CURRENT AND NEAR FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES AND SYSTEMS AS MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO THE PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001300120004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 13, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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ORD 1006 -70
13 February 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Carver, SAVA/DCI
SUBJECT : Current and Near Future Technologies
and Systems as might be Appropriate to
the Problem
REFERENCE : Memorandum entitled "Collection of
Intelligence on Communist Logistic and
Personnel Movements through Laos and
through Cambodia" dated 7 February 1970
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1. We, collectively or individually, have reviewed the
referenced document and have attended several meetings on the
subject. In response to a request for technological support levied
on the DD/S&T, two functions are responding: OEL with a sug-
gestion for increased COMINT coverage (under separate cover)
and ORD with a rather generalized overview of current and near
future technology as might apply to the problem (see attached).
2. We make no specific detailed suggestions of systems
or gadgets; rather we present a survey of ORD and other projects
and technologies of which we are aware, in no particular order
other than generic. All items mentioned have progressed to the
point of proof of concept, either by prototype demonstration or
test or through design studies. Hence, accurate performance,
cost and development cycle times are available. Some sample
systems of possible assemblies of available components and
technologies are proposed in general form by way of example.
3. We emphasize that we advocate no specific system
or device because we claim no knowledge as to the relative value
of various kinds of data to intelligence in this application. We
do, in passing, stress the mandatory requirements for a centralized,
coordinated, efficient processing means for handling the hugh
quantity of data which is readily obtainable by the means available.
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SUBJECT: Current and Near Future Technologies and Systems as
might be Appropriate to the Problem
4. We have assumed the following ground rules:
a. Strike capability is not required; hence, on-
line or real time processing is not mandatory.
b. Fairly peaceful ambient but with potential
danger from ground fire, AA or SAM and/or high perfor-
mance aircraft attack. Some electromagnetic intercept
capability on the part of the enemy is also assumed.
c. All enemy transmissions are of sufficient
strength to permit line of sight intercept.
d. COMINT is the best indication of personnel
movement; visual or parameter detection are best for
logistics movement.
5. In summary, we present many possibilities, all
realizable with predictable funding and time requirements. We
submit examples; all intend to provide data to sugest schemes.
We stand ready to respond to specific indliries./
AP/ORD/DD/S&T
Attachments
1. Paper on Platforms
2. Paper on Sensors
3. Paper on Components
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example. Propelled by electric motors, the balloon is powered
by prime batteries, recharged by solar cells. Tests to date show
that station keeping is realizable under most conditions. The
somewhat lower altitude is permissable by the very low optical
and radar visibility of the balloon. The 5 to 10 lb. payload of the
smaller version is adequate for the micropower, microelectronics,
automated receiving, transmitting or recording equipment which
are realizable with today's technology. Let this suffice for a gen-
eralized solution to the COMINT problem.
The logistics problem is somewhat more complex; not tech-
nically, but by virtue of the many sensors which seem to be required
to satisfy intelligence demands. For these, the choice is probably
a combination of extreme altitude platforms and very low altitude
ones. The choice depends of course on the type sensors chosen.
Photographic and IR techniques certainly benefit from proximity.
While new developments in optical techniques permit greater reso-
lution and sensitivity from high altitudes, the SE Asia weather is
not always compliant, especially for daytime operations where
great detail is desired.
Nonetheless, it
would seem that lower altitudes are the best all around. In addition,
lower altitude operations permit accurate air drop of in-place
sensors. One possible application of high altitude photo and IR
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is, of course, the detection of changes on a gross basis.
A distinction should be made as to what is meant by low
altitude. It is suggested that tree top level flights are the better,
particularly for continuous surveillance; the median altitudes
(10, 000 to 60, 000 feet) appear quite vulnerable to SAM and other
aircraft attack. For daytime, therefore, low and fast; while at
night, low slow and quiet. Examples of the former are the F-4;
of the latter, FAC, the quiet-powered Sweitzer sailplane or drone
aircraft, free flight and tethered balloon or VTOL devices or
drone helicopters. One point seems to emerge; that a cheap
drone will prove to be the ultimate solution when compared to the
cost of manned systems, particularly those that are lost. Drones,
which are realizable today, offer great advantage.
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PLATFORMS
Type
Drone Airplane
500 - 2, 000 ft. 65 mph
Operational Alt.
Payload Capacity 50 lbs.
Size 15 ft. wing span
Propulsion System Gas Engine
Power Source 24 Hours Reasonable - 1500 miles
Status Available with three months lead time.
To replace FAC as cheap drone - estimated
$25 K in production.
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PLATFORMS
Type 100, 000 to 110, 000 ft. Altitude Drone
Operational Alt.
Payload Capacity 100 lbs. 22 Hours on Station
Size 50 ft. Wing Spread
Propulsion System Jet Engine (Williams -Research) Needs
Development
Status Contemplated - Initial Study Under Way
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Type
Operational Alt.
Payload Capacity
Size
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PLATFORMS
Drone Helicopter (Flea Vehicle
To 40, 000 ft.
20 lbs.
12 ft. Rotor Diameter 110 lbs. total
Propulsion System Gas Engine with Alternator to Power Payload
and Controls
Power Source 40 Mile Range. .4 Hours Loiter
Status Design Study Complete. Also completed for
a 1 lb. payload, 25 lb. total weight version.
Has autopilot, some navigation.
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Type
Drone Boat, Remote (Over-the-Horizon)
Navigation & Control Package
operational Alt. N/A
Payload Capacity Depends Upon Boat Used
Size
Propulsion System Limited to Internal Combustion Engines
Power Source Standard
Status Breadboard Ready for Test and Evaluation
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It is clear that a multitude of sensor types can be
brought to bear the pr,ob1ems of COMINT and logistics
movement in SEA.. The type selected is in some cases
dependent upon the deployment mechanism and/or operational
platform. For example, a presently existing laser
illumination/scanner requires a moving platform in order
to generate area coverage. This platform must exhibit
the requisite stability and navigational capability; but
given that such platforms are available, the question as
to the useful target coverage that can be obtained must
be answered. Monitoring logistics movement through dense
jungle is clearly impossible due to the opaque nature of
foliage to visible wavelengths. The laser device,
however, has been flown and is an existing piece of
hardware demonstrating an excellent resolution capability
for areas not completely covered with vegetation. Other
photographic techniques such as a multiple wavelength
camera and IR scanner are also operational and provide
ideal matches for a variety of drone vehicles.
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Electronic sensors are also present in great numbers.
Perhaps the most significant point in this area is the
availability of a class of electronic devices that improve
power effeciency by orders of magnitude. This technology
makes possible the consideration of battery operated
systems for monitoring purposes heretofore unrealistic
due to limited useful life-time. A.multi-function relay
system has been built and demonstrated that consumes less
than 750 microwatts per repeater. The repeaters in
addition to accepting a variety of commands and being
uniquely addressable has carried information varying
from audio to T.V. video. Translating these techniques
to monitoring systems directed at these particular problem
areas can yield solutions previously technologically
impossible.
A specific area of technological development that
can change the whole pattern of area monitoring is the
field of primary energy. Where the new electronics
improve efficiency, they still require a long lived source
of energy. A source is at hand that promises substantial
amounts of power for time periods measured in years. This
source is the radio-isotope battery, a device producing
on the order of 25 milliwatts of power. Understandably
the projected life of 85 years has not yet been verified
experimentally.
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It seems clear that the capability exists in the
sensor area as represented by DCPG, TSD, and others'
efforts and what is required is for them to be mated
with a matching system, platform, or intelligence
gathering effort. The inter relation between the
sensor and deployment mechanism suggests many possible
configurations.
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SENSORS
Type lowlight level TV
Targets
moonlight scenes
Output real-time video
Size, Weight 100 in. 3 , 4-1/4 lb.
Power Reqd. 9 watts
Status In final test phase
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SENSORS
Type Slow Scan TV
Targets
Visible daylight scenes
Output 24Kbits/sec PCM video
Size, Weight 2-1/2 lbs. 5" x5" x 5"
Power Reqd. 7 watts
6 prototypes built
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SENSORS
Type IR Scanners - D3 - D4 - D5
Targets at low altitude: people, cattle, trucks,campfires
Output video image recorded on film (looks like photograph); can also
be used in near-real-time by means of a CRT viewer or by rapid
processing of film.
Size, Weight 150-200 lbs. per system. Size on order of 30" x 12" x 18",
plus several smaller units plus cabling.
Power Reqd.
normal aircraft 28vdc and 115 vac 3~
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SENSORS
Type Active"non-linear" radar operating at 150 MHz, 100 Kw peak power
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Targets rifles, trucks, & other manufactured objects
Output indication of targets out to a range of 3, 000 ft.
Size, Weight suitable for installation in a helicopter or airplane
Power Reqd . kilowatts
GRD has tested truckmounted system
MERDC is testing helicopter mounted system
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SENSORS
Type
lazer ilium/scanner
Targets 1/3 milliradii
Output
Size, Weight 100-200#
Power Reqd.
Status Perkin-Elmer and Hughes each make a system
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SENSORS
Type multi-spectral camera system
Targets
Output film
Size, Weight (4) P-220 camera strapped together
70 mm format camera w/filters Est. 50# w/stabilized
mount
Power Reqd.
Status in operation
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SENSORS
Type stabilized viewing, communication & photo devices
Targets
Output
Size, Weight binoculars with camera or laser commo
Power Reqd.
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SENSORS
0 0
Type Facsimile Video Sensor (Minifax) - produces a 90 by.360
panoramic video image in 30 seconds frame rate
Any target within about a mile; resolution is 0. 1? by 0. 1 ?
Targets
(1. 7 feet in 1000); daylight or twilight operation
Output video modulated voltage (0 to 16 volts); 1000:1 dynamic range;
line synchronization and frame synchronization
Size, Weight One inch diameter
tandbmpact shock of 1000 geight less than
0. 5 pounds; will wi
Power Reqd. 1. 2 watts for full operation
Status First prototype scheduled for completion in March 1970.
Additional units would require an estimated four to five months
for small quantities (cost of early units will be high -, in the $20, 000
to $30? 000 range).
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BASIC COMPONENTS
For lack of better definition, we discuss here basic
technologies, components, and devices which form the inter-
connecting parts of sensor/platform systems. Some have been
referred to elsewhere and are repeated here for convenience.
The problems attacked here are those of data handling,
power supply, and the possibilities of rebuilding existing
devices to reduce size and/or power consumption. These
prime for any
latter two considerations would seem to be P need no further
prolonged surveillance situation and probably namplification.
In the area of data handling, eg., from sensor ouput to
processing center, there are simply a multitude of possibilities.
Some basic problems need consideration:
a. Operation in a cluttered electromagnetic environ-
ment such as exists in SEA.
b. Enemy intercept and nullification
c. System efficiency
usipg data
The last item refers to the problem of efficiently
links and processing facilities. It would seem that sensor
data would be available on a temporarily sporadic basis unless,
of course, sensors are placed along a crowded highway, for
This then suggests a
instance, such as the San Diego Freeway.
store and dump-when-full or dump-when-interrogated capability.
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BASIC COMPONENTS
Item - Micro Power - Micro Electropics
The ability to constrict literally any electronic function in
small size and requiring only fractions of original power.
Status
Technology developed. Examples of application are:
a. Communications quality superhetrodyne receiver
in the volume of a matchbook
b. 1 mw UHF FM Transmitter in a pencil
c. Misc. radio control systems
d. Bi-divertional, multifunctional radio relay system
using less than 700 microwatts per repeat,
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Item - Solar Rechargeable Power Sources
For long lifetime system, ORD has found that solar
rechargeable secondary power sources are extremely efficient,
from a weight/energy standpoint.
If any solar exposure is possible, the tradeoffs of array
size, weight, detectability, and power cell size should be made
against use of life-limited primary cells.
Six- to twelve-month operating periods are possible.
Solar array studies for various applications have been
completed in RP and PC. Terrestrial uses are feasible.
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BASIC COMPONENTS
- Nuclear Battery
Life measurable in years
Tens of milliwatts available
Small size (1-1/2" dia. X 1-1/2" long) equipment
Radiation not detectable at 1 meter with laboratory
status $5, 000 ea)
Available but presently expensive
ur auo and
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BASIC COMPONENTS
Item
Miniature General Purpose Computer (CDC 470)
Logic
MOS/LSI circuits (4 MHz)
Four phase logic
43 instructions
Add-3 sec
Multiply - 9 sec
16 bit words
Memory
4, 000 x 16 bit words
Plated wire NDRO
No standby power required
System Characteristics (including memory)
10 cubic inches
0. 8 pounds
5 watts
First prototype is deliverable in the fall of 1970.
Additional units will be available at the rate of two to three
per month.
Cost is estimated at $25, 000 to $30, 000 (almost entirely
memory).
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BASIC COMPONENTS
Covert and/or interference resistant transmitter modulation
techniques.
Status
One system, for example, spread spectrum over 5 MHz
packaged complete in matchbox size.
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BASIC COMPONENTS
Item - Miniature Emplacement Package
Functions: Performs deceleration, impact shock protection
(to 1000 g), leveling and stabilization for systems in the 5- to 15-pound
total weight class.
Payloads would typically be miniature intelligence csmection,
storage and communications equipment (video, audio, etc. ). -
Status
Two prototype engineering models were completed in
January 1969.
Model No. 1 (Flat Lander) is being tested extensively in
February 1970.
Camouflage and scaling (weight and volume) analyses have
been completed.
Estimated six months to develop 10 to 20 units (cost per
unit is approximately, $5, 000 to $10, 000).
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BASIC COMPONENTS
Item - Position/Navigation - Omega Receiver
Weight 1-1 /2 lb. 8 watts
Absolute Accuracy 1 to 2 miles
Repeat accuracy 1000 feet (differential mode)
Readout digital or on link
Status
6 deliverable in March
$10K est.
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BASIC COMPONENTS
Item - Position /Navigation -_ Loran C-D Receiver
4-1/2 lbs. battery powered - 30 w
Absolute accuracy 400
Repeatable 200'
Readout digital or on link
S/N - 17 db.
(2) Prototypes and world wide evaluation underway
Follow-on being developed by USA
Eventually to MOS-FET at 3w
$35K in prototype quantity.
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BASIC COMPONENTS
Item - Quick - Turn-On Vidicon Tubes
250 millisecond turn-on time
20 milliwatt filament power
600 TV _ Line Resolution
Status
Two experimental one inch-tubes have been successfully
developed
one - all electrostatic one inch tube
one - all electromagnetic one inch tube
ExcIadSJ fr.ol aatamatic
doter f:iPV a sd
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Now TV camera magnifies light by thousands of times and can be used to spot enemy troops at night
':i o f
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Assn. of the U. S. Army last Oct. 14: to make use of it. Almost certainly, en-
Defense Dept. develops "The Army has undergone in Vietnam tirely new tactics and troop organiza-
in secret a new a quiet revolution in ground warfare- tions will have to be developed, and
concept of warfare tactics, techniques, and technology. elaborate computerized command and
This revolution is not fully understood control centers will direct them.
The Pentagon has set up the mecha-
In the jungles of Vietnam, at Fort by many."
Hood, Tex., in military and industrial Consolidation. Now the diffuse concept nism to coordinate projects and Chilli-
laboratories in the U. S. and West Ger- is emerging more clearly as the Penta- Hate duplication under its electronic
many, and at dozens of other locations gon attempts to whip it into an under- battlefield program. Lieutenant Gen-
here and abroad, the Pentagon has standable whole. Today, hundreds of eral John D. Lavelle of the Air Force is
been secretly experimenting with a systems for surveillance, target acqui- in over-all charge of the work. He
new concept of warfare. sition, night observation, and data pro- heads a task force called the Defense
General William C. Westmoreland, cessing are being used by or developed Communications Planning Group. Se-
Army chief of staff, calls the concept for all the services. And scores of con- crecy cloaking most electronic battle-
the "automated battlefield." More tom- tractors are working on them, field projects, however, still makes it
monly, it is known as the "electronic Covering a wide spectrum of projects hard to follow their costs and judge ogether.
battlefield." By any name, it is nothing are such companies as RCA, West- Growth. effectively they it tof many proj
less than an effort to develop a totally inghouse, Hughes Aircraft, Honeywell,
new method of waging war at the foot- General Electric, and ITT. Some, like ects are classified. However, McGraw-
slogger's level. To date, the effort has Barnes Engineering, Sandia, and Hill's DMS Industrial News Service has
been hidden within myriad programs Texas Instruments, are working on figures on how some of them have
of the three services. Thus far, $2-bil- such specialized devices as "intrusion grown. In fiscal 1967, the Defense
lion has been spent, and costs may soar alarms." Others, such as Varo, Inc., of Dept's Advanced Research Projects
to $20-billion in the next decade. Garland, Tex., and Aerojet-General, Agency (ARPA) budgeted $3.5-million
Out of the spending will come exotic are developing night vision optical fore sensor studies, appropriations two year
fors ate
new sensors--seismic, acoustic, in- equipment.
frared, radar, and others--to detect Out of all the technological effort, tronic battlefield research topped $90-
enemy movements over huge areas, two big problems have emerged: million. Then, as the armed forces
Strikes will be made through use of C Projects are becoming too many and placed orders for equipment developed
data links, computer-assisted in- too big to be buried within the three and tested in the preceding two years,
telligence evaluation, and automated services' separate budgets as attempts appropriations for procurement rose to
fire controls. And GIs will get costly to improve battlefield reconnaissance. $524-million.
electronic gear to help them find and Congressmen are probing for wasteful For fiscal 1970, DMS estimates, $78.5-
fight the foe. duplication and demanding that the million has been approved in this area
Soldiers on the front lines are a]- program be brought into focus. for R&D and $214.1-million for procure-
ready applying electronic battlefield e Technology especially of systems to ment. But either figure may increase
techniques. General Westmoreland collect battlefield data, is now so ad- through reshuffling of Pentagon funds
touched on rP~lel cFarfiQec0S1e,20O.41"1111t Ci4A'IIRDMRR17209IOO1kb?F2Ob'6f4'-fat year ends.
DEFENSE
VIP
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On the battlefield, sensors developed devices.
VViettna
for the electronic bz tlefieeld ~rai
i
e
are already changin~~rt
fight. `Says Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the
Pentagon's director of defense re-
n
search and engieering: "We may well
be oil . the verge of providing complete,
realtime battlefield surveillance
around the clock.." But putting such in-
formation to full use will require com-
inand and control centers able to keep
track of friendly, as well as enemy,
forces. Companies such as Litton,
Motorola, Otis Elevator, and IiRB-
Singer are deeply involved in devel-
oping the centers. But, in addition, spe-
cial new troop formations may be
needed just to handle complex elec-
tronic field equipment.
Field tests. The Army is tackling this
problem on several fronts. This year,
infantry and tank units will take part
in full-scale battlefield experiments at
Fort Hood, Tex., called Project
Master. The aim is to develop an In-
tegrated Battlefield Control System
(IBCS), where computerized control sys-
tems could make use of data from the
new sensors.
Going into IBCS will be Army ex-
perience in earlier and much more lim-
ited projects: Tacfire, a computerized
tactical fire control system developed
in the last three years, and TOS, a tac-
tical operations system that was tested
in Germany and demonstrated in De-
cember. Computerized equipment used
in TOS will be shipped from Germany to
Fort Hood this spring.
Sensors that can see
in the dark are changing
the way armies fight `
17 0R001300120004-7
doned after a battle. If enemy forces
return, these sensors target their
movements and relay data to the near-
est Army headquarters.
In the not too distant future, says
the Army, airmen and infantry will
work closely together, their tasks
coordinated by control centers like
those the Army and Air Force are
trying to develop. For low-level straf-
ing, the Air Force this year will try to
build up to a total of 100 heavily armed,
slow-flying "gunships" with amplified
television, radar that penetrates jun-
gles, and screens that display both ra-
dar and infrared images of what lies
ahead of the plane. Bendix, Emerson,
Itek, and Admiral are among com-
panies working on these systems.
The Army also wants to put less
weighty detection equipment aboard
its Huey combat helicopters, built by
Textron's Bell Helicopter Co. At least
16 companies are engaged in building
or developing multisensored aircraft
and helicopter systems, including
Grumman, Fairchild Hiller, IBM, LTV,
Martin Marietta, and Northrop.
To achieve surprise in reconnais-
sance, the Army and Marines, who fly
at rooftop level, want more than a
dozen Lockheed Yo-3 "quiet" airplanes
with several new sensing systems
aboard. The Yo-3s will whisper over the
enemy and detect his presence before
the planes are spotted. And the Air
Force wants to quiet the turbojet
Beech King executive aircraft, fit it
with larger, more elaborate sensors
and viewing equipment, and use it at
The Army's Combat Developments In their efforts to get even quieter
Command also has run small-scale and more stable observation platforms
tests of the new tactics, weapons, and for surveillance, military men are even
troop organization at the Hunter-Lig- looking into balloons. And Dr.
gett Military Reservation in Califor- Eberhardt Rechtin, director of ARPA,
nia. Now the Army is trying to decide believes that an unmanned, armored
who will get its expensive night-fight- and sensor-equipped helicopter can be
ing devices-all fighting men or only used to spot targets for the artillery.
certain units. To help get an answer, it He expects to have such a helicopter
is testing "limited action forces"- operating within two years.
small units heavily equipped with sen- Ordnance. Many of the munitions that
sor:s and special communications gear- tie in with the concept of remote-con-
in Hawaii and other training grounds. trolled warfare will be in Vietnam by
A prototype picture of the electronic the end of the year. Among companies
battlefield already exists in a limited involved in their development are Gen-
way. In Vietnam, the Army is using eral Dynamics, Raytheon, and Syl-
more than a dozen new night vision de- vania. Already in use are shells, rock-
vices as well as other types of sensors. ets, and bombs packed with hundreds
These include infrared sensors, light- of deadly, nail-like steel darts. And the
amplifying telescopes, and seismic de- Army is stocking up on a new type of
tectors to monitor enemy movements tracer bullet that shows up only on
for more than a mile around allied night-vision equipment and thus
bases. avoids disclosure of a gunner's position.
Some of this equipment, largely un- Electro-Optical Systems is delivering
tested, was rushed into use two years to the Air Force kits that will convert
ago during the siege of Khesanh, and conventional bombs to laser-guided
hundreds.of air strikes were directed weapons. Other companies at work on
against targets identified by sensing laser applications include Philco-Ford
Since then, U. S. troops in
Rifle scope amplifies light
and spots targets after dark.
Tank with infrared equipment keeps
a 24-hour vigil on the enemy.
and Perkin-Elmer. This year the Air
Force will begin to air-drop vast num-
bers of land and water mines that will
detonate when anyone comes close to
their sensors.
In a project related to air-dropped
mines, the Air Force already has equip-
ment to sow tiny, rugged "intrusion
detectors" across vast stretches of
land. Under a program called "College
Eye," these high-flying U. S. air-
craft are able to pick up concentrations
of enemy activity. To aid in the sub-
sequent attack, bombers carry TV cam-
eras that can amplify light. from the
moon and the stars tens of thousands
of times, thus allowing around-the-
,clock visual bombing.
The huge mass of information that
such developments will make available
may be the biggest problem in the elec-
tronic battlefield. As Lieutenant Gen-
eral George S. Boylan, Jr., deputy chief
of staff for Air Force programs, says:
"Our capacity to obtain information is
continuing to increase more rapidly
than our ability to reduce it to usable
intelligence." a
DE;,R,,E Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP80RO1720R00130012000aless: JANUARY 31, 1070 77
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300120004-7
by Leonard Sullivan, Jr.
In Vietnam, the targets are small, cheap, cleverly hidden
and mobile. it is not the kind of war we were prepared for,
but then that is the reason we have military 'R &
IN BRIEF: The author heads the office in
the Pentagon whose specific purpose is to
expedite those R&D activities which hold
some promise of increasing the effective-
ness of our forces in Southeast Asia. From
that special position, he tells of the impor-
tant role of R&D in the war. Currently, the
Department of Defense is investing some
$800 million per year in this effort. Given
the long time required to bring ideas
through the R&D process and convert them
to hardware, is it reasonable to expect that
today's ideas can be developed in time to
have an effect on the battlefield? The Pen-
tagon clearly believes so, citing the more
than one hundred new types of equipment
that are added to our operational inventory
each year. Currently, more than one thou-
sand specific R&D projects are going on in
support of the war.-D.A.
fl Some people wonder whether research and
development have a place in a war while that
war is going on. I believe strongly that there
is a place. for such endeavors-just as there
was in previous wars. Indeed, my office exists
under the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering for the specific purpose of expe-
diting those research and development activi-
ties which hold some promise of increasing the
effectiveness of our military forces in South-
cast Asia.
Most wars we fight will be different from
the ones we were anticipating. Every war will
have its own peculiarities and innovations.
always be a problem of remaking our military
forces, or reoptimizing them for the particular
type of war that comes along.
We know now that the war in Vietnam is
considerably different from any war we have
ever fought before. We entered this war fully
and beautifully equipped to fight either an all-
out nuclear conflict or World War II over
again. But then we found that Vietnam is a
new war-for many reasons. As I describe
these reasons, I believe you will see the impor-
tance of a strong R&D activity linked to our
engagement in Southeast Asia.
More than one war
At the time we undertook to help the South
Vietnamese, I do not think we fully realized
how difficult it would be to fight an enemy so
closely interwoven with our allies. It is a war
without front lines, a war where you can sel-
dom distinguish friend from foe-except by
the actions of the foe. Thus, we have had to
learn a great deal about how to find small
bands of enemy guerrillas dispersed over the
countryside. In addition to the insurgency,
however, several other wars have been super-
imposed, each with its own characteristics. I
will discuss each briefly.
The most advanced war, technologically, is
the bombing of the North; it uses many of our
latest tactical aircraft in a strategic role; we
are up against enemy surface-to-air missiles
for the first time; we are in combat against
supersonic Soviet-designed aircraft, firing air-
to-air missiles-and we are doing the same.
The electronic warfare is quite sophisticated
on both sides. Less sophisticated, but more im-
portant, we have had to learn how to survive
intense antiaircraft fire.
One frustrating aspect of this war is the
difficulty we find in really discouraging the
enemy, or killing his interest in fighting, by
bombing alone. We are also learning-or re-
learning--that when you run an air campaign
without ground follow-up, you frequently can-
not keep the targets destroyed. It is one thing
to bomb a bridge to slow someone's retreat on
the ground, or to bomb a convoy that is re-
supplying front line troops. But it is quite an-
other thing to try to stop a country from going
about its essential business-like driving
ps -when one e~ntibnof as an
I vii g shi' Lin-
Every war AV r& ddF~- R*1649ret~804Y9`6/12
equipment, and new objectives. So there will
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR001300120004-7
following up on the ground. These are things
which make it a very expensive kind of war-
and in many respects, the results are difficult
to quantify.
The second war is in trying to stop infiltra-
tion into South Vietnam. This is a relatively
new problem ; we had some experience along
the Korean demilitarized zone, but not during
a hot war.
Vietnam has about one thousand miles of
land boundary, and another thousand miles of
water boundary. We are trying to stop the
North Vietnamese from crossing these 2000
miles of boundary and resupplying the guer-
rillas in the South. Actually, relative nd rein-
forcements length of the border, the supplies
fcoming into the South are very
small. So the "flow rate" across any unit length
of the total boundary is low. But the boundaries
are difficult to patrol ; most of the natural as-
sets are on the side of the guerrilla. For ex-
ample, two-thirds of the land boundary is cov-
ered by heavy jungle. Across these boundaries,
the North Vietnamese either walk, carrying
supplies on their backs, or push bicycles. They
do not ride the bicycles; they use them as ori-
have
ental wheelbarrows, carrying up to 500 of supplies in "saddlebags." Lately, they have found
hav
begun using trucks to cross. They
that we cannot destroy their roads as fast as
they can build them. They have had a very ac-
tive road-building campaign and are now
building roads right into South Vietnam.
Within South Vietnam, a third war involves
the dissipation of the main enemy units-now
mostly North Vietnamese manned. These are
11 d destroy" actions in which the
ity should be--and hence I shall not try to put
myself in a role of military strategist. But the
facts in the guerrilla war are these: if all l the
smoke were cleared away, if we stopped l
bombing of the North, if the North Vietnamese
stopped infiltrating into the South, if we
stopped fighting main unit actions in the
jungles, we would still have the problem of
controlling the guerrilla.
Adjusting a threshold
Who is the guerrilla? He is simply the local
dissident or the local zealot. He is willing to
ake him-
t
o m
commit acts of violence in order
self heard and in order to change his lot and
that of future generations. The threshold of
his violence is a fine balance between the
strength of his discontent and his view of the
consequences of his violence. We should be able
to change an insurgent's threshold of violence
by adjusting both sides of the balance. We
lower his level of discontent by peaceful
and we can raise the apparent deterrent by
suitable military or police presence-and tech-
nology can probably help on both sides. By
"we" I mean the U.S. as well as the South
Vietnamese government.
It is mainly in this "fourth war" that social
science research has been used to advantage.
Before we can undertake to advise another
country-much less help and train it-we must
have a full understanding of the differences in
its culture, background, aims, and motivations
from those of our own society. We cannot real-
istically hope to assist in solving the problems
of South Vietnam which have caused the dis-
satisfaction and lawlessness until we under-
stand in considerable detail how and why those
problems arose.
The fifth and newest war with which we
have been confronted is the war of the cities-
a form of "escalation" or modernization of knows
Maoist insurgency doctrine. The enemy
that by rocketing and shelling from without
and by sniping and arson from within, it is
possible to cause considerable local and inter-
national consternation. Damage to property is
extensive, the innocent population is caught the
a cross fire they cannot easily avoid,
credibility of the government is put to a severe
The fourth war ill; one test.
tention to than we might have. This is the war' Although not solely a Vietnamese problem,
Abp W961 fln'pale fe 041i, 1[%, ~f P80 Qt 7 QA1s 6101~~A(~ ')Tied in minimizing
no position to determine where mi i ar?y pi'i
October 1968 SCIENCE & rrcirvnt.ocr 29
the search an employed in
U.S. forces have been mainly
South Vietnam. In these actions, we
enemy
to the countryside to try to
mainforce battalions and regiments that move
as units. We attempt ref" chcfriet Illy to gets.
them before they
This is where our firepower has com in to play,
along with the extreme mobility to fly our
Without that
forces anywhere in the cWentrty. need many
firepower and mobility,
more troops to do the job from relatively static
defensive positions.
we have paid less at-
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR001300120004-7
Joint General
Staff,
Vietnam
Vietnam
Armed Forces
FROM VIETNAM TO WASHINGTON: THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
the trauma of "urban insurgency." The prepa-
ration of a city, its people, its government, its
civic agencies, and its public utilities is not a
simple matter. The conduct of the urban coun-
terinsurgency, once engaged, demands special
troops, special training, special weapons, spe-
cial vehicles, and special tactics. And the re-
constitution of the city in the aftermath also
requires special planning and special tech-
niques to minimize the duration and extent of
the dislocation. All of these problems are on
the front burner in South Vietnam today-and
should be at least on the back burner in many
other parts of the world.
What value R&D?
With this background we begin to see a dy-
namic range of things in this war for which
our R&D activities are applicable. Indeed, the
range is enormous compared to that of any
war we have ever fought. It ranges all the way
from police techniques to electronic warfare-
and we are trying to modernize our forces
throughout the whole spectrum.
There are many people both in Defense (in-
cluding military and civilian) and in the U.S.
at large (including Congress and private citi-
zens) who believe that our efforts to make this
a war of technology are wasted. There are oth-
FT~
R&D
Joint Staff Joint neeu
U.S. Army,
Vietnam
Naval Force,
Vietnam
III Marine
Amphibious
Force
could conveniently fight with our already high-
ly sophisticated war machinery. I would dis-
pute these points. Although I would agree that
we will find no single device that will have the
climactic importance that the tank had in World
War I or the atom bomb had in World War II,
there are many, many opportunities to develop
better weapons and devices, skills and under-
standing by which to lower our losses, shorten
the duration of the conflict, and enhance both
our own and our allied military posture. In
several discrete battles of this war, brand-new
technology has had a very significant, if not
decisive, effect on the outcome. In other in-
stances, technology could have had a decisive
effect if our experimental equipment had been
available in production quantities, and if our
military forces could have been trained over-
night to embrace new equipment (and adjust
their tactics accordingly).
Moreover, some of our more important con-
tributions are only now reaching the theater
in operational quantities. As individual "gad-
gets," they cannot win the war by themselves,
but taken in the aggregate, the effort may be-
come significant. We will "break even" finan-
cially if our total effort shortens the war by
only one month-without assigning any value
to the lives saved thereby. And if the suns total
A I6ud"F -Refea "e` 1 2: p 0 7raisi
forced the alation of~iis wa-o o g t1t[ ~~i~ Cray ng
Commander, U.S
Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR001300120004-7
Commander
in Chief,
Pacific
Joint Staff I Joint requirements
U.S. Army,
Pacific
Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific
Pacific
Air Forces
Army requirements
Navy requirements
Marine requirements
WASHINGTON
Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Joint Staff
U.S. Army
'Ran
U.S. Marine
Corps
Secretary
of Defense
DePU,ty
or:Southrast
PROVOST
:.son io r_ .
eerina grr
Other govt. agencies
NASA AEC CIA
Dept. Agr.
IS, Air
Air Force requirements ce
Chart is a schematic representation of the echelons of command involved
in the war in Southeast Asia. Color signifies centers of R&D activity.
the threshold for violence elsewhere in the
world) then I can only conclude that our ef-
forts have been worthwhile.
In the main, the inventory of our genera'-
purpose forces was outstanding when we went
into Vietnam. The U.S. general-purpose forces
are designed to fight any sort of limited non-
nuclear war that might arise, anywhere in the
world--whether on an ice cap, in a desert, in a
jungle, in a marsh, anywhere. Because of the
broad range of conflicts in which we might
possibly become involved, ti single general-
purpose force cannot be really optimum for
any specific war except possibly in Europe.
Therefore, there is a very necessary tailoring
job that must be done, having nothing to do
with whether or not we spent enough money
for defense during peacetime. We will always
have to tailor our forces to a specific nonnu-
cleai' war once it comes along.
Organization for optimization
D
Department of e erase.
in the Department of Defense to do this? I ad hoc steering groups and committees; in es-
in +r,ofhev nil the various
One of the lessons I hope we will learn from
the war in Vietnam is that we must always be
prepared to optimize our forces after we get
involved. This is why we have generated a spe-
cial, highly responsive R&D team within the
f How did we organize
.Odda A[ a` eL tsuit of the war.
I4hP80i47 ROfl~A-300 [80+0@4P7~ '
ee $g 2 L~ n~ ~'ra
~
lollsS lun,frOlllL~ 'y-?.
October 1968 srrENCF Trrrrsnr.ocr 31
had few people's attention, to a rather large
war with ordnance delivery that matches Ko-
rea. The Pentagon chose to manage the vari-
ous aspects of the war, as much as possible,
within existing organizational management
and budgeting procedures. R&D for the war is
performed in accordance with this same prin-
ciple: It is_nianaged, essentially, by the same
people who are also controlling the R&D that
is done ,for other military devices which are
not involved in this war. However, to add em-
phasis to the work that was specifically needed
for Southeast Asia, Dr. John Foster, Jr., es-
tablished my office about two and a half years
ago as an expediting office within Defense Re-
search and Engineering. It was charged only
with creating and expediting R&D pertinent
to the war; and it will disappear when the war
is over.
Because we chose to manage the war through
the normal organizations, the problems asso-
ciated with streamlining our procedures have
been really those of personal contact--of indi-
viduals within the organization getting to-
gether and agreeing to do things; we work
either face to face or we hand-carry papers,
rather than letting them go through the stan-
dard procedures. We have formed a series of
 We use one cAM( Y, ,dfEPrtRele,8 2Q"10/121pCIAoRDP&0th.1720RG 3O0di2OO044fost
tion; PROVOST, for Priority Research Objec- impossible schedule; graduate students and
tives Vietnam Operational Support. professors who offer themselves without de-
It is at this level where you find the people manding recognition; people from all these
who are full time on R&D for Vietnam. Here groups who risk their lives in Vietnam to help.
we have a regular Senior PROVOST Steering I do not believe that any important develop-
Group; this is the mechanism I use within nient has been delayed by the vocal nonpartici-
the Pentagon to get practically everything pation of a few-though I personally believe
done. It is comprised of a senior military man that their method of self-expression is insult-
(a general or flag officer) who reports to his ing and demoralizing to our men in Vietnam.
military chief for R&D in each of the Services.
We also have part-time representation in Weapons, modified and new
the group from other government agencies Let me mention a few examples of the kinds
that have technical skills applicable to our spe- of developments I have been talking about. We
cific problems. For instance, NASA has people recently developed a new gunship-aircraft con-
who are available to us for solving problems figuration that happens to be very good at
for which they have unique talents. The killing trucks along the resupply routes and in
Atomic Energy Commission is also represent- providing close support to our ground troops.
ed-they have some of the finest engineers This plane was developed for the Air Force
and "gadgeteers" in the business. Finally, of in a military laboratory at Wright Field with-
course, we work closely with the Advanced Re- in a period of about nine months. It involved
search Projects Agency, a separate part of Dr. new equipment in an existing airframe. Wher-
Foster's office. ever possible, we borrowed and adapted exist-
We have over one thousand specific R&D ing components. The plane was 'tested in the
projects going on now in support of the war; U.S. and it worked adequately; then it was
as a rough average, we send about 100 new sent to Vietnam with its operational crew plus
types of equipment to the theater every year a number of test people who observed it over a
for operational tests and evaluation, to find period of time. The plane operated in combat
out whether they will in fact contribute to our and was judged to be sufficiently successful
fighting capabilities. Another 100-150 are also that the 7th Air Force submitted a formal re-
added to our operational inventory. These run quest for a production quantity. Production is
the, gamut, from a basically new type of heli- under way now.
copter, a new variety of jet aircraft, or a con- The HUEY Cobra program is another ex-
traband detector, all the way down to a new ample. Here the Army took the original Bell
type of tropical combat boot which will make HU-1 helicopter and redid virtually the entire
it easier for a soldier to walk around, a mod- aircraft to make it a better weapon platform.
ern transportable hospital, or better medicines It was introduced in the early part of this
against the types of disease that are prevalent year and we believe it may make a significant
in Southeast Asia. difference in the war. It has proven particular-
The actual research and development pro- ly useful in the urban insurgency context.
grams have been carried out in all the usual We have introduced several weapons which
R&D centers of competence-the military lab- are brand new. Some were already in develop-
oratories, private industry, and university re- ment before we became engaged in this con-
search centers. I am frequently asked whether flict, and hence it was simply a question each
the widely divergent views within the U.S. time of expediting or changing the weapon in
about the merits of war have had a deleterious some modest way to improve its effectiveness
effect on our efforts. Naturally, any member of for this war. There are new artillery rounds,
the U.S. Government is disappointed when he for instance, and new kinds of bombs, includ-
asks fors help from a laboratory, a company, or ing new kinds of delay bombs of various sorts
a university and is told that they do not feel it -some to go after the flak sites in the North,
appropriate for them to participate, that they some to go after the truck traffic, some to go
have other more pressing work to do, or that after enemy soldiers hidden under jungle can-
there is insufficient profit in it for them. I also opy. Most of our proudest accomplishments,
find it personally embarrassing to find this however, will remain classified until the war is
nonconstructive attitude within the engineer- over, although some of our night-vision equip-
ing and scientific community of which I con- meat and motion detection radars have now
sider myself a part. Nonetheless, for every been declassified since they have either been
temporary setback I receive, I can provide at lost to the enemy or have no reasonable coun-
least ten examples of service and dedication termeasure.
"beyond the call of duty": Laboratory scien- In addition to our test agencies in Vietnam
tists who work on their own, virtually without and our organization here in the Pentagon, we
funding support, huge U.S. corporations who have scientific advisors with the major field
essentially "donate" the services of some of commanders.
their best talent without hope of large profit Only the military men themselves can estab-
return; tinyAPg3r0p&d 31t t[SL020(O41 0/1211 IA1RbP> 0Rb-f72bROUT30(3f2MU4-fPr a
5
 Approved For Release 2004/1`0/12: CIA-RDP88RQ17t,0R00130O120004-7
piece of equipment. But our people in the field cite ese examp es to snow that the Ser-
are free to tell us of needs. When we are in- vices have the technological capabilities and
formed of these, we ask the scientific commu- procedures available to respond to the demands
nity to work on possible solutions. When solu- for R&D in this war. My office in ODDR&E
tions appear practical we present them to the has not taken over this role; the military Ser-
people in the field. Often they then turn vices do it themselves; our job is to help them,
around and give us a "firm requirement." This to encourage them, and to assist in finding the
may seem a somewhat unwieldly operational funds needed for these requirements.
chain, but we are primarily research and de-
velopment people trying to provide equipment
for a military organization; ultimately, the
operators must make the decision as to wheth-
er or not the solution is realistic.
In addition, each of the Services has set up
a quick reaction capability whereby the Ser-
vice can respond rapidly to special demands
for improved equipments. Each Service main-
tains its own laboratory people in the field. In
many instances, these experienced engineers
have found relatively simple, inexpensive
things that have made tremendous differences.
A typical example: Down in the Mekong Delta
region, where the fighting takes place on the
rivers and canals, we have been using small
landing craft of World War II vintage as pa-
trol boats. Because they have flat bottoms, they
are well suited for the shallow waters of the
rivers and canals. The Navy wanted to be able
to land helicpoters aboard these boats, which
are only 40 or 50 feet long, either for medical
evacuation, resupply of equipment, or various
command and control functions. One of the
Navy's laboratory personnel who was in the
theater at the time designed a suitable landing
deck. Within a few weeks, a prototype was
built in Vietnam according to his design-
with some help from his people back in the
U.S. Today, many of these "minicarriers" op
erate successfully in the Delta. This develop-
ment has measurably increased the flexibility
and effectiveness of those forces, and for a
very small sum of money. The Army maintains
their Limited War Laboratory which does
many of the same kinds of things, small jobs
that are badly needed in a hurry. These labs
are allowed to bypass some of the normal
chains of approvals, when the money is small
and quick reaction is urgently needed.
Total Defense
RDT&E (millions)
Southeast Asia
RDT&E (millions)
1965
6997
200
1966
7553
1967
7954
1968
8002
Good guys and had guys
The most difficult job in this war has been
to find the enemy. This may sound platitu-
dinous. After all, we have had to find the en-
emy in every war we've ever been in. But there
are no front lines in this war. The enemy op-
erates primarily in small units. You cannot tell
the "good guys" from the "bad guys"-many
aren't even wearing uniforms. The big prob-
lem is to find out where the enemy is at a par-
ticular time-and, in fact, to determine wheth-
er or not he is the enemy-and then to
determine his intentions. He is very good at
camouflaging himself, his installations, and his
equipment; and he moves primarily at night.
Over North Vietnam, the problem is of a simi-
lar kind: We try to knock out the bridges, ve-
hicles, and supply dumps, but these too are
hard to find, as are his radar installations and
antiaircraft defenses. The North Vietnamese
do not have a very advanced civilization, they
don't have large target complexes, and they
have learned that we have difficulty knocking
out their targets if they keep them small
enough, or if they hide them away during the
day. For every visible bridge, there may be
three or four alternate ways of crossing the
same stream.
In guerrilla and urban warfare, we must
find the man who is planting the mine along
the road, find the Vietcong who may come into
a village to cut the chief's throat during the
night, and find the teenage sapper team bent
on destroying a Saigon police station. In all
these cases, our biggest inadequacy is being
able to single out the target, or the individual
that represents the enemy. Perhaps a fourth
of our total RDT&E expenditures has been
solely for the purpose of trying to detect indi-
cations of enemy presence.
We are using virtually every type of indica-
tion that a human or vehicular target provides
in our attempts to develop better means to find
the real targets. These detection systems must
work in real time-it does no good to find that
100 men walked or drove down Trail X from
Point A to Point B a week ago. So realtime,
nighttime intelligence gathering has been one
of our major problems. We are beginning to
make significant inroads in this area. Starlight
scopes, for instance, permit a soldier to see
targets with nothing more than starlight as
illumination. They are now widely used in the
Southeast Asian conflict with very impressive
results.
;Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA- F DP80R& Z20F?a fJW01 004x7 the enemy has
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300120004-7
About ten percent of DOD's annual R&D budget is
currently going toward improving our equipment in
Vietnam. From this investment, which represents
some $800 million per year, come such develop-
ments as those shown on the opposite page. Clock-
wise from immediate right: Lightweight, inflatable
hospitals that can be transported by helicopter;
Navy contraband detector used to probe cargoes
for metallic objects; AH-IG "Huey Cobra," de-
shown extraordinary cleverness in countering
some new things we have introduced. It is sel-
dom more than a few months after we intro-
duce something new before we capture some
document that tells the enemy, in essence, how
to counter the new device. This is one reason
we have tried to be so very security conscious
during this war.
Where is the enemy's brainpower? Clearly,
some of it is in the field, and it is evident that
the enemy's allies have a certain amount of
scientific advisory talent working for them too.
I suspect there is an office like my own some-
where in the enemy structure, and that my
counterpart works with a smaller budget and
different emphasis. It is not the American way
to use a lot of manpower and just a few de-
vices that add to their capability; to save lives,
we tend to want to minimize the number of
men we use and to replace their skills with
more sophisticated technology.
Eye for eye, tank for mortar
There are those who have a deep concern
that we may be compromising much of our
latest technology for tactical warfare without
benefiting from a similar disclosure of Soviet
and Chicom capability. To a certain extent,
this is true; the Communists have committed
North Vietnamese lives rather than Soviet
technology wherever possible. The real ques-
tions, of course, are whether it is serious
to have exposed our own capabilities as a
means of reducing our own dead and crippled,
and whether it will be difficult to establish a
new level of capability in those areas where
surprise is advantageous. I have no doubts in
either area; we have done the right thing.
After all, new technology becomes available
faster than we convert it into military hard-
ware. And in many areas, we have had the
priceless advantage of finding out just how
veloped in less than two years, which the Army
credits with significant contribution in blunting the
Tet offensive; helicopter-borne water buckets, an
idea borrowed from the U.S. Forestry Service to
improve firefighting in urban warfare; Starlight
Scope, which greatly enhances the capability to see
and fight at night; and a motion-detection radar
that is now in wide use with the Marines in northern
provinces of Vietnam.
well our newer equipment works. We are thus
in a position to make the type of real-world
improvements in our forces that can only be
derived from practical experience. There is
very little good that comes from any war-
and we would be negligent, indeed, if we did
not profit from the only real R&D "benefit"
possible; a better understanding of our own
capabilities and needs.
There is another thing that is coming out of
this war loud and clear: There are dramatic
asymmetries between what we do and what the
enemy can do to counter us. In some wars, the
participants reason: If the other fellow has a
tank, we must have a tank with an extra inch
of steel; if he has a Mach 2 airplane, we must
. have a Mach 2.1 airplane ; if he has a 150-mm
artillery piece, we must have a 175. But be-
cause occupation and seizure of territory are
not elements of this war, such reasoning does
not hold in Vietnam. The enemy can destroy a
$6 million airplane with a $100 mortar shell.
He can shoot down a half-million-dollar heli-
copter with a 25r- bullet from a hand-held gun.
He can stop a tank with a hand-held antitank
weapon, because he just plain sneaks up to it,
stays under a bush for two or three days, or
submerges himself in a rice paddy and waits
for the tank to come along.
Such asymmetries are hard to live with.
Time and again, we are asked : Why do we
need a $2 million, two-seat twin-engine, after-
burning jet to destroy little bamboo bridges?
You could argue that we might be able to get
along with a somewhat cheaper airplane, but
the enemy has an air defense system above
that bamboo bridge, which employs MIG 21's.
Thus, we must have a weapon that can take on
both the bridge and the MIG 21. The whole
war has an enormous "dynamic" range, from
one extreme to the other. But if we give up-
if we say we cannot stop such resupply move-
ments, by which the local insurgents are sup-
ported and bolstered-then we are saying that
we cannot stop this conflict. If we cannot do
this, we cannot stop wars of national libera-
tion. If this is true, the whole world may be-
come "liberated" piece by piece.
The mortar problem in Vietnam is another
example of asymmetry. We have never before
been in a war where our cities, bases, and de-
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mortar shell can be carried in a man's pocket;
it can be hidden in a crate of lettuce. The en-
emy is willing to take two weeks, or two
months, to set up a 50-round attack. On the
average, 50 rounds can destroy $20 million
worth of airplanes. A simple weapon such as
a mortar or rocket can raise hell, and the coun
ter system is quite complex. job of
The enemy's allies are doing a good j
providing the North Vietnamese and the South
weapons-
Vietnamese guerrillas with ieces these
of pipe with
and they are not simply they are all
home-made explosives in them;
made somewhere in the Communist nations;
they come in little canvas carrying bags;
break down into pieces that can easily be
handled by a small man. This is not accidental.
This weaponry is carefully tailored for their
side of the job, just as we try to tailor ours to
counter it. It is a fascinating game of technol-
ogy against technology, but in one case with a
minimum use of manpower, and, in the other,
a rather extravagant use of h manpower.
the equip-
nd today
64
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October 1968 SCIENCE & TFCIINOLOCY 85
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aircraft and the weapons they drop; for in-
stance, the helicopters we use for pilot rescue:
henlanothee helicopter for when next two years,
and now we have begun to replace the second
helicopter with an even more capable machine.
Strategy for a "porous" war
In the field of detection, I think the angel
are occurring even more rapidly. You that
probably read about the chemical sniffers, That
smell the presence of human beings.
sounds rather sophisticated, but is little more
than normal laboratory instrumentation pack-
aged in an olive drab box. We put these boxes
into helicopters and fly them over the jungle.
Four or five years ago, I doubt that anybody
would have given us a plug nickel for this
idea, and yet, they are now being used in sub-
stantial quantity by regular operational forces.
Similarly, we are learning to detect footsteps
many yards away--with another spin-off from
laboratory instrumentation equipment.
some very ex
These developments open up
we as to wh~ t
ons as to wh~ t
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we can alo e that
hat
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we can Betel
carries metal, makes a noise, or is hotter or to either catch him in the act o erns an en-
colder than its surroundings, one begins to see emy or somehow to deter him from being an
the potential. This is the beginning of instru-
mentation of the entire battlefield. Eventually,
we will be able to tell when anybody shoots,
what he is shooting at, and where he was
shooting from. You begin to get a "Year 2000"
vision of an electronic map with little lights
that flash for different kinds of activity. This
is what we require for this "porous" war,
where the friendly and the enemy are all
mixed together.
Much of the new sensor technology has ap-
plication at the other end of the battle spec-
trum, in the security business. For example,
we must learn how to protect the road from
Saigon to the Mekong Delta, for this is the
.economic lifeline for the country. Some 40%
of the people live in the Delta; these people are
95% agrarian, and their products must get to
Saigon. Keeping this road free from ambush
is a very serious problem.
One other problem in the Delta is that most
of the people are not for either side; they want
both sides to go away so they can grow some
rice and sell it to somebody for a reasonable
price. They give their allegiance to no one. And
this is the frustration: They will tell you a
week later that the Viet Cong came in and took
20% of their rice. But they will not tell you
at the time it happens. They know we cannot
protect them adequately against others who
may sneak into the village again next week. So
our progress is inhibited by not being able to
provide an adequate level of security. Conse-
quently, a small group of Viet Cong can keep
the population silent and uncooperative.
Indeed, throughout the country one of the
biggest problems stems from the fact that no-
body has a telephone. There is often no way
for a victimized community, or family, to call
for help. We sorely need a simple, primitive
substitute for our own phone system. I think
it would help to raise the people's confidence if
they could report to their officials in time for
law enforcement to respond.
New concepts of war
What are the lessons to be learned from this
war? I believe the first is the fact that we can-
not separate the insurgent from his back-
ground. Next, when we do find a target-be it
a Viet Cong, a truck, or a bridge-often we
cannot kill it, and always the enemy can re-
place it. All the important enemy targets are
small, fleeting, hidden, moving, cheap, smart,
and reproducible. He knows how to use his en-
vironment to advantage. The jungle, the rice
paddies, the shallow streams and canals, the
firm clay earth itself, the long-suffering people
and their generations of discontent-these are
the environmental factors we must contend
with. And let me add one more: We must learn
to fight , pr iveld Fabrr 1teaWLe 2D /111'2
38 SC1FNCr, & TE IINOToav October 1.968
Over the past four years, the United States
has spent over $2 billion in Il&D on these
other problems of the war. We are on the
verge of some very important new military ca-
pabilities. We may not perfect them all in time
for this war. Indeed, some may never even
reach the field in test quantities. But these are
the things that will keep this kind of war from
breaking out again, and we must continue to
develop them into weapons and equipment that
can be readily adopted by the military, even
after we reach a ceasefire in Vietnam.
From the work we have sponsored during
this war, I can see three revolutionary con-
cepts coming into focus--and our research and
development programs have already begun to
demonstrate that these concepts can be made
practical:
? One: We are getting closer to being able
to provide complete realtime battlefield sur-
veillance around the clock, through suitable in-
strumentation.
? Two: Technology will soon permit the de-
velopment of practical weapons that will dis-
cretely destroy the types of small, fleeting
targets characteristic of this type of war.
? Three: It now appears that we may reach
the stage where there will be little difference
between fighting at night or during the day.
Clearly, this will be. the toughest challenge;
fighting at night will require a new systems
approach, new training, new doctrine, and new
ways of committing one's manpower.
In all three of these revolutionary concepts,
we are hindered by two real-world problems.
First, the technology is so new that it has not
yet become an inherent part of our weapons
system designs. Second, and equally important,
the introduction of new concepts is extremely
difficult during the conduct of the war. These
are the problems that must be solved if we are
to compress the learning and experience pro-
cess so that the greatest benefits of new tech-
nology can be felt in South Vietnam.
Finally, we must learn to share this new
technology with our allies. It is not enough to
equip only the U.S. forces with new capabili-
ties that make our men more effective. We
must become more aggressive in training and
organizing the South Vietnamese to take on
the "residual war" themselves. It is my own
opinion, after nine visits throughout South
Vietnam, that the South Vietnamese can
handle more sophisticated equipment-even if
we have to maintain it for some time into the
future. It is only by transferring our new ca-
pabilities to our allies that we can hope to turn
the counterinsurgency problem back where it
belongs, with a concurrent reduction in U.S.
costs and losses. When that happens, then my
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