KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001200030054-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: July 5, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

Following are the texts of key documents accompanying the
Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering events in
the Truman an.cl Eisenhower Administration. Except where
excerpting is specified, the documents appear ver?batin't, with
only unmistakable typographical errors col ree'ted.
?
Report 0110'
s Appeals to U a
S
In"416
to Support d pe idence
Cablegram from an American diplomat in Manor, identified as Landon, to
State Department, Feb. 27, 1946, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.
Ho Chi Minh handed inc 2 letters ad- September 1945 of PENW Democratic critically important to Malaya, Ceylon
Re ubic of Viet Minh: and Hong Kong and are of considerable
dressed to President of USA, China, p significance to Japan .and India, all
Russia, and Britain identical copies of C C. Summary of French conquest of Cochin China began 23 Sept 1945 and important areas of free Asia.
which were stated to have been for- still incomplete: d. The loss of Southeast Asia, espe-'
warded to other governments ifamed. D. Outline of accomplishments of An- daily of Malaya and Indonesia, could re-
In 2 letters to IIo Chi Minh request namese Government in Tonkin includ- cult in such economic and political pres-
sores in Japan as to make it extremely
?rna in so popular elections, abolition of ttn_
fs one of United Nations to sop g lp difficult to prevent Japan's eventual ac-
des
port idea of Annamese independence and resumption as far as possible of commodation to communism.
according to Philippines example, to normal economic activities: 3. It is therefore imperative `that an
examine the case of the Annamese, and E. Request to 4 powers: (1) to inter-. overt attack on Southeast Asia by the.
to take steps necessary to maintenance verse and stop the war in Indochina in Chinese Communists be vigorously op-
to
world peace which is being endan- order to mediate fair settlement and posed. In order to pursue the military
gered by French efforts to reconquer (2) to bring the Indochinese issue be- courses of action envisaged in this paper
Indochina. He asserts that Annamese fore the United Nations organization. to a favorable conclusion within a
will fight until United Nations inter- The petition ends with the statement reasonable period, it will be necessary to
fered in support of Annamese independ- that Annamese ask for full independ di ert military strength from other areas
ence. The petition addressed to major ence in fact and that in interim while thus reducing our military capability in
United Nations contains; awaiting UNO decision the Annamese those areas, with the recognized in,
A. Review of French relations with will continue to fight the reestablish- creased risks involved therein, or to in-
Japanese where French Indochina al- ment of French imperialism. Letters and crease our military forces in being, or
legedly aided Japs: petition will be transmitted to Depart- both,
B. Statement of establishment on 2 ment soonest. 4. The danger of an overt military
-
Asia. However, should Burma come un-
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.Goals in Southeast Asia
.Statement of Policy by the'National Security Council, early 1952; on "United
States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia."
According to a footnote, the docurtett defined Southeast-Asia as "the area
embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia."
seriously endanger in the short term,
Objective and critically endanger in the longer
1., To. prevent the countries of South- term, United States security interests.
a. The loss of any of the countries
east Asia from passing into the corn- of Southeast Asia to communist aggres-
anunist orbit, and to assist them to de- sion would have critical psychological,
Southeast Asia and India, and in the
longer term, of the Middle East (with
the probable exceptions of at least
Pakistan and Turkey) would in all
probability progressively follow: Such
widespread alignment would. endanger
the stability and security of Europe.
b. Communist control of all of South-
east Asia would render the U.S. position
in the Pacific offshore island chain pre-
carious and would seriously jeopardize
fundamental U.S. security interests in
the Far East.
c. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya
and Indonesia, is the principal world
source of natural rubber and tin, and a
producer of petroleum and other stra-
tegically important commodities. The
rice exports of Burma and Thailand are
trw,-a.cri a~a.au,L OIJUWILao~ . .
herent in the existence of a hostile and
aggressive Communist China, but such
an attack is less probable than can-
tinued communist efforts to achieve
domination through subversion. The
primary threat to Southeast Asia accord-
ingly arises from the possibility that the
situation in Indochina may deteriorate as
a result of the weakening of the resolve
of, or as a result of the inability of
the governments of France and of the
Associated States to continue to oppose
the Viet Minh rebellion, the millitary
strength of which is being steadily in-
creased by virtue of aid furnished by
the Chinese Communist regime and its
velop will and ability to resist com- political and economic consequences. In allies.
raunism from within and without and the absence of effective and timely 5. The 'sua.ces ful defense of Tonkin
to contribute to the strengthening of counteraction, the loss of any single is critical to the retention in non-Com-
the free world. country would Probably lead to rela- munist hands of mainland Southeast
` ii
1 1 ever means, of all Southeast Asia would' b communism of the rest frf' might. make Indochina, including Tonkin
with
militarily indefensible. The execution of
 the following U.S. ccurse6 of action v ail T ,, cl^ t finer olnticat,
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area may vary depending upon the security of the United States so that and psyci. uce the a;; rem
route of communist advance into South- they may be prepared for any of the se(8) US-French eenccooperation Viet Minh forces.
route Asia. courses of action proposed herein. (8) o vem in nu
t
6. Actions designed to achieve our ob cizing progressi sve developments in the
jectives in Southeast Asia require INDOCHINA foregoing policies in Indochina.
sensitive selection and application, on 8. With respect to Indochina the 9. In the absence of large scale Chi-
the one hand to ass-ire the optimum ef- United States should: nose Communist intervention in Indo-
ficiency through coordination of meal- - china, the United State, should:
a Continue to promote international a provide inuc ~sed aid on a high
ures for the general area, and on the
other, to accommodate to the greatest
practicable extent to the individual
sensibilities of the several governments,
social classes and minorities of the
area.
Courses of Action
SOUT}IEAST ASIA
7. With respect, to Southeast Asia, the
United States should:
a. Strengthen propaganda and cultural
activities,. as appropriate, in relation to
the area to foster increased alignment
of the people with the free world.
b. Continue, as appropriate, programs
of economic and technical assistance de-
signed to strengthen the indigenous.
non-communist governments of the area.
c. Encourage the countries of South-
east Asia to restore and expand their
commerce with each other and with the
rest of the free world, and stimulate the
flow of the raw material resources. of
'the area to the free world.
d. Seek agreement with other nations,
including at least France, the UK,
Australia and New Zealand, for a joint
warning to Communist China regarding
the grave consequences of Chinese a,-
gression against Southeast Asia, the
.issuance of such a warning to be con-
tingent upon the prior agreement of
France and the UK to participate in the
courses of action set forth in paragraphs
10 c, 12; 14 f (1) and (2) and 15 c (1)
-and (2), and such oxhers as are de-
termined as a result of prior trilateral
consultation, in the event such a warning
is ignored.
e. Seek UK and French agreement in
principle that a naval blockade of Com-
munist China should be included in the
minimum courses of action set forth in
paragraph 10c below.
f. Continue to encourage and support
closer cooperation among the countries
of Southeast Asia, and between those
countries and the United States, Great
Britain, France, the Philippines, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, South Asia and
Japan.
g. Strengthen, as appropriate, covert
:operations designed to assist in the
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east Asia." (3) Such reorganization of French au- gres
h. Continue activities and operations ministration and representation in Indo- states take whatever action may be
designed to encourage the' overseas china as will be conducive to an In- necessary, without geographic limita
Chinese communities in Southeast Asia creased feeling pf responsibility on the tion, to assist France and the Associated
to organize and activate anti-communist part of the Associated States. States in meeting the aggression.
groups and activities within their own. (4) Intensive efforts to develop the b. Whether or not UN action is im-
communities, -to resist the effects of. armies of the Associated States, includ- mediately forthcoming, seek the maxi-
parallel pro-communist' groups and ac-.' ing independent logistical and adminis- mum possible international supi?ort for,
tivities and, generally, to increase their trative services. and participation in, the minimum
orientation toward the free world. - (5) The development of more effec- courses of military action agreed upon
J. Take measures to promote the co- the and stable Governments in the Asso- by the parties to the joint warning.
ordinated defense of the area, and en- ciated States. These minimum courses of action are
courage and support the spirit of re- (6) Land reform, agrarian and indus- set forth in subparagraph c immediately
sistance among the peoples of Soul.hea.st trial credit, sound rice marketing sys- below.
Asia to Chinese Communist aggression tems, labor development, foreign trade
and to the encroachmer rmw cEor Fe}t aa2004t09/O3 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR0012000300
munists. 0 inued
support for the three Associated States. priority hasis for the French Union
b. Continue to assure the French that forces without relieving French author-
the U.S. regards the French effort in ities of their basic military responsibil-
Indochina as one of great strategic im-
portance in the general international
interest rather than in the purely French
interest, and as essential to the security
of the free world, not only in the Far
East but in the Middle East and Europe
as well.
c. Continue to assure the French that
we are cognizant of the sacrifices en-
tailed for France in carrying out her,
effort in Indochina and that, without
overlooking the principle that France has
the primary responsibility in Indochina,,
we will recommend to the Congress
appropriate military, economic and
financial aid to France and the
Associated States.
d. Continue to cultivate friendly and
increasingly cooperative relations with
the Governments of France and the
Associated States, at all levels with a
view to maintaining and, if possible, in-
creasing the degree of influence the U.S.
can bring to bear on the policies and
actions of the French and Indochinese
authorities to the end of directing the
course of events toward the objectives
we seek. Our influence with the French
and Associated States should be de-
signed to further . those constructive
political, economic and social measures
which will tend to increase the stability
of the Associated States and thus make'
it possible for the French to reduce the
degree of their participation in the mili-
tary, economic and political affairs of
the.Associated States.
e. Specifically we should use our
influence with France. and the Associat?
ed States to promote positive political,
military, economic and social policies,
among which the following are consid-
ered essential elements:
(1) Continued recognition and carry-
ing out by France of its primary
responsibility for the defense of Indo-
china.
Associated states towaru the evuiuuw1 t.LJU vy -.
ary development of the Associated include a UN resolution declaring that
___ ...:..t China has rnmmitted an ag-
ity for the defense of the Ai.soca
States in order to:
(1) Assist in developing indigenous
armed forces which will eventually be
capable. of maintaining internal security
without assistance from French units.
(2) Assist the French Union forces to
maintain progress in the restoration of
internal security against the Viet Minh. ?
(3) Assist the forces of Frr.nce and
the Associated State.; to defend Indo-
china against Chinese Communist
aggression.
b. In view of the immediate urgency
of the situation, involving possible large-
scale Chinese Communist intervention,
and in order that the United States
may be prepared to take whatever ac-
tion may be appropriate in such cir
.cu instances, make the plans necessary
to carry out the courses of action indi-
cated in paragraph 10 below.
c. In the event that information and
circumstances point to the conclusion
that France is no longer prepared to
carry the burden in Indochina, or if
France presses for an increased sharing
of the responsibility for Indochina,
whether in the UN or directly with the
U.S. Government, oppose a French with-
drawal and consult with the French and
British concerning further measures to
be taken to safeguard -the area from
communist domination.
10. In the event that it is determined,
in consultation with France, that
Chinese Communist forces (including
volunteers) have overtly intervened in
the conflict in Indochina, or are: covertly
participating to such -an extent as to
jeopardize retention of the Tonkin Delta
area by French Union forces, the United
states should take the - following
measures to assist these forces in pre-
venting the loss of Indochina, to repel
the aggression and to restore peace and
security in Indochina:
a. Support a request by France or
the Associated States for immediate ac-
 Approved For (ease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80RO17 01200030054-3
c. `Carry out the following, minimum ise o ver Comm ittee"s Me
courses of military action, either under 1
the auspices of the UN or in conjunction
with France and the United Kingdom On French for id
and any other friendly governments: E Requests
(1) A resolute defense of Indochina
itself to which the United States would Excerpts from memorandum for the record, Jan. 30, 1954, by Brig. Gen.
provide such air and naval assistance Charles H. Bonesteel 3d on meeting of President's Special Committee on
as might be practicable. Indochina.
(2) Interdiction of Chinese Communist 1. The Special Committee met in Mr.
communication lines including those in Kyes' office at 3:30 p.m. 29 January
China. 1954....
(3) The United States would expect 3. Admiral Radford said he had been
to provide the major forces for task in touch with General Ely, French Chief
(2) above; but would expect the UK of Staff, through General Valluy. Ten
and France to provide at least token B-26 aircraft are on the way to Indo-
forces therefor and to render such other china this week. These would contribute
assistance as is normal between allies, to filling the French request for air-
and France to carry the burden of pro- craft to bring two B-26 squadrons
viding, in conjunction with the Associat- up to a strength of 25 operational air-
ed States, the ground forces fqr the craft each. However, an additional 12
defense of Indochina. are needed to fill the full requirement
11. In addition to the courses of action because a total .of 22 are needed (12 to
set forth in paragraph 10 above, the fill the annual attrition plus 10 to fill
.United States should take the following the additional French request). There
military actions as appropriate to the was some .discussion on the seeming
situation: differences in requests reaching Wash-
a. If agreement is reached pursuant ington via Paris and those coming
to paragraph 7-e, establishment in con- through the MAAG. Subsequently in the
junction with the UK and France of a meeting-it was agreed that the French
naval blockade of Communist China.' should be informed that the U.S. would
b. Intensification of covert operations act only on requests which had been
to aid anti-communist guerrilla forces approved by General O'Daniel after Gen-
operating against Communist China and eral O'Daniel was set up in Indochina.
to interfere with and disrupt Chinese 4. Admiral Radford indicated that to
Communist lines of communication and fill the entire requirement for 22 B-26's.
military supply. areas. on an urgent basis would mean taking
c.. Utilization, as desirable and feasi- some of them from U. S. operational
ble, of anti-communist Chinese forces, squadrons in the Far East, but this
including Chinese Nationalist forces in could be done. The aircraft would not
military' operations in Southeast Asia, all have "zero" maintenance time on
Korea, or China proper. them.
d. Assistance to the British to cover 5. As to the additional French re-
an evacuation from Hong Kong, if quest for 25 B-26's to equip a third
regdired. squadron, it was decided that final de-
e: Evacuation of French Union civil cision to furnish them should await the
and military personnel from the Tonkin return of General O'Daniel. However,
delta, if required. the Air Force has been alerted that
they may have to be furnished on short
12. If, subsequent to aggression against notice.
!Indochina and execution of the mini- 6. As to the provision of a small
mum necessary courses of action-listed "dirigible," it was 'decided to inform
in paragraph 10-c above, the United the French that this could not be fur-
States determines jointly with the UK nished.
and France that expanded military ac- 7. Regarding the French request for
tion against Communist China is ren- 400 mechanics trained in maintenance
dered necessary by the situation, the of B-26 and C-47 aircraft, there was
United States should take air and naval considerable discussion. Admiral Rad-
action in conjunction with at least ford said he had informed General Ely,
France and the U.K. against all suitable through General Valluy, that the U.S.
military targets in China, avoiding does not believe the French have ex-
insofar as practicable those targets in hausted all efforts to get French civil-
areas near the boundaries of the. USSR an maintenance crews. He suggested
in order not to increase the risk of direct the French try. to find them through
Soviet involvement. "Air France" Mr. Kyes mentioned the
13. In the event the concurrence of possibility of obtaining French person-
the United Kingdom and France to ex- nel from their eight aircraft factories
paraded military action against Commu- or from the ' big Chateauroux mainte
nist China is not obtained; the United nance base where the U.S. employed.
States should consider taking unilateral French mechanics. General Smith in-
action. !quired about the possibility of lower-
Ing French NATO commitments to en-
,able transfer of French military me-
chanics. Admiral Radford said General
Valluy had informed him the French
Staff have carefully considered the idek
but the French Air Force does not have
enough military mechanics trained in
thanics were being trained on these
aircraft that the urgent requirement,
could not he rnet. He had also said that
the employment of French civilian me-
chanics presented a difficult, problem
in security clearance.
8. General Smith recommended that
the U.S. send 200 U.S. Air Force
mechanics to MAAG, Indochina, and
tell the French to provide the rest. Ad-
miral Radford said this could be done
and that the Air Force- is, somewhat
reluctantly, making plans to this end. He
had let the French know that if Ameri-
can mechanics were sent they must be
used only on air bases which were
entirely secure from capturd. General
Smith, wondered, in light of additional
French requests, if the Committee should
not consider sending the full 400 me-
chanics.
9. Mr. Kyes questioned if sending
200 military mechanics 'would not so
commit the U.S. to support the French
that we must be prepared eventually for
complete intervention, including use of
U.S. combat forces. General Smith said
he did not think this would result-
we were sending maintenance forces
not ground forces. He felt, however,
that the importance of winning in In-
dochina was so great that if worst came
to the worst he personally would favor
intervention with U.S. air and naval
forces-not ground forces. Admiral
Radford agreed. Mr. Kyes felt this con-
sideration was so important that it
should be put to the highest level. The
President himself should decide. Gen-
eral Smith agreed. Mr. Allen Dulles
wondered if our preoccupation with help-
ing to win the battle at Dien Bien Phu
was so great that we were not going
to bargain with the French as we sup-
plied their most urgent needs. Mr.
Kyes said this was an aspect of the
question he was resisting, Admiral Red-
ford read from a cable just received
from General O'Daniel, which indicated
General Navarre had been most cordial
to General O'Daniel at their meeting
and had indicated he was pleased with
the concept of U.S. liaison officers be-
ing assigned to his general headquar-
ters and to the training command. Gen
eral Navarre and - General O'Daniel
agreed to try to work out a maximum
of collaboration at the military level.
10. Later in the meeting, Mr. Allen
Dulles raised the question as to send-
ing the CAP pilots the French had
once requested. It was agreed that the
French apparently wanted then now,
that they should be sent, and CIA should
arrange for the necessary negotiations
with the French in Indochina to take
care of it.
11. Mr. byes said that if we meet
the French urgent demands they should
6 or C-47 maintenance to fill the re- b^ e ti e achieve-
z,
For i lit?QQE4> 93t>~e4AvR[i $ORg ~Ro ,a @~a~ation with
,such a_,delay while their military me- the French in training and strategy, and
QQ~2t i,~u4 cf
 Approved Fpr lease 2004/09/03.,CIA-RDP80RO172( 101200030054-3
,O'Daniel's hand in every way possible.
General Smith agreed and felt we should
reinforce General O'Daniel's position
not only with the French in Indochina
but also at the highest level,in Paris....
12. Summary of Action Agreed Re-
garding Urgent French Requests
Admiral Radford, Admiral Davis, Gen-
eral Erskine, Mr, Godel, BIG Bonesteel,
Colonel Alden.
Department of State--General Smith,
Mr. Robertson.
. CIA-Mr. Allen Dulles, General Cabell,
Mr. Aurell, Colonel Lansdale.
It was agreed:
,..'a. To provide 200 uniformed U.S. Air
Force mechanics who would be assigned
as an augmentation to MAAG Indo-
china, these mechanics to be provided
only on the, understanding that they
would be used at bases where they
'would be secure from capture and would
not be exposed to combat.
c. To send, the CAP pilots, with CIA
arranging necessary negotiations.
d. Not to provide a "dirigible."
e. To await General O'Daniel's return
to Washington before making a decision
on the other French requests. Efforts
should continue to get the French to
contribute a maximum number of
mechanics.
It was further agreed that General
Smith would clear these recommended
actions with the President.
13, The next item discussed was the
status of General 'O'Daniel. Mr. Kycs
said General Trapnell, the present Chief
of MAAG, is being replaced at the nor-
Trial expiration of 'his tour. General
Dabney had been chosen to replace
General Trapnell and is about to leave
for Indochina. Admiral Radford pointed
out that General O'Daniel could be made
Chief of MAAG without any further
clearance with the French Government.
General Smith said this would be Al
right but slioul d not preclude further
action to increase the position of Gen-
eral O'Danid . General Erskine pointed
? out that the MAAG i1 Indochina is not
a "military mission" but only an ad-
ministrative group concerned with the
provision of MDAP equipment. Ile
thought the MAAG status should be
raised to that of a mission which could
help in training. It was agreed that
General O'Daniel should probably be
first assigned as Chief of MAAG and
'that, for this reason, General Dabney's;
departure for Indochina should be tem-
porarily held up. General Dabney should,
however, go to Indochina to assist Gen-
eral'O'Daniel by heading up the present
MAAG functions. Admiral Davis was
requested to assure that General Dabney
-did not depart until further instructions,
were given.
20. Mr. Allen Dulles inquired if an un-
conventional warfare officer, specifically
Colonel Lansdale, could not be added"
to the group of five. liaison officers
to which General Navarre had agreed.
Admiral Radford thought this might be
done and at any rate Colonel Lansdale
could immediately be attached to the
MAAG, but he wondered if it would
not be best for Colonel Lansdale to
await General O'Daniel's return before'
going to Indochina. In this way, Colo-
nel Lansdale could help the working
group in its revision of General Erskine's
paper. This was agreeable to Mr. Allen
'54- RK-eport by Special Committee
On the Threat of Communism
Excerpts from Part II of the Special Committee's Report on Southeast Asia,
April 5, 1954. Part I was not made available with it.
IVr Conclusions
A. The Special Committee considers
that these factors reinforce the neces-
sity of assuring that Indo-China remain
in the non-Communist bloc, and believes
that defeat of the Viet Minh in Indo-
China is essential if the spread of Com-
munist influence in Southeast Asia is to
be halted. ,
B. Regardless of the outcome of mil-
itary operations in Indo-China and with-
out compromising in any way the over-
whelming strategic importance of the
Associated States to the Western po-
sition in the area, the U.S. should take
all affirmative and practical steps, with
or without its European allies, to pro-
vide tangible evidence of Western
strength and determination to defeat
Communism; to demonstrate that ulti-
mate victory will be won by the free
world; and to secure the affirmative
association of Southeast Asian states
with these purposes.
C. That for these purposes the West-
ern position in Indo-China must be.
maintained and improved by a military
victory.
D. That without compromise to C,
above, the U.S. should in all prudence
reinforce the remainder of Southeast
Asia, including the land areas of Malaya,
Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and the
Philippines.
Recommended Courses of Action
A. The Special Committee wishes to
reaffirm the following recommendations
which are made in NCS 5405, the Spe-
cial Committee Report concerning mili-
tary operations in Indo-China, and the
position paper of the Special Committee,
concurred in by the Department of De-
fense, concerning U. S. courses of action
and policies with respect to the Geneva
Conference:
(1) It be U. S. policy to accept nothing
short of a military victory in Indo-China.
(2) It Lie the U. S. position to obtain
French support of this position; and that
failing this, the U. S. actively oppose any
negotiated settlement in Indo-China at
(3) It he the U. S. position in event of
failure of (2) above to initiate immedi'.
ate steps with the governments of the
Associated States aimed toward the con-
tinuation of the war in Indo-China, to
include active U. S. participation and
(4) Regardless of whether or not the
U. S. is successful in obtaining French
support for the active U. S. participa-
tion called for in (3) above, every effort,
should be made to undertake this active
participation in concert with other in-
terested. nations.
B. The, Special Committee also con-
siders that all possible political and eco-
nomic pressure on France must be ex-
erted as the obvious initial course of ac-
tion to reinforce the French will to con-
tinue operatings [sic] in Indo-China. The
Special Committee recognizes that this
course of action will jeopardize the ex-
isting French Cabinet, may be unpopular
among the, French public, and may be
considered as endangering present U. S.
policy with respect to EDC. The Corn-
mittee nevertheless considers that the
free world strategic position, not only
?The Department of State representative
recommends the deletion of paragraphs A
and B hereunder as being redundant and
included in other documents.
in Southeast Asia but in Europe and the
Middle East as well, is such as to re-
quire the most extraordinary efforts to..
prevent Communist domination of South-
east Asia. The Committee considers that
firm and resolute action now in this
regard. may well be the key to a solution"
of the entire problem posed by France
in the free world community of nations.
C. In order to make the maximum
contribution to the free world strength
in Southeast Asia, and regardless of the
outcome of military operations currently
in progress in Indo-China, the U.S.
should, in all prudence, take the follow
ing courses of action in addition to
those set forth in NSC 5405 and in Part I.
of the Special Committee Report:
Political and Military:
(1) Ensure that there be initiated no
cease-fire in Indo-China prior to victory:
whether that be by successful military
action or clear concession of defeat by
the Communists.
Action: State, CIA
(2) Extraordinary and unilateral, as well
as multi-national, efforts should be un-
dertaken to give vitality in Southeast,
Asia to the concept that Communist im-
perialism is a transcending threat to
each of the Southeast Asian states. These
efforts should be so undertaken as to
appear through local initiative rather
than, as a result of U.S. or UK, or
French insti?ation.
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Cnntinuod
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.ACTION: USIA, State, CIA
? (3) It should be U. S. policy to develop
within the UN Charter a Far Eastern
regional arrangement subscribed and un-
derwritten by the major European pow-
ers with interests in the Pacific.
a. Full accomplishment of such an
arrangement can only be developed in-
the long term and should therefore be
preceded by the development, through,
indigenous sources, or regional economic
and cultural agreements between the
several Southeast Asian countries and
later with Japan. Such agreements might
take a form similar to that of OEEC:.
in Europe.
Action: State, CIA, FOA ,
b. Upon the basis of such agreements,
the U. S. should actively but unobtru-
sively seek their expansion into mutual
defense agreements and should for this
purpose be prepared to underwrite such
agreements with military.and economic
aid and should [rest unavailable].
D. The courses of action outlined`
above are considered as mandatory re=
gardless of the outcome of military op=
orations in Indo-China.
(1) If Indo-China is held they are
needed to build up strength and re-
sistance to Communism in the entire.
area.
(2) If Indo-China is lost they are es-
sential as partial steps:
a. To delay as long as possible the
extension of Communist domination
throughout the Far East, or
b. In conjunction with offensive opera
tions to retake Indo-China from the Com-
niunists.
(3) Should Indo-China be lost it is
clear-to the Special Coriunittee that the
involvement of U. S. resources either in
an attempt to stop the further spread
of Communism in the Far East, (which
is bound, except in terms of the n
extensive military and political effort,
to be futile) or to initiate offensive op-
erations to retake and reorient Indo-
China, (which would involve a major
military campaign), will greatly exceed
those needed to hold Indo-China before
it falls.
(4) Furthermore, either of these under-
takings (in the light of the major set-
back to U. S. national policy involved
in the loss of Indo-China) would entail
as an urgent prerequisite the restoration
of Asian morale and confidence in U. S.
?policy' which will have reached an un-
. precedentedly low level in the area.
(5) Each of these courses of action
would involve greater risk of war with
Communist China, and possibly the So-
viet Union, than timely preventive action
taken under more favorable circum-
stances before Indo-China is lost.
once at highest .level, I must confirm
this position. US is doing everything
possible as indicated my 5175 to pre-
pare public, Congressional and Constitu-
tional basis for united action in Indo- highest level.
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guns operated by Chinese and evidently
are- from Korea. These AA guns are
now shooting through clouds to bring
down French aircraft.
Dillon Cable to Dulles on Appeal
F or it Support at ienbienp u
Cablegram from Douglas'Dillon, United States Ambassador to France, to
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on April 5, 1954.
Fourth. One thousand supply trucks
of which 500 have arrived since 1
March, all driven by Chinese army per-
sonnel.
Fifth. Substantial material help in
guns, shells, etc., as is well known.
Bidault said that French Chief- of Air
Staff wished US be informed that US
air intervention at Dien Bien Phu could
lead to Chinese Communist air attack on
delta airfields. Nevertheless, govern-
ment was making request for aid.
Bidault closed by saying that for good
or evil the fate of Southeast Asia now
rested on Dien Bien Phu. He said that
Geneva would be won or lost depending
on outcome at Dien Bien Phu. This was
reason for French request for this very
serious action on our part.
He, then emphasized necessity for
speed in view of renewed attack which
is expected before end of week. He
thanked US for prompt. action on air-
lift for French paratroops. He then said
that he had received -Dulles' proposal
for Southeast Asian coalition, and that
lie would answer as soon as possible
later. in week as restricted Cabinet ses-
sion not competent to make this de-
cision.
New' Subject. I passed on Norstad's
Concern that news of airlift (DEPTEL
3470, April 3) might leak as planes as-
sembled. Pleven was called into room.
He expressed extreme concern as any
leak would lead to earlier Viet Minh
attack. He said at all costs operation
must be camouflaged as training exer-
cise until troops have arrived. He is
preparing them as rapidly as possible
and they will be ready to leave in a
week. Bidault and Laniel pressed him
to hurry up departure date of troops
and he said he would do his utmost.
URGENT. I was called at 11 o'clock
Sunday night and asked to come im-
mediately to Matignon where a restrict-
ed Cabinet meeting was in progress.
On arrival Bidault received me in La-
niel's office and was joined in a few
minutes by Laniel. They said that im-
mediate armed intervention of US car-
rier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu is now
necessary to save the situation.
Navarre reports situation there now
in state of precarious equilibrium and
that both sides are doing best to rein-
force-Viet Minh are bringing up last
available reinforcements which will way
outnumber any reinforcing French can
do by parachute drops. Renewal of as-
sault by reinforced Viet Minh probable
by middle or end of week. Without
help by then fate of Dien Bien Phu
will probably be sealed.
Ely brought back report from Wash-
ington that Radford gave him his per-
sonal (repeat personal) assurance that
if situation at Dien Bien Phu required
US naval air support he would do his
best to obtain such help from US Gov-
ernment. Because of this information
from ? Radford as reported by Ely,
French Government now asking for US
carrier aircraft support at Dien Bien
Phu. Navarre - feels that a relatively
minor US effort could turn the tide
but naturally hopes for as much help
as possible. French report Chinese in-
tervention in Indochina already fully
established as follows:
First. Fourteen technical advisors at
Giap headquarters plus numberous
others at division level. All under com-
mand of Chinese Communist Gemeral
Ly Chen-liou who is stationed at Giap
headquarters.
Second. Special telephone lines in-.
styled maintained and operated by Clii-
nese personnel.
Third. Forty 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns
radar-controlled at Dien Bien Phu. These
Dulles Cable Barring Intervention
china. However, such action' is impos-
sible except on coalition basis with
active British Commonwealth participa-
tion. Meanwhile US prepared, ' as has
been demonstrated, to do everything
short of belligerency.
FYI US cannot and will not be put
in position of alone salvaging British
Commonwealth interests in Malaya,
Australia and New Zealand. This neat-
ter now under discussion with UK at
Cablegram from Secretary Dulles to Ambassador Dillon in Paris, April 5,
As I personally explained to Ely in
presence of Radford, it is not (rpt not)
possible for US to commit belligerent
acts in Indochina without full political
understanding with France and other
countries. In addition, Congressional
action would be required. After gonfer-
 Approved For ease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80R017201200030054-3
Dillon Reply, o: French Reaction
Cablegram from Ambassador Dillon to Secretary Dulles, April 5, 1954.
I delivered message DEPTEL 3482 to unfortunately the time for formulating
Didault Monday evening. He asked me coalitions has passed as the fate of In-
to tell Secretary that he personally dochina will be decided in the next ten
covrid well understand position US Gov- drys at Dien-Bien-Phu. As I left he said
that even though French must fight
-rnment and would pass on your answer alone they would continue fighting and
to Laniel. he" prayed God they would be success-
He asked me to say once more that ful.
Memo of Eiserjhower-iliulles Talk
On the French Cease -Tire Plan
Memorandum by Robert Cutler, special assistant to President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Ma) 7, 1954.
At a meeting in the President's office
this morning with Dulles, three" topics
were discussed.
1. Whether the President should ap-
prove paragraph lb of the tentative
Record of Action of the 5/6/54 NSC
meeting, which covers the proposed an-
swer to the Eden proposal. The Secre-
tary of State thought the text was cor-
rect. Wilson and Radford preferred the
draft message to Smith for Eden pre-
pared yesterday by MacArthur and
Captain Anderson, and cleared by the
JCS, which included in the Five Power
Staff Agency. Thailand and the Philip-
pines. Radford thinks that the Agency
(which has hitherto been not disclosed
in SEA) has reahy completed its mili-
tary planning; that if it is enlarged by
top level personnel, its actions will be
necessarily open to the world; that
therefore some Southeast Asian coun-
tries should be included in it, and he
fears Eden's proposal as an intended de-
laying action.
The President approved the text of
paragraph lb but suggested that Smith's
reply to Eden's proposal should make
clear the following:
1. Five Power Staff Agency, alone or
with other nations, is not to the United
States a satisfactory substitute for a
broad political coalition which will in-
clude the Southeast Asian countries
which are to be defended,
2. Five Power Staff Agency exami-
raAion is acceptable to see how these
nations can give military aid to the
Southeast Asian counties in the coop-
erative defense effort.
3. The, United States will not agree
to a `:`white man's party" to determine
the problems of the Southeast Asian
nations.
I was instructed to advise Wilson and
Radford of the above, qnd have done so.
2. The Preside-.at went over the draft
of the speech which Dulles is going to.
make tonight, making quite a few sug-
gestions and changes in text. He
thought additionally the speech should
include some easy to understand slo-
gans, such as "The US will never start
"a war," "The US will not go to war
without Congressional authority," `,`The
US, as always, is trying to organize co-
operative efforts to sustain the peace."
3. With reference to the cease-fire pro-
posal transmitted by Eidault to thei
French cabinet, I read the following, as
views principally of military members
of the Planning Board, expressed in
their yesterday afternoon meeting:
1. US should not support the Bidault
proposal.
2. Reasons for this position:
a. The more proposal of the cease-
fire at the Geneva Conference would
destroy the will to fight of French
forces and make fencesitters jump to
Vietminh side.
b. The Communists would evade
covertly cease-fire controls.
3. The US should (as a last act to
save IndoChina) propose to France that
if the following 5 conditions are met,
the US will go to Congress for authority
to intervene with combat forces:
a. grant of genuine freedom for As-
sociated States
b. US take major responsibility for
training indigenous forces
c. US share responsibility for mili
tary planning
d. French forces to stay in the fight
and no requirement of replacement of
US forces
(e. Action under UN auspices?)
This offer to be made known simul-
taneously to the other members of the
proposed regional grouping (UK, Aus-
tralia, NZ, Thailand, Associated States,
Philippines) in order to enlist their par-
ticipation.
I then suiiimarized possible objec-
tions to making the above proposal to
the French:
a. No French Government is now
competent to act in a lasting vmy.
b. There is no ierdication France wants
to "internationalize" the conflict.
c. The US proposal would be. made
without the prior assurance of a re-
gional grouping of SEA states, a pre-
condition of Congress; although this
point might he added as another condi-
tion to the proposal.
d. US would be "bailing out colonial
France" in the eyes of the world.
e. US cannot undertake alone to save
every situation of trouble.
I concluded that some P13 members
felt that it had never been made clear
to the French that the US was willing
to ask for Congressional authority, if
certain fundamental precondition's were
met; that these matters had only been
hinted at, and that the record of his-
tory should be clear as to the US posi-
tion. Dulles was interested to know the
President's views, because he is talking
with Ambassador Bonnet this afternoon.
He indicated that he would mention
these matters to Bon net, perh-a.,ss mak-
ing a more broad hint than heretofore.
He would not circulate any formal pa-
per to Bonnet, or to anyone else.
The President referred to the propo-
sition advanced by Governor Stassen
at the April 29 Council Meeting as not
having been thoroughly thought, out. He
said that he had been trying to get
France to "internationalize" matters for
a long time, and they are not willing
to do so. If it were thought advisable
at this time to point out to the French
the' essential preconditions to the LS
asking for Congressional authority to
intervene, then it should also be r.:,ade
clear to the French as an additional
precondition that the US would never
intervene alone, that there must be an
invitation by the indigenous people, and
that there must he some kind of re-
gional and collective action.
I understand that- Dulles will decide
the extent to which he cares to follow
this line with Ambassador Bonnet. This
discussion may afford Dulles guidance
in replying to Smith's request about a
US alternative to support the Bidault
proposal, but there really was no deci-
sion as to the US attitude toward the
cease-fire proposal itself.
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Eisenhower's Instructions
U. S. Envoy at 'enev a T al ks
Cablegram, from Secretary of State Dulles to Under Secretary Walter Pedell
Smith, May 12, 1954.
The following basic instructions, that area peacefully to enjoy territorial,
which have been approved by the Presi- integrity and political independence un-
dent, and which are in confirmation of . der stable and free governments with
these already given you orally, will. the opportunity to expand their econ-
guide you, as head of the United States omies, to realize their legitimate na-
Delegation, in your participation in the
Indochina phase of the Geneva Confer-
ence.
tional aspirations, and to develop secu-
rity through individual and collective
defense against aggression, from within
1. The presence of a United States or without. This implies that these -peo-
representative during the discussion at ple should not be amalgamated into the
the Geneva Conference of "the problem of Communist bloc of imperialistic dicta-
restoring peace in Indochina" rests on torship,
the Berlin Agreement of February 18, 5. The United States is not prepared
1954, Under that agreement the US, to give its express or implied approval
UK, France, and USSR agreed that the. to any cease-fire, armistice, or other
four of them plus other interested states settlement which would have the effect
-should be invited to a conference at of subverting the existing ]awful govern-
ments of the three aforementioned
Geneva on April 2G "for the purpose states or of permanently impairing their
of reaching a peaceful settlement of the territorial integrity or of placing in
"
Korean question
and agreed further,
that "the problem of restoring peace
in Indochina" would also be discussed
at Geneva by the four powers repre-
sented at Berlin, and Communist China
.and other interested states. .
2. You will nat.deal with the delegates
of the Chinese Communist regime, or
any other regime not now diplomatically
recognized by the United States, on any
terms which imply political recognition
or which concede to that regime any
status other than that of a regime with
which it is necessary to deal on a
de facto,basis in order to end aggression
or the threat of aggression, and to
obtain peace.
3, The position of the United States
in the Indochina phase of the Geneva
Conference is that of an interested na-
tion which, however, is neither a bellig-
erent nor a principal in the negotiation.
4. The United States is participating
,in the Indochina phase of the Conference
in order thereby to assist in arriving at
decisions which will help the nations of
jeopardy the forces of the French Union
in Indochina, or which otherwise con-
travened the principles stated in (4)
above.
6. You should, insofar as is compati-
ble with these instructions, cooperate
with the Delgation of France and with
the Delegations of other friendly partici-
pants in this phase of the Conference.
7. If in your judgment continued par-
ticipation in the Indochina phase of the
Conference appears likely to involve the
United States in a result inconsistent
with its policy, as stated above, you
should immediately so inform your Gov-
ernment, recommending either with-
drawal or the limitation of the US role
to that of an observer. If the situation
develops such that, in your opinion, either
of such actions is essential under the
circumstances and time is lacking for
consultation with Washington, you may
act in your discretion.
8. You are authorized to inform other
delegations at Geneva of these instruc-
tions.
195 Study by ,the Joint Chiefs
On Possible U. S. Intervention
reference to the Fair East as a whole,
Indochina is devoid of decisive military
objectives and the allocation of more
than token U.S. armed forces in Indo-
china would be a serious diversion of
limited U.S. capabilities. The principal
sources of Viet Minh military supply lie
outside Indochina. The destruction or
neutralization of these sources in China
proper would materially reduce the
French military problems in Indochina.
b. In connection with the above, it
may be readily anticipated that, upon
Chinese Communist intervention in Indo-
china, the French would promptly re-
quest the immediate deployment of U. S.
ground and air forces, additional naval
forces, and a considerable increase in
MDAF armament and equipment. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their
belief that committing to the Indochina
conflict naval forces in excess of a Fast
Carrier Task Force and supporting forces
as necessary in accord.,nce with the
developments in the situation, of basing
substantial air forces in Indochina, will
involve maldeployrnent of forces and re-
duce readiness to meet probable Chi-
nese Communist reaction elsewhere in
the Far East. Simultaneously, it is nec-
essary to keep in mind the considerable
Allied military potential available in the
korea-Japan-Okinawa area,
c. In light of the above, it is clear
that the denial of these forces to Indo-
china could result in a schism between
the United States and France unless they
were employed elsewhere. However, it
should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have plans, both approved and
tinder consideration, which provide for
the employment of these forces in com-
bat operations outside Indochina. Never-
theless, it is desired to repeat that this
particular report is responsive to the
question of U. S. intervention in Indo-
-hina only.
Assuming the Chinese Communists
Intervene
3. Strategic Concept and Plan of Op-
eration
Seek to create conditions through the
destruction of effective Communist
forces and their means for support ,in
the Indochina action and by reducing.
Chinese Communist capability for ' fur-
ther aggression, under which Associated
States forces could assume responsibility
for the defense of Indochina. In the light
of this concept the major courses of
action would be as follows:
a. Employing atomic weapons, when-
ever advantageous, as well as other
weapons, conduct offensive air opera-
tions against selected military targets in
Indochina and against those military tar-
ots i Ch' Y-1- ' d th C
n
Excerpts front memorandum from Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of .Defense Charles E. Wilson, May 26,
1954, on "Studies With Respect to Possible U.S. Action Regarding Indochina."
The italicized emphasis appears in the original document.
g
uta, rnart, an o er om-
1. Reference is made to the memo- 2 a. The Studies requested by the munist-held offshore islands which are
randum by the Acting Secretary of De- Acting Secretary of Defense were de- being used by the Communists in direct
fense, dated I8 May 1954, subject as veloped within the parameters pre- support of their operations, or which
above, wherein the Joint Chiefs of Staff scribed in the memorandum by the Ex threaten the security of?U. S. and allied
were requested to prepare certain stud- ecutive Secretary, NSC, dated .18 May forces in the area.
195 4, subject as above. This memoran- b. Simultaneously, ies, and agreed outline answers to cer- French Union
dum is interpreted as assuming no con- Forces, augmented by U. S. naval, and
taro questions relating ther eto, for dis-
cussion with the Acting Secretary of current involvement in Korea. This as. air forces, would exploit by coordinated
sumption may be quite unrealistic and ground, naval, and air action such suc-
Defen
b
f
2 M
f
se on or
e
ore
a and
I v
~~snifOOR1'(~R04($0$tic@5~#-8 result of
subsequent submission lipA, 1~ f 4
Security Council NSC .. to point out their belief that, from the t e a oro oned air operations in or-
( point of.view of the United States, with der to destroy enemy forces in Indo-
. . China.
continued
 Approved For
c. Conduct coordinated ground, naval,
and air action to destroy enemy forces
in Indochina.
. d. In the light of circumstances pre
vailing at the-time, and subject to an
evaluation-of the results of operations
conducted under subparagraphs a and b
above, he prepared to take further action
against Communist China to reduce its
war-making capability, such as:
(1) Destruction of additional selected
military targets. In connection with these
additional targets, such action requires
an enlarged but highly selective atomic
pffensive in addition to attacks employ-
ing other weapons systems.
(2) Blockade of the China coast. Thi
might be instituted progressively from
the outset.
(3) Seizure or neutralization of
,Hainan Island,
(4) Operations against .the Chinese
mainland by Chinese Nationalist
forces....
Assuming Chinese Communists
Do Not intervene
9. Strategic Concept and Plan of
Action
Seek to create conditions by destroy-
ing effective Communist forces in Indo-
china, under which the Associated
States Forces could assume responsi-
bility for the defense of Indochina. In
the light of this. concept, the major
courses of action which would he t-ndcr-
taken are as follow; :
' a. Conduct air operations in sup-
port of allied forces in Indochina: The
employment of atomic weapons is con-
templated in the event that such course
appears militarily adIvantageous.
b. Simultaneously, French. Union
Forces augmented by such armed forces
of the Philippines and Thailand as may
be committed would, in coordination
with U.S. naval and Air Force forces,
-conduct coordinated ground, naval and
air action to destroy enemy forces in
Indochina.
ble by Dulles on
s
T..v. ) vie C1
d LI .
id-
11 CILC1116
Cablr'gsram by Secretary Dulles to United States Thnbossy in Paris with
copies to the United States Embassies in London and Saigon and to United
Stoics Consul General in Geneva for Under Secretary Bedell Smith, July 7, 1954.
We see no real conflict between
paragraphs 4 and 5 US-Ul' terms. We
realize of course that evc t agreement
which appears to meet all seven points
cannot constitute guarantee that Indo-
china will not one day pass into Com-
munist hands. Seven points are intended
provide best chance that this shall not
happen. This will require observance of
criteria not merely in the letter but in
the sjdiit. Thus since undoubtedly true
that elections might eventually mean
unification Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh
this makes it all more important they
should be only held as lone, after cease-
fire agreement as possible and in con-
ditions free from intimida.iiott to give
democratic elements best chance. We
believe important that no date should be
set now and especially that no condi-
tions should. be accepted by French
which would have direct or indirect
effect of . preventing effective inter-
national supervision of agreement en-
suring political as well as military
guarantees. Also note paragraph 3 of
President and Prim: Minister joint dec-
laration of June 29 regarding QTE
unity through free elections supervised
by the UN UNQTE.
Our interpretation of willingness QTE
respect UNQTE agreement which might
be reached is that we would rot (repeat
not) oppose a settlement which con-
formed?,to seven points contained Deptel'
4853. It does not (repeat not) of course
mean we would guarantee such settle-
ment or that we would necessarily sup-
port it publicly. We consider QTE
respect UNQTE as strong a word as we
can possibly employ in the circum-
stances to indicate our position with re-,
spect to such arrc.ngements as French.
may evolve along lines points contained
DEP'TEI., 4853. QTE respect UNQTE
would also mean that we would not
seek directly or indirectly to upset
settlement by force.
You may convey substarrtco above to
French.
e n Ch inrec~ -0
CaUiegram from Under Secretary Bedell Smith at Geneva to Secretary Dulles,
July 19, 1954.
Topping has supplied in confidence
following background information con-
cerning his story on views of Chinese
communist delegation.
He stated his informant was Huang
Hua, whom he has known for many
years. Interview was at Huang's'initia-
tive, was called on short notice, and was
conducted in extremely serious manner
without propaganda harangues.
Topping said he had reported Huang's
statement fully in his story but had
obtained number of "visual impres-
sions" during interview. When Huang
spoke of possibility American bases it-,
Indochina or anti-Communist pact in
Southeast Asia, he became very agi-
tated, his hands shook, and his usually
excellent English broke down, forcing
him to work through interpreter. Huang
also spoke seriously and with apparent
sincerity concerning his belief that I have
returned to Geneva to prevent settle-
ment.. Topping believes Chinese Commu-
nists convinced Americans made deal
with French during Paris talks on basis
of which Mendes-France has raised price
of settlement.
Glossary of `err s
6.6.(?.-ttachelor eticcrs' quarters.
C.A.T.--Civil Air lr,nsonrt, airline basrni on Taiwan.
DEpTEL--Stale Dep *rtnrost telenran.
E.'6.C.-Eurccnan 0`fenso Community.
F.E.C.-French Expeditionary Corps.
F.O.l..-Forel,n OrJ.rations Admrnisrraticn.
J.C5..-Joint Chb:.fs of Staff.
MA.AG--f.lilitan? Assistance Advisory 'Crow.
MCsAP-M1lutual Detrnse AnssMe a t'rosrern.
ational. S 0 Itd Council.
O.E.E.C.-Orga^+ratiu~i fur Europea r Economic Coorera-
lion.
Os.O.-Offla! of strref~ry of Defense.
SEA.-SYtthcast Asia.
~.S.O.M. -U.S. Operations Mission.
Continued
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 Chinese communist-s' Position Covei
un a i eutrai zeu ctoc r a
missioll
Cablegrurn from. Under Secr etary of State Bedell Smith at Geneva to Secre-
Duties, July 18, 1954.
tary
Following despatch given us in ad-
vance by Topping of Associated Press
apparently represents official Chinese
Communist position and was given Top-
ping in order that we would be-
come aware of it, It begins:
? QUOTA
e: The Communist bloc has 'demanded
that the United States guarantee the
partition peace plan for Indochina
and join in an agreement to neutralize
the whole country, a responsible Chinese
Communist informant said today.
The informant, who reflects the views
of Red China Premier Chou En-lai, said
the Communists are hopeful of a cease-
fire. agreement by next Tuesday's dead-
line if the Western powers agree to
'bar all foreign-military bases from Indo-
china and keep the three member states
out of any military bloc,'
The informant said the Communists
are pressing for the stamp of American
approval on the armistice agreement---
already okayed' in principle by Britain
and France--which would divide Viet-
nam between Communist leader Ho Chi
Mink's Viet 'Minh and Bao Dal's pro-
Western regime.
'We believe that the US as a member
of the conference should and is obligated
to subscribe to and guarantee any settle-
ment. Morally, there is no reason for
the US to avoid this obligation.'
But the informant did not (repeat not)-
rule out the chance of an Indochina
cease-fire even if the US refuses to
okay the armistice agreement.
The Eisenhower administration has
told France and Britain that they can go
ahead with their plan for an Indochina
settlement based on partition of
Vietnam, But Washington has made it
clear that it is not (repeat not) ready
to associate itself formally with the plan
which woidd sanction putting millions
of Vietnamese under Red rule.
The. Communist informant said the
'crucial issue' now in the Geneva peace
negotiations revolves around whether
the Western powers will agree effec-
tively to neutralize Indochina.
'Refusal to join in such a guarantee,'
the informant said, 'could seriously deter
a final settlement. On other important
.points in the negotiations we are in
agreement or close to it. We are hopeful
and we believe that there is- time to
reach. a settlement by July 20.'
French Premier Pierre Mendes-France
has promised to resign with his-Cabinet =Rd 5 ..
if he fails to end the bloody eight-year-
old war, by next Tuesday. -Fall of the
French Government probably would
doom the Geneva negotiations. The in-
formant declared that American efforts'
to organize, a Southeast Asia Treaty,
organization (SEATO) is a 'threat to .any
possible Indochina agreement'
'Success or failure of the Geneva Con-
ference may depend on the attitude of
the American delegation in this regard,'
he added.
END QUOTE
. The above seems to me extremely
significant, particularly in view of the
fact that in my discussion with Eden
last night he expressed pessimism,
which lie said was now shared for the
first time by Krishna Menon. Latter had
begun to feel, as I do, that Molotov
wishes to force Mendes-France's res-
ignation. Eden remarked that Molotov
had now become the most difficult and
intransigent member of Communist dele-
gation. You will note obvious intention
to place on shoulders of US responsi-
bility for failure of Geneva Conference
and fall of French Crovernment if this
occurs.
Molotov is insisting on a meeting this
afternoon which French and British are
trying to make highly restricted as they
are apprehensive of what may occur.
If such a meeting is hold and if demands
are made for US association in any
agreement, I will simply say that in the
event a reasonable settlement is arrived
at which US could "respect", US will
probably issue a unilateral statement of
its own position. If question of participa-
tion Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in
security pact is raised, I will reply that
this depends on outcome of conference.
Eden has already told Molotov that
security pact 'is inevitable, that he him-
self favored it some time ago and that
he would not (repeat not) withdraw
from that position, but he made the
mistake of saying that no consideration
had been given to inclusion of Laos and
Cambodia.
This final gambit is going to be ex-
tremely difficult to play and I do not
(repeat not) now see the moves clearly.
However, my opinion as expressed to'
you before leaving, i.e., that Molotov
will gain more by bringing down Mendes
Government than by a settlement, has
grown stronger.
Followinq are excerpts from the
I-eport of the Saigon, Mili,tarr?y Mission,
an American team headed h, . F]d vard G.
Lansdale, covering its activities in
the .19,54,-55 per-iod. The repo,?t acco 7anie.
the Yeiitagon`s study of this Vietnam war;
which cites it i.oitho?.tt identifying the
author, or c'rxt The excerpts appear
vei'bati,mm, with only unmistakable typo-
graph icac eir?ors corrected.
L FORE
W G
.. ?. This is the condensed account of
one year in the operations of a "cold
war" combat team, written by the team
itself in the field, little by little in mo-
ments taken as the members could.
The team is known as the Saigon Ivlili-
tary Mission. The field is Vietnam. There
are other teams in the field, American,
French, British, Chinese, Vietnamese,
Vietminh, and others. Each has its own
story to tell. This is ours.
The 'Saigon Military Mission entered
Vietnam on 1 June 1954 when its Chief
arrived. However, this is the story of
a team, and it wasn't until August 1954:
that sufficient members arrived to con-
stitute a team. So, this is mainly an
account of the team's first year, from
August 1954 to August 1955.
It was often a frustrating and perplex-
ing year, up close. The Geneva Agree-
ments signed on 21 July 1954 imposed
restrictive rules upon all official Amer-
icans, including the Saigon Military
Mission. An active and intelligent enemy
made full use of legal rights to screen
his activities in establishing his stay-
behind organizations south of the 17th
Parallel and in obtaining quick security
north of that Parallel. The nation's econ-
omy and communications system were
crippled by eight years of open war.
The government, including its Army and
other security forces, was in a painful
? transition from colonial to self rule,
making it a year of hot-tempered inci-
dents. Internal problems arose quickly
to points where armed conflict was
sought as the only solution. The enemy .
.was frequently forgotten in the heavy
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The Saigon Military Missiorl received
some blows from allies and the ene_e.y
in this atmosphere, as we work cd to
help stabilize the government and to
beat the Geneva time-table of Communist
takeover in the not tih. However, we did
beat the time-table. The government (lid
become stabilized. The Free Vietnamese
are now becoming unified and learning
how to cope with the Communist enemy.
We are thankful that we had a chance
to help in this work in a critical area
of the world, to be positive and
constructive in a year of doubt.
11". it 11-ii-ISN001110 I. I
The Saigon Military Mission (SMM)
was born. in a Washington policy meet-
ng early in 1954; when Dien Bien Phu
was still holding out against the encir-
,ling Vietminh. The S.''IIr$ was to enter
into Vietnam quietly and assist the Viet-
namese, rather than the French, in un-
conveentional war fare. The French were
to be kept as friendly allies in the proc-
ess, as far as possible.
On 1 July, Major Lucien Conc in ar-
rived, as the second member of the l
team. lie is a paramilitary specialist,
well-known to the French for his help 'i
with French-operacd maquis in Tonkin
against the Japanese in 1945, the one
American guerrilla fighter who h A not
been a member of the Patti Mission. He
was as-,igned to MAAG for cover pur-
poses. Arranged by Lt-Col William Ros-
son, a meeting was held with Col Car-
bonel, Col Nguyen Van Vy, and the two
SMM officers; Vy had seen his first
combat in 1945 under Conein. Carbonel
proposed establishing a maquis, to be
kept as a secret between the four of-
ficers. SMi1,.L refused, learned later that
Carbonel had kept the FEC Deuxieme
Bureau informed. Shortly afterwards, at
a Defense conference with General
O'Danit.l, our Chief had a chance to
suggest Vy for a command in the North,
making him a general. Secretary of State
fore Defense Le Ngoc Chan (lid so, Vy
was grateful and remained so.
Ngo Dinh Dien: arrived on 7 July,
and within hours was in despair as the
French forces withdrew from the Cath-
The Saigon. Military Pvlissiori (Si4IIv`i) course was initiated for the Ministry of Dirih in Tonkin. Catholic militia strearned
started on I June 1954, when its Chief, Information. Rumor campaigns were north to Hanoi and Haiphong, their
Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, added, to the tactics and tried out in hearts filled with anger at French aban-
arrived in Saigon with a small box of Hanoi. It was almost too late. doninent. The two SMM officers stopped
files and clothes and a borrowed type- The first rumor campaign was to be a a planned grenade attack by militia
writer, courtesy of an SA-16 flight set carefully planted story of a Chinese girls against French troops guarding
up for him by the 13th Air Force at Communist regiment in Tonkin taking a warehouse; the girls stated they had
Clark AFL. Lt-General John O'Daniel reprisals against a Vietminh. village not eaten for three days; arrangements
and Embassy Charge Rob Mc(Ciin- whose girls the Chinese had raped, re- were made for Chinese merchants in
tock had arranged for his appointment calling Chinese Nationalist troop be- Haiphong to feed them. Other militia
as Assistant Air Attache, since it was havior in 1945 and, confirming Viet attacks
were stopped, including one
improper for U.S. officers at MAAG namese fears of Chinese occupation against a withdrawing French artillery
at that time to have advisory confer- under Vietminh rule; the story was to
ences with Vietnamese officers. Ambr:s- be planted by soldiers of the Vietnamese unit; the militia wanted the guns to
sailor Heath had concurred already. Armed Psywar Company in Hanoi stand and fight the Vietminh. The Ton-
There was no desk space for an office, dressed in civilian clothes. The troops kinese had hopes of American friendship
no vehicle, no safe for files. He roomed received their instructions silently, and listened to the.advice given them.
with General O'Daniel, later moved to a dressed in civilian clothes, went on the Governor [name illegible] died, report-
small house rented by MAAG. Sec-get mission, and failed to return. They had edly by poison. Tonkin's government
communications with Washington were deserted to the Vietminh. Weeks later, changed as despair grew. On 21 July,
provided through the Saigon station of Tonkinese told Ti aexcited story of the the Geneva Agreement was signed. Ton-
CIA. misbehavior of the Chinese Divisions in kin was given to the Communists. Anti-
There was deepening gloom in Viet- Vietminh territory. Investigated, it Communists' turned to SMM for help in
nam. Dien Bien Phu had fallen. The turned out to be the old rumor cam- establishing a resistance movement and
French were capitulating to the Viet paign, with Vietnamese embellishment's. several tentative initial arrangements
minh at Geneva. The first. night in Sal- . There was political chaos. Prince Buu were made.
gon, Vietminh saboteurs blew up large Loc no longer headed the government. Diem himself had reached a nadir of
ammunition dumps at the airport, rock; Government ministries all but closed.
ing Saigon throughout the night. GCII- The more volatile leaders of political frustration, as his country disintegrat-
eral O'Daniel - and Charge McClintock ed after the conference of foreigners,
agreed that it was time to start ta,n i groups were proposing a evolution, With the approval of Ambassador
positive action. O'Daniel paved the way which included armed attacks on the Heath and General O'Danicl, our Chief
for a quick first-hand survey of the sit- French. Col. Jean Carbone] of the French
uction throughout the country. McClin Army proposed establishing P. regime drew up a plan o' overall govarnniental
tock paved the way for contacts with with Vietnamese (Nungs and others) action and presented it to Dien, with
Vietnamese political leaders. Our Chief's known to him Close to the Chinese bor- Hellyer as interpreter. It called for fast
reputation from the Philippines had pre- der and asked for our backing. Our constructive action and dynamic leader-
ceded him. Hundreds of Vietnamese reply was that this was a policy deci- ship. Although the plan was not adopt-
acduaintanceships were made quickly. sion to be made between the FEC top ed, it laid the foundation for a friendship
Working in close cooperation ~:ith congi,nand and U.S. authorities. which has lasted.
Goon e Hellyer, U IS Chief, a new p_~- /'I' A.rellano. Junior Chamber Inter- , ArPrr.ann visited Sr=aeon amain.'
chologicat warfare c a"~e 2g0J,,09~03.' C4 FQP8001721200030054-3
r ov r, to resrden s eersiort c. cial the draft Congressional resoht-
gave only a sketchy account and did April 4, contrary to what was written at tion-it is clear that such a Congression-
iot report asking Secretary of State John the time, was only tentative. The debate at resolution was prepared and circulated
Foster Dulles to draft a Congressional on intervention was still very much alive, in the state Department, the Justice De-
J?esolution. 4 the Pentagon account says. partment and the Defense Department.
The Eisenhower Administration felt In fact, the following day, April 5, Although some historians have specu-
intervention might be necessary, the the National Security Council, in an lated that Vice President Richard M.
study says, because without American action paper, concluded: Nixon strongly advocated American in-
help the French were likely to negotiate "On balance, it appears that the U.S. tervention in Indochina during these de-
a "sellout" at Geneva to escape an should now reach a decision whether bates, the Pentagon study does not de-
.mpopular war. or not to intervene with combat forces scribe his views. Moreover, the account
The Loss `Would Be Critical' if that is necessary to save Indochina does not mention Mr. Nixon as a par-
As early as August, 1953, the Na-
tional Security. Council decided that
American policy should be that "under
present conditions any negotiated set-'
tlernent would mean the eventual loss
to Communism not only of Indochina
but of the whole of Southeast Asia.
The loss of Indochina would be critical
to the security of the U.S." .
The Eisenhower Administration stat-
ed its opposition to a negotiated settle-
ment most fully in an N.S.C. paper,
"United States Position on Indochina to
be Taken at Geneva," late in April in
the week the conference opened.
It was at this point, according to the
study, that the Council urged President
Eisenhower "to inform Paris that French
acquiescence in a Communist take-over
of Indochina would bear on its status as
one.of the Big Three" and that "U. S.
aid to France would automatically cease."
In addition, the Council's policy paper
said that the United States should con-
sider co-ntinufng the war itself, with the
Indochina states, if France negotiated
an unsatisfactory settlement. America's
goal should he nothing short of a "mil-
itary victory," the Council said.
The President Decides
The Government's internal record
shows, the study says, that while Sec-
retary Dulles and Adm. Arthur W. Rad-
ford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, pushed hard for intervention, other
service chiefs, particularly Gen. Matthew
B. Ridgway of the Army, were more
cautious. They remembered the bitter
and protracted experience in Korea and
were not eager to repeat it.
President Eisenhower finally reached
e decision against intervention on April
4 after a meeting of Mr. Dulles and
Admiral Radford with Congressional
leaders the previous day showed that
the Congress would not support Amer-
ican action without allied help. .
As journalists wrote, at the time, the
President felt he must have Congres-
sional approval before he committed
American troops, and the Congressional
leaders insisted on allied participation,
especially by Britain.-
At the very time the President was
reaching this conclusion, Ambassador
Douglas Dillon in Paris was cabling that
from Communist control, and tentatively ticipant in any of the critical meetings
the form and conditions of any such at which intervention was discussed by
intervention."
the President, Secretary Dulles or Ad-
On May 7, with the news that Dien-
bionphu had just fallen and with tho
delegates already in Geneva, President
Eisenhower" met with Mr. Dulles in the
White House to again consider inter-
`U.S.. Will Go to Congress'
According to a memorandum by
Robert Cutler, the President's executive
assistant, they discussed how "the U.S.
should (as a last act to save Indochina)
propose to France" that if certain con-'
ditions were meta"the U.S. will go to
Congress for authority to intervene with
combat forces:" The words in paren-
theses appeared in the memorandum.
[See text, memo of talk, April 7, 1954.]
Mr. Cutler noted that he explained
to the President that some members of
the Council's Planning Board "felt that
it had never been made clear to the
French that the United States was will-
ing to ask for Congressional authority",
if the preconditions were met.
Mr. Dulles said he would mention the
subject to the French Ambassador,
Henry Bonnet, that afternoon, "perhaps
making a more broad hint than hereto-
fore."
The preconditions Included a call for
the French to grant "genuine freedom"
to the Indochina states-Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam.
They also stipulated that American
advisers in Vietnam should "take major
responsibility for training indigenous
forces" and "share responsibility . for
military planning." American officers in
Vietnam had long chafed under the
limits on the role the French allowed
them the study says.
Participation by the British, who-had
shown themselves extremely reluctant
to get involved, was no longer cited as
a condition,
The French picked up Mr. Dulles's
hint, and on May 10 Premier Joseph
Laniel told Ambassador Dillon that
France needed American intervention to
save Indochina. That evening the Presi-
dent again met with Mr. Dulles, along
with Admiral Radford and Secretary of
Defense Charles E. Wilson, to discuss
Both the State- Department and the
Defense Department then undertook
what the account describes as "con-
tingency planning" for possible inter-
vention--the State Department draw-
ing up a hypothetical timetable of
diplomatic moves and the Defense De-
partment preparing a memorandum on
the U.S. forces that would be required.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memo-
randum to Secretary of Defense Wilson
on May' 20, recommended that the
United States limit its involvement to
"air and naval support directed from
outside Indochina."
"From the point of view of the
United States," the Joint Chiefs said,
"Indochina is devoid of decisive mili-
tary objectives and the allocation of
more than token U.S. armed forces to
that area would be a serious diversion
of limited U.S. capabilities."
In the debates over intervention, the
study says, advocates of American
action advanced several novel ideas.
Admiral Radford proposed to the
French, for example, that the United
States help create an "International
Volunteer Air Corps" for Indochina.
The French in April had suggested an
American air strike with the planes
painted with French markings. And late
in May the French suggested that the
President might be able to get around
Congress if he sent just a division of
marines-some 15,000 men.
But all the arguments in favor of
Intervention came to naught. The French
Cabinet felt that the war-weary. Na-,
tional Assembly would balk at any
further military action.
And the military situation in the Red
River Delta near Hanoi'deteriorated so
badly in late May and early June that
Washington felt intervention would now
be useless. On June 15 Secretary Dulles
informed Ambassador Bonnet that the
time for intervention had run out.
the French had requested the "irn- Instructions For Dulles
mediate armed intervention of U.S. car-
rier aircraft at Dienbienphu." [See text, During the meeting President Eisen-
Dillon cable, April 5, 1954.] hower directed Secretary Dulles to pre-
Mr. Dillon noted that the French had pare, a resolution that he could take
been prompted to make the request be- before a joint meeting of Congress, re-
cause they had been told by Admiral questing authority to commit American
Radford that "he would do his best to troops in Indochina.
obtain such help from the U.S. Go ern- From 'a document included in the
merit." Approved For 2OO4i09fO3e: iCFA RDP8OR01720R001200030054-3
a legal commentary by a Pentagon offi-
 Approved For lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80R0172' 001200030054-3
When the Geneva agr-eersents were
concluded on July 21, 10154, the account
says, "except for the United States,
the major powers were satisfied with
their handiwork."
France, Britain, the Soviet Union,
Communist China and to some extz-nt
North Vietnam believed thee.t they h,ad
ended the war and had transferred the
conflict to the political realm.
And, the study says, most of the gov-
ernments involved "anticipated that
France would remain in Vietnam." They
expected that Paris would retain a ma-
jor influence over the Diem regime,
train Premier Diem's army and insure
that the 1956 elections specified by the
Geneva accords were carried out.
But the Eisenhower Administration
took a different view, the Pentagon ac-
count relates.
In meetings Aug. 8 and 1.2, the Na-
tional Security Council concluded that
the Geneva settlement was a "disaster"
that "completed a major forward stride
of Communism which may lead to the
loss of Southeast Asia."
The Council's thinking appeared con-
sistent with its decision in April before
the conference began, that the United
States would not associate itself with an
unsatisfactory settlement. Secretary
Dulles had announced this publicly on
several occasions, and in the end the
United States had only taken note of
the agreements.
The Voices of Dissent
But before the Council reached a
final decision in August on exactly
what programs to initiate in Indochina,
several dissenting voices rose inside the
Government.
The national intelligence estimate of
Aug. 3 warned that even with Ameri-
can support it was unlikely that the
French or Vietnamese would be able
to establish a strong government. And
the National Intelligence Board predict-
ed that the situation would probably
continue to deteriorate.
The. Joint- Chieis of Staff had also
objected to proposals that.the United
States train and equip the South Viet-
namese Army.
In a memorandum to the Secretary
of Defense ors Aug. 4, the Joint Chiefs
listed their preconditions for U.S. mili-
tary aid to the Diem regime:
"It is absolutely essential that there
be a reasonably strong, stable civil
government in control. It is hopeless
to expect a U. S. military training mis-
sion to achieve success unless the na-
tion concerned is able effectively to per-
form those governmental functions es-
sential to the successful raising and
maintenance of armed, forces."
The Joint Chiefs also called for the
complete "withdrawal of French forces,
French officials and French advisers
f n Indochina in order to provide mo-
eon
tivation and a sound basis for the es-
tablishrncrnt of national armed forces."
Filially the Joint Chiefs expressed con-
cern about the limits placed on Ameri-
can forces in Vietnam by the Genev^.
accords---they were restricted to 342
men, the number of American mili-
tary personnel present in Vietnam when
the armistice was signed.
Despite these arguments, the study
says, Secretary of State Dulles felt that
the need to stop Communism in Viet-
nam made action imperative. .
Dulle's Views Persuasive
In a letter to Secretary of Defense
Wilson, he said that while the Dien
regime "is, far from strong or stable,"
a military training program would be
"one of the most efficient means of
enabling the Vietnamese Government
to become strong."
In the end, the study recounts, Sec-
retary Dulles's views were persuasive.
On Aug. 20 the President approved a
National Security Council paper titled .
"Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East."
It outlined a threefold program:
cMilitarily, the United States would
"work with France only. so far as neces-
sary to build up indigenous forces able
to provide internal security."
cEconomically, the United States
would begin giving aid directly to the
Vietnamese, not as before through the
French. The French were to be dis-
sociated from the levers of command."
;Politically, the United States would
work with Premier Diem, but would
encourage him to broaden his Govern-
ment. and establish more democratic
institutions.
With these decisions, the account says
"American policy toward post-Geneva
Vietnam was drawn." The commitment
for the United States to assume the
burden of defending South Vietnam had
been made.
"The available record does not indi-
cate any rebuttal" to the warnings of
the National Intelligence Board or the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the account re-
ports. "What it does indicate is that
the U.S. decided to gamble with very
limited resources because the potential
gains seemed well worth a limited risk."
A Team Already Sent
Although this major decision for
direct American involvement in Vietnam
was made in August, the Pentagon ac-
count shows that the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration had already sent a team
of Americans to begin secret operations
against the Vietminh in June, while the
Geneva conference was still in session.
The team was Beaded by'Colonel Lans-
dale, the C.I.A. agent who had estab-
lished a reputation as America's leading
expert in counterguerrilla warfare in
the Philippines, where he had helped
President Ramon Iviagsaysay suppress
the Communist-led Ilukbalahap insur-
gents.
So extensive were his sub: ?ocluent ex-
ploits in Vietnam in the nineteen-fifties
that Colonel Lansdale was widely known
as the model for the leading characters
in two novels of Asian intrigue-"The
Quiet American," by Graham Greene,
and, "Tbe Ugly American," by William
J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick.
A carefully detailed 21,000-word re-
port by member ; of Colonel La_nsclale's
team, the Saigon Military Mission, is
appended to the Pentagon chronicle.
According to that report, fit the form
of a diary from June, 1954, {:o August,
1955, the team was originally instructed
"to undertake paramilitary operations
against the enemy and to Svago polit-
ical-psychological warfare."
"Later," it adds, "after Geneva, the
mission was modified to prepare the
means for undertaking paramilitary op-
erations in. Communist areas rather than
to wage unconventional warfare." ,
One. of Colonel Lansdale's first year-.
m-les was to get his team members into
Vietnam before the Aug. 11 deadline
,set by the Genova agreements for a
freeze on the number of foreign mili-
tary personnel. As the deadline ap-
proached, the report: says, it appeared
that the Saigon Military Mission "might
have only two members present unless
action was taken."
It adds that Lieut. Gen. John W.
O'Daniel, chief of the United States
Military Assistance Advisory Group,
"agi'eed to the addition of 10 S.M.M.
members under TdIAAG cover, plus any
others in the Defense pipeline who ar-
rived before the deadline. A call for
help went out. Ten officers in Korea,
Japan and Okinawa were selected and
rushed to Vietnam."
While It says that the team members
were given cover by being listed as
members of MAAG; the repoiE also
points out that they communicated with
Washington through the C.I.A. station in
Saigon.
A Member of the C.I-A.
Colonel Lansdale himself is identi-
fied as a member of the C.I.A. in a
memorandum on the actions of the Presi-
dent's Special -Committee on Indochina,
written Jan. 30, 1954, by Maj. Gen.
Charles H. Bonesteel 3d. [See text,
Eisenhower committee's memo,]
The memorandum, which is appended
to the Pentagon study, lists Colonel
Lansdale as one of the C.I.A. repre
sentatives present at the meeting. Allen
W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelli-
gence, also attended the meeting.
In the fall of 1954, after all the mem-
bers had arrived in Vietnam, the re-
port says, the team's activities in-
creased.
Under Colonel Lansdale, "a small
English-language class [was] conducted
for mistresses of important personages
at. their request."
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,pp,,t~l~l-ove F I -,0179 03(05.3
This class provided vaL~a~{-e con~acts~e K'~ C Trii~s~ae eam s report does not
for. Colonel Lansdale, enabling him to tive contract for flying the thousands .tell what kinds of intelligence or sabo-
get to know such people as the "favorite of refugees out of North. Vietnam. tage activities the Binh and Hao groups
mistress" of the army Chief of Staff, As the report describes the team's carried out in North Vietnam. But it
Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh, the report actions, "Ilaiph-ong was reminiscent of does recount that one Binh agent was
recounts. our own pioneer days as it was swamped mistakenly picked up by Premier.
When the Oct. 9 deadline for the with people whom it couldn'.t shelter. Diem's troops on his return to South
French evacuation of Hanoi approached, Living space and food were at a pre- Vietnam.
the team sought to sabotage some of mium, nervous tension grew. It was a "He was interrogated by being hand-
Hanoi's key facilities. wild time for our northern team. cuffed to a leper, both beaten with the
"it was learned that the largest print- Another team of 21 agents, code- same stick to draw blood, told he would
ing establishment in the north intended named the Hao group, were recruited now have leprosy, and both locked up
to remain in Hanoi and do business with in Saigon, smuggled out on a. U.S. Navy in 'a tiny cell together," it says "S.M.M.
the Vietminh," the report relates. "An ship while disguised as coolies, and, was able to have him released."
attempt was made by S.M.M. to destroy taken to a "secret site" for training, For fiscal year 1955, the report shows,
the modern presses, but Vietminh the report goes on. expenses for the Saigon Military Mis-
security agents already had moved into Arms for the Haos were smuggled sion ran to $228,000. This did not in-
the plant and frustrated the attempt." into Saigon by the United States Air elude salary for the American officers
It was tiro mission's team in Hanoi Force, the report says, adding that or costs of weapons drawn from Arneri-
that spent several nights pouring con- S.M.M. brought in eight and a half tons can stocks.
tariunant in the engines of the Hanoi of equipme.'nt. This included 14 'radios, The largest item, $123,980, was listed
bus company so the buses would gradu- 300 carbines, 50 pistols, 300 pounds of as payment for operations, including
ally be wrecked after the Vietminh took explosives and 100,000 rounds of pay and expenses for agents, safe-
over the city. ammunition. houses and transportation.
At the same time, the mission's team ~ f
carried out what the report calls "black i ghli io
C), Its psywar strikes"---that is, psychological
warfare with materials falsely attributed South Vietnam, the secret Pentagon ment" is "absolutely essential" basis
to the other side. The team printed account contends, is essentially the cre- for U.S. military-training aid, But Mr.
what appeared to he "leaflets signed,by ation of the United States, and the Dulles feels military-training program
the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on formative years were those of the Tru- is "one of the most efficient means" of
man and-in particular-tire Eisenhower stabilizing regime. With President's at)-
:how tb behave for the Vietminh take- Administrations, proval of Council recommendations for
over 'of the Hanoi region in early Here, in chronological order, are key direct economic, military aid to South
October, including items about property, events-actions, decisions, policy for- Vietnam, "American policy toward post-
money reform and a three-day holiday, mulations-of this period. Geneva Vietnam was drawn," account
of workers upon take-over." The attempt 1945.6 says.
to scare the people worked. -October-Lansdale team in "delayed
. "The day following the distribution of Ho Chi Minh writes series of appeals sabotage" of Hanoi railroad; contami-
these leaflets," the report adds, "refugee for U.S. support to President Truman, nates oil supply for city's buses for
registration [of those wishing to flee Secretary of State; no indication, ac- "gradual wreckage" of motors, distri
North Vietnam) tripled. Two days later count says, of any reply., butes fake Vietminh leaflets; recruits,
.Vietminh currency was worth half the 1350 trains, equips two teams Vietnamese
value prior to the leaflets. U.S. recognizes Bao . Dai regime, nut agents.
"The Vietminh took to the radio to Ho; French ask military aid; Secretary December-Gen. J. Lawton Collins,
denounce the leaflets; the leaflets were of State Dean Acheson says alternative U.S. special representative, urges re-
so authentic in appearance that even is "extension of Communism" through- moval and replacement. of Ngo Dinh
most of the rank-and-file Vietminh were out Southeast Asia "and possibly west- - Diem as leader or "re-evaluation of our
sure that the radio denunciations were ward." Aid decision, account says, plans" for area aid. Mr. Dulles replies he
a French trick." meant U.S. was "thereafter" directly has "no other choice but to continue
some Help From the. Stars involved "in the developing. tragedy in . our aid to Vietnam and support of
Vietnam.' Diem."
In the South, the team hired Viet- 1954 1::.55
namese astrologers-in whose art many National Security Council urges Presi- April--Mr. Dulles, after meeting with
Asians place great trust-to compile dent Eisenhower to war
the Vi n that "French General Collins, cables embassy in Sai-
almanacs burring dire predictions for acquiescence" in negotiated settlement gon to seek Diem alternative.
the Vietminh and good omens for the would end U.S. aid to France. Suggests May-Mr. Diem, with Lansdale aid,
new Government of Premier Diem. U.S. might continue war to "military qua,hes sect uprising,.Sa.igon. Mr. Dulles
To carry out clandestine operations victory." cancels cable. National Security Council
in North Vietnam after the' team French ask U.S. air strike with dis- draft statemeiit - its "main features"
evacuated Hanoi, the report adds, Maj. conveyed to Mr. Dienr-suggests he in-
Lucien. Conein,, an officer of S.M.M., tion planes. President's ecreon decision still ill S Secretary ry sist on free elections by secret ballot
recruited a group of Vietnamese agents of State John Foster Dulles says he twill with strict supervision. Communists in
under the code name of Binh. give "broad hint" to French that U.S. Germany had rejected those conditions;
"The group was to be trained and intervention is possible with precondi- "hopefully the Vietminh would follow
supported by the U.S. as patriotic Viet- bons. Eisenhower orders' draft Congrcs suit, account says.
namese," the report says, to come sional resolution Defense Department December-Mr. Dulles, in cable to
eventually under Government control prepares memo on. required U.S. forces. embassy, says U.S. should not act "to
when the Government was ready for Joint Chiefs of Staff memo says In. speed up present process of decay of
such activities. Thirteen Binhs were dochina is "devoid of decisive military Geneva accords" but not make "slight
quietly exfiltrated through the port of " est effort to infuse life into them."
-Hai hog . and taken on the first Objectives-" 4
stage of the journey to their training June---Col. Edward G. Landsale of 1956
area by a U.S. Navy ship." C.I.A. arrives Saigon to head team of U.S. sends 350 additional military
Until Haiphong was finally evacuated agents for "paramilitary operations" men to Saigon; account says this "ex-
in May, 1955, Civil Air Transport, the and "political-psychological warfare" ample of the U.S. ignoring" Geneva '
Taiwan-based airline run by Gen. against North. accords.
August-?--National intelligence esti- 1960
Claire Chennauit, smuggled arms for
the Binh team from Saigon to Haiphong. mate terms chances for strong; regime National intelligence estimate predicts
WW~~,,cc;~t 1.S . r ?i
Aij, Approved. For P, 4
to
pleting "major forward stride of Corn rise" and these "adverse trends," tin-
munism," study says. Joint Chiefs,' checked, "trill almost certainly in time flontrIJUC 1
___~_._-- ___.- t
training duties from them. shocked to discover when he visited October he organized a referendum to
The agreement was put into effect Mr. Dien,, at the palace during a coup choose between hiruself and Tao Dai.
in February, 1955, the account says, and attempt that the Official body wards had After winning what the Pentagon nar-
the French, under American pressure, ll dcserted.~~`.hlot a guard was left on native describes as a "too resounding"
began their unexpected withdrawal the grounds, the report says. "Presi- 98.2 per cent of the vote, Premier Diern
from South Vietnam. dent Diem was alone upstairs calmly proclaimed himself President.
Despite the decision in August, 1954, gett't ng his work done
" '
.
to back Premier Diem, there was still With permission from the embass
widespread uneasiness in the American t.l?c Saigon: Military Mission then began
over his lack of support secretly. paying funds to a Co Dal
and the fragile political situation in leader, Gen. Trinh Minh The, who
Saigon, the Pentagon account goes on. offered his services to Premier Diem.
General Collins, who had been given Colonel Lansdale also brought from
the rank of Aml;assador, felt that the Philippines President Magsaysay's
Premier Diem was unequal to the task senior military aide and three assistants
and urged that lie be removed. to train a battalion of Vietnamese ? In July, 1955, under the provisions
If the United States was unwilling to palace guards. of the Geneva agreements, the two
replace Mr. Diem, General Collins wrote
to Washington in December, 1954,
them "I recommend re-evaluation of our
plans for assisting Southeast Asia." This
is the "least desirable but in all honesty
and in view of what I have observed
here to date this may be the only sound
volution," he said.
Still Secretary Dulles remained con-
vinced, as he cabled in reply to General
Collins's message, that "we have no
other choice but continua our aid to
Vietnam and support of Diem." And he
told Assistant Secretary of State Walter
Robertson several clays later that the
United States must "take the plunge"
with Mr. Diem, the narrative adds.
In the spring of 1955 the crisis in
Saigon worsened. The Hoa Hao and
Cao Dal armed sects formed a united
front with the Binh Xuyen, a group of
gangsters who controlled Saigon's
police against Premier Diem, and spo-
spring
b of 1955, Colonel Lansdale visited
Mr. Diem nearly every day, the S.M.M.
report says. "At President Diem's re-
quest, we had been seeing hirn almost
nightly as tensions increased, our ses-
sions with him lasting for hours at
a time."
During the sect armies' uprising, the
Saigon Military Mission helped Premier
Diem plan measures against the Binh
Xuyen, and Colonel Lansdale repeatedly
pressed the embassy to support the
Premier.
With the acting C.I.A. station chief,
Colonel Lciisdale formed a team to help
take action against the Binh Xuyen. The
.S.M.M. report recounts that "all
measures possible under the narrow
limits permitted by U.S. policy were
taken."
`Number of Successful Actions'
radic fighting broke out in the city. The Uncharacteristically, the report adds,
French told Washington they thought "These will not be described here, but
Premier Diem was "hopeless" and there were a number of successful
"mad." actions."
General Collins, now adamant that On what proved to be the crucial
STr. Diem must go, flew back to Wash- day, April 28, the Pentagon study
inuton in late April to press his case reports, Premier Diem surnrnaned Colonel
personally with the Secretary of State. Lart'clale to the palace and outlined his
On April 27, after a meeting with trhis had just "received word
from his embassy in Washington that
General Collins, Secretary Dulles re- the U.S. appeared to be about to stop
luctantly agreed to the replacing of supporting him."
Premier Diem. He cabled the embassy This was probably a reference to
in Saigon to find an alternative. Secretary Dulles's decision of the pre.
But Colonel Lansdale was working dious day.
hard to support his friend Mr. Diem. In Premier Diem also reported that Binh
October the colonel had foiled a coup Xuy,cn units had begun firing on his
against Mr. Diem by Gen. Nguyen Van troops.
Hirsh, the army Chief of Staff, by invit- Colonel Lansdale sought to reassure
ing General Hinh's two key aides to him. "We told him that it looked as
visit the Philippines for a tour of secret
projects though Vietnam still needed a leader,"
. _ '.
zones of Vietnam were to begin con-
sultations on the elections scheduled
for the next year.
But Premier Diem refused to talk with
the Communists. And in July, 1956,
he refused to hold elections for re-
unification. lie asserted that the South.
Vietnamese Government had. not signed
the Geneva accords and therefore was
not bound by them..
American scholars and government
officials have long argued over whether
the United States was responsible for
Mr. Diem's refusal to hold the elec-
tions and therefore, in a sense, whether
Americans had a role in turning the
Cornmunistt from politics back to
warfare.
Connivance by U.S. Denied
The Pentagon study contends that
the "United States did not---as it is
often alleged-connive with Diem to
ignore the elections. U.S. State Depart-
ment records indicate that Diem's re-
fusal to be bound by the Geneva ac-
cords and his opposition to pre-election
consultations were at his own
initiative."
But the Pentagon account also 'cites
State Department cables and National
Security Council memorandums indicat-
ing that the Eisenhower Administration
wished to postpone the elections as
long as possible and communicated its
feelings to Mr. Diem.
As early as July 7, 1954, during the
Geneva conference, Secretary Dulles
,suggested that the United States ought
to seek to delay the elections and to
require guarantees that the Communists
could he expected to reject.
In a secret cablegram to Under
Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith,
report do not s ecificall Pr sc n a . IFOP who filled in for him after he withdrew
p Y ~ t f' 8?~tQ1t7 Ot @~k 20t4lilts3t~ -Acretary
team's instructions incluc e upporLing 0
Dulles wrote:
c
4
 25
v F le s 210P 09103 : cIA-RDP80RO17 0120003005.4.-3
"Since undoubtedl~p i~ t~t mar(e ly efter armed ace trained rk toward the weakening of the
tions might eventually mean unification than they were when the U.S effort Communists in North and South Viet-
Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, this makes began' and President Diem showed a nam in order to bring about the eventual
it all more important they should be remarkable ability to put down factions peaceful reunification of a free and
only held as long after cease-fire agree- threatening the GVN [Government of Independent Vietnam under anti-Corn-
ment as possible and in conditions free monist leadership.".
from intimidation to give democratic Vietnam] and to maintain -himself in 9"Support the position of the Govern:
elements best chance." office. rnent of Free Vietnam that all-Vietnam
Following similar reasoning the Na- The American aid effort, the study elections may take place only after it is
tional Security Council in May, 1955, reports, was focused almost entirely on satisfied that genuinely free elections
shortly before consultations on the elec- security. Eight out of every 10 dollars can be held throughout both zones of
tions were supposed to begin, produced went to security, a draft statement, "U.S. Policy on All- y' and much of what During the late nineteen-fifties, the
Vietnam Elections.'. i . was intended for agriculture, education,
-or transportation actually went to study relates, United States officials in
According to the Pentagon study, it security-directed programs, Saigon were also optimistic in their
held that to give no impression of
blocking elections while avoiding the For example, the account says, a 20- public comments about the situation,
possibility of losing them, Diem should mile stretch of highway, built between despite the pessimistic secret reports
insist on free elections by secret ballot Saigon and Bienhoa at the insistence they forwarded to Washington,
with strict supervision. Communists in of the MAAG commander, Gen. Samuel "While classified policy paper thus
Korea and Germany had rejected these T. Williams, received more aid money dealt with risks," the account says,
conditions; hopefully the Vietminh than all the. funds provided for labor, "public statements of U.S. officials (lid
would follow suit." community development, social welfare, not refer to the jeopardy. To the con-
But on June 9, the account says, the health and education from 1954 to 1961; trary, the picture presented the public
Council "decided to shelve the draft But despite American hopes and the and Congress by Ambassador Durbrow,
statement. Its main features had already aid effort, the insurgency in the country- General Williams and other Administra-
been conveyed to Diem." side began to pick up again in 1957 Lion. spokesmen was of continuing
Secretary Dulles's ambivalent attitude and particularly in 1959. The number progress, virtually miraculous improve-
toward the Geneva accords is also re- of terrorist murders and kidnappings of ment, year in and year out."
flected in a cablegram he sent to the local officials rose dramatically, and Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow and
United States Embassy in Saigon on enemy units began to attack in ever- 3eneral Williams for example, told the,
Dec. 11, 1955, outlining Washington's increasing size, Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
position toward the International Con- As the insurgency grew, the small the summer of 1959 that. serious
trol Commission. internal security was "in no o serious
American intelligence network "cor- danger" and that South Vietnam was in
Neither Help Nor hindrance rectly and consistently estimated" the a better position than ever before to
"While we should certainly Diem and his own weaknesses, the
positive step- to speed up present Pentagon study says, The American - - A Progress Report
process of decay of Geneva accords,"
it said, "neither should we make the Sound" it addstimates "were remarkably The next spring General Williams
slightest effort to infuse life into them." A special national intelligence esti- wrote to Senator Mike Mansfield that,
In May, 1956, in what the Pentagon mate in August, 1960, for example, said the Unite Die an seco doing so v: p that
account says is an "example of the U.S. that: the a States could begin begin a rn
withdrawal" of American advisers, in
ignoring" the Geneva accords, 350 addi- "In the absence of more effective 19,1,
tional military men were sent to Saigon Government measures to protect the That was the situation that con-
under the pretext of helping the Viet- peasants and to win their positive co- fronted President Kennedy when he
.uamese. recover and redistribute equip- operation, the prospect is for expansion. took office early in 1961.
meat abandoned by the French. of the areas of Vietcong control in the "The U.S. had gradually developed a
This was "a thinly veiled device to countryside, particularly in the south- special commitment in South Vietnam,"
increase the-number of Americans in western provinces. writes the Pentagon analyst charged
Vietnam," the Pentagon account says. "Dissatisfaction and discontent with with explaining the problems facing
These oxen, who were officially desig- the Government will probably continue President Kennedy. "It was certainly
nated the Temporary Equipment Re- to rise. - - not absolutely binding-but the commit-
covery Mission or TERM, stayed on as "These adverse trends are not irre- ment was there
a permanent part of the Military As- versible, but if they remain unchecked, "Without U.S. support," the analyst.
sistance Advisory Group, the narrative they will almost certainly in time cause says, "Diem almost certainly could not
says, to help in intelligence and ad- the collapse of Diem's regime." - have consolidated his hold on the South
ministrative work. However, the study relates, "the during 1955 and 1956.
Washington dispatched the TERM national intelligence estimates re Diem "Without the threat of U.S. inter-
group, the Pentagon study discloses, do not appear to have restrained the vention, South Vietnam could not have
"when it was learned informally that N.S.C. in its major reviews of U.S. refused to even discuss the elections
policy" toward Vietnam.
the Indian Government would instruct called for in 1956 under the Geneva
its representative on the I.C.C. to Inter- The basic Eisenhower Administration settlement without being immediately
pose no objection:', policy papers on Southeast Asia in 1956, overrun by the Vietminh armies.
The I.C.C. is oom osed of re ~resenta 1958 and 1960 repeated American ob- "Without U.S. aid in the years follow-
.C. 1 jectives in virtually identical" language, Lrg, the Diem regime certainly, and an
tives from Poland, India and Canada, the Pentagon account reports,
with the Indian usually considered the
independent South Vietnam almost es
neutral representative. Among the Goals of Policy certainly, could not have survived ..."
,
pass- National Security Council, these were Vietnam was essentially the creation
spring s the ~ datenfor lrelectiions uneventful 956, among the goals of American policy,- of the United States."
American officials were hopeful that toward Vietnam: -
President Diem had succeeded. strong, stable sttable Free and Vietnam to develop a An analysis of the Pentagon study,
"It seemed for a while that the constitutional gov- by Max analysis el, the Washington cor-
gamble against long odds had sue- ernertnt toncrnable tFree. Vietnam to
' an is
g y attractive con- respondent of The New York Times,
ceeded," the Pentagon account says, trast to conditions in the present Com- will appear tomorrow.
"The Vietminh were quiescent; the Re- monist zone?"
public of Viettta d f
at m
t
According to the 1956 paper by the In brief, the analyst concludes
"South
it
e orces were
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 Approved For lease 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80R0172001200030054-3
7 n-C' ", b vj 1 ?
ti n} ' Ctt nova
no -.. sing' se of
,
Following are t.'ac texts of the "final 5. The Conference takes note of the 9. The cornpetent: representative au-
declaration" endorsed orally by Freese, clauses in the agreement on the cessa- thorities of the Northern and Southern
the Vietnzini, Britain, China, the So- tion of trostilities in Viet-Nram to the of- zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the au-
viet Union, Loos arrd Cambodia at the feet that no military base under the con- thor-ities of Laos and Cambodia, must
end of the Geneva conference in July, trol of a foreign State maybe. established not permit any individual or collective 1954, and of the statement of United in the regirouping zones of the two par- reprisals against persons who have col-
ties, the latter having the obligation to any States policy delivered at the corzclud- see that the zones allotted to them shallla rtiesedin any way with one of the
session by Under Secretory of not constitute part of an , parties during the v.ar, or at a rhst nhernn
y military alli- bens of such persons' familie.,.
State Walter Bedell Srnith. The "final ancc and shall not bc, utilized for the re-
declaration," along with the armistice surnption of hostilities or in the service 10. The Conference takes Hole of the
of an aggressive policy. The Conference French declaration of the the effect ninent of the
agreement signed by France acrd the also takes note of the declarations of French Republic to the ethat it is
Vietininh, constitutes the Geneva ac- the Governments of Cambodia and Laos ready to withdraw its troops from the
cord's On Vietnam. to the effect that the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-
'y will not join in N 41,
^
t
The 'Final Declaration'
FINAL DECLARATION, dated the 21st
July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on
the problem of restoring peace in Indo-
China, in which the representatives of
Cambodia, the Deiaocratie Republic of
Vict-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Re-
public of China, the State of Vict-Zdarn,
the Union of Soviet; Socialist Republics,
the United Xingdcnh, and the United
States of America look part.
. 1. The Conference takes note of the
agreements ending hostilities in Carn-
bodia, Lacs and Viet-Nam and organiz-
ing international control and the super-
vision of the execution of the provisions
of these agreement:.
2. The Conference expresses satisfac-
tion at the ending of hostilities in Cana
bodia, Laos and Viet-Narn; the Confer-
ence expresses its conviction than the
execution of the p+?u?visions set out in
the present declaraton and in the agree-
ments an the cessation of hostilities will
permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam
henceforth to play their part, in full in-
dependence and sovereignty, in the
peaceful community of nations.
3. The Conference takes note' of the
declarations made by the Governments
of Cambodia and of Laos of their inten-
tion to adopt measures permitting all
citizens to take their place in the rha-
tional community, in particular by par-
ticipa%:ing in the next general elections,
which, in conformity with. ?the cos,
tion of each of th'cse countries, shall
take place in the course of the year 1955,
by secret ballot and in conditions of re-
spect for fundamental freedoms.
4. The Conference takes note of the
clauses in the agreement on the cessa-
tion of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibit-
ing the introduction into Viet-Nam of
e 2;equ-sts o te Governments
cny agreement with other States if this am, a
a_ reement includes the obligation to concerned and within periods which shall
g he fixed by agreement between the par-
participate in a military alliance not in ties except in the cases where, by agree-
conformity with the principles of the ment between. the two parties, a certain
Charter of the United Na.tion. or, in the number of French troops shall remain at
case of Laos, with the principles of the specified points and for a specified time.
agreement on the cessation of hostilities 11. The Conference takes note of the
in Laos or, so long as their security is declaration of the French Government to
not threatened, the obligation not to the effect that for the settlement of all
establish bases on Cambodia or Laotian the problems connected with the re-
territory for the military forces of for- establishment and consolidation of peace
in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the
sign poc.ers' French Government will proceed from
6. The Conference recognizes that the the principle of respect for the inde-
essential purpose of the agreement re- pende_nce and sovereignty, unity, and
hating to Viet-Nam: is to settle military territorial integrity of Canhhodia, Laos
questions with a view to ending hos- and Viet-Nam.
tilities and that the military demarcation 12. In their relations with Cambodia,
line is provisional and should not in any Laos and Viet-Nam, each mer,iber of the
way be interpreted as constituting a po-
litical or territorial boundary. The Con-.
fcrence expresses its conviction that the spect the sovereignty, the independence,
execution of the provisions set out in the unity and the territorial integrity of
the present declaration and in the agree- the above-mentioned states, and to re-
rnent on the cessation of hostilities ore- frain from any interference in their in-
ates the necessary basis for the achieve- ternal affairs,
ment in the near future of a political 13. The members -of the Conference
settlement: in Viet-Narn. agree to consult one another on any
7. The Conference declares that, so far question which may be referred to them
as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement
of political problems, effected on the by the International Supervisory Com-
basis of respect for the principles of in- mission, in order to study such measures
dependence, unity and territorial integ- as may prove necessary to ensure that
rity, shall permit the Viet-Namese peo- the agreements on the cessation of hos-
ple to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, tilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nan'i
guaranteed by democratic institutions are respected.-
established as a result of free general
elections by secret ballot. In order to
ensure that sufficient progress in the The American Statement
restoration of peace has been made, and
that all the necessary conditions obtain
for free expression of the national will,
general elections shall be held in July
1956, under the supervision of an inter-
national commission composed of repre-
As I stated on July 18, my Govern-
ment is not prepared to join in a declara-
tion by the Conference such as is sub-
rnitted. However, the United States
makes this unilateral declaration of its
foreign troops and military personnel as sentativcs of the Member States of the position in these matters:
well as of all kinds of arras and inuni- international Supervisory Commission,' "Tire Government of the United States
Lions. The Conference also takes note of referred to in the agreement on the ces- being resolved to devote its efforts to
the declarations male by the Govern- sation of hostilities. Consultations will, the strengthening of peace in accord-
nients of Cambodia and Laos of their be held on this subject between the corn- ance with the principles and purposes
resolution not to request foreign aid, potent representative authorities of the of the United Nations takes note of the
whether in war material, in personnel two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards. agreements concluded at Geneva on July
or in instructors except for the purpose 8. The provisions of the agreements 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) The Franco-
of the effective defense of their territory on the cessatiton of hostilities intended Laoti:irt Command and the Command, of
and, in the case of Laos, to the extent to ensure t * r e . ' o di the Ie.oplcs Army of Viet-Naar, (b) the
defined by the agreement> !'fQ\Md:ford'14&I~ta ~tu e- /l 1 ORP 740 M 03005 and the
Lion of hostilities in Laos. applied and must, in particular, allow Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-
everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely
in which zone he wishes to live. t:a~l$zati8d
6
 Atpro~ed For ~,~lease 2004/09/03 CIA-RDP80RO172 01200030054-3
Nani;' (c) Franco-Vietna se ommand
and the Command of the Peoples Army
of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 to 12
inclusive of the declaration presented to
the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954
declares with regard to the aforesaid
agreements and paragraphs that (i) it
will refrain from the threat or the use
of force to disturb them, in, accordance
with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the
United Nations dealing with the obliga-
tion of members to refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use
of force; and (ii) it would view any
renewal of the aggression in violation
of the aforesaid agreements with grave
concern and as seriously threatening
international peace and security.
"In connection with the statement in
the declaration concerning free elections.
in Viet-Nana my Government wishes to
n ake clear its position which it has
expressed in a declaration made
in Washington on June 29, 1954, as fol-
ows:
"'In the case of nations now divided
against their will, we shall continue to
seek to achieve unity through free elec-
tions supervised by the United Nations
to insure that they arc conducted fairly.',
"With respect to the statement made
by the representative of the State of
Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates
its traditional position that peoples are
entitled to determine their own future
and that it will not join in an arrange-
ment which would hinder this. Nothing
in its declaration just made is intended.
to or does indicate any departure from
this traditional position. -
"We share the hope that the agree-
ments will permit Cambodia, Laos and
Viet-Nam to play their part, in full in-
dependence and sovereignty, in the
peaceful community of nations, and will
enable the peoples-of that area to deter-
Mine their own future." -
27
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