PHUNG HOANG
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01720R001100080034-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 14, 2004
Sequence Number:
34
Case Number:
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80R01720R001100080034-1.pdf | 64.4 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 :'CIA-RDP80R01 720R001 100080034-1
SUBJECT : Phung Hoang
1. We believe USAID's redraft of the original SAVA draft is
essentially sound and, considering USAID's horror of being publicly
identified with "Phoenix" or "counter-subversion", it seems quite
forthcoming and unbiased. USAID has managed to submerge its own
preferences to some extent in favor of encouraging a continued, well-
defined counter-subversion advisory effort even if they get tarred
by the semantics brush. In effect, of course, USAID has been
involved in counter-subversion to some extent all along - they advise
the National Police Field Force which is a Phung Hoang action arm -
but have enjoyed the buffer provided by the stated responsibility of
the U.S. military to advise Phung Hoang.
2. We have recently been informed, through a Progress
Report, that the National Police, under Public Safety Division kUSAID)
advisors, will take over the Phung Hoang Management Information
Service which handles Automatic Data Processing (ADP) of VCI. This
suggests, at least to some extent, a cooperative and realistic attitude
by USAID in the field.
3. We have noted several places in the attached draft where
minor changes should be made for clarity and consistency. The
insertion of "if anyone" in paragraph 4C is significant, however,
since it may well be that no U.S. agency will either want or need
to advise the PRU. Such lack of direct advice to the PRU would not
seem to leave a worrisome gap, to any greater extent than the with-
drawal of U.S. military advisors from ARVN units will leave gaps.
USAID would be expected to provide administrative and logistics sup-
port to the PRU as they do for all police elements including the
Special Police.
4. We believe that paragraph 3 of the USAID draft may require
some reworking by DOD. It is our impression that the problem is not
V s + _ G ~ PIT A Z _
(1 7-2"0111 01100080034-1
ft-NY n
TApproved For Release 2004/10/28 :1 lA-RDP80R01720R001100080034-1
in the numbers of Phung Hoang advisors to be retained but in their
qualifications. Too many trained Phung Hoang advisors might be
rotated out and replaced by untrained persons, and what is needed
is to assure that properly qualified persons fill the residual advisor
slots until the U.S. military advisory effort is terminated.
25X1
Attachment:
USAID Draft (H/W)
Approved For Release 2004/10/2$,; ,P80R01720R001100080034-1