LETTER TO MR. ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR FROM WILBUR MILLER, CHAIRMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000300010042-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: November 30, 1959
• Content Type: LETTER

THE STAMFORD FORUM FOR WORLD AFFAIRS
Advisory Committee
FRANK ALTSCHUL, DR. STANLEY HIGH, WALTER N. MAGUIRE, REGINALD NEUWIEN, DR. GEORGE SHUSTER, WALTER H. WHEELER, JR.
Executive Committee
DR. ROBBINS W. BARSTOW
CHARLES NOSAL
REV
DONALD F
CAMPBELL
RABBI DAVID W
PEARLMAN
D.B. WILBUR MILLER, Chairman
.
.
.
Miss ROSEANN CONCILIO
MRS. GEORGE N. SHUSTER
MISS MILDRED D. WILCOX, Vice-Chairman
THOMAS A. GAINES
DR. ROGER STRASSER
MRS. J. KING HOYT, Secretary
REV. ANDREW J. GILBRIDE
ARTHUR J. SYLVESTER
MRS. WILLIAM A. GORDON
MISS MARGARET C. TONER
Treasurer
BENJAMIN BOGIN
,
MISS MARIE V. HURLEY
JOSEPH J. TOOHER, JR.
NORMAN T. WOODBERRY, Membership
MRS. PAUL D. MOSER
ROBERT P. WEIL
r?oveinbcr 30, 1959
~.. en ;:Ul_CS Pirec to"=
Central Intelligence .":r'ency
2!1-3,0 2. ;,tom eet, T,7 T
.Tas'zington, D.
C.
in ?_;59 the ;ta: ford oruL for world (fairs had three _Jrogra s concerned i.,711_1
longer rw:nL~e considerations of U. S foreign policy. The reco=endations resulting
froz t'ioce meetings are describes in the enclosed booklet on 2 was ,, ' T,
~Dage ..s . Sze dis-
''tin ?- o.T_ s ' tii_,~ ~rc e ?1J wn... panelists uZ?rO participated V.,.. :i.n 'G::OSC .., e~S are on
sage 6. ~? ~.rthcr, it s` ould be said. that :itho Zt the active Interest of such iac i1ber s
of ~ lto _ ` our ..~:~-isor? n ~o~.:i1i~.,,,,tte ..e as 'a- r _ TtT. .ia-,tia?e, Core ,: L,.-,~;,.,~h ~ste_~ and
-_ter ~'' eeler; the lo=,,lm could not have carried out such a U_niC L e project-.
'.e year 1960 offers an unusual opportunity for attention to ?.rorla affairs. In 'keel
ng uit'_~ the Dol m's longer range concerns : any ,rill be thinking of the decade ahead.
It is also an Election year in it is =-:.:.rorta?^_t that broad non-partisan or bl-
i 1" tis n =_ss es s fall p edomina.te o 'er any narrouer partisan cons -1 derat ions in foreign
affairs as the .r4 erican electorate roves to,:ard decisions most eventful for the entire
,:'Orld. In this s"_Jirit, ;:e should like to invite you to address t_ e Stanford Forum for
'Torld
..e have set aside three Sunday afternoons, January 24, ''e'JrL.Cry 28 a d. L rch 27 but
should ; o., be inclined to accept our invitation and these dates are inconvenient ,re
,:ould be .:puling to rearrange our sc'heduLle . "e ,ro ld still ho-.e ope for a Sunday after-
. noon and that you could either open or close our 1960 series.
`^'_:e For= in its fourteen years has had. ,ror thuhi le projects , :costly concerned
c.~rrsrt problems. D ilding on the y ror ^a~. t'_-.is year Z?.'hizh emphasized longer
range co:sider.ations, -.re hope in our 1960 series to e..azaine further :hat should be
our national goals in :rorid affairs and ::het'~e= ire have the ?rill to achieve then.
'.'e :* t',at you can make an outstanding contribution to this pro ;ran and h De that
you might choose our -elatforin from aaaong many offered you for one of your author _
ative e yposit'.ons. T' e should be happy to cooperate in efforts to see that your
address reaches as much as possible beyrond the confines of our meeting place.
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November 30, 1959
?-'e very much ho'De for a favorable response to our invitation. It is likely that
Mr. Altschul will be in touch with- you with any further information which may
assist you in your decision.
Sincerel;;r yours,
T-W: na t??ilbur Miller, Chairman
Lnc
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 Some
Recommendations
for
LONG-RANGE
FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING
THE STAMFORD FORUM
FOR
WORLD AFFAIRS
OCTOBER, 1959
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Recommendations For LongR
Convinced of the need to emphasize longer range
considerations in planning the foreign policy of
the United States, the Stamford Forum for World
Affairs, aided particularly by the Advisory Com-
mittee, the Resources Committee and the Board of
Directors and after consultations with outstanding
experts in Foreign Policy, respectfully asks consid-
eration of the following broad recommendations:
(I) To insure more effective representation overseas,
we recommend:
(A) that Congress appropriate sufficient money for
the operation of all U. S. embassies so, that ca-
reer diplomats or others eminently qualified
may fill all ambassadorial posts without need
of private fortunes.
(B) that Congress appropriate on a long-term basis
so that recently improved'; practices for in-
service training among Foreign Service person-
nel may be further extended and a long-range
program developed to attract and to hold out-
standing young persons in aState Department
career.
(II) Recognizing that we may not have used economic
assistance as effectively as we might have, either as
a weapon in the cold war or as:, an instrument in
building a peaceful world, we recommend:
(A) that economic assistance be planned, and finan-
cial appropriations be made' where necessary,
on a long-range basis.
(B) that long-term, low-interest loans be made more
readily available, particularly for the benefit
of underdeveloped countries.
(C) that for economic and technical assistance,
more use be made of international organizations
such as the UN-specialized agencies.
(D) that U. S. government personnel administering
economic assistance programs be, in so far as
possible, career personnel with high standards
of in-service training and specialized experi-
ence.
(E) that in both the planning and operation of eco-
nomic assistance programs,fulll advantage be
taken of eminently qualified technical consult-
ants from universities, foundations, industry
and labor.
(F) that proper incentives be devised to stimulate
increased participation of private groups, in-
cluding business and foundations, in economic
programs of value to the free world.
(III) Recognizing that de facto recognition of foreign
governments has been our policy during much of our
2
 ange Foreign Policy Planning
nation's history, although a de jure policy has some-
times been used to express disapproval of certain gov-
ernments, we recommend:
that our recognition policy be realistic. It should
be made clear to our citizens that recognition
does not necessarily denote approval of a gov-
ernment but is based on the belief that impor-
tant benefits will be derived by our nation and
our people.
(IV) Besides bilateral recognition policy there are
also important questions concerning membership in
the United Nations. In this regard, we recommend:
that in view of recent developments such as
the possibility of a world-wide atomic test
monitoring system on the one hand and the
Tibetan experience on the other, the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the admission of
Communist China to the United Nations be
thoroughly explored to chart a course of action
of maximum value to the continued survival
of the free world.
(V) To insure a more valid American Image overseas
and to offset propaganda directed against us as well
as certain inaccurate impressions emanating from our
own country, we recommend:
that the Department of State be encouraged to
stimulate and coordinate public and private re-
sources in the most effective program possible
for informing our allies, those who oppose us
and the neutral nations so as to bring a more
real focus on our national life and on our ob-
jectives for the future in a world changing its
ways with revolutionary rapidity.
(VI) Secretary of State Herter on May 7. 1959, told
the American people:
"Foreign policy is not an obscure art for a few
specialists. It is of importance to all of us.
Therefore, it must be of interest to all of us.
Our foreign policy, to be successful, requires
your continuing understanding and support."
To this end, we urge that newspapers, magazines,
radio and television provide increased opportunity for
citizen understanding by offering more information
about world affairs. We also recommend that for in-
creased citizen interest, understanding and support,
the leaders in the Department of State be encouraged:
(A) to offer more frequent and better delineated
statements of policy to the American people.
(B) to use the fullest candor limited only by mini-
mum requirements of national security so that
the American people are confident that they
have a maximum of significant facts, be they
favorable or unfavorable to the continued sur-
vival of the free world.
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The Stamford Forum World
In November 1958, the Stamford Forum for
World Affairs issued a prospectus, "How Can the
Citizen Influence Foreign Policy?" It was suggested
that broad, long-term foreign policy objectives be
considered:
What are America's long-term goals in
World Affairs? Are they obscured by day-to-
day improvisations to meet Soviet inspired
diplomatic offensives ... or don't they exist?
Can goals in a leading democracy of the
twentieth century be specifically formulated
and stated publicly as Mr. Khrushchev has
proclaimed the Soviet objectives for 1970?
Perhaps more than anything else, a long-
term World Affairs program for the United
States needs to be enunciated. At least broad
principles and overall objectives require defi-
nition. Then as progress is made, a feeling of
accomplishment, of progress, can better per-
meate the American mentality. Short-term
improvisations to the initiative of our oppo-
nents may well contribute to a feeling of
individual helplessness in the American elec-
torate with a mixture of uneasiness and com-
placency an inevitable but frightening by-
product.
The Forum Board believe there are several
things that should be done. Among these:
to concentrate on longer-term Foreign Policy
objectives at citizen level;
to encourage the use of more far-seeing prac-
tical idealism and less short-sighted expe-
diency in dealing with other countries;
to dramatize that Foreign Policy is dynamic
and must be worked at continuously;
to bring our Congressional representatives
into closer and more regular, contacts with
our citizenry on international affairs.
One approach to accomplishing the Forum ob-
jectives was suggested:
TWENTIETH CENTURY SCIENCE
AND DEMOCRACY
Our science and technology have been our
strength. We have relied on';, them as our
deterrent against aggression. This may no
longer suffice.
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 Affairs Project For 1959
We need a formula wherein we can blend
the enlightened concern of informed citizens
dealing with facts as realistically as scientists
do and operating in their daily lives at the
national or international level, with the
awakened concern of citizenry at the local
level. Cumulatively, it is this citizenry oper-
ating at the local level which has the power
to support, to deny, or to cause re-examina-
tion by our elected leaders of a foreign policy
to determine whether it serves our national
interests.
If the "experts" lose touch with "the peo-
ple," their influence is lost. If the people are
governed by romantic and unrealistic con-
cepts, the world may be lost. Twentieth cen-
tury technology with all the changes it brings
in the daily lives of our people forces a
twentieth century reappraisal of the ways
for democratic decision making. Imagination,
time, enlightened enthusiasm, experience and
the right people working properly together
can perhaps achieve a meaningful response
to this twentieth century challenge to democ-
racy.
The formula for citizen participation was de-
scribed:
THREE SUNDAY AFTERNOONS ...
would be reserved by the membership and
boards plus a newly created Resources Com-
mittee of the Stamford Forum for.World
Affairs to hear from, to question, to discuss
and to meet informally at tea with outstand-
ing personalities in world affairs. An informal
buffet dinner would follow for off-the-record
discussion among the guest speakers, the
Resources Committee and the Forum Boards.
Opportunity would thus be created to pro-
ceed from broad on-the-record considerations
to candid off-the-record discussions from
which might best emerge broad recommen-
dations for Foreign Policy.
Membership in this committee is to be
enlisted from among those residents of the
Greater Stamford Area who participate in the
management of or control resources impor-
tant in the several strengths of America-
church, communications, foundations, busi-
ness, industry, federal and international
.agencies, associations and other educational
activities.
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Subjects and
Major Participants
JANUARY 25,19 i 58
WHAT SHOULD BE MAJOR LONG-TERM AMERI-
CAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES?
Speakers: Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
Dr. Charles Burton Marshall, Visiting Scholar at
the Carnegie Endowment.
Panelists: Dr. George N. Shuster, President of
Hunter College; Dr. John W. Nason, President of
the Foreign Policy Association; Mr. Frank Altschul,
Vice President and Secretary of Council on For-
eign Relations.
MARCH 1, 1959
THE AMERICAN IMAGE OVERSEAS
a) Our Diplomatic Representatives
b) Economic vs. Military Aid to Meet the Peo-
ple's Needs
Speakers: Dr. Henry M. Wriston, President of
the American Assembly; Mr. August Hecksher, Di-
rector of the Twentieth Century '''Fund.
Panelists: Mr. Thomas H. Carroll, Vice President
of the Ford Foundation; Mr. Griffiths Johnson,
Vice President of the Motion Picture Association
of America; Mr. Arthur Lanckton, Vice President
of Mobil International Oil Co.
APRIL 12, 1959
DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION ..'i. THEORY AND
PRACTICE
Speakers: Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Hamilton Fish
Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at
Columbia University; Honorable Ernest A. Gross,
former Deputy U. S. Representative to the UN and
now in legal practice.
Panelists: Rev. Donald Fisher Campbell, first
Chairman of the Stamford Forum for World Af-
fairs; Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, Stated Clerk
of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.;
Mr. Oscar A. de Lima, former Chairman of the
Board of the American Association for the United
Nations.
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Highlights From Talks
In judging our recommendations, it is important
to bear in mind the highlights of remarks by our
speakers.
LONG-TERM FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
It was suggested that the long-term goal of our
Foreign Policy is "to seek a world environment in
which our permanent revolution can go on with the
least disruptive influences from outside." More spe-
cifically, we should
.... seek to prevent the spread of Communist
power and doctrine
.... attempt to maintain other democracies
.... help new nations establish a viability of
their own
.... create alliances for our own defense
.... maintain our own defensive strength
.... encourage a United Europe
.... work for reduction of armaments
.... work for a more open world in trade and
travel
.... work to- keep peace in the world
These goals point up the problems of reconciling
our long-range interests with our short-term objec-
tives. Further, we must ask, "What can the U. S. do
when it cannot lay down the law?"
Plans for action in most situations must be de-
vised with an understanding of the problem of
"multiple causation" or a bundle of considerations
for which there is a lack of precedents. For example,
do we give aid to Pakistan and run the risk of antag-
onizing India? in countering Russia, do we give aid
to a corrupt state? to a state that doesn't collect its
own taxes? to a friendly dictatorship? What do we
do in Algeria - support the people in their struggle
for independence and weaken our alliance with
France or vice versa? Broad policy must then be
tailored for individual situations. Yet in establishing
specific policy about specific problems it is impor-
tant relative to our broad, long-term goals to keep
in mind:
1) the thermonuclear equation
2) the great and expanding number of new
states which have the franchise but can-
not make policy
3) the problem of world development, partic-
ularly in competition with Russia
4) the tone of our policy and the relative em-
phasis given to such deterrent doctrines
as "massive retaliation"
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THE AMERICAN IMAGE OVERSEAS
(a) Diplomatic Representatives. The Foreign
Service of the United States has been upgraded in
many ways in the last five years. Now, 80% of the
personnel with identifiable language skills are
placed where advantage is taken of their specialized
training, 84%. have a working knowledge of at least
one foreign language and 60% can speak one foreign
language fluently. In-service training and selection-
out practices have been increased to insure better
use of top-flight personnel. In view of the size and
complexity of our diplomatic missions, this increased
emphasis on high-caliber Foreign Service career
personnel is very necessary. Yet more Congressional
attention should be given to adequate appropriation
of funds to insure that new personnel can be attract-
ed to and properly trained for the Foreign Service.
The day is past when we should have political
ambassadors. About 70% of our ambassadors are
career personnel. The remainder, although appoint-
ed from outside the Foreign Service, have not all
been "political" as illustrated by such; outstanding
men as Dr. J. B. Conant, David E. Bruce and Ells-
worth Bunker. Yet for embassies suchas London,
Paris, Rome and Rio, the President must consider
only appointees who can afford to spend $75,000 to
$100,000 a year out of their own pockets for main-
tenance of such embassies. To remedy this situation
and to make possible career men for any top em-
bassy spot, Congress would need to appropriate
additionally less than $2,000,000 a year., Our present
practice is tenable perhaps only because the Deputy
Chiefs of Mission are now 100% professionals. It is
time for the American people to take stock-to insist
on paying our own way for the best possible diplo-
matic representation overseas.
(b) Economic vs Military Aid to Meet the Peo-
ple's Needs. Despite the report of the improvements
in the Foreign Service in the past five years, the
American Image has become blurred over the past
ten years. The decline in the American Image has
not been due so much to Russian propaganda as to
the way we ourselves have responded to fast moving
events in world affairs. Americans have miscon-
ceived the threat of Communism, misapplied the
strength of Capitalism and messed up Colonialism,
all because we have not understood economic aid
as a weapon. Our pacts and agreements on arma-
ments for many countries are inadequate in the face
of the Russian economic offensive into,; which they
have put tremendous drive the last four or five years.
They have shown greater flexibility in their loan,
barter and aid policies, their techniques appear
simpler, their society more dynamic. From us the
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people abroad too frequently see a capitalism too
complex for them, which is not running at capacity
to meet needs they consider important and whose
representatives show great concern about low and
balanced budgets while enjoying relaxed and fat
living.
A new image of America can be created by
greater recognition of the need for a real focus on
our life as a nation and of the fact that we cannot
have great poverty and great wealth side by side in
the world. To increase the effectiveness of America
in the great world struggle, economic aid should be
considered from the long view and appropriation
policies altered accordingly, economic assistance
must be at a higher level, international agencies
should be used to a greater extent in our aid pro-
grams and more highly trained manpower should
be used at almost every level in our assistance
programs.
DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION-THEORY
AND PRACTICE
The recognition policy of the United States since
its founding has been by and large de facto (as a
matter of fact) rather than de jure (as a matter of
legality). The shifts in policy have reflected our
changing self-interest. From Thomas Jefferson as
Secretary of State until Mr. Seward, the U. S. recog-
nized a new government if it were running the
country. Under Mr. Seward, the policy was changed
to indicate that revolutions in a republic ought not
to be accepted. This policy prevailed until the
1880's. The government under Woodrow Wilson
would not recognize people coming to power by
assassination. -In the 1920's, policy diverged along
three lines: 1) Latin American changes were not
recognized very quickly, 2) countries further away,
such as Portugal, were recognized within twenty-
four hours after a governmental change, 3) the
Soviet Union did not win recognition of the Bolshe-
vik government for 16 years although the Menshevik
government had been recognized after only 5 days.
Since 1933, the policy for the most part has been
rapid recognition as shown within the last year for
Iraq, Venezuela and most recently Castro in Cuba.
In the United Nations, there are several member
governments which have not recognized one an-
other, as for instance, Israel and the various Arab
states or Russia and Jordan.
Now in a world fragmented by the cold war and
the iron curtain there is a new major issue relative
to recognition policy - that of the divided states
such as China, Korea, Vietnam and Germany. A
major question for those of us who do not wish to
perpetuate such divisions is, "What processes can
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be devised to achieve the unification in freedom of
the peoples of the world?" The Soviets, on the other
hand have used recognition as a' political weapon
in their cold-war strategy. Then there is the neutral-
ist or non-aligned view which is perhaps indicated
in the extreme by India and Burma who refuse to
recognize the government of the Republic of Korea
which is UN recognized.
Among the problems of divided states, a most
controversial question for us in recent years has
been what to do about divided China. For the U. S.,
there are two questions: 1) whether to continue to
oppose the admission of Communist China to the
U.N., 2) whether to recognize the government of
Communist China. The UN question far transcends
in importance the bilateral concerns of Communist
China and the United States. It' is important that
the U. S. not place itself in the position of under-
mining confidence in the United'; Nations should a
majority of UN members wish to 'admit Communist
China - a possibility somewhat less likely since the
recent Himalayan Pearl Harbor in Tibet. Rather
should ways be explored to have the two Chinas
represented in the UN since, as is obvious from
relations among other members, recognition among
UN members is not necessary. ~ There are some
advantages to having Communist !,China account for
her aggressive actions within the framework of UN
procedures. Therefore, the U. S. should consider
carefully the terms on which Communist Chinese
UN admission or bilateral recognition is opposed,
for the most important long-term assets in such
questions is the maximum effectiveness of the
United Nations.
In judging the action of other countries of the
United Nations, it is important to ascertain whether
their action reflects their best self-interest as they
see it. The lack of a consistent policy of recognition
in our own history indicates we have operated
largely on a similar self-interest, principle and so
would be expected to sympathize !with other nations
similarly motivated.
Audience Response
The panelists opened the question period of the
afternoon sessions after the presentation of the talks
by our speakers. They also directed the discussion
in the smaller evening meetings. Questions from the
large afternoon audience stimulated further discus-
sion. The written questions procedure - while de-
tracting from the spontaneity of vocal interchange
in the second and third meetings - gave a more
comprehensive indication of audience interest and
concern. The written questions also could be carried
from the audience of several hundred to the smaller
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evening meetings of approximately fifty Resource
Committee, Advisory Committee and Board mem-
bers who questioned the speakers or expressed
themselves with candor and frequently with some
vigor.
In such activity at our first evening meeting of
this relatively well-informed group, there were sev-
eral who pointed to a general concern as to lack of
information about and a lack of U. S. leadership in
Foreign Affairs. It was felt that if our leaders in
Washington would give out more information on
?specific questions such as thermonuclear develop-
ments and would propose programs to gain the
initiative rather than reacting defensively so fre-
quently, the American people would back whatever
appropriations seemed necessary for military secur-
ity, foreign assistance, etc.
Further, from comments of various participants
in the first evening discussion, the following views
may be cited: Our objectives must be related realis-
tically to the world we live in. Even without the
competition from Russia, with whom we should at
all times be willing to negotiate, our well-being
would depend on the well-being of others. Our
programs should be planned with this uppermost
in our minds. Therefore, a war on illiteracy, poverty
and disease is important to us in our survival as a
free and prosperous nation. This war is most acute
in some of the new and emerging states where time
may be required for them to develop to the point
where they can consider economic and political
systems such as ours. We want and need them for
our friends. Our assistance should be rendered with
this understanding of the interdependency of the
free world and should be administered with a real
sense of decency and good will. We should consider
greater use of the United Nations specialized agen-
cies for our assistance activities, where possible.
But making friends is not always a question of
money. The genuine courtesies extended at a per-
sonal level by our individual representatives, official
or otherwise, can be most important. To attract
friends or to compete with a vicious opponent in a
fast changing world, we must "put our own house
in order," we must demonstrate the worth of our
system and maintain our strength to compete by
expanding our domestic economy, solving our social
problems, etc.
In the second and third evening meetings where
the topics were more specific, the discussions were
more closely confined to various aspects of the
speakers' remarks or elucidations thereof. From
three such meetings, it was possible to devise rec-
ommendations as described elsewhere herein.
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THE STAMFORD FORUM FOR WORLD AFFAIRS
1101 BEDFORD STREET STAMFORD, CONN.
DAvis 4-9522
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Frank Altschul Reginald Neuwien
Dr. Stanley High Dr. George N. Shuster
Walter N. Maguire Walter H. Wheeler, Jr.
OF DIRECTORS
BOARD
..... RS
Miller .
Dr. Wilbur
Miss Mildred D. Wilcox .......... Vice Chairman
Mrs. J. King Hoyt ......................... ... Secretary
Benjamin Bogin .............................. Treasurer
Norman T. Woodberry ................Membership
Dr. Robbins W. Barstow
Rev. Donald F. Campbell
Miss Roseann Concilio
Thomas A. Gaines
Rev. Andrew J. Gilbride
Mrs. William A. Gordon
Miss Marie V. Hurley
Mrs. Paul D. Moser .
Charles Nosal
Rabbi David W. Pearlman
Mrs. George N. Shuster
Dr. Roger Strasser
Arthur J. Sylvester
Miss Margaret C. Toner
Joseph J. Tooher, Jr.
Robert P Weil
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