TOWARD A BASIS FOR EXPLOITING INTELLIGENCE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000900080059-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: January 1, 2000
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/21 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000900080059-7
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Toward A Basis For Exploiting
Intelligence In The National Interest
"National Security" and "National Interest" are terms
which, if each is defined very broadly, can mean essentially
the same thing, and if defined very narrowly can mean "guns"
and "butter. " A mix of these two extremes, put in perspective,
can be helpful. In an unthreatening world, no effort (cost) would
be expended in defending one's self; in a very threatening world,
all one's effort would be expended on self-defense and if defenses
were inadequate, extinction would result. In fact, reality is a
mix of proximate and remote risks and benefits of such a variety
that trade-offs are made in the expenditure of effort as between
"interest" and "security." Interest and security are coupled in
this view: immediate threats to security are met, at a cost to
interest, with "off-the-top" resources; remote threats are
created or discounted in the pursuit of interest.
As a way of quantifying this, I postulate that, on a scale
of value appropriate to both "interest" and "security, " an action
which causes a gain in the interest metric by one unit can in turn
decrease, with some probability and at some future time, the
security metric by more or less than one unit -- all conditioned
by intervening events. If one must buy back on the security value
scate'the cost incurred then, if the present value of the interest
gain is greater than this buy-back cost, the earlier decision was
a good one; otherwise it was not. Thus if there is a potential
cost due to national security risk resulting from a prospective
national interest benefit, proper questions are
-- What is the cost associated with the risk?
-- When is it likely the cost will be incurred?
-- What are the conditional (scenario) probabilities
associated with these two questions?
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An example might make this concrete: the contribution
to national income derived from the sale of high technology
(computers, large scale integrated circuits, etc.) processes
and factories to the Soviet Union is clearly in the national
interest. Such a sale makes American jobs, moves American
influence overseas to a "denied" area and improves American
world prestige for the implied Soviet deficiency in the technology
area. However, such a sale is conceivably even possibly contrary
to national security.. Computers and integrated circuits are the
non of efficient and effective modern weapon systems
which can threaten American national security.
It is the speculative nature of the foregoing paragraph
which is important: what is the national interest and what
with some precision -- is the threat? There has been since
at least late 1971 an apparently sincere effort by both policy-
makers and the intelligence community to work together
effectively on energy, economics, narcotics, terrorism, and the like. ,At
the same time, however, there is a prevalent unease or dissatisfact'.on'
that an adequate job was being done.
I assert that progress has been slow for two reasons:
we have not made systematic the'Comparison of national interest
values and national security values, and as a consequence, we have
not had the confidence required to move large amounts of resources
to national interest related intelligence; on the other hand, the
national interest community -- that identified by the codeword
"butter" -- has not structured itself to use abundant and complex
intelligence relating to interest.
These two value systems are now separate and the way
to change the situation is to tie them together by a mutually
regenerative feedback between them. It appears that the
intelligence community is willing and capable of responding
to the needs of the "interest" community. If circumstances
are left as is, an evolution in each community will take place with the
result that better intelligence will be provided and it will be used more
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effectively. We could, however, short-circuit this evolution
by adapting a national security process known to be effective --
some see it as too effectiNe -- to national interest problems.
What follows is a synthesis of the elements of the
national security (military-industrial complex, MIC) process.
It is the working of this process which as a byproduct develops
Don inputs to NSSM studies; the result of which is an assessment
of policy options. To the degree that the non-DoD inputs result
from similarly disciplined processes, NSSM study results are
balanced. In an area where options are conditioned by both
national security and national interest (e.g., where both an
NSSM and a CIEPSM are required for implementation), it appears
that all inputs are not so rigorously arrived at. The suggestion is
therefore that the national security process should be adapted to
clarifying "national interest" policy options.
1. Thi2: e=ti_.on is the starting point initiated or
? suggested to the policymaker. It leads to customer
intelligence requirements of a general nature as in
the DCI's Key Intelligence Questions and generates
? the necessary, permanent process of their develop-
ment. These general requirements lead to:
2. Intelligence acquisition through the intelligence process
(requirements and priorities for collection, processing,
production and analysis and dissemination). The
intelligence acquisition permits a threat description
not complete in all dimensions but providing a
basis for:
3. Threat definition in the context of the customers'
perception of the threat. The definition may be
elaborated in an informed community in and out
of government (e.g., MIC), which then puts
forward:
4. Systems* concept formulation to gain capability for
countering the defined threat. The conceptual
System is meant to connote either hardware or software (i.e.,
organiz,Ltional or logical) constructs which produce deterministic
results.
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'roe
countering systems might by class be offensive,
defensive or non-competitive and must be proved
by state-of-the-art assessments and by systems
analysis. When realizable or very probably
realizable systems are identified then:
5. Cost/benefit calculations based on net assessment (i.e.,
system analysis of A's "threat" vs B's "counter" in
which 'responsive strategies are permitted to develop)
should be carried out. This mandates establishing a
value system or "metric" for assessing and/or
rationalizing various kinds of costs, risks, and
benefits. When the costs and benefits of
candidate approaches (systems) are identified
they could become inputs to the NSSM/CIEPSM
study and provide the basis for identifying policy
options. In any event, when the cost-beneficial
system (or class thereof) is found, then:
6. System definitioiL (specification) in terms of performance,
cost, schedules, reliability, risks, initial operating
capability, etc., is made, and agreement is reached
(a contract made) with theorganization responsible
for actions leading to the capability.
7. System RDT&E* is an iterative process of items 1-6 above
leading to a prototype system on the one hand and
incidentally a better understanding in the intelligence
process (#2) of the threat indications. Conditioned by
the system's being hardware or software, the prototype
might be an "all-up" copy, a "breadboard" or "brass
board," an operating mock-up, anew computer simu-
lation or a "game," When the system meets defined
specifications adequately, then given a decision to go ahead:
8. System procurement is implemented: for hardware
systems, replication might be large; for software
systems, final procurement could have been accom-
plished in the RDT&E phase, i.e., in obtaining the
prototype. Finally:
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9. System operation and maintenance (O&M) is carried on..
Some monitoring of O&M is required to assure that
the desired objective (countering the threat) occurs
and that costs and benefits are as assessed or that
discrepancies are understood and corrected if
possible.
Clearly, the foregoing process is too elaborate if the
national interest is getting a negotiator ready for a GATT meeting.
However, the organized approach it conveys is appropriate to
enduring, complex or chronic problems relating to national interest.
How to propagate such an approach is not evident. The I\TIO's and
the ICS as DCI bearers of different aspects of intelligence community
interests could -- given highest level support -- be the catalysts for
change toward the relevant aspects of the structure shown above.
The present time of flux in the intelligence community and in the
government is a good time to start trying.
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Offi,..of the Director
of Central Intelligence
Messrs. Slighton and
May 7, 1974
ttached is a note to me froff
To be blunt, it reinforces my prejudice
t at systems analysts should be seen and not
heard.________got Leo Cherne quite stirred
up withissuggestion that we (i.e., the DCI)
ought to organize an "intelligence-industrial
complex" to serve functions (beneficial in
eyes) similar to those now performed
by the "military-industrial complex." It took
me several minutes over the long distance
telephone to get Cherne off the chandelier and
reassure him that this brain storm
was neither stimulated nor endorsed by
Mr. Colby or anyone else I had encountered
in the DCI's office. After you have had a
chance to look over this paper I would like to
discuss it briefly.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
'711C
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MEMORANDUM'F
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AUG 54
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REPLACES FORM 10-101
WH ICH MAY BE USED.
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