HANOI REGIME MOVES AGAINST 'COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001300050014-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 2, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300050014-4
S1i EA 6~1 US ,01U~
.~t.. DEPAR1S ENT OF
~ ~ ~3I ECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH i)l
April 2, 190,
2'7xS FOi'I
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To The Ac t ing Secretary Ylly I'xJS2 ~!1?LyC.T ~'/ten A
S pl'' r~x r'OuV, ~ c Oa,~qTr. gTrz<
S1,,
Through: S/S r'y' t
t T
From 11S George C. Denney, Jr'..` GQ'NrCZ,
~o,.i(L l ar.
~r'lty.
ime doves Against "Counterrevolutionaries"
i R
H
eg
ano
Sub,je ct:
On arch 21 the North Vietnamese . regime published a decree on "the punio'l -
,
rient of counterrevolutionary crimes." This decree, adopted on October 30, 1907
by the DRV National Assembly. and promulgated by President 110 Chi Minh on
November 10, 1967, listed fifteen "counterrevolutionary" crimes and prescr' ed.
a variety of punishments for them ing from several years' irnprisonme) to
death. The four-month delay between the promulgation and the publicatio( cf
t Hanoi's expectations of c:atcr
1>,e decree is apex lamed but may be .:elated to
US military effort.
"Counterrevolutionary" Crimes Listed. The ."counterrevolutionary" crime::
listed in the.decree cover a wide range .of activities harmful to NVN state
security and to the warNeffort.' They include such crimes as "treason to the
.fatherland"; "plotting to,overthrow the , people's' democratic power"; "armed rebel-
lion"; "banditry for counterrevolutionary.purposes"; "defecting to the enemy";
rrs.aoote", "intruding into-.the territory of the, DRV"; "agitation to disturb
public security", "attacking deltention~camps"; "harboring counterrevolutionary
elements", and conspiring to do any of the'above as well as other listed acts.'
The decree also emphasized that state organs were to exercise leniency toward
those who were forced to act, who chose not to carry out their plots, who re-
;ro?L,te.d their actions, and/or who cooperated with the state security apparatus.
The Party journal Nhan Dan ?Qn March 21. accompanied publication of the
~r editorial calling for''greatcr, popular vigilance against "counter-
hr:; report wa~' p, t~K&q b~?N~'d Ofirr
,f intelligence and Research, Aside G'r _ Jt 1
-rum normal su'usiantive exchnnt;e with aL' ~Ol113 ~~C
,thcr agencies at the working level,
t hat, not been coordinated elsewhere. 1S /NO I-IO IGN DISSJ;M/CONr1 ZOU D 1)Z ~,IfjC~C)lV ,;: ;li:~ il(, ?l;i l
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revolutionary" elements and ar(.;uinL, 1ihat defense of security had to bee oil;e:
the "regular" work of every state or(;an and every citizen.
iZiari Dan Lists "Counterrevolutionaries;'. According to Nhan ll n, the
"counterrevolutionaries" comprise :"the stubborn elements in the former ox-
ploitting classes: landlords and capitalists, the reactionary elements profit in
by religion, the former puppet administration, army elements not \rantin;_'to
trances= themselves, and other reactionary and sabotae ink; . eloumcnts." It ;; ~atcu
that those "counterrevol.utioiiaries" arc. "only sa smal]. :force,", but added that
`Uheir scheiiic is too perfidious, and their activity is eiui tC dan(ereuw. " T'i-
called for harsh punish,uent but. also urged "clemency and puniskunent as ~ociatc:d .
with reformatory 'education" and stated that, the . re-ime will. not "misjudge the
Types of "'Counterrevolutionary" Acts. 1`?han Dan stated that the "counter-
revolutionaries,t.:plot to intensify activity attemptin3 to obstruct the socialist
construction work, weaken our national, defense force, and prevent the Nor-1-diorn
people's support for the liberation war waged by Southern .compatriots." Lccord-
to APP, the Vice Chairman of the People' c supreme Court complained that: .
"Tile counterrevolutionaries have tried to stop the peasants from joining the
cooperatives and from participating in mass, organizations. In addition, they
have tried to prohibit children from attending the state. schools and have tried
to stop citizens from fulfilling their military, service." IELse criticisms sugi;est
innocent."
~ha ilanoi is concerned, about pcr istcnt resistance to. the- increasing comniuriza-
lion of life in North Vietnam, in addition .to being concerne(t about the economy,
the war effort', and the infiltration
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T /110 r OFLuIGN D13s! M1(,OMtitULL:D 1)I ii i'S ` r ~ d ~ W'JbL US
internal Problems May Be Greater Than ::vident. Publication of the decree,
with ho Chi Minh as theprom ulga'uor, suggests. that the regime's internal prob-
lems maybe greater than has been' evident so far.' We do not believe that the
situation has come to any point approaching active opposition to the regime,,bLit
there may be passive resistance in the,, form of reluctance to work as ;hard as the
regii~ie wishes, and of a general failure to cooperate as enthusiastical.ly'as do-
aired with the regime's economic and military policies.' There may alsc be a.
gcncra1`7nalaise developing, combined ' with a widespread tendency to evade incluw-
tion. recent reports by repatriates leaving; North Vietnam indicate that l.ivin,;;
conditions and morale have declined appreciably in the last two years, particu-
larly in the' countryside which has. been bombed much more heavily than the big
cities.. But the reports do not reveal.any evidence of concerted action against
the regime, though they indicate considerable strain between the people and
corrupt Party cadre.* Nor do we anticipate such action, unless the'Party
splits or conditions worsen radically.
Deecree May Be Be;l.ated to Bombing, The regizue may have published the re-
port at this time bccause._it may expect-,an increase, in US bombings as the w-,,ather
improves over the next few months. It is noteworthy that the decree was origin-
ally px'omulgated in November 3.907 after several months of particularly int.en se
attacks against' the North. At that time there were other indications of i an.oi
;ace RM R -1l, "Spanisiz `~epat;ri.atc.s Report on Livj.n, Conditions an'
Morale; .in North Vietnam, March 3, .1963, and a! 1MA-12, "Spanish Itie-
patriates F;epor't on affects of Bombing in North Vietnam," March 16,
196. 1'OPJ!;IGN DISS:EM/COi7-4ROLI,'t;l) I)IS 1:114)
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INTERNAL USE ONLY
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SEC2.102AU FORLIGIN DISSiM~COiTI`RUI.L j) ISSIIi
concern about. public security. The regime publicized .;evcraj. arrests of pur-
ported "spies" in August of that year, and tae September Issue of the Party
ideological Journal Tine, carried two ' articles about the security problems
allegedly caused by. US/South Vietnam :se activities. We also receiveci a report
of greater security measures being . instituted in the northern provinces in
October and November. 1967. Hanoi's concern appears to have abated after that,
perhaps because the pace of the bombing; slackened somewhat, but it may be
mounting again at this time. A March 29.' broadcast stressing; the need to main-
tain security and order in the face of alleged increases in US psychological
warfare and espionage activities suggest that this is the case.
May Also Be Related to Southern Effort and Post-'Tet Letdown. It is also
possible tl,a publication of the decree reflects regime assessment of dc,ve].op-
,,,.,me7i~s in South Vietnam. The regime may anticipate the need to send many ri~ore
troops to the South and may believe that it must further tighten Northern
security conditions in order to be able both to:immunize its population from
war-weariness. and Allied blandishments and to 'ensure popular cooperation With
a smaller armed force in place. It may.., also be concerned about morale problems
in the North because of an emotional let-down following the r Lgh excitement and
expectations aroused by the Tot offensive.
Decree _Has Precem tine Character. . lFor these reasons, we believe the decree:
is intended not so much to combat current;problems as to forestall poccible future
problems. For. the time being,, despite inorale problems and. the severe dislocations
caused by the war, ef'fort and by. US bombings, -conditions in the North do not
appear to have deteriorated to the point where one can speak of significant
"
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;CRET/HO FURi';ZGN DISS~;M/COiV'i'1~oL LLa) DI S S'L'M
In 11.Qr, wily,
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Popular resistance to rec;ime policies.. But conceivably the rei;it:se may 2,c
worried that this situation could?worpon sharply if, air attacks intensify
while: Hanoi has to send.more troops to .the South, and the .'population co:aos to
the conclusion that the war 'could still last 'a lonk time. believe that the d ecree, is not intended primarily to combat lsc;
major crimes it lists (such as X)Iot tint; a ,;;ovc,rnlsment overthrow or armcc,
r, -
belliun) but to combat' the host. of' other problems S u c h : h as' dc:sert:ion, bla~ .z
znarkc?teeriit;;, and other acts harfu1 'to the economy) which could blossom ill'
conditions worsen further. The regiiiie may. hope that it can combat those lesser
acts more effectively by tying thorn tb. nsajor crimes wind to the .machinations of
foreign powers.
Decree Aims at Consolidation and Reiteration. The decree appears to aint
more at consolidating and dramatizing the: body of' North Vietnamese rules on
"counterrevolutionary" crimes than at creating new regulations. Though the
regime has not precise~.y listed its categories of "counterrevolutionary" crimes
in recent year,, most of the acts mentioned in the new decree would certainly
have, been punishable before the decree was passed. Thus,.: the decree serves
wore as a reminder and d warnin ; to: the. population of the regime's readiness
to act than as a now criminal code.
Array Problems Seem Unlikely. A. reference to, "army units not wantin,_; to
transform 'themselves" might be interpreted to sug est that the regime is con-
corned. about, military' loyalty and. support. We would, however, be inclined to
view ;.such speculation with' caution, since the reference occurs. in, list itt,:
Ui eounterrevolullonary" e.1cmento dating, back to pre-1954. Since we doubt
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Si C1,1~T/NO k'UI2LIGi~ '1? S J~ a 1/cor~'I 0I.LJU n7:;:, Ji 'i
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that there are many ouch older army elements left after fourteen years of
tight Communist rule,.we believe thatthe.reference in question probably is
intended to create sca
e
t
` ,
p
goa
s rathc
of. military loyalty and''discipline .
M1 or Last 1'"uroncan Connections Also Seem Unlikely.
By the sa;iac.? taZ; n,
we are not inclined to tie publication of ache new decree to,.arny netir llanoi
threat a ainst captured US pilots' or the' import of liberal, influences. such an
interpretation is possible in the case, of the pilots, since a swiuaary of tip;
decree; was broadcast in E.n,