CAN WE 'NEUTRALIZE' THE VCI?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001100060035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM OF PERSONAL VIEW
FROM: POL//nternal - Henry S. Biter
SUBJECT: Can We "Neutralize" the VC/7
1. As American withdrawals continue in South Viet-Nam, the question
of how well the Vietnamese government can compete on its own against
the Viet Cong draws increasing attention. A key factor, of course,
is how strong the Communist side will be when the erucial confronta-
tions take place. The GVN is trying to weaken the Communists by
striking at the cadres of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, the core of
the enemy's apparatus, through Phung Moans and other programs. This
memorandum gives a personal view of how successful the effort against
the VC/ has been and, looking ahead, discusses the likelihood of an
eventual "neutralization" of the enemy.
SUMMARY
2. There are varying estimates of how effectively we have undermined
the VCI over the past three years, Emphasizing achievements, come
say that our anti-VCI measures have succeesfully kept the enemy from
controlling the population. Others stress the areas where we have
fallen short and state that we have not disrupted the Viet Cong's
infrastructure significantly. Looking at evidence from the enemy's
current strategic and tactical preparations, this study concludes
that our efforts have hurt the enemy but have not weakened his will
to fight. The basic picture appears of a harassed VC/ adjusting to
damaging events, but doing so in the most effective way in terms of
its remaining resources through a strategy of "protracted war" that
concentrates on the most vulnerable aspects of the GVN.
3. The allied effort against the VC/ is formed of various interrelated
components. The most conspicuous of these is Phung Hoang. In one
sense this is a passive statistical operation scoring VCI "Letutraliza-
tions" achieved by all agencies, and in another sense it is an active
intelligence and police operation targeting individual cadres. Viewed
either way, Phung Hoang has been a useful tool but its results have
not been decisive. The targeting effort has been somewhat disappointing,
and the statistical program can be only subjectimely and ambiguously
assessed since the action elements lie with various independent agencies.
Evidence that Phung Hoang has had some impact on the VCI, however, is
provided by the fact that the enemy e rt s considerable effort to
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counteract it. In improving Phung Hoang's effectiveness, particular
attention should now be directed toward correcting the program's
image with the Vietnamese public. The aura of arbitrariness that
it has in the eyes of many Vietnamese is a major weakness. Phung
bang's success depends on information given by sympathetic,
cooperating individuals in the community.
4. Military operations are another important element in the anti-VCI
struggle, They provide territorial security, vital to the suppression
of the Viet Cong cadres, and they supplement the more methodical police
and statistical work of ?hung Roans with strong punches against the
enemy like last year's Cambodian campaign. However, the impact of
military achievements is limited because they are revealed in gross
terms only. Military operations can be merely a framework for the
more refined efforts aimed with greater precision at the enemy's
infrastructure.
5. In the future, it will probably be harder to reduce the VCI's
ranks than it has been up to now, since as the total VCI strength
goes down a greater percentage of the cadres still at large are the
top-level hard core, the toughest to get. Even if neutralizations
could be maintained at their current rate (and misusing that the
enemy's capacity to replenish his ranks neither increases nor
diminishes greatly), the VCI would be left with more than half its
present strength at the end of lv73. Thus, it seems likely that
there will long be a sufficient number of VCI to create a serious
threat to internal security. To be sure, total elimination of the
VC/ is not a necessary goal, and a more realistic way of looking at
the anti-VCI campaign is to view it as a means of damaging the VCI
enough to keep the enemy from influencing the people. However, even
in this sense ?hung bang's success has been only moderate.
6. /n the end, our effort against the VCI will be fruitless unless
the political and social fibre of the Republic of Viet-Nam is
strengthened. The Communist cadres exist by capitalizing on basic
weaknesses in the South Vietnamese body politic. -- weaknesses that
the Communists are preparing to exploit with particular vehemence
as they adjust to the current realities of the war. To counteract
this threat, the CVN must learn to govern well and make itself.
attractive to its people. To the limited extent that our influence
as American advisors can affect this sphere, we should revitalize
our efforts to help the Vietnamese accomplish this task. END SUMMARY.
THE RESULTS SO FAR
7. The conceptimf a concentrated attack against the enemy's infra.
structure has been in effect for roughly three years, What have
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we achieved in that period?
8. There is wide disagreement among American observers about the
effectiveness of the effort against the VCI. Some emphasize
achievements, while others display skepticism. Basically, the two
opposing viewpoints can be described as follows.
9. The Optimistic View: According to the available figures, over
55,000 VCI were "neutralized" by our side's entire range of activi-
ties during the three years ending December 1970. Of this total,
about 15,000 were accounted for in 1968, roughly mono in 1969, and
just under 22,400 in 1970. The dimensions of this achievement can
be seen when one realizes that the total estimated strength of the
VCI is currently put at 65,000-75,000, while three years ago it was
put at 85,000-100,000. Although an unknown number of captured
cadres who were subsequently released have possibly returned to the
Viet Cong, and a large but undetermined number of Chiu hot ranters:
have likewise been lost trace of, the problem of people who may have
gone back to the enemy is alleged by proponents of our anti-VCI effort
to be a minor one. Cases where this is known to have happened are
said to be infrequent, and there is evidence that the Communists are
not trustful of colleagues who have once seen the GVN side at close
range over a period of time. The defects in the GVN's tracing
procedures on ralliers and released prisoners are recognized and
are being worked on. Phung Hoang is now putting an elaborate
automated tracing system into effect.
10. Statistics state that cadres working at the district level or
above comprised about 137 of those neutralized in 1968. about 21%
in 1969, and about 24% in 1970. These figures are al/ higher than
the estimated percentage of total VCI (about 10%) who work at these
levels. During the first six months of 1970, 31% of all neutraliza-
tions were full members of the People's Revolutionary Party, and an
additional 107. were probationary members. Thus, it is claimed that
the GVN's programa are aiming at the higher VCI ranks.
11, Supporters of these programs also say that the VCI have been hit
qualitatively. Each time a cadre is eliminated from the rolls, a
replacement must be foundand.trained. The training period varies
depending on the level of the positions, but several months is taken
as the average. Moreover as the GVN expands territorial security in
the country, the VCI's manpower pool for replacements diminishes, an
effect amplified even more as the Viet Cons is driven farther into
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unpopulated jungle areas Where many potential recruits are reluctant
to serve. All of these developments have significantly reduced the
quality of the VC/.
12. As evidence of the current weakness of the VC/, some observers
cite the fact that the enemy is engaged in a rebuilding campaign.
That they are doing this is known from various sources. They must
be hurting, the reasoning goes, or they wouldn't have to rebuild.
Also cited are the frequent references in recent captured documents
to the need for logistical "self-sufficiency" on the part of local
enemy units. This applies to even such basic items as food. It
must be difficult for the VCI, these observers point out, to have
to tell the lower echelons, in effect, "we cannot supply you anymore."
13. Analysts bore noted that the VC/ concentrates over half its
strength in nine key provinces, and proponents of the GVN's current
efforts against the enemy point out that noteworthy results have
been achieved recintly in programs eephasicins neutralizations in
these localities.-' A CYN drive in Kien Hoa Province, for example,
caused the Chios Doi rate there to rise dramatically. While some
of these returnees may have been false ralliers planted by the VCI,
the evidence suggests that the enemy was so disoriented by this drive
that it was powerless to prevent mass defections by hard pressed Viet
Cone adherents. All that the enemy's provincial leaders could do in
most cases was to extract a hurried promise from the rattier* not to
reveal anything important and to be willing to be contacted by cadres
at some future date. Such achievements show that positive results
are being seised against the VCI in crucial places.
14. The Pessimistic View: Looking at the effort against the VCI
from the standpoint of where we have fallen short as against what
we have accomplished, the view Is lifferent. The permanency of the
55,000 neutralisations claimed over the last three years is often
questioned. The gaps that have existed in the tracing procedures on
ranters and released prisoners are cited as a major statistical
weakness, and the assumption is made that many rallying and captured
VC/ do in fact return to the Viet Gong after their release. The
shortness of sentences often imposed on captured cadres permits them
1/
The nine provinces are: Quang Nam (including Danang), Quang Tin,
Quang Ngai? Binh Dinh, Dinh TUong. Elea Bea, Vinh Binh, Via Long,
and An Xuyen.
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to revert ?4 their former roles after very brief periods of GVN
detention. As for the ralliers, it is charged that many of them
may actually be VCI agents. The enemy is known to rely fairly
heavily on false ralliers to infiltrate agents into GVN-controlled
territory. Many other rilliers who are not planted agents are
nevertheless subject to being. re-contacted by the VCI and pressured
into working *gain for the YiectCcing.
15. In particular, it is claimed that the CVN has scarcely touched
the VCI top commend. Getting someone at the COSVN level is extremely
difficult and is almost purely a matter of luck. Some province-level
people have been re-itched, but even here the results are disappointing.
The cadres generally neutralized are village and district cadres.
Unfortunately these are precisely the ranks where the enemy's
regenerative capacity is greatest. The recruitment ability at this
level is relatively high, especially given the Viet Cong's attraction
to village youth for its promised upward mobility and its spirit of
adventure.
16. The quality of new recruits has certainly gone down within the
VC/. But at the level where the MIN is mainly touching them, quality
may not be greatly needed. Besides, there is evidence that the enemy's
top leadership is currently purging the VCI, weeding out unreliable
people and consolidating political structures. While these moves are
probably designed in part to reverse a decline in the quality of the
cadres, they also may be interpreted ass sign that the enemy still
has enough manpower to trim off low-quality personnel. Thus, the
current rebuilding campaign of the Communists may be used also as
evidence that the VCI ranks are not being greatly hurt.
17. Critics generally acknowledge that the VCI is faltering in
certain functions, largely because of its inability to counter
14/
The legal limits on sentences under the Phung Roang detention system
are two years for "A" cadres and from one to two years for "B" codree.
("A" cadres are those at all administrative levels who are members of
the Party or who occupy command or decision-making positions, The "B"
group includes the less important full-time personnel. There is also
a "C" group comprising part-time workers, once included in Phung Homing
statistics but no longer considered.) Extensions of sentences are
ponsible and are not uncommon, though the majority of prisoners serve
only one term. Mow cadres receive much less than the maximum initial
sentences. Phung 'bang does not credit neutralizations, however, unless
a sentence of mne year or'more is imposed.
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pacification. Logistics, tax collecting, intelligence gathering, and
some aspects of recruitment are the VCI's main headaches these days.
However, this development is not uniform countryside, and furthermore
most of these are essentially back-up activities for the enemy,
extremely important but not central to the Communists' current main
aim of preparing for subversion. Only the intelligence function, among
those substantially affected, is performed by the hard-core VCI. Other
activities of the inner infrastructure, such as proselyting among
civilian and AMVN ranks, are proceeding without serious interruption.
18. Many analysts believe that the VCI cadres have generally main-
tained at least minimum "access" to the population through all the
setbacks they have suffered. (This concept refers to the enemy's
ability to reach people for propaganda, terror, and other purposes,)
It is said that the VC/, nationwide, still have the capability to get
to just under 60% of the people for at least two hours of individual
proselyting a week, either overtly or on a clandestine basis. Regional
figures vary considerably on this point, and logger periods of access
have unquestionably been greatly reduced by the OVN's pacification
program. Naturally, how each the enemy can accomplish in a given
period of proselyting depends largely an the attitude of the people
contacted toward the government. However, two hours weekly is con-
sidered sufficient for ordinary propaganda activities.
19, In searching for the reasons behind these alleged shortcomings,
Americans familiar with the anti-VCI targeting efforts at the province
and district levels often cite what amounts to a failure of nerve on
the capture and detention side. A cadre may be pinpointed by the
Phung Hoang apparatus, but somehow he is never caught. Or if he is
caught, he may be released without sentence. American observers can
seldom track down exactly what the problem is. Perhaps the Vietnamese
officials implementing Phung Hoang are secretly accommodating with
the Viet Cons, or they may have family ties with the targeted cadre,
or they may even fear that the man has political influence locally
and wonder if they will be sustained in their endeavors against him.
Still another possible explanation is that they may vaguely regard
the Viet Cons as misguided idealists who deserve to be treated
leniently as long as they are not in the process of attacking some-
body. Quite apart from these possibilities, officials responsible
for Phung Hoang may simply be frightened of reprisals, These are
all natural reactions in today's Viet-Nam. It takes a deep commit-
ment to the OVN and considerable courage to be a staunch Phung Hoang
operative. In particular, it is known that Phung Hoang officials
are prime targets for Viet Cong assassination precisely to the extent
that they are effective. It is likewise taken for granted that, if
the other side wins tha war, personnel associated with Phung Hoang
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be among che first "enemies of the people" to b iot..
edicated Mune hoang operativee ok) exist, but they et, to e=eee
?':e Some hmerican critics state ehat Phung Hoene's roe as a CO
of anti-VCI targeting in province and distrects is more
eeeen than apt irrelevant to any eesulte acteaily accoeeliehee0
eittie tradine oe information is done among the orgaeieetione
eeeeed by Meng Hoene, these observers declare, and eaeh of the
eeeareizetions tends to operate independently. The reanon generally
eeven tor this le that nobody Ix responsible personelle to Flung
aoang, Wnich is a program not an agency; all the eereoaael are
eeeountateie to their own agencies, and hence this is where the
loyaity lieo.
Me Evidence From Current Enemy. ketions
el, The above disparity of view about the effectivenees of the GVN':1
eeforts against the VCI rarely concerns factual points, Differencee
le emphasizing one factor aver-another conetitete the chief eearce cf
eoutroversy. Such questions are highly debatable undee our preueut
ate of knowledge about the enemy. We do not know, fer example,
what the Viet Cong's manpower requirements are in certain categories,
eed this makes it hard to judgethe impact of their cadre losses in
-ehese fields. Consequently, indirect evidence must be sought to
iodge the condition of the VCI.
el. Both points of view offer evidence based on the eeemy'e preeent
activities. A malor change of tactics and organieation is known to
have bean underway for some time on the Communiet side_ To what
extent is the enemy being compelled to alter his policies, and to
ethat extent is he doing so voluntarily? The answez to this geestion
may provide the most useful way to judge how much the 'WI is being
.burt. Though the enemy's. change of direction relates to more than
condition of the VCIe nevertheless it showe how the other side
views its chances in the current struggle and the basic environment
in which the VCI operates.
COSVN Resolutions eiandele: The other sides curcent reassess-
ment began during the hard-fought battles of 1965. After exposing
large numbers of cadrecand seeing them chewed up in the Tet Offensive,
e'he enemy engeged over the next several months in a 1)f unit military
eampaign that it could not win (though it did achieve whet may have
..loan a subsidiary aim, namely inflicting casualties on the Americans
Jt a Dace that the US public found demoralizing). Viet Cone succeseep
of the early end middle 1960's steadily eroded. The percentage of tle,
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rural population under effective Viet Cong control, according to a
recent special White House study, dropped from about 45% right after
Tot to about 25% at the beginning of 1969, and the figure continued
to drop after that. The term "control" was defined in this study as
the type of territorial dominance that permits virtually unhampered
recruitment activities and a general exercise of authority -- in short,
a key indicator of the VCI's freedom of action. HAMA apparently
decided in the first half of 1969 that a shift of strategy was called
for to bring Viet COQ' actions into harmony with the new situation.
A return to the tactics previously stressed of small-unit insurgency
3/
not dependent on large-scale territorial control seemed to be in order.--
The well known GOWN Resolutions 9 and 14 initiated this new policy,
24. These two landmark documents of COMM have been variously inter-
preted. But a fair description of the strategy they outline, as
amplified by laterorders, would seem to be that, although an early
political settlement on Communist terms is the preferred solution to
the war, a "protracted struggle" aimed at exhausting the allies over
a long period must be anticipated. The tactics that the VCI is directed
to carry out are the following:
a, The VCI must emphasize guerrilla tactics and political agitation
over an extended period. The option of an upsurge in military activity
designed to force en early settlement will be kept in reserve,
b. Big military units must be broken down into small, specialized
guerrigla forces. These forces suet be largely "self-sufficient" in
logistical matters. (Military Region I is an exception here; big-
unit tactics have remained the rule just below the D1Z:)
c. The VCI must be increasingly compartmentalized to strengthen central
control, avoid security leaks, and withstand GVN pressure. Many cadres
will be downgraded (from province level to district level, etc.) to
further enhance control. These cadres will guide local guerrilla elementp,
d? The placement of "legal cadres" (covert VCI working in GVN terri-
tory with CVN identity papers) will be given high priority. These
cadres will then be able to reach the people and will be available
for subversive tasks.
3i
? In some places in Military Region Iv no major shift was required;
the war had never really departed from the guerrilla model in these
areas.
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e. The VCI's main effort rust be directed against the GVN pacifica-
tion and Vietnamisation programs. The Regional Forces and Populax
Forces will be the main military targets, since they epitomise the
GVN's enlistment of the people in the war.
f. A diplomatic effort will be undertaken by Hanoi and the NLP.
This initiative will be used mainly to sow confusion in the allied
ranks, but also to probe the possibility of an early coalition
government under terms advantageous to the Communists, including
total US withdrawal. In either case, the VCI's political struggle
will continue until the Communist side overcomes its adversaries.
g. Concurrent with the above efforts, steps will be taken to enhance
the stature of the high-level cadres forming the Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government, both internationally and in the eyes of the South
Vietnamese people. Likewise, the standing of the Revolutionary
Committees will be promoted as the representatives of the PRG in the
villages. Front organisations will also be cultivated at various
levels. These actions will be particularly useful if a diplomatic
approach is followed to end the war, but they will equally well serve
to strengthen the viability of the Communist claim to govern the
country under the protracted-struggle approach.
25. &Laically a Fempiltagg: The circumatances surrounding the
above charges indicate that the Communiste were largely driven to
them involuntarily. Apart from the clearly established origin of
the new strategy in post-Tet failures, perhaps the best evidence of
this is that their "self-sufficiency" campaign can be interpreted
as a sign of logistical failure. Supporters stress this interpreta-
tion, and numerous captured documents and interrogation reports in
recent months confirm it. The theme of food and other supply shortages
is repeated frequently in these source*, although clandestine purchases
from Saigon and inpute from the peasantry are likewise commonly noted
as mitigating factors. Many local units are now being instructed to
cultivate their own food crops, a new activity for the Viet Cons on
such a scale.
26. In part, the present emphasis on "legal cadres" also reflects
a problem, in this case that of reaching the population as GVN
pacification progresses, Proof that the VCI's ability to contact
the people is falling off is shown particularly by the recruitment
difficulties appearing in the enemy's ranks. About 807 of the
military main-unit strength of the enemy is now composed of Norther-
ners, and even some Northern cadres are being inserted into the
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political VCI. Manpower shortages as well as supply problems may
have caused the downgrading of units currently being noted, especially
in Military Region III. Ia contacting ARVN soldiers, the VCI used to
urge them to defect to the Viet Cong; now they usually ask them merely
to desert and go home, knowing that their recruitment as guerrilla's
is unlikely.
27. lalt?Alle_lantdiggmet_leMpavaltilm: Despite these Communist
setbacks, we should not consider the enemy s present strategy as proof
that the VCI is on the run. For ono thing, Hanoi has likewise driven
our side into some choices we would have liked to ovoid, Our with-
drawals of troops, to the extent they are forced, represent an impor-
tant break for the VCI. In a sense? Hanoi is seising a favorable
opportunity in shifting completely away from big-unit fighting and
concentrating on political subversion as the overwhelming American
military machine ceases to be its mein worry, Though the enemy must
still fight ARVN, this probably seems less of a threat, one that is
particularly susceptible to guerrilla and subversive countermeasures.
Hanoi may believe that it can always return to a big-unit conflict
to strike the final blow after the Saigon government has been under-
mined politically and the American division* are gone.
78, The VCI's opportunity is reinforced by the fact that guerrilla
harassment, terror, and subversion are probably its best weapons
against the GVN's pacification program, which has become our side's
main war-winning effort. Pacification is the OVN's own brand of
"people's war"; at frontal attack on it would probably be doomed to
failure. The strategy that the Viet Cong aro now adopting represents
their tried and true formula in this kind of struggle. That this is
not a completely vain belief is shown by the success they achieved
in the first half of 1970 after brooking down the 10th NVA Regiment
Lu Phu Yen Province. A politically-oriented abduction campaign
conducted by the resultiag smell units managed to drop that province
from 10th highest. it the pacification listings to 38tn highest (out
of 44 provinces).
29. The "contradictions" that the Communists see in the Saigon regime
are additional fuel for Hanoi's belief that the current strategy is
a winner. The economic inequalities, corruption, and political
10
4/
There is some reason to believe that the original 10th-place
ranking was overly optimistic.
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divisiveness that plague South Viet-Nem today lend this long-
standing Communist doctrine considerable plausibility in Vietnamese
eyes, and the Communists smetderive considerable hope from these
all-too-visible weaknesses. An astute British observer of North
Viet-Nam commented to Embassy officers several months ago that
Hanoi is banking on the fissuree existing in South Vietnamese society
to bring them victory over the long haul. More recently, a nanadian
attached to the ICC expressed the view to an American official that
the North Vietnamese intend to move against what they call the "house
of cards" in Saigon once the U.S. troops have withdrawn Calculated
harassments, including stepped-up activities in the cities to provoke
urban instability and anti-regime feelings, will in their view speed
the disintegration of the Saigon government.
30. Furthermore, in the event that negotiations bring a ceasefire,
the dispersal of the enemy's units into small groups, with many
personnel "legalized", gives the VCI a much better idleness to hide
themselves among the population in preparation for a subversive
upsurge. Thus, the present strategy hes the advantage of serving
both alternative courses of action anticipated by COSVN Resolutions
9 and /4, the possible but unlikely quick solution and the more
probable protracted struggle.
The LonEALTAINekeeSeRtigles
32. Thus, the evidence from the enemy's current strategy can be
argued either way. This says a great deal about the indecisive-
ness of the results achieved by both sides in this war. In each
case, a tremendous expenditure of effort has resulted in the
infliction of punishment on the adversary, but nothing like
decisive results have proved possible. The Viet Cons have reacted
to this situation by gearing down for a long-term struggle aimed
at the most deeply rooted vulnerabilities of the CVN.
33. This is by no means a new strategy for the enemy. The Viet
Cong's Whole concept of warfare from the very beginning has been
based on "protracted struggle." Tet 1969 was, in a s ase, an
aberration from the pattern -- or, in another sense, it was the
use of one option within the guerrilla strategy to maximize an
advantage and achieve early conclusive results. Its apparent
failure to achieve the hoped-for goal forced the enemy to revert
to the tactics of slowly trying to make the Saigon regime politically
impotent through various subversive means. This protracted confron-
tation, which has been with us since the start of the war, may now
he shaping up in perhaps its starkest form.
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THE COMPONENTS OF OUR EFFORT
34. Our attack on the enemy's cadres is conducted through a variety
of moans. In a sense, everything that our side does serves this
goal, illustrating the fact that the allied struggle in Viet-Nam is
* fabric composed of many closely interwoven threads. However, only
two operations have a prominent impact: the Mina Roans program and
military activities.
PhunAloAng
35. The CVN's principal weapon against the VCI is the Phung Hoang
operation. In assessing how well our side to doing in the struggle,
a particularly close look at this program is necessary. As we saw
abov4, our overall campaign against the VCI has achieved only mixed
results. To what extant has Phung Hoang shared in this indecisive
outcome?
36, The DualAttatA_Mmglikm: We must note first of all that
Phung Hoang can be defined in more than one way, These different
aspects are sometimes confused, creating misleading opinions about
the program's effectiveness.
37, In one sense, Phung Roan can be regarded as a statistical program
keeping score on the VCI that have been "neutralised" (killed, sentenced
to prison after capture, or induced to rally) by the whole range of
operations conducted by our side against the enemy. Consider& this
way, it is a functionally limited but Structurally broad program
embracing all agencies. Thus, the Chieu Hoi program is considered
an integral part of ?hung Hoang to the extent that it attracts VCI
ralliers. Statistics from military engagements are listed under
Phung Hoang whenever losses are suffered by the VCI. (In fact, most
Communist cadres killed are accounted for in military actions not
specifically tergeZed against the VCI.) This blanket quality of
Phung Hoang makes it an extremely useful indicator of the VCI's
condition, but it also adds to the roughness of the program's esti-
mates. The statistics combine the inherent inaccuracies of several
programs.
38. But Phung Hoang also has a narrow definition. It is a specific
intelligence and police program targeted against the VCI, planning
operations designed to "neutralize" specific cadres. The actual
operations have been carried out by a variety of action elements
(National Police, Special Police, Provincial Reconnissance Units,
etc.) under the coordination of Phung Roans acting as the intelligence
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arm. This is the heart of the program, for it is where the question
of how much we are hurting the VCI passes from a purely passive
scorekeeping operation to an active effort at meeting the threat
posed by the VCI'. existence.
39. Basic Results of Phung Hoene: How successful has Phung Hoang
been, in terms of either its broad or narrow definitions? Good
results in either field would certainly go far to justify the effort
our side has put into the program,
40, As a statistical operation, the program has unquestionably served
to focus attention on the enemy's cadres, and therefore it has contri-
buted to whatever progress has been achieved against this key adversary,
Of course, the passive character of Phung Hoang's statistical services
makes it difficult to attribute specific achievements to the program
itself. One could argue that any of the agencies tasked by Phung
Hosing, such as Chieu Role would be no less successful today had Phung
Hoang never been invented. However, this judgment seems not quite
fair. If nothing else, Phung Roans has been a central clearing house
for information on the Vet, however imperfectly it may have performed
this role. It continually strives to improve the reliability of its
data. Moreover,, by forcing planners to think of the VCI as the main
target, ?hung Hoang has added in a non-quantifiable way to the over-
all impact on the enemy.
41. As an active police program, Phung Hoang has registered results
that are more easily seen but unfortunately are not very conclusive.
The enemy has been thrown off balance somewhat, his ranks have been
thinned, and he is forced to divert part of his attention to protec-
tive measures. At the same time, however, skeptics can assemble mech
evidence showing that most key VCI activities have eluded Phung Hoang
operations, The specific targeting of suspects accounts for roughly
ono-fourth of the VCI killed, captured, or induced to rally. Little
that has been done keeps the Communists from their cuerent prepara-
tions for "protracted war" against the GVN's weakest points, in this
connection, it must be remembered that the Viet Cong are inured to
hardship; logiaticel shortages, while especially serious now, are not
new to them. They can get along on very little, counting on their
own tenacity and the prospect of "inevitable" triumph to pull them
through. Even the currentereports of morale problems must be taken
with a grain of salt -- such reports have been coming in for years.
42, In sum. Phung Hoang has been a useful tool, but decisive results
have eluded it. The active targeting aspect of the program is some-
what disappointing thus far, and results in the statistical field can
only be subjectively and rather ambiguously assessed.
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43. The VCI's Countermisfums_AgqpiLl_ghunAlzgats. One proof that
Phung Roans is having at least some impact is the fact that counter-
measures against it are a major priority for the enemy. Captured
documents and interrogation reports often repeat the theme that
?hung Hoenig (considered here in the narrow sensplas the GVN's anti'
VCI police effort) is one of his major worries,v He tries to protect
his cadres from it by three basic defensive measures; compartments.-
Hutton, "legalisation, and tighter over-all security. Compart-
mentalisation, already referred to, insulates groups of cadres from
one another and thus makes the CVN's job of gathering intelligence
on the VCI structure more difficult. The infiltration of "legal"
cadres into GVN society, while primarily designed to prepare for
subversion, also serves to put Phung Hoang's targets under a deeper
cover. The tightening of security embraces many techniques from
the surveillance of cadres to the protection of documents, all
designed to prevent defections and information leaks.
44. In addition to these defensive tactics, the VCI also tries to
counter-attack against the Phung Roans police effort through aggres-
sive means. First, as captured documents make clear, the enemy
devotes a continuing effort to finding out how Phung Hoang works,
who its personnel are, etc. With this information, the VCI can
infiltrate local Phung Hoang operations, assassinate Phung Roans
directors, seize the files, or generally sabotage the program in
numerous ways. Secondly, the Communists have from time to time
launched campaigns intended to discredit Phung Roans in the eyes of
the Vietnamese public through attacks on its basic equity. This is
a technique that has been used only occasionally up to now, but we
should be alert to stepped-up efforts along these lines. Unfortu-
nately, the quasi-judicial procedures used under Phung Hoang to
determine the guilt or innocence of prisoners, while not peremptory,
are easily subject to suspicion for their fairness; in short, the
program is vulnerable to this kind of psychological offensive.
The Provincial Security Committees are governed by a bare minimum
of procedural standards; their treatment of the accused depends
largely on the personal principles of their members. Lengthy
periods of detention before processing, the absence of a rule
requiring personal appearance of the accused, unjustified arrests
to meet quotas, and the exaction of bribes as a condition of
release are among the practices that have been cited against them.
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Several prominent anti-Communists in South Viet-Nam have criticized
Phung Hoang on these or similar grounds. Sections of American
opinion have likewise expressed doubts about the ethics of the
program. The VC; may well try to exploit this feeling on a major
scale.
45 All of these enemy actions, of course, reflect a substantial
VCI fear of ',hung Hoang. It is the CVN operation aimed most
directly at the VCI, both as individuals and as an apparatus.
However, there is little evidence from the available sources that
the cadres feel incapable of protecting themselvee agaiast the
program to the extent necessary for their most crucial plans,
46, lEpLeyipl_eas,Hoeng: Measures can and should be taken to
improve Phung Hoang. Much is already being done, such as the
efforts being made under the stimulus of Sir Robert Thompson's
report. In particular, organizational improvements are being
studied to overcome the lack of coordination and accountability
now found among the agencies implementing the program, which as we
saw above is a frequently criticized obstacle. Commendable ateps
have also been taken to improve the soundness of offender dossiers,
speed up the processing of cases, and provide legally trained prosecu-
tors to the Provincial Security Committees. Publicity campaigns
designed to explain and nopularize Phung Hoang have likewise been
undertaken and should be continued, A parole system permitting the
release of selected prisoners who show good behavior is being put
into effect in some places, and this ahould help to improve the
program's standing with the public. However, more remains to be
done before Phung Hoang can become a truly valued instrument
4L Until further reforms are undertaken integrating the program
more fully with the community's legal system and standards of
equity, the whole operation will retain an aura of arbitrariness
that is to some extent justified. This is a crucial weakness
requiring a solution as quickly as possible, not only on moral
grounds but also because Phung Hoang's success depends on informa-
tion supplied bac cooperating individuals throughout the community.
The Communists will no doubt try to promote an uncooperative spirit
to the fullest possible extent. It is, of course, true that procedures
used to eliminate an enemy in wartime cannot be as elaborate as those
used to apprehend and sentence criminals during coudittons of peace.
However, Phung Hoang procedures must be seen by the Vietnamese public
as basically fair. This is especially true in the type of war now
being fought in Viet-Nam, where the miiitary danger is receding and
the government is striving to brand its guerrilla enemy in the minds
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of the people as a group of outlaws, The enemy's best counter-
attack against this charge is to try and brand the government as
being unfit to rule, an effort made easier whenever the government
cuts corners on its methods or condones corruption by implementing
officials. The fact is ehat, having embarked on a program of
disrupting the VCI, our side can succeed in the endeavor only if
its program is tangibly effective and generally considered equitable.
It cannot be just one or the other, for the two factors are inseparable.
48. If a program can be devised that is basically irreproachable to
the average Vietnamese, it might than become politically feasible to
introduce tougher implementing measures. For example, the initial
sentences banded down could be lengthened beyond the brief periods
now permitted, One could argue that the present system tries to
make up in pointlessly short initial sentence() (pointless considering
that the crime could be defined as treason) for its vulnerability to
criticism on procedural grounds, This gives it the worse of both
worlds" If nothing is done to correct this situation, there is a
chance that Phung Hoang may eventually have an over-all negative
effectiveness, antagonising the public to a greater degree than it
achieves a disruption of the VCI-
ItilltImOnerations
49, The importance of the military elemeut in the anti-VC/ struggle
is hardly open to question. For one thing, the gains achieved against
the VCI are largely dependent on continued territorial security, a
job that particularly the various armed forces perform, Even with
perfect territorial security, lasting suppression of the enemy cadres
on a nationwide basis may take quite a few more years; if territorial
security evaporates, the VCI has free rein in harassing the villages
and drafting the population to its cause. The anti-VCI effort is
rendered almost Impossible,
50, Furthermore, it is apparent that much of the success achieved
against the VC/ derives from the ever-all disruptive effect of allied
military campaigns, particularly special operations like the 1970
Cambodian incursion- The VCI was out into considerable disarray by
this attack, which severely aggravated problems it had already begun
to experience in Military Regions II/ and IV. This is true especially
of its logistical difficulties. Also, there has been a major shift
of resources on the Communist side from South Vietnam to Cambodian
targets, causing a decline in their activities on the Vietnamese aide
of the border. Carefully planned and well executed punches of this
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type against the enemy seem to be needed from time to time as
supplements to Phung Hoang's more wethodical day-to-day police
eampaigns and statistical operations.
91. Military campaigns, however, are ot limited effectiveness in
the anti-VCI effort. Their impact is manifested in gross terms,
such as the disruption of a supply line, the anticipation and
thwarting of a VC attack, or the maintenance of general security
in a province. These results, though essential, provide at best
a framework for the more refined efforts required to undermine
the enemy's infrastructure. While cadres are indeed killed or
captured in military operations, this comes either by chance or
frr_mt a general kind of targeting that cannot achieve precise
results..
OITLOOK AND CONCLUSIONS
52. Where will our anti-VCI apparatus carry us over the next several
years? if the results so far are really as indeciaive es described
above, we must take a hard look at how we can overcome the eeemy's
cadres_ in the coming phase of the struggle.
"The Other Side Will Still Ile There"
53, A factor to bear in mind is the possibility that reductions in
the VCI's ranks, regardless of how accomplished, will now become
harder to achieve than the past. As the total number of VCL goes
down, an increasing percentage of the remainder represents the top
level hard core, the most difficult cadres to track down. Greater
exertions will be required to reach these individuals, The CNN has
recently issued instructions to step up the Phung Hoang effort, and
possibly some new vitality will enter this nrogrem. The efforts now
underway through the recommendations of Sir Robert Thompson to improve
the police and rejuvenate Flung Hoang will of course be most helpful
3ut the ineffectiveness of Phung Hoang's Cield operations that wee
noted above, stemming from competing considerations such as family
ties and sentiment and even outright fear, will not be overcome
easily, short of a dramatic improvement in the over-all Vietnamece
perception of the war.
54. Even if it could be assumed that the present rate ef neutralize-
eiona will be maintained in the coming years, the results would probabLy
be moderate at best. In the past, the VCI has been able to replenish
up to half of its neutralized cadres each year. The net anneal loss
has been 10% - 15%. This rate, if continued, would leave the VCI
with over half its current strength by the end of 1cr73. OE course,
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e_ te
the replenishment level may well drop somewhat, bet the net result
will probably not be dramatically different.
55. A projection of half the current VCI strength by the end of
1,973 is not a cheerful forecast in today's political setting,
especially since a large proportion of the remaining VCI will be
the high echelons who are protected within a base of operations
that has so far proved largely impenetrable. The continuation
of these echelons, the backbone of the VCI, gives force to
President Nixon's comment last October that when the war is over
"the other side will still be there."
56. To be sure, the subordinate cadres, whom we have hurt more
substantially, are not inconsequential. They are in a sense the
cutting edge of the enemy's attack, for this is the level where
the enemy contacts the villagers on a day-to-day basis. By the
same token, it is where the VCI is most exposed. Thue, hitting
the VCI at thie point makes considerable sense, especially since
one purpose of the anti-VCI campaign is to put enough pressure
on the VCI to cut it off from the people. This is a more practical
goal than the game of statistical "neutralization", and one which
puts the program in a realistic perspective. However, we must bear
in mind that in reducing the cadres who deal with the villagers we
are not touching the core of the movemenc. Nor have our achieve-
ments against the VCI at Aut level prevented it from gaining access
to large segments of the population for at least minimum propaganda
purposes, as we saw above. In the subversive war now shaping up,
this is an ominous sign.
The Other Part of the Answer
57. If one accepts the conclusion that we are unlikely to reduce
the VCI's numbers in the foreseeable future to a level where the
infrastructure no longer poses a major threat, then several results
follow. What this means, basically, is that a strategy relying
mainly on attacking the enemy's apparatus will never win the war.
It can bold the cadres at bay and even disrupt them, thereby serving
the important task of providing security on a current basis, but such
measures will not remove the log-term danger. The struggle becomes
a waiting game, with each side able to keep the adversary at arm's
length but forced to rely on internal weaknesses and exhaustion on
the other side for a decisive result. The side that wins this type
of war, or comes closer to winning in an eventual compromise settle-
ment, will be the one that tends to its own affairs more effectively,
keeping its base of support intact and convincing the weverers that
it is a preferable alternative to its adversary. The Communists
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believe they can play this game better tiv_n the GVL This belief
ie the real meaning of "protracted war."
53? Recognition of this danger is, of course, not new. The eatire
pacification program, for example, aims at the dual goal of protecting
the rural popolation through attacks on the insurgents and generating
allegiance to the Saigon regime through civic action. No claim is
made in this memorandum to having reached a unique conclusion. It
does seem, however, that the GVN and its U.S. advisors are not following
through on the logical consequences of this reasoning. One gets the
impression that our side is counting more on external_ aggressive
means to counteract the VCI and less on internal, defensive ones.
To be sure, there are exceptions: economic policy and land reform
are perhaps the most noteworthy. Goaded by the drug abuse problem,
we may now be turning major attention to corruption, although much
of this deeply corrosive problem remains untouched. Other questions
such as the chronic political fragmentation in Saigon and the con-
spicuous social inequalities appear to be getting low-priority treat-
ment,Compared to the task of invigorating Vietnamese society to overcome
these problems, the job of organizing military campaigns and targetiue
VCI looks easy, and even the economic sphere appears tractable by
comparison to the slippery domain of political and social reform.
The OVN does not seem to have its heart in such reforms, Some observere
say it is organizationally incapable of implementing such measures in
a. controlled manner. Americans understandably shy away from preaching
to the Vietnamese about improvements whose successful implementation
depends on peculiarly Vietnamese cultural factors. How can Americans
advise the Vietnamese about the kind of epirit that should be instilled
into the GVN to reduce corruption, for example? We've tried to advise
the Vietnamese on many such items in the past only to find our counsel
quietly evaded. Besides, a too fatherly attitude on our part would
only serve to lessen the self-confidence and initiative of the GVN,
themselves important goals, Finally., the GVN always appeare to have.
other pressing thiegs to worry about, especially prosecuting the war.
59 These dilemmas are certainly real. They illustrate the limits
of our ability to affect the Vietnamese scene. However, it seems
unwise to let ourselves be drawn into overecautious inaction by them,
for we would thereby _ighort the very ereasethat the VCItisipre,pering
to subxert as it ad uta to th erreet oft0i;e war. Other
priorities may seem more important now, bit in a few years the "contra-
dictions" of the Saigon regime could emerge as the main elements in a
Communist victory, or at best in a compromise that gives the Communists
MOTS than their nationalist adversaries and prepares the way for
subsequent trouble. A better policy would seem to be to study these
problems now and judge how we, as Americans, can effectively advise
in their improvement during the remainder of our close involvement
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in Viet-Nam. Having already played a role in the establishment
of the present regime, we should show an interest in its efficient
operation, rather than drop out and watch the Vietnamese fumble.
Our continued expenditure of money and manpower in Viet-Nam
presumably means that we still care about a non-Communist govern-
ment in the South and that we believe its preservation is feasible;
we should therefore be willing to help in removing the internal
obstacles to the well-being of the South Vietnamese body politic
as well as in resisting the external VCI and North Vietnamese threat,
60. Nor is there reason to despair of results. While complete
success is probably not in the cards, given the elusiveness of
the problems, something considerably short of perfection would
certainly be tolerated by the South Vietnamese people as long as
visible improvement and an appropriate quality of leadership are
manifested. Furthermore, the CVN is not without advantages here,
for there are "contradictions" on the Communist side too which will
serve our struggle well if they can be made to stand out sharply
against a reasonably well-run GVN. The Viet Cong suffers from the
aura of being a subversive institution, harrassing the populace and
trying to overturn the established society. If that society appears
to the average Vietnamese as the "will of the community" in the
Confucian sense, the enemy has little chance of winning the victory
he now aims for.
DISTRIBUTION:
Ambassador Bunker
Deputy Ambassador Berger
POLIMIN - Mr. Hitchcock
POL - Mr. Askew
POL - Mr. Sylvester
POL/Internal
POL/External
POL/Provincial Rep.
POL/MIL
OSA
MACV/SRA
CORDS - Ambassador Colby
CORDS/Phung Hoana
CORDS/PP&P WCMcAfee
Files: Viet Cone, Chron
REVIEWED IN DRAFT (not necessarily cleared): POL-Mr. Askew;
POL/Internal-Mr, Sylvester; POL/External-31el1in; POL/Prov,, Pep-11Face;
OSA; MACV/SRA; CORDS/Phung Hoang-AMason: CORDS/PP&P-WGMcAfee.
Drafted by:POL/HSSizer:sfb 5/71
sw4tETIMPPIT
,
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
Mr. Carver:
July 27, 1971
Enclosed for your infor-
mation are copies of a memo
by Embassy Saigon on the Phung
Hoang Program and Ambassador
Colby's comments on the
memoran m.
STAT
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