REPORT ON THE NATIONAL POLICE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 184
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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SEUtET
ON THE
NATIONAL POLICE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
BY: SIR ROBERT THOMPSON
SIR RICHARD CATLING
W.L.R. CARBONELL
J.H. HINDMARSH
D.S. PALMER
NSC review completed - may be
declassified in full
C: R D S
MAT
MAT
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 ^ r- ^ r% -mow
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R E P O R T O N
T H E N A T I O N A L P O L I C E F O R C E
R E P U B L I C O F V I E T N A M
SIR ROBERT THOMPSON
SIR RICHARD CATLING
MR.
W. L. R.
CARBONELL
MR.
J.
H.
HINDMARSH
MR.
D.
S.
PALMER
MISS D. A. KEIGWIN - Secretary
Signed on 29 March, 1971, in Saigon.
SECRET
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SECRET
L I S T O F CONTENTS
Note: Paragraphs are numbered consecutively right through the Report,
except in Appendices.
Recommendations are numbered consecutively right through the
Report with the number in brackets, including in the Appendices.
Appendices are alphabetically numbered.
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
Terms of Reference
Composition of Team
Co-operation
Hi story
General Situation
The Threats
Cease-fire
The Problem
The Aim
CHAPTER II STATUS AND ROLE
Status
Role
Weaknesses
Recommendations (1) to (8)
CHAPTER III COMMAND
Introduction
Tasks
Command
Recommendations (9) to (14)
CHAPTER IV CONTROL AND ORGANISATION
National Police Headquarter s
Special Police
SECRET
Paragraph
1
2-3
4
5-6
7
8
9
10-11
12
13-15
16-20
21
22
23
24-29
30-34
35
36-37
38
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SECRET
CHAPTER IV CONTROL AND ORGANISATION (cont'd)
Paragraph
Judicial Police
Personnel and Training
The Comptroller
Technical Services & Supply Directorate
Operations
Registry
Regional Headquarters
Provincial Headquarters
District Headquarters
The Police Station
Recommendations (15) to (35)
CHAPTER V REORGANISATION
39-44
45
46-47
48
49-50
51-56
57-58
59-60
61-62
63-64
65
Introduction
Administrative Police
Central Records Office
Traffic and Order Police
The Inspection Corps
Immigration Service
Recommendations (36)
CHAPTER VI SPECIAL POLICE
66
67-69
70-71
72-73
74-80
81-82
83
Threat
84-94
Command and Mission
95-100
Recommendations (37) to (41)
101
Organisation
102- 107
Counter Communist Service
C
108-111
ounter Subversion (non-Communist) Service
112
Protective Security
P
113-117
rotective Security Service
118-122
Operations Service
123-125
Administration Service
Registry
126-127
128
Research Bureau
Methods
129-131
132
Down to the Ground
,
1 33-1 37
Registry Procedure
Security
138-13q
140-143
Lower Formations
144
Regional Special Police headquarters
P
I4 _ 148
rovince Special Police headquarters
149-150
SERE I
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CHAPTER VI SPECIAL POLICE (cont'd)
Paragraph
District Special Police headquarters
151-157
158-160
Staffing of the Special Police
161
Special Funds
ital Police Region Special Police
Ca
162-168
p
169.
General Conclusions
170
Recommendations (42) to (65)
CHAPTER VII FIELD FORCE, MARINE POLICE,
WOMEN POLICE AND MONTAGNARDS
171
General
172-176
Field Force
177
Recommendations (66) to (72)
178-.180
The Marine Police
181
Recommendations (73) to (80)
182-184
Women Police and Clerical Duties
185
Recommendations
(81) to (83)
.
186-190
Monta gnard s
191
Recommendations
(84) to (87)
CHAPTER VIII
ESTABLISHMENT, STRENGTHS,
RECRUITING, TRAINING AND RANKS
192-193
Establishment
194-198
Strengths
199-201
Auxiliary Police
202
Police Volunteer Reserve
203
Recommendations (88) to (94)
204-209
Recruiting
210
Recommendations (95) to (100)
211-215
Training - General Principles
216
Training Centres - Rach Dua
217
Refresher Training at Regional Level
218
Specialist Training Centres
219
Police Academy
220
Recommendations
(101) to (108)
221 -225
Ranks
Recommendations
(109) to (1 11)
CHAPTER IX
PAY AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
228
227
-
Pay
229-236
Other Benefits
237-245
Conditions of Service
246
Recommendations (112) to (126 )
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CHAPTER X CAPITAL POLICE REGION
Paragraph
SMPD - Organisation & Control
247-253
Operations /Information Rooms
254
Traffic Precinct
2.55
Harbour Police
256
Airport Police
257-261
Saigon and Gia Dinh
262-265
Capital Police Region
26.6-268
Other Citie s
269
Recommendations (127) to (132)
270
CHAPTER XI THE POLICE STATUTE
Draft Statute
271-272
Articles
273-275
Recommendations (133) to (136)
276
CHAPTER XII PHUNG HOANG
Threat
2,77-271)
Co -ordination
280
Points for Review
281-285
Release of Prisoners
286-288
Committees
289.299
Districts
300 - 30 3
The Province Chief
304
Recommendations
(137) to (145)
305
Explanatory Note
306 - 301)
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 L
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A. Historical Growth of National Police.
B. Strength of Police Force, February, 1971.
C. National Police headquarters.
D. Region Police headquarters.
E. Province Police headquarters.
F. District Police headquarters.
G. Village Police Stations.
H. Technical Services and Supply.
J. National Special Police headquarters.
K. Regional Special Police headquarters.
L. Province Special Police headquarters.
M. District Special Police headquarters.
N. Capital Police Region Special Police headquarters.
P. Rank Conversion.
Q. Saigon and Gia Dinh Map.
R. Capital Police Region headquarters.
S. Capital Police Region Precinct headquarters.
T. The Draft Police Statute.
At Appendix G, para 15, are recommendations (146) to (149).
At Appendix H, para 8, are recommendations (150) to (157).
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
TERMS OF REFERENCE
1. We were invited by the Government of Vietnam, supported by the
United States Government, to visit Vietnam for two months in February and
March, 1971, with the following terms of reference:
"To examine the problems of the National Police Force in South Vietnam
in both peace and war, including its responsibility for internal security intelli-
gence, and to make recommendations on the Force's status, structure, organi-
sation, training and roles, including its relationship with other forces and
government departments. "
COMPOSITION OF TEAM
2, The team was composed of:
Sir Robert Thompson (formerly Secretary for Defence, Malaya,
_________________ Head of the British Advisory Mission,
Vietnam)
Sir Richard Catling (formerly of the Palestine & Malayan Police
Mr. W. L. R. Carbonell (formerly of the Malayan Police & the
________________ Commissioner of Police, Malaya)
Mr. J. H. Hindmarsh (formerly of the Malayan Police, member
____________________ of the British Advisory Mission, Vietnam.
& the Commissioner of Police, Lesotho)
Mr. D. S. Palmer (formerly Senior Assistant Commissioner
_________________ Malayan Police Special Branch, & Deputy
Head British Advisory Mission, Vietnam)
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3. In view of the limited time and the area and subjects to be covered,
both geographically and functionally, we divided our tasks and, although
members of the team visited each region to see their special requirements,
we concentrated in more depth on the Directorate General of National Police,
the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate and typical provinces within easy
reach of Saigon. Above all else, we were concerned with the basic principles
on which a police force must be founded, from which all details then flow.
We did not have the time to go into all these details ourselves but we hope to
have indicated where further study and action are required. We have divided
our report into the following chapters:
II Status and Role
III Command
IV Control and Organisation
V Reorganisation
VI Special Police
VII Field Force, the Marine Police, Women Police & Montagnards
VIII Establishment, Strengths, Recruiting and Training, Ranks
IX Pay and Conditions of Service
X The Capital Police Region
XI The Statute
XII Phung Hoang
CO-OPERATION
4. We are very grateful for all the assistance and cooperation which we
have received from Major-General Tran Thanh Phong, the Commanding
General of the National Police, his staff and all ranks of the Police Force,
and from Mr. Frank E. Walton, Director of the Public Safety Directorate
of CORDS, and all members of his staff. We found all of them. fully aware
of the need for an effective police force and of the problems which now face
the National Police Force in Vietnam. We are also very grateful to the
Government of Vietnam, its officers and officials whom we met throughout
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eqin which we were received and ually t Ambassador William E rColby,
the country for the
theey provided, manner
assistance which they P
Deputy for CORDS, and his staff.
5. We were briefed on the past history of the National Police from its
founding in June, 1962, when the previous Surete', Saigon Municipal Police,
elements of the Gendarmerie, the Combat Police and various provincial forces
were combined into one National Police Force. Owing, however, to the trans-
fer of the Civil Guard, which was then the only rural constabulary, to the
Ministry of Defence, the initial strength of the National Police was only about
17, 000 and there was no police force in the rural areas of the countryside.
Since that date the strength of the National Police has been dexpanded,yasls65;vn
in Appendix A. A National Police Field Force was and a Marine Police unit later in the same year. Since 1968 the National Police
has been gradually deployed in the provinces down to village level. On
12 January, 1971, Major General Tran Thanh. Phong was appointed Director
General of the National Police Force and on 1 March, 1971, Natio al Poli we
Force was established by Decree as a separate command, a step
are in full agreement.
6. On 1 February, 1971, the total strength of the National Police was
103, 859 and it was deployed as between National Police Headquarters, Saigon
Municipality and the four Regions as shown in Appendix B. Of this strength,
however, only 27, 565 officers and men were of career status, the remainder
being on contract, daily paid or floating assimilated. Under present plans it
by the to 124 050 by the end of 1971
utd be increased
is proposed that the strength shoul
(see also Appendix B) and to o end of 1973.
GENERAL SITUATION
7. In considering the police requirements we have naturally taken into
account the general situation within the country. Remarkable progress has
been made since the 1968 Tet Offensive mainly because of heavy enemy man-o
e n
power losses, especiallmsmgthe abil tyVietcong;
of the Government oftlVi tnamaeverathe
and Pacification progra , the st
last few years; and the continuing operations in Cambodia and Laos, which have
resulted in the loss of Kampong Som (Sihanoukville) as a port of enemy supply
and the interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. As a consequence of greatly
increased security and government control in the countryside, there is,now an
opportunity both in the towns
and rurl areas for mic devel.opmentoandtreconstruction. This
to normal with emphasis on econo
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situation has, however, revealed weaknesses in the civil administration and
notably in the National Police, whose responsibilities must inevitably increase
as the military responsibilities within the country decline.
THE THREATS
8. We assume that North Vietnam will continue the struggle and that a
North Vietnamese military threat will remain on the Demilitarized Zone and
on the Cambodian and Laotian frontiers with constant incursions, but that
these can be militarily contained. We also assume that the Vietcong with some
NVA support will make a tenacious attempt to retain their traditional base areas
within the country. These bases will take time to eradicate. There will also be
a residual local guerilla activity in some rural areas which will be mainly the
responsibility of the para-military forces. Excluding these two threats we have
made our recommendations in the light of the following four threats to the in-
ternal peace and stability of the country with which the National Police will be
chiefly concerned:
(a) We are convinced that the greatest long term threat to internal
security will come from the cadres of the Vietcong party
organisation (the PRP) within the population, more commonly
referred to as the Vietcong Infrastructure, and that the Vietcong,
in accordance with COSVN 9 and 14, will give priority to con-
tinued subversion and terrorist activity coupled with an attempt
to legalise their cadres as a means of penetrating both the
Government and the civil population. Meeting this threat is
likely to be the main task of the National Police in the internal
security field.
(b) With the withdrawal of American forces and a run-down in the
war, with possibly a measure of demobilisation, there is likely
to be a period of increased unemployment which, in conjunction
with the number of stray weapons available, could lead to an
increase in armed crime and banditry.
(c) Post war conditions are also likely to give rise to political,
social and economic unrest, particularly in the labour, student,
veteran and religious fields leading to protest marches, demon-
strations and possibly riots.
(d) As a natural consequence of war and inflation, there will be the
continuing problems of corruption, the black market and drugs.
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9. There is also the possibility, although not in our view before the end of
1972, that there could be some form of a cease-fire which would greatly re-
strict the use of military forces and throw a much heavier burden on the Police,
both in maintaining internal order and in ensuring that the conditions of the
cease-fire do not operate to the disadvantage of the Government. A number
of the threats above could well be exacerbated by a cease-fire situation. It is,
therefore, our view that fully normal conditions of peace are unlikely to prevail
within the foreseeable future and that in fact, from the internal security point
of view, peace can be almost as dangerous as war. This will necessarily have
a consequential effect on police strength requirements and their deployment.
10. We appreciate that the rapid expansion of the National Police Force has
been dictated by events. This, combined with a lack of quality in the recruiting
base, has greatly hampered the creation of an effective force. Not only have
recruits been below the required standard but their training has inevitably been
inadequate. The Force has consequently been overloaded with administrative
and training problems to the detriment of its operational responsibilities. The
low priority accorded to the National Police Force in the past has greatly re-
duced its standing in the eyes of the public, especially in relation to other forces.
Although performance has steadily improved over the years and the Force has
done much useful work, notably during the Tet Offensive of 1968, it is not yet
fully capable of playing its proper part in meeting the threats.
11. It is our view that no police force can be effective unless it has the
respect of the population. This has to be earned by the role which it plays in
the community, by its efficiency and by the quality of its personnel. If success
in this respect is to be achieved, the National Police Force must have the full
political and financial support of the Government. Such support must be made
apparent both to the Force itself and to the public. This in turn will give the
Force pride in itself, improve its morale and enhance its standing and prestige.
12. We have accordingly made recommendations in our report to achieve
the following aim:
To create an efficient, unified and independent National Police
Force that will be responsive to the needs of the Government in
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enforcing the law, preventing crime and maintaining internal
order and security, and to the needs of the people in protecting
life and property, investigating complaints and ensuring justice
for all."
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CHAPTER II
S T A T U S AND R O L E
13. In considering the status of a Police Force the most difficult concept
to comprehend, and to provide for, is the independence of the Force. This
concept stems from the proposition that society can only exist in an acceptable
form if there are rules to govern behaviour; that it is the responsibility of the
representatives of the people to decide what rules are necessary and to enact
them as laws; that it is the role of the Judiciary to administer and interpret
these laws; and that it is the role of the Police Force to enforce them so that
the rule of law and not the rule of force prevails.
14. While theoretically it is the duty of every citizen to keep and enforce
the law, the Police Force is generally regarded as being responsible for en-
forcing the law on behalf of the people and the Force is, therefore, accountable
to the people rather than to the Government. In individual actions and cases of
law enforcement members of the Police Force are of course also accountable
to the Judiciary. In both these respects the Police Force has a unique position
and stands apart from the normal executive machinery of the government. It is
the tool of the nation as a whole, not of the government of the day.
15. There are two extremes against which it is necessary to guard. The
first is that a centralised Police Force should not become a tool of the Govern-
ment leading to the creation of a Police State; and the second is that the Police
Force and its Command should not be so fragmented that its various separate
parts can be hired and fired at the whim of local politicians leading to a situation
where there is no law enforcement at all. To avoid both of these and, at the
same time, to achieve a high standard of efficiency and an economy of effort,
we are convinced that it is right to retain a unified National Police Force and
that, in its main police role, the Force should be independent of Government
direction and interference. For this reason the Force should be established
as a separate Command, and its role defined, by Statute, This will indicate
both to the Force and the public its independent status, and the manner in which
it performs its duties will then establish its standing and reputation in the com-
munity. It only remains that the Government should support the Force both
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politically and financially so that it has both the manpower and the resources
to carry out its role. This will further indicate both to the Police and the public
the Government's determination to restore the rule of law. On his side the
Police Commanding General will be responsible to the President for its efficient
operation and to the Minister responsible for the Police Force for the correct
expenditure of monies voted to it by the House of Assembly.
ROLE
16. In the present circumstances within the country and in light of the threats
stated in paragraph 8, we consider that the Police role divides into three main
parts:
(a) the normal police role of law enforcement
(b) the special role of the Police in countering communist sub-
version and terrorism;
(c) the defence role.
17. The normal police role can be defined as follows:
(a) to maintain the rule of law;
(b) to preserve peace and good order and to prevent breaches
of the peace;
(c) to protect life and property;
(d) to prevent and detect crime and to arrest offenders;
(e) to enforce all laws and regulations with which the Force
is charged.
18. All normal police tasks are derived from this role and many will be
contained in the law together with police powers. It is not possible to enumerate
them all but we do indicate some of them in Chapter III. It should be noted that
under roles (a) and (b) above the Force has a responsibility for maintaining
internal security against all forms of disorder, including demonstrations and
riots, however inspired. In this respect it is the duty of the Police Commanding
General:
(a) to keep the Government and Armed Forces informed of any
activity, whether communist inspired or not, which might
represent a threat to law and order;
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(b) to prepare and keep up to date contingency plans, in conjunction
with the appropriate civil authorities (Mayor or Province Chief)
and the Armed Forces, for maintaining law and order in urban
and rural areas (other than against enemy attack);
(c) to include in the plans arrangements for reinforcement by
police reserves in the first instance and by the Armed Forces,
if necessary, and for the protection of vital installations to the
life of the community, i. e. , power, water, light, broadcasting,
communications, transport, health services, food and essential
supplies.
19. Secondly, there is the special role of the Police in countering communist
subversion and terrorism. This again is part of the Commanding General's re-
sponsibility for internal security. While stressing that this is part of the role
of the Police Force as a whole, we do, however, consider this special role in
Chapter VI on the Special Police.
20. Thirdly, it is perfectly normal in time of war or emergency for the
Police Force, or part of it, to be employed in defence of the country against
an external, or an externally inspired, threat and for this purpose its operations
obviously need to be co-ordinated with those of other forces. A distinction,
therefore, has to be drawn between those activities in which the Police are
operating in an independent police role and those in which they are operating
in conjunction with other forces in defence of the country. This distinction is
not always easy to define clearly and leads to difficulties as to command and
control. Where, for example, police in conjunction with other forces are used
to defend a town or village against attack, they are clearly being used in a de-
fence role and their units, still commanded by a police officer, may be placed
under the operational control of another command such as a Sector or Sub-Sector
Commander. This may similarly apply in an offensive situation where a police
unit is being used in conjunction with other forces against armed Vietcong
forces, including armed members of the Vietcong Infrastructure. Where,
however, the Police are conducting activities which fall within their normal
police role such as investigation of crime and arrest of offenders, they must
retain their independence and act in accordance with their responsibilities to
the Judiciary.
21. In respect of the above police roles there are two weaknesses to which
we wish to draw attention.
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(a) There is a confusion of law throughout the country and often
different laws as between the former Annam and Cochin-China.
Moreover, the whole judicial system is in need of overhaul and
civil and criminal courts need to be established or re-established
in many provinces. There is a particular requirement for the
revised Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes to be enacted as
soon as possible. We have noticed that law is only a small, in-
stead of a major, part of the police basic training program.
Unless he knows the law a policeman cannot be effective.
(b) It also seems to us that in the roles and missions of the various
forces at present operating in an internal security role there is
a considerable overlap. It should be made absolutely clear which
force has the primary responsibility for any task or mission and
which forces are in support. Just as the Police will have a sup-
porting defence role, so on occasions will other forces have to
support the police in their role, for example, in neutralising the
Vietcong infrastructure or when, in dealing with civil disturbances,
the Police become over-extended and other forces are required
to support them.
22. We therefore recommend that:
the National Police should remain a unified Force;
(2) the National Police should be established as a separate Command
by Statute (as well as by the present Decree);
the normal police role should be laid down, first by Decree and
then by Statute, as in para 17 above;
(4) the Statute should also make provision for the police defence
role;
in its normal police role the Force should be independent of
Government and political direction and interference;
(6) the Government should give the Force the necessary support to
carry out its role effectively;
a high priority should be given to the recodification and revision
of the law and its enactment (so that instruction in the law can
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become a major part of the police basic training program) and
to the establishment and re-establishment of the courts;
the missions of the various forces operating in an internal
security role should be clearly defined to avoid overlap and
to establish primary and supporting responsibilities.
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Note: Throughout this and the following chapters
reference will often be made to Force Standing
Orders. By these we mean administrative
instructions, called Force Standing Orders
made by the Commanding General, which are
not inconsistent with the Police Statute or of
any Regulations made thereunder, for the
general control, direction and information of
the Police.
23. In the following three chapters of the Report we deal with Command,
Control and Organisation. Because of the length and the complexity of the
important issues which arise in this connection we have thought it best to
divide them into the following three parts:
(a) the tasks, arising from their role, which the Police are
required to perform and from which the whole command
structure and organisation, based on urban and rural police
stations, must stem (Chapter III);
(b) our proposals for the re-organisation of National, Regional,
Provincial and District Headquarters to support police sta-
tions in urban and rural areas (Chapter IV);
(c) those parts and functions of the present National Police
Headquarters which we consider serve no useful purpose
in relation to the police role and tasks and which can,
therefore, be transferred or abolished (Chapter V).
24. As we have indicated in (a) above, before the issues of Command, Con-
trol and Organisation can be discussed intelligently, attention should be given
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to what tasks the Police are required to perform. As we have said in para 1 8,
all police tasks derive from the police role. Although it is not practicable to
enumerate them all, we consider that they fall into two distinct groups:
(a) the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of
the law;
(b) the protection of the people and the Government against
subversion and terrorism.
25. In the first group the principal tasks are the maintenance of law and
order and the protection of life and property. Generally speaking these re-
quire the establishment of police stations in urban and rural areas with uniform,
well-ordered procedures. These stations should remain open to the public 24
hours a day. To provide protection to the people living within the police station
areas it will be necessary to devise an efficient system of day and night beats
in urban areas and patrols in rural areas. In addition a means must be pro-
vided by which the public may summon police assistance quickly, such as a
999 service in towns. The underlying principle of this main responsibility is
that of providing a service to the public. This in its turn generates mutual
trust and public support without which no police force can operate.
26. We fully appreciate that in the present circumstances there are diffi-
culties in providing the public with unimpeded access to the police station, and
that defence works and armed guards may discourage people from visiting them.
At all command levels there should be a regular assessment of the security
situation with a view to the progressive reduction of overt defence measures
at police establishments wherever possible. Undoubtedly the reduction or
removal of these physical defences will increase public confidence. We sug-
gest that to overcome this at those stations where defence arrangements must
continue for a while longer, an information office be provided near the gate to
which the public can have access at all times without hindrance.
27. Other tasks under this heading include the effective policing of all
places of public resort, the control and regulation of traffic on all roads, the
handling of lost and stolen property and the registration of all privately owned
firearms in the country.
28. The third principal task in this group is the investigation of crime and
the arrest of offenders. For the police to discharge this task efficiently there
should be a pool of experienced and efficient judicial police investigators at
National, Regional and Provincial level. Their task will be to undertake the
investigation of serious offences which require expert methods. Such offences
and the headquarters by which they should be investigated must be listed in
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Force Standing Orders so that responsibility for their investigation can be
clearly allocated. The kind of offences we have in mind are politically moti-
vated murder and attempted murder, major fraud, offences involving inter-
national criminals and cases of corruption in the government service and
particularly in the Police Force. These investigators should also supervise
and assist with other cases at lower levels and be given authority to take over
any investigation, particularly where the case straddles formation boundaries
or where an impartial investigation is likely to be influenced by local condi-
tions. In like manner, a lower level should be able to request their assistance
should it be considered necessary.
29. As far as the second main group of tasks is concerned (see para 24
above), the work of the Force is chiefly confined to the collection of intelli-
gence relating to subversion and terrorism. In this respect its responsibility
is:
(a) to inform Government and the Armed Forces of any activity,
whether enemy inspired or not, which might represent a
threat to` law and order;
(b) to prepare and maintain civil disturbance contingency plans
(see para 18);
(c) to participate in the general vetting procedure by checking
against criminal records all applicants for Government em-
ployment and recruits to the Armed Forces (see para 114).
COMMAND
30. We consider that the basic unit of the Police Force is the urban and
rural police station and that it is at this level, more than at any other, that
the Police come into contact with the public and by the manner in which they
perform their duties establish themselves as an organisation which the public
can respect and trust - or not. It follows from this that every part of the
country must come within the boundaries of a police station area. Only in
this way can a police service be provided for every member of the community.
For purposes of command and control police station areas should be grouped
together under a District headquarters. Notwithstanding the location of these
headquarters in cities or towns, both the latter will be policed by one or more
police stations, and the headquarters staff at any level should play no part in
the policing of these towns and cities. (Inevitably, in some towns this will
mean that station area boundaries will differ from the village or urban ad-
ministrative boundaries. ) We stress, therefore, that there are only two
purposes for the establishment of headquarters at District, Province, Region
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and National levels - first to provide an independent clear-cut chain of com-
mand from the Commanding General at the top to the lowest rank at the bottom
and secondly to provide the police personnel in the police station with the
support they need to discharge their responsibilities.
31. The organisation which we believe to be necessary to provide this
chain of command and support is discussed in Chapter IV and is set out in
diagrammatic form at Appendix C (National level), Appendix D (Regional
level), Appendix E (Provincial level) and Appendix F (District level). We
present the organisation in this manner for reasons of clarity, but we em-
phasise that we have constructed the pyramid from the bottom (the village
police station, see Appendix G) upwards in the light of the concept set out in
pars, 30 above.
32. The tasks and duties of the Police at all levels stem from the law.
The control of all police and police activity in any Region, Province, District,
area or place must be vested solely in such police officers as may be appointed
by or under the direction of the Police Commanding General for the purpose.
This, and only this, will provide him with the integrity of command he must
have to direct and control the activities of the Force. Similarly this will pro-
vide individual police of all ranks with the protection from outside interference
which they must have if they are to be able to carry out their duties efficiently.
33. In saying this we have not overlooked the fact that responsibility for
peace and good government at city, provincial and district levels rests with
the Mayors and Province and District Chiefs. We do not consider that an inde-
pendent police command will in any way impair the ability of these officials to
discharge this responsibility. We have emphasised already the obligation
placed upon the Police to play, a major part in ensuring the security of the
country, and their particular function in relation to the elimination of Vietcong
cadres. We have made clear in para 20 our acceptance of the fact that in
carrying out such duties the Police may come under the operational command
of another force with whom they are working jointly from time to time, but
that in such circumstances the police personnel involved will be under the com-
mand of a police officer. In this matter of nearly similar responsibility of
Mayors and Province and District Chiefs and their police counterparts we see
no reason why, if each has a clear understanding of the responsibility of the
other, there. should be confusion if the arrangements for joint planning are
simple, sensible and, .above all, permit consultations between the two at
regular intervals according to a set pattern. We go further and recommend
that this procedure for joint consultation and planning should apply to all levels,
from village upwards.
34. The foregoing refers to the relationship between Police and the Mayors
and Province, District and Village Chiefs in their civil capacity and to their
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differing responsibilities. This concept of regular joint consultation and
planning assumes greater significance when one takes into consideration the
large numbers of Armed Forces (RF, PF and PSDF) which exist in Provinces
and Districts under the command of Province and District Chiefs, as Sector
and Sub-Sector Commanders.
35. We recommend that:
(9) the basic unit of the Police Force should be the police
station, both urban and rural;
(10) the public must have access to the police station at all
times;
(11) the dual purpose for the establishment of headquarters at
all levels is to provide a clear-cut independent chain of
command and to support the police station;
(12) there must be absolute integrity of command vested in
Police Commanders at all levels;
(13) there should be no conflict between the principle in (12)
above and the responsibilities of Mayors, Province,
District and Village Chiefs for peace and good government;
(14) arrangements for joint consultation and planning between
Police and the civil administration should be established
at all levels.
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CONTROL AND ORGANISATION'
NATIONAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS
NOTE Throughout our proposals we have used
the terms Directorate and Director to
describe what is now known as a Police
Block and a Chief of Block. We have
done so for reasons of convenience and
clarity. We appreciate that these terms
may not lend themselves easily to a
correct definition in the Vietnamese
language.
36. At Appendix C we have set out in diagrammatic form our recommenda-
tions for the organisation and distribution of responsibilities at National Police
Headquarters. Basically our concept is an organisation at this level which will
enable the Commanding General to command and direct the Force. It will also
ensure ,that the day to day implementation of his policies proceeds in a smooth
and orderly manner'and will provide him with a means of delegating responsi-
bility and authority. We do not feel able in the time available to write job
specifications for every Directorate in the Headquarters. We can, however,
list the principal subject headings for which each Directorate should be res-
ponsible. Nevertheless,, it should be the concern of the Commanding General
that these specifications are prepared as soon as possible, in the form of Force
Standing Orders, and that in these Orders the different levels of decision making
and extent of authority are spelt out unequivocally. If the delegation of authority
and responsibility is made clear beyond doubt, we feel that not only will the
Directors holding staff appointments appreciate their proper. functions and act
accordingly, but'that the present highly monolithic system of decision making
will be replaced by one which will decentralise sensibly and accelerate consi-
derably the administrative and control procedures.
37. We have indicated by a symbol in the charts at Appendices C, D and E
those duty,posts: in which we think the respective holders should be of equal
rank. We have assessed them on a combination of the importance of the post
and the burden of responsibility attached to each. We emphasise that these
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are suggestions only. In making recommendations for the shape of the head-
quarters we have followed our main concept which is that the staff of the head-
quarters have the functions of supporting the command of the Force and of
ensuring that orders are implemented so that the individual policeman on the
ground can do his job. The six Directorates are:
Special Police
Judicial Police (Criminal Investigation Department)
Personnel and Training
Comptroller (budget, accounts and pay)
Technical Services and Supply
Operations
SPECIAL POLICE
38. Chapter VI of our Report is devoted exclusively to this Directorate and
it needs no further comment here.
39. In Appendix C we have set out what we think the form of the Judicial Police
Direcorate at National Police Headquarters should take. In para 28 we have
already stated the need for a pool of experienced and efficient judicial police
investigators at national, regional and provincial levels.
40. We think it will be necessary to create at National Police Headquarters
within the Judicial Police Directorate a small investigation and research unit.
Its task will be to concentrate on the investigation and study of any particular
type of crime which is, or may become, widespread and deep rooted. In the
course of its work this unit will examine and advise upon methods and regula-
tions which may be effective in eradicating the particular crime under study.
The types of crime we have in mind are corruption, trafficking in narcotics
and the more serious forms of juvenile delinquency. The list of course will
vary. We believe that there is a need for this type of unit now with the immed-
iate task of investigating cases of corruption within the Government Service.
This unit should process such cases through the courts. A suitable name for
this unit would be Special Investigations Unit and it is shown as such on the
chart at Appendix C.
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41. It should also be the responsibility of the Judicial Police (C. I. D. ) at
National level to establish a system of criminal records (The Criminal Records
Office). This will consist of:
(a) the full fingerprints of all persons convicted of an
offence under the criminal law;
(b) the personal particulars of such persons, including
photograph and ID Card No. , the offence of which con-
victed, date of conviction, court sentence and in the
case of imprisonment, where served;
(c) particulars of persons ordered by the courts to be
subject to police supervision and restricted residence
for a period;
(d) a modus operandi system as an aid to the identification
of recidivists.
42. ' It should be the duty of the Criminal Records Office (CRO) to maintain
records relating to crime from which criminal statistics maybe extracted as
necessary. We stress that such statistics should only be'extracted when there
are practical advantages to be derived from them. In our' view these advantages
can only accrue from either or both of the following:
(a) as a measurement of the effectiveness of crime
prevention;
(b) as a means of enabling police resources to be
adjusted in relation to the incidence of crime
in any area.
43. It is essential that every complaint of a criminal offence, which is
accepted by the police and investigated, should be registered at the police
station within whose area of responsibility the offence was committed. From
this level (the police station) will flow the particulars set out in para 41 above
to the CRO. For the work of the CRO to be fully effective it is essential that
the -court should notify the police formation, at which an offence is registered,
of the result of trial immediately after it is concluded and sentence is passed,
including any variation of sentence following appeal. The establishment of
this pattern can be nullified by the present habit of Examining Magistrates
directing the police of one formation to make further enquiries into an offence,
the initial investigation of which was made by another-formation. This means
that the records of the latter are and may remain incomplete. The authority
to conduct a criminal investigation (recording, supervising the recording
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of evidence from witnesses and accused persons and preparing reports of
offences for the courts) should only be exercised by authorised judicial
police officers. The grant of authority to a judicial police officer indicates
that the holder has a sufficient level of experience, ability and professional
competence to undertake these responsibilities. This authority should be on
a countrywide basis. It follows that judicial police officers must be stationed
throughout the Force structure (except at District) down to village police
station level.
44. At National level as part of this Directorate there should be adequate
forensic and photographic aids for the detection of crime which should be
readily available for the use of subordinate formations.
45. It is our view that this Directorate is one of the most important of the
six, and that its efficient functioning is vital to the process of replacing quantity
in the Force by quality. We say this because we consider that it is the means
by which the Commanding General will be able to select the best from among
the applicants offering themselves for employment in the Force, of ensuring
that their basic training and subsequent training are of the right durations,
quality and content and, more importantly, that the only criteria for promotion
are experience, professional ability and merit. Elsewhere in this report
(paras 238 to 241) we give our views on the need for the Police Force to have
its own code of discipline and a clearly established procedure for enforcing it.
If these are accepted this Directorate will play a principal part, first of all
in devising the code and procedure, and thereafter in ensuring that it is properly
and fairly applied at all levels.
46. We have spent some time examining the work of the present Budgets
and Accounts Service, and its relationship with the Director General of the
Budget and Foreign Aitl. (DGBFA) and the Ministry of the Interior. We have
reached the conclusion that even when the Police Budget is approved by the
House of Assembly, it certainly is not treated thereafter as an appropriation
to the Commanding General of monies for expenditure under stipulated articles
and items. Our reason for coming to this conclusion is the requirement for the
Head of Service to apply to the DGBFA Bureau in the Ministry of Interior for
permission to expend money within the budget. We believe that the Commanding
General should be trusted to expend money voted to the Force by the House of
Assembly, but be subject to the overall direction of Government as regards the
rate of expenditure, because this must be determined by Government's own
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L
cash flow. We believe, moreover, that the police appropriation should be
a total one and include all articles of expenditure and all monies grant d toand
meet them regardless of origin. If such a change in. policy should folow,
we strongly recommend that it should, we are confident that not only would the
Comptroller and his staff be able to meet the Police needs more efficiently,
tly,
but that a sizeable reduction in the numbers of staff presently employed in the
Budget and Accounts Service would be possible. It will be noticed that we
have provision in our recommendations for this Directorate to have an Internal
Audit Section. The purpose of this is to eliminate the need for Ministerial
audit except at the stage of final accounts.
47.. It would be appropriate at this point to make three general comments on
the Budget:
(a) Owing to the provision of some funds from aid sources, the
approved Police Budget does not show the total annual cost
of the Force.. We feel that, from the point of view of calcu-
lating cost-effectiveness and for forward planning, it would be
helpful to have this total figure, in relation to the proposals
made for the size of the Force and its re-organisation, for
FY 1972 if possible or FY 1973 at the latest.
(b) The percentage of the budget allocated to salaries and allowances
is out of all proportion to that allocated to operating material and
services. The Force, at its present strength, is quite clearly
not getting the material support which it needs to be operational.
This applies particularly to POL, vehicle and boat maintenance,
building maintenance, and equipment right down to torch batteries.
The present ratio is over 90% salaries to under 10% operating
hope
costs. A more realistic ratio would be 75% to 25%. We' that our subsequent proposals in Chapter VIII for a reduction in
the planned strength of the Police Force will provide considerable
savings on pay. and allowances, and that these can be allocated
instead to operating material and services, thereby improving
considerably the present ratio.
(c) The Direct Investment provision is also quite inadequate if the
Force is to acquire (or build) the properties,necessary to es-
tablish suitable police headquarters and station buildings on a
countrywide basis, 234) well
A plan ed forward program over 51
modation (see para
yearly periods is required.
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TECHNICAL SERVICES AND SUPPLY
48., We believe that the task of this Directorate is self-evident because
the services it provides are all those which are required to maintain a
policeman operational in the field. In our view this Directorate is a key one
and the efficient functioning of the services it controls are essential to the
overall efficiency of the Force. We say this because we firmly believe that,
provided there is quality in manpower, a Police Force can carry out its tasks
with lesser strength just so long as the radio communication faciliites and
mobility (transport) are all that they should be. It is appropriate here to
remark that, although we are not informed on the present market value of
motor transport and radio technicians, we feel that this will have to be taken
into account when the rankings for the duty posts for the Heads of the Corn-
munications and Transport Services in this Directorate are, determined. It
may well be that in order to prevent them being over-ranked in relation to
their colleagues a technical allowance may have to be considered for them.
We make detailed comments and recommendations on the logistic problem at
Appendix H.
49. In order to make decisions and give appropriate directions to the Force
the Commanding General must have easy access daily to information concerning
the security situation in the country. This should be provided by an Operations/
Information complex manned by a system of Duty Officers 24 hours a day, The
information presented in such a complex should be a summary of daily reports
from all police formations, displayed on maps or charts as convenient. This
information will then provide the basis for a daily situation report which can be
presented to the Commanding General, his Directorates and the Government.
In addition, it is normal for Field Force deployment, Force totals of manpower,
transport, radio communication networks and crime statistics to be displayed
as they constitute a ready means of reference to the Commanding General for
planning his dispositions. This Directorate should also be responsible for the
co-ordination of joint planning. As we make clear later such co-ordination
must be provided at Regional, Provincial and District levels also,
50. We further consider that it should not be a function of the Field Force
to furnish static guards for the security of National Police Headquarters. The
Field Force is the Commanding General's operational mobile reserve, and is
his only ready means of providing re-inforcement to lower formations and
should not, therefore, be dissipated. We have therefore included in this
Directorate provision for a Guard and Escort Company at headquarters and
its name is a sufficient indication, we think, of its duties, including VIP escorts.
The officer in charge of this Company should also control a pool of motor vehicles
to serve the needs of National Headquarters.
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REGISTRY.,
51. We.feel that we must comment on the present proliferation of records
in various parts of, National Police Headquarters. The meticulous and almost
tedious care with which papers are checked into and out of every block, service,
bureau and even section constitutes an inevitable impediment of a- speedy flow
of work in the headquarters. While care in the handling of papers undoubtedly
is necessary., and to be encouraged, we are in no doubt whatsoever that the
present Method is wasteful of time and manpower. -Moreover, it has resulted
in a rash of small collections of, records and card indices which appear to us
to have little or no practical., value, and to some extent duplicate each other.;
We acknowledge that the present procedure is in part due to the almost complete
absence of, delegation of. authority within the headquarters.
52. In our view there should be a major re-organisation of this part of the
headquarters machine, and this should take the form of creating one :-central
registry. The responsibilities of this registry would be threefold:
(a) to be the sole; authority-for the raising of a non-classified
subject or personal file;
(b)_ to register all incoming non-classified correspondence and
its onward transmission in the appropriate file. to the first
action officer;
Jr) to make, adequate provision for storing dead files pending
destruction (archives).
53. The purpose of- the registry would be to .ensure--that all non-classified
transactions under a single subject heading are recorded in one file,, and in
the case of personal records of an individual member of the, Force also in
one file, thus eliminating any duplication of .this type, of record.. In the case
of the personal file of an individual there is need for only one original and one
copy. The original should always be retained in the National Police Head-
quarters - the copy being located at the headquarters of the formation in which
he is serving. In addition, each individual police officer will have a conficlen-
tial personal, file. One copy only of this is necessary and it will remain at
National Police Headquarters. To ensure that this does happen we consider
that a Force Standing Order should issue prohibiting the raising of any other
non-classified -subject file or personal file. Notwithstanding the Re.gistry's
overall authority in this field, we recognise that for purposes of practical
efficiency there will have to be-a physical decentralisationof the subject- files
themselves to the respective Directorates,, Despite this, -however, it should
not be within the authority of a Director to raise a new subject file, except
as stated in para 54 below. -
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54. There will be a requirement for a Secret (classified) Registry to which
the same principles will apply. Ideally this should be close to the non-classified
Registry so that as far as possible the two sets of subject files can be kept in
step. There is an obvious requirement for the Special Police and the Judicial
Police to have their own files because of the nature of their work. At the
same time we consider that the same care should be taken jointly by the two
Directors concerned, with the Central Registry, to ensure that there is no
duplication of general purpose subject files.
55. A comparatively simple means of keeping a Director and his senior
staff informed of the business transacted by his subordinates is a daily circu-
lation file containing copies of correspondence initiated by any action officer in
his Directorate. After circulation these copies can then be destroyed.
56. A considerable saving in manpower at National Police Headquarters
should result from the adoption of these proposals (paras 51-56).
REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS
57. We have included our proposals for the organisation of headquarters at
Regional level in Appendix D.
58. We think it unnecessary for us to do more than stress the underlying
principle that at Regional level staff work is largely confined to ensuring the
implementation of policies evolved at National level within already prescribed
procedures, and therefore the numbers of such staff can and should be kept to
a minimum. It is the responsibility of the Commanding General and his Directors
to calculate the actual numbers of staff required, in conjunction, of course, with
the Region Police Commanders. Our comments on the proliferation of records
at National Headquarters apply no less strongly to Regional level, and to meet
this point we have included provision for a Central Registry. Similarly, we
have provided for an Operations /Information unit, and staff provision for this
to be able to operate on a 24 hours basis will have to be made.
PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS
59. We have included our proposals for the organisation of headquarters at
Provincial level in Appendix E.
60. In the same manner as at Region, we have reduced the number of staff
heads by applying the same principles. Here, too, we consider it to be the
responsibility of the Commanding General and his Directors to calculate pre-
cisely the numbers of staff required. Our remarks concerning a Registry and
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Operations /Information unit at Regional level also apply at this- level...: We
have made provision here, too, for staff to control the licensing and regis-
tration of privately owned firearms and ammunition.
DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS
61. We have included our proposals for the organisation of headquarters at
District level in Appendix F.
62. It will be seen that no provision is made for Judicial Police. This is
because we consider that the judicial police at police stations within the District
will be responsible for investigation. Should they require assistance it can be
provided from the Provincial headquarters judicial police element.
THE POLICE STATION (village or urban)
63. This should be entirely functional, and the-sole aim of the-officer in charge
must be to ensure that at all tithes a maximum percentage of the station's strength
is out of the station actively engaged on the primary police tasks of protecting
the public and preventing and detecting crime. This takes us ba~k to ,the basic
concept of policing which we have set out in para 30 and which we feel cannot
be over -Stre-ssed.
64. In order to ensure that the Police gain the confidence and support of the
public "by their effectiveness it is essential that their duties should be clearly
defined. in Standing Orders, and similarly the manner in which they should be
carried out. Above all, it is important that the size of the station's complement
should match the extent of the.'station's responsibilities. We have attempted to
assist in this problem by setting out in Appendix G the important factors which
in our view should be taken into consideration when calculating a village police
station's strength and duties. While the:size of population and the extent of the
police station area are factors to be taken into consideration, they are not the
only ones. Each area will have its own particular problems and these will
affect the police tasks. Thus, no system of calculating police station strengths
on a ratio of police to population or size of area for the whole country can be
realistic.
RECOMMENDATIONS
65. We recommend that:
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Directorates
(15) National Police Headquarters should consist of six
Directorates as follows:
The Special Police
The Judicial Police (C. I. D. )
Personnel and Training
The Comptroller (budget, accounts and pay)
Technical Services and Supply
Operations;
(16) job specifications for the Directorates should be prepared in
the form of Force Standing Orders making clear the different
levels of decision making and extent of authority;
Judicial ?Police
(17) a Special Investigations Unit should be formed to investigate
and study particular types of crime;
(18) a Criminal Records Office be established as set out in Para 41;
(19) the Criminal Records Office should have the responsibility of
maintaining criminal records from which relevant statistics
can be extracted as necessary;
(20) the Courts should notify police stations of the results of trials
immediately following their conclusion and passing of sentcn.e;
(21) every complaint of a criminal offence which is accepted by the
Police and investigated should be registered at the police station
within whose area of responsibility the offence was committed:
(22) the Court should address any instructions for the further inves-
tigation of a case, presented to it by a police station, to that
station only and to no other police formation;
(23) adequate forensic and photographic aids to the detection of c rinw
be provided at National level as part of the Judicial Police Direc-
torate;
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(24) the authority to conduct a criminal investigation should only
be exercised by authorised judicial police officers of and
above a certain rank, with such authority being on a country-
wide basis;
(25) judicial police officers should be stationed at all Police forma-
tion levels (except District) down to and including police station
level;
The Comptroller
(26) the Commanding General should be entrusted to expend money
voted to the Force by the House of Assembly, subject to overall
direction by the Government as regards the rate of expenditure;
(27) the Police budget should be a complete one and reflect total
annual cost regardless of the source of the funds;
(28) the Comptroller's Directorate be provided with an internal
audit unit.
Operations
(29) there should be established an Operations /Information complex,
manned throughout the 24 hours by a system of duty officers;
(30) a Guard and Escort Company should be established at National
Headquarters, and at other headquarters as indicated in the
charts, to be responsible for the security of headquarters,
escorts as required, and the control of the headquarters
transport pool.
Registry
(31) one Central Registry should be established at National Police
Headquarters and at other headquarters as indicated on the
charts with responsibilities as set out in para 52;
(32) there should be a Force Standing Order limiting authority for
raising non-classified subject files to the Central Registry
and other Registries;
(33) there should be a Secret (classified) Registry to which the
same principles apply;
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(34) there is a requirement for the Special Police and Judicial
Police Directorates to have their own separate registries
because of the nature of their work;
(35) The organisation of Regional, Provincial and District Head-
quarters should be as stated in the text and as shown in
Appendices D, E and F.
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REORGANISATION
INTRODUCTION
66. We do not consider that the present National Police Headquarters is
capable, as a command and staff organisation, of supporting lower police
formations and in particular urban and rural police stations so that the Force
can carry out its role and tasks. We have been disturbed during our visits
to units in the field by instances of serious delay (which may have been excep-
tional) in obtaining comparatively simple administrative decisions from the
centre. Similarly, in many cases the level at which such decisions, under the
present procedure, are taken is quite out of proportion to their significance.
Quite a lot of this seems to be dictated by the fact that the Police are subject
to outdated civil service procedures. Nevertheless, in our view the major
reason for the slow and inefficient handling of administrative work at the
national level is the inordinate size of police headquarters and that, in part,
this has resulted from the Police being saddled with responsibilities which
are not properly theirs, or are unnecessary altogether.
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICE
67. The most striking example of this is the responsibilities given to the
Administrative Police. These have been described to us as being:
"Conducting administrative record searching in relation to:
(a) associations, hotels, newspapers, weapons and
ammunition, radios and automobiles, titles;
(b) citizens of Vietnam requesting exit and entry visas;
(c) persons seeking public office and civil service positions;
(d) promotions, nominations, renominations and change of
status in respect of all government personnel;
(e) searches of records in respect of prisoners scheduled
for release;
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68. Not only do these requirements presently occupy the time and energy
of a considerable number of police at various levels, and this in our view is
counter-productive because of the very nature of the work, but obviously they
also provide a vast field of opportunity for corruption. We accept that the
vetting of certain persons seeking public office and applicants for some civil
service positions is a police responsibility, and we refer to this and the manner
in which we consider it should be done, in Chapter VI of this Report. We accept
also that there is a security requirement for the Special Police to check appli-
cations made to Government for new associations and newspapers. Finally, we
consider it important that the Police should be made responsible for the regis-
tration of privately owned firearms and ammunition. Efficient systems for the
control of firearms and ammunition have been evolved by the Police elsewhere
and we recommend that these be examined now with a view to immediate imple-
mentation of a practical system for Vietnam. In these three cases we believe
that the work to be done should become part of the work of the appropriate
Directorate at national level. In the case of persons seeking public office or
entry into the civil service, the Special Police and the Judicial Police Directorates.
In the case of associations and newspapers it would be the Special Police Direc-
torate and in the case of the registration of privately owned firearms the Judi-
cial Police Directorate.
69. We are convinced, however, that with regard to the responsibilities set
out in (b), (d) and (e) of para 67 above, the Police should play no part. The work
of dealing with applications for exit and entry visas by Vietnamese citizens, (b),
can only be a responsibility of the Immigration Department.; to have the kind of
checks of serving Government personnel referred to in (d) seems to us manifestly
wrong, counter-productive in every sense, and calculated to depress morale.
Finally, we consider that, if the Government acts to give effect to our recom-
mendation arising from para 41 (the Criminal Record Office) the need for the
requirement at (e) disappears. To sum up, those elements of the Administrative
Police mission which we accept as police responsibilities can be redeployed to
other parts of the headquarters organisation. The remainder are not in our
view police responsibilities and it follows that the Administrative Police as a
separate Service can and should be abolished at all levels.
70. In like manner we have made a critical examination of the Central
Records Service. The responsibilities of this Service have been given to us
as being:
(a) the filing and preservation of records nationally;
(b) loaning records to the constituent parts of National Police
Headquarters as may be necessary;
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(c) the provision to "authorised persons" in military, civilian
and government agencies of information from the Service's
records concerning individuals;
(d) ensuring that records from subordinate levels are transferred
to the Service at the appropriate times.
71. We understand that, approximately, the records built up by the
Service now number some 1, 200, 000 personal dossiers and 600, 000 case
dossiers, supported by a master nominal index. About 70% of these records
are of a political nature, 20% criminal, with the remaining 10% being of a
general nature. We have given careful thought to the functions of the Service
in relation to the Police role and tasks, and in particular, to our recommenda-
tions in respect of the part to be played in these tasks by the staff of Police
headquarters at national level. We have again reached the conclusion that at
this level there can be only two kinds of police records against which checks
are necessary, and which can be made speedily and effectively. The one is
political (Special Police) and the other is criminal (Judicial Police). We
refer in the Report to the establishment of both sets of records. Whatever
may be the written description of the functions of the Central Records Service,
we are satisfied that it is in fact no more than a set of elaborately indexed
archives. In view of the fact that Force Standing Orders should provide for
the retention by Special Police and the Judicial Police of their respective
records for stipulated periods before destruction, we consider that the Central
Records Service can safely be abolished.
TRAFFIC AND ORDER POLICE
72. The third headquarters Service which we believe should be dispensed
with is the Traffic and Order Police. Quite clearly there is very little staff
work to be done at the national level on traffic questions for the simple reason
that these have seldom been raised either by Government or by subordinate
police formations since the traffic law was revised in 1967. In fact, the main
source of traffic expertise seems to be the Traffic Precinct of the Saigon
Municipal Police Directorate. Clearly what little staff work in this field is
necessary at national level can be done either by the Deputy Commanding
General, assisted by his staff as necessary, or by the officer in charge of the
Traffic Precinct of the Saigon Municipal Police. We believe that the control of
traffic within a police station area is one of its normal police tasks. In large
urban areas, where there are two or more police stations grouped together under
a District or Precinct Headquarters, it may be necessary for the control of
traffic to be made the special task of an officer with an appropriate number of
men under his command.
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73. We have examined the responsibilities of the Order Police, as set
down in the handbook describing the operations of the various blocks in
headquarters, and we are satisfied that either they can be taken over by
another part or parts of headquarters, or that they are not properly police
responsibilities, or, finally, that they are meaningless. The first category,
we quote from the orders - "studying preventive measures, fixing regulations
to protect VIPs, order and security in moving and participating in ceremonies"
- we think is properly the task of the Internal Security Section of the Special
Police, or a Guard and Escort Company, or both. The second category (the
registration of motorcycles of 50 c. c. or less) is, we are convinced, not a
police function and should be made the responsibility of the Department of
Public Works which we understand is responsible to Government for the
registration of all other motor vehicles. The third category, again we quote
from the orders - "searching, disseminating administrative regulations,
security regulations, public order and sanitation, and controlling national
police units in their order work" - contains responsibilities which should either
be those of one of the Directorates or be allowed to lapse entirely because they
are unnecessary. We believe that all these changes or modifications are sen-
sible, should be made and the Traffic and Order Police abolished at national
headquarters and levels below.
THE INSPECTION CORPS
74. We have examined the functions performed by the Inspection Corps at
Police Headquarters. Briefly these consist of twice yearly visits to national,
regional, provincial and district formations by five inspection teams (each
team consisting of a Commissioner and a Redactor) and the production of re-
ports on such visits ; dealing in the first instance, with cases of corruption
and disloyalty involving police officers; complaints against: the Police; guid-
ance of subordinate formations on "protective security", and the management of
a system of records, which is designed to identify cases of illegal detention so
that remedial action can be taken.
75. We have examined a number of reports produced by the inspection teams
and, while we do not doubt that in every cas-e the inspections themselves were
conducted with care and patience, we have been compelled to the conclusion
that the reports themselves are of little practical value. There is no indication
in them, for example, that the inspecting officers have examined critically the
responsibilities of a unit and the means available to it (such as command and
control, manpower, facilities for operational control and liaison with the Armed
Forces and civil administration, supply of intelligence, Courts, accomodation,
logistics) for discharging those responsiblities to ensure that both are what they
should be and, if not, why not, and what is needed to put them right. Such
recommendations as are made by the inspecting officers seem to us to be of too
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general a nature and too vaguely worded to be of much practical value either
to the unit inspected or to the Commanding General and his senior staff.
Moreover, there is a system of grading a unit A, B, or C (good, mediocre or
unsatisfactory) at the conclusion of an inspection, which appears to us to
serve little or no purpose except possibly to cause an officer to be moved from
his command when an inspection team has only awarded his unit a "C" rating.
76. We are of the opinion that the principal responsibility for inspecting
the Force rests upon the Commanding General and his Deputy. Furthermore,
inspection is an integral part of command at all levels all clown the line, and
these two officers should be assisted in this task by the regular inspection
annually of all their units by the officers commanding Regions, Provinces
and Districts, according to clear instructions issued by the Commanding
General in the form of Force Standing Orders. Supplementing this (although
they would not be formal inspections) should be periodic visits by Directors
at Police Headquarters and their senior staff officers to oversee the working
of their counterparts in the headquarters units of subordinate formations and to
ensure a smooth and efficient discharge of staff duties. We feel strongly that,
for the Commanding General and Police Commanders at all levels to be able
to exercise proper control and direction of the Force, they will need to spend
a large proportion of their time in the field with their men anyway, and, con-
versely, that the men will benefit in every respect by command exercised in
this manner. Moreover, if this does not happen, the principal purpose of
inspection will have been lost because we believe that the purpose of inspections
is not confined to checking and correction. Far more important is the con-
structive part of it, i. e. , where the officer conducting the inspection is con-
cerned with the practical value of, or the practicability of, headquarters
instructions when applied in the field. Finally, as soon as comprehensive
Force Standing Orders are promulgated regulating the Police in their activities,
the element of assistance in an inspecting officer's task will, as it properly
should, exceed the monitoring element. We recommend that this concept of
inspections in the Force be accepted and that the present inspection teams be
disbanded.
77. [We must make one consequential comment here, which is applicable to
the whole civil side of the Government, that a civil air transport service is
required if Saigon Ministries and Departments, including especially the Police
Force, are to exercise command and control functions by visits and inspections
in the field. This also applies to the Police at regional level. It is unlikely
that the Air Force, except for the rapid movement of police reserves, could
provide this EDrvice and Air America is obviously not the long-term answer.
The possibility of Air Vietnam, separately from its commercial domestic
schedules, running on behalf of the Government both a fixed courier service
and charter flights with small aircraft and a few helicopters should he examined.
The same arguments also apply to a freight service by both air and water. Pro-
vision for such travel would need to be entered in the Police budget. ]
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78. As far as the responsibilities of the Inspection Corps which relate to
corruption, disloyalty and complaints against the police generally are con-
cerned, we are of the opinion that staff work at National Police headquarters
in the investigation of such complaints is properly a responsibility of the
Personnel Directorate. If during the course of such investigation there
appears to be prima facie evidence of the commission of a criminal offence,
then the investigation of that offence should become the responsibility of the
Judicial Police Directorate, with the Personnel Directorate suspending the
member or members of the Force concerned from duty as necessary until
the conclusion of the criminal investigation and court action, if such follows.
We have referred to corruption in paras 40 and 84.
79. We consider that protective security is properly a subject for the
Special Police Directorate and we deal with it in Chapter VI.
80. We have also examined the function of the Detentions Bureau of the
Inspection Corps. The Bureau was created in 1968 for the purpose of guiding
subordinate formations in all matters concerning persons in police custody,
and the places and conditions of their confinement. The Bureau was made
responsible for maintaining such statistics as were necessary to ensure that
relevant police orders were complied with, and that persons in police custody
were held according to law. In 1970 a computerised arrest accountability sys-
tem was instituted for monitoring all police detentions, which required some
help from the Detentions Bureau in the initial stages. We understand that the
help given by the Bureau was valuable but that, now that the computerised
system is in full operation, the part played by the Bureau is no longer neces-
sary and that it can revert to its 1968 role. We feel that even this should be
unnecessary if all formations understand clearly their powers of detention
under the law, and if Force Standing Orders are explicit on the treatment of
persons in police custody, and the conditions of their confinement. If for-
mations do not understand their powers of detention this indicates an alarming
situation which the Commanding General should rectify as a matter of urgency.
When these two matters have been dealt with, there is no longer a need for
the Detentions Bureau to continue in being, and the Inspection Corps itself can
then be abolished.
81. It is appropriate in this part of our report to explain in some detail our
reasons for recommending a change in the police responsibility for handling
alien visits to the country (Immigration Service). We have looked at the
organisation which presently exists for this purpose and, although the apparatus
is impressive at first sight, it becomes clear fairly quickly that in fact it is
flimsy and full of holes. It is quite evident that the present system does no
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more than divide the responsibility for, and authority to control, the movement
of aliens into and out of the country, and provides no control over them while
they are inside the country. The authority for granting permission to any alien
to enter the country is that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its over-
seas representation in the form of a normal visa (entry permit). This permit
is of a limited duration, and it follows that an alien must leave when it expires
unless, in the meantime, the Ministry has seen fit to extend it on the application
of the alien. At the present itme, when an alien's visa expires and there is no
proof that he has left the country, then and only then does the search for him and
his subsequent process through the courts become a police responsibility (a law
enforcement task). However, we consider that it is a proper task for the Police
to control the movement of aliens while they are in the country. The existing
Immigration Service of the Police does not do this, and has no means of doing
this.
82. If our view concerning responsibility for controlling the entry and move -
ment of aliens is accepted, we consider that there is no reason why the Police
Immigration Service should not disappear, and be replaced by the small Regis
tration of Aliens unit which we have included in the chart at Appendix C under
the Judicial Police Directorate, the responsibility of which would be to control
and regulate the movement of aliens while they are within country. We recommend
the enactment by Government of legislation to require aliens to be issued with
a temporary and distinctive identity card on arrival and for them to notify the
Police of their arrival in and departure from any District, and any other infor-
mation which may be considered appropriate and necessary. The present
Police Immigration Service can then be disbanded.
RECOMMENDATIONS
83. We recommend that:
(36) provided the reallocation of duties which we have indicated in
this Chapter is made, the following Services can and should be
abolished:
Administrative Police (at all levels)
Central Records
Traffic and Order Police (at all levels)
The Inspections Corps
The Immigration Service.
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CHAPTER VI
S P E C I A L P O L I C E
84. The threat to the internal security of the country, apart from an in-
vasion by a foreign power, arises from:
(a) communist insurgency which may take the form of:
(i) semi-conventional warfare with attacks by local and
main force units; or
(ii) subversion, illegal and legal activity, supported by
small scale attacks and terrorist acts of destruction
and assassination by small guerilla units, or a mixture
of both;
(b) other political subversive activity;
(c) espionage and attempts to gain information, the knowledge of
which could be used to endanger national security, or informa-
tion on other matters or activities which the Government may
wish to protect;
(d) sabotage;
(e) any other illegal activity in the country which, because of its
nature or its scale, may threaten the Constitution, the
Government or the maintenance of law and order, for example,
widespread and uncontrolled corruption which could be a
threat to the country's security.
85. The gravest threat to the country at the present time is communist
insurgency and this will probably continue in one form or another for a
number of years. Even when this attack involves fairly large unit forma-
tions, the communists are seeking to influence the people and to gain their,
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ideological and material support. It is among the population that they seek
intelligence, carry out acts of sabotage, terror and assassination and pro-
mote other kinds of subversion. Another form of communist attack is to
subvert by the use of illegal and legal activities and by infiltration into
political parties and other groups. This subversion is supported by small
guerilla squads to promote terror and to attack selected government targets
or individuals. Whatever form the attack may take the main field of counter-
intelligence work will be among the civil population.
86. To protect the country against any of these threats they must first be
detected and then eliminated. It is individual men and women who plan,
instigate and carry out these activities who must first be identified and then
prevented from continuing with their intentions or actions by due process of
the law. This is both an intelligence and a police operation,, supported by
the RVNAF as may be necessary.
87. The communist threat, whether by the use of armed units or by sub-
version, is always aimed at the Government and seeks to gain control over
the population. It is this threat to the internal security of the country which
must be countered by the Internal Security Intelligence organisation.
88. The communist subversive attack assumes many forms. The field
for intelligence collection is so widespread amongst the community that it
is essential to have one organisation responsible for it to prevent overlapping
and omission.
89. Although at the present time communism is the greatest single threat
to internal security, other situations may and do arise which can lead to a
breakdown of law and order and the Police Force will also require infornia-
tion about these in order to carry out its normal police role.
90. The collection of intelligence about any threat is not sufficient; there
must also be a continuous legal process to eliminate it. It follows, therefore,
'Mint the intelligence collecting and collating organisation must always have
this end in view and, if it is divorced from the responsibility of taking action
against the threat, it will soon become increasingly involved in the tech-
niques of intelligence collection to the exclusion of everything else.
91. Effective law enforcement and countering subversion amongst the
population are only achieved by establishing and maintaining one overall
command to ensure the proper balance between:
(a) the time which is often required for successful intelligence
collection, coupled with the need to maintain established
channels of information; and
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(b) the necessity, frequently pressing, to eliminate the threat
to internal security as it arises by the appropriate police
action which may, on occasions, have to be a lengthy and
continuous process.
92. Since maintaining law and order, the collection of internal security
intelligence and the countering of subversion amongst the civil population
are so inextricably mixed it is right that one Commander, the Police
Commanding General, should be responsible for all three. It follows,
therefore, that the Special Police within his Command should be made the
Internal Security Intelligence organisation.
93. The communists direct and control their attack through the Party
apparatus and, therefore, this should be the first target for intelligence
operations and for elimination. It is the Party committees, of which the
senior military commander is a member, which plan, co-ordinate and
collect intelligence and are responsible for all activities in their area.
94. In the present circumstances
will e continue to be for some time, tithe` by
enemy armed forces and it is, and responsibility of RVNAF to deal with this. To do this effectively they must
have their own military intelligence organisation. However, this is all
part of the total communist threat and, apart from the purely military
intelligence, RVNAF will also require other intelligence which is in any
way related to the actions and intentions of the enemy's armed forces,
whose operations are under the control of the Communist Party apparatus.
Similarly, the Special Police will need to have all other information collected
which is in any way related to the Police internal security responsibility.
While the communist threat continues to take these two forms, two intelli-
gence agencies will continue to exist, but there must be continuous, close
and effective liaison at all levels. As the threat of armed attack is reduced,
it should be the aim for the Special Police to become the sole Internal
Security Intelligence organisation.
COMMAND AND MISSION
95. The Special Police, as the Internal Security Intelligence organisation,
are under the command of the Police Commanding General and it should be
the duty of the Director of Special Police to provide him with all information
necessary to carry out his responsibilities. Similarly, the Heads of the
Special Police at subordinate levels have the same responsibility to their
respective Police Commanders. As the Internal Security Intelligence
organisation comes within the police chain of command, it will be important
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to ensure that there is complete integrity of intelligence reporting and that
intelligence is put to its proper use. Without some safeguard a senior
police officer could alter or suppress an item of information. In order to
reduce this potential danger to a minimum, it will be necessary to define
the role of the Special Police and the responsibilities of the Director of
Special Police, and also to establish the channels for the flow and use of
intelligence within the Police Force by Standing Orders.
96. The Director of Special Police, which is the Internal Security Intelli-
gence organisation, should have the right of direct access to the Prime
Minister on any matter, after informing the Police Commanding General.
Through the police chain of command the Director of Special Police and the
Heads of Region and Province Special Police units will be able to direct,
acting for their respective Police Commanders, the intelligence work of the
force formations. In addition, Standing Orders should establish the right
of the Head of a Special Police unit at any level to report direct to the head
of the Special Police at the next higher formation, but this must in no way
absolve him from his duty to keep the senior police officer in charge of his
formation fully informed. Standing Orders will also protect, on a need-to-
know basis., the information, activities and records of the Special Police.
97. It follows, therefore, that the mission of the Special Police should
be:
to collect, collate, assess and disseminate all information
which is or may be related to any form of subversion or
illegal activity which is or may be connected with:
a threat or a potential threat to the internal security of
the country;
(ii) a threat or a potential threat to the maintenance of law
and order in the country;
(iii) espionage or sabotage.
(b) to keep the Commanding General of the National Police fully
informed on all matters which concern his overall responsi-
bility to protect the people and the Government.
The Director of Special Police may, after he has informed the Police
Commanding General, have direct access to the Prime Minister on any
matter relating to his task as Head of the Internal Security Intelligence
organisation of the Republic of Vietnam.
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98. The mission must be clearly interpreted within the police chain of
command. The proper channels for the flow of information and its pro-
tection on a need-to-know basis must be established. This should be done
by Force Standing Orders.
99. We have shown in para 84 the main sources of the threat to the in-
ternal security of the country and have recommended that the Director of
Special Police be charged with the responsibility as defined in para 97.
This is a most important position of responsibility. The Director of Special
Police reports directly to the Police Commanding General on all aspects of
his responsibility and in addition has direct access to the Prime Minister.
He should, therefore, be appointed by the President on the recommendation
of the Prime Minister, and should be of the same rank as, or next in rank
to, the Deputy Commanding General (and he should take command of the Force
in the absence of both the Commanding General and his Deputy).
100. The Director of Special Police must have a Deputy, who will be re-
sponsible for the day to day control of Special Police work and thus leave him
free to advise the Government, to attend meetings with or on behalf of the
Police Commanding General on matters which may affect the internal security
of the country and to plan and supervise any concentration of effort on any
aspect of the work done by any of the Special Police Services at National Head-
quarters which he may wish to direct personally. He should make frequent
inspections of the Special Police formations in the Regions and Provinces.
The Deputy Director will, in addition to his day to day control of the work of
the Special Police, act for the Director in his absence, attend, as required,
meetings on behalf of the Director and assist in the supervision of Special
Police work in the Regions, Provinces and Districts by making frequent visits.
The Police Officer appointed to this post by the President on the recommenda-
tion of the Prime Minister, should have the same rank as, and be on the same
level as, Directors in charge of the other Directorates at National Police
Headquarters.
RE COMMENDATIONS
101. We recommend that:
(37) the Special Police should become the Internal Security Intelli-
gence organisation of the GVN and eventually become the sole
agency;
(38) a clearly defined mission for the Special Police should be laid
down;
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(39) the Director of Special Police should have the same rank
as the Deputy Commanding General and be appointed by
the President;
(40) the Deputy Director of Special Police should rank with
other Directors and be appointed by the President;
(41) Force Standing Orders should define duties of Heads of
Special Police at all levels, control dissemination of
intelligence and protect its security.
102. A chart showing our proposals for the organisation of National Special
Police Headquarters is at Appendix J. The organisation of the Special Police
must be so arranged that each form of threat is matched by a department
whose sole objective is to counter it. The degree of danger which any par-
ticular form of threat represents may increase or decrease at any time and
it is, therefore, essential that the Special Police organisation be completely
flexible so that the strength of any department can be varied accordingly.
103. The Director of Special Police should be able to change the strengths
of his services, bureaux or sections at National Police Headquarters or at
any subordinate police formation as circumstances demand. It is the danger
that any particular threat represents in an area and the amount of Special
Police resources necessary to counter it which should determine the strength
to be deployed. There should be no set pattern of deployment which is applied
rigidly to all Districts and Provinces and Regions throughout the country.
104. The collection of security intelligence is a selective process and there
must be constant vigilance to ensure that only information relating to sub-
versive activity is collected and stored. Since the enemy will constantly
change his method of attack and seek to disguise the manifestation of his
activity in order to evade detection, so there must be a constant re-evaluation
of the sources of information and the targets to which they must be directed.
105. Counter-intelligence work against a well -established and experienced
subversive organisation requires a continuous effort and ever increasing
skillful application of intelligence techniques combined with determined
police actions to disrupt it. As one part of the organisation is identified
and shut down by the arrest of its members, another may grow in its place:
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as one channel of subversive activity is blocked, another may be opened up.
Just as in a military battle a General commands all operations against an
opposing General, so it is essential in these counter subversive operations
to have one person who controls and plans the counter-intelligence work
against the subversive organisation and all its activities.
106. When a serious danger to security arises through the subversive
activities of one organisation, it is not the Director of the Special Police who
is in the position of the General matched against that particular organisation.
He has responsibility for countering all types of threat to internal security.
The correct procedure is for him to appoint a senior officer, supported by a
suitable staff, to command all counter measures against it.
107. The communist threat to the Government and people of Vietnam is of
such a magnitude that it requires the greater part of the effort of the Special
Police to be concentrated on it in order to eliminate it. This is the most
important task of Special Police and will continue to be so for a number of
years. A very senior officer with considerable experience should he
specially selected to be in charge of this work, His responsibility will he
to collect, collate, assess and disseminate all intelligence related to
communist subversive activity in the country and to plan and generally
supervise counter action to eliminate the threat it represents. His rank
should be the same as that of the Deputy Director of Special Police at
national level and, in the absence of both the Director and Deputy Director,
he should take over responsibility for the Directorate.
COUNTER COMMUNIST SERVICE
108. The Counter Communist Service will have the following tasks:
(a) to discover, analyse and interpret the policy and plans of
the communists and to monitor their success in the imple-
mentation of these plans, and to keep the Commanding General,
the Government and the Armed Forces continuously informed
on these matters;
(b) to conduct special studies on selected aspects of communist
activities so as to inform the Commanding General, the
Government and also lower formations at Region and Province,
as may be necessary, of changing communist methods and of
the techniques which are proving successful in countering
them;
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(c) to identify members of the Communist Party and infrastruc-
ture, to determine their organisation and to maintain records
of these;
(d) to prepare and issue weekly and monthly summaries of in-
telligence and prepare special reports on important matters
and to distribute these to those who have a ''need to know';
(e) to prepare assessments of the success of counter-action
against communist subversion and to direct the Regions and
Provinces on the implementation of these counter measures
including the setting, or alteration of, priorities;
(f) to direct and supervise, through his corresponding bureaux
and sections in the lower Special Police formations, the in-
telligence effort to ensure that the right information is
collected and appropriate action is taken at all levels, in-
cluding the supervision of and targetting of penetration opera-
tions.
109. The Head of the Counter Communist Service both plans and directs
all the counter measures against communist subversion. He should have
the authority to organise and vary the strengths within the bureaux and
sections under his control according to the volume of the work to be done.
For the most part the work will be done by Desk Officers, with assistants,
who will be allotted specific tasks or targets. They in turn will be grouped
together in sections working on related subjects, co-ordinated by the section
Heads. Within these sections the Desk Officer at national headquarters
supervises the collection, collation and assessment of all information from
all sources at all levels which may be related to his particular target.
Research for this purpose is also the direct responsibility of the Desk
Officer or one of his assistants. It is, therefore, unnecessary to establish
separate sections for research. This pattern of responsibility in relation
to targets must be consistent throughout the work of the Special Police at all
levels. Desk Officers and their assistants are all part of a team studying
and investigating various facets of communist activity and their work must
be completely and continuously integrated with the final aim of eliminating
their target.
110. The Head of the Counter Communist Service must have a Deputy,
who, in addition to the normal responsibility of a Deputy Head of Service,
will have the particular task of ensuring that incidents of significance from
the work of the Service, or from the work of the Counter Communist Sections
at subordinate Special Police formations, or from any other department or
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agency, are given appropriate circulation throughout Special Police Head-
quarters. He also prepares the weekly and monthly intelligence summaries
covering the work of the Service.
111. We consider that the Counter Communist Service will require four
bureaux as follows
(a) the Communist Party Bureau: this is the main bureau re-
sponsible for studying and reporting on communist party
policy, plans and the organisation that exists to implement
them; included in this bureau will be a section with the
responsibility for preparing and maintaining up-to-date
records of the organisation of the Party and its infrastructure
and the individuals within it.
(b) the Communist Penetration Bureau will be responsible for
detecting and countering communist penetration into legal
parties and groups. The Sections within this bureau will vary
as to the number of Desk Officers according to the degree of
penetration achieved, the priority given to it by the conimunists
and the danger it represents. The responsibility of the Bureau
would normally be divided into three Sections covering political
parties, groups and associations; and government servants
respectively.
(c) The Special Studies Bureau will be required to undertake, at
the direction of the Head of the Counter Communist Se rvie e,
specially selected investigations in depth into the activities
of a particularly important communist personality, or into
manifestations requiring particular analysis or into manifes-
tations which, at first sight, may not fallinto any recognised
category. The exact nature of these will change from tilde to
time and thus no permanent structure of sections will be
necessary. As an example, the communist emphasis on
activity in towns would be an obvious choice for special
study at the moment. The object would be to examine the
methods used by the communists to infiltrate into towns and
to set up their organisation within them, and also, most
important, to study the methods used by the Special Police
and Police in those towns to eliminate there. As a result of
this study guidance can be given to othe r fornuations. Other
examples might be sabotage or communist penetration of
school teachers.
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(d) the Communist Document Bureau: Communist documents are
a most important source of intelligence and their study re-
quires both skill and considerable experience in communist
terminology. From the study of documents this bureau will:
(i) report on communist policy plans and morale;
(ii) ensure that the Bureaux and Sections of the Counter
Communist Service have up-to-date information from
documents for their own use;
(iii) make any statistical analysis of information such as
finance, stores, manpower, etc. , which may have sig-
nificance in assessing the Vietcong capability in any
area;
(iv) supervise the use, analysis and preservation of docu-
ments at all Special Police formations,
(e) a small section will be required to deal with the activities of
fellow travellers and intellectuals both of Vietnamese and
foreign origin, including the activities of foreign communist
parties which may be related to communist subversion in the
country.
COUNTER-SUBVERSION (NON-COMMUNIST) SERVICE
112. All subversion which is not communist inspired should be the re-
sponsibility of a separate Service which, according to the weight of work,
may have to be divided into Bureau and Sections. This Service will monitor
the activities of political parties, groups and associations from press and
public comment and from reports that may be received from Region and
Province formations. The Service should not normally be required to carry
out any detailed intelligence work on any of these groups unless there are
manifestations or reports that may suggest subversive activity. If mani-
festations are found, on investigation, to be communist inspired, the case
should then be handed over to the Counter-Communist Service for further
action.
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
113. Nobody can be charged with the responsibility for protective security
until it is first made clear what is to be protected. The Government should,
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after consulting its professional officers, lay down a clear protective security
policy and revise this from time to time as may be necessary in the light of
the experience of its application. It should be the aim of Government in
establishing its protective security measures by administrative direction:
(a) to define categories for the security classification of docu-
ments, activities and processes according to the degree of
protection each may require, and then to establish.a pro-
cedure for their correct security classification so that, when
classified, they are afforded the degree of protection appro-
priate to their category;
(b) to ensure that the Heads of all Government Departments,
where classified documents are handled, review the methods
of handling, distribution and storage of these documents and
to make sure that this is done in accordance with these
regulations and that they are kept within as limited an area
as possible;
(c) to issue directions governing access by individuals to classi-
fied material and to lay down procedures to check the loyalty
of those who are given such access;
(d) to lay down responsibilities for the enforcement of security
measures and a system for reviewing them.
It is usual for measures to safeguard Government secrets to be embodied in
a Statute (usually described as an Official Secrets Act) which includes pro-
visions for penalties for breaches of the various conditions in it.
114. The most usual method of protection of Government. secrets, officials
and vital installations which are considered vulnerable to attack, is to ex-
amine the credentials, associations and history of those whp work in close
proximity to them; a process commonly known as vetting. There are two
degrees of vetting; the first, known as negative vetting, is carried out by
checking the name of the individual against criminal and Special Police
records to see if there is an adverse record; the other method, known as
positive vetting, requires in addition that the individual be interviewed to
assess whether his behavior has been of an acceptable standard and an
independent check made on this through relatives and associates.
115. When there is an extensive subversive threat within a country, there
is always a heavy and, generally, an increasing demand for positive and
negative vetting by the security services. Much of this arises because of a
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failure to understand the degree of protection that is given by these processes.
Negative vetting frequently gives a false sense of security; the fact that an
individual is not on record is no guarantee that he is not, for example, a
communist, or a communist supporter or even that he is not being forced to
act in support of the communists; it is also no guarantee that the individual
is not an undetected criminal.
116. As the weaknesses in the negative vetting process become more
widely known, there is an increasing demand for positive vetting to be
carried out until there is so much to be done that it is inadequately super-
vised and the work of investigation is hurried and lacks thoroughness. It is
comparatively easy for individuals with something to hide to escape detection
in these circumstance-s.
117. To ensure that positive vetting is effective it should be kept to a
minimum and for this purpose there should be a constant review of the ex-
tent to which its application is necessary and of the thoroughness of the in-
vestigation procedures in the light of all available intelligence.
PROTECTIVE SECURITY SERVICE
118. Protective security and the preservation of Government security are
so important that there should be a separate Service with these responsibili-
ties at Special Police National Headquarters. The Head of this Service
should be charged with responsibility for:
(a) the protection of Government secrets and advising Govern-
ment departments on this and other security practices;
(b) countering espionage;
(c) the detection and investigation of attempts at sabotage;
(d) advising Government on the policy and implementation of
vetting procedures;
advising those responsible for the protection of VIPs and,
where necessary, the provision of limited Special Police
personnel to assist them;
(f) advising all Directorates at National Police Headquarters on
protective security measures;
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(g) studying and analysing information made available from other
Services at Special Police National, Region and Province
Headquarters which relates to these responsibilities.
119. The Protective Security Service at Special Police Headquarters
should be divided into two bureaux - one with the responsibility for the
protective measures relating to Government secrets and for vetting pro-
cedures; the second for counter-espionage and counter-sabotage. There
should be one section covering Special Police responsibility related to the
protection of VIPs.
120. It is apparent that the present practice of giving full responsibility
for the protection of VIPs to the Special Police is in conflict with its main
mission - the collection and dissemination of intelligence. The greater part
of the work involved in the protection of a VIP can be effectively performed
by specially trained armed men from the Guard and Escort Company (see
paragraph 50) who may be in uniform or plain clothes according to circum-
stances. The Special Police have a clear responsibility to advise those in-
volved about the potential security threat to the VIP and should provide
Special Police personnel to augment the escort only when this is considered
essential. The Special Police responsibility lies along the route and at the
places to be visited and they should ensure that Special Police personnel are
alerted in good time and directed to take any action deemed necessary.
121. The Head of the Protective Security Service, in order that he may
carry out these responsibilities, will need to keep in close liaison with the
security officers in other Government Ministries and Departments and with
the appropriate intelligence formations in the Armed Forces. He will have
to brief the Guard and Escort Commander on any threats to the VIPs to be
protected, and he should also receive from the Guard and Escort Commander
any relevant information arising'from the protection of these VIPs.
122. The Head of the Bureau which is responsible for vetting procedures
should maintain close liaison with the Immigration Service and co-operate
in the maintenance of a list of prohibited immigrants and emigrants. Now
that National Registration is almost complete throughout the country there
should be a review of the necessity to vet, even negatively, all those seeking
exit visas; the "black list" may be considered sufficient for detection pur-
poses. In addition, for the similar reason that all those now living in the
country are on a National Register, there should be a review of the extent
to which applicants for citizenship need to be vetted.
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123. The Operations Service at National Special Police Headquarters
provides a service to the Counter Communist and Counter Subversion (non-
communist) Services and it should operate at their request. It should super,
vise the techniques of the operations units at Province level and should assist
their operations when necessary. It is convenient to divide it into four
Bureaux - operations, investigations and surveillance, task force and the
National Interrogation Centre. As all its operations become increasingly
successful, the prestige of this Service will become much greater. As this
occurs it is important to ensure that it is not permitted to initiate operations
without the approval of the Head of the appropriate Service.
124. The Head of this Service would be responsible for:
(a) carrying out special operations and investigations, including
surveillance, in support of the work being undertaken by the
other Services of National Special Police Headquarters;
(b) supervising and assisting the work of special operations, in-
vestigations and surveillance at Region and Province level;
(c) allocation of Task Force support to subordinate levels;
(d) the maintenance of special equipment (for which a special
section will be required);
the operational efficiency of the National Interrogation Centre
and the supervision of the Interrogation Centres at region
and Province and of interrogation techniques used in the
Districts.
125. When any kind of operation is carried out, or enquiries are being
made, by the Operations Service at national level, it will in fact be taking
place within a District area. This applies equally to those carried out by
similar Regional and Provincial personnel. Full up-to-date local knowledge
is almost always an important element for the success of these operations
and, for this reason, it should be a Standing Order that no such operation is
carried out in any area unless or until the Head of the Special Police of that
area has been informed. There may be a few exceptions to this based on
solid reasons of security, but in every case where an exception appears to
be necessary the operation must have the personal approval of the Director
of Special Branch or his Deputy. At Region and Province, it should be the
Head of the appropriate Special Police formation who gives approval,
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THE ADMINISTRATION SERVICE
126. The Administration Service will be required by Special Police to keep
classified records about its personnel, secret funds, supplies and special
equipment and special training. These are additional to the normal records
held in the appropriate Directorates at National Police Headquarters.
127. The Head of this Service should be responsible for:
(a) maintaining all Special Branch records - the management,
as directed, of personnel including transfers;
(b) accounting for the expenditure of special funds and the cal-
culation of the annual budget for these; accounting for and the
preparation of demands for supplies;
arranging for the purchase and distribution of special stores;
the supervision of the Special Police Training schools;
the Special Police Registry;
any other routine administrative duties.
To carry out these responsibilities the Administrative Service will have
bureaux covering each of the following subjects: Registry, Personnel,
Special Finance Supplies and equipment, and Special training.
128. It is essential that there should be only one Registry for the whole of
Special Police National Headquarters which will hold in a secure manner .
all documents, records and other classified material and serve all staff
employed there. No Service, Bureau of Section should be permitted to raise
or maintain any records whatsoever in their own offices. "Phis principle will
also be applied at Region and Province Special Police formations. The
method of working a Registry system of this kind is referred to in paras 138-
139.
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RESEARCH BUREAU
129. A Research Bureau will be required by the Director of Special Police
at National Headquarters. The purpose of this bureau will be to carry out
special research studies allotted to it by the Director which may involve or
be required by all or any of his other Services. These will be more effec-
tively handled by a separate bureau because of the length of time involved and
the depth and nature of the studies. We have in mind that they would generally
be directed towards the changing nature of the threat to the country so that the
Director can plan for the future in terms of policy, manpower, re-organisation special techniques and training. This unit must not be used for the.normal dray
to day research associated with the specific tasks of the Services, Bureaux or
Sections.
130. We consider that another important study for the Research Bureau is
the relationship of the Special Police and the Police Force as a whole with the
population, its effect on the collection of information and how best this can be
encouraged, which would include the study of a reward system. This would be
similar to the work at present being carried out by the People's Intelligence
Bureau, which we do not think is justified as a separate Bureau or Section at
any level. We agree that it is important to encourage the population in every
way to discharge their responsibility to the community by giving information
about any activity which is suspicious or may be of an illegal nature. Good
police relationship with the population must be encouraged to achieve this so
that it fosters the basic information network across the country. We have
developed this theory further in paras 133, 153 and 155.
131. We consider that a separate Regulation Service is no longer necessary.
The control that it now exercises is properly part of the command function and
this should be undertaken by the Director, his Deputy, the Regional and Pro-
vincial Heads of Special Police formations. The Director may also wish to
delegate some of this responsibility to the Heads of the two main Services -
Counter Communist and Counter Subversion. The very delicate records. cur-
rently kept by the Regulation Service, should be kept separately in the Special
Police Registry with only very restricted access allowed to these by officers
nominated by the Director. If they cannot be kept securely in this Registry,
they must be kept in a special office under the Director's personal control.
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132. In our view the present Special Police in their short history, start-
ing with limited resources and expertise, have very considerable achieve-
ments to their credit. We well understand the difficulties of the Director
of the SpecialPolice who has had to concentrate on developing a nucleus of
the most experienced staff at national leve 1 while the large number of
Special Police deployed throughout the country have not had much of an
opportunity to acquire a high degree of expertise.' This has led to a con-
centration of operational effort at national level. Because of the changing'
nature of the war with increased emphasis by the Communists on subver-
sion amongst the population, we believe that there are certain important
methods of Special Police operations to which he may now wish to give his
attention."
DOWN TO THE GROUND
133. It is a simple fact that the more Province and District Special Police'
formations are capable of collecting good intelligence by their own efforts,
the greater will be the flow of useful intelligence to national level and the
wider the spread of the intelligence net across the country. The move away
from centralisation can be speeded up by interrelated actions, first by
building up the level of expertise through the transfer of experienced officers
from headquarters to the field, and secondly by raising the level of impor-
tance of the information to be contained in reports submitted to National
Headquarters, thereby reducing the volume of reporting to that level.
134. The building up of expertise in the field can best be achieved by the
transfer of selected desk officers, skilled investigators and interrogators
to the field and similarly the reduction in the numbers of task force per-
sonnel held at National Headquarters. An additional method is for a prac-
tice to be established whereby a Headquarters Desk Officer or one of his
assistants should, in the case of more difficult investigations, proceed to
the area concerned and personally supervise or work alongside the local
Special Police in pursuit of his enquiries.
135. The Operations Service should recognise that an important part of
its work is to assist Special Police in the Provinces by working together
with them. This method of imparting their expertise in conducting special
operations makes a much greater impact than formal training courses.
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136. The distribution of work among the interrogation centres perhaps
best illustrates the principle that we have outlined. At present the National
Interrogation Centre is processing a large number of prisoner interroga-
tions each month while some of the Province Interrogation Centres- a-re
finding great difficulty in keeping their interrogators fully occupied,., Not
all of those now being brought to the National Interrogation Centre can have
information of sufficient importance for them to be interrogated at national
level. To adjust this, the level of criteria for admittance to the National
Interrogation Centre should. be raised and, if this is done, the Province
Interrogation Centres will again be fully occupied and, because of the reduc-
tion of load on the National Centre experienced interrogators will then be-
come available for transfer to the field.
137. If this same principle is followed by transferring experienced officers
from other kinds of Special Police work to lower formations, the whole level
of performance of Special Police at Province and District would be raised
and this would quickly become a self-generating process. An increase of
personal responsibility in the field would have a marked effect on morale.
138. In the time available it has not been possible to- set out in detail the
actual procedures to be adopted in the Registries for the handling of Special
Police correspondence and files - but we believe it is essential that there
should be an efficient central Registry operated on standard procedures for
the storage and handling of all information so that it is both readily avail-
able and securely held.
139. There are certainbasic requirements in establishing a secure
registry system:
(a) It should be sited in a secure building as- close- as possible
to the major user of service.
(b) The building should be physically divided into compartments
for the separate storage of documents and files in their
appropriate security classifications.
(c) The nucleus of all registry procedurss is the card index.
Clear- and, precise instructions are necessary to govern the
method' of carding. No intelligence information should be
shown on cards for reasons of security.
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(d) There must be rules setting out the authority for, and the
method of raising, subject or personal files (dossiers).
(e) Very strict rules must govern access to, and the distribu-
tion of, the various categories of files and the recording of
their. movement.
(f) There must be instructions and physical. checks to ensure
that no documents or files are held in offices in the absence,
for any reason, of an authorised officer unless locked in an
approved container.
140. Special Police offices, activities It and record will
continuing rlesponsib lips of
ority target for communist infiltration.
any intelligence organisation to ensure that the maximum security pre cau-
tions are taken to preserve the secrecy of all its activities.
141. - We believe that, to achieve this objective, the following points are
in need of urgent attention:
(a) All Special Police buildings should be made physically secure
and adequate barriers erected to prevent and check unauthor-
ized entrance.
(b) All files and documents now kept in nearly every office should
be removed to the central Registry, integrated and then stored
in adequate security. After integration all redundant material
must be destroyed. There should be no storage facilities other
than an approved container'' in certain selected offices.
(c) There must be an urgent review and a.dra ticsetailment
of the number of copies of documents, report, c. , which
are being typed and circulated.
(d) There must be strict adherence to the regulations (which stem
access concerning the classification
from an Official Secrets Act)
of information and the right of to it.
Even efficient vetting procedures are not a guarantee against
(e)
infiltration. These procedures must be coupled with a
system of control of personnel so. that they have only step
by step access to classified information. There must. be an
appreciable period of time spent ateach nstep~land during this
period a continuous assessment a
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integrity must be made. In no circumstances may a new
recruit work in the registry.
(f) All these points must be subject to rigorous enforcement
and subject to continuous checks - a responsibility which
belongs to every officer in the Special Police.
142. The present practice in all Special Police formations throughout the
country is to put all intelligence collected through an excessive series of
written and recording processes of collation, assessment and dissemination
even when this distribution is within the same formation. The sheer volume
of work, consistently duplicated and often overlapping, demands more and
more of the time of Special Police officers and thus inhibits them from
concentrating on their real task which is the collection of information and
its use against selected targets.
143. The main work of collecting intelligence must be conducted from
District and Province level, and the main work of collation, assessment
and dissemination should be undertaken at Province and National level.
Similarly, the main responsibility for mounting positive counter measures
for the promotion of intelligence leading to the elimination of Vietcong
elements must be with District and Province Special Police units. We
accept that there are a limited number of occasions when, for overriding
reasons of security or because of the very high level of the target, it is
necessary to conduct operations from National Special Police Headquarters.
LOWER FORMATIONS
144. Our proposals for the organisation of Special Police Headquarters
at Regional, Province and District level are set out in the following para-
graphs and in Appendices K, L, and M respectively. They are based on
the concept that the Special Police requirement at Region and Province
level is dictated solely by the need of the Heads of the respective Head-
quarters to control, co-ordinate and supplement the District Special Police
effort.
REGIONAL SPECIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS
--------------------------------------------
145. There are two reasons for the existence of a Special Police for-
mation at Regional level:
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(a) to provide the Region Police Commander, and through him
the Regional Commander, with information reports and regular
digests of intelligence related to the security of the Region;
(b) to control and co-ordinate Special Police activities in the
Provinces, which consist of:
(i) the setting of priorities within the. Region and ensuring
that all Special Police work in the provinces is prop-
erly targetted towards them;
(ii) the deployment of the assets of the Special Police with-
in the Region to the best advantage and the maintenance
of a small tactical reserve;
(iii) the supervision of inter-province Special Police activ-
ity;
(iv) ensuring co-ordinated Special Police activity where
Vietcong boundaries overlap provincial boundaries. will
146. To undertake these tasks the Head s of
orthe diate1theSCounterPComn unist
have to have a small staff to control and
Service and the Counter Subversion (non-communist) Bureau. He will also ion, need an Administration Bureau to
rnaterialtsupplies,nto functout the
prepare the collective demands
special training requirements of Special Police personnel in the Region
and to run the Registry. The results of vetting investigations from Prov-
ince Special Police formations will be routed through Regional Special
Police Headquarters, where they will
Speccial Police Headquarterse check in
to
the Registry, en route
147. The Head of the Region Special Police should carry a reserve in
the form of a Task Force.
148. The Regional Special Police Headquarters should not carry out in-
dependent Special Police operations and it should not operate as an indepen-
dent intelligence collecting unit.
PROVINCE SPECIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS-
149. The'Province Special Police unit should be the lowest level of
Special Police deployment on a full scale basis and District Special Police
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should be regarded as the active arm of the Province formation. It follows
that the Province Special Police must be so organised that it can direct
and co-ordinate Province and District Special Police activities in order to:
(a) provide intelligence reports for the Province Police Coniniander
and other Province Sector authorities;
(b) provide Regional and National Special Police with processed
intelligence reports;
(c) provide each District Special Police unit with collated and
assessed intelligence relevant to its area;
(d) provide manpower and material support to District Special
Police units in the tasks of intelligence collection, investica-
tion and operations;
(e) carry out such protective security duties and investigations
as may be necessary in the Province;
prepare and maintain records for both Province and 1)istri.c
Special Police units;
undertake all administrative work on behalf of Province and
District Special Police formations.
150. In addition, the Province Special Police should have an operatit,nal
task within the Province in circumstances which, for reasons of security
or the degree of expertise required necessitate this, or when two or nmor,?
District areas are involved.
THE DISTRICT SPECIAL POLICE
151. The task of the District Special Police personnel may be sunu>ariied
as follows:
(a) at all times to be in contact with the population and the local
police in order to learn about any activity of an illegal or
subversive nature or of any information which may lead to
a suspicion of such an activity;
(b) to investigate such information further and decide if and
immediate action is essential;
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to take the necessary action, under direction from their
(c)
immediate superior, should not prevent any
ken when this is obviously indepen-
action
dent immediate
called for, because as members of the Police Force, they
have a duty to enforce the law and arrest law breakers.
152. The task of the Head of the District Special police will be:
and hamlets
(a) to ensure that his througho t the Personnel
tact with the p p
in the District; ret
n fl to deploy his staff on a selective basis nd to
u e of them
(b) bility of deployment thereby making
according to the demands of the security situation;
ma-
to ensure that his men are instructe in e kin
tsrand
been given of in
(c) tion they should seek, that they hav targ
strict Special Police Headquarters;
that they report to the Di
to ensure that Village Police Station CoPaolnde era ti nd Village
(d) Chiefs are kept fully informed on Special
which may affect their area;
to direct the collection of intelligence, to supervise the use
>n should
(e)
of appropriate techniques or and
further exploitation);
be taken (whether arrest the (f) to report intelligence ensure that he to
s fullyebriefedronlallein-
Special Police and
telligence related to the area;
(g) to maintain close and frequent liaison with Special Police in
adjacent Districts;
to provide operational intelligence to to need to knChief and
(h) such Sub-Sector authorities who have to maintain such records as may be laid down by Province
(1)
Special Police Headquarters. s
ssa
and u 153. In order to discharge these derlmanent bas'sCein each Villageon d
per, d
tive to station Special Police, on a
Hamlet in the District. The Regular Police complement at Village an
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Hamlet level should have a general knowledge of the community and of the
activity of individuals within it and be alert to the first signs of any unusual
occurrence or behavior. In addition the Special Police will be keeping in
contact with the police and the people in the area by regular visits and it is
they who, with their knowledge and special training, then have to identify
the significance of any such occurrence and, if the situation warrants it,
conduct more detailed investigagion.
154. In order to discharge their task efficiently Special Police should
operate from a District base so that they can be kept fully briefed, con-
trolled and supervised and so that the system of selective information
collection can be maintained. From a District base they are in a better
position to make their contacts in a secure and discreet manner.
155. Too much reliance must not be placed on information networks
because they give a false sense of security by implying that if anything of
significance occurs, it will automatically be reported. General coverage
of this nature is obtained by the normal police activity described in para
153 above. An informant is only of value as an aid to a specific investi-
gation or when he is given a specific target.
156. The District Special Police should work from a minimuni nunihe r of
records which should generally be restricted to:
(a) an area file containing up-to-date factual information about
the District which will include such items as details of
associations, groups, political parties, etc;
(b) a communist file which may have several parts including:
(i) ORBAT;
(ii) dossiers of leading Communist personalities (pre-
pared by Province Special Police Headquarters);
(iii) a list of suspected communist contacts and supporters;
(iv) details of communist communication/liaison routes;
(v) a copy of each communist document of local impor-
tance.
(c) one file for information reports;
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(d) one file for agent reports;
(e) one file for correspondence with Province Special Police
Headquarters.
157. The strength of Special Police in any District must be determined
by the number of people necessary to perform the tasks outlined above and
an assessment of the likely extent of illegal and subversive activity in the
area. The number required in any area will change from time to time as
the threat increases or decreases; an assessment of this factor should be
made at regular intervals.
158. In the present situation the policy of the Government must be to
give a very high priority to the collection of intelligence which will enable
the Vietcong to be neutralised as soon as possible. The Commanding
General of the National Police bears the main burden of implementing this
policy. The communist threat aimed at subversion and the manipulation
of the population is planned and directed by well trained experienced Party
members and the present form of their attack is much more difficult to
counter. A high degree of intellect, skill and experience is needed to
identify the many and varied manifestations of the threat and to plan and
execute counter measures: For this reason the Government should give
its greatest support to the Internal Security Intelligence organisation the
Special Police) by instructing all other Ministries and departments to co-
operate by releasing selected officers of high calibre on transfer to them.
Similarly, within the overall responsibility of the Commanding General
internal security should have by far the highest priority. It is, therefore,
essential that police with the highest level of intelligence and experience
should be allocated to the Special Police, if necessary at the expense of
other branches of the Force.
159. The whole essence of defeating an enemy is to know him, to watch
his every move and continuously study his reaction to any situation. This
demands that continuity of effort must be sustained by the Special Police
personnel matched against the Communist Party leaders at each level.
Therefore, certain personnel posted to the Special Police may have to
remain in a specific post for a considerable period of time. It is likely
that they will be amongst the most able men in the Police Force and
measures must be taken to ensure that this operational requirement (toes
not impair an individual's opportunity for promotion.
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160. Special Police personnel must be subject to the general police
training courses at the Basic and Refresher training schools and the
Police Academy. However, the overriding need for continuity may mean
a postponement of regular police training so far as certain Special Police
personnel are concerned. This must be the subject of negotiation and
adjustment between the Director of Personnel and Training and the Director
of Special Police, who should have the last word. There is a Special Police
training school which is exclusive to Special Police personnel. For security
reasons the content of the Special Police training programs must be the
sole responsibility of the Director of Special Police. The Director of
Special Police also has a responsibility for contributing to the content of
regular police training by providing lecturers on Special Police subjects
and in the preparation of course material.
161. The need for secrecy in conducting counter-intelligence operations
makes it essential that the Director of Special Police has special funds
allocated to him for the payment of agents, special personnel, rewards anti
the purchase of special equipment. The funds needed for this purpose
cannot, for security reasons, be itemised under separate account heads.
The control over the use, disbursement and auditing of the accounts of these
special funds must be the subject of a directive issued by the Police
Commander to the Director of Special Police.
CAPITAL POLICE REGION SPECIAL POLICE
162. Elsewhere in this Report (Chapter X) we have recommended that
the present Saigon Municipal Police Directorate be merged with the Gia
Dinh Provincial Police into one unified command. The general re as
for this proposal are set out in detail in pares Zf,Z to Zt>5. It will be
apparent that, in relation to the current nature of the threat in dens(
populated areas and their immediate environs, these reasons apply
more strongly in considering the co-ordination of the Special Police eii~)i?t.
The Head of the Special Police in the Capital Police Region will, therefore,
have the combined responsibilities of a Region Head of Special Police and
a Province Head of Special Police and he should be provided with one
unified staff. He will need the services of an additional Deputy who will
have a special responsibility for co-ordination Special Police work in the
rural areas of the Capital Police Region. This is shown in the chart at
Appendix N.
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163. In the same way as we described the District Special Police as
being the active arm of the Province Special Police Headquarters earlier
(para 149) we are applying the same principle to the relationship of the
Precinct or District Special Police Headquarters with the Capital Region
Special Police Headquarters. Similarly, the records to be maintained at
Precinct and District Special Police Headquarters in this Region will be
kept to a minimum. In principle one Registry and one set of records will
serve the whole Region. For ease of operations and quick reference there
will have to be certain additions and these are set out in para 167 below.
164. Because of the density of the population. in this area it will also be
necessary to strengthen the complement of Special Police at Precinct and
District Headquarters in certain respects, and also to arrange for the de-
ployment of some senior Special Police staff (Desk Officers) to Precincts.
This staff may have responsibility for their subject in one Precinct or in a
group of adjacent Precincts.
165. This means that the Precinct Special Police complement will include:
(a) Special Police personnel to maintain contact with the popula-
tion (as in all other District Special Police Headquarters);
and may include all or any of the following:
(b) Special Police Case officers and staff working to targets
within the Precinct area;
(c) Desk or Case officer teams from Region Special Police
Headquarters who, for tactical and security reasons, can
best operate at a Precinct headquarters;
(d) Assistants to Desk or Case officers only.
166. The density of the population will also mean that it may be nec-
essary to locate Special Police personnel in some police stations within
a Precinct. The pattern of deployment cannot be consistent throughout
all Precincts and it must be subject to change from time to time and
determined solely by the security situation in any area at any one time.
A policy of maximum flexibility must be maintained.
167. In support of operations and in order to ensure effective co-
ordination with this Region Special Police Headquarters, it will be nec-
essary for additional records to be maintained in Precincts and Districts
in excess of those we have recommended for District Special Police
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Headquarters in other Regions. These should take the form of a nominal
card index. The cards will only and may only be raised at Region Special
Police Headquarters but, whenever a card is raised, copies should be sent
to each Precinct and District. It is not necessary to send copies of the
information to which the card refers to the Precincts or Districts. The
Precinct will already have dossiers (copies prepared by the Region Special
Police Headquarters) of local suspects and targets.
168. The role of the additional Deputy with particular responsibility for
the Rural Areas, to whom we have referred in para 162 above, is:
(a) to inform the Deputy Commander at Capital Police Region
Headquarters, who is in charge of Gia Dinh Province, on
all matters relating to the internal security of that area;
(b) to supervise and co-ordinate the work of all, Special Police
personnel assigned to the rural areas of Gia Dinh Province
and to ensure that their work is thoroughly integrated with
that of the Precincts ;
(c) to ensure that he receives from all Services and Bureaux at
the Region Special Police Headquarters all information
necessary for him to carry out his tasks;
(d) to act as liaison officer on behalf of the Head of the Region
Special Police at meetings of the Gia Dinh Phung Hoang
Committee;
(e) to pay constant attention to the inter-district co-ordination
problems ensuing from the differences between the Govern-
ment administrative boundaries and the Vietcong District
boundaries.
For these purposes he will use the facilities of the Registry at Region
Special Police Headquarters and he will not require any staff except for
one typist.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
169. We have considered these proposals very carefully and are con-
vinced from our experience that they will work and will provide a more
rapid and effective intelligence flow which will enable counter measures
to be taken promptly against any threat. It is the people within an
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organisation who make it effective, not the structure. It is, therefore,
essential that all members of the Special Police recognise their individual
responsibility and ensure by personal direction that the work involved is
carried out vigorously at all levels. This will mean that responsible
officers must travel extensively to assure themselves of this by personal
inspection and to give their assistance wherever it may be needed.
We, therefore, recommend that:
(42) there should be one Service responsible for all counter
measures against Communist Subversion headed by a very
senior officer (para 107);
(43) there should be a Counter-Communist Service containing
four Bureaux, and one separate Section (paras 108-111);
(44) there should be a Counter-Subversion (non-Communist)
Service (para 112);
(45) consideration should be given to the promulgation of an
Official Secrets Statute (para 113);
(46) there should be a Protective Security Service with two
Bureaux and one separate Section (paras 118-122);
(47) the provision of all personnel required for the protection
of VIPs should no longer be the responsibility of Special
Police (para 120);
(48) there should be an Operations Service with four Bureaux and
one separate Section (paras 123-125);
(49) there should be an Administration Service with four Bureaux
(paras 126-127);
(50) there should be one Registry to serve the role of Special
Police National Headquarters (para 128);
(51) there should be a small separate Research Bureau for
special studies under the control of the Director (para 129-
131);
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(52) the Regulation Service can now be abolished (para 131);
(53) more of the experienced officers now at National Headquarters
should be transferred to the Provinces (paras 133-137);
(54) there must be improved security in the handling and storage
of records (para 139);
(55) there should be a revision of the responsibilities of Regional
Special Police Headquarters (paras 145-148);
(56) Province Special Police Headquarters should be the lowest
level of Special Police deployment on a full scale basis
(para 149);
(57) District Special Police units should be regarded as the active
arms of the Province Special Police (para 149);
(58) a high priority should be given to the staffing of the Special
Police with experienced personnel of a high calibre (para
158);
the promotion of officers in the Special Police be protected
(para 159);
(60) there must be separate and additional Special Police training
programs (para 160);
(61) the Special Police in the whole of the Capital Police Region
should be under one unified command at the Region Head-
quarters (para 162);
(62) Capital Police Region Special Police should he served by
only one Registry (para 163);
(63) ? the Precincts in Saigon and the Districts of Gia Dinh should
be regarded as the active arms of the Capital Police Region
Special Police Headquarters (para 163);
(64) there should be flexibility in the staffing of Precincts and
Districts in the Capital Police Region according to the
specific needs of each (para 164);
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(65) finally, the whole organisation of the Special Police should
be at all levels as set out in the charts at Appendices J,
K, L, M, and N.
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FIELD FORCE, MARINE POLICE,
WOMEN POLICE AND MONTAGNARDS
171. The National Police Field Force and the Marine Police are under the
direct control of the Commanding General. They are mobile and can be moved
at comparatively short notice, and to a certain extent they are self-contained.
The Field Force is the Commander's first line reserve for the reinforcement
of police formations in any area of the country. We have found that, in respect
of both these units, there is some misunderstanding inside and outside the
Force concerning their respective roles, the manner in which they should be
committed to support formations, and the arrangements for operational command
once they are so committed.
NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE
172. We repeat our concept of the role of this arm of the Force, i. e. , to
provide the Commanding General with a means of reinforcing quickly any
police formation in the field. Within this role the Field Force has a police
task and a security task. By a police task we mean supporting the police for-
mation to which they are allocated in such situations as riots, control of large
gatherings of any kind, wide scale searches and mobile checks. By a security
task we mean planned operations with or without the participation of other armed
forces.
173. It seems to us that the Field Force should be used as sparingly and econ-
omically as possible, particularly as it is the only Police Force reserve. A1-
though we can understand very well the natural tendency of Regions (including
Saigon MPD) to desire a permanent allocation of the Field Force, we consider
the present distribution of Field Force units on an "equal shares for all'' basis
to be wrong. We have drawn attention earlier in this Report to our views that
there should be regular appraisals of the security situation in their areas by
the Police Commanders at regional, provincial, district and police station
levels in order that sensible adjustments in dispositions can be made. In the
same manner we believe that at National Police headquarters there should be
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similar appraisals, and particularly so before any part of the Field Force is
allocated for any length of time to the support of a formation. We have noticed
that in the Standing Orders for the Field Force the purposes for which it should
be used and not used are clearly stated. One of the prohibitions is static guard
duties. We have seen many instances of flagrant abuse of this Standing Order,
and we are of the opinion that the present method of allocating Field Force units
and of leaving them allocated on a more or less permanent basis is likely to
encourage rather than prevent such abuses.
174. There must be a clear understanding that at all times Field Force units
are firmly under command of their own officers. However, once a unit is
allocated to the support of a police formation that unit at once comes under the
operational control of the Police Commander of that formation? The fact that
a Field Force unit committed to the support of, say, a Police District may take
part in a combined security operation in no way affects this principle. To sum
up, therefore, we recommend that the deployment of the Field Force by the
Commanding General be based solely upon his assessment of the security need.
175. Further material points that we think should be made concern the length
of time a policeman should remain in the Field Force and the transport and
accommodation needs. Members of the Field Force are policemen first and
Field Force personnel second. For this reason we think there should be a
reasonable time limit set on Field Force service for career personnel. In
addition, and for the same reason, there must be adequate provision in the
work program for Field Force units for training at regular intervals in police
duties as well as in para-military techniques. In so far as transport is con-
cerned we think platoons must be self-sufficient and able to move at short
notice with all necessary equipment and supplies. We are not convinced they
have this capability to a sufficient degree. Although some accommodation has
been provided for Field Force units at various levels, we have the impression
that what has been done has been on an ad hoc basis as far as planning is con-
cerned. Clearly some housing needs to be provided, and should include an
element for married personnel, but the extent of it and the locations for it we
believe require careful planning for the Field Force as part of an overall
Police building program, which we discuss in both Chapter IX and Appendix H.
176. Finally, we have seen some of these units in the field and, having
visited the training school at Dalat, we are strongly of the opinion that what is
needed above all else, to give this admirable unit the cutting edge it should have,
is a cessation or drastic reduction of further expansion so that the necessary
consolidation, particularly the training of platoon and squad leaders, can take
place. We understand the reasons for the rapid expansion of the Field Force
and the heavy strain this has placed upon leaders at all levels. We also under-
stand the reasons why the Dalat training school has so far been unable to play
its full part, particularly in respect to the training and retraining of platoon
and squad leaders. We think that this situation can and should now be remedied.
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(66) the role of the Field Force be set out clearly in Force Standing
Orders;
(67) its deployment by the Commanding General be based solely
upon his assessment of the security need;
(68) it should not be employed on static guard duties,;
(69) there should be adequate provision in the work program of Field
Force units for training at regular intervals in police duties as
well as in para-military techniques;
(70) Field Force platoons should be made self-sufficient in transport so
that movement, with all equipment and supplies, is possible at
short notice;
(71) planning the extent and location of housing for the Field Force
should be carried out as part of the overall police building program;
(72) any further expansion of the Field Force be stopped, or drastically
curtailed, to make possible a period of consolidation during which
platoon and squad leaders can be trained.
178. We have been unable to discover a clear description of the role of the
Marine Police although Decree 161 /SL/AN of 30 October, 196 7, contains a
somewhat vague reference to some of its tasks. There does not seem to be,
either, any discernable method of allocating these units to formations, of
establishing beyond any doubt the responsibility for them or their chain of
command while so allocated, or of differentiating between the tasks of the
Marine Police and those of the Navy when committed to internal security
support roles. It seems to us that the result is doubt and uncertainty at all
levels which, in turn, prevents the maximum advantage being obtained from
the Marine Policee. Lastly, we think that the training provided should place
greater empha.is than it appears to do at present on seamanship skills.
179. It has been made clear to us that there is a need to strengthen officer
ranks so as to improve the quality of Marine Police leadership. We think
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that this is a matter for careful selection and training. As far as the
latter is concerned, it is hoped that Naval training facilities could be made
available when required. We also feel that there is a need to improve the
unit's support facilities by increasing the number of technicians (mechanics
and engineers) now authorised. It is important that these facilities should
be adequate and as efficient as possible if the Marine Police is to be able to
produce a sustained operational performance. One of the impediments to
this, to which our attention has been drawn, is a lack of engine spare parts
which, in some cases, has resulted in boats having to be brought long dis-
tances to the Marine Police headquarters at Phu Xuan for repair. As far as
types of craft with which the unit is equipped are concerned, once the role
is clearly established, it would seem to us necessary to review numbers
and types for the different tasks,
180. We consider that more attention needs to be given to the Marine
Police and that, until this can be clone, particularly in the respects to
which we have drawn attention, the unit should not be expanded further.
(73) the role of the Marine Police should be clearly defined, and
the manner in which it is to be discharged (tasks);
(74) the operational command of the Marine Police should be
clearly stated, and we suggest that this can only be vested
in Commanders of Regions in which Marine Police units are
based, and exercised by them through Police Commanders
of subordinate formations as necessary;
(75) because the unit is of a sp('cialisi nature, provision should
be made for the senior Marine Police officer in a Region to
advise the Region Police Commander on all technical matters;
(76) the officer commanding the Marine Police in the Force be
authorised to withdraw from Regions boats and crews for
maintenance and training as he considers necessary, after
consultation with the Region Police Commanders concerned;
(77) the officer element be strengthened by careful selection and
training;
(78) the number of technicians be increased;
74
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(79) the scaling of spare parts be reviewed;
(80) the numbers and types of craft be reviewed when the role
of the Marine Police has been defined.
182. The numbers and ranks of women police in the Force today are 21
Redactors, 73 Inspectors and 3, 050 Sub-Inspectors, making a total of
3, l44.? The majority of those in the ranks of Redactor and Inspector enjoy
career status; those in the rank of Sub.-Inspector are temporary appoint-
rnents (floating assimilated). We have been assured that the Redactors
+nd Inspectors have all received training at the Police Academy. Those in
temporary appointments have received little or no training, and no plans
.xi=yt at present for giving them any. We understand that the majority of
so`.i.ce.women in the Force are engaged on clerical duties.
'. ;a. We feel that, while it is not surprising to find such large numbers
,of women engaged in clerical work, there is undoubtedly a need for a num-
ber of trained and capable policewomen to perform certain police duties
which can only be done by women. These include the searching of women,
assisting in the investigation of rape, soliciting and prostitution cases, the
care of lost or vagrant children while in police custody and certain other
duties in connection with criminal investigation and Special Police work.
It may be, of course, that the 94 career trained Redactors and Inspectors
who exist now will be sufficient for these purposes although we doubt this.
The duties which trained policewomen will undertake, where they will be
undertaken and the numbers required in each location should therefore first
be worked out clearly, and the total number, by ranks, then required cal-
culated from this.
184. With regard to the requirements of the Force for clerks, we are of
the view that, because of its size, its importance and the need for security
and to orotect it from labour disputes of any kind (strikes, go-slow cam-
paigns and the like) it is necessary that it should continue to have what is
virtually its own clerical service, and that persons employed for this work
(mainly women) should continue to be recruited as temporary police officers.
At National Police headquarters the numbers of temporary women police
employed on clerical work were increased considerably by the introduction
of the Identification Card Service. When this Service has completed the
present issue of identity cards, by the end of this year or early in 1972, it
should be possible to effect a substantial reduction in, or transfer of, the
numbers of temporary women police so employed.
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(81) certain recognisable police duties which we have indicated
in para 183 should be carried out by policewomen;
(82) the duties which trained policewomen will undertake, where
they will be needed and the number required in each location
should be worked out, so that the total requirement, by ranks,
can then be calculated;
(83) for the reasons stated in para 184 the clerical requirements
of the Force should continue to be met by temporary police
who should mainly be women.
186. The Police Force faces a particular problem in respect of these
people because of language (we understand that the Montagnards speak little
or no Vietnamese and have as many as 25 different dialects of their own).
Furthermore, they inhabit a part of the country which is remote, rugged and
in which communications are limited. Small elements live in Regions I and
III, but it is' in the seven provinces of Region II - Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon,
Darlac, Tuyen Duc, Quang Due and Lam Dong - that they constitute a pro-
blem to the Police because of their numbers. The latter has been given to
us as 388, 000, with the caution that it may well be higher.
187. Much is made of the communication difficulty and its effect on the
policing problem in countries which have minorities using their own lan-
guage and not the national language, or tribes with different tribal dialects,
and rightly so. Where such a situation exists the Police Force must employ
in its ranks sufficient numbers of the minority group for it to discharge its
responsibilities satisfactorily. It is important that the police should be
able to understand the people properly, communicate with them effectively
and take into account their customs and characteristics if their trust is to
be gained. We think these general principles apply to the Montagnards and
the Police in Vietnam.
188. At present, out of a total Police strength of 4, 556 in the seven pro-
vinces of Region II mentioned above, only 508 are Montagnards. We regard
this as a good beginning to the establishment of a much higher Montagnard
content in the Police Force in these seven provinces, but emphasise our
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conviction that the aim should be to reach a satisfactory percentage of
Montagnard policemen at the village police station level in Montagnard
areas, as soon as practicable within the particular training resources
available. We think that 75?/ Montagnard policemen in such a station is a
satisfactory percentage. We use the word 'particular' in relation to train-
ing because we understand that Montagnard young men in the numbers re-
quired., possessing the necessary educational qualification for recruitment
into the Force at the bottom level, do not exist. The educational standard
should therefore be lowered, and we have been pleased to learn that the
Commanding General has, in fact, already issued instructions to this
ff'o J-
l89. However, it is as important to use their police status and training
as a means of educating these Montagnards to a realisation that they are
Vietnamese first and Montagnards second, as it is to use them as a means
wher:by the Police can be effective in Montagnard country. For this reason
we .rec:orm-nerd that the basic training course be extended to include a purely
a.4 .atior~;., content, and that the major part of this be tuition in the Viet-
inaYVnc see language and simple expositions of how the Government is con-
structed and works. While it is doubtless necessary at the present time
to limit the use of Montagnard police to the areas from which they have
been recruited, we feel that this should not be made one of their conditions
of service.
190. It may be that the training of these men would best be done at Ban
Me Thuot rather than at the Basic Training Centre at Rach Dua and we feel.
that careful consideration should be given by the Commanding General to
the need for such a separate training establishment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- --------------------
19 1. We recommend that:
(84) the object should be to achieve 75% Montagnard policemen
at the village police station level in Montagnard areas, as
soon as practicable within available training resources;
(85) the Force educational requirement for recruitment at the
bottom level (patrolman) be lowered in the case of Montag-
nard recruits;
(86) their recruit training should be extended to include a purely
educational content, of which the major part should be tuition
in the Vietnamese language and simple expositions of how the
Government is constructed and works;
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(87) the Commanding General should consider the need for a
separate training establishment for this purpose at Ban
Me Thuot.
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ESTABLISHMENT, STRENGTHS,
RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND RANKS
192. The authorised establishment of the Force is the total number of
police by ranks approved by the government. Strength is the existing
number by ranks at any given time. The establishment must be calculated
by reference to the organisation, role and duties starting at police station
level and working up. It cannot be precisely calculated by a rough rule of
thumb method related to population numbers and area sizes using an arbi-
trary ratio, although admittedly in present circumstances this does provide
some guide. It should be calculated on the normal and not on the emer-
gency requirements, so as to give the number of men, by ranks, necessary
to carry out the Police task.
193. The establishment of the Force should be constructed by numbers
in each rank and unit so that every individual can be accounted for, in the
sense of being necessary, and so that there is an established post for
every member of the Force in each rank with the individual knowing his
own position and responsibilities. Police Commanders down to province
level should be given an opportunity to express their views when increases
or decreases of an establishment are being considered, or when redeploy-
ment of existing manpower is being planned. The establishment system
will then permit efficient control of police manpower as a whole and will
enable recruitment, training and promotion to be planned methodically
and sensibly according to pre-determined programs. In the light of our
proposals for re-organisation we appreciate that it may take 1 - 2 years
to work out an acceptable authorised establishment, although we think
that an approximate one could be arrived at in a matter of 6 - 9 months
after the organisation has been agreed.
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194. Without the establishment study suggested above we cannot
possibly give a precise figure for the regular establishment. of the
whole Force, but taking into account the abnormal features of South
Vietnam, such as the long borders and coastline and the extensive
waterways, we think that the figure is likely to be between '70, 000
and 80, 000, of which about 12% would be officers.
195. We recognise that, in time of emergency, the regular establish-
ment needs to be expanded by temporary recruitment. We are, how-
ever, unanimously opposed to the present plans to increase the Force
to 122, 000 this year by an intake of approximately 34, 000 and to
increase it to 160, 000 by 1973. The great majority of these cannot
fail to be of low standard and their subsequent training quite inadequate.
They will have to be got rid of later and much effort will have been
wasted on them. The Force, particularly if it is going through a re-
organisation, could not possibly absorb this number without being in
a worse state at the end of 1971 than it is now. Its further expansion
should therefore stop.
196. The same considerations equally apply to the proposal to take
2, 050 ARVN officers and aspirants. Moreover, we consider the
intention to deploy the great majority of these officers down to village
police stations to be positively harmful. Many such stations are work-
ing well under policemen with several years service and the insertion
of an outside inexperienced aspirant would cause considerable local
resentment; nor would it be likely to improve those stations which are
not yet working so well.
197. Rather than increase the Force by further mass recruiting we
consider that the emphasis should now be on quality rather than quantity
(see para 204). At the same time action should be taken to dispense with
some of those who are unlikely to achieve career status. In this way
the strength of the Force could be stabilised this year at 100, 000 or
below.
198. It should be noted that, if our recommendations for re-organisation
are accepted, there will be several thousand men, now performing purely
administrative tasks which are no longer necessary in various head-
quarters throughout the country, available for redeployment and more
active duty.
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199. Another step which should be taken as part of the whole process
of re-organisation is the identification, among the whole range of police
duties now being performed, of those which are of a temporary nature
only and which arise from the present emergency situation. We have in
mind static guards and similar duties, which do not require the services
of a fully trained policeman but in which it is important, for reasons of
control and co-ordination, that the men performing them should be under
police command. The temporary nature of these duties, and their dis-
tinction from the permanent duties of the regular Force, would be clearly
shown if they were allocated to men who were separately recruited and
trained as Auxiliary Police.
200. It would be necessary to provide authority in the Police Statute
for the engagement of such police in such numbers as were considered
necessary, on a full time paid but temporary basis. The Statute should
also define their role and powers. As soon as legislation is enacted and
as part of the process of re-organisation, it would be logical to transfer
existing temporary policemen, engaged in duties such as we have out-
lined above, to Auxiliary Police status. Furthermore, while the con-
tinued employment of temporaries is necessary, both to allow time for
the build-up of an all career Police Force, and to meet fluctuations in
the Force requirement for temporary manpower, their recruitment should
be confined to Auxiliary Police.
201. It is most important in our view that the numbers of Auxiliary
Police be strictly limited so that the problem of controlling and support-
ing them does not place too great a burden on Police Commanders. If it
should become necessary for any reason to increase the Auxiliary Police
strength substantially, such as the inclusion in it of a large proportion
of existing Popular Forces in anticipation of a cease-fire, then the
Auxiliary Police should. be constituted as a separate arm of the Force
but still under the command of the Commanding General.
202. What we have said in the context of Auxiliary Police applies in.
emergency conditions. However, a Police Force should always have a
reserve which it can call upon to augment police formations whenever
necessary in the discharge of its normal duties. This is usually a
voluntary organisation composed of men recruited in their own locality
and used for very short periods (perhaps a few hours a week) to augment
the strength of their local police station. Recruitment to such an organ-
isation, known as the Police Volunteer Reserve, should be open to armed
members of the PSDF.
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203. We therefore recommend that:
(88) present plans to increase the Force to 124, 050 this year
and to 160, 000 by 1973 should be abandoned;
(89) a study should be made over the next two years to decide
the precise regular authorised establishment of the Force;
(90) until this. is completed a career status planning figure of
about 75, 000 should be accepted;
(91) to meet emergency requirements the strength of the Force
should remain above this figure but not in excess of
100, 000;
(92) provision should be made in the Statute for Auxiliary
Police;
(93) the number of those not likely to achieve career status
should be gradually reduced over the next few years (or
transferred to Auxiliary Police), as career police are
recruited;
(94) consideration should be given to the establishment of a
Police Volunteer Reserve, to which members of the
PSDF might be recruited.
RECRUITING
204. Of all the subjects in our report we regard recruiting policy as
of the greatest importance both in respect. of quality and nurnbers. Un-
like a soldier who is a member of a unit and acting at almost all times
under direct orders, a policeman is normally exercising his responsi-
bility under the law on his own initiative. The standard laid down for
police recruiting into the lowest rank should, therefore, be higher than
that for the Army. Numbers should be related to the Force level re-
quired to carry out the role and to cover casualties, leave, sickness
and training commitments. Recruitment for all branches of the Force
must be in accordance with policy laic] clown by the Commanding General
for all levels within the authorised establishment. The rate of recruit-
ment must also be regulated by the training capacity, which in its turn
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should be designed to produce quality and never stretched to produce
quantity only. Capacity, in this sense, is related not only to accommo-
dation and feeding but also to the instructor/ student ratio and size of
classes.
205. Recruitment also has to be made at higher levels than the lowest
if the objective of quality is to be achieved. ? This is because:
(a) it is the only means of attracting academically highly
qualified candidates who would not be interested in
serving in the lowest rank;
(b) it is one means of achieving quality more quickly in the
middle and senior ranks of the Force;
(c) it is necessary for the staffing of the Special Police,
which requires recruits of good academic standards and
a higher percentage of officers.
206. We do not particularly care for the present system whereby
officers'-can be recruited at several levels depending on their academic
qualifications. This leads to a situation where a young man with, for
example, a law degree can find himself in a comparatively senior
appointment without any police experience at all. He then becomes
reliant mainly on his junior officers to guide him in his duties, which
is neither good for him nor for the morale of those below or equivalent
to him with vastly more experience. We, therefore, consider that
there should be only one point of direct officer entry at 2nd Lieutenant
(on probation) with a minimum academic qualification. If an individual
has a higher qualification, so much the better. It should, when he
acquires experience and develops leadership qualities, make him eli-
gible for accelerated promotion.
207. Nevertheless, at the present time and for a limited period,
there may be a need for direct recruitment at Police Major level,
This should be strictly controlled to the need of the Force for more
officers at this rank and to avoid blocking the promotion of promising
officers of Police Captain's rank. In addition, there are two special
categories, which will be the exception and should not affect general
policy:
(a) Military officers, at present serving with the Force, if
suitably experienced and otherwise qualified, should be
offered the choice of joining the Police Force at an
equivalent level of seniority to their present military
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rank. If they chose to remain military, their services
should be temporarily retained until they can be replaced
by a suitable police officer.
(b) There will need to be some specialist recruitment, which
may be for limited engagements, from both the Armed
Forces and civilian employment for such services as
NPFF,Marine Police, Communications, Transport,
Logistics, etc.
208. We appreciate that in the past the Police Force has had to take
what it could get when it could get it; this has led to the erratic expansion
of the Force with recruits mainly of poor quality which, in our view, is
one of the chief reasons for the present low standard of the Force as a
whole. Annual recruiting should normally be a comparatively even and
steady process to replace wastage with emphasis on quality to ensure
that training assets are not wasted and that the whole administrative
machine is not overloaded. This is the planning responsibility of the
Directorate of Personnel. Such annual recruiting will require a drastic
change of policy on the part of the Government of Vietnam, but we feel
that, if account is taken of our earlier recommendations with regard to
strengths' and re-organisation, a new policy could be initiated immediately
whereby police recruiting of the required academic, physical and security
standards could be limited to a total of about 6, 000 policemen and police-
women and'about 600 officers annually (which in present circumstances
would not unduly compete with other Forces). All of these recruits
should, after a period of probation of not less than two years, be of
career status. If this policy could be adopted for five years with little
annual variation, then this intake combined with those already of, or
becoming eligible for, career status would provide for a Force, the
greater majority of which would be composed of qualified professional
policemen. We have in mind that by the end of 1975 the career status
element of the Force should be approaching 65, 000, thereby leaving some
room for manoeuvre before the Force attains its final authorised career
strength level.
209. Recruitment should be directed at obtaining the best possible
material to meet police standards of education and physique. As the
situation and the prestige of the Police Force improve, and the Force
becomes a more attractive career, standards should be constantly
reviewed and raised. Every effort should be made through the news
media to promote recruiting well in advance of the target date. The
essence of good recruiting is not so much to appeal to the population
to join, but to spell out the advantages of a police career. Recruiting
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officers should visit schools and universities to explain the Police to
students as a career prospect, especially for direct officer entrants.
A high quality in the Force will continue to attract a high quality.
(95) suitably high standards should be laid down for normal
career recruitment to the Force at the level of patrolman
and 2nd Lieutenant;
(96) apart from limited direct recruitment to Police Major
level, the only other exceptions should be certain
specialist appointments and suitable military officers
now serving with the Force, who wish.to transfer;
(97) recruiting for the remainder of the 34, 000 and 2, 050
ARVN officers planned this year should be cancelled
immediately;
{ 9,8) instead only about 6, 000 patrolmen and 600 officers
suitable for career status (in accordance with standards)
should be recruited annually (i. e. , about half this num
ber might be recruited in the latter half of this year);
(99) even and steady annual recruiting of similiar numbers
should be continued until 1975;
(100) thereafter recruiting should be confined to the annual
wastage rate plus that required to reach the final
authorised establishment of the Force.
TRAINING - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
211. The efficiency of training is reflected in the efficiency of the
Force, and we consider that, in the improving situation, the time has
come to move towards a greater emphasis on professional police train-
ing. The object should be to train the individual to take individual
responsibility with a sound knowledge of his profession. It should also
be borne in mind that basic police training is the first encounter a re-
cruit-has with his new profession, and that it will leave a lasting im-
pression on him.
212. It is for the Commanding General of the Force to decide who is
to be trained, how, when and where. To enable him to do this there
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should be a Training Service under the Director. of Personnel and Train-
ing with four bureaux to deal with basic, refresher, promotion (including
advanced) and specialist training. The last will coordinate CID, Marine
Police, Field Force, Transport and Radio. All police, including those
in specialist branches, should do normal basic, refresher and promotion
training.
213. For instruction to be effective the normal class should not be
more than 30 students. Although we appreciate that for some time this
figure may have to be exceeded, we hope that classes can gradually be
reduced to this level. Classes of over 50 are for most students com-
pletely unproductive. It is also generally accepted that a student retains
more of what he is taught if the teaching method is practical and visual
rather than one of lectures. There should be more practical demon-
strations, in which students can play a part. At the basic training centre,
for example, there should be a model police station for this purpose. The
content of courses needs: to be re-designed to give the student more know-
ledge of police work and law at the expense of the existing high percentage
of time devoted to the military aspect (weapons, tactics, tae-kwon-do,
and drill). It should also be recognised that there is an absorption level
beyond which instruction becomes.counter-productive. Courses need
therefore-to be well-balanced and to include organised leisure pursuits.
214. Instructors should be trained and experienced police officers
before being trained to teach. The value of good instructors to the Force
should be recognised. They should receive a specialist allowance and
their career prospects must remain unaffected. There should be a regular
exchange. of instructors and no one should be retained too long. They should
be encouraged to contribute their views on the training program and should
have opportunities of meeting with senior field officers to review training
-results, as shown by performances on the ground. There should be a
feed-back to training centres of new methods and techniques evolved in
the field which may be worth incorporating in programs. For this pur-
pose there should also-be lively and inquisitive research section in the
Personnel and Training Directorate at National Police headquarters.
215. Training will.be uneconomic unless facilities for efficient admin-
istration and adequate security exist at training centres so that instructor
and student are undisturbed and able to get on with their program. These
facilities should cover accommodation, messing, medical, welfare,
recreation, transport, communications, training aids and security. High
priority should be given to providing housing for instructors at training
centres, and in particular at the Academy. Above all, students and
instructors should not be responsible for defence and security. If they
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are, it cannot fail to interfere with training and, in certain circumstances
could be positively dangerous (for example, if basic training were carried
out at Dalat). ,.
TRAINING CENTRES
-------------------
RACH DUA
216. At Rach Dua the two adjacent training schools should be placed
under the overall command of one Commandant with a Deputy for the
immediate command of each. This will reduce administrative overheads
slightly and' may improve control and direction. As at present, one
school should deal with all basic recruit training, and the other mainly
with refresher and promotion training for the lower ranks (patrolman to
adjutant). The, best basic training course we think would be of about
5-1/2 months :duration and be held twice a year for 2, 000 recruits each
(of course, the ideal would be a 6 - 8 month course for a lesser number,
but we realise this must be postponed). Meanwhile, to meet the higher
figure required for career status recruits over the next few years we
suggest three 16 week courses of 2, 000 each annually. The advanced
training centre could then be devoted to two refresher or promotion
courses annually of 8 weeks duration separately for patrolmen, for ser-
geants and for adjutants. Refresher training courses for police station
commanders would later be included. It might also be used for the basic
training of women police lower ranks.
REFRESHER TRAINING AT REGIONAL LEVEL
-------------------------------------------
217. Refresher training for lower ranks at Regional Training Centres
should be divided between refresher training for sergeants and adjutants
in charge of village police stations and refresher training for patrolmen.
After an initial special course of 4 - 6 weeks for all the former, which we
regard as most important in establishing uniform and correct station pro-
cedures and duties, such courses would then become a limited annual
commitment and should be carried out at Rach Dua. Regional centres
would then be able to concentrate entirely on refresher courses for patrol-
men. The ideal would be that every career patrolman should receive an
8 week refresher course at least every 5 years. Unless the capacity of
the centres is expanded further, this would be impossible on the present or
proposed strengths. We suggest, therefore, that the length of courses
should be reduced during the next few years to 4 - 6 weeks.
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218. Certain branches have their own specialist training centres
(Special Police, Field Force and Marine Police). There is also special-
ist training for drivers, radio operators, etc. All this must continue.
The only point we wish to stress again is that all these specialists are,
policemen and must therefore receive normal basic, refresher and pro-
motion training.
POLICE ACADEMY
-----------------
219. All officer training whether by direct entry or by promotion from
the lower ranks should be undertaken at the Police Academy with the
duration and syllabi of the courses geared to the requirement of each
category. In view of the overall capacity of the Academy it will be possi-
ble to organise additional courses running concurrently with those men-
tioned above. These should include:
(a) officer promotion courses up to and including the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel;
(b) advanced officer training at all levels;
(c) administrative and staff training;
(d) senior officer seminars;
(e) Judicial Police training for officers and sergeants;
(f) instructors at both officer and lower rank levels.
We are certain that the Academy when finally completed will be one of the
greatest assets of the Force. It must set the officer standards and tone.
RECOMMENDATIONS
220. We recommend that:
(101) classes at Training Centres should be gradually reduced to
30 with more use being made of visual aids and practical
demonstrations and a greater emphasis on police work and
law;
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(102) experienced police officers should be trained as instructors
and receive a special allowance;
(103) great attention should be paid to facilities at training centres
including security, so that programs. are not interefered
with;
(104) the training schools at Rach Dua should be combined under
one Commandant and the courses proposed in para 216
introduced;
(105) at Regional training centres there should be an initial
special course for those in charge of village police stations
but, subsequently, such courses should be run at Rach Dua;,
(106) Regional training centres should then concentrate on re-
fresher training for patrolmen;
(107) specialist training centres and courses should continue but
all specialists should receive normal basic, refresher and
promotion training;
(10$),., all officer, and certain lower rank (promotion to officer.,
instructor and judicial), training should be carried out at
the Police Academy.
RANKS
221. The existing rank structure is a relic of the colonial past and in
our view. fresh proposals contained in the latest draft.Statute do not suffic-
iently getaway from this. They are also extremely complicated with classes
within ranks and very long incremental scales. The simpler a rank structure
the better. Moreover, a rank is a rank and should not be. subdivided into
classes. We would have preferred a civilian structure, but appreciate that
suitable Vietnamese terms are not available. We, therefore, accept that
military. ranks with. the prefix 'Police' are probably the best solution. They
emphasize the.chain of command, which is essential to ensure the economic
useof manpower and its discipline, and establish the authority of an officer
in relation to, his post and responsibilities.
222. Taking into account the strengths, responsibility and roles of the
Police ,we consider, that the Commanding General should be a Police Lieut-
General (three star). The remaining officer ranks will then be:
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Police Major-General
Police Brigadier-General
Police Colonel
Police Lieut-Colonel
Police Major
Police Captain
Police Lieutenant
Police 2nd Lieutenant (on probation).
There should be no classes within these ranks and the incremental scales
for each rank should be the same as for the Army which we understand are:
2nd Lieutenant
Initial point + 2 increments
Lieutenant
If "
+ 3
Captain
It "
+ 4
Major
"
+ 3
Lieut-Colonel
It
+ 3
Colonel
It
+ 4
B rigadier-General
Fixed
Major-General
Lieut-General
Initial point + 1
We attach at Appendix P a correlation between the existing and proposed
rank titles.
223. We deal with promotion in the next chapter but promotions should
depend on there being vacancies in the next higher rank. An officer who
remains on the top incremental scale of his rank for seven years and is
not then promoted 'should be given the opportunity to retire. An officer
with not less than 6 months service in a rank should be granted paid acting
rank in a duty post carrying a higher rank which should not he more than
one rank above his. substantive rank. A successful period of acting rank
would be one of the factors to be taken into account when promotions are
being considered.
224 With regard to lower ranks, we consider that there should be three
ranks of Adjutant, Sergeant and Patrolman. We would not object to there
being one higher rank above that of Adjutant, which might be called Adjutant
Major and could be used for certain specialist and technical appointments
or to reward those with long and faithful service who have no prospect of
promotion to officer.
225. Ranks should be allocated to all police duty posts in accordance with
the responsibilities of the posts and at the same time a study should be made
of suitable rank insignia which should approximate to those of the Army in
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order to indicate the standing of the officer. In precedence a Police officer
should rank with a military officer of the same rank.
a completely new rank structure, using military terminology
with the prefix 'Police', should be instituted;
(110) ranks should be allocated to all duty posts in accordance
with the responsibilities of the posts;
(111) in the order of precedence Police officers should rank with
RVNAF officers of equivalent rank.
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CHAPTER IX
PAY AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
227. We appreciate that there can be no change in the basic rates of
.police pay or in allowances except in so far as it may be necessary to
adjust them to, meet the new rank structure. Although police pay is gen-
erally ;low, . which leads to many problems and abuses, it must obviously
be. equated to the general rates which apply to the Armed Forces and Civil
Service. We note that there are innumerable allowances which impose a
heavy administrative burden in calculating pay. This is a matter for an
"overall salary and wage review within the Government and is not solely
confined to the Police, There are, however, a number of areas where
benefits which are applicable to the Armed Forces might also be applied
now to the Police.
228. In this respect the major issue is the pay differential between career
status, daily and floating assimilated which does not apply in the Armed
Forces as between regulars and reservists. As a matter of principle we
consider that all those, whether career or temporary, in the same rank
and doing the same job should be paid at the same rate.. The only advan-
tage accruing to those of career status should be their pension entitlement
and other retirement benefits. Those temporarily engaged should also be
entitled to the same annual increments for their rank and to promotion, as
well as to consideration for transfer to career status.
OTHER BENEFITS
2Z9. With regard to disability pensions and pensions for dependents of
thosekilled in action, we consider that these should be on the same basis
for-the Police Force as for RVNAF, including a quarterly support payment
and continued medical benefits for dependents.
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230. Otherwise, medical benefits for both Police Force and RVNAF
are similar. We do, however, think that local arrangements should be
made, especially for battle casualties, for police to be accommodated
in military hospitals where these are more accessible. Dental care
should also be made available to police dependents as for RVNAF.
231. As with ARVN the Police should receive free rations when on
operations (this will mainly apply to the Field Force). Everything possible
should be done to improve the food provided for recruits under basic
training. The Government contribution should at least cover a free issue
of rice, sugar, salt and tea. At the end of his basic training a recruit's
weight should have increased by an average of 3 kilos.
232. We understand that, beginning in March, 1971, RVNAF will receive
a rations supplement (of 1 tin of fish, 2 meat, 112 poultry and 1/2 short-
ening a month) at a cost to the United States Government of $53 a man in
the first year, decreasing to 70%r contribution in the second year and 30%r
contribution in the third, by which time ARVN is expected to have built
up its farm program for supplemental rations. We make no recommen-
dations with regard to the Police on this subject. It is a matter for the
Government to raise with the United States Government. A case might he
made out for a similar program to be implemented, at least in the case of
students at police training establishments.
233. We do, however, consider that Commissary services should he
extended to cover the Police Force. We understand that, because of bulk
purchases, etc. , the Commissary is able to sell items at 20-30'/, below
the market rate. This saves a bachelor approximately 800 Ps and a
married man 1600 Ps a month. To bring the Police in would need a sub-
stantial Government loan to finance increased stocks. We feel that this
benefit-would do much to improve police morale and to indicate Govern-
ment support for the Police. We are not, however, in favour of the
Commissary being exempt from normal taxation on its supplies as this
can lead to abuse.
234. Quite one of the most important benefits which must be considered
is the provision of housing. We understand that there is a joint GVN/US
plan to build 200, 000 dependent quarters for RVNAF over the next 8 years.
We consider that a similar program should be worked out for the Police
to build approximately -40, 000 quarters over 10 years (this can be reviewed
and extended further in subsequent years). Quite apart from the pecuniary
and morale advantages gained from the provision of dependent quarters,
there are a number of other good reasons for such a program. Police
are required to serve anywhere in the country and cannot therefore be
expected to purchase their own houses. They are also, especially in large
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towns, subject to pressures and even intimidation through their families.
There is a, further advantage in having quarters close to or preferably at
police stations in that, in the event of an emergency, men can.rapidly. be
recalled to duty. While any housing program should be flexible, we feel
that first priority should be given to quarters in the,lar.ge towns, and
especially Saigon. (This also helps to relieve pressure on ac.commoda
tion for the urban poor.). If village policemen are serving in their native
locality they are more likely to be able to live in family houses, but there
may be remote .villages and districts where the program should be given
a higher priority. While much might be done in the construction of Police
buildings .under a self-help program with materials- only being provided,
there,will be a.case on economic grounds in urban areas for a contractual
program; both as a means of stimulating employment and. maintaining a
local construction capacity.
235., With,r,egard to uniforms we consider that all lower ranks (patrol-
man,, sergeant,, adjutant) should be provided with free uniforrn.complete in
every ;particular and not just with, material as at present. Damage, result-
ing in. excessive issues to an individual, may be a case for, disciplinary
action and a fine. Officers (2nd Lieutenant and above) when initially re
.cruited should receive. an issue of two uniforms but, thereafter,, should
receive a uniform allowance and purchase .their own. Operational uniforms
shouldbe.a freeissue to all ranks (as in NPFF).
236. Except in the cases of the Field Force and Marine Police, we do
not regard the present colours and cloth of uniform as very suitable. The
white and grey show dirt too easily and are too conspicuous for night patrolling.
On the other hand we would not propose jungle green as we feel that the Police
should, have a distinctive uniform. We suggest a khaki, a dark grey or a blue.
Long sleeved shirts should be provided for night duty. What is required is a
smart new look. A smart Police Force may not be efficient but an efficient
Police Force is always smart.
CONDITIONS. OF SERVICE
237.. As a separate Command of armed and uniformed men, the con-
ditions of service of. the Police Force should be laid down by regulations
made by the-Prime Minister under the Police Statute with certain safe-
guarding principles in the Statute. In some particulars, such as pension
entitlement, retiring age, other retirement benefits, leave, transfer
expenses, medical attention, etc. , the conditions of service should be the
same as.for the Civil Service or RVNAF. But in two respects - discipline
and promotion - they must be distinct and clearly defined.
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238. At present, with regard to discipline, all police are subject only
to the disciplinary code applied to all government servants under Ordinance
No. 9 of 14 July 1950. Article 45 sets out the punishments which may be
awarded for violations of the code. A Director-General (now the Police
Commanding General) may only warn and reprimand. For other punish-
ments he may only make proposals to the Ministry of the Interior. This
is quite inadequate and unacceptable. The exercise of discipline is an
integral part of the command and control of the Police Force. No Force
will be efficient when the discipline, and punishment, of its members is
exercised through officials other than police officers. Moreover, in view
of the public responsibility borne by the Force, the conduct of its members
should be impeccable. This requires a strict code of discipline admin-
istered by a fair, just procedure conducted through the Force's own officers.
239. The pattern of conduct and behaviour of any policeman at any level
is governed by two factors; a code of discipline enforced by law and a code
of self-discipline which is developed and guided by moral ethics and en-
vironmental conditions. The upholding of a high standard of discipline in
its widest sense will correspondingly affect police performance from the
most senior ranks to the most junior recruit. Disciplinary, procedures are
a safeguard for the Force's reputation and performance and enable each
case to be judged solely on its merits. Punishment is not an end in itself;
it is a method for rectifying what has gone wrong so far as the individual
is concerned, deters repetition and warns others.
240. To provide for discipline there must be:
(a) a code of discipline for all ranks of the Police, which
itemises the offences with which a police officer can be
charged;
(b) a list of punishments which can be awarded, differcnti.ating
between major and minor, with the code also indicatin.; how
these may be expunged from the individual's record;
a clearly defined procedure for the conduct of an enquiry
into a disciplinary offence, the recording of evidence and
the summoning of witnesses, the rights of the accused and
the avenues of appeal against sentence;
(d) provision in the procedure for an officer investigating an
offence against discipline to refer the case to a more.
senior officer if in his opinion:
(i) the case is of such gravity that his powers of punish-
ment are inadequate;
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by reason of the accused's previous offences against
discipline he cannot adequately punish the officer
charged.
241. It is normal for provision to be made under a Police Statute for the,
Commanding General to be able to reduce in rank or dismiss from the Force
any member below the rank of officer convicted of a criminal offence without
further disciplinary enquiry, provided that the policeman so dismissed has
power of appeal to ministerial level. It is also normal to include powers for
the Commanding General to suspend punishment and to recover fines by deduc-
tion from salary, and by the same means, the cost or part of the cost of police
property lost or damaged by negligence.
242., With regard to promotion the only basis on which it can be made is on
merit which.is a combination of character, experience; ability and professional
competence. Only officers of the Force are in a position to assess these
factors, which far outweigh any academic qualifications.
243. It is. normal practice for the promoting and appointing authorities to
be the same. Nevertheless, while emphasising the natural competence of a
police authority to assess the four criteria above,. the, importance of the re-
sponsibilities discharged by senior police officers is such that ministerial
approval for promotion is a desirable safeguard. This means that the Com-
mandingGeneral, through a system of Police Promotion Boards, should
recommend to the Prime Minister appointments and promotions to the rank
of Major and above. As far as the posts of Commanding General, Deputy
Commanding General, Director of Special Police and the Police Region Corn-
manders are concerned, appointments should be made by the President on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister, and the promotion of officers above
the rank of, Colonel should be similarly made.
244. The Commanding General should be the sole authority for the appoint-
ment of patrolmen and promotion, within the vacancies available, to the ranks
of sergeant, adjutant, lieutenant and captain. There must, of course, be a
practical system within the Force for the selection of candidates, both officer
and lower ranks, for promotion training and promotion. This system must
provide formations below national level with an opportunity to produce their
candidates.
245. Within the overall rank structure there should be only three promotion
examination bars:
from lower rank to officer
from Captain to Major
from Lieut-Colonel to Colonel
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Promotion examination bars should normally involve a course at the
Police Academy, followed by an examination. Otherwise promotion should
be on merit (as we stated in para 242) in accordance with vacancies in the
next higher rank. We wish to stress the point that any person with the
qualifications to become a 2nd Lieutenant, provided that he subsequently
passes the promotion examinations and has the necessary qualities, can
attain the highest ranks in the Force including that of Commanding General.
(112) the pay differential between career and temporary police
personnel should be abolished and the latter brought up to
the rates of the former;
(113) disability pensions and pensions for dependents of those
killed in action should be the same as those for RVNAF,
including a quarterly support payment and continued
medical benefits for dependents;
(114) local arrangements should be made to accommodate police
in military hospitals where these are more accessible,
especially in the case of battle casualties;
(115) police should receive free rations when on operations;
(116) the food provided for recruits on basic training courses
should be improved and the Government's contribution should
at least cover a free issue of rice, sugar, salt and tea;
(117) the RVNAF Commissary service should be extended to
include the Police, but the Commissary should not be exempt
from normal taxation on its supplies;
(118) a program to build 40, 000 quarters for the Police over the
next 10 years should be worked out, and first priority
given to Saigon and other large towns for such housing;
(119) patrolmen, sergeants and adjutants should be provided with
free uniforms but officers should get only an initial issue of
two uniforms, with a uniform allowance thereafter, except
that operational uniforms should be a free issue to all ranks;
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(120) the Police should have a new, smart distinctive uniform;
(121) in several respects police conditions of service should be
similar to those of the Civil Service but in two respects,
discipline and promotion, they must be distinct and peculiar
to the Police alone and be clearly defined in Regulations
made under the Police Statute;
(122) the sole basis for promotion should be merit as shown by
a combination of character, experience, ability and pro-
fessional competence;
(123) the promotion of officers to the rank of Major and above
should be made by the Prime Minister on the recommendation
of the Commanding General after processing by appropriate
machinery which should be established for the purpose;
(124) appointments to duty posts carrying the rank of Police
Brigadier-General and above should be made by the Presi-
dent on the recommendation of the Prime Minister;
(125) the appointment of patrolmen, and promotion to the ranks
of sergeant, adjutant, lieutenant and captain should be made
by the Commanding General, after appropriate machinery
within the Force has been established to select candidates,
including provision for formations below national headquarters
level to make recommendations;
(126) there should be only three promotion examination bars (from
lower rank to officer, from Captain to Major and from Lieut-
Colonel to Colonel) which should involve an examination after
a promotion course at the Police A cadency.
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C A P I T A L P O L I C E R E G I O N
SAIGON MUNICIPAL POLICE DIRECTORATE - ORGANISATION AND CONTROL
247. From the point of view of peace and good order in the country the
policing of Saigon is of prime importance. It is critical that command and
control in the capital is right and effective, particularly in view of the Com-
munist strategy set out in COSVN 9 and 14.
248. In addressing ourselves to this problem we re-emphasize our main
principle that the police station is the basic unit of the Police Force and that
it is at this level, more than at any other, that the police come into contact
with the public (para 30).
249. In Chapter VI on the Special Police we make reference to the fact that
it is through the population that the main communist threat to the Government
will be mounted. It follows that in densely populated areas such as Saigon it
is essential that the machinery for law enforcement is effective but not harsh.
250. We recognise that the burden of responsibility of the Police in the
Capital equates with that of a Region. In fact the existing organisation in the
City is already equivalent to that in a Region. The only real difference is in
description in that for Regional Directorate read Metropolitan Directorate,
for Province read Precinct and for District read Sub-Precinct. A small start
has been made in establishing a counterpart of the village police station in
the City. There is one major difference, however, between the Police organi-
sation in a Region and that in Saigon; it is one of distance and time. In the
Regions the extent of territory and spread of population inevitably require that
the basic Police units are widely dispersed. This dictates that headquarters
support should be provided at Region, Province and District levels in the
shape and size that we have set out. Distance and time do not apply in this
sense in Saigon. This has not been recognised and there is, as a result, a
maximum of police working in the various headquarters offices throughout
the city and a minimum working in close contact with the public, which is
what we believe the police function to be. We are unable to produce exact
figures, but consider from what we have seen that, expressed in percentages,
70% are in the former category and only 300/c in the latter. Such a state of
affairs is unacceptable.
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251. It may be argued that mobile patrols of one policeman on a motor
cycle are a substitute for the policeman on the beat, but we do not accept
this. There is certainly a need for a number of mobile patrols, particularly
at night, when police mobility is often necessary and the streets are deserted.
However, in our view the policeman on the beat (on foot) is as basic to the
police station as the station is to the Force, in the sense that it is the police-
man more than any other who is the outward and visible sign of a police
presence in the locality and the man to whom the public should turn for help
in the first instance. Police checks by night of the house registration system
do not achieve this end and can be counter-productive in that they may have
an unfortunate effect on relations between the police and the public. While
we recognise that checks of this nature are necessary on a selective basis
and with a particular purpose in view, they should not be allowed to become
a routine police duty.
252. We have given the problem of policing the Capital very careful thought
and have reached the conclusion that a satisfactory means of ensuring effect-
iveness is to reconstruct the present sub-precinct headquarters as a police
station. We realise that, for the police station to be able to have full coverage
of the area for which it is responsible, it is necessary for the present policy
of establishing police posts below this level to continue and, if possible, to
be accelerated. These posts will, of course, be under the control of the
officers in charge of the police stations concerned (the old sub-precincts).
253. The logical extension of such a move in this particular environment
is that, so far as is practicable, the present Precinct headquarters should be
regarded primarily as having an operational support role to play towards the
police station. To do this we think that, in certain administrative procedures
such as pay, accounting, personnel records, training and logistics, the
police stations can deal direct with the Headquarters of the Saigon Municipal
Police. We are satisfied that this proposal makes sound administrative
sense. More important, we know it will make available for active duty a
sizeable number of trained policemen at present engaged on administrative
tasks. There will have to be some departure from absolute adherence to
this pattern because for the purpose of command at Precinct headquarters
some staff functions will still be necessary. This organisation means that
a Precinct headquarters will be in a police station area. Ideally, for reasons
of economy, such headquarters should be housed in different parts of the
same building or collection of buildings as the police station, although we
appreciate that this may not always be feasible.
OPERATIONS /INFORMATION ROOMS
254. Just in the same way as we have recommended the establishment of
Operations /Information Rooms at National Police headquarters and all sub-
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ordinate formation headquarters (see para 49), so this facility must be pro-
vided at City, Precinct and Station levels in Saigon.
255. We appreciate that there are sound reasons for the Traffic Police
in Saigon continuing to be a separate Precinct which is in fact a part of
Saigon Municipal Police Headquarters. However, there are certain points
relating to traffic police activity which require special mention:
(a) They should be relieved of any responsibility for the regis-
tration of motorbikes and motorcycles (see para 73).
(b) They should not be placed in the position of having to adjudi-
cate where persons accused of minor traffic infringements,
liable to a fixed cash fine, refuse to admit liability to pay.
This is a function of the courts.
(c) The volume of traffic offences in the City is such that we feel
there is reason to consider the establishment of a separate
Traffic Court. We have been told that one difficulty faced at
the moment is the inability of the Traffic Police to maintain
a simple record of offenders dealt with by the courts, because
the results of cases sometimes take as much as a year to
reach them. The establishment of a separate Traffic Court
might solve this problem.
256. Policing the harbour has been the responsibility of a separate Har-
bour Police Precinct for many years and still is. Until recently, this Pre-
cinct was equipped with a number of boats for its use on the harbour waters.
These have now been taken over by the Marine Police from whom the Harbour
Police have to indent for their requirements daily. We were told that the
requirement was not always met in full and it was clear to us that this change
has been accompanied by friction between the Harbour and the Marine Police.
Our view is that there is no justification for a special unit to police the har-
bour and its immediate shore line. The land area falls quite naturally into
one police station area or another and the harbour, or canal waters contig-
uous to this land area, should also come within the same jurisdiction. For
policing the harbour and canals the police stations concerned $hould be
allocated a Marine Police element. In our view this element would be better
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off with boats of a type more suited to the purpose than the "interceptor"
boats currently used on Saigon waters by the Marine Police. The latter are
capable of high speed, which ordinarily we believe is unnecessary, and are
expensive to run and maintain. We think that a boat of more modest pro-
portions would be more practical and that a suitable design could doubtless
be produced locally. Our conclusion is that the Harbour Precinct, as a
separate unit, should be abolish-ed.
257. We visited the Airport Police Precinct and were disturbed by the
high proportion of manpower engaged on unproductive static guard duties,
either within the Precinct headquarters compound itself or on gates within the
general area of the airport, or on accounts work and immigration duties.
The figures on the day of our visit were 96, 28 and 56 respectively out of a
total strength of 329. Moreover, some 20 more were on duty at the airport
passenger terminal in Saigon City (in our view a rather odd responsibility
for this Precinct to have to undertake), which further reduced the men avail-
able for the policing requirements of the public using the airport.
258. With regard to the general security requirement of the whole area of
the airport, we feel that the Police of this Precinct should not be required
to undertake this responsibility. We consider that, while the present security
situation persists, this is a military task which should be undertaken by mili-
tary forces. The Police, naturally, would continue to be responsible for the
safety of their own Precinct headquarters.
259. With regard to the Immigration Department duties at present per-
formed by the Police, we have already made our views clear in paras 81
to 82. This is not a police responsibility and it should be removed from
them. Nor do we consider that the police at the Airport should be required
to record the passage into and out of the airport of aircraft and passengers.
This should be a responsibility of the airport authority.
260. We are of the view that there can only be one purpose for the Police
of this Precinct and that is to provide a normal police service to the mem-
bers of the public who use the airport, and that to provide this service all
that is required is a police station of appropriate size.
261. The responsibilities, which we have indicated as not being properly
those of the Police, should be removed from them, and the Airport Police
Precinct should be abolished and the Precinct headquarters converted for
use as a police station of Tan Binh District, its task being to provide the
normal police services to the travelling public and visitors using the airport.
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262. We spent some time with the officers in charge of the Police in
Saigon and in Region III examining the problems which arise from the fact
that, what may be described as the "feeder areas" of the capital (in the
province of Gia Dinh) which affect both police and security tasks there, are
part of another Police command. Recognition of the problem is not new be-
cause at various times in the past these areas, or some part or parts of
them, have been included as part of the SMPD, although they were later
returned to the Police of Gia Dinh Province. The most recent such change
was in 1969. Since then the natural urban spread of the Capital into parts
of Gia Dinh has continued, and this process has undoubtedly accelerated
recently in direct proportion to the improvement of the general security
situation in the City and the Province, and seems likely to continue to do
so. The extent to which this has occurred so far is indicated on the map at
Appendix Q.
263. The kind of difficulties which are experienced as a result of the spread
of the City's built-up area into Gia Dinh Province are, we understand, par-
ticularly acute in Tan Phuoc Hamlet, Cay Da Xa area and Binh Tri Deng
Village, outside but adjacent to the present City limits, where thieves, hood-
lums and robbers lie up when not preying on the inhabitants of Saigon, espec-
ially in the area of Ap Dang Ba and Xom Chua which borders the 1st Precinct.
Generally speaking, we have been told, there is a passage by communist
terrorists into and out of the City from these and other parts of Gia Dinh
Province. Also explained to us was the absurdity, for example, of the
arrangements for escorting VIPs between the City centre and Tan Son Nhut
Airport having to be the responsibility of two separate commands despite
the short distance involved.
264. As a result of the examination to which we refer, we are satisfied
that these difficulties do impair the ability of the SMPD to afford a maximum
of protection to the inhabitants of the city, and that they constitute a problem
of command and areas of command which should be resolved as early as
possible. We have been told that already representatives of the Saigon Mun-
icipal Council and the Gia Dinh provincial authority have made proposals to
the Government which, if accepted, would entail enlarging the City's boundary
to include the urban "feeder areas". The extent of these proposals are shown
on the map at Appendix Q and would extend the City's authority to all those
parts of Gia Dinh Province within the dotted line. The proposals include
provision for removing the present provincial capital at Gia Dinh to a place
in the Quan Thu Duc District of the Province. We understand that these pro-
posals, which would require the establishment of 4 new Police Precincts, and
the enlargement of certain others, are still receiving consideration by the
Government.
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265. We consider these proposals to be a step in the right direction but
not to constitute a completely satisfactory solution to the Police problem.
They do no more than remove the existing problem further out into Gia
Dinh Province to areas, which in the course of time, will undoubtedly be-
come much more urban in character than they are at present, even if they
do not become completely built over. The criminal and the terrorist will
still be able to remain concealed there betweenforays into the City.
266. From the Police point of view the most satisfactory solution is to
make the City and Province Police commands each part of a single corn-
mand. In other words, the existing Saigon Municipal Police Directorate
and the existing Gia Dinh Province Police would be brought together to
constitute a new Police Region. Should this recommendation be accepted
the present police difficulties would be eased, irrespective of the manner
in which the City's. administrative boundaries may advance to take in parts
of the Province now or in the future. We believe the policing of Saigon to
be so important that the new post of Region Police Commander, which would
be required, would merit a high rank.
267. Because of the weight of his responsibilities he would need to he
supported by two Deputies. One of these would be responsible to him for
the policing of the City of Saigon, and liaise with the Mayor as necessary.
The other would be responsible to him for the policing of the rural part of
the command in Gia Dinh Province, and for liaison with the Province Chief.
The existing Saigon Municipal Police Directorate headquarters would be-
come the headquarters of the new command with its staff providing a com-
mon-user service to the Region Police Commander and both his Deputies.
We think the new command might be called the Capital Police Region.
268. Generally the organisation of the Capital Police Region will not. differ
in any major respect from that of the other Regions although, because of its
close proximity to the resources of National Police Headquarters, we think
that sensible arrangements can be made for supplying the police stations in
Saigon direct from those resources. We have included at Appendices R and
S charts showing the lay-outs we recommend for the Capital Police Region
headquarters and a Precinct headquarters respectively. As far as police
stations in the City are concerned the guide lines set out in Appendix G for
the village police station apply, except that they will tend to be larger.
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269. Special arrangements, as far as control and organisation are con-
cerned, clearly have to be made for the Capital, but there are already a
number of other towns which have been given city status by the Government.
We see no reason for any departure from the ordinary police structure in
respect of any of these. Such cities should be policed by police stations with
the City Police headquarters operating on exactly the same lines as a Dis-
trict responsible to the Province headquarters and under its command,
(127) the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate and the Gia Dinh
Province Police should be amalgamated into a single Police
Command to be called the Capital Police Region;
(128) Sub-Precinct Headquarters should be converted to Police
Stations;
the establishment of Police Posts should be continued;
(130) the Harbour Police as a separate Precinct be abolished
and the policing of the Harbour and canals be made the
responsibility of the Police Stations concerned, with an
allocation of Marine Police as necessary;
(131) the Airport Police, as a separate Precinct, be abolished and
the Precinct Headquarters be reconstituted as a Police Station
of the Tan Binh District Police Command;
(132) some changes in the responsibility and authority of the Traffic
Precinct should be made as in para 255.
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THE P O L I C E S T A T U T E
271. We consider that the Police Force should be established as a
separate Command by Statute, not only by Decree,: as early as possible.-
The latest draft Statute makes a good starting point and we attach this to
our Report at Appendix T. It will, however, require some amendment to
provide fora :National Police Force. as a separate Command, and to embody
certain of the recommendations made in our report.
272. We appreciate that the enactment of such a Statute may take some
time and,we: suggestthe.refore, that,a further Decree should be,drafted and
promulgated on exactly the same lines as the new Statute. incorporating our
amendment s.
273. Tho following are: our comments and suggestions fox' thenew Statute
referring to the articles in the latest draft:
General Titles and interpretation etc. will need to be amended
to take into account the new separate Command and.new. ranks.
Article 1
Amend to read: "This law provides for the status of the National;
Police F.orce..of?the Republic of Vietnam, defines its role, command
organisation; powers, obligations and. privilege.s, and makes
provision, by regulations for its; conditions of service,. including
promotion and=discipline".
Article 4
Omit "and classes".
:Add at ,end '!from time to time".
109
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Article 5
Add "the protection of life and property and the enforcement of law.
Article 7
Add "command" and "discipline" .
Article 8
All police officers above the rank of Colonel should be appointed
by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
Insert word "statutory" before "functions".
Article 9(1)
Will require some rephrasing.
9(2)
It is only necessary to say "Police boundaries shall normally
conform. . . . ...
Article 10
Should read "shall be prescribed by the Commanding General with
the approval of the Minister".
Article 11
Omit sentence in first part "provided that. . . . . . . Assistant
Director-General." In second part say "In the case of areas or
units below Provincial level the Commanding General may, by
order in writing, delegate to a police officer commanding a Region
the authority . . . . "
Article 12 (2)
Delete "the maintenance of law and order" and substitute "peace
and good government".
Article 13(1)
Amend to read To assist the Police in the maintenance of law
and order the Armed Forces may be requisitioned by the Commanding
General with the prior agreement of the Minister, or a Region Police
Commander with the prior agreement of the Commanding General. "
Omit Province Police Chief and the subsequent sentence.
Article 14
We are very strongly in favour of this Article, empowering Police
to arrest members of the Armed Forced who are, after all,
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citizens of the country and subject to its laws. A good principle
to establish is that where a member of the Armed Forces commits
an offence against a civilian or civilian property then the juris-
diction should lie with the civil courts (and be processed by the
Police), but where the offence is against another member of the
Armed Forces or military property then the jurisdiction should
normally be that of the Military.
The word "guilty" should be omitted from this Article.
Article 15(1)
Delete "by Service Letter" and substitute "in Force Standing
Orders".
Article 18
Add, after "law, " "or any regulations made thereunder".
Article 19(1)
To be amended to conform to recommended rank structure.
Article 19(1) & (2)
Classes should be omitted.
)
Article 20W
Delete first sentence and omit class.
Article 20(3)
Delete, if a proper career establishment is worked out. Insert
provision to say that police officers will rank for precedence with
Military officers of the same rank.
Articles 21 to 52(inclusive)
We think that many points in these Articles could be covered in
Regulations by Decree of the Prime Minister setting out Conditions
of Service, in which provision should be made to cover recruiting,
appointment, promotion, promotion procedures, discipline etc. ,
but we appreciate that certain basic safeguarding principles should
be included in the Statute.
Article 53
This should conform to the role. Lives and property of all residents,
not just citizens, should be protected.
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Article 56
This Article indicates the need for recodification of the law.
Article 69
A police officer might have a good excuse if he or his wife had
been permitted to engage in trade under Article 64.
Article 71
Add "except as may be provided for under the disciplinary
regulations. "
Article 80
Add "and the Police Commanding General".
Appendix
As for Articles 21 to 52.
274. Provision should also be made in the Statute for Auxiliary Police
and for a Police Volunteer Reserve. The latter should make provision for
recalling retired police officers or lower ranks to duty in an emergency
and for enrolling PSDF and giving them police powers only when on duty.
Much of the details for these two units could be covered by regulations.
275. The Statute should also include a provision to make clear which
former statutes and decrees are cancelled by it.
(133) the present draft Statute should be amended to embody
our recommendations;
(134) consideration should be given to the suggestions in
para 273:
(135) provision should be made for Auxiliary Police and a Police
Volunteer Reserve;
(136) the Statute should state which earlier statutes and decrees
are cancelled by it.
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CHAPTER XII
PHUNG HOANG
277. The present threat to the Government and people of the Republic
of Vietnam is planned, directed and carried out by members of the Communist
Party, organised as a standard party apparatus, which relies for support ter on what has become known as
members of party front organisations and active
all-embracing and includes of the VCI who work amongst
supporters of every kind. Without the support greatly reduced
the population the subversive threat security
The attack on the VCI, therefore,
and to a large extent rendered impotent.
is of the greatest importance and has, Phung o Hoang pr rightly been given a
high priority by the setting up of
278. Recent communist policy, outlined in the r solutions c ntainestin
COSVN 9 and 14, places even greater emphasis
civil population. The Phung Hoang program, therefore, becomes even more
important and it is with this in mind that we have studied its work and its
current mission.
279. Increasing VCI activity tion heici it p ul areas whered ecreasing
enemy military threat presents a situa inhabited
counter attack should now be brought from t etogether under one nemy armed forces st lllrema ns~sation,
the special Police. The threat however, to which ARVN and the other para-military forces are com it 1d.
The concentration of the communist effort amongst the civil population
also give more Government departments a part to play in the counter measures.
CO-ORDINATION
rin 280. We are convinced thainto a oconcerted et he o act vi gebody
is still essential to bring together of these agencies so that they are effectively
constructivoe the changes which
the VCI. We wish, therefore, to pp
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will assist the Phung Hoang program to achieve its objective and broaden
the scope of its co-ordinating function. We consider, however, that this
program should be carried out by Committees at National, Regional and
Province level only.
POINTS FOR REVIEW
281. We are very concerned with the effect of the present practice of
setting goals in the form of numbers of VCI to be neutralised over set
periods and by areas. We consider that this can only result in some false
identification and unjustified arrests. Actions of this nature must lead to
a number of people being detained against whom there is little or no evidence
of complicity in communist activities. Not only does this clog an already
overstrained detention facility but, worse, it breeds antipathy to the
Government and contempt for the law. Finally, we are of the opinion that
quantitative targets set in this manner only dilute the effort against the VCI
and provide no guidance to those who have to meet the goals. In our view
selected parts of the VCI organisation and the individuals in it should be
the targets for elimination in each area.
282. Since the Phung Hoang program was established it has developed in
the PIOCC and DIOCC a large volume of dossiers, documents and other
records. These are copies of similar records already held by other
organisations such as ARVN and Special Police. The build-up of all these
duplicate records has led to the erroneous impression that the Phung Hoang
is a separate operational organisation at these levels. The organisation
of the present PIOCC and DIOCC, should be changed, and the records which
they maintain should be integrated with those of the Special Police. At the
same time the personnel of the Provincial Reconnaisance Units, where the-se
are attached to PIOCCs, should be transferred to one of the regular forces.
283. There are two aspects of intelligence collection which should now be
re-examined, in view of the change of Vietcong tactics as outlined in
communist policy documents, COSVN 9 and 14. First, the implementation
of these resolutions will result in a closer integration of the members of
the Vietcong guerilla squads and militia units with the population and with
the activities of the Vietcong Infrastructure. In fact, these new tactics may
also mean that some members of the Vietcong local forces will attempt to
return to live in the inhabited areas. We suggest, therefore, that the
classification of PW, now given to members of these units who are captured,
may no longer be appropriate and that they should be considered as VCI.
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284. Secondly, we consider that the present mission now given to both
the Regional Forces and Popular Forces should be re-examined, particularly
in respect of their tasks in intelligence warfare. The tasks of both these
forces in this respect should be clearly defined to be in support of the Special
Police intelligence role. If these two changes were made it would assist
considerably in the work of neutralising the VCI.
285. Every Hoi Chan is a potential source of good information about the
VCI. All the information available from this source may not have been
exploited to the fullest extent by all the agencies concerned with the attack
on the VCI. The failure to process this fully may have enabled enemy agents
to regain or acquire a legal identity and to return to live among the population
without detection. To redress this weakness we feel that this should be an
area of co-ordination for which Phung Hoang Committees should be given
responsibility.
RELEASE OF PRISONERS
286. The process of neutralising a Vietcong cadre does not cease when he
has been sentenced to prison; it is just as important to ensure that he is not
released until he no longer represents a threat to security.
287. In the Phung Hoang program there has never been any authority for
this very important aspect of the work of neutralisation of the VCI. The
lack of general supervision and control over what happens to a VCI after
sentence has led to:
(a) the uncontrolled mixing of hard core communists
with other prisoners so that more communist supporters
may be leaving prison than ever went in tb it;
(b) lack of emphasis on programs of re-training and
rehabilitation for prisoners, thereby permitting many to
remain unconverted;
(c) anomalies in the assessment of individual prisoner's
suitability for release, which may lead to instances of
hard core members of the VCI being released to villages
to continue their subversive activities.
288. There must be an assurance that a communist, once arrested, will
continue to be isolated from the population until such time as he will no
longer act in a manner prejudicial to security. If there is no such assurance,
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there may develop a sense of frustration amongst those concerned which
could lead to the use of harsh and unconstitutional methods. No government
wishes to be in the position of having to detain large numbers of hard core
communists for an indefinite period but the problem of them is very real.
It can be considerably reduced by streaming and by well planned and active
programs of re-education and rehabilitation. These programs are even
more effective for the less convinced communists and sympathisers, if
they are properly isolated from contamination by the hard core.
COMMITTEES
289. The whole process of neutralising the VCI by legal means, which
may have to include long term detentionfor hard core communists, is one of
prime importance to Government in countering the communist threat. Because
it involves the combined efforts of a number of departments of government,
a strong co-ordinating and directing body is essential. We consider that
the Phung Hoang Committees are the proper bodies to undertake this task and
we suggest, therefore, that the mission of the Phung Hoang program should
be slightly revised so that it accommodates the points we have made above.
To assist the Phung Hoang Committees to take a more active role it might
be more convenient-if the membership of the Committees were to be reduced
and confined to those members, the work of whose ministry or department is
actively and continuously involved in the attack on the VCI. Each Committee,
of course, would have the power to co-opt representation from other Government
departments to help resolve a particular difficulty arising in his field.
290. We suggest that the Phung Hoang Committee at National level should
be under the chairmanship of the Prime. Minister and that the members should
be:
The Minister of the Interior;
The Minister of Justice;
The Minister of Chieu Hoi;
The Chief of Staff RVNAF;
The Commanding General of the National Police.
(a) to supervise, co-ordinate and generally control the
implementation of their mission by the Regional and
Provincial Phung Iioang Committees;
(b) to identify any areas of difficulty experienced by any
agency in discharging its responsibility and to draw
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the attention of the appropriate ministry,
department or command to these so that they may
be quickly resolved.
The Secretary to this Committee should be the Head of a small staff needed
to service it. It would be convenient for the Secretary and his staff to be
located in National Police Headquarters.
292. We suggest that the Phung Hoang Committee at Regional level should
be under the chairmanship of the Regional Commander and have a similar
supervisory and controlling function. The members should be:
The Representative of the Ministry of the Interior for
the Region or the Delegue (if such an appointment is made
to the Region);
The Regional G2 ;
The Regional Police Commander.
The Secretary to this Committee should be the Head of the Phung Hoang
staff of the Province Phung Hoang Committee located in the same town,
who would thus serve both Committees. He should co-ordinate the secretarial
work of the other Province Phung Hoang Committees in the Region.
293. The Phung Hoang Committee at Province level should be under the
chairmanship of the Province Chief and the members should be:
The'senior Military Commander (other than the Province Chief);
The Province Police Commander;
The Province Chieu Hoi representative.
294. To implement the Phung Hoang mission the task of the Province
Committee should include:
(a) co-ordinating the activities of all civil and military agencies
of the Government, which are related to the elimination of members
of the Communist Party, their organisation and infrastructure;
(b) supervising the preparation of a wanted list, and ensuring
the authenticity of identification of those included in it;
(c) laying down criteria by which individuals included in the
wanted list may be classified according to the threat to
security each represents;
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(g)
(d) ensuring that there is adequate representation of the
merits of a case to any review body before a decision
is taken to release or to continue the detention of a
convicted prisoner;
(e) making recommendations for the segregation of categories
of prisoners, their re-education and rehabilitation;
(f) ensuring that there are adequate procedures to release prisoners
as soon as it is reasonable to assume that they no longer
represent a threat to security;
recommending means by which individual prisoners can be
given their liberty under conditions which prevent them
being a threat to security;
(h) recommending measures to ensure that all information
from Hoi Chan is fully exploited in the attack on the VCI,
and to prevent infiltration through the Chieu Hoi program
of enemy agents;
(i) identifying any difficulty experienced by any agency in
discharging its responsibility and drawing the attention
of the appropriate ministry, department or command to
this so that it may be quickly resolved.
295. It should be the responsibility of the Secretary of each Province
Phung Hoang Committee to maintain in chart form details of the Communist
Party structure and the VCI within his area indicating the identities of the
individuals where known. The charts should also show the blanks in the
information. The dossier file number and a symbol showing which intelligence
agency holds dossiers on the individual should be shown against each
identified individual on the chart. The Secretary will not need to maintain,
separately, dossiers, files of information, reports etc. , for the purpose of
maintaining the charts. It will. be the responsibility of the Special Police
and the Military G2 to provide the Secretary with the necessary information
for this purpose and to bring any dossiers or files required by the Committee
to any of its meetings. The charts should be displayed on wall boards but
in such a manner that they can be obscured and securely locked when not
in use. The Secretary should have a small staff to undertake this work and
handle the Committee's correspondence.
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296. The Province Committees should meet at regular intervals to
review the progress of the neutralisation program. The criteria by which
progress of neutralisation in an area should be measured are the extent
to which complete details about each member of the Communist Party and
of the VCI are available, the success achieved in neutralising them, by
legal means, and the reduction in the number of communist inspired
incidents in the area. Now that the operations of the VCI are so integrated
with the population, statistical records of the total number of VCI neutralised
are not by themselves an accurate measure of success. It is the extent to
which those who are directing and controlling the subversive activity are
known, and then removed, that is the true measure.
297. The Province Committees would be a convenient forum in which
the representatives of the various agencies could reach agreement on when
operations should be prohibited in certain areas of a province, for a period,
to facilitate intelligence exploitation or to plan operations of a special
type in direct support of an intelligence exploitation exercise.
298. At all meetings of Phung Hoang Committees at all levels, the senior
Military Commander should be accompanied by the senior Military Intelligence
Officer within his command and the "Police Commander by his Head of
Special Police.
299. In addition to a Committee member's corporate responsibility for
the whole mission of the Phung Hoang Committee, it is also his responsibility
to take positive executive action on any difficulty which his own command
or departmental structure can resolve.
300. In some districts where there is a Communist main force threat and
consequently a concentration of friendly armed forces to meet it, it will
be necessary to have a co-ordinating Committee of Phung Hoang for the
area concerned under the chairmanship of the District Chief. The members
would be the senior Military Commander in the district and the District
police officer, who would be accompanied by their respective intelligence
officers.
301. Such Committees should work from the DIOCC, which would need
to be retained in such areas, and maintain charts and maps as described
for the Province Phung Hoang Committee. An officer of the District
Special Police should be Secretary of such Committees and head the staff.
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302. In those districts throughout the country which are now in the
transition stage between VC military activity and political subversion, it
may not be necessary for the present Phung Hoang Committee to meet
frequently but the existing DIOCC staff should be retained temporarily for
intelligence co-ordination purposes.
303. We have recommended in Chapter VI that the Special Police should
become the sole Internal Security Intelligence organisation, which will
receive intelligence from all sources direct. In districts where military
activity is only of a minor or sporadic nature, there should be a gradual
transfer of all DIOCC responsibility to the Special Police. In some districts
this could take place now.
PROVINCE CHIEF
304. It is, of course, essential that the Province Chief should play an
active part in leading the Province Committee to ensure that the VCI in his
province are attacked in the most vigorous manner. In addition to this task,
the Province Chief is at present, among his many other responsibilities,
the Chairman of the Province Security Committee, which sentences members
of the VCI. These two functions carried out by the same official might
appear to be in conflict. We, therefore, suggest that consideration might
be given to making some alternative arrangement which would relieve the
Province Chief of this dual responsibility.
(137) the Phung Hoang program should continue but its
mission should be amended;
(138) the dossiers held by PIOCCs and DIOCCs should
be integrated with those of the Special Police;
(139) the Provincial Reconnaisance Units should be gradually
transferred to one of the regular forces;
(140) the classification of PW should be reviewed;
(141) the intelligence mission of the Regional and Popular
Forces should be revised;
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(142) the Phung Hoang Committees should be given certain
responsibility in relation to the Chieu Hoi program;
(143) the Phung Hoang Committees should also give their attention
to the method of processing prisoners after sentence and
before release;
(144) the composition of the Phung Hoang Committees at
National, Regional and Provincial level should be
amended to reduce their size;
(145) at District level there should be progressive integration
of DIOCCs with the Special Police until the former can
be abolished as a separate entity.
EXPLANATORY NOTE
306. In view of the fact that our concept of the mission of the Phung
Hoang program differs slightly from the present practice we feel that a
note outlining how a Phung Hoang Committee can generate and co-ordinate
action to eliminate VCI, their primary target, might be helpful.
307. We take as our example a Province where the elimination of the VCI
has not been very effective and, as a result, there has been a resurgence
of communist inspired incidents. In this event the Province Chief would
call a special meeting of the Phung Hoang Committee. This could he on
his own initiative or at the direction of the Region Phung Hoang Committee
Chairman. At this special meeting the Committee would analyse the cause
of the deterioration in the security situation of the area - or any part of it -
by examining the detail of VC incidents and determining the extent of the
participation of the VCI in assisting Vietcong armed units by providing
information, guides or material support. They would also identify, if
possible, which of the VCI in the area could have been involved in such a
series of incidents. Such an examination should reveal the gaps in the
intelligence cover of the VCI in the area.
308. A study should also be made of the last known positions of the VC
units in the area, the location of the Party organisation (District or Village)
responsible for directing these incidents and their lines of communication.
This type of analysis will enable the Committee to draw up plans to launch
a co-ordinated attack on the right targets. This might involve the RF and
PF attacking the VC local forces and guerilla units and harassing the
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Party cadres of the communist district or village committees, while
the Special Police, supported by PFF and PSDF, intensify their investiga-
tions and searches within the populated area to locate and arrest VCI and
those known to be VCI supporters. The intelligence back up for such
planning would be provided by the Special Police and the Military Intelligence
Officer. A Province Phung Hoang Committee should when necessary co-opt
the District Chiefs to their meetings or, if the effort is to be concentrated
within one district, hold special meetings of this kind in that particular
District Headquarters.
309. Once the plan has been formed and agreed, the members of the
Phung Hoang Committee, each of whom will have his part to play in this
co-ordinated attack, should put it into action. Progress should be reported
in Committee as necessary to enable adjustments to be made, again on a
joint basis, and to the Regional Committee which can then co-ordinate
action with neighbouring Provinces and provide additional resources if
required.
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Appendix A
HISTORICAL GROWTH OF NATIONAL POLICE
130,0007 LEGEND:
6,777
74,800
f
x
/
110,000 CAREER NON-CAREER AUTHORIZED
PERSONNEL PERSONNEL STRENGTH
100,000
90,000
80,000
80,155 71,282
r 78,43
74,800 74,800 74_800~ ~~ 291 65,69
r---
70,000 / 60,09
I
H
/ 59,999
60,000
/ 50,97
52,242
50,000 44,90
I
40,000 /
/
/33,570
30,000 26,821
20,8001
20,000 -19,7111
2,934
12,762
PNM=m
TOTAL ACTUAL %
STRENGTH /
/
105,0001 103,859
/ I6,29
97,556
124,050
0
YEAR END 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
1stFeb.
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Appendix B
STRENGTH OF POLICE FORCE, FEBRUARY, 1971
(Figures in brackets are provisionally projected Increases for end-year 1971)
NA
POLICE
SPECIAL POLICE' NPFF
MARINE
TOTAL
TIONAL POLICE HQ
SAI
7,360
( 9,150)
2,011 (2, 400),
1,417
(2,440).
521 (460)
11
579 (14
450)
GON_M- P.O.
MILITA
10,856
(13,150)
2,307 (2,310)
2,884
(2,976)
238 (244)
,
,
16
285 (18
680)
RY REGION 1
MILITA
8,664
(9,120)
2,575 (2,266)
2,624
(4,338)
104 (162)
,
,
13
967 (15
886)
RY REGION 2
MILITA
8,305
(10,735)
3,515 (2,586)
2,552
(7,550)
209 (262)
,
,
14
581 (21
133)
RY REGION 3
M IL ITA
13,700
(11,530)
2,795 (2,849)
2,430
(5,556)
83 (234)
,
,
19
008 (20
169)
FtY REGION 4
19,180
(18,222)
4,524 (4,544)
3,728
(9,578)
1,007(1, 388)
,
,
28,439 (33, 732)
68,335
(71, 907)
17,727(16,955)
15,635 (32,438)
2,162(2, 750)
1103, 859 (124, 050)
(1) In addition to the personnel of the six Blocks and various separate Services and offices which
comprise the Headquarters, the figures for National Police Hqs include also personnel:
a. of all Training Establishments;
b. of the National Reserve battalion of the NPFF;
c. of Con Son Island "Special Province'
d. detached for duty with other GVN agencies and/or awaiting assignment.
(2) The projected Increases for National Police Hqs include a Leave & Training Reserve of 2,000.
(3) The projected Increases under "Police" include provision for Regional Hqs of 350 men each.
(4) The projected Increases under "NPFF" include provision for a reserve Company at Region Hq.
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Appendix C
NATIONAL POLICE HEADOUARTERS
-- -- -------------- COMMAND ING GENERAL
PERSONAL ASS ISTAM
D Y'COMM AING
ONERL
IECALARFA IR5IL yerl
PUBLIC REIA710N5
SPECIAL POLICE
DIRECTORATE
JUDICIAL POLICE s,
DIRECTORATE
PT RSODEL AND
TRAINING
DIRECTORATE
BAT IC TRA INI
SCHOOL
cR IMIWTL
RECORDS Off ICE
CONDITIONS OF
SERVICE
ESTIMATES AND
BUDGETS
REGION POLICE CDAMNNDERS
TECHNICAL
SERVICES
AN INTENAICE
WORKSHOP
!STAFF1
L Veh ile EffiDish RCM
MmeMWS, Types & AIINMIon
2 BeMgdkg & replxemeeg Of
VdSkIM & spares pmiskq
3. D Mh g d ygrM
5. Workshop SENT
3. POI.
GUARD AND ESCORT
COMPANY
HEADQUARTERS AM
TRANSPORTATION POOR
STORES
FIELD FORCE
FIELD FORCE
TRAINING SCHOOL
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TECHNICAL
SERVICES
AND SUPPLY
DIRECTORATE
LOMWpIICAiIOE
BUILDING
AN INTENANCE
OPERATIONS/ IWCRAVT ION
(Intl Duly Ofkersl
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REGIONAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS
O SPECIALPOLICE
H
REGIONAL TRAINING;
SCHOOL
RECRUITMENT
TRAINING
TRANSFERS
PROMOTIONS
DISCIPLINE
WELFARE
PAY AND
.ACCOUNTS
PAY ANDS
ALLOWANCES
INCE POLICE Z=j
TECHNICAL SERVICES
AND SUPPLY
WORKSHOP:
Appendix D
FIELD
FORCE
OPERATIONS/
INFORMATION
LARD AND ESCORT FCMPAW'
(For Reglon and
-wince_ Headquarters).
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Appendix E
PROVINCE POLICE HEADQUARTERS
JUDICIAL POLICE
(C. I. D.)
CRIME:
INVESTIGATORS
MODUS
OPERAND I
P
OLICE C IRCULARS
F
POLICE SUPERVISION
PHOTO LAB.
ADMINISTRATION
LICENSING, AND
REGISTRATION OF
PRIVATELY OWNED
F IREARMS
OPERATIONS/INFORMATION ROOM
Ind Duty Officers
GUARD AND
ESCORT
COMPANY
PAY, ALLOWANCES
AND ACCOUNTS
FIELD
FORCE
T71
PERSONNEL
RECORDS
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Appendix F
DISTRICT POLICE HEADQUARTERS
DISTRICT
POLICE COMMANDER
FIELD FORCE
(When Allocated)
SPECIAL POLICE
OPERAT IONS/ INFORMATION
(Incl Duty Officers)
VILLAGE POLICE STATIONS
ADMINISTRATION
PERSONNEL
PAY
STORES
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Appendix G
THE V I L L A G E P O L I C E S T A T I O N
1. The provision of law and order to all populated areas of the country
is a pre-requisite to good government, and we have made clear our view
that, as far as the Police Force is concerned and the part it plays in law
enforcement, the basic unit of its organisation and activities is the police
station. We consider, moreover, that the manpower to be allotted to a
village station, the duties it will perform, the manner in which it will per-
form and its equipment
to set out in some detail thought
what we
purpose believe are the
purpoosse e of f this Appendix main guidelines to be used in these various respects.
2, The yardstick used so far to calculate the number of men required in
a village station has been an arbitrary scale in relation to population density
and size of area. We understand the reasons for this. In fact the size"(man-
power requirement) of a station should normally be calculated in relation to
a variety of factors among which the topography of the area, population
density, types of population (whether a minority group or groups exist), the
security problem, state of communications, state of the economy in the area
and political attitudes, can be numbered. All of these will affect the duties
to be performed by the station. In present circumstances it is important that
there should be flexibility in this aspect of the establishment of a village sta-
tion. We mean by this that security problems will differ from place to place,
as will political attitudes and economic conditions, and we believe, therefore,
that, if proper and careful attention is given to these various factors in rela-
tion to duties, the number of men required in a station calculated by this
means will in many cases be markedly different to the number calculated by
the present means.
3. A further main factor which will influence the size of a village station
is, of course, the availability of Government funds for theso Polic
degree of st.
cases, probably, there will have to be a compromise,
between what is considered desirable by the Force and what is financially
possible. None of this runs counter to the over-riding principle thaof illage
station complements calculated in this manner, rather by rule umb,
are more likely to produce efficient law enforcement and a police image
attractive to the public which will encourage public co-operation and support.
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4. We understand that the present method of calculating the manpower
for a village police station will produce some very large units; indeed at
some places 63 will have more than 50 men each. We regard units of this
size as out of proportion to the policing requirement., and, at this stage of
the development of the National Police, too big to permit efficient command
and direction.
5. The desirability of stationing village policemen in their home areas
is questionable. On the one hand, if it is done, there is the possibility of
an erosion of police authority resulting from pressures on the policemen
from family and other sources. On the other, if it is not, there will be
difficulties in housing, feeding and schooling. We have considered this
carefully and on balance, because of the special circumstances prevailing,
we believe that village policemen will have to be stationed in their home
areas, at least until the police housing program is sufficiently advanced.
DUTIES
6. In our view, in addition to the general factors set out above, it is the
duties to be performed by a village station which determine the size of its
complement. Notwithstanding our other comments we think we should attempt
here to give some general guidelines in this respect. Taking quality rather
than quantity as fundamental, we consider that the smallest station which will
be effective is one of seven policemen. We arrive at this figure as follows:
Officer in charge I
Charge Room duties
(Combined with station
sentry)
Patrols (in pairs) Z
Sick & leave reserve/
standby
In such a case we think the rank of the officer in charge might be that of
sergeant. We recognise that some village areas, because of the extent of
the police task in those areas, will require police stations of a strength in
excess of 7 men. We very much doubt whether there would ever be occasion
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under normal conditions for such station strengths to exceed 25-30 men.
We do not consider that a fixed upper limit can be set arbitrarily but the
command and control factor will determine the size.
7. As the purpose of the village station is to provide a service to the
public (the maintenance of law and order, the prevention and detection of
crime, apprehension of offenders, etc. ), it may be helpful at this point if
we set out some of the requirements to be taken into consideration when
estimating the beat and patrol element of a station's work. No clear-cut
formula can be laid down, of course, but the following are some of the points
which should receive consideration:
(i) the type of locality, i.e. shopping, business or
residential;
(ii) the types of offences committed and whether
the area naturally lends itself to other offences;
(iii) traffic problems;
(iv) crowd problems, i.e. cinemas, bars, markets etc.
(b) Patrols
These are prir,c.to:1.lly for rural and scattered residential
areas, where generally there is no great policing problem,
and it is more a question of the police showing the flag,
maintaining contact with the population and giving the public
a sense of security.
8. In general terms, of course, foremost among the village police sta-
tion's responsibilities will be the neutralisation of the Vietcong Infrastructure,
which will in turn require regular contact by the officer in charge with the
Village Chief and the co-ordination of the station's work with that of other
forces. The officer in charge will have numerous other duties, of course,
of which the principal will be:
(a) the investigation of all crime reported to the station;
(b) ensuring the correct and accurate use of all station books
and registers;
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(c) the instruction of station personnel on their duties and the
allocation of such duties;
(d) the maintenance of discipline;
(e) the safe custody of all arms, ammunition and equipment
in the station;
the maintenance of the requisite charts, maps etc. in the
station;
(g) reporting to his District headquarters on all matters
affecting his station duties.
9. The general requirement for police housing has already been dealt
with elsewhere in the Report. However, it is important to remember that
two important adjuncts are necessary in any police station. They are:
(a) a lock up for prisoners;
(b) an armoury for weapons and ammunition (station holding,
separate from individual weapons).
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that, for security and other reasons,
it is essential that the village police station and its compound should be an
entity of its own and not part of a village council office or of the establish-
ment of any other authority.
10. Every village police station should be provided with:
(a) radio - preferably the FM 5 set, because no village
police station should be dependent on the village radio
for reasons of:
(i) security, and
(ii) misuse of station personnel (i. e. policemen
having to operate the hamlet/village radio);
(b) bicycles for patrol duties;
4
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(c) weapons (station holding or reserve, as opposed to
personal issue, i.e. LMG's, etc. as laid down in
Standing Orders);
(d) torchlights.
11. Only essential books should be maintained, and these should be the
subject of a Standing Order. They will include:
(a) Station Diary, to include all station activities, i. e. the
departure and return of patrols, station duties, training
periods, weapons situation, visits and inspections, in
fact every occurrence in the station;
(b) Report Book, in which all complaints from members of
the public are entered;
(c) Inspection Book, to contain the record of all inspections
by officers of senior formations, with follow-up action
clearly recorded;
(d) Visitors Book, to record visits by all senior police officers
and representatives from other Government departments;
(e) Patrol Duty Scheme, to contain details of the defined
patrols to be covered by station personnel, including
patrols to neighbouring village police stations and im-
portant points to he covered during the patrols, par-
ticularly in regard to line of communications;
(f) Patrol Register, to contain a record of all patrols carried
out by station personnel giving number of men, patrol
covered and method of execution (foot, bicycle, etc. ).
12. A co-ordinated defence plan should be prepared for the police station
compound in conjunction with local forces in the village (i. e. PSDF and PF)
and any Field Force unit available in the area so that the defence of the sta-
tion will interfere with police duties as little as possible. In preparing the
plan the fact that the station is there to provide a service to the public, and
that for this and other purposes it functions 24 hours a day, should not be
overlooked.
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13. Every effort should be made to provide the requisite training for
officers in charge of stations in such manner as to ensure that within a
reasonable period all have a good working knowledge of their duties. Military
Advisory Training teams could help in planning and co-ordinating the defence
of village police stations within the framework of the defence of villages and
hamlets by PSDF and PF, and in training the forces so involved in this task.
For their part, officers in charge of stations will be responsible for giving
regular instruction to their men in law, patrol and other police work, and we
suggest that such instruction should take place not less than twice a week.
14. Specific Standing Orders should be issued by the Commanding General
to all Regions and Provinces setting out the duties to be performed by village
police stations and the manner in which these should be performed. They
should include:
(a) duties and responsibilities of the officer in charge and
his staff;
(b) supply and maintenance of station equipment;
(c) supply and use of Station books;
(d) defence and training;
(e) investigation of crime;
(f) treatment and disposal of prisoners.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(146) village police stations should be manned initially by
individuals who know and understand both the area and
the population;
(147) the number of personnel employed at a village police
station (not less than 7) should be governed by the factors
and principles set out in paras 2 to 5 above;
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(148) carefully selected personnel should be appointed to
command village police stations who should also be
sworn Judicial police officers;
clear and concise Standing Orders should be issued
by the Commanding General on the following subjects:
(a) the duties and responsibilities of the officer in
charge and his men;
(b) the supply and maintenance of station equipment;
(c) the supply and use of Station books;
(d) defence and training;
(e) the investigation of crime;
(f) the treatment and disposal of prisoners.
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Appendix H
TECHNICAL SERVICES AND SUPPLY
1. We consider that there are weaknesses in the existing system with
regard to:
(a) planning new police buildings and the maintenance
of existing buildings;
(b) the supply of stores and equipment to police in the
field on a regular basis;
(c) ensuring a sensible establishment for the distribution
of police vehicles in the Force, adequate funds for their
operation and maintenance, and their replacement when
they are beyond economic repair.
POLICE BUILDINGS
In the case of police buildings we understand that, although the
Logistics Service has a "'Real Estate Bureau" which is responsible for
the staff work at National Police Headquarters in respect of new buildings,
there is no forward planning and woefully insufficient funds in the Police
budget annually. Funds for new buildings are limited to those considered
necessary to implement specific projects or programs financed by aid
money. There do not appear to be any arrangements for calculating the
needs of the. Force for other new buildings, either annually or over a longer
period, nor for the provision by Government of funds for the purpose.
The amounts of 12, 900, 000, 128, 000, 000, 7, 000, 000 and 7, 000, 000
piastres in the budgets for the years 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971 respectively
were, we, have been.told, for specific aid-financed projects, mainly the
new Police Academy.
3. There is a fair amount of police real estate throughout the country,
much of it needing repair and redecoration. Some, like the Police Academy,
the regional training centres (some still under construction), the Marine
Police Training Centre at Phu Xuan and certain Field Force installations,
are excellent because they are new, as are also the building extensions at
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the Rach Dua Training Centre. However, although there has been some
self-help and civic action construction to supplement the new building, the
majority of village police stations have to share offices with Village
Councils and have no dependent accommodation. There is an urgent need
for new construction throughout the Force, in addition to the dependent
housing scheme we have mentioned in para 234 of the Report. If a start
is to be made on tackling this very formidable building problem it will
require careful planning.
4. For this purpose we think that a Police Building Planning Committee
should be established, on which representatives of the Ministry of the
Interior and Department of Public Works could sit as necessary. This
Committee would be responsible for planning the overall police building
requirement according to 5 yearly development periods, and for deciding
priorities within such development periods. It would consult Region Police
Commanders to obtain accurate details of their needs, and to ensure that,
before any police buildings are erected, police ownership of the land is
clearly established. It could, at the same time, study carefully the
possibility of taking over for police use any installations vacated from time
to time by United States and Free World Forces.
5. In the case of the maintenance of existing buildings the budgetary
provision of 12, 000, 000 piasters (1970) and 15, 000, 000 piasters (1971) has
been and is, we were assured, quite inadequate. To allow provincial
police officers to re-decorate and make small repairs to those police
buildings requiring such attention would, apparently, necessitate an
expenditure of something like 60 piasters per square metre, or a pro-
vision this year of 92, 692, 000 piasters.
6. There are warehouses of varying sizes at Danang (Region 1),
Nha Trang (Region 11), Bien Hoa (Region 111), Can Tho (Region 1V) and
Saigon (Saigon Municipal Police Directorate). The chief difficulty appears
to be to keep these units supplied with a reasonably comprehensive range
of uniform, equipment and stores from which provinces can expect to have
indents met within a reasonable period. In the case of Danang and Nha Trang,
of course, the chief difficulty in this respect is their distance from Saigon
and the poor communications which exist between the three places. Naval
assistance in transporting supplies to them is provided on an "as and when
possible" basis. Only a very limited amount is airlifted. We accept the
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estimate given to us that units in Regions I and II can expect delays in
meeting their indents of anything from two weeks to three months.
VEHICLES
7. There are at present approximately 4,450 four wheel vehicles in
the Force and some 830 motorcycles (at existing Force strength this works
out at about 1 vehicle /motorcycle to every 20 men) with a large variety of
types in both categories. Not unnaturally, the latter factor has complicated
the maintenance problem, and in particular the provision of an adequate
scale of spares. A workshop at National Police Headquarters is able to
supply a reasonably wide range of repair and maintenance services, but
those at Regional and Provincial levels have capacities which are considerably
less than this. There does not appear to be any system for the replacement
of vehicles when these are beyond economic repair.
(150) the needs of the Force for new buildings(capital works),
whether aid financed or not, should be calculated by a
Police Building Planning Committee according to 5 yearly
development periods, and the necessary financial provision
should be included in the Police budget annually;
(151) the maintenance of existing police buildings should be put
on to a practical basis, which could take the form of a
system for painting and redecorating exteriors at cal-
culated periods, (say once every 3 years), and interiors
similarly, (say once every 5 years), for which annual
provision should be included in the budget, including a
reasonable sum for minor repairs;
(152) the plan which exists for improving the supply system be
accepted and implemented, thereby providing adequate
supply points at:
Danang - to serve Region I
Qui Nhon
Nha Trang - to serve Region II
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Bien Hoa - to serve Region III (but
excluding Long An and
the Capital Police Region
which can draw direct from
National Headquarters)
My Tho
Can Tho - to serve Region IV;
(153) a staff study of the problems involved in supplying by
sea the warehouses at Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Tang, and
possibly Can Tho, should be undertaken in conjunction
with the Navy with a view to obtaining such support from
the Navy on a regular basis;
(154) police vehicles should be standardised and the number
of types to be used kept to a minimum in order to simplify
the maintenance and repair problem;
(155) an establishment of police vehicles should be prepared,
so that the motor transport requirements of all units,
from police stations upwards, can be properly calculated
and met, and should contain a provision for a small
reserve to be held at national and regional levels, from
which replacements against vehicles brought in for lengthy
repairs or overhauls could be issued;
(156) the needs of the Force concerning replacement vehicles
should be calculated annually by the Director of Technical
Services and Supply, and appropriate financial provision
included in the budget;
(157) a staff study should be instituted by the Director of Technical
Services and Supply from which decisions can be made by
the Commanding General concerning:
(a) the levels at which motor transport workshops
should be established;
(b) the scale of repair and maintenance work to be
performed, i. e. first, second, third or fourth line;
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(c) the workshop staff required;
(d) the plant, equipment and tools required.
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Appendix K
REGION SPECIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS
HEAD OF REGION SPECIAL POLICE
(REGION 1, 2, 3, 4)
I DEPUTY HEAD
COMMUNIST
BUREAU
COUNTER
COMMUNIST
COORDINATION
SERV ICE
COORDINATING
INTERROGATION
SECT ION
SECTIONS
COMMUNISTS PLANS
COMMUNISTS POLICY
COMMUNIST OR BAT
COMMUNIST
RETENTION
SECTION
COORDINATING
DOCUMENTS
SECTION
COUNTER
SUBVERSION
(NON COMMUNIST)
COORDINATING
BUREAU
COORDINATING
DESK OFFICERS
BUREAU
SECTIONS
POLITICAL PARTIES
GROUPS
ASSOC IAT IONS
ADMINISTRATION
BUREAU
TASK FORCE
SECTION
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Appendix J
COUNTER COMMUNIST
SERVICE
COMMUNIST PARTY
BUREAU
SPECIAL RESEARCH
BUREAU
COMMUNIST PENETRATION
BUREAU
POLITICAL I (ASSOCIATIONS
PARTIES GROUPS
POLITICAL PARTIES
BUREAU
COUNTER SUBVERSION
(Non communist)
SERVICE
GROUPS
ASSOCIATIONS
BUREAU
PRESS
SECT ION
SPECIAL STUDIES
BUREAU
ADMINISTRATION
SERVICE
REGISTRY
BUREAU
DOCUMENT
BUREAU
FELLOW TRAVELERS
INTELLECTUALS
PRESS
FOREIGN COMMUNIST
PARTIES
ESPIONAGE
SABOTAGE
BUREAU
OPERATIONS
BUREAU
PERSONNEL
BUREAU
FINANCE TRAINING
SUPPLIES BUREAU
BUREAU
TASK FORCE
BUREAU
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
SERVICE
GOVERNMENT
BUREAU
VIP PROTECTION
SECTION
SPEC IAL
EQUIPMENT
SECTION
INVESTIGATION
SURVELLANCE
BUREAU
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
SERVICE
NAT ZONAL
I NTER R OGAT ION
BUREAU
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Appendix L
COUNTER
COMMUNIST
BUREAU
OPERATIONS
BUREAU
771
ESPIONAGE
SABOTAGE
COMMUNIST PLANS
COMMUNIST POLICY
COMMUNIST ORBAT
COUNTER
SUBVERSION
SECTION
(NON COMMUNIST)
r-- -s
COUNTER
COMMUNIST
PENETRATION
FELLOW
TRAVELERS
SPECIAL
STUDIES
71-
F INA
SUPPLIES
PROVINCE
INTERROGATION
CENTER
TASK
FORCE
INVESTIGATION
SECTION
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Appendix M
DISTRICT SPECIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS
HEAD OF DISTRICT
SPECIAL POLICE
TYPIST
(ONE MAN)
INTELLIGENCE
COLLECT ION
TEAMS
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Appendix N
CAPITAL POLICE REGION SPECIAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS
HEAD OF C. P. R.
SPECIAL POLICE
COUNTER
SUBVERSION
(Non Communist)
COMMUNIST
PENETRATION
BUREAU
GROUPS
ASSOCIATIONS
DOCUMENT
SECTION
SPECIAL
STUDY
SECTION
FELLOW TRAVELERS
INTELLECTUALS, PRESS
FOREIGN COMMUNIST
PARTIES
GOVERNMENT
VETTING
DEPUTY HEAD SPECIAL POLICE
RURAL AREAS
ADMINISTRATION
SERVICE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
SERVICE
REGISTRY PERSONNEL FINANCE TRAINING
TION SUPPLIES SECTION
BUREAU SEC SECTION
OPERATIONS
BUREAU
INVESTIGATION
SURVEILLANCE
BUREAU
TASK FORCE
SECTION
SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT
SECTION
INTERROGATION
BUREAU
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Appendix P
RANK CONVERSION
PRESENT RANKS
PROPOSED RANKS
DIRECTOR GENERAL POLICE COMMANDING GENERAL
DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL DEPUTY POLICE COMMANDING GENERAL
POL ICE MAJOR GENERAL
POLICE BRIGADIER GENERAL
POLICE COLONEL
POLICE LIEUTENANT COLONEL
COMMISSIONER ( 2 GRADES) POLICE MAJOR
POLICE CAPTAIN
REDACTOR (2 GRADES) POLICE LIEUTENANT
POL ICE 2ND LIEUTENANT
INSPECTOR (2 GRADES) ADJUTANT MAJOR
ADJUTANT
SERGEANT
SUB INSPECTOR( 3 GRADES) PATROLMAN
PROPOSED NOMENCLATURE FOR
COMMAND DUTY POSTS
POLICE COMMANDING GENERAL
REG ION POLICE COMMANDER
CAPITAL POLICE REGION COMMANDER
PROVINCE POL ICE C OMMANDER
DISTRICT POLICE COMMANDER
POLICE STATION COMMANDER
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Appendix Q
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13
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Appendix R
CAPITAL POLICE REGION HEADQUARTERS
F REGIONAL TRAINING
SCHOOL
RECRUITMENT AND
TRAINING
MODUS OPERANDI
POLICE CIRCULARS
POLICE SUPERVISION
TRANSFERS
PROMOTIDNS
DISCIPLINE
WELFARE
PAY AND
ALLOWANCE
DEPUTY RURAL AREAS
(Gia Dinh Province)
COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSPORT
SUPPLY
OPERATORS
(Signals)
GUARD AND
ESCORT COMPANY
PRECINCT POLICE HEADQUARTERS
DISTRICT POLICE HEADQUARTERS
OPERATIONSIINFORMAT ION
IInci Duty EDTicersl
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Appendix S
CAPITAL POLICE REGION PRECINCT HEADQUARTERS
OPERATIONSIINFORMATION ROOM
f 1w D* (itk s)
JUDICIAL POLICE
(C. 1. D.)
POLICE STATIONS
AND POSTS
LICENSING AND
REGIS1RATIOII OF
PRIVATELY *PED
FRIEARNS
APPOINIAENI
TRAINING
PRONRHIONS
FIELD FORCE
(When Allocated)
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Appendix - T
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
DRAFT POLICE STATUTE
LAW No. of DATE
In view of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam dated
April 1, 1967, and upon discussion and vote of the National Assembly,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Hereby promulgates the National Police Statute the text of which is as
follows:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1. This Law provides for the Status of the National Police of
the Republic of Vietnam and defines the purpose, organization, disci-
pline, duties, powers, rights and benefits of the National Police Force.
CHAPTER II
TITLE AND DATE OF COMING INTO FORCE
Article 2. This Law shall be called the National Police Statute and
shall become effective on the date of its promulgation.
CHAPTER III
INTERPRETATIONS
Article 3. In this Law unless the context otherwise requires:
The singular shall include the plural.
"Director General", "Deputy Director General", "Assistant Director
General", mean the Director General, Deputy Director General and
Assistant Director General of National Police appointed in accordance
with Article 8 of this Law.
"Force" means the National Police of the Republic of Vietnam
established by Article 4 of this Law.
"Government" means the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.
"Management Committee" means the National Police Management Com-
mittee established by Article 21 of this Law.
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"Minister" means the Minister responsible for the police.
"Unit Commander" means the police officer in command of {the National
Police in any specified area or in any specified unit, as the context
requires.
"Police Officer" means any member of the National Po lice who has
taken the oath of office prescribed by Article 16 of this Law, and
relates to both males and females.
"Republic" means the Republic of Vietnam.
CHAPTER IV
SECTION I: ESTABLISHMENT
Article 4. Police duties in the Republic shall be performed by a Force,
to be known as the "National Police of the Republic of Vietnam", which
shall consist of such numbers of police officers of the various ranks
and classes created by this Law as may be authorized by. the Government.
SECTION 2: EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES OF THE FORCE.
Article S. The Force shall be employed throughout the Republic, (inclu-
ding its territorial waters) for the maintenance of law and order, the
preservation of the public peace, the prevention, detention and
investigation of crime, the apprehension of offenders and the collection
of 'information on matters likely to endanger internal security.
Article 6. The President may, in time of war or other emergency, employ
any part of the Force to serve together with the Armed Forces in defense
of the Republic; provided that any part of the Force so employed shall
remain under the command of the Director General, exercised through such
police officer as he may appoint.
SECTION 3: COMMAND OF THE FORCE
Article 7. The Force shall be under the command of a Director General
who shall be responsible to the Minister for the control, direction,
training and management of the Force.
SECTION 4: APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPUTY DIR-
ECTOR GENERAL AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL
Article 8. The Director General and the Deputy Director General, at least
one of whom shall be a police officer, shall be both appointed by the
President and Assistant Directors General shall be appointed by the Prime
Minister on the advice of the Minister with the concurrence of the
Director General.
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The Director General may, at his discretion, delegate certain of
his functions to the Deputy Director Generalor to an Assistant Director
General, and, in the event of his absence from the Republic, his in-
capacity or his absence on leave, his functions may be performed by the
Deputy Director General or, in the event of the Deputy Director General
being for any reason unable to assume them, by an Assistant Director
General authorized in written Order by the Prime Minister.
SECTION 5: TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE
Article 9.
(1) The Force shall be organized territorially into five levels:
a. The Directorate General;
b. Four or more regional directorates, one Saigon Metropo-
litan Directorate, all subordinate to the Directorate
General;
C. A number of Provinces and Autonomous Cities, or, in the
case of the Saigon Metropolitan area, a number of
Precincts, subordinate to their related Directorates;
d. A number of NP Sub-Precincts in Saigon,a number of NP
Districts in Provinces or Cities and in any locality as
necessary;
e. A number of NP Posts in Saigon, a number of NP Stations
in City Quarters or in each Village of each Province.
Upon requirements, there may be a number of NP Sub-Posts
or Sub-Stations in any locality as necessary..
(2) The boundaries of NP Precinct, City Province, Sub-Precinct,
District, Post, Stations, Sub-Post, and Sub-Station areas shall normally
conform to those of the corresponding civil administrative area.
(3) Where an emergency or other special problem makes it necessary,
the Minister may by Order create police "special areas" with the status
of police Province, District or Station as. may. seem to.him to be appro-
priate; provided that any Regulation made under this section shall be
reviewed annually and that no police special area shall remain in being
for longer than is necessary to overcome the emergency or problem to
meet which it was created.
SECTION 6: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE
Article 10. The internal organization of the Force shall be prescribed
in an Order issued by the Minister.
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SECTION 7: COMMAND OF POLICE IN RESPONSIBLE TERRITORIAL
AREAS
Article 11. The command of the police in the territorial areas defined
in Article 9 (1), provided that such command positions must be below
that of Assistant Director General, shall be exercised by officers
appointed for this purpose by the Director General.
In the case of areas or units subordinate to a. Province and func-
tional positions below that of Province Police Chief, the Director
General may, by order in writing, delegate to a police officer holding
a functional position of Director of NP Directorate and above, the
authority to appoint the police officers by whom command of such areas
or units shall be exercised. Provided that all such appointments are
made in accordance with the terms of Article 23 of this taw.
SECTION 8: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE AND CIVIL
ADMINISTRATION
Article 12.
(1) It shall be the duty of every Police Unit Commander to keep
the appropriate Administrative Chief informed of all matters occurring
or likely to occur within his area of responsibility which may affect
the peace, security or good order of the area.
(2) The Administrative Chief is responsible for the maintenance of
law and order within the area of his jurisdiction and he may direct the
Police Unit Commander, by written order, to take such lawful measures
as he considers necessary for this purpose. Provided that the Adminis-
trative Chief may not direct the Police Unit Commander to undertake
duties not provided for in this Law, or Regulations made thereunder or to
act in contravention of the policies, methods and procedures prescribed
by the Director General.
SECTION 9: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE AND ARMED FORCES
Article 13.
(1) Armed Forces may be requisitioned by:
The Director General of National Police,
A Regional Director,
A Provincial Police Chief,
When, within his area of Police jurisdiction, a serious breach
of Public Security is apprehended or for the purpose of quelling a
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serious breach of Public Security when such authorized officer is satis-
fied that a situation which is considered to be imminent or which has
developed cannot be met by the National Police.
(2) Where Armed Forces are requisitioned in the terms of para-
graph (1) above they will be in support of the civil authorities.
(3) Regulations governing the manner in which Armed Forces may be
requisitioned and employed in the terms of this Article shall be pre-
scribed by Decree of the Prime Minister.
Article 14. National Police shall have the same powers of arrest and
detention over guilty personnel of the Armed Forces as they have over
any other member of the public provided that within the time limit
prescribed by law any member of the Armed Forces so arrested or detained
shall be released or handed over to the Civil or Military Public Prose-
cutor having jurisdiction.
SECTION 10: MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS
Article 15.
(1) 'Every Police Unit Commander shall maintain records in such
manner and in such form as may be prescribed by Service Letter of the
Director General; in particular all complaints and offences against any
Law which are reported by members of the public or by police officers
and the name and Identity Card number of every person arrested or
detained, the reason for such arrest or detention and the ranks and
police numbers of the police officers making the arrest of or detaining
such person shall be recorded.
(2) A copy of any entry made in any police record maintained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) above and certified by
the Police Unit Commander concerned shall, until. the contrary is proved,
be accepted by the Court as an accurate record; no proof of the signa-
ture of the Police Unit Commander shall be required unless the Court has
reason to doubt its genuineness.
SECTION 11: OATH OF OFFICE
Article 16.
(1) Every police officer shall, on first appointment and before
assuming duty, taken an oath of office, in such form and before such
officer as may be prescribed by Order of the Minister, in the manner
most binding on his conscience.
(2) Every police officer appointed to an office to which judicial
powers have been entrusted by law shall take before a regional tribunal
an oath of office in such form as prescribed by law prior to assuming duty.
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SECTION 12: CERTIFICATE OF APPOINT[IENT
Article 17. A certificate of appointment, in such form as may be pre-
scribed by the Minister, signed by the Director General or other
officer authorized by him, shall be issued to every police officer at
the time of his first appointment to the Force and shall be proof of
his Status as a police officer, vested with the powers, responsibilities
and immunities provided by this Law.
SECTION 13:- GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND PRIVILEGES
Article 18. Police officers are a special type of government employees
but, except where contrary to the provisions of this Law, shall be
subject to the same Laws and Regulations, and shall enjoy the same
rights and benefits, as are applicable to civil servants of correspon-
ding status.
CHAPTER V
SECTION 1: RANKS
Article 19,
(1) National Police personnel shall consist of four ranks each of
which will be sub-divided into a number of classes in the following
order of seniority and command authority.
INTENDANTS
Principal
Intendant Out of Class
Principal
Intendant
Intendant
Class
1
Intendant
Class
2
Intendant
Class
3
Intendant
Class 4 (Also Probationary Intendant)
COMMISSIONERS
Commissioner
Class
1
Commissioner
Class
2
Commissioner
Class
3
Commissioner
Class
4
(Also Probationary Commissioner)
DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS
Deputy Commissioner Class
1
Deputy Commissioner Class
2
Deputy Commissioner Class
3
Deputy Commissioner Class
4
(Also Probationary Deputy
Commissioner)
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INSPECTORS
Inspector
Inspector
Class
Class
I
2
Inspector
Class
3
Inspector
Class
4
(Also Probationary Inspector),.
(2) The salary indices to be applied to each rank and class of
rank shall be prescribed by Decree of the.Prime Minister.
SECTION 2: SENIORITY AND PROPORTION OF RANKS
Article 20.
(1) The ranks and classes prescribed in Article 19 (1) are arranged
in order of seniority, from the highest to the lowest.. Officers of
higher rank command all those of lower ranks and officers within higher
classes of each rank command all those in lower classes of their rank.
(2) The Director General and Deputy Director General and officers
of each rank and class within each rank shall wear a separate and dis-
tinctive insignia. Insignia and dress uniform for each rank and class
of rank will be prescribed by Decree of the Prime Minister.
(3) The proportion of police officers in each rank above Inspec-
tor shall be not less than:
Intendants 0.2% of total Force strength
Commissioners
Deputy Commissioners 9.0%
SECTION 3: NATIONAL POLICE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
Article 21.
(1) Police officers of all ranks are placed under the management
of the National Police Management Committee, which shall consist of:
The Minister (or his representative) ...... Chairman
The Director General (or his representative) ... Deputy Chairman
The Chief of Personnel Service, Directorate General...Member
Two representatives from each rank of the Force selected by
the officers of each rank respectively ............ Member
In addition to being a full Member of the Management Committee,
the Chief of Personnel Service shall also act as Secretary.
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(2) The Management Committee shall meet whenever convened by the
Chairman or at the request of the Director Genera; it will make all
decisions by a straight majority vote and, in the event of a tied vote,
the vote of the Chairman shall decide
(3) In matters relating to the discipline and promotion of
individual officers only those officers of or above the rank of the
officer concerned may attend management committee meetings.
SECTION 4: RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION
Article 22. Upon the recommendation of the Management Committee,
police officers will be recruited, promoted, punished or permitted to
resign by Decree, Order or Decision from the following officials:
- Prime Minister Decree in respect of officers of
the rank of Intendant and above,
Ministerial Order in respect of
officers of the rank of Commis-
sioner and Deputy Commissioner,
Director General Decision in respect of officers of
the rank of Inspector.
SECTION 5: ASSIGNMENT OF COMMAND POSTS
Article 23.
(1) Police officers shall be assigned to functional and command
positions according to the following comparative table:
Positions of Director General and Deputy Director General
will be assigned to officers of the rank of Intendant
Class 1 or above.
Positions of Assistant Director General or equivalent
will be assigned to officers of the rank of Intendant
Class 2 or above.
Positions of Chief of Service or equivalent will be
assigned to officers of the rank of Intendant or above.
Positions of Chief of Province Police or equivalent will
be assigned to officers of the rank of Commissioner
Class 2 or above.
Positions of Chief of Bureau or equivalent will be
assigned to officers of the rank of Deputy Commissioner
Class 2 or above.
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Positions of Chief of District or equivalent will he
assigned to officers of the rank of Deputy Commissioner
or above.
Positions of Chief of Station and equivalent will be
assigned to officers of the rank of Inspector Class 2
or above.
(2) The Prime Minister will prescribe equivalent command and
functional positions by Order.
SECTION 6: RECRUITMENT
Article 24. Individual who wish
lowing general requirements:
to join the Force must meet the fol-
(1) Aptitude: Be of Vietnamese
rights and of good behavior.
Nationality, possessing civil
(2) Education Abe and Physical Condition
a. To be appointed Intendant hold a university degree.
b. To be appointed Commissioner hold a Baccalaureate Part 2
Certificate or equivalent, or higher.
c. To_ be appointed Deputy Commissioner hold a Baccalaureate
Part 1 Certificate or equivalent.
d. To be appointed Inspector possess an educational back-
ground as completion of Elementary level.
e. Be at least 18 and not more than 30 years of age (Appli-
cants under 21 years must have their parents' or
sponsors' approval). This age-limit may be extended by
not more than 5 years for applicants holding university
degree, 10 years for persons with equivalent seniority
in either the civil or military service or a combination
of the two, and 15 years for serving non-career officers
of the Force.
f. Be in good health as certified by a public health agency.
Have a minimum height of:
Male: 1m57
Female: 1m47
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h. Have a power of vision of:
5/10: uncorrected
10/10: with glasses
Provided that no one may be directly appointed to the rank of
Intendant or Commissioner other than in a technical capacity. All other
appointments within these ranks shall be reserved for serving officers.
(3) The physical conditions stipulated in (g) and (h) above may be
reduced by the Minister, after consultation with the Management Committee,
in the light of service and manpower needs.
(4) Professional Ability
a. Applicants must pass an entrance examination fixed by an
Order of the Minister for the rank at which they wish to
enter and then graduate from a specialized training
course conducted by the appropriate Police Training Center.
b. During the training period, trainees will receive the
salary of a probationary officer of the rank for which
they have been recruited from which deductions shall be
made by order of the Director General as a contribution
towards the cost of messing and for such other benefits
as they may receive.
SECTION 7: PROBATIONARY PERIOD
Article 25. Recruits will undergo a two-year probationary period, in-
cluding time spent under training. Non-career police officers trans-
ferred to career status may count their previous service for a maximum
reduction of one year in the period of probation.
SECTION 8: RECRUITMENT OF ALIENS
Article 26. Vietnamese of alien descent may be recruited into the Force
in career. status only after five years of naturalization; provided that
the following persons shall be exempt from this condition:
a. Former Vietnamese and their minor children on their re-
naturalization.
b. Aliens recently naturalized who have completed military service
in compliance with current regulations.
c. Aliens recently naturalized who are adjudged by the Minister
to merit a waiver of the five year naturalization rule.
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SECTION 9: RESIGNATION
Article 27. Police officers may normally request permission to resign
only after five years of service. This period may be reduced for
female police officers. Requests for resignation must be made in hand
writing at least three months before the date on which the police
officer concerned wishes to cease work. The request will be decided
upon by the appropriate official, as defined in Article 22, on the
advice of the Management Committee.
CHAPTER VI
SECTION 1: EVALUATION SHEETS FOR CLASS PROMOTION
Article 28. In September of each year every police officer must record
all matters relating to service and family status in an Evaluation
Sheet, the form and content of which will be prescribed by Order of the
Minister.
Article 29. Annually, Unit Commanders shall forward the Evaluation
Sheets of their subordinates to the Personnel Service of the Directorate
General of National Police, through command channels together with
nominal lists of:
a. Police officers meeting seniority requirements and recommended
for promotion in class.
b. Police officers meeting seniority requirements but not recom-
mended for promotion in class. In each ase the reason for
not recommending promotion, and any statement the police
officer concerned wishes to make after having been notified
of this reason will be attached.
c. Police officers not meeting seniority requirements for promotion
in class.
SECTION 2: REVIEW FOR CLASS PROMOTION
Article 30. In December of each year, the Personnel Service of the
Directorate General will gather complete promotion dossiers of all
police officers to submit to the Management Committee for review and
consideration. Decisions of the Management Committee shall be issued
in the forms of minutes, over the signatures of all authorized committee
members, and shall be transmitted to the appropriate official prescribed
in Article 22 above for promulgation of the necessary Order or Decision.
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SECTION 3: PREVIOUS SENIORITY
Article 31. Previous seniority in military service and time served in
unhealthy or dangerous areas may be added to police seniority for class
promotion in accordance with the provisions of the current laws
governing the status of civil servants.
SECTION 4: CLASS PROMOTION
Article 32.
(1) Officers who have completed two years of service in the top
step of their class will be considered for class promotion provided
that they have been recommended by their direct commander and have no
punishments recorded against them for two years.
(2). Class promotion will be based solely on merit which will in-
clude spirit in service performance and academic qualifications.
SECTION 5: STEP INCREASE
Article 33.
(1)' Police officers will be advanced automatically to the next
higher step within their class after completing two years of service on
their present step, provided that they have not been awarded a major
punishment or two recorded minor punishments during that period.
(2) A police officer whose step increase is stopped in accordance
with paragraph 1 above shall be awarded the step increase after two
years from the date of the award of the last recorded punishment.
SECTION 6: POLICE OFFICERS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PROMOTION
Article 3.4. The dossier of an officer not recommended for class promo-
tion on three consecutive occasions will be forwarded to the Management
Committee for review. In these circumstances, the officer concerned has
the right to appear in person before the Management Committee to present
his case prior to any decision being taken.
SECTION 7: RANK PROMOTION
Article 35.
(1) Rank promotion, as necessary to fill vacancies, shall be made
by examination of eligible serving police officers followed by gradua-
tion from a course of training.
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(2) Only when the Management Committee is satisfied that there are
no serving police officers eligible and suitable for rank promotion will
vacancies be filled by direct entry.
SECTION 8: EXAMINATION FOR RANK PROMOTION
Article 36.
(1) Save as provided in Article 39, eligibility for attendance at
an examination for rank promotion is reserved for officers with at least
four years service in their present rank who have not less than three
years service to complete before reaching retirement age.
(2) A police officer who fails at his first or any subsequent
attempt to pass the examination for promotion to a higher rank shall
wait two years before becoming eligible to make a further attempt.
(3) Details concerning examinations for rank promotion shall be
prescribed by Decree of the Prime Minister or Order of the Minister, as
appropriate to the rank for which they are intended.
SECTION 9: COURSES FOR RANK PROMOTION
Article 37.
(1) Police officers who are successful in the examination for
rank promotion will be accepted for the appropriate training course and,
on graduation, shall be promoted to the next higher rank.
(2) A police officer who fails, other than for disciplinary
reasons, to graduate from a training course for rank promotion, may be
allowed to re-enter for the qualifying examination and attend a second
course after a period of three years.
SECTION 10: SALARY INDEX UPON RANK PROMOTION
Article 38. Upon promotion an officer shall be placed.on the step of
the new rank which carries the same salary index or, if there is no
such step, at the step which carries the salary index closest to but
higher than that which he held in his previous rank.
SECTION 11: EXEMPTION FROM SENIORITY REQUIREMENT FOR
EXAMINATION
Article 39. Police officers of the following ranks holding the diploma
or certificate shown will be exempted from the seniority requirement for
promotion examination:
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- 1.).spectors Class 3 or above holding Baccalaureate 1 or
an equivalent diploma;
Deputy Commissioner Class 3 or above holding full
Baccalaureate or an equivalent diploma;
Commissioners Class 3 or above holding Bachelor Degree
or an equivalent diploma.
SECTION 12: MEDALS-COMMENDATIONS
Article 40.
(1) Medals, commendation letters and merit citations may be awarded
to police officers who display exceptional merit. In case of death in
action, and dependent upon the merit of the individual, a special class
or rank promotion may be granted posthumously.
(2) Benefits on the different types of awards which may be granted,
the officials who may make awards and the circumstances in which they
may be made will be prescribed by Decree of the Prime Minister.
CHAPTER VII
SECTION 1: SALARIES
Article 41. Police salaries consist of:
a. Basic salary, calculated upon the salary indices authorized
under the provisions of Article 19(2);
b. Common allowances for civil servants, provided in Article 18;
c. Functional allowances: the positions for which this allowance
shall be paid shall be prescribed by Decree of the Prime
Minister;
d. Special allowances reserved for police officers as authorized
by Articles 42, 43, 44 and 45 of this Law.
SECTION 2: SPECIAL ALLOWANCES RESERVED FOR POLICE
OFFICERS
Article 42. Risk Allowance: Shall be paid monthly to serving police
officers.
Article 43. Housing Allowance:
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(1) Married police officers shall be provided with suitable
family accommodation and bachelor police officers shall be provided
with suitable bachelor acconmiodation at their assigned location or
shall be paid ri monthly housing,; Allowance in Lieu.
(2) Where both husband and wife are police officers and are
serving in the same location, only one of them, at their choice, shall
be entitled to accommodation or Housing Allowance in lieu.
(3) A police officer who for any reason refuse.s to occupy accomo-
dation allocated to him shall forfeit all entitlement to Housing
Allowance while assigned to that location.
Article 44. Uniform Allowance:
(1) Police officers shall be issued with free uniform and personal
equipment. If for any reason it is not possible to provide, in whole or
in part this free issue during any given year, a Uniform Allowance or a
proportion thereof shall be paid in lieu for that year only.
(2) The pattern and scale of issue of uniform and personal equip-
ment provided for police officers shall be prescribed by Order of the
Minister.
Article 45. Technical and Specialist Allowance: Police officers of and
below the rank of Deputy Commissioner who have graduated from an approved
course of technical or specialist training shall be paid a monthly Tech-
nical Allowance for as long as they remain assigned to the technical or
specialist duty for which such training qualifies them.
Article 46. The amount of the allowances authorized by Articles 42, 43,
44 and 45, the circumstances in which and the method by which such
allowances shall be paid shall be prescribed by Order of the Minister.
CHAPTER VIII
SECTION 1: DISCIPLINE
Article 47. Loyalty and Obedience: Police officers must be loyal to
the Government, uphold and safeguard the Constitution and enforce Na-
tional and local laws and regulations. They must also promptly and
strictly obey the orders of their superior officers provided that these
orders are not in abuse or excess of the powers, or outside the respon-
sibilities of the Force, as prescribed by Law.
Article 48. Responsibility for Maintenance of Discipline: The Director
General shall be responsible for the discipline of the Force and shall
have the authority to issue specific instructions for the maintenance of
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discipline. Police officers holding command or supervisory positions
at any level are responsible for the discipline of their subordinates
and for enforcing the instructions of the Director General.
Article 49. Offences: A police officer who commits any of the following
offences shall be punished by one of the disciplinary measures provided
in Article 50:
a. Cowardice in the performance of duty;
b. Insubordination;
c. Disobedience or neglect of police regulations or any police
orders, whether written or verbal;
d. Sleeping on duty;
e. Absence from duty without leave or good cause;
f. Being unfit for duty through intoxication from drink or
drugs ;
g. Malingering;
h. In the course of duty making a statement which is false in a
material particular;
i. Wilful or negligent destruction, damage or loss of government
property;
j. Unlawful, excessive or unnecessary use of police authority;
k. Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline or
which is likely to bring the Force or the public service into
disrepute.
Article 50. Punishments:
(1) Any police officer who violates Articles 47, 48, and 49 shall
be subject to one of the following punishments:
a. Warning without record in personnel fire.
b. Reprimand with record in personnel fire.
c. Confinement in barrack for 1 to 30 days.
d. Delay in promotion.
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e. Downgrading one or two salary steps.
f. Suspension from duty for 1 to 60 days without pay.
(2) The table at Appendix 1 of this Law provides for higher police
officers the authority to order punishments, the ranks of the officers
against whom they may order punishments, and prescribes the maximum
punishment which they may order; no punishmwnt order other than those
listed in paragraph (1) above may be imposed upon a police officer for a
disciplinary offence.
(3) The power to. dismiss from the Force Police officers of any
rank is reserved to the officials empowered to appoint to that rank.
Article 51. Appeal against Punishment: Police officers have a right of
appeal against punishment in accordance with procedures fixed by the
Director General.
SECTION 2:. REMOVAL OF PUNISHMENT RECORD FROM PERSONAL
FILE
Article 52.
(1) Warning, reprimand and confinement in barrack are minor punish-
ments and do not of themselves affect promotion; after a period of two
years of clean conduct they will automatically be removed from the record.
(2) The remaining punishments are major and are a bar to promotion.
A police officer may request that a record of a major punishment be
removed from his personal. file and that he. be restored to the promotion
list if he:
a. Has completed two years of clean conduct from the date
of the original offence and thereafter receives official
recognition of meritorious service or outstanding
achievement, or .
b. Has completed six years of clean conduct from the date
of the original offence.
(3) A request by a police officer for the removal of a record of
a major punishment shall be decided by the Director General, on the
advice of the Management Committee.
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CHAPTER IX
SECTION 1: RESPONSIBILITIES OF POLICE OFFICERS
Article 53.
(1)
Police officers are responsible for:
a. Protecting lives and property of the citizens;
b. Maintaining order and security;
c. Assisting administrative and judicial authorities in
the enforcement of laws and regulations and in search,
investigation and arrest of offenders;
d. Collecting, collating and communicating intelligence on
matters likely to endanger the internal security of the
Republic;
e. Controlling traffic, preventing obstructions of any kind
and keeping order on public roads and in other public
places;
f. Cooperating with other states and international organi-
zations with which the Republic of Vietnam has policing
agreements.
(2) Whether on or off duty, police officers must at all times be
ready to carry out these responsibilities and for this purpose may be
assigned for duty at any time anywhere within the Republic of Vietnam.
SECTION 2: RIGHT TO USE FIREARMS
Article 54.
(1) Individual firearms are provided to police officers for use
in carrying out their responsibilities. A permit shall be issued by
the Director General or any police officer to whom he delegates this
power authorizing the police officer to whom it is issued to carry a
firearm. But this permit shall not exempt a police officer from
licensing requirements in respect of any private firearm in his
possession.
(2) Any police officer may use arms against:
a. Any person in lawful custody when such person is
escaping or attempting to escape where such police
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that he
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cannot otherwise prevent the escape and has given an
oral warning to such person that he is about to use
such arms against him and such warning is unheeded;
b. Any person who:
By force, rescues or attempts'to rescue any other
person from lawful custody; or
By force, prevents or attempts to prevent the law-
ful arrest of himself or any other person.
Where such police officer has reasonable ground to
believe that he or any other person is in danger of
grievous bodily harm and that he cannot otherwise effect
such arrest or prevent such rescue.
(3) In the event of police action in any of the circumstances in
paragraph (2) above, accidental injury caused to a third person will be
a civil charge against the Government and all compensation payable to
the victim. will be met from the National Budget.
SECTION 3: POWER TO ERECT ROAD BARRIERS
Article 55.
(1) Any Unit Commander of NP Directorates, Precincts, Provinces,
Cities, Sub-Precincts, Districts, Posts and. Stations may for the mainte-
nance of law and order or for the prevention or detection of crime or
for the apprehension of offenders, cause barriers to be erected across
any road or other public place.
(2) Any National Police officer in uniform may take reasonable
steps to prevent any person or vehicle from passing such barrier and
any person who fails to comply with any reasonable signal of such
police officer requiring him to stop before reaching such barrier shall
be sentenced to from eleven days to six months imprisonment or to a
fine of from $250 to $5,000.
(3) National Police officers shall not be liable for any loss,
injury or damage caused to any person or property resulting from any
attempt to pass such barrier in disregard of police signals.
SECTION 4: POWER TO ARREST WITHOUT A COURT ORDER
Article 56. Any police officer of or above the rank of Deputy Commis-
sioner is empowered to arrest without a warrant:
a. Any person whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of
having committed a felony or misdemeanour;
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b. Any person who obstructs a police officer while in the
execution of his duty, or who has escaped from lawful
custody;
c. Any person in whose possession anything is found which
may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property or
who may reasonably be suspected'of having committed a
felony or misdemeanour with reference to such thing;
d. Any person whom he suspects on reasonable grounds of
being a deserter from the Armed Forces of Vietnam;
e. Any person whom he finds in any public road or other
place during the night and whom he suspects upon reason-
able grounds of having committed or being about to
commit a felony or misdemeanour;
f. Any person having in his possession without lawful excuse
any firearm or offensive weapon or any implement of
housebreaking;
Article 57.
Any person for whom he has reasonable grounds to believe
to be the subject of a warrant of arrest, or a court
order of restricted residence and police supervision
with any of the provisions of which he is failing to
comply.
SECTION 5: POWER TO STOP, SEARCH AND APPREHEND PERSONS,
VEHICLES AND VESSELS 11 1
(1) While carrying out their responsibility for the maintenance of
public order and security any police officer in uniform is emplowered to:
a. Stop and check the papers of suspect persons or of
those in possession of something or doing something
which requires a permit as prescribed by law.
b. Arrest, without court order required, persons who are
not in possession of identification papers or who possess
improper identification papers, except when such persons
are guaranteed by two reliable persons and on the condi-
tion that they shall report themselves on receipt of a
Court order or a Police requisition letter requiring
them to do so.
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c. Temporarly detain on the spot for search, without Court
order required, persons, vehicles and vessels suspected
of an illegal action; provided that,. if no illegal act
is revealed, such temporary detention shall not last
longer than is reasonably necessary for check, search
and interrogation.
d. Any person who fails to obey a reasonable signal, order
or request made under paragraph (1) above shall be sen-
tenced to imprisonment from from 11 days to 3 months or
to a fine of from $250 to $5,000.
(2) Vehicles or vessels reasonably suspected of having been used
for illegal purposes shall be moved to the nearest police station for
custody pending a fuller investigation. Such custody shall not exceed
forty-eight hours; thereafter the case must be submitted to the Court
for decision.
SECTION 6: POWER TO SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT
Article 58.
(1) In addition to carrying out Court orders any police officer
of or above the rank of Deputy Commissioner may, with the consent of
the householder or owner, search buildings under the following
circumstances:
a. To pursue and arrest offenders seen to enter, or whom
there are reasonable grounds to believe have entered
and are still within the building and to seize for use
as material evidence in Court, anything in the posses-
sion of or left by an offender.
b. When there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there
are traces or material evidence left by an offender in
the building which, if not seized immediately, may be
subject to destruction or removal.
(2) In either of the cases mentioned in paragraph (1) above, if
for any reason the consent of the householder or owner cannot be ob-
tained, police officers may still enter and search provided that they
do so in the presence of two voluntary witnesses and, if there is no
other reasonable way by which they may achieve their lawful purpose,
may use such minimum force on persons or property as may be necessary
to obtain entry and to effect search.
(3) For the purpose of emergency pursuit of offenders or of
approach to the scene of a crime, police officers may demand the
opening of any door or gate and the removal of any other obstacle
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to their progress and, if such demand is refused or not complied with
in reasonable time, may use such minimum force as is necessary to obtain
passage.
(4) In every case where the powers provided by this Article are
used, an immediate police report must be made and signed by all persons
concerned and sent to the public prosecutor having jurisdiction in the
area.
SECTION 7: POWER TO CONTROL PUBLIC MEETINGS AND
ASSEMBLIES
Article 59.
(1) The Police Unit Commander of a Province, Precinct or City,
shall consider all requests for meetings or ceremonies, with or without
procession, for which a permit is required and advise the Administrative
authorities whether or not such requests should be approved with adduc-
tion of good reasons.
(2) Police officers are empowered to order any unauthorized pro-
cession or meeting to stop and disperse and to arrest, without Court
order required, any person who does not promptly obey such order.
(3) Police officers are empowered to order any authorized pro-
cession or meeting which is in violation of any conditions imposed by
the administrative authority or when fresh facts make it appear that
such gathering will endanger security, to stop and disperse and to
arrest, without Court order, any person who does not promptly obey such
order and who is responsible for any such violation.
(4) Any person who fails to comply with an order made under para-
graphs 2 or 3 of this Article 59 shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
from 11 days to 3 months or a fine of from $350 to $5,000.
SECTION 8: POWER TO FORBID DISPLAY OF FLAGS SLOGANS
AND POSTERS
Article 60.
(1) With the concurrence of the Administrative authority the
Police Unit Commander is empowered to forbid the display within his
area of jurisdiction of any type of flag, slogan, poster or other
devide which may intentionally or otherwise excite the public against
the Government or lawful authority, endanger the security of the
Republic or cause public disorder and any police officer may, without
a Court order, arrest any person who continues to display such flag,
slogan or poster or other device and seize the material evidence for
production before the Court.
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(2) Any person who fails to obey the police order made under
paragraph (1) of this article 60 shall be sentenced to from 11 days to
3 months imprisonment or toa fine of from $250 to $5,000.
SECTION 9: POWER TO TAKE FINGERPRINTS
Article 61. Police officers are empowered to require persons lawfully
in police custody or subject to restricted residence to submit to the
taking of their fingerprints, footprints or photograph as may be
necessary for identification or investigation and, if any person re-
fuses to submit, to use such minimum force as may be necessary to
achieve the purpose.
SECTION 10:. POWER TO CALL WITNESSES
Article 62.
(1) A police officer of or above the rank. of Deputy Commissioner
may verbally or by letter require any person who he has reason to
believe has information which will assist him in investigation. to
attend before him at any police station in the localy in which such
person resides or for the time being is.
(2) Any person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with
a requisition to present himself to a police station shall be sentenced
to a contravention penalty.
SECTION 11: UNCLAIMED PROPERTY
Article 63.
(1) Police officers are empowered and required to take possession
of all unclaimed property found by or handed to them and to deposit
such property at the police station having jurisdiction over the area;
on each occasion that a police officer takes possession of any un-
claimed property, he shall make an immediate report, countersigned by
one or more witnesses, of the circumstances of the case.
(2) The Unit Commander of every police station shall maintain a
register of all unclaimed property deposited with him for safe custody
and shall cause a notice of such property to be prominently displayed
outside the police station; any property not claimed by its owner
after a period of three months shall be reported to the competent
Court with a request for a decision.
(3) Unclaimed property of a perishable nature shall be made the
subject of a report to the Court. of competent jurisdiction within the
area for a decision.
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CHAPTER X
SECTION 1: OBLIGATIONS OF POLICE OFFICERS
Article 64. Restriction on Commercial, Business or Trade Activities:
(1) No police officer or his wife or minor child shall engage in
any activity of a commercial, business or trade nature the object of
which is to obtain or undertake Government contracts or services or to
obtain for a third person any Government permit, license or other
official document.
(2) Whenever a police officer or his wife wishes to engage in any
commercial, business or trade activity, he shall first obtain the per-
mission of the Director General or an officer authorized by him; such
permission shall not be refused unless the Director General or officer
authorized by him is satisfied that the proposed activity fails within
the scope of paragraph (1) of this Article 64 or is otherwise detrimen-
tal to the efficiency of the police officer concerned or to the repu-
tation and good name of the Force.
Article 65. Prohibition of Political Activities:
(1) Police officers are prohibited from holding officer or taking
active part in the conduct or management of, or speaking or canvassing
on behalf of, any federation, association or party the object of which
is political.
(2) Within thirty days from the date of promulgation of this Law,
police officers holding office in or taking part in the conduct or
management of any federation, association or party engaged in political
activities shall resign from such officer and cease to take any part in
the conduct or management thereof; any police officer who, after this
period of thirty days, continues to hold office in, assist in the con-
duct or management of, or speaks or canvasses on behalf of, any
federation, associal or party engaged in political activities, shall be
in violation of Force discipline.
Article 66. Prohibition of Membership of Trade Unions:
(1) Police officers are prohibited from becoming or remaining
members of any Trade Union or any other organization other than a
Police Society established in accordance with Article 73 of this Law,
the purpose of which is to influence the pay or conditions of service
of police officers or of any other group of individuals.
(2) Within thirty days of the promulgation of this Law, any
police officer who remains a member of a Trade Union or other body
prescribed in paragraph (1) above shall be in violation of police
discipline.
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Article 67. Prohibition of Strikes: Police officers are forbidden to
go on strike for any purpose whatsoever.
Article 68. Property Declaration:
(1) Every police officer shall, upon first recruitment to the
Force, make a written declaration of all property or other assets
possessed or co-possessed by him or his wife and minor children of a
value of VN$100,000 or more.
(2) Thereafter, every police officer shall submit a supplementary
declaration whenever there is a change in his assets of VN$100,000 or
more.
Article 69. Presumption of Corruption Activity:
(1) Police officers publicly conducting their lives obviously in
excess of the salary and allowances enjoyed by them shall, unless they
can show justification for their additional income, be presumed to be
engaged in corrupt activities.
(2) A police officer shall be presumed, until such time as the
origin of such property or other asset can be justified, to be engaged
in corrupt activities when he, his wife or minor child is found pos-
sessing, co-possessing or signing for the possession of any property or
other asset to a value of more than VN$100,000 which has not been
declared in the original and supplementary declaration.
SECTION 2: PRIVILEGES OF POLICE OFFICERS
Article 70. Protection against Court Action when Acting on Lawful
Orders:
(1) A police officer executing in accordance with lawful procedure
any order of sentence, Court summons or any other written order by a
competent government official shall not be held responsible for the
result of such action but shall be regarded as a witness.
(2) Where an order of sentence, Court summons or other written
order is proved to be forged or unlawfully signed, a police officer
executing or acting upon it shall still not be held responsible for the
result if there is reasonable evidence to show that he acted upon such
order in good faith.
(3) When detained for investigation, police officers will be con-
fined in a separate section of each jail.
Article 71. Protection of Salary and Allowances: No deduction may be
made from the salary and allowances of any police officer in settlement
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of a private debt or for any other reason except in accordance with a
proper Court order or with the written consent of the police officer
concerned.
Article 72. Military Service:
(1) Except in the case of general mobilization, a police officer
is exempted from his obligation for military service for as long as he
remains on active duty or upon completion of five years service in the
Force.
(2) In the case of general mobilization a serving police officer
who has completed not less than two years service, including period
under training, shall be exempt from military service for as long as
he remains on active duty in the Force; any police officer who, for
any reason other than discharge on medical grounds, leaves the Force
during a period of general mobilization, shall immediately become liable
to complete his full military obligation.
Article 73. Police Societies:
(1) In order to give police officers the opportunity to study all
matters related to the conditions of their service and employment and
the effectiveness of the methods and procedures used in police work,
and present to the Government any changes or improvements which seem to
them to be necessary or aspirations, one or more Police Societies may
be created,
(2) A police society may cover one rank or a combination of
several ranks, but membership shall be confined to police officers;
the society shall be completely independent and shall not be associated
in any way with any federation, organization or individual outside the
Force and should not be considered as a trade union.
(4) A police society may not engage in any form of political
activity, neither may it interest itself in the appointment, promotion,
transfer, discipline or dismissal of any individual police officer
unless such action involves a matter of general principle affecting
other police officers; the organization, procedure and operation of
police societies shall be prescribed by an Order of the Minister.
CHAPTER XI
SECTION 1: MISCELLANEOUS AND TRANSITIVE PROVISIONS
Article 74. Conversion to New Ranks: Career and non-career police
officers in the Force at the date of promulgation of this Law shall be
converted from their present rank and status to the new ranks provided
in Article 19 in accordance with a Decree of the Prime Minister.
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Article 75. Attached and Detached Personnel:
(1) Civil servants and military personnel attached for service
in the Force shall assume the obligations, and may enjoy the full rights
and privileges, provided by this Law except that,?in:the case of pro-
motion, they will continue to be governed by the regulations of their
parent branch; save as provided in paragraph (3) of this Article 75,
periods of attachment may not exceed two years.
(2) If required in the interest of the public service, police
officers may be detached to serve with other government agencies.
During such detachment police officers shall enjoy either the full
rights and privileges provided by this Law or the full rights and
privileges of the agency to which they are detached, whichever are the
more beneficial to them, except that, in the case of promotion, they
will continue to be governed by the provisions of this Law; save as
provided in paragraph (3) below, periods of detachment may not exceed
two years.
(3) When, on completion of a period of two years attachment or
detachment the Force or the other Government agency, as the case may
be, wishes to retain the services of the officer concerned for a fur-
ther period, it shall first obtain the written consent of the officer
himself before seeking the agreement of the parent agency for the con-
tinuation of such attachment or detachment; during any period of
attachment or detachment exceeding two years, the officer concerned
shall, except in the case of promotion, enjoy the rights and privileges
of the agency with which he is employed.
Article 76. Branch Transfer:
(1) Civil servants and military personnel attached for service
in the Force at the date of promulgation of this Law and who have been
so attached for a period of not less than three years, shall have the
right to request permanent transfer to the Force in the ranks provided
in Particle 19 appropriate to their status and seniority.
(2) Requests made in accordance with paragraph (1) of this
Article 76 shall be the subject of a recommendation to the Prime
Minister by the Director General, having considered the advice of the
Management committee; the detailed procedure for such transfers shall
be prescribed in a subsidiary text by the Prime Minister.
Article 77. Additional Responsibilities, Powers, Rights and Benefits:
The responsibilities, powers, rights and benefits conferred on a
police officer by this Law shall be in addition to and not in derogation
of any other responsibilities, powers, rights and benefits conferred on
such police officer by any other Law.
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Article 78. Regulations and Orders: As appropriate to each level,
the Prime Minister, the Minister and the Director General are empowered
to issue whatever Decree, Ministerial Orders and instructions are
necessary to implement, complement or apply this Law.
FINAL CHAPTER
Article 79. Any provisions of current laws and regulations contrary to
those of this Law no longer apply to the National Police.
Article 80. The Prime Minister and the Minister are charged, within
their area of responsibility, with the execution of this Law.
This Law will be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of
Vietnam.
SAIGON,
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APPENDIX I
TABLE OF DISCIPLINARY PUNISHMENTS
ese~~s
Committee of
Rank of
Punishments from the
committee or
Officials having
punishable
minimum to the maximum
Officials
authority to order
Officers
having author-
ity to decide
or propose
punishments
Management
-Principal
-Warning
-President
Committee
Intendant
-Reprimand with record
-Prime
-Delay in promotion or
Minister
-Intendant
removal of name from tie
nominal list for promo-
tion (not exceeding
2 years)
-Downgrading I or 2
salary steps
.-Suspension of duty
-Proposal for dismissal
to the Prime Minister
Commissioner
-Warning
-Prime
-Reprimand with record
Minister
-Delay in promotion (not
exceeding 2 years)
-Downgrading 1 or 2
salary steps
-Suspension of.duty
-Dismissal
Deputy
-Warning
-Prime
Commissioner
-Reprimand with record
Minister
-Confinement in barrack
not exceeding 30 days
-Downgrading 1 or 2
salary steps
-Suspension of duty
-Dismissal
Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
Director General
-Intendant
-Warning
Management
-Commissioner
-Reprimand with record
Committee
-Delay in promotion (not
exceeding 1 year)
Deputy
-Warning
Management
Commissioner
-Reprimand with record
Committee
-Confinement in barrack
not exceeding 20 days
-Delay in promotion (not
exceeding 2 years)
Inspector
-Warning 1Management
-Reprimand with rlecord Committee
-Confinement in barrack
not exceeding 30 days
-Delay in promotion (not
exceeding 2 years).
-Downgrading 1 or 2
salary steps
-Suspension from duty
not exceeding 60 days
without pay
-Dismissal
-Deputy DG
-Intendant
-Warning
Director
-Assistant DG
,.Commissioner
-Reprimand with record
General
-Regional
Director
-Rector of NP
Deputy
-Warning
Director
Academy
Commissioner
-Reprimand with record
General
--Director of
-Confinement in barrack
Police Training
not exceeding 10 days
Center
Inspector
-Warning
Director
-Reprimand with record
General
-Confinement in barrack
not exceeding 15 days
Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
-Chief of Service
Deputy Chief of
-Warning
Deputy DG or
Precinct,
-Reprimand with record
Assistant DG
-Chief of Precinct,
Province and
Province and
City Police
Police
Cit
y
Deputy Com-
-Warning
Deputy DG or
-Deputy Rector
cissioner
-Reprimand with record
Assistant DG
-Deputy Director
-Confinement in barrack
of the SMPD
not exceeding .7 days
d
ant
-Inten
Inspector
-Warning
Deputy DG or
-Reprimand with record
Assistant DG
-Confinement in barrack
not exceeding 10 days
-Deputy Chief of
Deputy
Warning
Intendant
Precinct, Prov-
Commissioner
-Confinement in barrack
commanding a
ince & City Police
not exceeding 6 days
unit or Service
-Chief of Bureau
DGNP and Regions
Inspector
-Warning
-Equivalents
-Confinement in. barrack
-Commissioner
not exceeding 8 days
-Chief of Bureau
Inspector
-Warning
Intendant or
Province or
-Confinement. in barrack
Commissioner
Training Center
not exceeding.5 days
commanding a
-Chief of Sub-
unit
Precinct and
District Police
-Chief of NP Post
and Station and
Equivalents
-Deputy
Commissioner .
commanding a
unit.
Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
MAT
MAT
Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5
NSC review completed - and t t
on document
Approved For Release 2007/12/28: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300060003-5