DICK:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001000190017-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 5, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

National Ir telf Bence OfficerApproved ~ R sLI 002/01/09 : CIA-F F 20R001000190017-9
NOTE FOR: General Walters
STATINTL
.for me by To your knowledgeable,.~~H'
"'
eye is there anything to this allegation of
a pro-Nazi group hibernating in Chile,
or is it the product of someone's over-
active imagination?
George A! Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
cc: NIO/LA
Executive Registry
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - D/NIO Chrono
1 - RI
*NSC Review Completed*
STATINTL
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. CHILE
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a Nazi colony, known as La Digni a , located at Parral about ')AA
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I ormer Luftwaffe pilots after World War II,* and"is-run
by Franz Pfeiffer Richter,. head of the Chilean Nazi Pat T1
miles, south of Santiago. on the Pan-American Highway. The colony was -
founded b f
.7 . Ze -. _
colony, with a population of about 250, covers an area of over 3,000
nr?rna
the colony maintains
radio contact with other pro-Nazi groups in Chile, in other Latin
American countries and in Europe,
that DINA maintained a-detention center inside the colony. It is not
ac s with the Chilean.-Air Force, and specifically with General
Gustavo Leigh, the Air. Force member of the Junta.-
The former Luftwaffe pilots at La Dignidad maintain good con
t t
CONFIDENTIAL/NOF0RN/NOCON
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6 May 1976
Assistant NIO for Western Europe
Attached is a note from the Director conveying
a well deserved expression of thanks for the work you
did and organized in getting together the briefing
book on his trip to Europe and other steps you took in
preparing him for that journey. As I was able to
observe from watching you in action and reading the
material, it was a typically splendid performance.
(I am writing Ed Proctor separately to be sure that
copies of this note go to
George,(. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Attachment
cc: Director of Personnel (for inclusion in OPF)
GACarver, Jr./kes
Distribution:
Original - w/att
1 - D ers as indicated above) w/att
1 - Appreciation/Commend tion file w/att
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/attV
1 - RI wo att
STATINTL
STATINTL
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
4 May 1976
STATINTL
NI0/Western Europe
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
STATINTL
Please accept this much overdue thank-you for your excellent
work in organizing the briefing book for my short trip to Europe
at the end of March. Your essay on possible futures for the
U.K. was most thoughtful, and suggested a number of useful points
STATINTL that helped is into context.
The essay by nd that of
also con ri uted greatly
STATINTL to my understanding -- they were concise, well-written, and
presented clearly the essential information I needed to comprehend
the current forces at work in those countries.
In addition, I found the questions you prepared for possible
use with my interlocutors just the ones I would have asked - if
there had been any opportunity to do so during what proved to
be a hectic five days devoted to getting to know people with
whom I will be working: Therefore, I regret not having been
in a position to come up with some answers for you and your
colleagues: I trust that future visits of this sort will include
some time for the kind of reflective discussions that should
result in information helpful to you and all the others who
are doing the real work of the Agency.
I would appreciate your conveying to all those who
contributed to that fine briefing book both my thanks and my
assurances that it was just right in the amount and kind of
information, and that on future occasions I trust I will be
able to exploit the same kind of good work with profit for all
concerned.
STATINTL
67276-19ZfO^
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6 May 197
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
George A. Carver, Jr.
SUBJECT The Management of National Production
The following proposal for the management of non-
current national production has been developed jointly
by Messrs. and Carver and reviewed with -
It reflects an approach on which all three
of these officers agree and which they feel will take
care of your concerns about present arrangements while
preserving and improving a flexible instrument de-
signed to help you discharge what are among your most
important responsibilities: being the substantive
fount of national intelligence.
1. Organizational Location: The entity managing
national non-current production will be part of the
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, re-
porting directly to and being supervised directly by
him. This entity and its head, however, will have to
work continuously in close, cooperative concert with
your Agency Deputy, your Community Deputy and their
respective subordinates.
2. The Basic Building Block -- National 'Intelli-
gence Officers: The basic conceptual building block
of the new entity will be that of the National In-
telligence Officers, essentially as they are now
constituted but with some adaptation and modification.
a. Each NIO will be a senior staff officer
(slotted at the GS-18 level or military
equivalent) who will serve the DCI directly
and speak in his name as his senior coun--
sellor on that NIO's area of substantive
responsibility.
-- The mix of NIOs will be -flexibly 'adj ust--
able in accordance with-the DCI's wishes.
The number of NIOs and the apportionment
of portfolios among them will depend on
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your perception of the DCI's needs and
your concept -- at any given time -- of
what are the major areas of substantive
responsibility (functional or geographic)
for which you want the support of a desig-
nated NIO.
The NIOs will be used as a device to knit
the Community together and also to bring
in fresh thinking from outside the Com-
munity plus, where possible, outside the
government. They will be drawn as much
as possible from throughout the entire-
Intelligence Community, plus non-intel-
ligence government components and, where
feasible, the non-governmental world. In
principle, NIO assignments will be rota-
tional ones of two to three-year duration.
The NIOs will not constitute a separate
production office (see below). Each of
them will serve you as an advisor in his
or her specialty and as a coordinator who,
acting on your behalf, can focus the re-
sources of the entire Community on par-
ticular problems of major substantive
importance.
--- To minimize the risk of bureaucratic lay-
ering, each NIO will----.in principle.
be limited to one Assistant (at the
GS-
15/16 level or military equivalent)
and
one secretary. This rule might
be
adjusted
in certain individual accounts,
but
the
reasons for giving an NIO more
than
one
Assistant would have to be exceptional and
doing so would require your personal approval.
b. The NIO structure will have a small editorial
staff (three to five people) to assist in
maintaining the quality of output.
C. The NIO structure would also have a small
reproduction facility to maintain flexibility
and capacity to cope with requirements as
they arise without unduly burdening the
Agency's publications components.
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d. The NIO structure will be headed by a senior
officer, who will have no other duties and
who has your personal trust and confidence.
In effect, he will be your deputy for national
intelligence, though for any of a variety of
reasons -- cosmetic, political or other ---
you may care to give him some different
title. He will report directly to you in
the sense that he will not be subordinate
to either of your two principal Deputies.
(Should you develop the Chief of Staff con-
cept, the ground rules for relations between
the head of the NIO structure, the Chief of
Staff and you yourself can be worked out at
that time.) The head of the NIO structure
will be accountable to you for the total
work of that structure and the total qual-
ity of its performance. He will also be
responsible for ensuring that, at any given
time, the totality of requests for intelli-
gence support levied on the intelligence
community by policy level consumers through
this structure do not overburden the system
(thus inhibiting the effectiveness of its
responses). When circuits are in danger of
becoming overloaded, he will raise this
problem directly with requesting consumers
(or ensure that it is so raised) and endeavor
to get them to refine their requests or put
them in'some priority order, advising you of
the problems involved as appropriate and en-
listing your help when necessary.
3. Responsibilities: The NIO structure will be
responsible and accountable to the DCI for:
a. The management of non--current national
production including:
-- Formal National Intelligence Estimates
and Special National Intelligence Es-
timates
-- National Intelligence Analytical
Memoranda
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-- Interagency Intelligence memoranda
and studies
-- Intelligence Alert Memoranda
-- Other analyses and assessments of varying
degrees of formality requested by senior
consumers -- or commissioned to fill an
obvious need. which the consumers them-
selves might not 'clearly perceive -- whose
preparation involves the work of more
than one component of the Intelligence
Community.
b. Supervising the preparation of the DCI's
substantive briefings to senior Executive
Branch bodies (e.g.., the National Security
Council and its major subcommittees such as
the Washington Special Action Group) and
his substantive briefings to various Con-
gressional committees.
c. Providing a coordinating mechanism, operating
in the DCI's name and on his behalf, to focus
the talents and resources of all Community
components involved on problems of particular
importance, e.g., the work on Soviet collec-
tion now done by the NIO for Special Activities.
d. -Maintaining continual dialogue with senior
consumers at the Assistant Secretary level
or above, or their military equivalents, to
ensure that their needs are identified, that
they receive the best intelligence support
obtainable to assist them in their policy
duties, and to provide a channel for continuous
feedback and two-way communication on intel-
ligence matters. This responsibility will
also entail the service function (in each
major substantive area) of giving the policy
level consumer one point of contact to which
he can turn for any form of intelligence
support, knowing that his request will be
brokered to those elements of the Community
best equipped to handle it.
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e. Within the Intelligence Community, develop-
ing and maintaining continuous interaction
and dialogue among all who work on any given
substantive area -- collectors, analysts
and producers -- so that they can get to know
each other and all can benefit from the con-
tributions of their colleagues.
f. In the DCI's name, maintaining contact with
knowledgeable experts outside the government
in each major substantive area to improve the
flow of ideas and ensure that intelligence
production benefits from the best analyses
and thinking attainable anywhere within the
United States.
g. Developing major substantive requirements
through the operation of the substantive
aspects of the Key Intelligence Question
mechanism or whatever modified successor to
that approach is endorsed by the present
DCI. (In this sphere, and related areas,
the NIOs will work closely with your Com-
munity Deputy and the latter's staff as
outlined in paragraph 9 below.)
h. Performing any other services the DCI wants
them to perform,. such as giving him an inde-
pendent appraisal of the probable risks, bene-
fits and chances of success of covert action
proposals.
4. Production Mechanism:
a. Except in rare instances, the NIOs would not
function as a production office* and the NIO
structure would not include a drafting staff.
There could be (and have been) occasional instances
where, on matters of great sensitivity, some senior
official such as the President or his Assistant for
National Security Affairs might want a substantive
comment quietly prepared by only one person.
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would be done by line officers drawn from
the Community component or components best
equipped to handle the particular project
in question.*
c. The _d~rafting of national products would be
done` under- the supervision bf -the NIO respon- -
sible for the project in question.- The
draft produced would not be viewed as an
institutional product, i.e., neither the
office nor the component to which the
drafter(s) belong would be bound by the draft
or obligated to support it during the coordina-
tion process.
d. After a draft has been produced and reviewed
(see paragraph 5 below),.it would be submitted
to concerned line components for coordination
and discussion. The precise nature. of these
coordination procedures would vary with the
formality of the document -- NIEs and SNIEs
being the most formal- In every instance,
however, line entities would have ample op-
portunity to express their views during the
coordination process and the NIO responsible
would be under an obligation to ensure that
the final product-fairly reflected signifi-4
gant'` differences" of judgmental opinion when
The procedures. for- minimizing the disruption of line
offices' work and erosion of line command jurisdic-
tion entailed by- this approach are outlined in para-
graph 6.
Coordination between and among Intelligence Community
components is an essential feature of the production
of truly national products. The concept of coordination
operative here, however, does not involve the develop-
ment of consensus -- lowest common demoninator -- judg-
ments. . Divergent views will be submitted, as they :should
be, to the clash of debate and argument among knowledge-
able experts, but where significant differences of in-
formed opinion remained unresolved on important issues,
these differences will be clearly, even sharply, re-
flected in the final finished products so that policy
level consumers can know that there are such differences,
what they are, and what are their bases.
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5. Collegial Review (The Intelligence Advisory Panel):
One criticism of the current approach has been that national
products do not, at any stage in their production, for-
mally receive collegial scrutiny and review. This defi-
ciency will be rectified by the following steps:
a. The creation of an Intelligence Advisory
Panel to the DCI. This Panel will consist
of approximately three dozen people of extra-
ordinary competence in key substantive areas,
who are also articulate, logical and generally
insightful. The members of this Panel, would
be drawn from within the Intelligence Commu-
nity, the non-intelligence components of the
government, and -- to the extent feasible --
the outside world:- academia, industry, and
even (if possible)'the world of journalism.
b. The optimum point in the production process
for collegial review is after the basic draft
is prepared and before it is circulated for
coordination. Consequently, on each NIE/
SNIE or other significant national product
(unless deadlines make this absolutely im-
possible), three people will be picked from
the Intelligence Advisory Panel to go over
that particular product at that stage in its
production.*
--- Arrangements will be made for the Panel
members to have copies of the draft in
sufficient time to go over them thoroughly
in private.
Normally at least two of the three members of the Panel
convened to review a particular paper (national product)
will not he specialists in the subjects addressed in
that paper. For example, an optimum panel to critique
an estimate on German political developments would in-
clude a Sovietologist and an Economist -- plus, perhaps,
a Far Eastern expert, who could subject it to critical
scrutiny from the standpoint of a sophisticated out-
sider.
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-- After that, the three Panel members in-
volved will meet in Washington and spend
whatever time is necessary -- usually a
day -- going over the draft of the national
product with the NIO (and his/her Assistant),
the project chairman and the drafters.
They will critique the draft for adequacy,
balance, objectivity, coherence and overall
quality, ensuring that it addresses the
right questions, is clear, is cogent, and
takes proper account of ancillary issues
and critical variables.
-- Membership on the intelligence Advisory
Panel would not entail a large expenditure
of time over a prolonged period, but it
would entail a willingness to work in-
tensively for periods of short duration.'
The reason for having a Panel of approxi-
mately three dozen is to ensure that on
any given national product, one could
select three good reviewers appropriate
to that particular project.
c. The Intelligence Advisory Panel will not
only provide a mechanism for the most useful
kind of .collegial review; it can also serve
as a vehicle for giving the DCI advice on
the' overall quality of the national produc-
tion effort and engaging in that effort the
best talent'available in the United States.
While the Panel would seldom, if ever, meet
as a whole (except, perhaps, for an occa-
sional ceremonial dinner), various members
of it could and would be convened to parti-
cipate in seminars or discussion groups
critiquing the totality of our effort in
various fields (as well as serving on
troikas specifically reviewing specific
papers).
d. Though the panel would be advisory to
the DCI, its normal point of contact
with the- DCI's office would be the
head of the NIO structure. The latter,
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in turn, would need a full-time special
assistant (who could be styled the
Panel's Executive Secretary) who would
handle the details involved.
6. The Minimization of Line Disruption: Since
the NIO structure will not have its own independent
drafting staff and, hence, will be forced to borrow
talent from line components, some intrusion on line
offices is inevitable. The amount of this intrusion,
however, can be minimized by the following steps:
a. There will be created a steering
group consisting of the head of the
NIO structure and the heads of the
major production components of the
Intelligence Community (or their
designees). This group will meet
regularly to review the totality
of the national production effort
and ensure that the workload in-
volved is properly and fairly
distributed. This group --^ or sub-
committees'it appoints for these
purposes -- will keep production
schedules and requests for specific
projects involving extensive work
under continuing review to ensure
that the disruption-to line compo--
nents is minimized.and that the
tasking necessitated by requirements
for national products is handled-in
the most efficient, least disruptive
fashion possible.
b. Each NIO will be specifically charged
with levying his tasking requirements
through the appropriate chain of com--
mand of the intelligence Community
component or components involved. The
particular procedures used by each NIO
with each individual Community component
will be worked out with that component's
head so that the NIOs make their contacts
with his office in the way that component's
head wants them made.
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c. Any component head who feels that NIO-
sponsored tasking is disrupting his
office will be encouraged to take this
matter up initially with the NIO in-
volved, then with the head of the NIO
structure and if that does not prove
satisfactory -- directly with the DCI.
d. The NIOs individually and the head of
the NIO structure will work cooperatively
with all component heads and will sup-
port any reasonable requests for addi-
tional resources these component heads
feel are needed to handle requests for
national products passed through the NIO
structure.
7. Credit: Some measure of tension between staff
entities and line components is inevitable, but the
procedures just outlined will do much to minimize fric-
tion. One additional step, however, is also necessary
in this sphere -- the proper apportionment of credit
for work done by others:
When a national product involves the
work of more than one Intelligence
-Community component, identification
of the offices and components con-
tributing to it-will appear in a
prominent place on-either the cover,
-the-title page, or the first page of
the work in question.
b. In those instances (and there will be
many) where a request from a senior
consumer, passed through the NIO struc-
ture, in fact can be and is met by a
product which is predominantly the work
of a single Community component, that
component will get full credit for the
response. Usually, this will involve
having the response printed as a product
of the component which produced it and
simply forwarded by note or buckslip
from the NIO to the consumer, with the
transmittal vehicle calling attention,
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to the fact that the consumer's request
was taken care of by the attached "CIA
Memo," "DIA Memo," etc.
8. The CIA Relationship: One of the NIOs' main
functions is to help knit the Community together as
an organic whole and, in producing national intelli-.
Bence, draw on the totality of Community resources.
it is a fact of life, however, that the bulk of the
Community's analytic talent (not all of it by any
means, but nonetheless the bulk) is to be found in
CIA, whose legitimate equities and interests must
be protected for a variety of obvious reasons. Thus,
the NIO/CIA relationship is both special and crucial.
It must be symbiotic and in no way adversary. Ar-
rangements will be worked out with your CIA Deputy
to ensure that he is kept abreast of all of the use
that the NIOs are making of CIA resources. These ar-
rangements will take whatever form and follow what-
ever procedures are desired by your CIA Deputy. It
will serve all interests to ensure that the CIA con-
tributions to the process are not obscured in the
assembly of a Community product.
9.. Relations with the De ut to the 'DCI 'for 'the
Intelligence Community: Though the NIOs, under this
concept, would not be a component of the IC Staff sub-
ordinate to the D/DCI/IC, the relationship between the
NIO structure and the D/DCI/IC will obviously have to
be a close and cooperative one -- particularly with
respect to the DCI committees (formerly USIB com-
mittees) on whom the NIOs will have to draw and.
rely for many things and for which your Community
Deputy has supervisory responsibility. The mechanics
of this relationship will be worked out in a manner
mutually agreeable to your Community Deputy, the
of the NIO structure and -- of course -- your
a. These arrangements will be devised
to ensure an improved, constructive
and mutually supportive relationship
between the NIO structure and the
intelligence Community Staff to
-- give your Community Deputy
guidance with respect to basic
needs, requirements, future per-
spectives, etc.
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-- help the D/DCI/IC strike the
right balance between resources
and substantive needs, matching
the former to the latter wherever
possible but arranging substantive
needs in priority order in areas
where resources are inevitably
finite.
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-- assist the D/DCI/IC in his and his
staff's evaluation work.
b. These arrangements will also be de-
liberately structured to minimize areas
of non-productively overlapping respon-
sibilities. The NIOs, for example, will
be in continuous touch with consumers to
stay abreast of their evolving needs; the
IC Staff will be responsible for after-
action evaluations of products and ser-
vices -- but both will contribute to
giving you overall assessments of the
Community's total performance.
10. Support to the DCI: Under the concept here
proposed, the NIO structure is an integral part of
the DCI's office. There will, therefore, have to be
continuing close contact between its head, your Agency
Deputy and-your-Community Deputy (plus, if you create
one, your Chief,of Staff). All of these officers will
endeavor to ensure, collectively, that you receive the
most efficient and the best possible support in the
discharge of all of your responsibilities and, hence,
that you are able to give the President and his senior
advisors products of the highest quality and, overall,
the best intelligence in the world.
George A. Carver, Jr.
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5 May 1976
25X1A MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT PFIAB Study
1. Attached is a copy of the paper submitted to the
PFIAB by the three-man subcommittee -- chaired by Bob
Galvin -- which the Board appointed last December to
scrutinize the Community's performance in strategic
estimates. As you know, the other two members of the sub-
committee are Drs. John Foster and Edward Teller.
2. In my opinion, it is essential that we not be
unduly defensive in reacting to this document or in any
way convey the impression that we are loathe to consider
innovative procedures which might improve the quality of
our strategic assessments. On the other hand, some of
the concrete proposals advanced by the Board would be
extremely difficult to accommodate without prostituting
the whole intelligence process. This applies particularly
to the proposal (about which the Board feels very strongly)
for a "competitive analysis group" which would be tasked
with preparing -- on certain selected issues -- what
would in effect be an alternative estimate to 11-3/8-76.
3. The basic problem is the fact that the Board's
concrete recommendations derive from a perception of
what intelligence is and ought to be which is quite
different than ours -- and in this case, I am personally
convinced we are right and the Board, wrong. The game
(unintentionally) is given away in three sentences in the
NIE Evaluation Committee's paper:
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-- "...whether or not a particular technical
judgment in the NIE is correct or incorrect
is less significant than whether the
document illuminates for a busy decision
maker the range of threat possibilities and
their implications relative to his special
responsibilities." (Paragraph 6, pp 2-3).
-- [One of the four purposes an NIE serves is
to] "Support Congressional authorization and
appropriation proceedings." (Paragraph 17b,
p. 6. A similar thought is echoed in paragraph
29 on page 9: "...during Congressional
hearings, the NIE may present serious
problems to Defense officials whose programs
are based on different threat appraisals.")
-- [NIEs] should be measured by whether they
stimulate policy makers to face up to hard
decisions in sufficient time to make a
difference and by the thoroughness with
which threats, uncertainties and alternatives
have been illuminated." (Paragraph 34, p. 11).
4. What the Board wants is a national estimate which
will.set forth all the things -- especially the unpleasant
things -- which the Soviets could or might do, without
any estimative.judgments.about.the relative probability
of the Soviets achieving these various goals or pursuing
these alternative lines of behavior. The real reason
(I think) why some members of the Board are pushing for
"the competitive estimate" by a group composed of at
least some persons outside the Intelligence Community.
is that they want to be sure that the total package
includes all the worst case possibilities that can be
thought of. Under the approach the Board is recommending,
the President and his senior policy advisors will simply
have this range of possibilities laid before them, hence,
powerful arguments could be advanced that the only re-
sponsible course to follow to protect the nation's
interests would be to hedge against the worst case
threats, and NIEs developed through the recommended
procedure would serve as ammunition supporting such a
pitch. If our nation's resources were infinite, this
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might be an intellectually defensible thesis. They are
not, however and, hence, it isn't. This procedure would
leave the decision maker at the mercy of technical shamans
with no basis for ascertaining which of these shamans'
analyses or predictions were more credible than their
competitors'.
S. Per our discussion at the 5 May Executive Committee
meeting, I urge that copies of the attached paper not --
repeat not -- be circulated. Its language, in many
places, is outrageous and (with reason) would be taken
as deeply offensive by many hardworking professionals who
are fully conscious of their own fallibility but have
devoted their careers to providing our government with the
most objective and balanced assessments attainable by
mortals operating with less than total information. Bob
Galvin, an eminently decent person trying to do a very
serious job, is most anxious to avoid initiating a paper
war for reasons I consider obvious, commendable and entirely
persuasive. I plan to talk quietly with him in order to
try to separate the concrete recommendations -- several of
which are well worth trying -- from the philosophy behind
some of them which we cannot endorse. I am reasonably
confident that through quiet dialogue we can develop a
set of experiments which may actually prove helpful, will
put the DCI in the posture of being responsive to the board
and which, at the same time, will not sacrifice our
principles or things all of us believe in very deeply.
25X1A
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/kes
Distribution
Ori
1 -
1 - Mr. roc or
1 - DCI (copy of Galvin nete to Carver only)
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/att
1 - PFIAB file w/att
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 Approved For Rejoask
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
29 April 1976
Dear George:
Johnny and I are very appreciative of your having met
with us yesterday, and for the constructive spirit
of our discussions regarding the work of the Board's
Intelligence Estimates Evaluation Committee.
As promised, attached is the basic report and, for
the purpose of implementing its recommendations, a
draft National Security Council Decision Memorandum,
and the summary comparison of NIE 11-3/8-74 with
NIE 11-3/8-75.
Sincerely,
T/99 : CIA-RDP80RO172ORW1000190017
S
Mr. George Carver
Deputy to the DCI for
National Intelligence Officers
CIA Headquarters Building
Room 7E62
Washington, D. C. 20505
Downgrade to Unclassified upon removal of
enclosures. /r_ /,Q i1~1
C1A,91FITO SY
E .. T FROM G'.: A (1F,. . ..
,.a1'. . :11,~ CAF (
?71) P-1 r
.. __- -{ ~ ....I? J. C Iy .ui ~..CVtra, it nu7j'-
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1 April 1976
A Review of
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
on
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT
(NIE 11-3/8 series)
and of
THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATING PROCESS
by the
NIE Evaluation Committee of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Robert W. Galvin, Chairman
Edward Teller, Member
John.S. Foster, Jr. , Member
CLAMrFfs,'D gY _ _ j~F 1 J1~M-
a. .-.. .
CXr..P aW f?::Gb9 .'.!V:~ sL i?`v?I AS'il"ICaTfr~~
&CiiEilUl Ci' :.!);IV": G`:'^ ? ?1;;2 r;#,
11 u ,
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Section
Paragraph(s)
page
A. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1-6
1
B. The Assignment of the NIE Evaluation Committee
7-8
3
C. Modus Operandi . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
9-10
3
D. Note of Appreciation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
4
E. Comparison of NIE 11-3/8-75 with NIE 11-3/8-74
12-16
4
F. Questions Put to the Authorities Surveyed. . . . . .
16
5
G. Responses to the Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17-29
6
H. Ten-Year Track Record in Strategic Estimating
30
1. Conclusions /Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . .
31-40
10
Tab
A. PFIAB Letter to President Ford, 8 Aug 75
B. DCI Colby Letter to Chairman, PFIAB, 2 Dec 75
C. 10-Year Track Record in Strategic Estimating,
Conclusions (pages i-ix)
D. Summary Comparison of NIE 11-3/8-74 and
NIE 11-3/8-75
E. Proposed Memorandum to Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs from Chai rnnan, PFLAB
F. Draft National Security Council Decision emorandum
re National Intelligence Estimates
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A. Background
1. Since its establishment in 1956, the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board has been vitally concerned with the adequacy of strategic
intelligence. This traditional concern was given sharpened focus when
President Nixon, in March of 1969, assigned to it the task of providing a
yearly threat assessment in order to supplement the regular intelligence
assessment.
2. The key observations in previous assessments which the Board has .
made of the strategic threat include:
a. Expressions of confidence in short-term (two-year) force
predictions, while noting concern with the inadequacies of longer range
projections, and caution regarding pessimistic estimates of Soviet low
altitude air defense capabilities and Soviet antisubmarine warfare potential.
b. A consistent underscoring of the number of wide gaps in US intelli-
gence capabilities that continue to leave major uncertainties as regards
missile accuracies, doctrine and tactics, and nuclear weapons targeting
policies of the Soviet Union.
c. A repeatedly declared conviction as to the ". . . imperative need
for an interdepartmental mechanism to conduct net evaluations of the
strategic capabilities and vulnerabilities of the US and USSR. " The term
most commonly used to describe this kind of analysis is "net assessment. "
3. In early August 1975, the PFIAB met with President Ford and supplied
him with a letter of record dated 8 August, attached as Appendix A, which
advised him of the PFIAB's perception of deficiencies in NIE 11-3/8-74
and which suggested 'certain improvements. These were:
(1) NIE 11-3/8-74 is seriously misleading in the presentation of
a number of key judgments and in projecting a sense of complacency
unsupported by the facts; as a consequence, it is deficient for the purposes
it should serve.
(2) Judgments in critical areas are made with the force of fact
although the cumulative evidence is conflicting, often flimsy and in
certain cases, does not exist. These critical areas include estimates of
Soviet ICBM accuracy; Soviet developments in antisubmarine warfare; and
Soviet capabilities against US bombers.
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(3) The NIE gives the appearance of a net assessment and thus the
added weight of "operational" consideration when in substance it is not.
For example, it assumes the survivability of the US command and control
apparatus and accepts unproven data regarding US silo hardness.
b. Suggestions for improving the NIE process:
(1) Selected aspects of intelligence considered critical by key
decisionmakers should be subjected to analysis which is conducted separate
from and competitive with the analysis performed by the intelligence
community; the alternate views developed should be presented to the
President and other key users. The competitive analysis function should
be directed by the DCI using governmental and private sector expertise.
(2) The NIE should avoid to the extent possible the appearance of
being a "net assessment. " Indeed, the intelligence community should
generate a "purely intelligence document" following which and together
with the Departments of State and Defense, and under the aegis of the
National Security Council, a genuine net assessment should be produced.
Ultimately, the net assessment should be critiqued by an independent
entity.
4. At the conclusion of the briefing to the President, he asked that
specific proposals for implementing the suggestions be submitted as soon
as possible.
5. Pursuant to the President's request, on 15 August, the Board staff
developed proposals based on the 8 August letter to implement the afore-
mentioned suggestions on a trial basis using the mechanism of a National
Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM). However, as a consequence of
DCI Colby's strong exceptions, implementation of the test was not pursued.
6. In a letter to Admiral Anderson of December 2, 1975, DCI Colby stated
that the Board's letter ". . . might cause the President to suffer an erroneous
impression of the accuracy and seriousness of the 1974-75 strategic forces
NIEs. " Accordingly, DCI Colby prepared a refutation of the major findings
which was provided to the President and to his Assistant for National
Security Affairs. The DCI's rebuttal, attached as Appendix B to this report,
is factually incorrect in a number of areas. However, more important in
the Committee's view, is that it misses the central thrust of the Board's
efforts and intentions: whether or not a particular technical judgment in
the NIE is correct or incorrect is less significant than whether the document
illuminates for a busy decisionmaker the range of threat possibilities and
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their implications relative to his special responsibilities. The Board had
concluded that the NIE did not adequately perform this function and that the
NIE process was not structured to encourage it; our suggestions to cultivate
competition in analysis and in judgment formulation with respect to a few
key intelligence issues were aimed at fulfilling this purpose.
B. The Assignment of the NIE Evaluation Committee
7. Stimulated by DCI Colby's exceptions to-the Board's letter of 8 August,
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (General Scowc'roft),
by memorandum of 4 December, asked the Chairman of the PFIAB to comment
on the suggestion that the Board review NIE 11-3/8-75 (Soviet Forces for
Intercontinental Conflict through the mid-1980s) and ascertain the extent to
which this NIE overcomes deficiencies which the Board perceived in
NIE 11-3/8-74, the estimate on the same subject for the preceding year.
The Board was requested to report its findings to the DCI and to the NSC
staff, and to discuss specific courses of action.
8. The Board staff responded to General Scowcroft's 4 December
memorandum and advised that Admiral Anderson had appointed an ad hoc
committee composed of Mr. Robert W. Galvin as chairman, and Dr. John
S. Foster, Jr. and Dr. Edward Teller as members to review and report on
the subject.
C. Modus Operandi
9. The NIE Evaluation Committee has devoted the past four months to an
intensive review of the NIEs regarding Soviet strategic forces, and more
generally, to the process of intelligence estimating. This review has
encompassed:
a. Individual discussions with approximately 40 authorities including:
(1) Intelligence analysts and senior level managers from most entities
within the intelligence community;
(2) Users of intelligence estimates; such as those involved in US
force planning and in arms limitation and disarmament negotiations; and
(3) Private citizens, well informed regarding US-Soviet strategic
relationships.
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b. A study, which was commissioned by Mr. Galvin and performed by
representatives of the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers
(Mr. George Carver), to address the intelligence community's 10-year
track record in strategic estimating. This study was briefed to the full
Board during the February meeting and written copies were provided for
detailed examination. Important elements in this study are
commented on in paragraph 30 below; the conclusions of the study have been
extracted and are attached as Appendix C to this report.
c. Several discussions between the Committee members themselves,
involving a review of what the Board has had to say about NTIEs in the past
and a careful reconsideration of what the Board proposed to the President
on 8 August.
10. This report contains a number of observations made to the Committee
by a variety of people interviewed. In documenting these comments, care
has been taken to be as accurate as possible, without regard as to whether
the views expressed are agreed with. The Committee believes that certain
views have great significance irrespective of their objective validity, but
simply because of the stature or position of the person espousing them and
the sincerity and conviction with which they were stated.-
D. Note of Appreciation
11. Special mention is deserving of the cooperative and forthright attitude
of intelligence community personnel who quickly and unfailingly responded
to all Committee requests and greatly aided its efforts. Clearly, the
people involved in the NIE process are talented, dedicated, loyal Americans
who sincerely desire to produce the best intelligence estimate possible.
The Committee's judgments, however critical they may appear, are in no
way intended to impugn the motivations and overall competence of these
extremely hard-working professionals.
E. Comparison of NIE 11-3/8-75 with NIE 11-3/8-74
12. Both NIEs are very professional documents in their organization,
presentation of data and readability. They demonstrate tremendous effort
and coordination by and amoxrg many departments. As a work product which
reflects the consequences of careful planning in the employment of sophisticated
collection and analysis systems and the use of multiple disciplines in a
coherent way, the NIEs are, as one authority put it, a " tour de force. "
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 13. Q~~gaved~aavRej a e Z Agf /4~7?~I i~6$ ~a$YPARW921tOrtain
of the intentions in the Board's 8 August letter. , However, it should be
noted that the production of the Strategic Forces NIE is a year-long
endeavor with a November publication deadline. The 1975 edition was
well along in August with little opportunity then to effect major changes,
even if the authors had been persuaded as to the merits of the Board's
recommendations.
14. Some changes that were evident are:
a. Acknowledgment of improvements in Soviet ICBM accuracies;
expanded discussion of the difficulties inherent in antisubmarine warfare;
narrowing of the time period within which the Soviets might achieve an
effective low altitude air defense system.
b. Expansion and more prominent positioning of dissenting views.
c. An enlarged key judgments section which attempts to clarify the
degrees of uncertainty regarding various issues.
d. The term "interactive analysis" is used in lieu of "net assessment, "
and a statement is included which clarifies the meaning of interactive
analysis and which says it is not a net assessment.
15. These changes are noted and appreciated but the improvements are
considered to be minor, relative to the overall significance and impact of
the NIE. The Board's primary concerns are not yet accommodated. A
summary of changes as relates to deficiencies noted in the Board's letter
appears in a chart attached as Appendix D.
F. Questions Put to the Authorities Surveyed
16. In the Committee's discussions with the authorities, we pursued answers
to the following kinds of questions:
a. What purposes does the NIE serve?
b. How do principal users view its adequacy?
c. What is their level 6f confidence in it?
d. Are the major threat issues illuminated?
e. What are the major criticisms of the NIE ?
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f. Is the level of effort involved in producing an annual NIE the most
effective investment of intelligence community resources?
g. Could efforts at improving the process be attempted concurrent
with, and so as not to disrupt, the normal production cycle?
G. Responses to the Survey
17. Responses to the question, "What purposes does the NIE Serve?"
are worth singling out; in the Board's 8 August letter we had identified four
purposes:
a. Guide the formulation of Defense force levels and R&D.
b. Support Congressional authorization and appropriation proceedings.
c. Underpin arms limitation negotiations.
d. Shape the thought processes of policy makers regarding strategic
relationships.
DCI Colby's letter of 2 December, 1975, emphasized two additional purposes:
e. To provide warning of various things the Soviets might do; and
f. To provide warning of various things the Soviets are not likely to
do within given time-frames.
Finally, during the course of our inquiry, we heard such purposes as:
g. To keep the lid on defense spending by minimizing the threat.
h. To help rationalize an Administration's foreign and domestic
policies.
i. To project US perceptions of Soviet capabilities to our allies.
Regretably, because of cited purposes such as the last three, -:-_any of the
authorities look upon the NIE process as corrupt and upon the product as less
than believable. (It is notable that among those who volunteered the above
opinion, several complimented DCI Colby for greatly encouraging the
inclusion of dissenting views in the estimating process and thereby contributing
to a significant improvement in the product. )
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18. Most users do not find the information in the NIE timely and those
who require current information do not rely upon it. Indeed, some in this
category do not read the document because they know that it does not
reflect the latest intelligence. Depending upon the reader's particular
interest area, the contents are considered either too technical or insuffi-
ciently detailed. A number of readers vho said the NIE was useful, when
pressed for specifics, said that while they did not rely on "judgments"
they did find the graphics to be very helpful as ready references to details
of weapon systems characteristics. In striving to satisfy multiple purposes,
the net effect seems to be that the document masters none completely.
19. Some readers in very important policy formulation positions indicated
a belief in the validity of certain technical judgments -- on the assumption
that the raw data must have been carefully evaluated by independent,
objective standards which were agreed to by the "experts. " A few,
sophisticated readers expressed confidence in the technical analysis at the
lowest levels, but believe that summaries thereof -- the process of
hammering out compromises, accommodating divergent views, etc. --
result in generalized "mushy" statements devoid of meaning in a technical
sense. These remarks suggest that the concept of "technical uncertainty"
is not adequately conveyed.
20. Many readers acknowledged that NIE judgments are biased by
agency or service prejudices -- but shrugged this off as an inevitable
consequence of bureaucratic life. Thus, many key judgments in the NIE
are not only not accepted, but are viewed cynically. These readers believe
the NIE cannot express judgments which would be considered "too far from
an acceptable climate of opinion. " The dissents were viewed as exercises
in polemics and the "high-low-best" estimates are seen as merely additives
of a given number in order to accommodate divergence (e. g. , the controversy
over the Backfire bomber).
21. Many readers expressed the belief that a good deal of intelligence data
as well as information on US forces is not made available to the analysts or
has not been accurately addressed, and is therefore not factored into the
estimate (e. g. , results of high-level negotiations between US USSR personnel;
sensitive intelligence regarding Soviet antisubmarine warfare developments;
information regarding US submarine operations; vulnerabilities in US command
and control; accurate data on Minuteman silo hardness).
22. Several readers, including people who have been exposed to NIEs over
a period of years, as analysts and as members of the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB) which approves the final product, expressed the belief that
most USIB principals are not competent to evaluate the highly technical data
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 which is ess nt" to
USlAplpirove II s 4ea bO 6ilb' a '19'k P OjvdoRGO*000 k9G b7+9stimate. were described as ". . . managers of organizations who
have neither the time, training or experience in the variety of disciplines
incorporated to do more than superficially review some of the available
evidence. "
23. A number of readers expressed the belief that information and judgments
which do not fit comfortable patterns, or which are contrary to an agency's
inherent biases, are usually rejected from the final product. The recent
CIA intelligence estimate which nearly doubled the agency's previous
estimates of Soviet defense expenditures despite several years of substantial
evidence and argument to the contrary, was cited as one example. (More
than one "insider" observed that any estimate which in effect judged that
US Minuteman or Polaris ICBM forces were vulnerable, would never be
made by the intelligence community without prior clearance from the
Pentagon. )
24. Some readers in policymaking positions expressed the view that they
ascribe less value to a "pure" intelligence judgment than they would to an
assessment of "consequences" of the intelligence. This would require
extensive data regarding US forces and thus there was near uniform
agreement that it cannot be performed by the intelligence community.
25. While most readers expressed agreement with the desirability of
having net assessments, one senior official opined that this function,
particularly with respect to strategic relationships, is so complex as to be
beyond the competence of any group in existence or which might be formed.
He suggested that university-level scholarship be encouraged and funded -.
but not controlled -- by the government in disciplines relating to the USSR
and PRC. One element of governmental assistance would be the provision
of raw intelligence data collected over the years but never analyzed.
26. A senior analyst acknowledged that because of ad hoc pressures there
are enormous "opportunity costs" that limit thoughtful analysis. This person
estimated that as a result, perhaps only 5% of the analysts are forced to
carry the major responsibilities. An example cited was the annual
Strategic Forces NIE and the National Intelligence Daily, two documents
requiring enormous effort, much of which is focused on "cosmetics, "
or non-substantive matters because these are highly visible products of
the intelligence community.
27. An individual in a senior key position indicated that a most welcome
kind of analysis -- not presently being received -- would be for 2-3 experts
to present their views as to the. . .
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Consequences to Soviet society flowing from a
Brezhnev decision to rapidly develop a strategic
counterforce capability. What indicators would
appear to alert US decisionmakers that such a
decision had been. reached?
28. The response to questions regarding user confidence in the NIE did
not vary greatly: the high mark was a 75% level of confidence over the
next two years in the accuracy of weapons systems charact eristics; this
declined to 50% confidence beyond that time-frame, a rating which was
admittedly achievable by flipping a coin.
29. A former senior government official said that especially in the
strategic arms limitations area the NIE 11-3/8 series is viewed as the
"par" or standard of judgments regarding US-USSR strategic relationships,
against which any differing views must be rationalized. In this sense, the
"power of the first draft" is valued very highly since judgments are diffi-
cult to change. Moreover, during Congressional hearings, the NIE may
present serious problems to Defense officials whose programs are based
on different threat appraisals.
H. Ten-Year Track Record in Strategic Estimating
30. Certain observers hold the strong belief that the NIEs over the years have
been required to avoid the appearance of overstating any threats which could
be used to justify higher military spending. The Board itself has perceived
that the NIE 11-3/8 series minimizes the Soviet threat and strategic potential
of the USSR. As noted in paragraph 9. b. above, the Committee asked the
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers for a 10-year track
record study in strategic estimating; the 9-page summary of conclusions
has been extracted, highlighted and is attached as Appendix C. The
Board's perception of consistent underestimation in the NIEs is supported
by a number of the points in this study, which are paraphrased below:
a. Estimates in the mid-1960s ". . . failed to foresee the degree to
which the Soviets would not only catch up to the US in number of ICBMs
but keep right on going. The 1966 five-year estimate projected that the
Soviets would have between 805 and 1079 ICBMs. The actual count for
1971 was 1475. There was a similar failure to recognize that the Soviets
would want -- and demand in negotiating the Interim Agreement in 1972 --
more than the 35-50 modern ballistic missile submarines which the estimates
took to represent rough parity with the US. "
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b. "The NIEs overestimated Soviet concern about provoking new US
deployments or force improvements and were overimpressed with the
problem the Soviets faced in achieving and retaining full equality with
the US. "
c. "The estimates failed to warn of a number of qualitative improve-
ments such as missile accuracy, throweight and modernization of launch
control facilities."
d. "The estimates of the mid and late 1960s failed to convey an
adequate sense of the determination of the Soviets to build up sizable
force and war fighting capabilities. "
e. The 1972 estimate ". . . gives the impression that Soviet acceptance
of the 1972 SALT accords involved greater Soviet interest in a stabilized
strategic relationship and a greater concern to avoid action which might
jeopardize detente than proved to be the case. "
f. On the other hand, the NIEs overestimated: (1) Soviet willingness
to deploy antiballistic missile defenses beyond Moscow; (2) surface to air
missile force goals; and (3) force goals of two classes of interceptor
aircraft.
Our view is that these categories of overestimation are far below the
magnitudes of importance of the categories in which underestimation
prevailed.
1. Conclusions /Recommendations
31. The Committee has been struck by how frequently important judgments
in the NIE (often labelled "best") are based on very incomplete or partial
information and by the fact that most users are not conscious of the often
flimsy basis on which these judgments are based. We note that policy-
makers are not normally aware that a key judgment (as, for example,
survivability of the US Minuteman force) may in large measure be based
on incredibly complex analysis which only a very few people are competent to
understand, and regarding which serious disagreement may exist.
Extrapolation of the technical analysis to the level of "key judgment" and
the uncertainties extant throughout this process are obscured in the NIE and
are unknown to the policymaker.
32. Despite the N.LE's disclaimer of intention to perform a net assessment,
many of the key judgments cannot help but leave a reader with a sense that
some degree of net evaluation has been performed. For example, Soviet
ASW is estimated to be inadequate for the next 10 years to threaten our
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deployed Polaris submarines. This judgment is in part predicated on
assumptions regarding US submarine capabilities and operational proce-
dures. Additionally, Soviet ICBMs are estimated as being highly
unlikely to threaten US Minuteman ICBMs by the end of the 1970s. This
judgment is in part predicated on assumptions regarding US silo hardness.
In neither instance is the intelligence community authorized to challenge
the assumptions regarding US capabilities. Moreover, both judgments
should involve -.. but within the NIE do not involve -- a serious appraisal
of the effectiveness of US command, control and communications systems.
The Committee does not fault the intelligence community, but again notes
the essentiality to the decisionmaker of having net evaluations performed
on these critical issues.
33. There are common threads which run through the remarks made
by the variety of people interviewed: the NIE 11-3 /8 series in particular
and the estimating process in general are not highly respected for their
power to authoritatively and conclusively appraise threats; although the
collection of data and the presentation of facts are admirable, the NIEs
themselves are regarded as composites of consensus judgments achieved
through a process of arbitration and conciliation; external observers as well
as members of the intelligence community believe that institutional
pressures shape the purposes of the NIE, and the interpretation of data
and formulation of judgments therein. NIEs breed degrees of disbelief.
An unbelieved estimate is ignored, misused and challenged for political
as well as technical reasons.
34. The generally negative receptivity regarding the NIE 11-3/8 series
which the Committee encountered is serious, regretable and alarming.
NIEs should indeed signify the very best that our system of intelligence
can offer. They should be eagerly awaited (and thoroughly read) by
policyrnakers. There should be absolutely no question regarding their
purposes, utility or relevance. Attitudes of key people in government on
complex issues should be significantly influenced by intelligence estimates.
The NIEs should command uniform respect as major contributors to the
conduct of national security affairs. Their success should be measured
by whether they stimulate policymakers to face up to hard decisions in
sufficient time to make a difference and by the thoroughness with which
threats, uncertainties and alternatives have been illuminated.
SECRET 11
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001000190017-9
35. An analysis of why the NIE 11-3/8 series does not meet the above
criteria should begin with the intelligence consumer. The essential
question is: "What does the consumer want ?" The committee observed
that there are many different needs among a wide variety of consumers;
these may range from short, concise statements of factual data (e. g. ,
photographic intelligence which counts missile silos), to the best judgment
of a group of analysts who comment on Soviet strategic objectives, to
detailed appraisals of what is known and what is not known regarding weapon
system capabilities. In certain cases, and with particular reference to
the task of evaluating Soviet capabilities for intercontinental conflict, we
judge that the user frequently demands one answer or one best judgment, or
is so perceived by the intelligence community. The intelligence community
responds with its "best effort, " even in those cases where the data
available does not permit a single answer or judgment or where the user
actually needs alternate interpretations; thus unrealistic user demands
(sometimes expressed and sometimes assumed) and a compliant intelli-
gence community result in a product that ultimately does not satisfy and
which cannot withstand serious challenge. The following chart depicts
that relationship -- among many -- where the consumer demands "an
answer. it
l> "Best Estimate"
T
Judgments through conciliation
Interagency Compromise
Limited, 'Inconclusive Technical Data