MANY REFUGEES NEUTRAL ABOUT VIETCONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001100060011-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 26, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

a _XORK TIES
Approved For Release 200fM)V q RDP80R01720R001100060011-8
lt4 ony R. u e s
k &.f.rvey of. A ttit?des is
T&iete by Americans
u,rd about Vietcong s v#,.
were basically hopeful. Gov-
erninent assistance has been ., ~. e C ?7?sC3'.~, G'Q?Cgn c~tzbts on -~~'? t fgs?
provided to over P. third of
those interviewed, but it has Desire" to Push Operation Phoenix
been invariably late and usu-
Icy GLORIA I"s13IF,125[3N Their attitude toward the GVN special to The New York Tunes
has been generally favorable Spemar to The N.w York Times
Speolffi to The New York Tzniaa b ( stress the programs impor-
r lthough they do not credit SAIGON, South Vietnam, tance has resulted in the re-
SAIGON, South E ietria rr, GVN with doing much for !oct. 25 - Man American ad-
Oct. 25 - An official Amer-' them beyond secur- y
providing visors in the provinces are once vitally involved in it. Mori
lean survey of attitudes among itY?" voicing doubt about the willing- trained exclusively for the pro-
refugees has found that many `No Sense of Urgency' ness of Vietnamese officials to grain are being removed with-
take a. neutral view of the Viet-
On the question of initial carry out the controversial pro-
long and that they consider -Iv- Government assistance to the; gram known as Operation Phoe- 1nut replacement, the report on
ing conditions tinder Commit- refugees, the report says: "As'.nrx, whose purpose is to weed Quangnam said.
nist control to 'be. reasonably. In the past, no sense of ur-' out Vietcong political leaders. The senior province, official
good, gency was felt by the Gov- "In this province the Gov- In Baclicu Province, on the
The 181 refugees?interrogat-. ernment:." ernment will not allocate even southern coast, reported that
ed, from a group believed to "Due- to the high mobility a pencil, paperclip or piece of the Phoenix program. was cf-
number~ almost 80,000, are from of the refugees, a "L.et-the- paper on a regular basis to the fect.ive against low-level, Viet?
the U : Minh Forest, where a dust-settle-first' attitude aptly, program," according to Russell but "ineffective ainst
campaign to clear out enemy describes the initial feelings L.' Meerdink, senior American tl Ii-rd core" of the leader-
concentrations . has been un- of many officials about future !adviser in Phuyen, on the con-
der way since December, 1970. assistance," it continues. "Lack tral coast. I Experimental Rewards
I"h
G
"
e
It would seem that the
overnment puts the num- of sufficient social-action ca-
her of refugees at 45,000. dre and the generally slow problem is common," he said
Government assistance is procedures of the services com- ;!n a confidential report on paci-
of the refugees interviewed, ac-
cording to . the survey. The
death and destruction caused
by frequent military activities
by allied forces -? which means
troop movements, artillery
strikes and bombing - were
major reasons why many had
fled their homes.
The. report on the findings
points up the complexities of
dealing with the refugee prob-
.1cm despite the long-established
apparatus and the benefits os-
tensibly provided.
Long a Vietcong Base
The U Minh area, long a
base for the Vietcong guerril-
las of South Vietnam, is at the
southern tip of the peninsula
in three provinces. It is a com-
plex of dense jungles, open
cultivated land, winding
streams and straight canals.
The. survey and report were
done for the Pacification Stud-
ies Group, which is attached
to Civil Operations and Rural
Development Support, ' the
American agency that con-
ceived of the pacification pro-
granrs and supervises' diem.
Marked "For Official Use
Only," the study is in an idiom
meant for United States offi-
cials. A summary says:
"Living conditions -' of the
people in the past while un-
der VC "control were.' consid-
ered reasonably good. Few of
the refugees considered thern-
selves to have been living in
want. The people's attiudes to-
ward the VC while under their
control were largely neutral,
while feelings about their fu-
fure reception in GVN [Gov-
ernment of (South). Vietnam]
In Thoibinh District in An-
xuyen Province, for example,
20 per cent of the beneficiaries
failed to show the first time
for payments of a 30-day rice
allowance, the report notes,
explaining that there were "nu-
merous problems": failure to
register the refugees, compiled
the necessary official docu-
ments .and notify the refugees
when and where to appear.
"Many of these refugees
were out working to support
themselves," the report says.
a coastal ano nrgnianct area
north of Saigon.
"Tire low quality of person-
nel assigned to the program
must also be considered sonie-
thing other than 'coinciden-
tal,' " he added.
Who Is Being Fooled?
lie said it was the peroga-
tive of the Government in Sai-
gon to withhold support from
the Phoenix Program, but, he
added, "certainly the United
States Government should not
h
Last August, in an attempt
to holster the program, the
United States and the South
Vietnamese Government decid-?
ed to begin experimental cash
rewards in four provinces, pay-
inn up to the equivalent of
$11,000 for certain key lead-
ers. It is doubtful that the re-
wards are effective.
Last May the senior American
adviser in Binhtuy Province,
75 miles west of Saigon, said
the primary reason for the
lack of success was "the In-'
herent distaste" of people for
inducing relatives, friends of
people with political coiuiec-
tions.
When the second . uayment'9 ve t e Government of South
Vietnam the satisfaction of
session arrived, after ample thinking it is `fooling' the Ain-
notification, the report says,
ericans."
,,man of the refugees who
Y i The Phoenix Program, . con-
:show the first time went away ceived by the Central Intelli-
disappointed someone else gence Agency in 1967, was
had gotten their payments." turned over to the South Viet-
While the report says that namese in principle the follow -
life under Vietcong control in ing year. Americans have since,
the U Minh area was difficult :pushed the program, providing
'for a majority of the refugees !advisers and funds as a pri-
interviewed, "a surprising num- mary means of seeking out the
her, 37 per cent, considered it Vietcong. '
to be good or better." Since South Vietnam has not
The area was a major strong- given the program the empha-
hold of the Vietminh, who sis some American officials feel
fought the French. From 1940 it should have, they are con-
to 1954, under Vietminh con- sidering a reorganization of it
trot, living standards rose to program and its basic concepts
a level where the people could in the hopes of salvaging it.
be termed well off, the report Lack of interest in or dis-
says. From 1954 to 1966 the taste for the program is not
area was a major training and
supply center for the Vietcong.
Long exposure to one form
or another of Communist con-
trol did not seem to worry the
people as long as they were
able to make a living. As for
the future, two-thirds of there! the senior American advisor in
worry over their ability to earn Quangnani Province, which is
a living, while concern about in the northernmost military
security is found only among region of South Vietnam. Ile
half this number, the report traced the declining interest to
Quota for Each Province
Under the Phoenix operating
plan, each province receives a.
quota of Vietcong to be "neu-.
tralized" each month, which'
cart mean arresting a man, tak-
ing him into the Open Armr
program, which accepts defect-
ors, or killing hint.
The quota system led to crit-
icisms here and in Congres-
sional hearings in Washington.
"Volume rather than quality
neutralization" became the pat-
tern, a senior adviser wrote.
tern, a senior adviser wrote,'
discussing the quotas. "Much!
of this can be attributed to!
U.S. guidance and influence'
and quotas,', he added.
Testimony, in Washington
tary Region II. the program from 1968 to May
Lag Traced to Saigon 1 1971, amounted to $732-million.
Current contributions have not
"There seems. to be a de- been disclosed.
crease in.the interest and em-
phasis in the program," wrote
Approm rrg6leaa r 004/10/28 : Z*A-RBP80'k0 2i~l4801100060011-8 Saig