D/NIO CHRONO - FEBRUARY 1976 (CON'T)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
93
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 19, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 1, 1976
Content Type:
LIST
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9.pdf | 3.16 MB |
Body:
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D/NI0 Chrono - February 1976 (Con't)
34. 26 Feb 76 The National Intelli- Enno Knoche,AD/DCI/IC
gence Production Problem D/OSR
(Draft) for the DCI D/OCI
35. 26 Feb 76 Expanded outline of Sov- Dr. Edward Teller
iet civil defense study cc: Wheaton Byers
TREA has not
reviewed. Processed
IAW CIA TREA
arrangement letter dtd
4/11/08.
NRO review(s)
completed.
CRC, 2/14/2003
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D/NIO CHRONO - FEBRUARY 1976 (Con't)
17. 10 Feb 76
18. 11 Feb 76
19. 11 Feb 76
20. 11 Feb 76
21. 12 Feb 76
22. 12 Feb 76
23. 17 Feb 76
25. 17 Feb 76
26. 17 Feb 76
27. 20 Feb 76
28. 20 Feb 76
29. 20 Feb 76
30. 20 Feb 76
31. 23 Feb 76
32. 23 Feb 76
Economic Estimates NIO/E, USSR, ME, JP, WE
Structural Changes and Director
Institutional Reforms
Senate Select Committee Rea Director
Regarding KIQ Strategy Reports
and Narrative Performance Evals.
The DCI's Immediate Office NIOs, PP, and RI
Note to
Intelligence Support for RAdmiral Holcomb
General Haig
Secretary Simon's 4 Feb
Letter
Support for General
Haig
Thank you for note on Soviet
Foreign Policy
FOIA ADDeal for Cuban Docu-
ments
Intelligence Support for
General Haig
D/OCI via DDI 25X1
25X1
NIO/LA
RAdmiral Holcomb
25X1
Request Chairman, Review Staff
Charts used by SecDef at
Cabinet Mtg on 20 Feb
NIO/SP
Use of the Director of Lt.Gen Elmer T. Brooks
Central Intelligence's "State O/SecDef
of the World Check-list"
Joint Cong. Committee on
Atomic Energy Briefing
given by DCI on 19 Feb.
Hon. Donald Cotter
Asst/SecDef/Atomic Ene:
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1. 2 Feb 76
2. 2 Feb 76
3. 2 Feb 76
4. 2 Feb 76
5. 2 Feb 76
6. 2 Feb 76
7. 2 Feb 76
8. 4 Feb 76
9. 5 Feb 76
10. 5 Feb 76
11. 5 Feb 76
12. 5 Feb 76
13. 6 Feb 76
14. 7 Feb 76
D/NIO Chrono - February 1976
Rea for the date of the
first "Wise Men" Mtg
Thank you
Two Special Projects of the
Former Office of the DCI's
Special Asst. for Vietn.
Affairs
Senator Pell's Request
Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum on Thailand
General Tighe
General Tighe, A/D/:25X1
DCI
The 4 Feb Interagency Intelli- Parmenter, D/OCI
gence Memorandum on Thailand
Thanks for help on IIM-Thailand Hal Saunders, D/INR
Intelligence Support for
General Haig
Electronic Warfare
General Tighe's Request
Director, DDCI, D,25X1
DDI DDO
General Wickham
General Tighe, AD/DIA
Peter Rodman in ~25X1;rof1
office
DCI, DDCI, EA/DCI, DDI,
OSR, DDS&T, D/IC
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'lam DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGL r-
National Intelligence Officers
Dr. Edward Teller
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
University of California
Box 808
Livermore, California 94550
26 February 1976
Per our conversation in Washington, attached is an
expanded outline of the Soviet civil defense study as
the latter is presently conceived. This outline will
indicate the problems we consider important and the way
we plan to address them.
It would be most helpful if you could take the time
to read this prospectus with some care and then give us
the benefit of your reactions to and comments on it.
The subject is one of enormous importance, for several
reasons, and we want to make this look at the problem as
thorough and comprehensive as possible.
With many thanks for your help and with warmest
personal regards.
Sincerely yours,
Georg A. Carver, Jr..
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Attachment
GACarver, Jr.:kes
Distribution:
Original Addressee w/att (outline only--did not send memo fr
25X1 to IWG on Soviet Civil Defense)
1 NIO/SP w/o att
D/NI0 Chrono w/att
1 - NIO/RI w/o att
4.,,h i,.~ YS L s
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
SP - 29/76
25 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Interagency Working Group on
Soviet Civil Defense
SUBJECT . Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
on Soviet Civil Defense
REFERENCE : Memorandum (same subject), SP-16/76, dated 6 February 1976
'' (0
1. The referenced memorandum established a working group to prepare
an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet Civil Defense. At the
first meeting of the working group on 17 February 1976, an outline of the
memorandum and agency responsibilities for preparing major parts of the
paper were agreed upon. It was also agreed that the chairman of the work-
ing group in collaboration with the NIO for Strategic Programs would pre-
pare an expanded outline of the paper, indicating agency responsibilities
(attachment 1) and a work schedule based on a completion date for the proj-
ect of 1 June 1976 (attachment 2).
2. In preparing the expanded outline, it became obvious that back-
ground papers would be required to assist the agencies responsible for draft-
ing the several parts of the study. At least some of the background papers
identified in attachment 3 should become annexes to the main report.
3. The significance of Soviet civil defense to high level US officials
requires that participating agencies make a vigorous effort on this project.
The extent of research by contributing agencies will be limited, however, by
the need to meet the work schedule for completion of the paper. Even with
our best efforts, the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum will be a status
report of what we know and do not know about the subject; it will be a base-
line for further intelligence collection and analysis.
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SP - 29/76
SUBJECT: Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on
Soviet Civil Defense
4. The chairman of the working group for Preparation of the memoran-
dum is At the second 25X1
meeting of the working group, the members should be prepared to commit their
agencies to the proposed work program and schedule. The second meeting will
he held at CIA Headquarters at 0930, 1 March 1976, Room 7-E-62. Please pass
the names of participants to 25X1
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs
Attachments
As Stated
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SP -- 29/76
SUBJECT: Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence (Memorandum
on Soviet Civil Defense
Distribution:
D/DCI/NI0
NIO/SP
NI0/RI
IC Staff
D/NPIC
NIO/SP:
~25Feb76)
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ATTACHMENT 2
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Soviet Civil Defense
WORK SCHEDULE
1 March Working group meeting to finalize work program.
7 April Distribution of background papers to the working group.
14 April Agency comments in writing to originators of background
papers.
21 April Distribution of sections of the memorandum to the
working group.
30 April Distribution of the chairman's first rough draft of
the paper to members of the working group.
7 May Distribution of the first draft of the memorandum for
agency comments.
14 May Working group meeting to review first draft. To speed
the process of review, proposed substantive changes
should be in written form for distribution at the
meeting.
21 May Distribution of final (second) draft, with key judgments
and summary for agency approval.
27 May Working group meeting for clean-up of final draft.
1 June DCI approval for publication.
Graphics: Proposed graphics for the background paper (annexes) and the main
body of the memorandum should be submitted to the chairman as soon as possible.
Graphics may be rough layouts but they should have a title, an explanatory
caption and should be properly classified. Photographs should be marked with
appropriate annotations.
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ME HORAN[)UM FOR: Mr. Wheatnn Byers
Executiv )fficer
Presiden't's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Attached is a self-explanatory note to
Dr. Teller. Would you please be good enough
to see that it is sent to him via some
appropriate channel sufficiently secure to
accommodate this material.
Many thanks.
George Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
Date 27 February 1976
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
D/DCI/NIO
The attached memorandum lays out
the Soviet Civil Defense paper in more
detail than the original outline. This
is an ambitious project with a tight
schedule.
Ray
FROM: NIO/SP
FORM No
1 FEB 55 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED...
DATE
25 i-eb 76
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National Intelligence Officers
26 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Enno II. Knoche
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community
Mr. Richard Lehman
Director of Strategic Research
SUBJECT The National Intelligence Production Problem
Attached is the draft of a memorandum which outlines
and amplifies in writing some of the points I tried to
convey orally at our 25 February session with the Director.
I would welcome any comments or reactions either of you
might care to offer.
:[ know that each of you will not agree with several
of my prescriptive recommendations (though I suspect that
your respective objections will not be directed at the same
recommendations or based on the same arguments). I am
not soliciting agreement or consensus, but would appreciate
it very much if you would flag any comments which either of
you see as containing factual errors.
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 26 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter
Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT The National Intelligence Production Problem
Per our 25 February telephone conversation, attached is
a draft of a memorandum outlining my thoughts on an approach
to the problem of national production. I would welcome
your comments and reactions and, particularly, your flagging
any factual errors -- particularly in those portions of the
memorandum which discuss matters for which you bear the
primary responsibility.
Georg. A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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. .~~ u V I IN I -
National Intelligence Officers 24 February 1976
Honorable Donald R. Cotter
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Atomic Energy
Room 3D1074
The Pentagon
Dear Don:
Per our conversation on Friday,
20 February, I am forwarding for your
information a copy of the text of Mr. Bush's
briefing to the Joint Congressional
Committee on Atomic Energy on 19 February.
Also attached is the longer version of the
briefing, copies of which were provided
to the Committee in advance of Mr. Bush's
presentation.
Georg A. Carver
Jr.
,
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers'
NIO/SP:kes
Distribution
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Imo' - D/NIO Chrono w/o atts
.l - NIO/RI w/o atts
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/D/NIO Chrono w/o atts
Only original w/atts (NIO/SP
23 February 1976
NOTE FOR: NIO/SP
Attached is a set of charts used by the
Secretary of Defense at a Cabinet meeting on
Friday, 20 February.
At the DCI's request, would you please
arrange for the proper people to examine all of these
figures and see if they are in general accord with the
figures currently being used in national intelligence
production. If any of them are not -- i.e., are at
significant variance with comparable figures the
Intelligence Community is using -- please identify these
areas of disagreement.
After these checks have been run, please
prepare a short note to Bill Hyland for the DCI's signa-
ture either asserting that the Secretary of Defense's
figures are in substantial conformity with those of the
Intelligence Community or explaining any areas of
material difference.
George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 23 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant Colonel Elmer T. Brooks, USAF
Office of the Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT Use of the Director of Central Intelligence's
"State of the World Check-list"
1. In response to your query, I had each of the NIOs
review those portions of the DCI's "State of the World Check-
list" for which he (or she) was the principal drafter. As
I suspected would prove to be the case, this review indicates
that the Secretary can feel quite free to draw on this docu-
ment in the preparation of his own speeches or statements,
even unclassified ones. Much of the material and the judgements
contained in the checklist was, of course, derived from
classified data (some of it very highly classified), but the
actual language of the document itself is sufficiently general
so that drawing on it would not jeopardize intelligence sources
2. You will naturally appreciate that it would not be
desirable to identify these judgments or the language in which
they are couched as coming from a report prepared by the DCI for
the President. It will also be self-evident that the footnotes
giving specific references to classified studies should not be
cited in any document put in the public domain.
3. Some of the statements, while they reveal no partic-
ular sources or methods, are clearly politically sensitive and
would have a certain political impact if used in public state-
ments by cabinet-level U.S. officials. These are fairly obvious.
One example is paragraph 12; for the Yugoslavs arc quite touchy
about any discussion of Tito's possible death. Another, is the
characterization of Tong IIsiao-ping in the first paragraph of
UAL I
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the China section (which happens to come right after the
paragraph on Tito).
4. With the above exceptions, we see no difficulties
with the Secretary's drawing on the checklist in any way he
finds helpful and are pleased that he found the document of
some interest and value.
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
GACarver, Jr./kes
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - SA/DCI
tY - D/NIO Chrono
1 - PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
1 - NIO/RI
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20 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr.
Chairman, Review Staff
SUBJECT Senate Select Committee Request
1. Attached for your information is a copy of
Mr. Miller's 18 February letter to me, which I received
during the afternoon of the 19th and discussed at the
Executive Committee meeting on 20 February. Also
attached is Bill Bader's letter of 12 January, which
started this ball rolling, and 14 January 25X1
note to me commenting on Bader's 12 January letter.
2. Over the last month, we have had several
discussions with Lynn Davis and Beth Blumfield on this
matter. The SSC Staff is convinced it has a hard case
of Helms trimming his substantive sails and suppressing
analysts' truths which he felt would be unpalatable at
the White House. I think this interpretation is nonsense.
Helms made a judgment call which seemed right at the
time and which I think it is pointless to peck over in
hindsight. As I have tried to point out to the staff
(with no great degree of apparent success), they are
taking two documents out of the context of the totality
of the Agency's production during the period. So far
as I am concerned, the Agency's track record in delivering
unpalatable truths about Vietnam to the White House more
than speaks for itself and reflects considerable credit
on both the Agency and the DCI. This, however, is not
a line of reasoning the SSC Staff finds particularly
congenial and they apparently prefer to be selective in
their critical focus.
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3. I: plan to take no action on responding to
this letter pending the DCI's directions. IIe, in
turn, will probably not want to make a decision until
you have obtained some clarification of what is
involved.
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
cc: Mr. 25X1
Mr.
Ms.
GACarver, Jr., D/I)CI/NIO:kes
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cys - as indicated above w/atts
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/atts-
1 - SSC File w/oatts
1 - NIO RI w/o atts
25X1 /
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MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver, Jr., D/llC:C/NIO
SUBJECT Continents on Attached Letter
(Dated 12 January 1976)
1. in general, most of the points in the attached
letter are accurate, but they tend to gloss over some of
the important nuances in the situation.
-- the spring,1970 memorandum was on "prospects",.
not _ "political prospects" --,,a minor point.
--- as memory serves (and I do not have a. copy of.
the memorandum) , the point made in the memorandum
on military intervention into Cambodia was not
that it would not significantly affect the
ability of the communists to expand their
control in Cambodia. Instead, the point was that
for such a military action to have great impact
would probably require a large force to be
committed and to be sustained for a considerable
length of time.
the memorandum never said that a US military
incursion would fail.
by the time the memorandum hit the DCI's'desk,
it was practically the eve of the US military
action; the publication of the memorandum
would have inevitably appeared to have been
"writing for the record" --- the decision had
already been made.
2. The remarks in the letter concerning the draft estimate
on the results of the US incursion into Cambodia are correct.
Even so, it should be pointed out that between the time of
the -draft and the decision not to proceed with it several
factors were pertinent.
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the conditions surrounding the incursion
changed, i.e., the operation was terminated
at the end of June.
with the operation terminated, it did not
make much sense to rush into print with what
had to be incomplete data --- information on.
the results and -- more important -- on their
impact were still coming in. Moreover, the
key question then became that of "impact", and
it was too early to offer anything but very
tentative judgments on this score. -
A/NIO/SSEAAF
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 20 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral M. Staser Holcomb, USN
Military Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense
SUBJECT Intelligence Support for General Haig
Forwarded herewith for your er s and information
is a further set of the cables sent in support of
General Haig. Please return these and future messages to my
office after they have served your purposes. Please note
that there is no cable for Monday, 16 February, due to the
holiday.
George *A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Package transmitted under
O/DCI/NIO
Distribution
Orig - Addressee w/atts
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/o atts.--''
1 - HAIG SUPPORT FILE w/o atts
1 - NIO/RI w/o atts
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL lNTELLIGE,rE
National Intelligence Officers
20 February 1976
Thanks for your note of February 6, forwarding 25X1
comments on Soviet foreign policy.
As you are aware, is highly regarded for
his experienced and shrewd perceptions of the Soviet scene.
This piece strikes a particularly responsive chord here.
We too see the long-term Soviet policy horizon -- the
favorably changing correlation of forces -- somewhat blurred
by such intractable difficulties as agricultural productivity,
effective leadership of the disparate gaggle that passes
these days to. the "World Communist Movement," and translating
Western difficulties into specific Soviet policy gains.
Sincerely yours,
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
George A Carver, Jr.
'A/NIO/USSR:kes
Distribution:
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1 - A/NIO/USSR
41-,- , n/NTO ('hrnnn
1 -
1 - NIO/RI
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NOW
TI iE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
17 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter
Director of Current Intelligence
THROUGH Mr. Edward. W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Support for General Haig
Attached for your information and retention is a
Quarterly Report (September-December 1975) from
This report, along with 25X1.
earlier correspondence, confirms the value and efficacy of
the effort. On several occasions, General Haig has
personally indicated his appreciation for and the importance
he attaches to the analyses that he receives
from IIe clearly holds them in 25X1
high regard for the professional manner in which they have
discharged their duties in support of him.
Original - Addressee w/att
1 - DDI w/att
1 -- IHAIG SUPPORT w/att /
1 - D/NIO chrono w/o attt./
1 - NIO/RI w/o att
1 - DOC Chrono w/o att
Gcorge/A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National. Intel.lizence Officers
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17 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/SP
NIO/CH
NIO/SSEAF
SUBJECT Formal Request on
Attached is a note from I I which is 25X1
essentially the same as the intra-ICS memorandum for-
warded to you on 11 Februrary. We will caucus on this
subject after you have had a chance to sort out your
thoughts on the problem.
George4. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
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CENTRAL IN! IGENCE
-tional Intelligence' Officers :1.7 February 1976
DTE FOR: The Director
JBJECT : Secretary Simon's 4 February
Letter
Attached for your signature is a proposed
esponse to Secretary Simon's letter of
February (which we received on
0 February). Also attached is a copy of
hat letter, plus the 5 February note by
hich Bill Morell forwarded it to you.
Morell actually drafted Simon's letter
Aid Morell's text, in turn, was based on
_onversations with and
who drafted your proposed
-eply. In this exercise, therefore, there
a certain amount of circularity, but
this response will keep the record straight 6
and clear your books.
George A Carver, Jr.
D/D 'I/NIO
Copy of whole package will be returned
upon DCI's signature.
GACarver, Jr. :kes j
f - D/NIO Chrono
cy NIO/E
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TM) C;1 fPf?r 25X1
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1NE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
17 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral M. Staser Holcomb, USN
Military Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense
SUI3JICT
Intelligence Support for General Haig
Forwarded herewith for ysal and information
is a further set of-the cables sent in support of
General Ilaiff. Please return these and future messages to my
office after they have served your purposes.
George,,-s ,arver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
O/D/DCI/NIO:
Distribution
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Chrorono w/o atts
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TOP SECRET
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February 12, 1976
Dear Barbara,
Having been an admirer of yours for many years,
I am delighted to have an opportunity to add this note
to the compendium. Your contributions to the work of
this Agency have been legion; and your assistance to
a succession of its senior officers, indispensable.
Your poise, efficiency, tact, loyalty and unfailing
good judgment have been -- quite literally -- invaluable
during the past series of hectic, stressful months. All
of us are deeply in your debt, not only for helping make
Bill's office run so smoothly during an impossible time,
but also for being so helpful to the rest of us who needed
to work directly with him during this era -- and for
continuously giving us all a lift by your company, humor,
charm and great contribution to the aesthetics of his office
as well as its efficiency. I wish you well in your new
duties, which I know you will discharge with stellar
distinction, and look forward not only to seeing the range
of your contributions steadily increase, but also to the
pleasure of working with you as they do.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely yours,
George A. Carver, Jr.
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12 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIOs, PP and RI
SUBJECT The DCI's Immediate Office
Attached for your information is a note from
Mr. Evans which briefly delineates the responsibilities
of the DCI's two assistants -- and 25X1
UNCODED Please note the change in title for
j and ensure that all correspondence to him
carries the proper designator -- SA/DCI vice EA/DCI.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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e> 7
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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
'mw' ES 76-1
11 February 1976
Organization of the J}CIF s Immediate Office
1. The Director will be assisted by an Executive Assistant 25X1
and a Special Assistant Their 25X1
respective duties are generally as follows:
(EAJDCI). The Director will look
to her for the organization of his day, to include confirmation
of requests for appointments, as well as being the officer who.
will set into motion travel plans and monitor arrangements
related to same. She will have particular responsibility for
assistance to the Director with regard to Congressional,
journalist, and social/personal contacts. She will also under-
take special projects for the Director.
25X1
b. (SA/DCI). He will assist the Director
with regard to substantive intelligence production and opera-
tional matters. He will be responsible for checking the com-
pleteness of materials assembled for various meetings the DCI
is to attend such as the 40 Committee, SRG, PFIAB, etc. He
will also have a particular responsibility for seeing that briefing
materials are developed in support of DCI appointments. Addi-
tionally, he will screen intelligence publications and operational
cables.
20 The Director will be supported by two Secretary-Stenos 25X1
who will handle the telephones .
for the Director as well, as for the k;PL/DCI and SA/DCI, It is contem-
plated that in the future the latter will have his own Secretary--Steno.
3. The functions of the Executive Secretariat remain as described
in 'l-IN 1-99. As most of you know, has joined us as my
Deputy.
U. Evan
. Executive Secretary
r tYr r- L'~~ C~TTY
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11 February 1976
SUBJECT Senate Select Committee Request Regarding
KIQ Strategy Reports and Narrative
Performance Evaluations
1. I believe you have received at least some
briefings on your predecessor's Key Intelligence Question
mechanism, which was designed to focus the Community's
efforts on issues of major importance to our policy-level
consumers. This KIQ approach was tried on a pilot basis
in FY 1974 and attempted for real in FY 1975. In brief,
at the beginning of the fiscal year the NIOs prepare a
list of Key Intelligence Questions (69 in the FY 1975
list), which are developed in concert with concerned
elements of the Community, discussed by the USIB and
then issued by the DCI. On each Question, the NIO within
whose area of responsibility it falls then caucusses with
the appropriate collection and production managers throughout
the Community and develops something called a Strategy
Report, designed as a vehicle for identifying who can and
will do what in an effort to answer (or try to answer) that
Question. After the end of the fiscal year, all the KIQs
and the Community's performance on them are subjected to
something called the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP), the
first part of which entails having the NIOs write a
narrative assessment of the Community's overall performance
with respect to each KIQ.
2. From virtually the moment of its inception, the
Senate Select Committee and -- especially -- that
Committee's staff have evinced a great and continuing
interest in the KIQ/KEP Process. In August, the Staff
Director (Bill Miller) asked that the Committee be provided
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,0001 v
loan copies of the FY 1975 KIQs and the Strategy Reports
for five of these KIQs:
#7 Accuracy of new Soviet ICBMs
#22 Warsaw Pact defense budgets
#30 Prospects in Yugoslavia after Tito
These requested items were forwarded to Mr. Miller and his
staff associates via on 21 August. 25X1
3. On 12 January 1976, Mrs. Lynn Davis of the
Senate Select Committee Staff asked to see the NIOs' narra-
tive evaluation assessments of the Community's performance
on the above five FY 1975 KIQs. Bill Colby refused to
provide these documents on the grounds that they were
internal working drafts and part of an internal evaluation
process still in train. (Furthermore, at the time the
request was first levied) Bill himself had not had a
chance to read these evaluation reports and he was more than
a trifle irritated at being asked to provide internal
documents which he himself had not seen for SSC inspection.)
4. Last week, Bill Bader -- a senior member of the
SSC Staff -- called to repeat the request for these five
evaluation reports. Specifically, he wanted to know if you
would be willing to reverse Colby's decision.
5. There are several sets of equities involved here,
including your own determination of the general posture you
want to take with the SSC and its staff. All other things
being equal -- which, in this case, they may well not be --
I think you should let Bill's decision stand. These are
candid internal documents and all of your deputies are
more than a trifle gun-shy about passing such documents
to the Senate or House Select Committees, since on many
occasions over the past year our own prose has been used
as ammunition in hostile fire publicly directed against
us. Also, these reports were folded into an overall
evaluation (with numbers purporting to show allocation of
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Community resources to various KIQs), which was a disaster
and which Bill himself recalled. I would not want that
document to get outside the Executive Branch and am
concerned lest these five evaluation reports whet an
appetite for the entire package of which they subsequently
became a part.
6. Appended for your information is a copy of
the complete list of FY 1975 KIQs, the Strategy Reports
on the five KIQs in question (which were shown to the SSC
Staff), and the five performance reports for which they
are asking and which they have not yet been given. As you
will see, the performance reports by themselves are not
damaging; but the request for them relates to a larger set
of issues and our posture on that particular request should
be consistent with what you determine ought to be our general
posture with respect to these larger issues. I would appre-
ciate a decision as soon as it is convenient for you to make
one, since Bader will certainly be querying me again soon
and I would like to be able to give him a firm answer -- yes
or no -- the next time we talk.
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
cc: DDCI w/o atts D/DCI/IC w/o atts
Executive Registry w/o atts
GACarver, Jr./kes
Original - Addressee Watts
cys - as indicated above w/o atts
1 - SSC File w/o atts
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/o attsL
1 - RI w/o atts
3
`sl
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..r a...
BACKGROUND ON KIQ, KSR, KIQ NARRATIVE EVALUATIONS --
SENATE SELECTIVE COMMITTEE STAFF
Between 15 July and 12 August 1975
Mr. Peter Zimmerman and Miss Beth Blumfield reviewed
the "Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1975"
and the Key Intelligence Questions Strategy Reports for
FY 75.
8 August 1975
Mr. William Miller requested that the Committee be
provided loan copies of the' Key Intelligence
Questions - FY 75`and the KIQ Strategy Reports for the
following KIQs:
#7 Accuracy of new Soviet ICBMs
#22 Warsaw Pact defense budgets
#30 Prospects in Yttangl a,r; n -P+-- rP4 ~.
These items were provided on 21 August 25X1
for forwarding to Mr. Miller.
On 12 January 1976
Miss Davis requested access to the NIO narrative
evaluation reports for the above five FY 75 KIQs.
Mr. Colby said no since these are internal working
drafts -- part of the process but not the full
evaluation.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/SP
.NIO/CII
NIO/SSEAF
11 February 1976
SUBJECT Review of Need for
Attached is a self-explanatory intra-IC Staff
25X1 note onl After you have had an opportunity
to digest its contents, I would like to discuss it with
you particularly in light of the study that
25X6 I and their priorities.
Georg / A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
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25X1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
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11 February 1976
SUBJECT Structural Changes and Institutional
Reforms
1. Over the past several months, many have engaged
in discussion and thought (often more of the former than
the latter) about structural or organizational changes
in the intelligence community. The basic decisions may
have already been made, hence several of the suggestions
outlined below may have been overtaken by events; but I
thought you might find these observations of some interest
and use.
2. Structure should be keyed to function. The DCI
has three major sets of continuing responsibilities --
clearly interrelated, but nonetheless both distinguishable
and distinct:
a. Being the Government's senior substantive
intelligence officer and advisor.
b. Being the Government's principal advisor
on intelligence resources.
c. Managing the CIA.
3. Each of these three sets of responsibilities has
its own complexities.
a. Being the fount of national intelligence is
clearly the DCI's primary responsibility, since
establishing such a fount was clearly the 80th
Congress' primary objective in passing Section 102(d)
of the National Security Act of 1947.*
*What Congress wanted was a mechanism through which all of the
information available to the US Government bearing on national
security problems (with a foreign dimension) could be collated
and evaluated by one central entity, not under the control of
any cabinet department or military service.
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low
-- The primacy of this set of responsi-
bilities is further underlined by the fact
that the DCI's other major responsibilities
(advising on resource allocation and managing
the CIA) really have to do with the mechanisms
which enable him to discharge this function
of being the Government's principal substantive
intelligence officer and fount of national
intelligence.
-- The DCI's broader substantive responsi-
bilities logically evolved from this statutory
base, including his present responsibilities
for providing a broad range of current intelli-
gence reports and assessments and for providing
national estimates.
-- The key aspect of this set of responsibilities
is the latter's national scope. As applied to
intelligence, "natia l" has come to mean intelli-
gence which draws on all information available
to all components of the Government, is assessed
by the best analytic talent available throughout
the Government, and is presented to the President
and his senior advisors with a reflection of
significant dissenting judgments where the latter
exist and are of material consequence.
-- Over the last year or so there has been a
rising amount of debate over the extent of the
DCI's responsibility for providing substantive
intelligence support to the Congress. This
added complexity, however, does not alter his
clear obligation to provide support to the
President and the NSC, or his primacy as the
Government's principal foreign intelligence
officer.
b. The resource "advisory" role was only implicitly
adumbrated in the 1947 Act. It has evolved by pragmatic
precedent and was explicitly stated in President Nixon's
November 1971 letter. The precise dimensions of that
role, however, and the DCI's degree of authority in
resource matters are still vague, and disputed
(especially in the Department of Defense).
2
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c. The CIA is an instrument set up to help
the DCI discharge the responsibilities with which
he was vested by statute.
-- Over time, it was given -- under the
DCI's management -- certain other institu-
tional responsibilities, notably the covert
collection (espionage) function (a "service
of common concern"), the covert action
function (one of those "other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting
the national security" directed by the NSC),
and certain responsibilities for the
development and management of technical
collection programs (ditto).
-- Despite the language of the 1947 and
1949 Acts and the pragmatic precedents of
almost three decades, there is still some
debate within the Executive Branch -- and
within the Intelligence Community -- over
what CIA is, and what it is not. In part,
this debate is rooted in what may sound to
to a layman like a philosophical connundrum:
whether there is (or is not) a valid dis-
tinction between "national intelligence"
and "non-departmental intelligence". CIA's
production -- i.e., the published output of
the DDI and parts of the DDSIT -- is clearly
"non-departmental", since CIA is not under
the control of any cabinet department. Many
CIA analysts -- and managers -- would and do
argue that, ergo, what CIA produces is
national intelligence. This contention,
however, is by no means universally accepted
throughout the rest of the Intelligence
Community or the Executive Branch, where it
is argued (often stridently) that reports/
assessments/appreciations/estimates are not
national intelligence unless and until they
reflect (and, in some cases, clearly identify)
the views of all concerned components of the
Intelligence Community, not just those of CIA.
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-- This debate, in turn, is at the
root of what some, indeed many (outside
CIA), perceive as an inherent conflict
of interest in the dual roles of the
DCI (as his office is now structured)
as the Government's senior substantive
intelligence officer (the fount of national
intelligence) and -- simultaneously --
the head of one of the Intelligence
Community's analytic and production com-
ponents, i.e., the CIA.
4. In addition to the three sets of continuing
responsibilities outlined above, the DCI also has a fourth
set of responsibilities which are latent or intermittent:
providing intelligence support to national decision-making
in times of crisis. These are clearly related to his con-
tinuing responsibilities, but have several special features.
-- They bring into sharp focus the ambiguities
in the relationship between and responsibilities
of (on the one hand) the DCI and (on the other)
the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
-- They also bring the complex "national/
tactical" question into sharp focus.
-- They give added intensity to the debate
over the role and functions of the CIA.
5. The Present Structure. At present, the DCI is
supported by a command structure which was developed during
the tenure of your two immediate predecessors. It includes:
a. A Deputy DCI -- appointed by the President
with the Senate's advice and consent -- who serves
as Acting DCI in your absences, is the CIA member
of the USIB, performs a variety of special missions
and functions, but who (under present arrangements)
is not really in the line of command.
b. Two staff Deputies to the DCI who assist him
in the discharge of his two -- and it is important
to remember that there are two -- sets of community
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responsibilities: substance (the D/DCI/NIO)
and resources (the D/DCI/IC).
c. Four line Deputies -- DDSF,T, DDI, DDO
and DDA -- through whom the DCI runs the CIA.
6. The present system runs with the grain of the
DCI's major responsibilities. It is not bad. Actually,
it is fairly good. It does not -- nor can it -- alleviate
the problems engendered by the DCI's limited and ambiguous
authority (especially in the resource field); but apart
from that, it has only one serious flaw: within it there
is no overall, day-to-day manager of the CIA, other than
the DCI himself. This, in turn,
-- Sets up a great drain on the DCI's
time.
-- Compounds the perception of ".conflict
of interest" between the DCI's Community
and Agency roles, noted above.
-- Creates an anomalous and often awkward
situation: when the DCI is wearing his
"Community" hat adjudicating Community
disputes, the CIA has no single advocate to
explain and defend its legitimate institutional
equities.
7. The flaws in the present structure, however, could
be quite easily remedied by either of two approaches:
a. Changing the present concept of the role
of the DDCI, charging him with being the day-to-day
manager of CIA (and letting him be it), or
b. Re-constituting and perhaps enhancing the
now abolished position of Executive Director.
5
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U.~ "',Y .iI -_ A 1%W
8. The "Two Deputies" Approach. Another, super-
ficially appealing way to go at the structural problem
is to follow the "two deputies" approach: i.e., give the
DCI one Deputy DCI to manage the CIA and another to handle
the Community. I understand that this is the approach
now being favored downtown; but before any final decisions
are taken (if they have not already been made), careful
consideration ought to be given to the fact that this
approach would be likely to create more problems than
it solves.
-- This is because the DCI does not have just
one set of Community responisibilities, he has
two: substance and resources.
-- In solving the "CIA problem" it would compound
the "Community problem."
-- If the Community deputy were a
civilian (especially a non-Defense Department
civilian) there would be great -- and under-
standable -- concern within the DOD, the JCS
and the military services that Defense's resource
equities and requirements would not be properly
understood or adequately protected.
-- Conversely, if the Community deputy
were a serving military officer (or a civilian
with a Defense Department background) there.
would be serious, again understandable, concern --
within other componenents of the Executive
Branch, in the Congress, in the
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public (and, for that matter, within CIA)
about the objectivity of national
intelligence production.
-- If the two Community responsibilities -- substance
and resources -- are combined under a single deputy,
one of them would be bound to suffer. Given the
American fascination for the concrete and quantitative --
especially in light of the amounts of money involved --
said single Community deputy would almost inevitably
be inclined to focus primarily on resources, which
would probably soon come to drive substance. Hence,
substance -- i.e., the responsibilities the DCI
was primarily set up by statute to discharge -- would
almost inevitably suffer.
- The chances of serious friction between the two
deputies would be great. Even in the unlikely event that
both were always saints, there would be an inescapable
pecking order problem: one would have to be Acting DCI
in your absence, and he would be seen throughout the
Government, Congress and public as being your principal
Deputy. Giving primacy to the CIA Deputy would generate
one set of unavoidable problems; giving primacy to the
Community Deputy (especially if -- under this arrange-
ment -- he was a military officer) would generate
another.
8. Conclusion. In sum, I believe strongly that the two-
deputy approach is a loser, almost guaranteed to crate more
problems than it solves. Others (including Bill Colby) may and
do disagree, but I am convinced that the present, rather easily
modified framework offers a much more promising line of
approach within which you can fairly easily solve the "CIA
problem" without compounding and complicating the Community
one.
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
7
Lj eL,
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~~r.1figS?~m4"r. hq
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10 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Economics
INFORMATION NIO/USSR
NIO/Middle East
NIO/Japan
NIO/Western Europe
SUBJECT : Economic Estimates
Attached is the memorandum from Secretary Simon
via Mr. Morell that Mr. Bush mentioned at yesterday's
meeting. After you have had an opportunity to
peruse its contents, I would like to caucus with you
to discuss what response should be provided the DCI for
forwarding to Secretary Simon.
George A. Carver, Jr.
D%DCI/NIO
/ /NIO Chrono
ns !
C ra_.111-1 ;
.
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J-0 UNCLASSIFIED I CONFIDENTIAL I I SECRET L .1
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EXECUTIVE SEETARIAT
Routing Slip
ID/DCI/NI
131 Compt ,
19 EA/DCI
20
25X1
Remarks:
To 9: Please develop reply and advise
about how long it will take.
25X1.
ecutive ecretar
9 February 1976
Date
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r;.Kucuttve ft;ayictry
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
February 5, 1976
Dear Mr. Bush:
I am enclosing a letter from Bill Simon on a subject that
has interested him for some time. The letter, incidentally,
covers one of the general topics he discussed with the President
during the recent Saturday afternoon session with Cabinet offi-
cials on the organization and management of the intelligence
community.
I am delighted that your confirmation worked out as well
as it did. I'm looking forward to working with you in your
efforts to put all of the pieces back together again--albeit in
a somewhat different form. I do not underestimate the immensity
of your task but I am confident that for the Agency and the in-
telligence community 1976 will end better than it began.
If you wish I would be happy to work with your staff in
arranging a time for you and Bill to get together.
All the best for the future.
Sincerely,
William N. Morell, Jr.
Treasury Representative on the
United States Intelligence Board
The Honorable
George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY'
WASHINGTON 20220
CONFIDENTIAL
February 4, 1976
Dear George:
I have felt for some time that U.S. intelligence
could take a more active role in preparing estimates
of future developments important to our foreign eco-
nomic policy. While I have found many national esti-
mates helpful in providing background material relevant
to our interests--particularly in the scientific, po-
litical and military fields--I have observed that these
estimates rarely focus on important international eco-
nomic issues. Although the various policy offices of
the EPB departments and agencies will continue to do
the lion's share of this work--with the help of contri-
butions from your Office of Economic Research--I would
hope that we could work together to strengthen the
national estimates process in economic areas.
The trend of Soviet economic relations with Eastern
Europe is an example of the type of estimate we might
consider in view of the possibilities these trends may
offer to the United States and the West for involving
Eastern Europe more with the non-Communist world. While
we obviously must be cautious and realistic in our ex-
pectations regarding these possibilities, they do seem
worth exploring.
We have seen a number of recent developments in
the pattern of Soviet economic ties with Eastern Europe
which suggest that in coming years several Eastern
European countries will have less assurance that they
can depend on the Soviet Union as a major source of
foodstuffs, energy and raw materials. For example, as
a consequence of recent Soviet crop disasters Moscow
CONFIDENTIAL
?'r.W.._-_N.. Morel1, Jr.
Der"---31,__198 _
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NOW
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
has told the Eastern European countries not to depend
on the USSR for grain import needs during the 1975-76
period, stating flatly that they must fend for them-
selves. As you know, the Soviets also recently raised
the price of oil and other raw materials to Eastern
Europe, although not yet to the level of world prices.
Thus, as these countries look to the future, they
probably conclude that the Soviets will have continuing
difficulty in meeting East Europe's future import needs.
On the export side East European industries have
emphasized sales to the USSR. As they shift their
purchases to other areas, the Eastern Europeans must
find ways to earn the necessary foreign exchange to pay
for these imports by selling in hard currency markets,
a difficult task since most of their current exports
are not now attractive to Western buyers. Their trade
must expand if these regimes in Eastern Europe are to
achieve their modernization plans and meet the rising
expectations of their citizenry. All of this presents
a very real political and economic dilemma.
I believe it is important that we improve our
perception of future prospects in this area and that
we have a better understanding of the practical alterna-
tives open to the countries of Eastern Europe. If the
dilemmas described above develop, as we think they
might, what trade and financing opportunities would
the Eastern Europeans offer to the United States, other
Western countries, Japan, and certain countries in the
Middle East? What might the political and economic
consequences be for our own interests if we were to
more actively seek a strengthening of East Europe's
economic relations with non-Communist countries? How
might this best be done? Many other issues should be
considered which have a bearing on our policy deliber-
ations--issues which we would be happy to discuss with
representatives of the intelligence community.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
If you agree that there is some merit in giving
further consideration to the possibility of an esti-
mate on this subject, please let me know. I hope,
incidentally, that we can get together before long
and discuss some of the more important aspects of
intelligence support for foreign economic policy and
negotiations.
Sincerely,
The Honorable
George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
CONFIDENTIAL
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10 February 197
MEMORANDUM FOR: T'he Director
SUBJECT General Tighe's Request
1. On 9 February, the Acting Executive Secretary of
the USIB sent you a note informing you that at the
10 February USIB meeting, General Tighe wants to bring
up two additional items in ? - i_v session.. With
reference to one of these, reported that:
[General Tighe] is going to request that
DIA be given the lead on the study, "Vulnerability
of Soviet Space Systems", because of the interaction
with U. S. tactical reconnsissance. He indicated
that the Chairman, JCS sees this as primarily a
Defense problem.
2. The above statement almost certainly reflects some
garble, either in Tighe's own mind or in the relay of his
request. There is no study in train, or contemplated,
on the "Vulnerability of Soviet Space Systems", although
an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled "Soviet
Dependence on Space Systems" was issued in November. 1.975.
Tighe must have in mind the work being done on a related
but significantly different subject, namely the interagency
memorandum on "The Likelihood of Soviet Interference with
U. S. Space Systems in Crises and Con f-licts."
3. This study, which is in train, had its genesis last
fall in a request from the Off:ice of Management and Budget.
The OMB noted that National Reconnaissance Program satellites
and supporting systems were being justified in part on the
basis of their potential utility in tactical conflicts.
The 0MB concluded that the vulnerability of our satellites
was therefore pertinent to budget decisions about funding
of NRP programs as well as tactical reconnaissance systems.
OMB representatives expected that the findings of the
study would justify either budget reductions in satellite
systems if they were likely to be :interfered with, or
budget reductions in tactical reconnaissance systems if the
satellites were judged reasonably secure. The study results
may not meet these 0MB expectations.
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w
4. Despite the flaws in OMB's reasoning, the subject
is indeed of intrinsic importance and we did agree to take
it on. During December and January a work plan was
evolved under which the study would be produced on an
interagency basis -- under the overall'supervisi.on of your
NIO for Strategic Programs --- by an interagency task force
chaired by of CIA's Office of Strategic
Research. Notice to that effect was circulated throughout
the Community by two memoranda I signed on 16 January.
5. What Tighe is actually requesting is a switch in
procedures through which DIA would be given the lead in
directing the actual work in lieu of CIA (OSR).
6. I think this would be a mistake primarily for two
reasons:
a. The issues involved go far beyond military
questions, no matter how broadly defined. They
include considerations of Soviet attitudes, political
perceptions, and political intentions and strategy.
They do of course have military dimensions, but under
the interagency plan already developed, military
equities would be amply protected and the military
establishment's professional expertise fully engaged
by the degree of participation already requested
of DIA, the service intelligence agencies and other
Defense Department components.
b. Involved here is a very knotty problem which
goes to the heart of your responsibilities and your
retention of control over the mechanisms indispensable
to their discharge. What we are talking about is
national collection systems which are unquestionably
national, even though they also (unquestionably) can
and do provide information of an inordinate value to
tactical commanders. The needs of the latter must
clearly be served, but the allocation of priorities has
to he left to the DCI to determine if his position as
the government's principle intelligence officer is to
retain substance and meaning. The difficulty is that
in this instance (as in others), the old, tidy dis-
tinction between "national" and "tactical" intelligence/
assets/systems has been overtaken by technolgoy and is
no longer as neat, or clear, as may have been the case
a decade ago.
2
r~tv A`,
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`7 . The arrangement:s we have set up to do this
study w:i.l.l. }keep it in proper foots and protect everyone's
1eg1.t.i.m,tt:(eciu:i.t:ies, including both yours and those of
our colleagues in the Pentagon. I thin;: they should be
Continued. At a minimum, however, .T strongly recoiimiend
that you not acquiesce in General `l:ighe's proposal
at the meet.:i.ng and that, :i.f you do not fecl you want to
turn. hint off there wi th a -Flat negative, you simply
say you will. :Took into the situation in response to his
expression of concern, but do so in a manner that
does not commit you to any final outcome or d.ecis:i.on.
8. Appended for your information and background are
copies of my two memoranda of 16 January mentioned
above), plus an informal note by which 25X1
develops the cogent reasons why supervision of this
project belongs here and not in DIA.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
cc: DDCI
DDI
D/OSR
DDSF;T
D/DCI/IC
Executive Registry
Copy No. 1 - DCI
Copy No. la - EA/DCI
.Copy No. 2 - DDCI
Copy No. 3 - DDI
Copy No. 4 - D/OSR
Copy No. 5 - DDSIT
Copy No. 6 - D/DCI/IC
Copy No. 7 - Executive Registry
Copy No. 8 - NIO/SP
Copy No. 9 - D/NIO Chrono
Copy No. 10 - NIO/RI
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Notionol lntellijence Officers
SP - 4/76
16 January 1976
Copy /'
MEMORZANDUNN FOR: Mr. Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Mr. Carl E. Duckett
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Mr. Harold H. Saunders
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State
LTG Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF
Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
LTG Lew Allen, Jr., USAF
Director, National Security Agency -
Major General Harold R. Aaron
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army
Rear Admiral B. R. Inman
Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy
Major General C. J. Keegan, Jr.
Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, Air Force
SUBJECT Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
on Likelihood of Soviet Interference with US Space
Systems in Crises and Conflicts
1.. In response to a request of the Office of Management and Budget
(ONB) , the DCI has approved the preparation of an interag ency intelligence
memorandum on the likelihood of Soviet interference. with US military-
support satellite systems. The purpose of the study is to assess whether,
when, and how the USSR might use antisatellite systems or other means to
interfere with the functioning of US satellite systems -- especially those
reconnaissance systems associated with providing support to US military
commanders in the field -- in crises or conflict situations. The time
period to be addressed is about the next five years, and the US systems to
be addressed are those presently operating and now programmed. The study
will be prepared under aegis of the National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs.
t i.tGt iAt- S;', iCE
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2.. Attached are draft terms of reference for the memorandum, as
agreed between representatives of the OMB and NI0 for Strategic Programs,
in consultation with representatives of certain USIB agencies. The OM3
has requested that a draft of an initial memorandum be available by 1. June
1976.
3. In the preparation of the memorandum, inputs will be needed on
such subjects as US space systems (capabilities and vulnerabilities) and
their tactical applications, Soviet antisatellite capabilities, Soviet
space systems and Soviet dependency on them, Soviet conflict doctrine,
and NATO-Warsaw Pact theater conflict scenarios. For some of these in-
puts, participation of the NRO will be required.
4. You are requested to designate a representative to serve on the
ad hoc interagency aroun which will be responsible for preparing the
memorandum
The group w
Research C.
of the Office of Strategic
with the name of your representative by COB Thursday, 22 January 1976.
The first meeting of the ad hoc group will be held at CIA Headquarters,
Room 5G00, 1000 hours on Friday, 23 January 1.976.
George A. arver, r.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
cc: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
TOP SE C.RET 25X1
ill be chaired b
IA. Please provide
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National Intelligence Officers
Sr - 8/76
16 January 1976
Copy ___2L_
11Et ORANDUN FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office
SUBJECT Request for NRO Participation in the Preparation of an
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
:L. The Director of Central Intelligence requests the participation
of the National Reconnaissance Office -in the preparation of an interagency
intelligence memorandum on the likelihood of Soviet interference with US
space systems in crises and conflicts (see attachment). The memorandum is
to be produced in response to a request of the Office of Management and
Budget.
2. Among the inputs needed for this project (see paragraph 3 of the
attachment) are the capabilities and vulnerab:L:Lities of US space systems.
In this connection- the assets of the NRO clearly are the most appr.opriate25X1
to draw upon.
of your office recently participated in an interagency meeting
Oi{B request and the outline for the memorandum.
3. You are requested to designate your point of contact for the ad
hoc interagency group which will be responsible for preparing the memo-
randum. The group will be chaired by of the Office of 25X1
Strategic Research, CIA.
Gc rge A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for. National Intelligence Officers
.Y.~ t:..lf._' ".W1. L. i Z.
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N1EMORAUDUN FOR: Deputy Director : or Intc'iligcence
SUBJECT OSH/SEC Reaction _c) Recommendation
on Leadership of Interagency Project
"Prospects for Soviet Interference
with US Space Reconnaissance Systems"
1. The impending proposal that DIA. take the
lead in this project leaves us with mixed feelings,
on balance negative. The project is responsive both
to requests from OMB and to the DCIts KIQ No. 8.
OSR/SEC was assigned working-level leadership of this
project as early as September 1975 because it, alone
among many organizations in discussion with the NIO/SP
and OMB, expressed both a willingness to commit
resources to the effort and a belief that new work
had to be done. Several months of initial data col-
lection and problem formulation have been undertaken
by OSR/SEC to date.
2. The prospect of shifting the assuredly
heavy management and administrative (including security)
burdens of this complex project to another agency is
not unattractive to us. However, the. putative reason.
to shift the leadership of the project to DIA ----
because it concerns the interface of intelligence
with tactical operations --- is not in itself persuasive.
3. The project certainly involves tactical
intelligence functions of real-time systems. But
it also involves problems of real-t:i.me_ political and
strategic warning during the build-up of crises, a
major CIA concern.
4.. Tactical intelligence functions, by the very
nature of evolving collection technologies and the
great importance of the information they collect, are
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fu Lional intelligence mac L:i.c>ns . 1~
p ecedenL would be set: If CI'A were accorded a reduced
1:ol.e in this arena because it c:ar:cie : Lyre L-c(,rr:;
tac:ti.cal.
S. CSR/SEC has as ser. ted -Chat the problem requires
some Unique conceptual and organizational approaches,
combining space system expertise, apprecia L Lon of the
battlefield, and knowledge, of Soviet strategy and
operations.. During discussions of the problem, DIA
was not notably vocal in c .press:i ng such recognition.
6. To date, DIA has not been visibly c ger- to
put resources into this pro ject, much less lead it.
In response to our request for resource commitments
to the project, DID. offered up one major as a contract
officer,. and two lesser officers, as project participants.
7. It must be recognized that the purpose of the
project is not to investigate the tactical role of
real-time space reconnaissance assets per se, but
rather to assess the incentives the Soviet-s will face
to interfere in that role and ho.?i they might act on
those inventi_ves. It is not obvious that DIA is
uniquely strong in this kind of analysis,
S. DIA' s sudden interest in playing a leading
role in this study is commendable in itself. But it
probably derives from belated recognition that the
results of the study could shape the views of national
policymakers toward systems and programs in which the
DOD has major interests. Insofar as the programs of
central concern are in the NIP, CIA can be said to.
have :Less direct budgetary interest. But it is not
clear -Chat direct budgetary interests, of er the best
credentials for ieaderhs ip of an intelligence study
affecting those interest s.
9 , If successful in illurninat:ing a complex and
vital problem, the proposed study will have a direct
effect on the resources and systems with Which the DCI
meets his future responsibilities in peace, crisis,
and conflict. The principal question, then, is what
combination of leadership and analytic resources gives
the DCI the greatest confidence that the problem will
he illuminated.
Chief
Strategic Evaluation Center.
_ _
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9 February 1976
(1130 Hours)
NOTE FOR DCI
SUBJECT: USIB Executive Session
General Tighe just called to inform us that he intends to bring
up two additional items in the USIB Executive Session tomorrow:
a. He is going to request that DIA be given the
lead on the study, "Vulnerability of Soviet Space
Systems , because of the interaction with U. S.
tactical reconnaissance. He indicated that the
Chairman, JCS sees this as primarily a Defense
problem.
b. At the request of ASD(I), General Tighe is'
going to call for the importance of more collec-
tion against the Soviet navy. He said that this
relates to the recent information on the Soviet
navy mutiny. He indicated that Bill Nelson was
aware of this problem.
Acting Executive Secretary, USIB
cc:
D/DCI/IC
D/DCI/NIO
DDI
DDO
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nC Ulm[:% 'I' VI
CENTRAL IN rrLIGENCE
.tional intelligence Officers 9 February 1976
r. Peter Rodman
ffice of the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
ne White House
Per our telephone conversation, attached
25X1
s the picture. is the fellow
tanding at the left side of the picture with
pointer on his shoulder. He has done
-eoman work for (now) four DCIs and we will
iss him when-he retires in March. If
enry could spare fifteen seconds to
___
] it would be FtI 25X1
nscribe this picture toF
-neatly appreciated.
Many thanks for your help.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers,
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rrrr
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
7 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF
Acting Director.
Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT Electronic Warfare
1. Recently the Director of Central Intelligence
requested that a National Intelligence Officer investigate the
need for an Electronic Warfare study at the national level.
In pursuit of this, the National Intelligence Officer for
Conventional Forces has consulted with various organizational
groups in the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelli-
gence Agency. As a result, it has become apparent that a
study "ECM Capabilities - ECC" which has been produced by the
Defense Intelligence Agency for some years is now under
extensive revision. It is a Secret-level study with considerable
detail and of significant utility to operational forces.
2. Because of its limited level of security, however, it
can merely reflect, but cannot include, some of the more highly
classified and high informative material now available. As a
consequence, the study does not adequately fill the needs of
policy level personnel in Washington. It is clear that an addi-
tional study better serving the immediate needs of Washington
level consumers is needed. In order to accomplish this, it
has been decided that the Defense Intelligence Study should con-
tinue on its schedule with no interference in its production.
An additional interagency study should be produced which would
reflect significant features of the DIA study plus "all source"
material which can best illuminate Soviet electronic warfare
doctrine, practice, and policy.
3. We have learned that the DIA Directorate of Science
and Technolo has recently created a section under the leader-
ship of to thoroughly handle
SECT
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law NNW
electronic warfare aspects of the Soviet threat. Because of
this, it is requested that be designated
to manage the national level study under the aegis of the
National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces. It
is further requested that the Colonel develop an outline of
what would be needed for such a study and that this be sub-
mitted to the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional
Forces as soon as possible. Subsequent to this, the opinions
of USIB representatives will be solicited, their suggestions
considered, a production schedule set up and contributions
requested.
George /A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
GACarver, Jr., kj
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - NIO/CF
1 - D/NIO Chronol/
1 - DIA SUBJ file
1 - RI
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v m nr! nr7
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 6 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA
Military Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense
SUBJECT . Intelligence Support for General Haig
Forwarded herewith for your perusal and information
is a further set of the cables sent in support of
General Haig. Please return these and future messages to
my office after they have served your purposes.
ueorge arver, Jr.
Deput i for National Intelligence Officers
Carver, Jr. ":..kbs
Distribution
Copy.No. 1 - Gen. Wickham w/atts
Copy No. 2 - Chrono w/o atts
Copy No. 3 - D/NIO Chrono w/o attsV
Copy No. 4 - HAIG SUPPORT file w/o atts
Copy No. 5 - NIO/RI w/o atts
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T'fE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
5 February 1976
The Honorable Harold H. Saunders
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Hal,
I wanted to send a word of thanks for INR's institu-
tional and your personal contributions to the Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand issued on 4 February
by the DCI. You-taking the time to annotate the draft
and sharpen up its implications section was particularly
helpful and very much appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
.:D/NIO Chrono
RIO/RI
.CONFJDENTIAL
Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
George A
O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee
Prig.- Addressee.
1-~.- NIO/SSEAAF
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UU11F1Ili 3-i I i t
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.*iE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIG- CE
National Intelligence Officers
5 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter
Director
Office of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT The 4 February Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum on Thailand
east Asian Branch. UNCODED deserves a special word of
. 1. As you know, on 4 February an Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand -- prepared under the
aegis of the NIO/SSEAAF -- was issued in the DCI's name.
It was, I think, a very good paper.
2. As you doubtless also know, your colleagues did
most of the work on this paper, including the bulk of the
basic drafting. Would You lease relay down your command
chain my thanks and UNCODED for this typically 25X1
first-class job done by the East Asia-Pacific Division
and, particularly, those s lended analysts in its South- 25X1
thanks for his work, though saying that is not to slight
the contributions of UNCODED 25X1
and all the other cooks who contributed seasoning
to t is broth.
Georg6 A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee
Orig Addressee
1 - NIO/SSEAAF
I - D/NIO Chrono
1 - NIO/RI .
CON MENTIAL
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5 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
SUBJECT . Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
on Thailand
1. Attached is an Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum entitled "The Thai Election and. Its
Implications for the US", which was issued on
4 February.
2. Thai politics are now in a somewhat
volatile and potentially turbulent period, with-
assorted coup rumors beginning to circulate. Though
the latter, to date, appear somewhat ephemeral, none
of us want to get caught short by any sudden change
in the Thai scene, particularly during your first
few weeks in office. Consequently; I wanted to get
this memorandum out as quickly as possible and, hence,
took the liberty of signing it for you so that it could
be issued as soon as it was completed instead of holding
it for a day until your return from New York.
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Attachment
cc:- DDCI w/att
Executive Registry w/att
GACarver, Jr./kes
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/att
cys - as indicated
1 - NIO/SSEA w/o att
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/ntlh/
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SECRET V4W
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
4 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)
SUBJECT The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US
1. The attached Interagency Intelligence Memorandum contains the
intelligence community's assessment of how the present election campaign
in Thailand will affect Thai-US relations and prospects for retention of
a residual US military presence in Thailand.
2. As the memorandum indicates, there is a strong possibility that
the Thai military may assume control of the government at some point
before elections are held, or soon thereafter. Within the Thai military
establishment, there is considerable nervousness, plus a growing disen-
chantment with Thailand's experiment with parliamentary government.
Moreover, there are rivalries and crosscurrents within the military
establishment which could result in one or another clique's attempting
a preemptive coup against the presumed plans of some other group. In
short, the situation in Thailand is fluid and subject to quick and
dramatic change.
3. We gave serious consideration to issuing the attached study
as an "Alert Memorandum." Our decision not to use that particular art
form should not be misconstrued as a sign of complacency about the state
of affairs in Thailand. We will, of course, keep a close eye on this
situation and alert you promptly to any new developments giving further
grounds for concern.
-m'I George Bush
cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
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ww `X1
Secret
Intelligence
The Thai Election and
Its Implications for the US
Secret
NIO IIM 76-008
February 1976
Copy
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SECRET
February 4, 1976
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
SUBJECT: The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US
KEY POINTS
With elections scheduled for April, Thailand is experiencing
a growing sense of malaise concerning the country's experiment
with parliamentary democracy.
-- This sentiment is expressed by King Phumiphon, the
military, and many prominent civilian figures.
In these circumstances, there is a strong possibility that the
military might decide to assume control. For the moment, the
King appears to be against such a course, and many military
leaders would be loathe to act against the King's wishes. The
situation is fragile, however, and subject to quick change.
-- Some younger officers are maneuvering to force their
superiors to take a stand on the question of a mil-
itary takeover.
Given the rivalries within the military, it is also
possible that one or another military leader might
attempt a preemptive coup.
Other developments which would increase the likelihood of a coup
are:
-- a sharp deterioration of the security situation.
-- a breakdown in public order caused by widespread
strikes or anti-government disorders.
-- the prospect of a left-of-center coalition coming to
power which would threaten the vested interests of
the military and conservative elements in Thailand.
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intel-
Zigence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
SECRET
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Short of a coup, there is also a possibility that the elections may
be postponed, leaving Khukrit, the present caretaker prime minister
to rule through emergency decree.
-- Khukrit, the military, and the King may well come
to prefer this alternative over going through with
the elections.
Implications for the US during the election campaign
-- By the 20 March deadline on removal
ale of US combat
forces, the US will probably be
the negotiations now in train with the Khukrit
government regarding the residual US military
presence.
-- But there is no assurance that an agreement signed
by Khukrit will be honored by a new government.
-- The election campaign probably will complicate
Thai-US relations. The US presence is likely to
become an issue in the campaign, and campaign
pressures may force some candidates to insist
on a total US military withdrawal.
Implications for the US after an election
- If an election is held, it would be likely to bring
another centrist-conservative government into power.
- Such a government would probably be as fragmented
and contentious as the present government, but it
would keep Thai policy toward the US more or less
along present lines.
A less likely possibility is either a coalition based
exclusively on rightist elements, or one which included
the Socialists.
- A rightist government would be cooperative with US
interests, but would still be restrained by politi-
cal considerations on how far it could go, or ap-
pear to go, in accommodating the US.
- ii -
SECRET
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- A government in which the Socialists had a strong
voice would make it difficult, if not impossible,
for the US to maintain any military presence in
Thailand. Such a government, however, could
prompt the military either to force the government
to resign or to overthrow it.
In the event of a military takeover, the resultant government
would be sympathetic to US interests.
-- It would be unlikely, however, to reverse the long
term trend toward a more non-aligned Thai foreign
policy. Nevertheless, a military government might
call for a substantial increase in US assistance if
faced with a greatly expanded. insurgency or a break-
down of civil order in the country.
- iii -
SECRET
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I .-.".- _.. - . W1
CENTRAL INMt1IGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 4 February 1976
NOTE FOR: The Director
SUBJECT : Senator Pell's Request
1. Per our 3 February session, attached is
a memorandum outlining a set of talking
points you may want to use in a private
session with Senator Pell in response to the
queries contained in his 23 January letter
(a copy of which is also attached).
2. The attached memorandum is classified
because the subject with which it deals is
still considered classified. If you so
desire,
a) it could be recast into a letter
for the Senator, or
b) we could draft a formal reply to
Senator Pell giving technically accurate
answers to the two questions he actually
asked (i. e. , "no" and "no"), said reply.
to be amplified and explained by you in
oral conversation, or
c) drawing on the attached, you can
give him a candid oral reply in lieu of
any formal written response to his
23 January letter.
(OVER)
OLC
Executive Registry
GACarver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO:kes
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3. Please let us know your preference on
this matter.
George Al Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
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UNCLASSIFIED _ CONFIDENTIAL SERET
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
S/MC
4
DDS&T
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/iC
9
D/DCI/NI
10
1~
GC
LC
12
IG
13
Compt
14
D/ Pers
15
D/S
16
DTR
17
Asst/ DCI
18
AO/DCI
19
20
21
22
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rational Intelligence Officers 3 February 1976
OTE FOR: The Director
UBJECT : Two Special Projects of the
Former Office of the DCI's
Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs
Per our conversation on 3 February,
_ttached are resumes of the two special
rojects we discussed. Both of these
esumes were prepared in 1973.
George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
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National Intelligence Officers 2 February 1976
Lieutenant General Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF
Acting Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301
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'7!'(t- DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIG-CE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Thank you very much for making
available to assist us in the development of NIE 13--3--76.
He is clearly a member of the community best qualified to
take on this task and we appreciate your?letting him do it.
Sincerely yours,
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
GACarver, Jr./kes
Distribution:
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
S-6011/DE-3
Mr. George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Carver:
(S) I am pleased to accept your recommendation that
of my Directorate for Estimates assist you in the development of
NIE 13-3-76: "PRC Military Policy and General Purpose Forces" by
serving as principal text manager and drafter. Despite other critical
demands on our professional talent, for what you refer to as our
"near term needs," DIA attaches a first priority to support of the
national intelligence production effort. We welcome any opportunity
to play a leading role in that effort, particularly in military or
military-related subject areas.
Sincerely,
F. F. T!!:HE, JR, --.
I ktatenant General, USA
-y
-_ _ :; I. y reetor
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FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 95.1 - - ''
O 238 DOCUMENT CONTROL 03-4Oi
DATE OF DOC
13 Feb 76
TO
FROM
SUBJ.
SEC. CL.
S
ORIGIN
IC Staff
DATE REC'D
13 Feb 76
Need for
DATE
SENT
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_WP11 1"W
February 2, 1976
The Honorable Richard M. Helms
American Ambassador
American Embassy
APO New York 09205
Dear Dick,
I apologize for the delay in answering your note of
15 December. Unfortunately, our records came up blank.
I found myself stymied but (as always) reluctant to confess
failure. The other day, I had the happy thought of calling
Walt Rostow, who did not know the answer but said. he would
get it for me. Less than an hour later, I was called, by the
head of the LBJ Library, who informed me that the first
"Wise Men" caucus on Vietnam was held on 2 November 1967.
If he is accurate (and he insists that he was), your memory
was exactly 26 days off, which is not bad considering all
that has happened since then.
Actually, I have been meaning to write you a note for
some time. Few things in the period of lunacy which seems
to have afflicted this nation have irritated me more than
the spiteful assaults on you, your achievements and your
integrity. I find this utterly bewildering (as must you).
Your record speaks for itself. Virtually your whole adult
life has been devoted to the service of our country, with no
other aim in mind save that. You have served it well and
faithfully, with much skill and commendable success.
The current claque of carping pygmies ignore the fact
that in the real world -- as opposed to the dream world some
of your critics find more congenial -- one must act without
the benefit of clairvoyance or the knowledge conferred by
hindsight.. They turn a blind eye to the pressures you were
under. I do not know all that passed between you and
President Johnson and President Nixon. (It was not my busi-
ness then, nor is it now.) If you made tactical adjustments
on lesser issues to preserve larger equities, I can only hope
that if I am ever in a similar position, I will have the
wisdom and courage to do the same.
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I -hope the tide of lunacy is-now ebbing. Should,
unhappily, it prove not yet to be at flood, I want you
to know that there are few I have ever met whom I respect
as much as you and none that I respect more. I was proud
to serve with and under you, am proud to count you as a
friend -- and have said so, and will say so to anyone who
asks, under any circumstances.
Ruth joins me in warmest regards to you both.
As ever,
GACarver,.Jr./kes
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