BACKGROUND ON LAOS FOR POINTS PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001300050007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 2, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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2 March 1970
SUBTECT Background on Laos for Points Paper
I PRE-1962
1. Modern Political History:
Before the French arrived in Laos, a group of clans with
separate kingdoms had occupied the land for several hundred years.
The political boundaries of Laos, however, were ill-defined and came
into frequent conflict with territorial claims by neighboring states
until France made Laos a protectorate in 1893. Laos, as a name of a
state, dates from 1899 when the French began to administer the region
as a single unit with a chief resident at Vientiane. Under the French
the three kingdoms of Laos -- Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champassak
-- were unified in 1946 under the dynasty of Luang Prabang. The
country gained independence within the French Union in 1949. In a
series of successive steps subsequent to World War II, France gradually
accorded Laos its independence and in October 1953 recognized the
kingdom as a fully sovereign state. The kingdom of Laos, however,
reaffirmed its adherence to the French Union. This relationship was
dissolved upon the conclusion of the Geneva Agreements in 1954 which
terminated the Indo-China War.
Political forces set in motion from World War II worked
against a return to the status .quo ante. On 12 October 1945 the Lao
Issara (Free Laos) was formed. The Lao Issara, led by Prince
Phetsarath, included virtually all of the Lao western educated elite
a.s well as Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong. Their
political goal was to preserve the Japanese-instigated declaration of
independence from France.. .The speedy French reoccupation of Laos
prevented the Lao Issara, who were receiving aid from Ho Chi Minh
in the form~of Communist Vietminh troops, from. achieving their goal.
The Lao Issara dissolved. itself in 1949 with most of the members
returning to government service. Prince Souphanouvong, :however,
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who advocated collaboration with the Vietnamese Communist Vietminh,
was expelled from the Lao Issara and led several dozen dissatisfied
followers from Laos into Vietnam. There they received support and
training from the Vietminh and in 1950 Vietminh propaganda broadcasts
made their first reference to a "Pathet Lao" resistance movement
dedicated to the fight against "French imperialism"; Pathet Lao forces
fought against the French presence in Laos in isolated actions along the
Vietnamese border but controlled only small fractions of Laos until
1953. In April 1953 the Vietminh/Pathet Lao forces launched their first
thrust into Laos, occupying Houa Phan Province (Sam Neua) and
advanced to within a fetiv miles of the royal capital of Luang Prabang.
In this action Vietminh forces were twice as numerous as those of the
Pathet Lao and even the Pathet Lao ranks were filled preponderantly
with Vietnamese. Despite French-backed resistance, the invaders were
able to retain control of much of Houa Phan Province. Prince
Souphanouvong immediately announced the establishment of a "resistance
government" in the town of Sam Neua, declaring it to be the only legal
representative government in Laos, moving his headquarters there from
Vietnam. Again in late 1953, Vietminh forces crossed from Vietnam
into the panhandle of Laos to take the town of Thakhek. This force was
also dispersed by the French and went into the- surrounding hills, where
they began propaganda and subversive activities among the mountain
tribes. Pockets of control were thus established by the Pathet Lao.
By 1953, the Pathet Lao and Vietminh claimed to control all of Houa
Phan Province, a large part of Xieng Khouang Province and parts of
Luang Prabang and Phong Saly Provinces. This success, coupled with
skillful propaganda, ensured this movement recognition by the Geneva
Accords of July 1954,
2, 1954 Geneva Accords to 1962: . .
The Geneva Accords of July 1954 called for a single, independent
government for Laos. All "Vietnamese People's Volunteers" were to
be out of Laos within 120 days. Pathet Lao forces were to be regrouped
in the two northern provinces of Houa Phan and Phong Saly and were to
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be integrated into a national army within 120 days It became apparent
soon after the signing of the Geneva Agreement, however, that the
political differences between the opposing factions in Laos would
prevent a rapid integration of the Pathet Lao forces into a national
army. Furthermore, Pathet Lao military harassment of government-
controlled areas continued. Eventually a nominal integration of 1500
Pathet Lao troops into the Royal Army took place in February 1958 but
the two Pathet Lao battalions involved retained their own identities.
The Royal Government in May 1959 decided to force integration. Faced.
with this ultimatum, one Pathet Lao battalion complied but the second
escaped across the border to North Vietnam.
The Pathet Lao forces soon returned and between July and
September 1959 North Vietnamese Army and Pathet Lao forces made
strong attacks on government positions in both Houa Phan and Phong
Saly. Although the arrival of a UN fact-finding commission in late 1959
caused the enemy to cease large- scale operations, by October 1959 the
Pathet Lao had reverted to guerrilla attacks on Royal Army outposts and
villages.
In late 1959 and early 1960 the Royal Lao Government, always
fragile and unstable., underwent several changes of leadership. In
May 1960 Prince Souphanouvong and other communist leaders who had
been placed under arrest the previous year escaped from prison and fled
to communist-controlled areas within Laos. Shortly thereafter in
August 1960, Captain Kong Le, the commander of an elite government
parachute battalion, staged a succes sful coup d' etat in Vientiane. This
act thrust an important third force, Kong Le's neutralist army, on the
Lao political and military stage. The Pathet Lao saw Kong Le as a
potential ally and an additional disruptive force to plague the Royal
Government. In an attempt to avert civil war among the non-communist
elements, Prince Souvanna Phouma, a former prime minister, was
again called upon to form a government. General Phoumi Nosavan, a
leader of the rightist anti-communist faction, joined forces with Prince
Boun Oum in south Laos and mounted a campaign to retake Vientiane.
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$y mid-December Phoumi had rallied, retaking Vientiane in spite of
extensive Soviet airlifts of supplies to Kong Le. Prince Boun Oum,
together with General Phoumi, tn.en established a new government in
Vientiane .
At this point North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops again
invaded Houa Phan and pushed westward across the Plain of Jars. The
enemy further consolidated his position in the north by the capture of
? Muong Sai, an important town and military post that controlled access
to both Phong Saly and Houa Khong Provinces. To improve their
position in central and southern Laos, the Pathet Lao spearheaded by
North Vietnamese units launched three main drives in March and April
1961. The first thrust was aimed along Route 8 in central Laos; the
second about 50 miles to the south along Route 12; and the third still
further south captured the key city of Tchepone and its airfield.
Negotiations for a cease fire line began in early 1961 but were
repeatedly stalled by the Pathet Lao who sought to improve their strategic
position. The cease fire went into effect on 3 May 1961 and by the spring
of 1962 the North Vietnamese Army and Pathet Lao forces began a drive
against Nam Tha, first capturing Muong Sing near the border of China.
This defeat eliminated the authority of the Royal Lao Government in
northwestern Laos and opened western Luang Prabang and all of Houa
Khong Province to communist domination. With a tenuous cease- fire
agreed to by the three Lao factions -- rightist, neutralist and Pathet
Lao -- two efforts were undertaken to provide a political solution. A
14-nation conference was convened at Geneva in May 1962 and, on the
internal level, a summit meeting at Zurich was held among Princes
5ouvanna, Boun Oum and Souphanouvong in an effort to reach agreement
on the formation of a coalition government which would include all three
factions. On 12 June 1962 a Tri-Partite Provisional Government of
National TJnion was formed under Souvanna Phouma. On 23 July a
~eclaratian and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos was signed at Geneva
by all 14 participating nations .
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Of immediate importance under the 1962 Geneva Agreement
was the requirement that all foreign military personnel leave the
country within 75 days of the signing under the supervision of the
International Control Gommission (ICC) which had been reconvened in
April 1961 in New Delhi, All U. S. military advisory personnel departed
Laos before the 7 October 1962 deadline. However, only 40 North
Vietnamese troops were withdrawn through IGC check points leaving
behind an estimated 5, 000 to 6, 000 combat support troops.
II. POST-GENEVA ACCORDS (1963 to 1968)
Within a few months of the signing of the 1962 Geneva Agreements
the Pathet Lao, supported by the North Vietnamese, began xna,neuvering
to subvert or eliminate Kong Le's neutralist military forces which
constituted Souvanna Phouma's principal military strength. Minor
skirmishing broke into open hostilities by April 1963 when the Pathet
Lao attacked Kong Le's troops in positions they had held jointly with the
Pathet Lao. These aggressive tactics by the Pathet I~a0 resulted in
much closer cooperation than before between the neutralists and
rightists iri the political as well as the military field.
With the outbreak of fighting in April 1963, the two Pathet Lao
xYiinisters within the Government of National Union withdrew from
Vientiane leaving Pathet Lao representation in the government in the
hands of two Pathet Lao secretaries of state of Cabinet ranl~. By late
1964, however, the Pathet Lao secretaries of state also had withdrawn
to communist-held Khang Khay on the Plain of Jars .
Also in the spring of 1963 the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
forces increased their military operations in south and central Laos.
These actions were designed to consolidate the communist hold on lines _
of communication vital to their op?rations in South Vietnam. By early
June the communists had secured what is now known as Route 23. The
importance of the panhandle to the communists was clearly illustrated
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by their reaction to a Royal Lao Government offensive in 1963. By
8 December Royal Lao Government forces had moved to within 15 miles
of the North Vietnamese border on Route 8, but were heavily assaulted
by enemy forces augmented by North Vietnamese battalions, Other
enemy farces moved north and by the end of January 1964 had captured
the territory within i6 miles of Thakhek, In the process, the communist
forces strengthened their control of the important mountain passes
along the border, gained control of most of Route 8, and in general
occupied in strength an area which looked south down the panhandle
and west towards Route 13. Between 1964 and 1968 the fortunes of
battle seesawed back and forth in favor of the Royal Lao Government
forces in the rainy season and the communist forces in the dry season.
On the political side, throughout this same period numerous
attempts were made to restore peace. In May 1964 the British, at the
request of the Prime Minister, invited the signatories of the Geneva
Accords to begin consultations in Vientiane. The United States and
several at:her signatories accepted the invitation which the communist
states spurned, .At the close of consultations in June, the representatives
concluded that the Pathet Lao with North Vietnamese support had
initiated the attacks against the neutralists and that the deteriorating
military situation in Laos presented a grave threat to the peace of
Southeast Asia. Several attempts have been rr.ade since to convene a
new Geneva-type meeting of the 14 nations that took part in the 1962
conference. These have been unsuccessful, Efforts on the part of the
three Lao factions to resolve their difficulties in meetings in Paris
during August and September 1964 likewise produced no basic concessions
except a general agreement to continue talking. Talks have continued
sporadically since then. A Lao communist representative has resided
i:n Vientiane. In addition, there is a North Vietnamese Embassy. Prime
Minister Souvanna has attempted on numerous occasions to utilize these
channels to propose initiatives to re-establish the Tri-Partite _
Government and to restore peace. The North Vietnamese violations of
the international accords have been publicly denounced during the annual
sessions otz Laos of the General Assembly of the United Nations, through
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the publication of White Books by the Government of National Union in
1966, 1968 and 1969, and through numerous press conferences and public
statements by the Prime Minister or other ministers of the,Lao
Government.
III TURNING POINT (1969 to 1970)
1. North Vietnamese Escalation in 1969 and 1970:
Communist military activity intensified in 1968 and even more
in 1969. Whereas the communists had habitually advanced during the
dry season (November to May) and the government forces normally retook
lost ground during the wet season {June to October), the vigorous enemy
offensive camp~.igns in the dry seasons of both 1968 and 1969 departed
from this traditional interchange, In the spring of 1969 the North
Vietnamese carried their offensive considerably deeper into areas held
by Royal Lao Government farces for severa.Lyears, The Royal Lao
Government, in an effort to blunt further advances, launched limited
operations designed to cut the enemy's supply lines, This met with
unexpected success resulting in withdrawal of most of the North
Vietnamese forces in the Plain of Jars. But the enemy's determination
to move back into the area became clearer in September 1969 when
advance elements of the North Vietnamese 312th Combat Infantry Division
began moving into north Laos to bolster the North Vietnamese Army
316th Division which has been fighting in north Laos for several years..
In addition, they have introduced at least two tank companies, long-range
artillery and numerous sapper and other units. With the three remainin;
months of good ~hreather, it seems probable that the large North
Vietnamese combat force now assembled in north Laos woL~,ld be able to
exceed any military gains it has made in previous years, The communist
forces will almost certainly push well beyond the Plain of Tars, gain
control of the strategic road junction at Sala Phou Koun and possibly
threaten the royal capital of Luang Prabang and the administrative capital
of Vientiane, There is also cause for concern that the present level of
North Vietnamese military activity in Laos is no longer simply a response
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to the situation within Laos' but may also begin to reflect Ha:noi's
frustration in South Vietnam. We have long estimated. that the North
Vietnamese could readily seize the entire panhandle of Laos a.nd
establish themselves on the Mekong. We believe that ultimately North
Vietnam wants acommunist-controlled Laos. This objective, however,
is still subordinated to their primary goals in South Vietnam. Frustrated
by the interdiction of their personnel and military supply system through
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, it may well be that the North Vietnamese have
decided that they need to increase the pressure on the royal Lao
Government in the north permitting a greater degree of acquiesence
on the part of the Royal. Lao Government to let them use the Ho Chi
Minh Trail uninhibited.by government harassment or American bombing.
2. Role of the U. S , in Laos : ~
In mid-May 1964 the Pathet Lao supported by the North
Vietnamese took advantage of dissidence within the neutralist ranks and
attacked Prince Souvanna Phouma's neutralist military forces on the
Plain of Jars. This deliberate and open onslaught prompted the
Prime Minister to seek additional military assistance. The U.S. ,
respanding within the framework of the Geneva Agreements, supplied
military equipment and supplies for the Lao armed forces. This was
within the provisions of Article 6 of the Protocol to the Declaration on
-"'the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva in 1962 which provided "the
introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material
generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the
Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national
defense of Laos, is prohibited".
~ Because of the consistent refusal by the communists to allow
the ICC teams to enter their territory to inspect alleged violations of the
Geneva Agreement, the first American reconnaissance flight was flown
over .the southern part of Laos on 19 May 1964 after consultations with
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma the previous day. These reconnaissance
flights were extended on 21 May to cover the Flain of Jars and neighboring
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ublicly endorsed these
On 28 May 196 Souvanna Phouma pthat they were necessary
areas. These flights initiated
reconnaissance m~issioViolationsaof the Accords. r were continued. ,
unxst A Ministe ,
to observe comet eal of the Prim
royal, armed escorts were
in accordance with the app mister s aPP lane was shot down,
and later, with the Prime M~ ~ a letter
' added. On 12 June after u i yed escor p g
that the fli hts would go on.
Phouma stated p Souvanna stated that the flights
Souvanna June,
to the ICC co-chair hee ~ bO~xbing of positions of the Pathet Lao and
were legal and that t overnmental decision needs no other
Vietminh aggressors by g
justification" .
message to Congress on the a ae,Thehproblem of
~ a special
18 January 1965, President Johnson
defenses on monist forces to honor the Geneva
entered in 1962? We shall continue to support
Laos is the refusal of the coma. The Geneva Accords
Accords into which they eace. "
the legitimate government of that c?l ft alone in p
established the right of Laos to be continued violations of Lao
ears zn the face of ~ se, the Royal
In.the ensuing Y rit by the North Viet S assistance. It
neutrality and territorial integ Y uest further U.
commenced its air
Lao Government has continue ~S~srthat the U.S? istics support to
was in response to these req
rations over Laos and incre esed its training an ?g s
a se actions did not include theta~~one x n
op ~ Th
the Royal Lao Government?thexe are no U.S. combat troops
of U. S , combat troops and
Laos .today.
3. Current Political Initiat`ves_ vanna Phouma, through
~--- y_---- Minister Sou
1970 Prime co-evoked the North
On 3 February -
his Sp ra os ed his formula for the
ecial Assistant for Foreign Affairs' flue, designed to stop
~~se Charge d`Affaires and P p
Vietnam.- This initxa
of Jars and create a situation conducive to tal s
neutralization of the Plain of Jars .
the combat in the P1axn
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between the Royal Lao Government and Pathet Lao, was rejected out of
hand by the North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
6 February. "
Souvanna Phouma is currently making still another bid to the
co-chairmen of the 1.962 Geneva Accords to reconvene aGeneva-type
conference. There is little likelihood the Soviet Union will agree to
meet.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
li ence Memorandum RR IR 67-14 entitled, "Laos, the Divided
25X1 C~ h?tel ~g ~_~_
Nation June 1967
NIS 43B GS (REV), entitled "Laos -General
urve ,
25X1 _Nationall~~11 g67
Survey" , Y
ent of William H. Sullivan, Deputy Asp tteeto eUn.ited Statesast
Statem
Asian. and Pacific Affairs before the Su come
ecurity Agreements and Com~'nitments Abroad of the Senate Foreign
S 20 October 19`9
Relations Committee,
S ~cia1 N__atio_n_al Intelli ence Estimate, SNIE 58-70, entitled " e
_ _ -~ ----"-` 5 February 1970
Co~ xnunist View of the Situation in Laos",
? .~.
25X1
25X1
25X1
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the Violations of the 1962 Geneva A~CO-Rro sal LaoeGovernment,
White Book on ~__-- _--
of Nom tnam the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
196 9~
To Move a Natio??, New Yoxk, Doubleday and Company,
Hillsman, o er,
Inc., 1967
Conflict in Laos, New York,- Frederick A. Praeger,
Doznrnen, Arthur J. , _______` r----
ITI. c o , 1 7 c., ~,
ation Agency Backgrounder on Communism, Z- 9a/69-SM-78,
r,eements in Laos" , September
U.S. Inform
entitled "Hanoi's 'Troops Flout Treaty Ag
lydy
DqD AO- 64 Ca sole Facts for the
Armed Forces InformatFe ruary 1968
Awned Forces-- Laos, Y 1970
~.------ y.. ---
I Briefing for 27 February NSA Meeting - Laos, 27 Februar
Area Handb-ook for Laos, U.S. Government
DA Pamphlet No. 550- 58, _ _ -
Printing Office, June 1967
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