(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001100080031-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: CABLE

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1. The tempo of the drawdown in U. S. forces has added a note
of immediacy to several questions regarding the Phung Hoang Program.
The,,, questions themselves align into two basic categories: (1) those which
deal with the continuation of the U. S. military advisory support, and
(2) those which deal with the organization of the follow-on effort in the
post-withdrawal period.
2. With regard to the first issue, it appears to some Washington
analysts that while the tempo of the cuts could be dealt with by itself, when
combined with the fact that the cuts 'are based on tour length (DEROS) the
process genuinely threatens the effectiveness of the Phung Hoang Program..
These same analysts recommend that the Phung Hoang advisor program
be exempted from the DEItOS process if possible so that some continuity
can be achieved. In any case, a reasonably accurate estimate of the number
of advisors planned for 1 November is required as soon as it can be calculated.
3. With regard to the second issue, there are several questions that
must be answered in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the counter-
subversive program that will ultimately replace the U. S. military advisory
effort, within Phung Hoang. The questions as we see them are as follows:
(a) Who will advise the police on their counter-
subversive responsibilities?
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(b) Who will advise the Field Police on their counter-
subversive responsibility?
(c) Who will advise, the Special Police on their counter-
subversive responsibility?
(d) Who will advise the various other elements.of the
GVN who have an anti-VCI responsibility, i. e., the
MSS, the Province Chiefs, the District Chiefs?
(e) What will become of the PRU? If it continues to
exist, who will advise it?
(f) What will be the relationship between all counter-
subversion advisors, especially between U. S.
police advisors, U. S._ special police advisors,
and U. S: Field Police advisors.?
(g) Who will take responsibility for the training
facilities currently used to support the anti-VCI
program?
(h) Who will take responsibility for making intelligence
estimates of VCI strength and capabilities?
4. It appears at this end, based on the opinions of those who have
had some contact with the Phung Hoang Program, that the answers to the
above questions not only require a plan for a follow-on program to Phung
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Hoang but also must deal head-on with the constraints that have been
placed on USAID operations. While in the past the U. S. military advisory
effort provided a buffer between USAID and the counter-subversive activities
of the National Police, the removal of that buffer requires that we face the
problem of counter-subversive advisory roles rather more squarely. If
it is believed in the field that the operational constraints placed on USAID
and CIA are such that a. cohesive advisory effort is jeopardized, then the
issue must be taken up by the NSC so that it can be resolved as soon as
possible. With regard to this particular issue of organization on the U. S.
side, it has been suggested that overall responsibility for the advisory effort
should perhaps reside in a senior official of the Mission, where coordination
of the various U. S. elements could take place most expeditiously. The
Deputy Ambassador's office would look to us like a logical place, particularly
in view of Mr. Whitehouse's background and expertise.
5. Because of the clearly urgent need to make the necessary decisions
on how the U. S. will structure its future advisory support to the G VN' s
obviously essential tas].c of combating organized internal subversion, we
need your response to this cable and the questions it raises as expeditiously
as possible, but no later than 17 March.
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SECRET
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
CONFIIIEN'tIA
-FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
ppr6~96%o F
FORM NO. 7 Use previous editions
 VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF
A t )F:CTO 204?SL O04/'I MAiCIJRTRDS80RD1720R0
TO: Mr. Colby
FROM:
DATE: 3 ,March 19y I
E acx u~vowli~~~?
SUBJECT: Phung Hoang
REMARKS: Attached is a copy of a draft cable
which Mr. Carver presented to the Sullivan
Committee. We will advise you as to the
degree of agreement of the draft and provide
you with a copy of the final version.
A--
0
IN
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