intensity short of
a global shooting war.
Unless we meet this cumulative Communist threat
with all the brains and weapons we can mobilize for the
purpose, the United States at some point in the future
will face the terrifying implications of Cold War defeat.
It will be cornered, isolated, subjected to the kind of
paralyzing fears that have already weakened the fibre
of some technically free nations. We will have bypassed
a nuclear war?but at the price of our freedom and inde-
pendence. I repeat: we can freeze to dellth as well as
burn to death.
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OUR COUNTER-STRATEGY:
Logically we have no true alternative but to acknowl-
edge the reality of the Cold War and proceed to turn
Moscow's favorite weapons against world Communism.
We have only a choice between fighting the Cold War
with maximum concentration of energy, or waiting su-
pinely until we are overwhelmed. Our political counter-
strategy has to be as massive, as intensive, as flexible
as the enemy's.
We must meet the Cold War challenge in our own
household and in the rest of the world, and carry the
contest behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. We must
seek out and exploit the weak spots in the enemy's armor,
just as the Kremlin has been doing to us these 30-odd
years. We must make our Truth as effective and more
productive than Moscow's Lie.
Our political strategy and tactics should be in terms
of a major enterprise, on a scale for victory, with all the
inherent risks and costs. We cannot fight this fight with
our left hand, on the margin of our energies. We have
to bring to its resources, personnel and determination to
match the enemy's. This is a case where, as in a military
conflict, insufficient force may be as fatal as none at all.
If obliged to make tactical retreats, moreover, we
must not bemuse ourselves that they are enduring solu-
tions. To do so would be to disarm ourselves and open
ourselves to new and bigger blows. This is a principle
of particular importance during intervals when negotia-
tions with Moscow or Peking are being discussed or are
in progress.
The question, in truth, is no longer whether we should
engage in the Cold War. The Soviet drive is forcing us
to take counter-measures in any case. The question,
rather, is whether we should undertake it with a clear-
headed determination to use all means deemed essential,
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oy governments an-ct ioy private groups ? to win the
contest.
Our counter-measures and methods must be novel,
unconventional, daring and flexible. They must, more-
over, be released from the inhibitions of peace-time, since
it is peace only in outer forms.
Almost against our will, in point of fact, we have
launched more and more Cold War activities. But they
have been piecemeal, on an inadequate scale and often
without the all-important continuity of action. Worst
of all, they have not been geared for total victory, being
treated as extras, as harassment operations while hop-
ing against hope that there will be no outbreak of war
or that there will be a miraculous outbreak of genuine
peace.
Our current posture shares the weakness inherent
in all defensive strategy. The hope of a real compromise
is a dangerous self-delusion. It assumes that Soviet Rus-
sia is a conventional country interested in stabilizing
the world, when in fact it is the powerhouse of a dynamic
world movement which thrives on instability and chaos.
Our duty and our best chance for salvation, in the
final analysis, is to prosecute the Cold War?to the point
of victory. To survive in freedom we must win.
THE ENEMY IS VULNERABLE:
The free world, under the impact of Moscow's Cold
War victories, has tended to fix attention on Soviet
strengths while overlooking or discounting Soviet weak-
nesses.
The Communists expertly exploit all our internal
tensions, injustices and discontents. Yet within the
Soviet empire the tensions are imcomparably greater, the
injustices and discontents more vast. Our opportunity,
which we have failed to use so far, is to exploit these in
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order to undermine the Kremlin, exacerbate its domestic
problems, weaken its sense of destiny.
The nature of a malady can be deduced from the
medicine applied. In its fourth decade of absolute power,
the Soviet regime is obliged to devote a major portion
of its energies, manpower and resources to keep its own
subjects and captive countries under control, through
ever larger doses of terror. There we have the proof
that the Communists have failed to "sell" their system
to their victims.
Even a ruthless police-state does not maintain
gigantic secret-police forces, special internal security
armies, colossal networks of forced-labor colonies just
for the fun of it. These are measures of self-defense
against actual or potential internal oppositions. After
all discounts are made for wishful thinking and error,
ample evidence remains that in the Soviet sphere the
West has millions of allies, tens of millions of potential
allies.
Whether the potential can be turned into actuality,
whether the will to resist can be kept alive and inflamed
to explosive intensity, depend in the first place on the
policies of the non-Soviet world. Our potential fifth
columns are greater by millions than the enemy's. But
they have yet to be given cohesion, direction and the
inner motive power of hope and expectation of victory.
No one knows whether, let alone when, the internal
Soviet stresses can reach a climax in insurrectionary
breaks. It would be frivolous to count on such a climax.
But we have everything to gain by promoting a spirit of
mutiny, to keep the Kremlin off balance, to deepen exist-
ing rifts, to sharpen economic and empire problems for
them.
For the purposes of our Cold War strategy it suffices
that the potential for uprisings exists. Soviet economic
conditions are bad, particularly in the domain of food
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production. Nations which used to be exporters of bread
(Hungary, Poland, Russia itself) now lack bread for
themselves. As Secretary of Agriculture Benson said
recently: "Failure of the Soviet system to provide for
the basic needs of its own people could be one of the most
important historical facts of our time."
The Soviet peasants, still the overwhelming majority
of the Kremlin-held populations, are everywhere bitter
and restive. The Politburo knows that it cannot count
implicitly upon the loyalty and allegiance of its subjects.
At the same time it has failed utterly to assimilate the
captive countries, so that it has no allies but only sullen
colonial puppets.
In the last war the USSR fought on two fronts?
against the foreign invaders and against its own people.
There is reason to believe that Hitler's psychological
blunders, in insulting and alienating the Russian peoples,
helped save the Stalin regime from destruction by its
own subjects. In the present Cold War, too, the USSR
must maintain its fight against the Soviet citizenry, and
at the same time deal with seething dissidence in the
subjected countries.
The basic conditions for successful Cold War
counter-strategy thus exist.
GUIDELINES FOR POLITICAL OFFENSIVE:
Our guiding objectives in an all-out political offensive
are fairly obvious. They must include the following:
1. To keep alive throughout the Soviet empire the
spirit of resistance and the hope of eventual freedom and
sovereignty. If we allow that hope to expire, the Kremlin
will have perpetuated its dominion over its victims.
2. To break the awful sense of isolation in which the
internal enemies of the Kremlin live?by making them
aware that, like the revolutionists in Tsarist times, they
have devoted friends and powerful allies 'beyond their
frontiers.
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wp the
IINIONEXPolos
fear of their own people that is already chronic in the
Kremlin. The less certain the Soviets are of the alle-
giance of their people, the more they will hesitate to
provoke adventures involving the risks of a major show-
down.
4. To provide moral and material aid, including
trained leadership, to oppositions, undergrounds, resist-
ance movements in satellite nations and China and Russia
proper.
5. To make maximum use of the fugitives from the
Soviet sphere, millions in the aggregate, now living in
free parts of the world.
6. To appeal to the simple personal yearnings of
those under the Communist yoke: release from police
terror, ownership of small farms and homes, free trade
unions to defend their rights at the job, the right to
worship as they please, the right to change residence
and to travel, etc.
7. To shatter the "wave of the future" aura around
Communism, displacing the assumption that "Commu-
nism is inevitable" with a deepening certainty that "the
end of Communism is inevitable."
8. To inspire millions in the free countries with a
feeling of moral dedication to the enlargement of the
area of freedom, based on repugnance to slave labor, co-
erced atheism, purges and the rest of the Soviet horrors.
This inventory of objectives is necessarily sketchy
and incomplete. But it indicates the indispensable direc-
tion of the Cold War effort.
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THE MESSAGE OF FREEDOM
We must be quite certain of our destination before we
can begin to figure out means of transportation. There is
little point in discussing the how of it until a firm decision
for an all-out political-psychological counter-offensive is
reached.
In Hot War, you need a weapon and means of deliver-
ing it to the target. The same is true in Cold War. The
weapon is the message; after it has been worked out, we
can develop the facilities for delivering it to the world at
large and to the Communist-captive nations in particular.
The essence of that message (and its formulation is
the critical first step) is that America has decided, irrev-
ocably, to win the Cold War; that its ultimate aim is, in
concert with all peoples, to cancel out the destructive
power of Soviet-based Communism.
Once that decision is made, some of the means for im-
plementing it will become self-evident; others will be
explored and developed under the impetus of the clear-cut
goal. Agreement on the problem must come before agree-
ment on the solution.
"To be effective," as one student of the problem has
put it, "our decision must be as sharp-edged and uncom-
promising as the Kremlin's; it must be spelled out as un-
equivocally as the Communists have done in the works of
Lenin and Stalin and the official programs of the Com-
intern and Cominform."
Adjustment of our thinking in accord with such a
decision to win the Cold War demands clari.ty on at least
the following points:
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Tn
1. e struggle by means short of general
war is not
a preliminary bout but the decisive contest, in which the
loser may not have a second chance.
2. It must therefore be carried on with the same
focused effort, the same resolute spirit, the same willing-
ness to accept costs and casualties, that a Hot War would
involve.
3. In order to establish credence and inspire con-
fidence, our conduct must be consistent. Our philosophy
of freedom must embrace the whole of mankind; it must
not stop short at the frontiers of the Soviet sphere. Only
this can give our side a moral grandeur, a revolutionary
elan, a crusading spirit not only equal to but superior to
the other side's.
4. We must learn to regard the Soviet countries as
enemy-occupied territory, with the lifting of the occupa-
tion as the over-all purpose of freedom-loving men every-
where. This applies not only to areas captured since the
war, but includes Russia itself. Any other policy would
turn what should be an anti-Communist alliance into an
anti-Russian alliance, forcing the Russians (as Hitler
forced them during the war) to rally around the regime
they hate.
5. The fact that the challenge is global must be kept
clearly in view. Red guerillas in Burma, Communists in
France or the U. S., the Huks in the Philippines, Red
agents in Central America ? these are as much "the
enemy" as the Kremlin itself.
6. We must realize that world Communism is not a
tool in the hands of Russia ? Russia is a tool in the hands
of world Communism. Repeatedly Moscow has sacrificed
national interests in deference to world-revolutionary
needs. This provides opportunities for appeals to Ruasian
patriotism.
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7. Though the Soviets want a nuclear war no more
than we do, they accept the risk of it in pushing their
political offensive. We, too, cannot avoid risks. (It might
become necessary, Mr. Dulles said recently, "to forego
peace in order to secure the blessings of liberty.") The
greatest risk of all, for us, is to do less than is needed
to win the Cold War. At worst that would mean defeat
by default; and at best, a situation so menacing to the
survival of freedom that a Hot War may become in-
evitable.
Our present lead in the possession of nuclear weapons
and the ability to use them may be matched by the Com-
munists in the next few years. This is the view expressed
by competent statesmen, scientists and military experts.
If and when nuclear parity is reached, the enemy's fa-
natics (and there may be a powerful madman ? a Hitler
? among them) might be tempted to use them against
us by throwing a sneak punch. Since our policy is not
to throw the first nuclear punch but only to retaliate if
it is thrown against us, we may find as more horror-
weapons are unfolded, that to yield to the enemy the
initiative of the first offensive punch, is tantamount to
national suicide. All this further emphasizes the vital
need for winning the Cold War and preventing a Hot
War.
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peffirasral
V
TOWARD COLD WAR VICTORY
1. ORGANIZATION:
An organizational framework for fighting the Cold
War already exists. It needs to be adjusted and strength-
ened in line with the expanded scale and intensity of
operations.
A Strategy Board for Political Defense, the Cold War
equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military
side, is suggested. It should function directly under the
President, with Cabinet status for its Head. Top repre-
sentatives of the State Department, the Defense Depart-
ment, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U. S. Informa-
tion Agency, should sit on this Board. Liaison on a con-
tinuous basis should be maintained with all other agencies
which can play a role in the over-all effort.
There will be various operations which the Board
would undertake in its own name, with its own facilities.
But its primary function should not be operational. It
should be to plan, initiate, finance, advise, coordinate and
check on operations by other groups and agencies, whether
already in existence or created by the Board for specific
undertakings.
One cannot, however, be too specific at this point
about the organizational forms. John Foster Dulles wrote
in 1948:
"We need an organization to contest the Com-
munist Party at the level where it is working and
winning its victories. . . . We ought to have an organ-
ization dedicated to the task of non-military defense,
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just as the present Secretary of Defense macs up
the organization of military defense. The new depart-
ment of non-military defense should have an adequate
personnel and ample funds."
2. FINANCING:
On the matter of funds, likewise, one cannot at this
stage offer specific estimates. But let us recall that appro-
priations over the past four years for our Military De-
fense averaged approximately 45 billion dollars annually.
In contrast, it is significant to note that for the fiscal
year 1955 the total appropriation for the U. S. Informa-
tion Agency was 79 million dollars, of which 17 million
dollars is available for the world-wide activities of the
Voice of America.
As a working hypothesis it is suggested that a specific
and more realistic ratio between military and non-mili-
tary appropriations be worked out: say an amount equiv-
alent to 5 or 71/2 per cent of Military Defense appropria-
tions to be granted to the Strategy Board for Political
Defense ? this, of course, without reducing the military
budget and not counting foreign military aid and Point
Four types of expenditure.
I am convinced that if the American people and their
Congress are made fully aware of the menace we face,
of the urgent need for meeting it, and the possibility of
doing so by means short of war, they will respond will-
ingly as they have always done in times of national crisis.
They will realize that no investment to win the Cold War
is exorbitant when measured against the stakes involved,
and against the costs of the bombing war we seek to
head off.
3. IMPLEMENTING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE:
We must go from defense to attack in meeting the
political, ideological, subversive challenge. The imple-
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mentation of the attack would devolve upo Wiesla-9
and technicians. In gearing to fight a Hot War, we call
in military strategists and tacticians. Likewise, we must
have specialists to fight a Cold War.
This implies in the first place the mobilization of
hard, knowledgeable anti-Communists who understand
the issues and for whom it is not merely a job but a
dedication. The specialist in communications is impor-
tant; but the message to be communicated is even more
important.
The main weakness of our efforts to date to talk to
the masses ? and even more so to the elite groups (Army,
intelligentsia, etc.) ? in the Soviet camp is that we have
not always been consistent in what we had to say to them.
Our message has been vague and subject to change with-
out notice. As long as we regard Communist rule as
permanent, we can have no strong psychological bridges
to those who are under its yoke. The only free-world goal
that is relevant to them is one that envisages their event-
ual emancipation.
With the formulation of a message, we will at last
have something to say that interests them, not only us,
and can devote ourselves to perfecting the means of
delivering the message.
Before essaying a breakdown of Cold War methods
and techniques, we should recognize that many of them
.406111104 are already being used, and often effectively. Nothing
now under way needs to be abandoned. The problem is
one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, co-
ordination and continuity ? all geared to the long-range
objectives of the undertaking. The expanded offensive
with non-military weapons must be imbued with a new
awareness of the great goal and a robust will to reach it.
No outline such as follows can be more than indica-
tive. Operations are necessarily related to current de-
velopments and opportunities opened up by events.
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In all categories the arena of action is the whole
globe. Our Cold War targets are not only behind the
Iron and Bamboo Curtains, but in every nation, the
United States included. In the battle for the minds of
men, we must reach the Soviet peoples, our allies, and
the uncommitted peoples.
The agencies involved will be both official and private.
The objectives must aim to achieve dramatic victories as
swiftly as possible, as a token of the changed state of
affairs. While the Kremlin has suffered some setbacks
and defeats, its record in the Cold War has been strikingly
one of success piled on success. This trend must be
reversed, to hearten our friends, dismay the enemy, and
confirm the fact that Communist Power is a transient
and declining phenomenon.
4. PROPAGANDA:
If the weapon is our Message, one of its basic elements
is propaganda. It is the most familiar element, but we
should not underestimate its inherent difficulties. Hot
War is destructive: the killing of people, the annihilation
of material things. Cold War must be constructive: it
must build views, attitudes, loyalties, hopes, ideals and
readiness for sacrifice. In the final check-up it calls for
greater skills to affect minds than to destroy bodies.
Propaganda, for maximum effect, must not be an end
in itself. It is a preparation for action. Words that
are not backed up by deeds, that do not generate deeds,
lose their impact. The test is whether they build the
morale of friends and undermine the morale of foes.
No means of communication should be ignored: the
spoken word and the written word; radio and television;
fllms balloons and missiles to distribute leaflets; secret
printing and mimeographing presses on Soviet controlled
soil; scrawls on walls to give isolated friends a -sense
of community.
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5. COMMUNIST TARGETS:
The Communist sphere must be ringed with both
fixed and mobile broadcasting facilities, of a massiveness
to overcome jamming. The Voice of America will acquire
larger audiences and more concentrated impact under
the new approach. Its name, it is suggested, should be
expanded to "Voice of America? for Freedom and
Peace." This slogan added to the name will, through
constant repetition, impress the truth upon receptive ears.
Besides the official voice, we have other voices, such
as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation. There are
other popular democratic voices that should make them-
selves heard: those of our free labor movement, American
war veterans, the churches, youth and women's organiza-
tions.
Already there is a minor flow of printed matter
across the Iron Curtain, especially aimed at the Red
occupation forces. The volume and effectiveness of this
effort can be enormously enlarged. Magazines and news-
papers which outwardly look like standard Communist
matter, but actually are filled with anti-Communist
propaganda, have brought results.
A greater hunger for spiritual comfort, for religion,
is reported from Soviet Russia and its satellites. Pro-
grams of a spiritual and religious character are indicated.
They should preach faith in the Divine, abhorrence of
Communist godlessness, resistance to atheism. But in
addition they can offer practical advice to the spiritually
stranded ? for instance, how to observe religious occa-
sions where there are no ordained ministers or priests
to officiate.
The enslaved peoples do not have to be sold the idea
of freedom; they are already sold on it. The propaganda
should wherever possible get down to specifics. It should
expose the weaknesses, failures, follies, hypocrisies and
internal tensions of the Red masters; provide proof of
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the existence of friends and allies both at home and
abroad; offer guidance on types of resistance open even
to the individual. It should appeal to universal emotions,
to love of family, of country, of God, of humanity.
6. FREE-WORLD TARGETS:
The fighting front is everywhere. The program of
the U. S. Information Agency should be reappraised
with a view to improvement and expansion. "The Voice
of America ? for Freedom and Peace" has tasks to per-
form in many nations of the free world second in im-
portance only to those in the unfree world.
Merely to point up the inadequacy of our present
effort, consider Finland ? a country on the very edge of
the Red empire and under the most concentrated Soviet
propaganda barrage. Soviet broadcasts beamed to Fin-
land total over 43 hours weekly. A television station is
now being built in Soviet Estonia which will be directed
to a million potential viewers in nearby Finland. To
maintain their morale under this pressure, the Finnish
people, still overwhelmingly pro-West and pro-American,
have desperate need of our encouragement. Yet the
Voice of America in 1953 was compelled to discontinue its
daily half-hour broadcast to Finland to save $50,000
annually.
We need in every country, newspapers; magazines;
radio and TV stations, consciously and effectively sup-
porting our side. Those that exist should be aided ma-
terially to increase their range and vitality; others should
be started with our help. The strongest individual anti-
Communist voices must be provided with better facilities
for making themselves heard in their own countries.
Mobile film units are already penetrating backward
areas. The operation should be enlarged, its message
and appeal perfected. In addition, mobile big-screen
television units in black-and-white and in color can-carry
our message. Their very novelty will guarantee large
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and attentive audiences. Vast regions in Asia and else-
where, where illiteracy bars the written word and lack
of radios bars the spoken word, could thus be reached.
To quote the Chinese saying: "One picture is worth ten
thousand words."
The so-called backward parts of the world, particu-
larly Asia, are under the most concentrated Communist
psychological attacks. Of necessity the counter-offensive
must take this into account, and develop special tech-
niques for reaching both the masses and the elite of
those areas.
7. RADIO RECEIVERS AND PHONOGRAPHS:
Mass production of cheap and light-weight receivers
tuned to pick up American signals are now feasible. They
should be made available by the million at cost or gratis,
as expedient, to listeners in critical areas and behind the
Iron Curtain.
There are millions of persons in the world who do not
have electric power receptacles, electron tubes, batteries
or any of the electrical and mechanical marvels which
the free world has and takes for granted. A simple, hand-
operated phonograph device costing no more than a loaf
of bread, could be produced in quantities and supplied
gratis to millions of persons living behind the Iron and
Bamboo Curtains and in other critical areas.
An unbreakable and intelligible record, made of card-
board and costing less than a bottle of Coca-Cola, could
carry our messages to these people. Such records could
be dropped from the sky like leaflets and the messages
they carried could not be jammed.
8. USE OF FACILITIES IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES:
Nearly all European and many Asian countries
possess broadcasting facilities. We should seek to enlist
their use to supplement and intensify American broad-
casting on a world-wide scale.
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In some cases this could be negotiated on a quid pro
quo basis where we are providing military or economic
aid; in other cases we may have to buy the necessary
time for transmitting our message. Our friendly allies,
such as Great Britain, have vast short-wave facilities of
world-wide scope and range and have the same reasons
as we have for seeking to win the Cold War. We need
their help in this field. We are fully justified in asking
for such help and ought to receive it.
Propaganda is a large concept. In a sense it includes
and exploits all other activities. Its successful use calls
for imagination, ingenuity, continual technical research
and, of course, effective coordination with all other opera-
tions that bear on the problems of the Cold War.
9. PASSIVE RESISTANCE:
Pending the critical periods when active resistance
in one or another Soviet country is possible and desirable,
full encouragement and support must be given to passive
resistance. This refers to the things the individual can
do, with minimum risk, to create doubt and confusion in
the ranks of the dictatorship, to gum up the machinery
of dictatorship government.
The worker in the mine and factory, the farmer, the
soldier in the barracks, the office worker are able to do
little things that in their millionf old totality will affect the
national economy and the self-confidence of the rulers.
It is the method that comes naturally to captive peoples,
especially in countries with a long historical experience
in opposing tyrants.
Our opportunity is to give the process purposeful
direction. In this concept the individual opponent of the
regime becomes a "resistance group of one." He receives,
by radio and other channels, specific suggestions and
instructions. The tiny drops of resistance will not be
haphazard, but calculated to achieve planned results.
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Special action programs of the type that do not re-
quire large organization ? or at most units of two or
three ? would be worked out and transmitted. Our
sympathizers in the Soviet orbit would feel themselves
part of an invisible but huge army of crusaders. Symbols
of protest would appear on a million walls. The rulers'
morale would be deliberately sapped by a multitude of
actions too small, too widespread, to be readily dealt
with.
The special value of passive resistance, aside from its
direct effects, is that it nurtures the necessary feeling of
power and readiness for risk and sacrifice that will be
invaluable when the passive stage is transformed into
more open opposition.
10. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE:
Pockets of guerilla forces remain in Poland, Hungary,
the Baltic states, China, Albania and other areas. There
is always the danger of activating them prematurely.
But their existence must be taken into the calculations
and, in concert with exiles who know the facts, they must
be kept supplied with information, slogans and new lead-
ership where needed and prudent.
Many of these resistance groups are so isolated that
they do not know of each other's existence. The simple
realization that they are not alone but part of a scattered
network will be invaluable; methods for establishing
liaison, for conveying directions, can be developed.
11. INSURRECTIONS:
The uprisings in East Germany, the strikes and riots
in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, the dramatic mutinies inside
the concentration camps of Vorkuta in the Soviet Arctic,
are examples of revolutionary actions that failed. But
they attest that insurrection is possible.
We must seek out the weakest links in the Kremlin's'
chain of power. The country adjudged ripe for a break-
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away should receive concentrated study and planning.
A successful uprising in Albania, for instance, would be
a body blow to Soviet prestige and a fateful stimulus to
resistance elsewhere. (That little country is geograph-
ically isolated, ruled by a handful of puppets; able leader-
ship is available in the Albanian emigration.)
Eastern Germany is among the weakest links. Its
revolt would ignite neighboring Czechoslovakia and
Poland. The time to prepare for such actions is now ?
whether the time to carry them out be in the near or
distant future. Meanwhile we must not allow the Soviet
pro poganda to make unification appear as the Com-
munist's gift to the Germans. It is a natural asset that
belongs to West Germany and her allies.
12. COLLABORATION WITH EMIGRES AND ESCAPEES:
Tens of thousands of self-exiled fugitives from Com-
munist oppression emerge eager to plunge into move-
ments for the freeing of their homelands. When they
fail to find outlets for their zeal, disillusionment and
defeatism set in.
Maximum exploitation of this manpower and moral
passion is indicated. They must be drawn into specific,
well-organized, well-financed anti-Communist organiza-
tions and activities; utilized for propaganda and other
operations; enabled, in some cases, to return to their
native lands as "sleeper" leaders for future crises.
Officers' corps of emigres can be formed: perhaps
groups of only a score to a hundred, but available for
emergency and opportunity occasions. The existence of
such nuclei of military power ? a fact that will be widely
known ? should help generate hope and faith among
their countrymen back home.
13. PLANNED DEFECTION:
Escapees have come, and will continue to come,'spon-
taneously, now in trickles, other times in rivers. Beyond
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that the need is to stimulate defection on a selective
basis. Individual "prospects" in Soviet missions and
legations, in Red cultural and sports delegations, can be
carefully contacted and developed. Types of individuals
needed to man Cold War undertakings will be invited to
escape, assured of important work. Special approaches
can be worked out to encourage defection of border
guards, Army officers, secret-police personnel disgusted
by their bloody chores, scientists, important writers, etc.
Escapees today are often disheartened by their initial
experience. They are taken into custody by some foreign
Intelligence Service, pumped for information, and some-
times then left to shift for themselves. Their honest
patriotism is offended by the need to cooperate with for-
eigners before they are psychologically ready for it.
It is suggested that emigre commissions be set up,
composed of trusted nationals of the various countries.
The fugitive would first be received by the commission
of his own countrymen. Only when found desirable and
prepared for the step, would he be brought into contact
with American or British agencies.
14. TRAINING OF CADRES:
The immediate and prospective activities of the Cold
War offensive will require ever larger contingents of
specialized personnel for the many tasks; to provide
leadership for resistance operations; to engage in propa-
ganda, subversion, infiltration of the enemy; even to
carry on administrative and civic work after the collapse
of Communist regimes in various countries, in order to
stave off chaos.
Already, limited as our political efforts are, there is
a shortage of competent personnel. Meanwhile thousands
of younger men and women among the emigres are being
lost to factories, farms, menial jobs. This amounts to
squandering of potentially important human resources.
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We need a network of schools and universities de-
voted to training cadres for the Cold War. The objective
is not education in a generic sense, but specific prepara-
tion for the intellectual, technical, intelligence and similar
requirements of the ideological-psychological war.
This training, of course, should not be limited to
people from the Soviet areas. A sort of "West Point" of
political warfare ? analogous to the Lenin School
of Political Warfare in Moscow ? might be established.
Staffed by the ablest specialists obtainable, it would seek
out likely young people willing to make the struggle
against Communism their main or sole career.
The present "exchange of persons" program is clearly
valuable. Hundreds of foreign students go back home
with a better and friendlier understanding of America.
But beyond that, it is possible and necessary to educate
invited young people from abroad, carefully selected,
along lines of more direct and specialized value to the
Cold War effort.
In a sense these shock troops of democracy would be
like the "professional revolutionaries" on the Communist
side. They would be equipped to operate openly or as
secret infiltrees wherever the enemy's assaults need to
be neutralized. Trained anti-Communists from Asian
areas, dedicated and knowledgeable, would be available
for countries under Red pressure, as today in Southeast
Asia Latin Americans, Europeans, would serve similar
functions in their respective regions.
Thus, from a largely amateur enterprise, our counter-
offensive would gradually be transformed into a pro-
fessional undertaking.
15. CAMPAIGNS BY SPECIAL GROUPS:
An American trade union in the clothing field played
a major role in preventing Communitt victory in the
Italian elections in 1948. The International Confedera-
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Lion of Free Trade Unions (in which both the A. F. of L.
and the C.I.O. are active) is conducting important psy-
chological drives in many countries and offsetting the
mischief worked by the Moscow-controlled labor inter-
national.
Speaking as workers to workers, trade unionists
have a legitimate approach to the laboring masses in the
Soviet sphere. They have a special justification for ex-
posing and publicizing forced labor, onerous laboring
conditions and laws, phony totalitarian "trade unions."
In many countries ? France and Italy, for instance
? there are competing Communist-controlled and demo-
cratic unions. Free labor of all countries can throw its
moral and material support to the anti-Communist fed-
erations. It can take the lead in breaking Moscow's grip
on influential segments of world labor.
Corresponding political campaigns should be mounted
on a telling scale by other non-official, popular groups:
farmers' organizations and peasant unions would con-
centrate on the evils of Red collectivization; great church
groups on the immoral and atheistic aspects of Com-
munist theory and practice; youth organizations on the
perversion of youth under Communism, etc.
The scope of such focussed group and class appeals is
enormous. Some of them are being made already, but
without the coordination of effort and continuity of
impact that is called for.
What a specialized group can achieve has been demon-
strated by the society of Free Jurists in West Berlin,
which indicts and condemns in absentia persons guilty of
Communist crimes. Its work is sowing the fear of retri-
bution in East Germany. Radio Free Europe has made
successful forays of the same order ? identifying brutal
officials, exposing Red agents, etc. But the surface has
only been scratched in this type of psychological pressure.
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VI
DIPLOMACY IS A WEAPON
The Kremlin treats foreign affairs as a primary arena
of ideological and psychological effort. It makes moves
on the diplomatic chessboard for their propaganda im-
pact: to rally its friends in the outside world, to win over
a particular element in some country, to embarrass its
opponents. In the measure that democratic diplomacy
fails to do likewise, it is defaulting in a vital area of the
Cold War. Let us bear in mind:
1. Day to day conduct of foreign affairs is pertinent
to the struggle for men's minds. The rigid observance
of protocol, in dealing with an enemy who recognizes
none of the traditional rules, can be self-defeating. We
must make proposals, demands, expos? publications of
official documents, etc. that are carefully calculated to
show up the true motives of the Kremlin, to put a crimp
in Moscow political campaigns, to mobilize world opinion
against Soviet crimes and duplicities.
For ten years we have made one-shot protests against
Soviet election frauds in satellite countries, against
violations of treaties and agreements, against shocking
crimes in the areas of Human Rights as defined by the
U.N. Charter. The archives are packed with these docu-
ments. These should be followed up through consistent
publicity, renewed protests, etc.
Even when nothing practical can be immediately
accomplished, the facts of slave labor, genocide, aggres-
sions, violations of Yalta, Potsdam and other agreements
must be kept continually before the wo,r1d. Diplomacy
must champion the victims of Red totalitarianism with-
out let-up. At every opportunity the spokesmen of free
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nations should address themselves to e peop 01 8-9
le m
Soviet empire over the heads of their masters to the
people of free countries in terms of universal principles
of morality and decency.
2. The measures of reciprocity should be strictly
applied to Soviet diplomats, trade and other representa-
tives. These should enjoy no more privileges, immunities,
access to information than is accorded to free-world
representatives in Communist lands. Even socially they
should be made aware of their status as symbols of a
barbarous plexus of power. The desire to belong, to be
respectable, is by no means alien to Red officialdom.
3. Economic leverages, too, must be applied. Trade
can be turned into a powerful political weapon. The
stakes are too high to permit business-as-usual concepts
to outweigh the imperatives of the Cold War. Where
acute distress develops in a Communist country, our
readiness to help must be brought to the attention of the
people as well as their bosses. If and when food and other
relief is offered, it must be under conditions consistent
with our objectives ? to help the victims, not their rulers.
4. In virtually all countries outside the Communist
sphere there are large or small organizations devoted to
combatting Communism, at home or abroad or both.
There is little or no contact among such groups ? no
common currency of basic ideas and slogans, no exchange
of experience. Without at this stage attempting to set
up a world-wide anti-Communist coalition, or Freedom
International, we should at least facilitate closer liaison
and mutual support among anti-Soviet groupings al-
ready in existence.
? 1+ .m..611111.4 Our"
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VII
SUMMARY
No claim is implied that the foregoing outline is com-
plete, or that all of it can or ought to be launched at
once. The program here suggested should not be judged
on the basis of this or that specific proposal but on the
over-all concept and its underlying philosophy. As a
practical matter, methods flow from correct policies, the
availability of funds and trained manpower, the existence
of leadership and organization prepared to take advan-
tage of unfolding events.
Summarized, my observations and conclusions are:
1. We are in the midst of a Cold War which
the Communists are prosecuting vigorously on all
fronts in an unswerving determination to win.
2. We dare not lose this Cold War, because de-
feat may be as fatal as would defeat in a Hot War.
We can freeze to death as well as burn to death.
3. Our best and surest way to head off a Hot
War is to win the Cold War which is already in
full blast all over the world. But for the reasons
mentioned, such as insufficient funds and inade-
quate tools, our efforts in this decisive field are
strikingly little compared with the enemy's and
are wholly inadequate to achieve victory. We must
meet the political-psychological challenge of world
Communism fully and on a scale geared to winning
the struggle.
4. We should organize our efforts to win the
Cold War on a basis comparable to our organiza-
tion for winning a Hot War which we seek to pre-
vent. To this end it is recommended that a Strat-
egy Board of Political Defense (or some other
40
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suitable name) be set up to function as the uoia
War equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the
military side. Top representatives of the State
and Defense Departments, C.I.A. and U.S.I.A.,
should be members of this Board. Its activities
must be effectively coordinated with all Depart-
ments and Agencies of our Government concerned
with this effort. This new Strategy Board should
function directly under the President and its
Head should have Cabinet status.
5. Our decision to win the Cold War should be
communicated to the entire world as a fixed goal
of American policy. This will not rule out conven-
tional relations on the governmental level, where
the Kremlin, too, functions despite its clear com-
mitment to world revolution.
6. The American public should be made
promptly and fully aware of the nature of the
present Cold War, the importance of our winning
it, the costs and sacrifices that this may entail.
The significance and urgency of the problem
should be conveyed to the American people,
through discussion over Radio, TV, and in the
Press.
7. The idea of our determination to win the
Cold War must be presented for what it actually
is: a project that can be carried through success-
fully and thereby prevent a general war that could
force a devastating nuclear showdown. Once
grasped, this prospect would help to offset the
fears and frustrations generated in the public
mind by constant emphasis on the horrors of
Atomic War. The alternative presented, is under-
standable and hopeful. Instead of concentrating
on the perils of defeat, we can dwell on the pros-
pects for victory.
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8. Key leaders in Congress should be drawn
into the philosophy and purposes of the Cold War
counter-offensive from the outset. No program
of the scope suggested here can be undertaken and
executed without adequate funds that only Con-
gress can appropriate. In addition to legislative
support the Congress can aid immeasurably by
stimulating united, patriotic effort as complete
and non-partisan as in a Hot War.
9. To wrest from the Communists the advan-
tages they gain through constant use in their
propaganda of the appealing word "peace" ?
while casting us in the role of "war-mongers" ? it
is recommended that the present name of the
"Voice of America" be extended to the "Voice of
America ? for Freedom and Peace."
10. Our Diplomacy should be used as a weapon
against World Communism and our Message to
their captive peoples should contain the hope for
their eventual freedom. Our Message of Truth
should tell the world the truth about Communist
objectives, methods and practices as well as the
truth about ourselves.
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\d/
General David Sarnof
Chairman of the Board
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New 'fork
Dear David:
Congratu a ions on receiving the
Arises Exceptional Civilian Service
Award. This recognition of outstanding
service is well deserved. Your eentri-
button to your country redounds to the
benefit of many and I en sure nest give
you considerable personal satisfaction.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Da lies
Director
0/DCl/ (25 May 56)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 -
DCIckLJ
1 - JMC c h r on o
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;g
ARNOF;) j
.107.-NSr SECRETARY UILSON TH: ARMY'S EXCEPTICAL SERVICE
DECORATION ON RETIRED BRIO. GE. DAVID SAROFF-, CHAIRIA 07 7:= 70ARD
OF RCA.
TH7 crnE=y TOOK ":DLAC7 r:: c: C7 CE1.72AL OF Aran GEORG:
C. rAZ-ALL AFD OMER TOP UORLD UAT II LEAD:2S ATTEDINC A nEETP!C AT
T-fr TMTACON.
AR1':Y SECRETARY PRUCK22 READ A CIT.",TIO1,. PAYII\O TRI7UTE TO SAR1..OFF'S
"E=ORTHY" CONTRI'UTIONS TO :':ATIni\AL D'"--FrNr.E AD Is "KEY 30L7'
l'ARSHALLI::C FUDLIC OPII0 ALI) ci cn.mouT.A =TER Ur073STA'f:DINO
OF -1= RESERV: 7ROCRAM OF ME ARNY."
.
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, ?
metitr AWARD
GIVEN TO SARNOFF
? SiWIC to Th? t TWO
I
WASHINGTON. May 23?A,
, reunion of the 1953 Committee.
int Department of Defu OT.1
es.nization was marked today by
'he deooration of one Ininnher.f
David Sitrnoff. chairman of that
board of Radio Oergematies ofl
America
Charles X. Wilson, Secretary,
i of Defense, who nailed the omen
, men in to advise Wm on re-
1TE/inning the PieldagCM forty
in 1953. held the reunion lunch-
;lion LTI tun nfficial MOW
Just before the gimp Wt
, Secretary's office for the
room. Wilber M. Snicker.
retary of the Army, OM be had
a paper be would 111U to read.
H? read ? citation pestling Mr.
, Karnoff's noteworthy contribu-
tion to national defense and his
ksP role in mandiailing public
opalipartieulauly with regard
to beIteserve program'.
Mr. Surber succeeded the late
, GSM/ Julius Colts Adler as
'chairmen of the National &cur-
1 tty Trebling Camwdesion. Secre-
taryplumed on him the
I/Mere RIMillMonal Service die-
The solill-NStriber committee
was hereiriv Nelson A. Rock,-
Army ilhailkerliril=. then
, of the
chainlian of no ..lomt Chiefs of
Staff; Dr. Vannevar flush, then
, president of the Carnegie Insti-
, When; Dr, Milton S. Eisen-
president of Pennsytvantal
State University; Arthur 8
lrienumbeg, director of the Office
of Defense ItobIllzation, and
Robert A- Lovett. termer Secre-
tary se Defies.. AU 'we present
Mr. ?ionent,
I-411
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?
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L A-v
Medal BY A
leasningt'4On. r P
13 (rii--7Y
hsi
Army's modal for eareptirmat
civilian service was presented ta
day to David Sarnoff, chairman off
the board of the Radio Corpora-
tion of America. for his -untir-
ing" work in promoting the new
reserve training program
Secretary of Defense WIlsoil
made the presentation at a Pao!"
gen ceremony after Secretary of
Aram Brucker read the citation.
It praised Sarnoff's -eminent
career" and his Poet 'personal
contributions of time and effort
to the military service in Under?
taking numerous responsibilities
and amigaments to assist the
cause ag national daisner.'
The citation particularly
stressed Sarnoff's rola as chair.
man of the National Security
be
was praised SW IdaYind
role In marahalMd joufint
Training tkimmaaas.141th
and bringing ?ades? a bottle IS-
dinstandimr" '.-1114 Nem
anigrialt. I
23 May 1956
nage A-6
ounita are moo alipsiumatera sta .......w. ??????? *a ?? ,???? ? ? ? ? . ? - ? . ? .?.
Chiefs of Staff. and Dinnr-
111 Sarnoff Geis
. var Ihuah. former m .kli. -v ? p-
? airti and devetconor..., cnipt
nay saaretai.:; BitirKer fritO
1
w aws. d it ihe eleinaliv In Mr
tile e tation aeicanianying 1 he
?
5er/ice tUlftlid Illrilblilitecu
It that kr tamper bad
P David Sarnoff chairman of been -noteworthy fnr me pet -
,nnal ennt rthu?tors of 1.rpr
the Goarci of the Radio Corp "1 effort tn 1:,i militst V srwcr ,n
America. iodav readied the nindertakIniz nurorroux !rspervti-
ArnlY's ExCrptional Civilian tolities and assiunmenta
I Service Award
sented the award to Mr SarnofT
before a chstinsuished audiencetetigi
that included
Detente 6ecretary VCIson pre- contributions to the Army in If,.
communications field atO uric, 'A
thILL since nix aopointrnetA
It. compiimeried nun ,in h,R
Vie National .4e-
COITIM1srltal 'hr
,
Marshall, inventcy role in mat-
State and of De (Winton and
4roved ForoReleste? .
8 Eisenhower.
0 eeserve eniii
a better Indet-
r314400017,00010018-9
former cha e
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.Available
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Ap ebAlakteRfelifiliMe FOXR3:1041K: itletjjjklyOR01731R00070001
A
General David Sarnoff received the
Army's Exceptional Civilian Service
Award from the Department of Defense on
23 May. Attached is a congratulatory
letter.
25 May 56
(DATE)
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18-9
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
E
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a......L._.ftulive P telly
RADIO CORPORATION OF AlviE RICA
RCA BUILDING
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORE_ 209 N. Y.
DAVID KokuNoPite
CHAIRMAN OF TIM BOARD
Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
Dear Allen:
May 31, 1956
Thank you ever so much for
your thoughtfulness in writing me your note
of May 26 and for your generous observations
on the occasion of my receiving the Army's
Exceptional Civilian Service Award.
It was a memorable occasion
for me and I shall always cherish the Award.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
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APR 1956
etczL
-14.41rwon ;47-4: t.cIcatrci
Cit C-orpro4at
ucr lairg4,4a
"YorK
gW your vow ol`
? xt.-47,:mt address -41croiro
1.1W,PIZE &trait" Cctincils
?4:--er2rItc- tate your mote
twv:tAiuDe.re,?ardint romarks.
v_ine ituatt, to toalw this copportlatiUr
t-zic =Iv I
you tait,y,-., airevez racial-god for
kJ,tamtiact epivest 1ou at, yt= retreat
_ 4-.1%-;z4r4.14;_i; utular 4464.y. Mae etroguri ;or
your ottt4544:,Xla, eautztbutions1 =MI=4
? atoorvedi.flv,Ar c4WInion-
--711:YA
:aura autielk.
25X1r Apr 56)
3/Da.
? _
? _ ebrono
1 - rowtins
^ - (it
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4
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RADIO coluacacekuncara OF Am-ERICA
RCA BUILD ING
30 R0CREPELLI912 PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.
"DAVID SAIRATOPP
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
April 18, 1956
Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Allen:
I have just read your splendid address on the
"Purge of Stalinism" in Los Angeles on April 13. It is by
all odds the clearest and most convincing -- as well as the
most encouraging -- interpretation of the posthumous
purge of Stalin that I have yet seen. I could not resist the
urge to break into your busy life with this word of sincere
applause.
It is a pity that the address has not received
the wide attention it so clearly merits, and wonder what
could be done now to give it larger circulation.
With warm regards,
ILLEGIB
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a fired complexion glow!
MINK FOR THE MAN?A
little mink goes a long WRY
on a windy day. Mrs- David
Sarnolf, at far right, on hand
for the military salute paid
to General Sarnoff at Ft
Myer yesterday, lent her
mink stole to NBC vice presi-
dent Frank Russell, center,
who shielded his shoulder
a gains t. the unspring-like
wind at the parade with the
fur. At. left is NBC secretary
Pat O'Neill,
At Forne in Texas
Mr:\ and Mrs. Robert A.
Raley . . are now restding in
San Ant in, Tex., :following
their Mar i t marriage in
Milton, Del, h bride is the
former Sus N. Graves,
daughter ots M Milton T.
Graves and the late Mr.
Gras es, Milton. 1 e groom
is theAnn of Mrs. R ert A.
Ra'tte,V-k
Sam olf Is Saluted
41 Retreat Parade
WHIEF aid ter-
ritorial flags Fatined in a
ehilly unspring-hke breeze
yesterday at Fort Myer, VA,,
the Army honored Prig Gen.
David SarnofT At a toll dress
retreat parade.
'The fi5-year-eld G anera
who rose from messenger hos'
to president and chairman of
the board of the Radio Cor-
poration of America, also re.
oeiveria special citation or
Ills outstanding Com ributions
to the Army. Secretary of the
Army Wilber M. B rue k et
made the presentation,.
First., there was an 11-gun
sa lute, followed hy ruffles
and flourishes, and the Geri.
erars March played by the
United States Army Band.
Then, the band "trooped the
line" and the crack Third In-
fantry Regiment passed in re-
view.
In the reviewing stand with
General Sarnoff and Sccre.
tary Brucker was Mal, Gen.
John Gr. Van Hmien, oth._
manding General o!' We Mili-
tary District of Washington.
Seated -nearby to watch her
husband on his great day was
Mrs. Sarnoff .wearing
cinammon wool coat anti
small black hat. 'In tier right
was NBC's vice president
Frank Russell as protection
against the cold wild, HE
was wearing Mrs. Sarnriff
mink stole over hs hip coat).
ALL of the VIP guests al-,
rived at the paradr, from the
and
11-7-63 1 Rs006am 11
"r7h0001001 ' 1e
189 k"' h"
irk-off
luncheon for Military R
serve It'Pck. I;rn i"arnrff is
the chairman of the National
,Spounty 'Training Commic-
sion. A member of the Com
-
miss rio, Warren H. At he rt on
of Stockton, Calif , was there. j
Then there were Rep, Over. I
ton Brooks, chairman of the ,
House Subcommittee for Re-
serve A Finirs; Underaecrei
tary of the tv,rmy Charles
Finuoane, Assistant Secretary
Hugh Milton and .Arim.
Thomas
Gen. Milton B. Raker, sit-
pecintendent of the t' alley
Forge Military Academy,
came down from Pennsyl-
vania for the luncheon and
parade. Mr. and Mrs. John
If Wilson vsere there from
Philadelphia,
Others were Brig. Gen. and
Mrs. Harry LI. Semmes. the
Ed Sheltens and her mother,
11jrs. A. I. Innes,
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