INTENSIFIED COLLECTION PROGRAM TARGETED AGAINST THE LOGISTICS NETWORK USED BY NORTH VIETNAM TO SUPPORT COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001300120016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 3, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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DRAFT
3 July 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT Intensified Collection Program Targeted Against the
Logistics Network Used by North Vietnam to
Support Communist Activity in South Vietnam
1. The Problem. On 16 June 1969, you were given a joint CIA-DIA
briefing outlining in considerable detail the Washington intelligence
community's knowledge and analysis of the logistics network used by North
Vietnam to support Communist activity in South Vietnam. At the close of
that 16 June briefing, you asked me to inventory the US Government's
present collection efforts in this sphere and submit a paper outlining steps
that would improve the quantity and/or quality of intelligence collected on
that topic. In particular, you requested a list of courses of action that
could:
(1) Improve our detailed knowledge of the nature and
quantities of supplies' moving into II Corps and III Corps
via the southward extension of the Laotian route complex the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" -- particularly from Route 922
(the cut-off to Ashau) through Base Area 701 and southward
along the Cambodian border.
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(2) Improve our detailed knowledge of the nature and
quantities of supplies sent to support the NVA/VC effort
(particularly in IV Corps, III Corps and lower II Corps)
via Cambodia i. e. , supplies that did not transit Laos
but, instead, came into Cambodia by water transport (either
through the port of Sihanoukville or over the beaches in the
Gulf of Siam) and moved northeastward to their Communist
end-users in South Vietnam via roads and trails located in
Cambodian territory.
(3) Help clarify and quantify -- in both tonnage and
percentage terms-- the respective or relative contribution
made to the NVA/VC logistic support structure by "the
Laotian route system" and "the Cambodian route system.
2. It was my understanding that the initial response to your request
should include a list of technically feasible new collection activities or
intensifications of current collection activities framed without inhibiting
reference (in this initial cut) to cost factors, current political strictures
on certain forms of activity and/or activities in certain areas, or questions
of priority allocation of scarce, long lead time assets (e.g., COMINT
collection platforms).
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3. The Response. To.comply with your request, I have convened
an ,d hoc task force whose membership includes representatives of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense
Communications Planning Group, the Special Assistant to the Chairman,
JCS for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), the Director
for Reconnaissance (JCS/J-3), the Director of Operations for the United
States Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations, and both
the analysis and the collection components of this Agency. After we had
carefully reviewed in joint discussion all aspects of the problem you
posed, I asked each of my associates to submit in writing an analysis of
new collection procedures or improvements in existing procedures that
could be effected in those areas that fell within his office's primary
jurisdiction or special technical competence.
4. This memorandum and its two annexes embodies a melding of
all of these inputs, circulated in draft to all members of the task force
reviewed by us all in joint session. One of the two annexes to this
and
memorandum inventories our current collection assets and procedures; the
other outlines in some detail a series of action recommendations summarized
paragraph ' below. The tripartite package, of this memorandum and its
in p g
annexes reflects the unanimous concerisus judgments of the entire task force.
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5. General Considerations. Certain general considerations
and certain aspects of the overall problem you posed have directly or
indirectly affected all of our action recommendations and constitute,
collectively, the context within which these recommendations were
framed:
a. Proving Negatives. Part of the complexity of
the problem of analyzing the current utilization of the Vietnamese
Communists' total logistic structure -- and a good deal of the
debate over the current relative roles of the Cambodian and
the Laotian route systems -- derives from a lack of hard data
on whether supplies are moving in any appreciable quantity,
or moving at all, over certain portions of the Laos trail
system below Route 922 or over certain portions of the
Cambodian system opposite northern III Corps and southern
II Corps. In Cambodia, for example, we have low level
agent reports of supply movements over road and trail seg-
ments that photography indicates are impassable or not utilized
by any traffic at all. In Laos, evidence we do have on the
operations and utilization of some segments of the Laotian
route network suggests the presumptive inference that supplies
are moving over other segments of the Laotian route. We have
little or no evidence of actual movement over these other
segments,, but this absence of evidence is hard to evaluate
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since the segments over which there is little to no evidence
of actual movement are ones receiving a degree of collection
effort appreciably less than that devoted to the segments over
which we do have evidence of movement. One of the principal
tasks of an integrated, expanded collection effort will be to
clarify and enhance our knowledge of which segments of both
route systems are not now being used. Negatives, however,
are hard and tricky things to prove, particularly in short
time spans.
b. Seasonal ..Factors. The evidence we do have in
hand and the evidentiary record developed over the past years
demonstrates conclusively that the Communists' use pattern
of their logistic system in both Laos and Cambodia 'shows a
cyclic pattern keyed to the seasonal rhythms of Indochina's
monsoonal climate. Throughout both systems, the dry season _
is the period of maximum use (i. e., supply movement); the
wet season that of minimum use. Unfortunate.y, the early
stages of any intensified collection effort now mounted are
going to be out of phase with our adversaries' use cycle. The
rains have come in both Cambodia and Laos, our increased
efforts will hence come at a time of diminished enemy activity,
a fact that is certain to affect, adversely the conclusiveness of
the early returns from an inten aa
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augmented in the near future.
 c. Technical vs Human Collection. Two general types
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of collection assets can be brought to bear on the problem here
considered: technical (e. g. , sensors, communications intercept
platforms, and photography) and human (e. g. singleton agents,
informant nets, roadwatch teams and raiding parties). Although
the action program outlined below recommends an intensification
of effort in both the human and the technical fields, we believe
the weight of our immediate effort should be placed in the technical
area. The portions of south Laos and northeastern Cambodia
against which much of our augmented effort will be initially
targetted constitute extremely hostile environment in which enemy
presence is pervasive and in which the enemy reacts sharply and
forcefully to any intrusion. In these sparsely populated regions,
there is little indigenous population we can use for cover or
through which we can work. Friendly personnel, teams or units
inserted into . the se areas find movement difficult, must perforce
devote much of their time and effort to simply staying alive, and
can devote only a fraction of their attention to collecting meaningful
intelligence. Because of these circumstances, the recruitment,
training, insertion, support and exfiltration of such teams or
units becomes. a very elaborate, complex process. In short, the
intelligence return on human collection in these, areas is very
small in terms of. the.effort investment required. Furthermore,
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road and trail watching teams (whose observations are inevitably
sporadic and short in terms of time) are poor instruments for
establishing or disproving the fact of a flow over selected trail
and route systems. Technical collection procedures have their
own complexities and problems, but the intelligence return on
effort invested is considerably greater than is the case with
human assets operating in a hostile environment. Sensors, for
example, are by all odds the best method of establishing whether
or not there is movement over particular route or trail segments
and of pinpointing particular target areas sufficiently lucrative
to warrant follow up investigation or attention by human assets.
d. Lead Times and Results. It will require from 60 to
to 90 days from the time the policy decision to proceed is made
for ,the augmented collection program outlined below to get into
full operation. The speed with which meaningful returns will
begin to come in will vary among the various components of
the program and will also be influenced by what is (or is not)
learned. Sensors implanted along suspect route segments, for
example, should begin producing meaningful data almost immediately
if these route segments are in fact used for significant supply
movements. On-the other hand, if the route segments are not
in use, it will take considerably longer for us to be confident
that this "negative" has been satisfactorily proved. In any event,
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since much of the augmented program invo ves re-orienting,
-re-targetting activities already in operation, some evidence
of value should begin to come in fairly soon after the augmented
effort begins, even though it will take longer for. the full effect
of the new effort to be felt. Even under the best of circumstances,
our augmented effort program will not difinitively answer all of
our outstanding questions, but it should help to clarify most of
them.
(e) Intelligence Collection vs Reaction and Interdiction .
The primary object of the augmented collection program outlined
below is to generate more and better intelligence on the Vietnamese
Communists` logistic support system through which Hanoi aids and
abets the Communist-directed struggle in South Vietnam. If
successful, this collection program will not only produce strategic
information on the totality of this logistic support system and the
respective importance of the system's several components, it will
also develop or identify lucrative tactical targets for allied inter-
diction and reaction strikes. Although the task force has devoted
its efforts to developing a collection program, not an interdiction
program, we believe the program adopted should consciously
maximize interdiction possibilities and, further, that in certain
contexts, controlled interdiction can be used as one effective means
of producing additional intelligence. For example, in determining
the mix of human and technical assets targetted against a given
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geographic area, it should be constantly borne in mind that the
insertion of ground teams into that area either precludes the
possibility of interdiction strikes or, at best, raises thorny,
complex problems of coordination, clearance,., and control.
At the other end of the scale, if, say, a landline complex
presumptively serving a particular route segment is identified,
a strike on the landlines may force our adversaries to resort to
interceptable radio communications.
6. Recommended Augmented Collection Program. We have framed
two sets of recommendations for augmented collection efforts: One keyed
to improving our knowledge of what does, or does not, move over the
"Laos system" south of Route 922, the other keyed to improving our
knowledge of what does, or does not, move over the "Cambodian system."
Each of the two sets of recommendations is further broken down into the
two spheres of. technical and human collection. Our recommendations are
summarized below and outlined in further detail in this memorandum's
Annex II.
(a) South Laos - Northeastern Cambodia
(1) Technical Collection
. (a) COMINT /ARDF: Deployment, on a
trial basis, of a collection platform over.
southern Laos to cover areas along Routes 92/96
south of. Route 922.
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(b) Sensors: More extensive sensor
coverage of routes south of Route 922 is
required if sensor detections are to yield
accurate reflections of truck movements on
these roads and in northeast Cambodia.
(c) Aerial Reconnaissance: An increase
in the frequency of aerial high and low altitude
reconnaissance suitable to yield enough
interpretable photography to make judgements
on probable levels of activity.
.(d) Wire Tap Operations: Current plans for
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there. Failing this, all land lines should be located
and destroyed thereby f sing the use of radio
communications.
(2) Human Collection
(a) Roadwatch and Agent Operations: In Laos
we visualize the launching of more roadwatch teams
to high priority target areas when their chances of
survivability are good. Additionally, we would
attempt the expansion of our agent efforts in
critical areas, and increase the use of recon-
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an expansion of our on-going operation to recruit
additional unilateral agents should be attempted.
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(c) Visual Reconnaissance: An increase in night
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sorties, with appropriate night vision devices, flown
in the Route 922 area to at least one-third that of
the sorties now flown in the STEEL TIGER area of
Laos is recommended. Also, an increase in the
number of low-level missions should be programmed.
(a) COMINT: A greatly expanded COMINT
collection prograrh to include monitoring of suspected
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(d) Document Collection: It is recommended that
a ground attack be mounted against one or several of
of the military way stations (Binh Tram) in Laos with
a view to disrupting the system and collecting intelli-
gence information in the form of documents. .
(b) .Cambodia
(1) Technical Collection
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- should be expanded to insure
(b) Sensor: Sensor strings should be placed
in Cambodia contiguous to`the South Vietnamese
border to measure the activity level on routes
off the main Cambodian supply roads leading
toward South Vietnam.
(c) Aerial Photography: Existing aerial re-
connaissance programs --
90 percent cloud free and interpretable photo-
graphy of these target areas in order that mean-
ingful judgments regarding the use and probable
levels, of activity of the logistical systems may
(2) Human Collection
(a) Agent Operations: An expansion of the
current agent operations against Cambodian
involvement in the enemy logistical system to
include information on official Cambodian complicity
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deliveries to and through Sihanoukville and
information regarding Communist supply channels
through Stung Treng and Ratanikiri Provinces.
(b) MACSOG: The
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assets should be directed toward long term monitor-
ing and reporting on the enemy logistical. system
avoiding all- contact except when it is deemed de-
sirable to attempt to capture enemy logistical personnel.
7. Suggested Follow-Up Action. The recommendations outlined above
constitute, in effect, a catalogue of technically or theoretically feasible actions
that could be taken to improve our intelligence on the Vietnamese Communists'
logistic'support system. In their present form, they do not constitute an
actual action program since, per our instructions, they were framed without
reference to current policy restrictions on activities in certain areas (e. g.
Cambodia) and without attempting to resolve problems of conflicting priorities
competing for scarce, long lead time collection assets (e. g. COMINT plat-
forms). Also, though the Air Staff, DCPG and the CIA's Clandestine Services
have already done a considerable amount of thorough, detailed planning, once
`' the necessary policy decisions on ground rules and priorities are made, the
list of approved actions will have to be translated into a specific series of
operational plans - a process that will require consultation with. ou'; military
and civilian colleagues in the field who will have to handle the actual execution
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hoc task force can carry on the work reflected in this memorandum, devise
a specific program, and pinpoint the policy decisions that will have to be
made on rules of engagement, costs and asset allocation in light of overall
collection priorities. Once the necessary policy guidance is obtained, we
car. then develop a schematic operational plan for field consideration and
Washington approval.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachments:
Annex I - Current Collection Operations
Annex II -- Recommended Augmented Collection Program
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