OPERATION PHOENIX A VIETNAM FIASCO SEEN FROM WITHIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001100090012-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: NSPR

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Ar- rietnam Fiasco
I"Ia From within
By Wayne L. Cooper
A ~ 'r'qn. Service officer,
Coopr,- ..;cep-i IS ,gin-lhs in. Vietnam,
7nosf of ~., a, r ."hoenLr adr scr at
Cua+fr ,, c,,,' 4 J:nnq Delta.
M l\Y OF'i'iiotii? who recognize
our military mistakes in Indo-
china fail to acknowledge the blunders
of our quieter war for "hearts and
minds." Yet we made most of the same
mistakes in this other war of pacifica-
tion that our armed forces made in
applying American weaponry.
'rake, for instance, "Operation Phoe.
nix": That disreputable, CIA-inspired
effort, often deplored as a bloody-
handed assassination program, was a
failure. It was a failure for many re-
sons, most of them Vietnamese. It was
a success in a way none of us intended
or would have wanted.
The origins of most CIA failures are
obscure; the assault on the Vietcong
Infrastructure (VCI) was no exception.
In the mid-1960s, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency began a program which,
came to be known as"Counter Terror"
or "CT." It was a unilateral American
program, never recognizel by the South
Vietnamese government. CIA repre-
sentatives recruited, organized, sup-
plied and directly paid CT teams,
whose function was to use Vietcong
techniques of terror-assassination,
ambushes, kidnappings and intimida-
tion-against the Vietcong leadership.
After all, the Vietnamese police agen-
cies had amply shown their inability to
cope with VC political activity and ter-
ror. By 1965, the situation was critical,
A Spear-Fishing Plan
IF GUERRILLAS "swim" among a
friendly populace like fish, as Mao
ohsrrvecl, dynamite nil nets (conven-
tional military opcrat ions) would clear
out most of the fish, the pilot fish,
however, required selective spear-fish-
ing-a "rifle shot" rather than a "shot-
gun" assault. And that's how CT oper-
ated, with the CIA recruiting Nung,
(''amho . and even Vietnamese
in,ds nio C'i' tf,wr- or r,hvious rea-
l , dl ;r na,,,. i_,:. _oved to
"Provincial Pecona.'~ar,ce Units"
(PRU) and t:); res,:onsibilities were
enlarged. Event ..av PRUs operated at
the discretion or the Vietnamese prov-
ince chief, who--with his Special
i.~uarus, Iproved'Foc'ReIeasep4?OO
eialized functions. CiA continued to
pay the bills.
In 1968, this program was expanded.
The CIA and province chiefs retained
authority over the PRUs and their op-
erations against the VCI. An intelli-
gence coordination program was de-
vised to identify VCI targets for the
PRUs. The Americans called their ad-
visory program "ICEX" (Intelligence
Coordination and Exploitation) and
eventually "Phoenix." The Vietnamese
program was called "Phung Hoang,"
after an all-seeing, mythical bird
which, condor-like, selectively snatches
its prey. Phung Hoang had a hierarchi-
cai structure, with a Central Phung
Hoang Office in Saigon.
By mid-1968, however, the cardinal
rule of intelligence-keeping the oper-
ation small-was broken. Everyone
was sold on Phung Hoang. "Neutraliz-
ing" the VC leadership became our
first priority. Everybody said so. Gen.
William C. Westmoreland, Ambassa-
dor-for-pacification Robert Komer,
prominent journalists, political scien-
tists and others all hailed Phung
Hoang as the greatest gimmick since
canned beer. Even Sir Robert Thomp-
son, President Nixon's personal coun-
terinsurgency expert, was said to have
remarked that if the VCI could be
eliminated, one could confidentl;, buy
stock in South Vietnam. Othervi::,' we
should pack up and get out.
And that's what the CIA din, r>v li,i
1968, CIA was rapidly withdrawing it.,
support from the program. ICE: cw-
came CORDS/Phoenix with a pa del
hierarchy to Phung IIoang, By Jai:,
1969, CORDS-Combined Operations
for Revolutionary Development Sup-
port-replaced CIA support and per-
sonnel with Army advisers and a few
civilians, including the writer. There
were a few CIA hangers-on, who re-
mained in positions of authority and
whose presence gave the program an
aura of efficiency it never really had.
Mechanics in the Garden
NFRASTRUCTURE Is a g e
I word, characteristic of the vc ahe-
lary used by men who think like me-
chanics in an era, effort and io, ide re-
quiring gardeners. The infrastructure
of the Vietcong was seen a, a ""ital
part that could be removed, desir --?tng
the insurgency-sort of like ripping off
the distributor cap from the anem, s
machine.
See PHOENIX, Page 84
Inside Outlook
enrrztie -a d
Ciudad Guayana V'
new Pittsburgh of the wilderness,
is being plagued by the chronic
problenis of Latin Arn, rican indus-
trial growth-too few jobs for too
many people who are too little pre.
pared. Lewis H. Diuguid's report
appears on Page B5.
The next Russian reuolroron
just starting to dawn, is the tour. n.,c
of the automobile. 1T'itlr thr Tint
designed Zhiguli corning in, :1.-.o
duction, Carl such. Western J'si.b.
lets as providing highmoti "rr
service facilities and avor+ha
urban congestion be far bch.rnd:-
Murray Seeger's story is on Page
B2.
f 77369i$'AY+% L .. :. +:'lrS:... ..n p,.',C ~+~. )wyl.?.:.~Y.:.~:.v,..: .:.,... m~RG ~., ...
-Ci-i.'xa"~. :X~v14'ttL?.~:tiJ:~i~:~~:U:9CY~J:~ii~:..::~~~:~'~:a4X~:..~i: \::~3Y
 The mythical Pining Iloang bird,
symbol of the Vietnamese prograntt
paralleling Phoenix.
PHOENIX, From Page B1
As the assault on the VCI became
more organized, and Phoenix/Phung
Hoang issued directives about them-
selves, a theoretical division of labor
was formed..The Americans would pro-
vide funds and advice for the creation
and operation of District Intelligence
and Operations Coordinating Centers
(DIOCCs), with PIOCCs at province
headquarters. The American Phoenix
'coordinator" or adviser would furnish
cash for the construction of a building,
furniture, typewriters, and supplies.
The Vietnamese Phung bang func-
tlonaries would get reports from the
agencies they represented.
The S-2 officer, for example, would
know of VC military intentions and
would presumably receive information
on VC recruiters, saboteurs and mili-
tary/security elements. The National
Police representative and the Census
Grievance representative would task
their agents with reporting VC tax
collection, extortion and other uncivil
actions. The Chieu Hoi (open arms)
representative would read debriefing
reports by VC defectors, and so on. At
the DIOCC meetings, these agency
representatives would pool their infor-
mation, identify a VCI member and
start a dossier on the man. Their in-
formants and agents would be assigned
to report specifically on this individ-
ual. The dossier would become fatter.
Soon the man is captured, interro-
gated and eventually prosecuted be-
fore a province security committee,
where he gets a two-year renewable
ei,c?: nee to the prisons on Conson Is-
lam. The Phung Hoang bird has
struck. Shazam, Everyone gets out the
era on, and adds a VCI to the briefing
cdarts. The commanding general is
briefed on the capture the next morn-
ing, Unless one was horribly dense,
however, he soon learned that Phung
Iloang didn't work that way. -
?
Vietnam-or who collected what they
saw as protection money, a custom as
old as Asia. To compound this prob-
lem, for months we Americans used a
Vietnamese expression meaning "un-
derstructure" or "low-level bureau-
crat" to convey our "leading cadre"'
concept of the VC1.
and your family in a time )f great un-
certainty and danger. The a gent work
which must be done is secondary. The
war has exacerbated this syndrome of
hustling to a point where often the
only work done is in the cause of self-
advancement. The late Larry Burrows,
a great man and a great photographer
,
Third, there was usually a lack of ? once deplored the Vietnamese overdo-
direction in the Phung Hoang centers ing reasonable graft. "Elsewhere in
at all levels. Intelligence collection and Asia, you willingly pay 10 per cent
collation was not centrally directed graft and accept it as necessary lubri-
and "agent handling" consisted of in- cation for transactions," he said. "Here
formants being instructed to report ev- the greedy buggers want 90 per cent."
erything about everything. Phung Hoang 'suffered from this syn-
Fourth, there was almost no specific drome, although the pickings were
targeting of individuals for capture, slim compared to the cement, roofing,
despite abundant official paper pre- money, rice and wheat available from
scribing such targeting. Perhaps 5 per other American programs. But the Vi-
cent ,of the hundreds of daily required etnamese in the DIOCC were con-
"Phung Hoang operations" went to a stantly preoccupied with supplies and
specific location to capture a specific how to get more from their American
individual. Most were massive troop advisers. They had an unquenchable
exercises, in which dozens of soldiers appetite for paper, file cards, acetate:
would sweep or cordon an area and de- crayons, maps, more desks, more file
tain every adult they came across. cabinets, more of everything. They fre-
These "suspects" would sit for hours quently complained that the Ameri-
while their ID cards were compared cans weren't supporting the program
against a cumbersome "blacklist" adequately. The DIOCC building needs
which was never up to date. Occasion- money for an extra room. And wh-,
ally such operations did capture VC or isn't the adviser's jeep made available
North Vietnamese soldiers; VCI were for others' use? Nobody seemed to
captured by accident, if 'at all, and worry about neutralizing VCI except.
usually released for lack of evidence. insofar as It required more supplies or
Fifth, and most seriously, the "judi-
cial" aspect of Phung bang was a
sieve. Despite the punishments stipu-
lated for different levels of VCI, the
late John Paul Vann guessed that 90
per cent of genuine VCI suspects were
freed within 90 days of capture. Insuf-
ficient evidence was only one reason;
there were also many instances of
bribery, inertia, intimidation, influ-
ence, and often just the normal Viet-
namese concern that a man's family
not go hungry because he passed out
some leaflets or collected donations
for "Vietminh veterans." South Viet-
namese officials and politicians added
to this drain of captured VCI with
their holiday amnesties and third-party
assurances. The lack of a detainee ac-
countability system made it impossible
to know who had been released or
sentenced.
Vietuainese Attitudes
I N ADDITION to Phung Iloang's in-
ternal weaknesses, several uniquely
Vietnamese traits handicapped the pro-
gram.
Consider the Vietnamese attitude to-
ward employment: Once a man gets a
position, that job will have certain ad-
vantages and oipportunities. He can
come to work late and leave early
.
Alienating the People Maybe he'll have a government car.
money. With nothing but cardboard,
acetate, crayons and maps, most
DIOCCs and PIOCCs "neutralized"
VCI to their satisfaction, while their
American advisers became exasperated
and eventually resigned to F'hurv
lloang's pretenses.
Most fundamental of all, File Viet
namese people were not sufficiently
committed to the Saigon government
or its programs. Their ioyaitie were to
their families, then their hamlets and
then to their ethnic or religious
group. We still take much American
satisfaction in noting the loyalty of
these groups to Saigon (or at least
their passivity), confusing it with the
initial tie? of a man to his group. The
allegiance to the group to Saigon was
usually incidental and unimportant to
individual Vietnamese.
A typical DIOCC would have an im
possible clutter of paper. with wheat
and chaff filed together. The alphabeti-
cal files we insisted they keep would
not be cross-referenced by alias, fain-
ily, location or any other useful desig-
nation. The dossiers so vital to prov-
ince security committee prosecution
would contain poor, skimpy informa-
tion; perhaps enough for an operation,
but not enough for prosct ation. Other
files-most-wanted lists, potential
guide files, mug shots and so on-were
r EVLRAL WE'tKNESSES among Maybe he'll have access to some re- maintained so poorly as to be useless,
Phung bang prevented its becom- sources, commodity or service which, or never kept at all. There would be no
ing an effA p(QuadaFor Release 20041 TIA'RDI R@1 20NGO1 I O O9O 1 -4ollection plan, and agents
First, there was a lack of command Maybe there'll be subordinates who received little direction.
emphasis, from Saigon all the way can be counted on for favors or contri- Because of operational and neutrali-
.1-,..._.. a-. al... .i I.I..i- 14 . b..A-4 ....... - -
 is tiu Assa,i!t on Itu VIA became sct?unng such targeting. Perhaps 5 per other ,\aurican taut earn Bu e'
,Wore organized, and Phoenix/Phung cent of the hundreds of daily required etnamese in the DIOCC wcr?c ro
issued directives about them- "]'hung Hoan o erat'o s t reoccupied with supplies an
ve~?(plpClSk i rdWeaSe 2Q44/1 G8ifi~l Q O~ 00 , et more from their .' merica
% vas formed. The Americans would pro- individual. Most were massive troop advisers. They had an ungc.rr 'hdbl
id
f
d
d
d
i
i
e
un
s an
a
v
ce for the creation
and operation of District Intelligence
and Operations Coordinating Centers
(DIOCCs), with PIOCCs at province
headquarters. The American Phoenix
"coordinator" or adviser would furnish
cash for the construction of a building,
furniture, typewriters, and supplies.
The Vietnamese Phung Hoang func-
tionaries would get reports from the
agencies they represented.
The S-2 officer, for example, would
know of VC military intentions and
would presumably receive information
on VC recruiters, saboteurs and mili-
tary/security elements. The National
Police representative and the Census
Grievance representative would task
their agents with reporting VC tax
collection, extortion and other uncivil
actions. The Chien Iloi (open arms)
representative would rend debriefing
reports by VC defectors, and so on. At
the DIOCC meetings, these agency
representatives would pool their Infor-
mation, identify a VCI member and
start a dossier on the man. Their in-
formants and agents would be assigned
to report specifically on this individ-
ual. The dossier would become fatter.
Soon the man is captured, interro-
gated and eventually prosecuted be-
fore a province security committee,
where he gets a two-year renewable
sentence to the prisons on Conson Is-
land. The Phung Iloang bird has
struck. Shazam. Everyone gets out the
crayons and adds a VCI to the briefing
charts. The commanding general is
briefed on the capture the next morn-
ing. Unless one was horribly dense,
however, he soon learned that Phung
IIoang didn't work that *ay. --
Alienating the People
S EVERAL WEAKNESSES among
Plating Hoang prevented its becom-
ing are-effective program. -
First, there was a lack of command
emphasis, from Saigon all the way
down to the districts. Its budget was
very small; few Vietnamese-including
those running the program-believed
in it$ widely touted "priority." The
personnel assigned to the DIOCC from
the various police-type agencies were
often the least talented or experienced
,individuals available; in short, those
considered most expendable to another
gimmick program.
Second, there was a widespread fall-
ure to educate the Vietnamese about
Phung I-Ioang and to win their support.
One Vietnamese farmer, asked what
Phung Hoang was, replied, "It's a gov-
ernment program to catch young men
for the array." In addition to rounding
up draft-eligible young men, Phung
Iloang operations further alienated a
cautious, rural folk by causing incon-
venience and harassment. Stealing a
farmer's chickens or rice-as light-fin-
gered Vietnamese troopers have been
known to do-or making him and doz-
ens of neighbors sit in the sun for
hour < while ID cards are checked won
few supporters to Phung Iioang aind its
avowed goal of protecting the people
from terrorism.
Most farmers re,;arde:: the armed
VC guerrilla as the mane threat, not
the harmlc s neighbor who hung up
VC flag= r ;,;.u ? ,en, o:? who propa-
gandized nr, a : r;,, .n:' i.v--. ta.. is cheap In
exerc
ses, In which dozens of soldiers
would sweep or cordon an area and de-
tain every adult they came across.
These "suspects" would sit for hours
while their ID cards were compared
against a cumbersome "blacklist"
which was never up to date. Occasion.
ally such operations did capture VC or
North Vietnamese soldiers; VCI were
captured by accident, If ' at all, and
usually released for lack of evidence.
b'ifth, and most seriously, the "judi-
cial" aspect of Phung Iloang was a
sieve. Despite the punishments stipu-
lated for different levels of VCI, the
late John Paul Vann guessed that 90
per cent of genuine VCI suspects were
freed within 90 days of capture. Insuf-
ficient evidence was only one reason;
there were also many instances of
bribery, inertia, Intimidation, Influ-
ence, and often just the normal Viet-
namese concern that a man's family
not go hungry because he passed out then to their ethnic or religious
some leaflets or collected donations group. We still take much American
for "Vietminh veterans." South Viet- satisfaction in noting the loyalty of
namese officials and politicians added these groups to Saigon (or at least
to this drain of captured VCI with their passivity), confusing It v ith the
their holiday amnesties and third-party initial tie. of a man to his grou?+. The
assurances. The lack of a detainee ac- allegiance to the group to Saigon was
courftability system made it impossible usually incidental and unimportant to
to know who, had been released or individual Vietnamese.
Vietnamese Attitudes
TN ADDITION to Phung Hoang's in-
j ternal weaknesses, several uniquely
Vietnamese traits handicapped the pro-
gram.
Consider'the Vietnamese attitude to-
ward employment: Once a man gets a
position, that job will have certain ad-
vantages and opportunities. He can
come to work late and leave early.
Maybe he'll have a government car.
-Maybe he'll have access to some re-
sources, commodity or service which,
through diversion, will enrich, him.
Maybe' there'll be subordinates who
can be counted on for favors or contri-
butions.
In short, the'..purpose of a job in
Vietnam Is to get it operating for, you
appetite for paper, file eardh, acetate
crayons, maps, more desks, more fil
cabinets, more of everything. They fri
quently complained that the Amer
cans weren't supporting the progra
adequately. The DIOCC building need
money for an extra room, And wh:
isn't the adviser's jeep made available
for others' use? Nobody seemed ti
worry about neutralizing VCI except
A typical DIOCC would have an Ina-
possible clutter of paper, with wheat
and chaff filed together, The alphabctc.
cal files we insisted they keep would
not be cross-referenced by alias, fam-
ily, location or any other useful desig-
nation. The dossiers so vital to prov-
ince security committee prosecution
would contain poor, skimpy informa-
tion; perhaps enough for an operation,
but not enough for prosecution. Other
files-most-wanted lists, potential
guide files, mug shots and so on--were
maintained so poorly as to k e useless,
or never kept at all. There would be no
intelligence collection plan, and agents
received little direction.
Because of operational and neutrali-
zation quotas levied from above, all op-
erations tended to be labeled as
"Phung Hoang operations," and most
South Vietnamese troopers, with suspects traketa. during a Phung Hoarrs
sweep, wade across a river in the Mekong Delta.
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RbP80R01720R001100090012-4
insofar as It required more st,nplies of
money. With nothing but ca,'Iboard
acetate, crayons and maps, most
DIOCCs and PIOCCs "neutralized'
VCI to their satisfaction, while them
American advisers became exasperated
and eventually resigned to 1'hun.
IIoang's pretenses.
Most fundamental of all, ti c? Viet
namese people were not sufficiently
committed to the Saigon i ovc?rnment
or Its programs, Their loyalties were to
their families, then their hamlets and
 Photrs by Wayne L. Cooper
"'Suspects' would sit for hours while their ID cards were compared against a cumbersome 'blacklist'."
detainees and KIA were recorded as The idea that our allies might have no- enced interrogation and imprisonment
VCI. Credit was taken for capturing tions of their own on the uses of by Vietnamese authorities fail, to this
significant VCI even after the individ- Phung Hoang, and might abuse the,) day, to be major concerns of the U.S.
ual had been released. program for their own political pur- government, despite the responsibility
poses, was either ignored or dismissed we, incurred in financing Phung
The Terror Issue as a matter of Vietnamese concern. Hoang.
TIIE MAIN WEAKNESS of Phung After all, we were only advisers and
I-loang, for which the program won internal security was a purely Viet- Bureaucratic Body Count
few Vietnamese hearts and minds, and namese matter. T WOULD BE impossible to get
for which many advisers were dis- In the field, we saw the inertia and .L an accurate total of the millions of
quieted and demoralized, was the fail-' ineptitude and knew the program dollars USAID, USAID/CORDS, the
ure to adequately acknowledge and wasn't succeeding. But we failed to no- - U.S. Army (MACV), and the CIA con-
dispose of the terror issue. tice that Phung Hoang was becoming tributed to the support of Phung
Phung Hoang was an attempt to legi- something else-a means for repres- Hoang in the last five years. A classi-
timize and institutionalize a highly un- sive political control over the South fied GAO report states that $80 million
conventional, frequently illegal count- Vietnamese. VCI economy-finance represents this effort; however, consid-
er-terror program financed and con- cadres and military-security cadres ering the costs of the advisory effort
trolled by the CIA. Phung Iloang was would be captured again and again, alone (training, salaries, vehicles and
not., however, an assassination pro- only to be released. But the "subver- servicing, housing, travel, family allow.
gram; it wasn't that competent. But sive" nationalist who expressed fatigue antes) the total must certainly exceed
even after "CT" become "ICEX" and with the war, scorn for Thicu and Ky, $100 million.
then "Phoenix," the publicity-from and enthusiasm for a coalition govern- What have we to show for this
the best news analyses to the sorriest ment, was by definition a threat to
been Thousands of presumed
jounalistic pap-continued to confuse public security. He might easily find VCI have investment?
himself on Conson Island, his arrest ized," an estimated 27,000 rep from Janu-
rarely roles, functions and titles, and was
-
rarely accurate. Oqe article talked of being explained to advisers by ascrib- ary, 1970, to March, 19-. 1. Phung IIoang
CIA's new assassination unit in Viet- ing to him a VCI title. represents a last, lingering vestige-
nam, "ICE," which coordinated and ex- The larger task of neutralizing the the bureaucratic body count-of a
ploited intelligence to zap the VCI. Vietcong leadership was obviously con- U.S.-imposed quota system, at a human
Even Newsweek ascribed to "Opera- sidered impossible by South Vietnam- cost impossible to measure. Nobody
tion Phoenix" the techniques of "in- ese authorities. With self-interest fore- knows what Phung Hoang has done to
timidation, torture and outright mur- most as usual, -the Saigon government the Vietcong infrastructure. The high-
der." ' used the mechanisms of Phung Hoang est officials in our Saigon embassy and
These kinds of conclusions were en- to intimidate and control more accessi- in Washington can only quote statistics
couragc?d by common usage of ble segments of the population, on fulfilled quotas, sentencings, and
"i'hoenix" as an all-descriptive term One byproduct of this intimidation overall "neutralizations." Statistics
for Phung Iloang, its advisers, opera- was the one-candidate presidential about Vietnam, however, were and are
tions, police intimidation, PRU opera- election of 1971, a curious monument practically worthless.
tions, U.S. Army Intelligence person-' to the cause of self-determination for The only honest conclusion one can
nel, and the CIA. which 55,000 Americans are supposed ' form, based on impressions rather than
In fairness to the reporters, it should to have died. When retired Gen. Duong hard facts, is that VC political activity
ec noted that the Phoenix program ac- Van Minh, whose candidacy against has slowed. One strongly suspects that
quired some strange advisers. The President Thieu might have made the this lessening of activity represents a
should.-r-holstered .38, the handle-bar farce less obvious, announced his de- tactical VC decision and is not a result
mustache, the knowing winks and cision to withdraw, one of his reasons of Phung Hoang. Yet VC documents
hair-raising war stories became was Thieu's police apparatus of polit- referred to Phung Iloang personnel a<
affectations for many oen dvis- ical control, which operated through r }~o~ ~'}} d assassins" and VC
ers. Both y,t lpr g1rtpj e,, a 200ddiJG1 Big.CIA-RDP80R01720R00~ 8'~`e ~ttd~ e4horted to -`crush the
ime sergeants who should have known At the rice-roots level, we Americans head of the Fauns' L --arc snake" Tilt
?,et.tcr played at Billy the Kid or James were filling our neutralization reports VC were aware of i? u, riven=
 r , s.., ..? [urnr~ Inons of
it'(*
oiti'n
ult
,Approved, Foh"Re1e *e 2ftW Q)
,'i'
W,1-(
'I lac 't'error 1?-Sae
r ilit: MAIN WI?AKMLSS of Phung
itoang, for which the program won
h' Vietnamese hearts and minds, and
fat which many advisers were dis-
quieted and demoralized, was the fail-'
ure to adequately acknowledge and
dispose of the terror issue.
Phung Iloang was an attempt to legi-
t.imize and institutionalize a highly un-
conventional, frequently illegal count-
er icrror program financed and eon-
anat. however, an assassination pro-
,rain, it wasn't that competent. But
+wen after become ' ICEX" and
then "t'hocui\," (lie publicity--from
'i he best news analyses to the sorriest
?jounalistic pap-continued to confuse
roles, functions and titles, and was
rarely accurate. Ouc article talked of
('a A's new assassination unit in Viet-
nam, "ICE," which coordinated and ex-
ploited intelligence to zap the VCI.
Even Newsweek ascribed to "Opera-
tion Phoenix" the techniques of "in-
timidation, torture and outright mur-
der,"
These kinds of conclusions were en-
couraged by common usage of
"Phoenix" as an all-descriptive term
for Phung IIoang, its advisers, opera-
tions, police intimidation, PRU opera-
tions, U.S. Army Intelligence person-
nel, and the CIA.
In, fairness to the reporters, it should
be noted that the Phoenix program ac-
quired some strange advisers. The
shoulder-holstered 38, the handle-bar
mustache, the knowing winks and
hair-raising war stories became
affectations for many Phoenix advis-
ers. Both young lieutenants and old-
time sergeants who should have known
better played at Billy the Kid or James
Bond.
The specter of terrorism also re-
mained because the provincial recon-
naissance units (PRUs) remained in
CIA hands. The PRUs operated at the
discretion of the province chief, when
and where they wished, presumably
against VCI targets. But the PRUs and
their Navy advisers answered to the
CIA province representative: he paid
the bills, he did the recruiting, he re-
ported on their operations and neutral-
izations. Thus PRU was the best paid,
the best led, the best equipped and
best motivated tool that could be used
against the. VCI. But Phoenix never
had control over and seldom informa-
tion from the PRUs or their swagger-
ing advisers. In 1970, the PRUs were
turned over to Vietnamese police au-
thority. Their pay and performance
have noticeably diminished.
A Tool of Repression
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abuse ~the of by day, tolbe major icone ierns of fail, the U.S.
QW1.7 R0011WQHQM 2tc4,;ite the responsibility
poses, was either Ignored or dismisses
as a matter of Vietnamese concern.
After all, we were only advisers and
internal security was a purely Viet-
namese matter.
In the field, we saw the inertia and
ineptitude and knew the program
wasn't succeeding. But we failed to no- -
tice that Phung Hoang was becoming
something else-a means for repres-
sive political control over the South
Vietnamese. VCI economy-finance
cadres and military-security cadres
would be captured again and again,
only to be released. But: the "subver-
sive" nationalist who expressed fatigue
with the war, scorn for Thleu and Ky,
and enthusiasm for a coalition govern-
ment, was by definition a threat to
public security. lie might easily find
himself on Conson Island, his arrest
being explained to advisers by ascrlb-
ing to him a VCI title.
The larger task of neutralizing the
Vietcong leadership was obviously con-
sidered impossible by South Vietnam-
ese authorities. With self-interest fore-
most as usual, the Saigon government
used the mechanisms of Phung Hoang
to intimidate and control more accessi-
ble segments of the population.
One byproduct of this intimidation
was the one-candidate presidential
election of 1971, a curious monument
to the cause of self-determination for
which 55,000 Americans are supposed
to have died. When retired Gen. Duong,
Van Minh, whose candidacy against
President Thieu might have made the
farce less obvious, announced his de-
cision to withdraw, one of his reasons
was Thieu's police apparatus of polit-
ical control, which operated through
Phung Hoang.
At the rice-roots level, we Americans
were filling our neutralization reports
and briefing charts and hoping the
program would somehow improve. We
never questioned our allies as to what
evidence justified a Phung Hoang ar-
rest; the Vietnamese knew their coun-
try, it was their problem. And once a
suspect was forwarded upward for fur-
ther questioning, we never knew wheth-
er he'd been 'sentenced or released;
there was no detainee accountability
system. Like advisers everywhere, we
reported what the Vietnamese told us,
continuing to deliver their supplies.
There are thousands of political pris-
oners in Vietnamese jails and prisons.
Many of them may be innocent, Many
of them may be there on too severe a
charge. Many of them may be
hardened VC leaders and 'agents. We
just don't khow. Despite this negli-
gence and Ignorance, millions of dol-
T HERE WAS another reason the ter- lars have been poured; and continue to
rorism issue remained: the South pour, into Phung Hoang. The unfortu-
we Incurred in financing Phung
Bureaucratic Body Count
IT WOULD BE impossible to get
an accurate total of the millions of
dollars USAID, USAID/CORDS, the
U.S. Army (MACV), and the CIA con-
tributed to the support of Phung
I-ioang in the last five years. A classi-
fied GAO report states that $80 million
represents this effort; however, consid-
ering the costs of the advisory effort
alone (training, salaries, vehicles and
servicing, housing, travel, family allow-
ances) the total nius. certainly exceed
$100 million.
What have we to show for this
Investment? Thousands of presumed
VCI have been reported as "neutral-
ized," an estimated 27,000 from Janu-
ary, 1.970, to March, 1971. Phung Iloang
represents a last, lingering vestige-
the bureaucratic body count-of a
U.S.-imposed quota system, at a human
cost impossible to measure. Nobody
knows what Phung Hoang has done to
the Vietcong infrastructure. The high-
est officials in our Saigon embassy and
in Washington can only quote statistics
on fulfilled quotas, scntencings, and
overall "neutralizations." Statistics
about Vietnam, however, were and are
practically worthless.
The only honest conclusion or;e can
form, based on impressions rather than
hard facts, is that VC political activity
has slowed. One strohigly suspects that
this lessening of activity represents a
tactical VC decision and is not a result
of Phung Hoang. Yet VC documents
referred to Phung Iloang personnel as
"bloody-handed assassins" and VC
cadres were exhorted to "crush the
head of the Phung Hoang stake." The
VC were aware of Phung Hoang and it
was possibly hampering their plans.
More specific conclusions by anyone
would be almost impossible to verify.
What, then, is the final lesson of the
failure of Phoenix? For too many
Americans in Vietnam, and political
scientists and counterinsurgency ex-
perts busily analyzing the whole mis-
adventure, there is an enthusiastic list-
ing of mistakes we Americans made
and of suggestions for doing it right
elsewhere the next time.
In fact, it is the lesson that gim-
micks - administrative like Phoenix
or technological, like "smart" bombs
and mines - cannot compensate for
South Vietnam's Internal rraementa-
tion and lack of staying pmvor It is
the lesson that the most relevant ques-
tion to be raised is: Given the Third
World as it is, with iv --11 bitt un-
avoidable realities, can an advisory
counterinsurgency effort succeed at
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