NIE 50-68, SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1968

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Publication Date: June 28, 1971
• Content Type: NOTES

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S- -C-R-E-T
28 June 1971
NOTE FOR: George Carver
SUBJECT : NIE 50-68, Southeast Asia After Vietnam dated
14 November 1968
1. This paper has its origins in a request from Secretary
of Defense Clifford to the DCI dated 21 June 1968 (see attached).
Clifford refers to para. 29 in NIE 1-68, World Trends and
Contingencies Affecting US Interests dated 6 June 1968. Work
on NEE 50-68 proceeded slowly and the draft encountered heavy
weather during coordination. It was remanded by the USIB on
its first appearance in late October and was then held over
deliberately until after the US election.
25X1
MORI
review(s)
completed.
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ECRET/SENSITIVr
NIE 50-68
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
CONTROLLED DISSEM
14 November 1968
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 50-68
Southeast Asia After Vietnam
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
14 November 1968
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
Vice Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
It. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Mr. Howard C. Brown, the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission
Abstaining:
Mr. William 0. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
AFTER VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
In this estimate we consider two possible outcomes of the war:
first, a political settlement which, for one reason or another, would
permit the communist to take control of the government in South
Vietnam, not immediately but within a year or two; the second,
acceptance by Hanoi of a solution that falls well short of its objectives
while preserving important elements of its political-military apparatus
in the South.
THE ESTIMATE
1. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
1. Whatever the outcome in Vietnam, there are several constant factors in
Southeast Asia which will serve to condition developments there. Stability in
the region is jeopardized by the internal weaknesses of states still seeking the
right mixture of traditional practices and modern institutions after a long
period of colonial rule. In most states, the central government has little ca-
pacity to mobilize national resources; and in several countries, border provinces
are remote and neglected, and there is widespread alienation among ethnic and
religious minorities. Other broad social problems and poorly functioning econ-
omies add further to the burdens of the frequently inefficient civilian and
military leadership. While these conditions offer opportunities for communist
subversion, they are partially offset by a growing sense of nationalism, traditional
fear of China, and distrust of communism as an antinationalist and pro-Chinese
movement.
2. Obviously, there are significant differences in the inherent stability of the
nations of the region and in the strength of internal factors resistant to com-
munism. The military regimes of Burma and Indonesia, for example, have
still not developed a firm popular consensus in support of their policies and
programs, nor is it clear that the existing political institutions are viable.
In both countries, however, the sense of nationalism is strong enough to hold
the basic political framework together. In Malaysia and Singapore, on the
other hand, the ethnic loyalties of the Malay and Chinese communities conflict
with their national feelings, but representative government and the electoral
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process have taken hold, and there is positive support for the national leader-
ship based on its commitment to economic betterment.
3. Thailand and Cambodia occupy a middle position. The Thai regime still
searches for mechanisms to ensure and legitimate its predominance; while in
Cambodia, Sihanouk's highly personalized rule has forestalled any real test
of political institutions. But both regimes are reasonably acceptable to the ma-
jority of the people and neither appears to have domestic political opposition
with sufficient strength or cohesion to threaten its position. In both countries,
too, political stability is reinforced by widespread respect for the royal family.
Though Laos is also a Buddhist monarchy, it lacks the homogeneity of popu-
lation and the sense of history which provide a firm basis for Thai and Cam-
bodian nationhood. In any event, Laos is a special case: Fundamentally, the
Souvanna regime depends for its survival on the external forces which created
and sustain it.
4. Economic weaknesses-inadequate utilization of resources, capital short-
ages, low export earnings-are also conspicuous among the problems of South-
east Asia, but the impact of such deficiencies on political stability should not
be overstated. In general, the region's predominantly agricultural economy pro-
vides sufficient food to adequately feed the population despite continuing high
birth rates. In this situation, sophisticated economic analyses often have little
application to the life of the mass of the citizens, much less to their political
attitudes. It is apparent, however, that the reasonably well-managed and rapidly
;rowing economies of Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore have enhanced the
political stability of their governments, while economic stagnation contributes
to the uncertainty of prospects for the regimes in Burma, Indonesia, and Cam-
bodia. In a category apart is the Philippines where a fairly good growth rate
tends to mask ever-widening disparities between rich and poor.
5. The leaders of Southeast Asia are further distracted by the rivalries and
frictions which frequently characterize their relations with one another. Prince
Sihanouk views Cambodian history as essentially a struggle to forestall na-
tional extinction at the hands of more aggressive Thai and Vietnamese. As a
result, Cambodia's energies-and those of Thailand and South Vietnam as
well-are often diverted by border incidents, propaganda wars, and diplomatic
recriminations. The burgeoning dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines
over the ownership of Sabah threatens to disrupt efforts to achieve greater
regional cooperation. Thailand's longstanding doubts about the loyalty of its
ethnic Malay peoples causes Bangkok to deny full cooperation to Kuala Lumpur
in joint efforts to deal with security problems along their common border. For
their part, the Malaysians remain suspicious of Indonesian ambitions in Borneo
despite Sukarno's departure from the scene. And Singapore is persistently fear-
ful of absorption by its Malay and Indonesian neighbors.
6. Communist Subversion. More than any other part of the world, the coun-
tries of Southeast Asia have been hampered in their quest for stability by
communist subversion. Each of them, except Singapore, has had to contend
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with a communist insurrection on some scale, and communist bands are still
active in most countries. So far, however, the communists have gained complete
control of only the northern half of Vietnam and adjacent portions of Laos.
Moreover, although Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, .and Cambodia have, at one time
or another, required the assistance of foreign combat troops to meet the com-
munist threat, the others-Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines-
needed only the input of materiel, technical aid and, in some cases, advisory
personnel.
7. Communist parties in Southeast Asia have fared poorly, not because Marx-
ism and Socialism are unpopular, but because the communists acted in such
a manner as to alienate nationalist sentiment in the various countries. In
1948-1949, just as newly independent, nationalist and socialist oriented regimes
were appearing in the region, Moscow and Peking proclaimed a general line of
armed liberation for Southeast Asia. This gave the communist parties an anti-
nationalist image which alienated most students, intellectuals, and workers.
(A major exception, of course, was in Vietnam where the communists managed
to gain a predominant position in the nationalist movement after World War
II.) After the failure of these premature insurrections, communists in some coun-
tries tried to operate at the legal and parliamentary level under the slogan of
peaceful coexistence. But popular support, except in Indonesia, could not be
developed, and most of the parties had no alternative but to continue with
the effort to develop peasant-based insurrections. In several cases, this has
meant operating in remote areas populated by relatively primitive minority
peoples.
8. Communist prospects in Southeast Asia reflect these inadequacies. Com-
munist insurgency is much less of a threat today in Malaysia, Singapore, In-
donesia, and the Philippines than 20 years ago. The once formidable Malayan
Communist Party force is down to less than 1,000 men and is holed up
just north of the Thai-Malaysian border. -Another 500 or so guerrillas from
Sarawak roam the highland jungles south of the Sarawak frontier. Both groups
are comprised mainly of ethnic Chinese residents of Malaysia, but neither
maintains any substantial foothold on Malaysian soil. The Huk movement
in the Philippines consists of an armed nucleus of about 150 men and appears to
have degenerated from a communist guerrilla movement into more of a Filipino
"mafia," engaged in murder and extortion for a livelihood. In central and
eastern Java, a few hundred Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) activists have
taken to the hills in hopes of developing the sort of guerrilla force the party so
obviously lacked during the crucial weeks of October 1965. The PKI effort has
been severely set back by recent government operations against its bases; many
top communist leaders have been killed. Despite this setback and the party
debacle of 1965-1966, the communist movement in Indonesia remains the most
potentially significant subversive force in Southeast Asia aside from the Viet-
namese communists.
9. While Communist insurgency has declined in the insular and peninsular
states of Southeast Asia, activity further north-in Burma, Thailand, and Cam-
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bodia-has been stepped up in recent years, partly because of the war in Viet-
nam and partly because of the stimulus of Peking and Hanoi. Fundamentally,
the present significance of the communist parties in these countries lies in their
role as instruments of external forces rather than in their own internal appeal
or strength.
10. In Burma, the long-simmering insurgency of the 4,000 or so Peking-oriented
White Flags (Communist Party of Burma/ White Flag) was given a new orien-
tation about two years ago when they adopted a full-blown Maoist line. This
was followed shortly by a crisis in Sino-Burmese relations generated by Peking's
Cultural Revolution. Although the Chinese have since moderated their overt
hostility toward the Ne Win regime, they persist in an effort to weaken it;
they supply guns and training in adjacent Yunnan Province to the relatively
few members of dissident ethnic groups willing to cooperate with White Flag
elements in attacks against government units in northeastern Burma. Whatever
the communist strategy in Burma, Peking and the White Flags probably have
little hope of implementing it without substantial cooperation from the Kachin,
Shan, Karen, and other ethnic insurgent forces. In the past, the lack of common
objectives and cohesion among these rebel groups has been their principal weak-
ness vis-a-vis the Rangoon government, and there are few signs that this defect
will soon be remedied. Moreover, most ethnic insurgent leaders appear to be
anti-Chinese and to oppose communism as a threat to their ancient modes of
living.
11. The decision to commence active insurgency in Thailand in early 1965
was probably made by Peking in concert with Hanoi; the former has always
dominated the Thai communist movement. While preparation for guerrilla war
in Thailand began at least as early as 1962, plans were accelerated in 1965
probably to assist Hanoi by generating concern in US official circles over a
possible communist "second front" in Southeast Asia and by stimulating fear
in Thailand over further extending its military commitments to the US. So far,
the communist insurgents have made little headway, but their actions have
alerted the regime to its vulnerabilities in remote sectors of the country and led
it to institute various remedies in the fields of security, administration, and eco-
nomic development. In the Northeast, across the Mekong from Laos, 1,500 or
so insurgents are on the defensive, despite occasional forays. In the dense high-
land jungles of the North, several hundred tribesmen, with grievances against
the government, have been armed and trained by communists and are harassing
government forces and outposts near the Lao border. On the other hand, the
communists are not likely to exert any significant influence away from remote
tribal districts so long as their appeal is geared mainly to hill-tribe grievances.
Efforts to penetrate the ethnic Thai in the North have not progressed far but
do pose some threat for the future. Communist terrorism on a much smaller
scale is a continuing problem in other regions of the country.
12. Over the past year or two, guerrilla activity has revived in Cambodia and
become a serious internal problem for the Sihanouk regime. Its origins and
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nature are vague, but activity is centered in two areas. In the remote north-
eastern part of the country, where the Vietnamese communists operate in sup-
port of the war effort in Vietnam, some dissident tribesmen have apparently
accepted arms from Hanoi to oppose the increasing government presence in
the region. Of greater potential significance are the disruptive activities of the
ethnic Cambodian insurgents, styled "Khmer Rouge" by Sihanouk, who operate
sporadically in small armed bands throughout western Cambodia. There have
been incidents elsewhere, however, and the Khmer Rouge appear to have links
to subversive elements in Phnom Penh itself.
13. In Laos, of course, the communists pose a major threat. They control about
half the country and a third of its people, and the indigenous communists-the
Pathet Lao-have an internationally recognized claim to a share in the national
government. The backbone of the insurgency is, however, provided by regular
North Vietnamese forces.
? 14. In sum, the nations of Southeast Asia exhibit serious social, political, and 1
economic weaknesses. But they are generally buttressed by a sense of nationalism
and a determination to preserve their independence. They have had considerable
experience in dealing with communist subversion, and they have learned over
the centuries to survive in the shadow of a powerful China. None of the countries
in the region, with the possible exception of Laos, is so weak that communist
movements are likely to increase their strength greatly over the next several
years without major and direct foreign assistance. ?-./
15. The US Role. How the US views its role and commitment in the region,
and how this is perceived by both communist and noncommunist elements, will
continue to be crucial factors in the Southeast Asian political equation. There
is no realistic prospect that over the next several years another power or a
regional system will appear to relieve the US of the security function it has
been undertaking in the area. In fact, the expected withdrawal of UK forces
from Malaysia and Singapore will inevitably pose new problems for the US in
this regard.
II. A SETTLEMENT FAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS'
16. In discussing an outcome favorable to the communists, we rule out such
unlikely assumptions as the military collapse of Allied forces in South Vietnam
and precipitate and unilateral withdrawal of these forces, or a negotiation involv-
ing political concessions so sweeping as to be tantamount to granting Hanoi
outright achievement of its aims in the South. The contingency here discussed
is a political settlement of the war which, for one reason or another, would
permit the communists to take control of the government in South Vietnam.
'Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, and Maj. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF, dissent from the argument in this section. For their views, see their footnote to
paragraph 38, page 12.
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Insofar as the rest of Southeast Asia is concerned, an important variable would
be the time required for the communist takeover. If it took 5 or 10 years, the
repercussions elsewhere would tend to be muted or even lost among other de-
velopments during the period. For purposes of this estimate, therefore, we assume
a much shorter period, say no more than a year or two, during the course of
which the Southeast Asians would come to the conclusion that the settlement
accepted by the US made a communist success virtually inevitable.
17. Communist Reactions. A settlement in Vietnam favorable to the commu-
nists would give a psychological lift to leftist elements everywhere in Southeast
Asia, but it would not necessarily lead them to rely more heavily on armed
violence than at present. Some local parties are already doing all they can in
the field of "peoples' war;" others would require considerable time and outside
assistance before a large-scale campaign of violence could be initiated. And
the decision to attempt this course would depend not only on the local party
and its view of the opportunities but also on the policies of its patron-China,
North Vietnam, or the USSR as the case might be. Only in Laos, and perhaps in
Cambodia, is there a capability in being to increase the level of armed pressure
and violence quickly and significantly.
18. Hanoi's first reaction to its success in South Vietnam might be an early
move to unleash the armed forces it controls in Laos and to provide large-scale
assistance to a Cambodian resistance movement. There is, after all, no doubt
that Hanoi's objectives are to establish its control over Laos and attain pre-
dominent influence in Cambodia. But we believe the Vietnamese communists
would be somewhat more cautious. They might fear that there was some risk
of a new US military response and, more important at this stage, this level
of military action would probably seem unnecessary to the North Vietnamese;
they would expect the regimes in both countries to be amenable to Hanoi's
influence without further resort to war. Moreover, Hanoi would be preoccupied,
for a time at least, with the formidable task of consolidating communist rule
in South Vietnam.
19. Initially, therefore, Hanoi would probably apply pressures in Laos, hoping
in this way to produce a new coalition government dominated by the Pathet Lao.
(Hanoi might indeed have embarked on this course in advance of the Vietnamese
settlement if it were convinced during the negotiations that the US was in the
Process of a major reduction in its commitments in Southeast Asia.) If pressure
tactics failed in Laos, the North Vietnamese might undertake new military action
to strengthen the communist bargaining position or to effect an outright military
takeover of the country. In Cambodia, Hanoi would probably move more gradu-
ally, settling initially for a government reasonably responsive to its influence.
[f Sihanouk proved uncooperative, Hanoi would apply additional pressures, in-
cluding assistance to procommunist elements in Cambodia.
20. Hanoi sees both Laos and Cambodia as falling primarily within its sphere
of influence and, in the aftermath of a successful settlement, would resist efforts
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by Peking-or by Moscow-to have a controlling voice in either country. Else-
where in Southeast Asia, Hanoi is not likely to seek a predominant role in the
communist effort. Activities in Laos and Cambodia would have first call on
its capabilities. In Thailand, the North Vietnamese are currently providing sup-
port to the guerrilla forces though they recognize that the Chinese have a major
interest and may be in a better position, over the longer term, to influence the
communist movement there. Hanoi will probably be reluctant to leave the field
entirely to the Chinese, however, and will do what it can to maintain an influen-
tial role in the communist insurgency in Thailand. With regard to Burma, Indo-
nesia, and Singapore, on the other hand, the North Vietnamese will probably
be more intent on cultivating friendly relations in the postwar years.
21. As for Peking, it is difficult to estimate the extent and nature of its ac-
tivities in Southeast Asia after Vietnam, especially because of the uncertainties
engendered by China's domestic situation. Recurrent internal crises, for example,
could limit China's ability to sustain a consistent policy line toward the region.
On the other hand, if internal order is maintained, China's aspirations for great-
power dominance in the region would lead to increased efforts to limit or dis-
place US influence, particularly in those states close to China's borders. But
this will be true no matter what the outcome in Vietnam. In any event, China
would almost certainly claim some credit for any communist success in Vietnam
and exploit it at the diplomatic and political level throughout Southeast Asia
as part of the continuing effort to advance its national interests. A communist
success in Vietnam would encourage Peking to support subversive movements,
but the scale of its efforts would be influenced by the degree to which local
conditions provided promising opportunities. Current Chinese strategy does not
appear to call for overt aggression and we do not foresee a change in this strategy.
22. The impact of communist success in Vietnam on relations between Peking
and Hanoi could have substantial implications for Southeast Asia, particularly
over the longer term. It is possible, for example, that the two countries would
draw closer together and undertake joint political, propaganda, and subversive
efforts in the area. It seems more likely, however, that Hanoi would wish to
take the opportunity to establish quite clearly its independence of the Chinese,
relaying on continued Soviet and available Free World sources for the material
and technical assistance essential to its postwar reconstruction. Following such
a course would require that Hanoi soft-pedal support for subversive activities
outside Indochina at least. It would also increase the chances that the age-old
Vietnamese distrust of China would combine with current conflicts of interests
to produce serious strains in Hanoi-Peking relations.
23. The Soviet Union is not likely to become a major supporter of communist
subversion in Southeast Asia after Vietnam. The Soviets will be disposed to
defer to Hanoi's wishes on Laos and Cambodia and will probably attempt to
increase their own influence in the outlawed Indonesian communist movement.
In general, however, the end of the war and of its self-imposed obligation to
support Hanoi, would lead the USSR to seek a more important political position
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in the area-particularly in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines-
by developing further its diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. The Soviets
would oppose increased Chinese influence everywhere in the region.
24. Reactions of the Southeast Asian Countries. Most of Southeast Asia would
welcome an end to the war in Vietnam, but a settlement favorable to the com-
munists would produce a crisis in Laos and severe anxiety in Cambodia and
Thailand. Throughout the area, the settlement would have an adverse psycho-
logical impact that would damage US prestige and credibility. In view of the
extent of US commitments to South Vietnam and the depth of US involvement
in the war, serious doubts would be felt about the validity of US power and
commitments, and there would be renewed concern over communist intentions
and the longer run prospects of surviving in the shadow of Chinese power.
25. The greatest danger in this situation would not be that subversive ele-
ments in Southeast Asia would immediately take heart and make rapid progress
in undermining the stability of noncommunist governments. As indicated above,
local communist organizations generally lack the capability and the appeal for
any such rapid growth. Rather, the main danger would be the development of
an atmosphere of defeatism and resignation in noncommunist countries in the
area, with individual governments losing their hope of withstanding the political
and psychological pressures of Hanoi and Peking. There could be a general move
to placate the communist powers by cutting military and political ties with the
US. This process could begin before the communist takeover had been com-
pleted, particularly if Hanoi moved quickly and successfully to upset the balance
in Laos.
26. We cannot say that it would not work out this way in the end, for much
would depend on continuing US actions. While some Southeast Asian leaders
would probably entertain increased doubts about the will of the US to play a
security role in the area, we do not believe that they would be panicked into
precipitate changes in policy or posture. They would probably suspend any
definitive policy decision at least until there had been time and opportunity to
study indications of future communist conduct and intent and, more critically,
those of the US.
27. Concern over the communist threat in the aftermath of Hanoi's success
would also be conditioned by the circumstances of the time. Some countries
may be psychologically prepared for a settlement which appears to be favorable
to the communists. Moreover, if the settlement came in the next year or so, the
atmosphere in Southeast Asia would be quite different from that which existed
in 1964-1965. At that time, there was the spectacle of unbroken Viet Cong suc-
cesses against South Vietnamese forces, rapid Chinese advances in the field of
modern weapons, and an increasingly powerful Sukarno/PKI coalition taking
charge in Indonesia and bullying the newly-organized and fragile Malaysian
federation. In the intervening years, however, Southeast Asians have seen China
bogged down in confusion and disorder, Sukarno ousted and the PKI suffer
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bloody suppression, and the Vietnamese communists pay a fearful price during
long years of war.
28. A communist success in South Vietnam would have its sharpest and most
immediate impact in Laos. The realization that North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao
could quickly overrun government-held territory if they chose to do so, would
generate sentiment among civilian politicians in Vientiane for reaching an ac-
commodation with Hanoi. Souvanna and other Lao politicians would be willing
to see a return to the 1962 Geneva Accords, a coalition government with com-
munist participation, and a more truly neutral foreign policy. They would be
reluctant, however, to agree to concessions that appeared to threaten a com-
plete communist takeover. The top Lao military figures would oppose any major
concessions to the communists. Much would depend on how far and how
quickly Hanoi pressed its advantage. Without increased US involvement, Laos
could not long withstand the military and psychological pressures which Hanoi
would in due course almost certainly apply.
29. Cambodia would also feel directly exposed as a result of a communist
success in South Vietnam, especially if North Vietnamese Army units remained in
Cambodia. Khmer Rouge and other insurgent elements might be emboldened
to intensify their efforts, but they are not likely to develop quickly into a major
threat to Sihanouk's regime without considerable support from Hanoi. Sihanouk
would probably try to suppress the insurgents, meanwhile taking steps to ac-
commodate Cambodia to the new situation in the Indochina area. Internally, for
example, he would probably decide to bring procommunists into the government,
though he would oppose a predominant role for them. Internationally, he would
seek the good offices of Moscow and Peking to help secure Cambodian inde-
pendence, and might even propose convening a new Geneva Conference to this
end. Sihanouk would do these things in hope of avoiding the complete commu-
nist takeover that he has long feared. If all such measures failed, Sihanouk would
probably bow out rather than subject his country to a Vietnam-type conflict or
accept a figurehead status for himself in a communist-controlled regime. A new
leadership that could carry on effective resistance to Hanoi would be unlikely
to emerge.
30. In Thailand, the will of the present ruling group to maintain itself in power,
to assert national independence, and to resist internal subversion would probably
remain strong despite communist success in Vietnam. The present Thai leaders
would have limited options because of their longstanding and unequivocal com-
mitment to military alliance with the US, an alliance which they have regarded
as indispensable in the face of a continuing armed threat from China. We do
not believe that these leaders would view alignment with Hanoi or Peking as
acceptable alternatives to continued reliance on the US.
31. In these circumstances, Thai counterinsurgency forces would persist in their
efforts against the communist guerrillas, and communist prospects for recruiting
large numbers of local Thai for their forces would remain poor. But Thai capa-
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bilities could be severely taxed if Hanoi were to emerge from the Vietnamese
struggle prepared to adopt a more aggressive and direct role in support of the
Thai insurgents; for example, by sending trained Vietnamese guerrilla cadres and
more sophisticated hand weapons into northeastern Thailand, a prospect which
is already a source of great concern in Bangkok. The Thai leaders would be par-
ticularly sensitive to signs that Hanoi was moving toward a complete takeover
in Laos, in view of the strategic importance they attach to it as a buffer against
direct communist pressure. Indeed, we could expect that the Thai would press
the US to take measures to prevent communist control of the Mekong Valley.
32. Even if Hanoi does not adopt this more aggressive posture toward Thailand,
neutralist and leftist elements on the Bangkok political scene would become more
vocal. But their influence would probably not grow sufficiently to sway the gov-
ernment unless US support and US responses to Thai requests had made it ap-
pear that the US was withdrawing from its commitments to Thailand. The Thai
would, in any case, consider whether their relationship with the US ought to be
changed in some way. Any reevaluation would proceed carefully and would
closely reflect Thai judgments of US statements and actions following a settle-
ment in Vietnam. Under the changing circumstances, the Thai might decide that
the evolution of US policy left them no choice but to adopt a posture of strict
neutrality.2
33. Peking is the chief concern of Burma which is currently being harassed
by the Chinese-supported White Flags. Ne Win will be sensitive to the possibility
of any increase in such support in the wake of the Vietnamese War, but it is
doubtful that communist success in Vietnam would lead him to alter significantly
Burma's domestic or foreign policies. Malaysia and Singapore are apprehensive
of any substantial increase of interest by Peking in their ethnic Chinese leftists
and guerrilla remnants. These groups have usually been responsive to Peking's
direction and, in the event of communist success in Vietnam, might receive addi-
tional covert support from legal leftist fronts which continually agitate in these
countries for accommodation with the communist powers. Such activity could
serve to heighten existing tensions between the Chinese and Malay communities
in both countries.
34. Indonesia would feel less vulnerable than the others because of its remote-
ness from China and the small proportion of ethnic Chinese in the country. It is
most unlikely that the present leadership in Djakarta would falter in its deter-
mination to cope with Indonesia's internal communist problems; indeed, the re-
gime would attach considerable importance to the continuation of US economic
aid to sustain this determination. The psychological impact on the Philippines
' Capt. Frank M. Murphy, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence),
Department of the Navy, believes that the probable political impact upon Thailand of the
assumed settlement would be more severe than stated. He would have the last sentence
read: "Under the changing circumstances, the US-Thailand relationship probably would
change, with the Thais beginning to move toward pragmatic adjustment to the new political
realities after the Communist take over."
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would be somewhat greater than in Indonesia, if only because the Filipinos
have been for so long wholly dependent on the US for their defense. While
Filipino leftists and anti-US factions would derive new confidence and vigor from
the US failure in Vietnam, the problem of communist subversion in the Philip-
pines would probably not increase to any important extent. In any case, it would
remain far less of a threat to Philippine stability than the chronic political
corruption and economic malaise of the country.
35. The US Posture. Over the longer run, a great deal would depend on the
role the US decided to play in the region, and on its success in convincing leaders
there of its will and capacity to continue backing them. Initially, the Southeast
Asian states would fear a tendency for the US to withdraw generally from in-
volvement with the security of the entire region, particularly if a settlement was
reached in such a precipitate manner as to suggest a sudden and basic change
in US policy. This initial concern would probably be least in Burma which chooses
not to rely on external support for its security and is unlikely to change in this
regard. The self-reliant Indonesians would be somewhat less concerned than the
Filipinos and a good deal less concerned than Malaysia and Singapore. The
two latter have been accustomed to British protection and are disturbed by the
prospect of its complete withdrawal.
36. These initial reappraisals of US capabilities and intentions would be sub-
ject to continuing review. We believe that governments with any sort of security
arrangements with the US-i.e., Laos, Thailand, and the Philippines-would
wish to retain them, at least until further evidence was available on the course
of US policy in the region. All would urgently seek concrete reassurances of one
sort or another and, if these were forthcoming, they would over time tend to
dilute the impact of the loss of South Vietnam. For the Thai, one of the lessons
of Vietnam could be that US support is not likely to be effective without greater
efforts of their own. They would, therefore, move to bolster their forces, including
acquisition of all possible material aid from the US.
37. For the other nations of Southeast Asia, US actions in support of Thai-
land would be an important measure of its intentions throughout the region; few
would expect any major US military effort in behalf of the more exposed Lao.
No matter how the US performed in Thailand, however, there would inevitably
be an increased search for alternatives to heavy reliance on US military power.
There would, for example, be increasing interest in a strong counterinsurgency
role for regional associations, though all member nations would realize that
defense against external aggression could not be the province of such groupings.
And there might be some interest in having the Russians play a greater role in
Southeast Asia as an additional counterweight to Peking. Even the Thai, con-
current with their efforts to obtain new US security guarantees, would doubtless
explore such foreign policy alternatives. Neutralist sentiment in Burma would
tend to become even firmer, and neutralist voices would become louder, though
hardly decisive, in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.
38. One factor of great importance would be the appraisal made by US
leaders and public opinion of the meaning of the Vietnam experience for the
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future course of US policy. A traumatic popular reaction in the US, revealed
perhaps by recriminations over Vietnam and bitter debate over future use of
US power in Southeast Asia would greatly intensify the impact of the loss of
South Vietnam. Conversely, if American opinion seemed in the main to take
a steady and sober line, echoes in Southeast Asia would be similarly moderated.
In effect, US domestic interpretations of a setback in Vietnam and the impres-
sions others consequently formed as to the likely course of US policy in the
region might ultimately prove as important as the event itself.3
III. A SETTLEMENT UNFAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS
39. In discussing an outcome unfavorable to the communists, we are not in-
cluding in our consideration any outright surrender on their part or the com-
plete abandonment of their campaign to take over South Vietnam. We are
assuming the acceptance by Hanoi of an outcome that falls well short of its
objectives but which preserves some important elements of its political-military
apparatus in the South. This situation might come about as a result of a negotia-
tion or it might become gradually apparent as the communists scaled down their
attacks, disengaged their forces, and otherwise indicated a willingness to termi-
nate the shooting war. In either case, an increasingly confident regime, allied
with the US, would retain power in Saigon.
40. The principal initial reaction of the Southeast Asians to such an outcome
in Vietnam would be a sense of relief and a belief that additional time had
been won to bolster further their own political and economic stability. Few
would conclude, however, that the future of the Saigon government had been
assured, that the Vietnamese communists had been permanently stopped, or
that Hanoi had abandoned its ambitions in Laos and Cambodia. Nor would an
' Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, and Maj. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF, dissent from Section II. They believe that this section seriously underestimates the
impact of a communist success in South Vietnam, and gives inadequate consideration to the
attendant circumstances. The postulated settlement favorable to the communists would seriously
damage US prestige and credibility. And, in view of the expenditure of vast resources to
prevent a communist takeover in South Vietnam, the noncommunist governments might be
highly skeptical of any US commitment to their defense. Communist elements throughout
Southeast Asia would be encouraged and would press harder to emulate the demonstrated
success of "peoples' war." Both Laos and Cambodia would come under some form of communist
domination fairly soon; even the Thai probably would change their relationship with the US.
Whatever the reaction of the noncommunist governments of Mainland Southeast Asia over
the short term, for the longer term, regardless of US assurances, they would probably seek
some means of accommodation to communist pressures. Some leaders in the area almost
certainly would view accommodation as an acceptable alternative to the prospect of prolonged
military action in conjunction with the US-ending only in a solution favorable to the
communists.
The Army and Air Force members also believe that elsewhere in Southeast Asia, leaders
would be greatly influenced by the outcome and would, at the time of the settlement, view
US support in the area as uncertain. In the US acceptance of an unfavorable settlement in
Vietnam, they would see US withdrawal from a longstanding and deep commitment. On that
basis, Southeast Asian leaders would make those policy decisions then considered necessary
to national survival.
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outcome unfavorable to the communists remove Southeast Asian doubts con-
cerning the willingness of the American Government and people to engage on
a substantial scale in any new military conflict in the region.
41. US prestige would increase, however, and its allies in Southeast Asia
would reaffirm their links to the US. Everywhere in the region, the morale of
communist forces would sag while that of the noncommunists would improve.
But the impact on the actual power relationships in each country would not be
significant, except in Laos where the political position of the Souvanna gov-
ernment would be greatly strengthened, and in Cambodia where the will of
the regime to oppose domestic communists would be reinforced.
42. Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence would be felt inside the com-
munist countries and within the various communist movements. The successes
of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions have no doubt been highly influential
in the continued commitment of other communists in Southeast Asia to the
concept of "peoples' war." Defeat in Vietnam, even if rationalized as a temporary
setback, would bring the doctrines of Mao and Ho Chi Minh into question.
"Revisionism" might begin to gain some adherents, and there would probably
be some splits and degeneration in the various insurgencies. There might ensue
a period in which communist forces would place greater emphasis on working
within the system through popular fronts and association with other leftwing
movements. In such a case, Peking and perhaps Hanoi would lose some influence.
43. Because of the importance of Southeast Asia to China, it is conceivable
that Hanoi's acceptance of an unfavorable outcome in Vietnam might provoke
recriminations in Peking and result in a leadership crisis. We think, however,
that such a reaction is unlikely. For Peking at least, there already exists a rationale
for the defeat of the Viet Cong, namely that because of improper tactics they
were unable to persist in a protracted war. Chinese policy might become more
threatening, but it is more likely that the failure of the communist campaign
in Vietnam would not have a major effect on Chinese policy elsewhere in
Southeast Asia.
44. As for Hanoi, we believe that it would remain unreconciled to the division
of Vietnam and to the presence of US power in Indochina. The Vietnamese com-
munists would try to preserve what assets they could in the form of cadres and
organization in South Vietnam. They might well, however, refrain from instituting
further violence while they rebuilt their potential and waited for the diminution
of US power and interest in Vietnam.
45. A communist failure in South Vietnam might further strain Hanoi's rela-
tions with Peking. There might be mutual recriminations and Hanoi, in its
weakened position, might be more than ever concerned to retain Soviet support
and avoid overdependence on China. Nonetheless, normal prudence, if nothing
else, would suggest that Hanoi would attempt to maintain good relations with
Peking. Both Hanoi and Peking, of course, would want to prevent any further
strengthening of the noncommunist position in Laos, and Hanoi would try to
hold the areas of Laos bordering on North Vietnam.
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w 'wee
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