LETTER TO MR. COLBY(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000900060038-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: April 10, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

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ilgei,ce
Officers
Hr. Colby,
Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence
DATE: 10 April 1974
At our community meeting of
Soviet watchers on 11 March, you.
requested a dialogue of detente's
pros and cons from Soviet points
of view. John was concerned that
the flavor of a dialogue not-get
watered down in coordination as
an annex to the NIAM on Detente
now in progress, so he commissioned
a separate piece.
Attached is an advance copy for
your browsing. The piece is by
I of OC .
They chose a discursive dialogue to
convey some feel for detente's
variety and complexity; the simplistic
shorthand in which we usually speak of
the Soviets and detente is just that.
John and I will be contemplating
possible further distribution and would
welcome any suggestions you might have.
cc: DDCI (w/att.)
D/DCI/NI0 (w/att.)
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OCI No. 1312/74
10 April 1974
SUBJECT: Detente: The View From the Kremlin
It is no more than analytical prudence to assume that
the policy of detente, its wholistic configuration as well
as its constituent parts, is under continuing review by the
Leaders in the Kremlin. However, the circumstantial
evidence also suggests that Brezhnev and his cohorts, both
his supporters and his detractors, are now giving fresh
attention to the status of detente, and its viability as
a strategy for achieving the purposes of the Soviet state
and people in the world and at home.
Secretary Kissinger in Moscow made the undoubtedly
pertinent point that Brezhnev has a historical stake in
detente, but' the Soviet Leader must be equally impressed
with detente's present and future claim on his political
fortune. Insofar as detente is thought to be in trouble,
then Brezhnev himself is under some pressure to demonstrate
either that it is not so, or that he is moving with alacrity
to make those policy adjustments that are necessary to
protect Soviet interests under changing circumstances.
In his Alma Alta speech in mid-March, Brezhnev again sought
to disarm the naysayers by arguing that the present diffi-
culties had been foreseen by himself and the other supporters
of the present policy. As has been the case at previous
certain junctures, there was a defensive quality to his
remarks on detente, perhaps giving evidence that he is
under some pressure from his would-be successors, perhaps
,signaling that he himself is having second thoughts.
When deputy economic minister Kuz'min almost plaintively
'd a US diplomat during Zissinger's visit that the Soviet
Union needed an economic agreement--any agreement--in order
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to counter the arguments of unnamed opportunists, he may
well have been doing more than playing negotiating games.
Indeed, Kuz'min may have been speaking to an important
aspect of detente that is as frustrating as it is
ephemeral. Detente is a concept that is, at its heart,
subjective.
There is no coherent way of taking its temperature,
of determining its health by objective criteria. Detente
is in trouble when it is thought to be in trouble. Indeed,
detente is as subject to a downward spiral of self-feeding
disappointments as to an updraft of unrealistic expecta-
tions. Progress can be made on a panoply of issues, but
one highly visible setback, even if greatly exaggerated,
can create doubts that are not commensurate with any objective
criteria. At this relatively early stage of its development,
detente is a hostage to the vagaries of domestic politics,
the mercurial nature of public relations, the prejudices,
the fears as well as the justifiable concerns of honest
men.
For Brezhnev, the emergence of the negative force of
all these factors has been somewhat unsettling. His recent
ascerbic references to the Western press are evidence of
frustration that the Soviet Union is being unfairly saddled
with the responsibility for what seems to be going wrong
with detente. It is one thing to reap opprobrium for
conscious policies, quite another to be irrationally blamed
for circumstances that are not of one's own doing.
For the Soviets, detente means more than reducing
tensions and building shared interests with the US; it also
refers to West Europe and the rest of the non-Communist
world. Nonetheless, relations with the US are the lynchpin.
If the administration in Washington--any administration-- is
in political difficulty, then the Soviets have reason to be
concerned. In the present circumstances, such concerns have
the additional dimension that President Nixon has, in some
respects, become identified with the policy of detente. If
the President is in political trouble then so is detente.
ioreover, insofar as the President is .politically weakened,
he is less able to deliver on issues that are of immediate
concern to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, and Brezhnev
in particular, has a strong political stake in the welfare
of President Nixon. They will do what they can to make
the President's road easier--within limits. Where those
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THE FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENTS
The policy of detente means different things to different
Soviet leaders. Some will argue that moves toward accommoda-
tion with the West can be pursued with little adjustment of
Soviet foreign political objectives or domestic policies.
They will contend that a relaxation of international tensions
will provide Moscow with a breathing spell during which
greater attention can be paid to strengthening the Soviet
economic and military base. These leaders will argue that
Moscow's detente tactics have already produced major benefits,
including US acknowledgement of the USSR's right to strategic
equality, recognition of Moscow's special role in the settle-
ment of virtually all international problems, acceptance of
Soviet post-war claims in Europe, and isolation of China.
This faction will also maintain that persistent pursuit of
detente will eventually result in Soviet emergence as the
number one power in the world.
Other pro-detente leaders will argue that detente should
be used to modernize the USSR's economic and political
system and to redirect scarce resources from defense to more
productive economic endeavors. They will contend that
increments to Soviet strategic power are unlikely to produce
greater security for the USSR, and that economic priorities
must be changed to the benefit of the civilian sectors of
the economy. In their view, the survival of the Soviet
political system depends more on the modernization of Moscow's
political and economic institutions than on the continued
build-uo of the military establishment, and that if major
remedial action is not taken soon, Moscow-cannot expect to
play a major role in world affairs despite its military power.
The USSR must negotiate earnestly with the West and not try
to seek marginal advantages that can only cast doubt on
Soviet intentions and deny Moscow access to vital Western
technology and capital.
On the other side of the fence are those in the Soviet
leadership who will contend that detente either as a tactic
or a strategy will only encourage the West to undertake new
assaults against Communism. They will point to Allende's
overthrow in Chile and to unilateral US actions in the Middle
East as croof that Moscow's hands are tied because of detente-
They will point to CSCE controversies and the trade-emigration
tangle with the US as evidence that the West is, in fact,
already seeking to undermine Soviet society. All these
events show the real nature of US imperialism which is only
waiting for the propitious moment to pounce on the USSR.
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Limits Lay is an ongoing analytical problem. Suffice it
to say that because of his own internal requirements,
Brezhnev will find it tougher and tougher to be helpful as
the detente atmosphere sours, and if it appears that Moscow
is not getting what it wants out of detente.
The following sections present an abbreviated and
overly rationalized run-down on the major issues affecting
detente as they might be seen by detente proponents and
opponents in the Soviet Leadership. Not surprisingly, it
;presents a mixed picture, and it may convey some sense
.of how complex and inter-related the factors are in the
"real world."
Detente is bound to have a significant impact on high
politics in the Kremlin. Not only is it a conceptual frame-
work for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy but it is
fraught with ideological and concrete implications for the
nature of the Soviet polity. It is highly unlikely, however,
that a manichean interpretation of detente's impact on
Kremlin politics--i.e., the "liberal" pro-detente forces
vs. the "orthodox" hard-Line opponents--accurately depicts
the conflicting opinions and motivations of the contenders
for power. The ideal types almost certainly do not fit
existing persons; it seems more likely that each individual,
whatever his own biases, finds himself sometimes perched
right in the middle. Moreover, politics and personal.
political gains may take precedence over the "rights" and
"wrongs" of a particular issue. Opportunism, and the need
or desire to be on the winning side may cause "hardliners"
to back pro-detente policies, or vice versa.
There does not seem to be any overriding substantive
imperative, unless one is prepared to argue that the Soviet
Union's need to modernize makes some form of detente histori-
caZZy inevitable. It may be prudent to estimate that there
is a systemic bias in favor of detente that is significantly
reinforced by Brezhnev's personal need that detente not end
in ignominious failure. Beyond those biases, however,
there is some Latitude for a tougher overall approach and a
harder Line in specific substantive areas that are
particularly sensitive for the Soviets, or where they think
that detente is not fully serving their needs.
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They will argue that a war economy and extreme vigilance
are required to protect the Soviet Union from its external
enemies and from the subversion of internal dissidents.
Moreover, Moscow is duty bound to support Communist
and revolutionary movements worldwide. Collapse of the
capitalist system and political structure, they will avow,
can provide the only conditions under which the Soviet
state can flourish. Thus, any deals with the West will only
strengthen Moscow's adversaries.
SALT
The strategic arms limitations talks that
began in November Z969 have become the center-
piece of the process of accommodation in US-Soviet
relations. Because these talks involve the vital
security interests of both sides, their relative
success or failure will have considerable impact
on the whose policy of detente and perhaps even
on the political fortunes of those Soviet leaders
who support this policy. "Success" at the talks
would mean that deeply rooted mutual suspicions
about each other's intentions could be set aside
in the interest of achieving a greater degree of
strategic stability in the relationship. This
in turn would likely produce. greater efforts
toward conciliation in other areas touching on
the vital interests of the two sides. "Failure""
at the talks would not only jeopardize the con-
tinued viability of the arms agreements already
achieved, but would lead to an intensification
of the arms race, a sharpening of the adversary
relationship across-the-board, and increasing
official and public questioning on both sides
of the advantages of detente in general.
The arguments for continued Soviet interest in nego-
tiated arms restraint are much the same as ;they were when
SALT began. The Soviets want US recognition of Moscow's
right to strategic equality and a role in world affairs
commensurate with this capability. The Soviet proponents
of detente would argue that the ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement on offensive weapons were good deals from Moscow's
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standpoint, insofar as they checked the further deployment
of antimissile weapons--an area in which the US had a
commanding technological edge at the time of agreement--
and allowed a Soviet advantage, both in numbers and
throw-weight, in the systems limited by the offensive
agreement.
These Soviet leaders would argue in behalf of future
arms agreements on both military and economic grounds..
In their view new SALT accords would have the effect of
restraining US technological developments in the strategic
area, allowing Moscow to catch up, and perhaps even to
gain some slight margin of advantage in certain strategic
i
capab
lities. A new agreement might also permit some
economies in the strategic weapons area, allowing greater
expenditures on conventional forces and arms and providing
more. resources for non-military sectors of the economy as
well.
Con
The political forces arrayed against detente would
argue that the US cannot be trusted--as evidenced by
Secretary Schlesinger's recent pronouncements--and that
US programmed and planned strategic forces show that Washing-
ton would like to achieve strategic superiority. They would
contend that the USSR will be able to catch up with the US
in strategic weaponry during the period of the Interim
Agreement, and possibly achieve a significant strategic
advantage if the arms talks and the detente policy are
properly manipulated. The present mood of the US Congress
and the Nixon Administration's political difficulties can
be exploited to Moscow's benefit. In addition, the USSR
can use its emerging strategic prowess to impose Soviet
diktat on the solution of world problems. In effect, the
detractors of detente would argue that history shows that
the US only appreciates armed strength, and that the Soviet
leaders are duty bound to acquire whatever it takes to
assure that the USSR is the number one power in the world.
THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR
Although there is a real question in the
minds of Western analysts about the extent to
which the Soviet economy can effectively absorb
advanced foreign technology and managerial methods,
Soviet efforts to gain both have been an important
part of Moscow's move toward detente.
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The proponents of detente likely argue that without
access to Western goods and markets, the USSR will have
little hope of catching up with the industrialized countries
of the West, and, in fact, may have difficulty in maintaining
Moscow's present position. They will tend to rationalize
the setback for most-favored-nation treatment, saying that
the Nixon Administration is fully committed to improving
trade and extending credits to Moscow. The Administration
and US businessmen will find ways of circumventing US
Congressional opposition and efforts.to link the trade
issue with Soviet emigration policies.
These detente advocates contend that.autarky has failed
and that the USSR must have access to Western technology
and capital investments if the Soviet economy is to be
modernized. The proponents will argue further that greater
economic interdependence with the West will likely produce
a more stable and advantageous international order, inso-
far as Moscow's adversaries have as much to gain from
increased economic ties as the USSR, and will therefore
be reluctant to move against clearly perceived Soviet
interests.
Mindful of traditional Soviet sensitivity to Western
ideas and influences, the detente faction will say that
greater access to Western economies need not require a
loosening up of internal discipline, and certainly will
not require fundamental changes in the economic or political
system. A greater influx of Westerners in the USSR will
naturally require vigilance on the part of Soviet authorities,
but if the Communist state has any vitality at all, the
populace can be made resistant to bourgeois overtures.
t ~n
The opponents of detente will argue against the foregoing
considerations on political and economic grounds. They will
say that the West is bent on subverting Soviet society and
that economic bridgebuilding will be the instrument of these
efforts. They will argue that the greater presence of
Westerners in the USSR, whether businessmen or tourists,
will inevitably result in a resurgence of bourgeois morals
and political dissidence in Soviet society.
The detractors of detente will also contend that greater
economic ties with the West will entail forms of dependence
that will inhibit Moscow from pursuing traditional political
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objectives, will encourage Soviet allies and clients to
follow Moscow's example, and will constitute a "sell-out"
of other progressive political forces in the world. They
will point to US Congressional efforts to link trade issues
with Soviet domestic policies as proof of Washington's
perfidy, alleging that the Nixon Administration is not
genuinely committed to non-discriminatory treatment of the
USSR, but wants only to extract advantages from Moscow.
On economic grounds, the anti-detente forces will argue
that the West is only interested in gaining access to vital
Soviet natural resources. To allow such access would
strengthen economies of Moscow's adversaries at the expense
of future Soviet economic growth and would deplete resources
that the USSR will itself eventually need. This opposition
will also maintain that increased economic ties with the
West are likely.to produce over time changes in the Soviet
economic system, since Moscow's planned economy and economic
structure is ill-suited to adapt to Western business methods
and managerial techniques.
Ideology is in fundamental competition with
detente: the concept of a revolutionary inter-
national Communist movement, with the Soviet
Union as its leader and chief benefactor, must
somehow be squared with the Soviet Union as
partner in peaceful co-existence.
Detente does not preclude strenuous ideological
competition with the West; pro-detente forces not only
subscribe to, but emphasize, the proposition. The Soviet
Union has the best social system and it should become
clear in the industrial West as well as the Third World
that socialism, not capitalism, will meet the needs of
the people. Socialism need not fear that increased con-
tacts with the West necessarily mean a loss of ideological
fervor. On the contrary, it may turn out that the greater
familiarity with the West will be a tonic for the socialist
peoples. Brezhnev's concept of "victory through contacts"
means victory over the backsliders and the reactionary
elements in the socialist systems as well as over the
ideas and the gimickery of the capitalist nations.
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The pro-detente people would not deny that increased
contacts with the West will place an additional burden on
ideological discipline within the socialist community.
But socialism is equal to the challenge, and heightened
awareness of what it means to be a communist, they might
well argue, will not only immunize our people against the
siren song of the capitalists, but will have the positive
effect of reinvigorating and rededicating the socialist
parties. At home, it will be necessary to tighten-down
on those who oppose the socialist system and those who
are irretrievably lost to anti-Sovietism. The'disposition
of the Solzhenitsyn case demonstrates that detente has not
reduced our capacity to purge our society of heretics.
Lenin teaches that socialism must constantly adapt
to changing conditions, and detente is appropriate to
the present historical period. Under the shadow of
nuclear war, the old tactics and strategy run an inordinate
risk of destroying the Soviet state and people. Moreover,
the energy, resource and inflation crisis that grips the
capitalist West is evidence that detente does not stand
in the way of the inevitable decline and fall of capitalism.
Taking the tactical line,. the pro-detente forces would
also argue that detente helps promote the idea of "united
front;" it makes Communist movements and parties respectable
in parts of the world where they are thought to be sinister
creatures of the Soviet Union, or it makes them viable
candidates for power in countries of Western Europe where
they have been effectively shut-out. ,
The naysayers would emphasize that detente, even as
it seems to be working--reducing tensions with the West
and establishing increasing contacts and inter-dependence--
will inevitably cause a lessening of socialist discipline,
no matter what lip service is paid to greater vigilance.
The USSR will be inclined to adopt quasi-capitalist methods
and thinking in order, for example, to make more effective
use of the Western technology and know-how that is to be
introduced.
In Eastern Europe, pro-capitalist elements will be
encouraged to pressure their governments for increased
liberalization in the economic sphere, in the pattern of
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everyday life, and in the expression of diverse (and
noxious) ideas. This will make it more difficult for the
Soviet Union to keep Eastern Europe from going the route
of Romania, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia during the
1968 "Prague Spring."
It may be true that the so-called detente atmosphere
will make it easier to organize a new world Communist
meeting, but at the same time it makes it less likely
that such a conference will take a firm stand against
the Chinese or will otherwise rally around the-Soviet
Union as the head of a disciplined, cohesive and aggres-
sively competitive world communist movement. Detente
with the US makes it easier for Peking to charge that it
is the Soviet Union that is revisionist. Moreover, it
makes a tough line with China more difficult to sell
psychologically within the Communist world. After all,
if the Soviet Union can find a way of composing its
differences with the capitalists why not with the apostate
Communists?
The current crisis of capitalism, far from demonstrating
the efficiency of detente, is a good reason to question
detente's utility to the Soviet Union. As the "crisis"
grows worse the capitalists will become more desperate,
adventuresome, and dangerous. The Soviet Union will
need greater vigilance not less. Moreover, the problems
of the capitalists offer opportunities to the Soviet Union
which ought not to be foregone in the interests of anything
as ephemeral as detente.
CHINA AND EAST ASIA
The proponents of detente would argue with some
force that better relations with the West and the US helps
isolate Communist China. They would argue that China
represents a real and growing threat to the Soviet Union.
Peking not only has a growing military capability that makes
any Soviet preemptive attack less and less attractive, but
the whole raison d'etre of Peking's foreign policy is to
frustrate the Soviet Union, to counter and arrest Soviet
influence in the non-Communist world and to challenge its
hegemony among the Communist parties and nations. The threat
from Peking has grown as China has ended its self-imposed
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isolation of the Cultural Revolution, and seeks to promote
its place in the world as the first among equals of the
"third world"--the one nation that is big and strong enough
to challenge the great powers, but whose economic and techno-
logical development enables it to identify its interests
with the other developing countries.
The Soviet Union must, the proponents would argue,
place itself in a position vis a vis the Chinese where
the onus falls on Peking for the tension that arises from
the rivalry of the two nations. Detente with the US and
the West serves as a model for how nations with different
social systems can compose their differences. The Soviet
Union is willing to reach an accommodation with the renegade
Chinese, but it is Peking's obduracy that stands in the way.
A tougher Soviet attitude on the prospects for peace with
the US and the non-Communist world serves Peking's purposes
by enabling the Chinese to argue that the Soviets are the
new imperialists on the international scene.
The proponents would also see the continuation of a
viable detente policy as forestalling closer relations between
Washington and Peking. The US, they might say, would
naturally turn to Peking if it believed that the prospects
had declined for better relations with the Soviet Union.
It would do so to apply psychological and diplomatic pressure
on Moscow, and perhaps even in order to create a security
threat for the Soviet Union in the East as a means of
diverting Soviet attention from Europe and the Middle East.
For their part, the Chinese would seize the opportunity
afforded by a breakdown in the detente atmosphere to improve
its relations with the US to gain some leverage with the
Soviet Union. Peking might calculate that a souring of
US-Soviet relations would inevitably have the effect of
increasing suspicions in Western Europe of Soviet. intentions
and would, therefore, breathe fresh life into the nascent
European movement toward defense cooperation. This in turn
;fight have the effect, in Chinese eyes, of making it harder
for the Soviet Union to hang tough in the East.. As a con-
sequence, the proponents of detente might argue, the Chinese
would be even less inclined to reach an acceptable accommo-
dation with the Soviet Union.
The proponents might also make the case that maintaining
the detente atmosphere with the L'S would make a post-Mao
leadership more amenable to improving relations with the
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Soviet Union. As long as the Chinese feel themselves to be
on the short-end of the triangular relationship, they will
have some constraints on their international adventurism
and some incentive to compromise their differences with
Moscow. If US-Soviet relations are relatively cool and,
concomitantly,.if Sino-US relations are relatively warm,
the new leaders will believe themselves to be in the
advantageous position and they have little reason to adopt
restraint or a conciliatory line with the Soviet Union.
A significant weakening of the detente atmosphere
would also complicate the Soviet Union's relations with
Japan. Although Tokyo has strong economic interests in
Siberian development, it might be more inclined to drive
a tougher bargain if it felt that the Soviets had adopted
a tougher stance toward the non-Communist world. Domestic
and US pressures might force the Japanese to make a closer
linkage between economic cooperation and political issues
such as the northern territories and a peace treaty. Peking
would also seek to take advantage of Japanese apprehensions
by pressing for closer economic and political ties with Tokyo.
The Soviet Union would face similar problems elsewhere
in South and Southeast Asia. Moscow's influence in
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore would
be arrested and its efforts to curtail Chinese influence
would be undermined if there were a growing impression
the region that the Soviets were launched on a new and
tougher foreign policy. In addition, the US might be
more forceful than in recent years to move to curtail
Soviet influence either by increasing its military and
economic assistance in the region or promoting a regional
successor to SEATO that froze-out the Soviet Union.
The hardliners on detente would try to refute the idea
that good relations with the US are forestalling or limiting
a Peking-t'lashington connection. The Chinese invasion of
the Paracel Islands and Peking's acquiescence to the
prospective US base on Diego Garcia prove that a de-facto
understanding between the US and China is already a reality,
detente notwithstanding. Furthermore, it is not necessarily
immutable that Moscow would become the isolated party if
its relations with Washington went sour. On the contrary,
evidence of a general toughening of the Soviet posture might
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have a tonic effect in Pekin
the Chinese to their. senses thantevmight t
idenceoof oSovietbring
Pusillanimity. Moreover, Peking may believe that the
requirements of detente have a more restraining influence
on Soviet behavior with respect to China than would emerge
from a closer Sino-?us relationship.
A Moscow that is less concerned about what the US or
Europe thinks is also freer to deal with China from a
position of strength. Dealing from such a position, a
tougher line with respect to the US could be accompanied
by fresh overtures to the Chinese. These might not bear
immediate fruit, but they would be in the direction of
bridging the ideological schism in a way that would be
both acceptable to the Soviet Union and in the interests
of both China and the USSR. Implicit in the naysayers'
argument would be the prospect of some change in the Chinese
leadership that would be less locked into the old disputes
and animosity of the early years of the Chinese revolution.
The hardliners might also hold out the prospect that any
movement toward a closer connection with. Peking would also
increase the Soviet Union's leverage with the US.
Regarding the effects in the rest of East and South
Asia, the hardliners would likely argue that if the USSR
really needs Japanese investment, the profit motive will
suffice to bring the Japanese around. They would also
contend that there is a irreducible foundation of mistrust
and conflicting interests between the Chinese and Japanese
that would forestall any relationship that need greatly
concern the USSR. They would argue against the idea that
detente has helped the Soviet Union counter Chinese influence
in Southeast Asia, pointing to the considerable inroads that
the Chinese have been making over the past few years. In
their view, a tougher line with the US would not have any
appreciable impact on Moscow's relations with India, which
is still dependent on Moscow for most of its sophisticated
military hardware.
EUROPE
Detente is portrayed by its proponents as the most suitable
means for achieving Moscow's goals
conditions. in Europe under present
The detente faction in the Soviet leadership
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likely argues that the best way to remove US influence
and extend Moscow's in Europe is by encouraging a multipli-
cation of interlocking ties between the USSR and various
European states. The detente group probably contends that
its policies have already produced major results, as attested
by the various agreements signed over the past few years
between Moscow and/or its Warsaw Pact allies and West
Germany and France in particular. International acknowledge-
ment of the GDR's legitimacy has at last been achieved.
Moreover, this faction also likely points to Western
disarray during the recent Middle East crisis and to the
split between the US and a majority of the European states
over the Arab oil embargo as further vindication of Soviet.
detente efforts. In general, Western European exposure to
a benign Soviet policy face will tend to make them less
desirous or tolerant of US presence and influence in Europe.
The proponents of detente likely maintain that a
careful nurturing of Soviet ties in Europe will produce
greater access to Western technology on terms favorable
to Moscow, and will provide the USSR with an alternative to
economic reliance on Washington. Although acknowledging
that Moscow at times will be required to make concessionary
gestures in the interest of producing Western acceptance
of common objectives, for instance at MBFR or CSCE, the
Soviet advocates of detente will argue that Moscow's aims
will still be more readily realized than by adopting a
tough belligerent posture. This group likely contends
that minimal concessions at CSCE, for example, will
lead to a hasty conclusion of that conference, securing
West European acknowledgement of the far more important
Soviet objectives of permanence of post-war boundaries,
a greater Soviet voice in European affairs, and an enhance-
ment of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. On MBFR, the
detente faction will argue that Soviet willingness to reduce
its military presence in central Europe can be manipulated
to result in a weakening of US and NATO capabilities, not
in he Warsaw Pact's.
~rrj
The opponents of detente likely argue that the-achieve-
ment of Soviet policy goals in Europe requires no con-
cessions to the West. This group would contend that a
manifest disunity among the the West European states and
a gradual weakening of the Atlantic alliance was evident
in the period before detente. Conciliatory moves on
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Moscow's part now, this group would maintain, may backfire
by causing the European nations to demand that the USSR
pay a price for gains that were likely to come Moscow's
way in any event.
This faction would claim that the MBFR talks had
provided the US with the means to indefinitely postpone
the unilateral reduction of its military forces in Europe;
such reductions were all but inevitable prior to the opening
of MBFR. CSCE, this group would contend, was supposed to
be a quick, simple consolidation of the Soviet position in
Europe, but the conciliatory requirements of detente have
diluted CSCE's impact. De facto Western recognition of
post-war boundaries in Europe had been achieved prior to
the talks as a direct result of Moscow's military might.
Soviet concessions at the talks now, particularly on such
issues as the freer exchange of ideas and people, are
dangerous and could imperil Soviet control over Eastern
Europe and prove to be disruptive inside the USSR as well.
The detente opposition may also argue that the USSR
should perhaps modify its longstanding goal of removing
the US from Europe, since an American presence has actually
served some Soviet purposes. This faction would maintain--
and the proponents might be compelled to agree--that US
economic interests and military presence have impeded, in
some important instances, greater European unity, and have
given Moscow ample justification for strengthening its
position in Eastern Europe. A major reduction in the
American presence in Europe might only serve to strengthen
European resolve to pool their resources, particularly
military, thereby becoming a formidable obstacle to Moscow's
interests. Moreover, this group would argue that a major
reduction of the US presence would make it more difficult
for Moscow to maintain some hegemony over the Warsaw Pact
states.
The movement of events in the Middle East,
particularly since the October war, make this
one of the most difficult areas for. the pro-
ponents of detente. They would be hard pressed
to find solid evidence that detente has helped
the Soviets in concrete ways or that it has
created conditions that point to a brighter
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future for Soviet influence in the region. In
essence, their arguments would boil down to asser-
tions that, without a reasonably close relation-
ship to the US, things would be worse than they
now are.
The pro-detente leaders would argue that, for the first
time, the US has publicly acknowledged that the USSR has a
rightful and legitimate role to play in the Middle East.
This acknowledgment, they would contend, has considerable
symbolic importance by impressing on the countries of the
region the fact that the Soviet Union will continue to be
a power to be reckoned with in the Middle East and, therefore,
in establishing the basis on which future Soviet policy can
be built.
The detente supporters would make the case that the
setbacks the USSR has suffered in the Middle East do not
derive from any constraints imposed by detente. If any-
thing, detente enabled the Soviets to back the Egyptians
and the Syrians with less fear of directly involving them-
selves in hostilities with the US than was the case during
the 1967 war. Because of detente, a potentially explosive
situation was brought under control in a way that not only
did not undermine Soviet influence in the Middle East but, in
fact, provided via the Geneva conference a means by which
Moscow could retain a major voice in the future political
arrangement of the region.
The problem for the USSR, the detente supporters would
assert, is that the objective conditions in the Middle East
were, through no fault of Moscow or its policies, working
in a way that was favorable to the US. The US was able to
regain some initiative in the Middle East because the Arabs,
particularly the Egyptians for their own reasons, were
interested in affording the US a larger role. This had
nothing to do with detente. It is well to remember, the
pro-detente faction might well argue, that the Soviet Union
is dealing with rulers in the Middle East whose social out-
look is not always fundamentally in accord with the pro-
gressive forces of the world. Many of them share an
ideological affinity with the US that acts as a bias--although
not one that cannot be overcome with a properly tuned policy--
against Soviet interests.
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Detente did not help prevent a war in the Middle East.
Moreover, opponents of detente would point to recent
developments in the area as evidence not only that detente
does not promote Soviet interest in the world but that it
can be artfully used by the US as a way of limiting or even
erasing the USSR's hard-won gains. It was not detente, they
would argue, that paved the way or even put the finishing
touches on the emergence of the Soviet Union as a Middle East
power. Washington's "acknowledgment" was nothing more than
;recognition of the reality of Soviet power and influence that
was won by years of efforts, billions of rubles, and the
reality of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean.
The objective evidence demonstrates, without contradic-
tion, that whatever its lip service to the "proper" Soviet
role, Washington will do everything it can to thwart the
Soviet Union in the Middle East. It is not only that Sadat
is ungrateful for the Soviet Union's past assistance.
Kissinger's personal diplomacy is skillfully designed to
drive a wedge between the Arabs and the USSR, and he has done
everything in his power to isolate the Soviet Union from the
mainstream of Middle East events. US support for Israel
has increased, not diminished. In truth, the Soviet Union
has been relegated to the sidelines with the likes of
France and Great Britain. Nor will going to Geneva
necessarily change the objective situation. The Soviet
Union may well find itself as isolated there as it does
when Kissinger shuttles between the Arab capitals, or when the
Israelis and Syrians are talking in Washington.
Detente has had the effect of beguiling the USSR
into believing that the US would not seek unilateral
advantage in an area of vital interest to both countries.
The US, far from being constrained by detente, will feel
itself having a greater latitude to operate in the area.
This, the opportunists would argue, is the real meaning of
the Defcon III alert.
The same misperceptions that make the US less solicitous
of the Soviet Union's amour propre in the Middle East also
have the effect of making the nations of the region less
mindful of Soviet advice, less willing to shape their policies
in accordance with Soviet desires, and even contemptuous of
the Soviet will. Moscow's adherence to detente leads to a
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sense of Soviet ineffectuality and weakness that provides
the basis for Sadat's swing toward the US, for Asad's
refusal to take Soviet advice, and even--the detente opponents
might add--for the failure to make more inroads among the
Persian Gulf states. They would argue that the meaning of
detente must be shaped in such a way as to enable the Soviet
Union to pursue without impediment its own interest in the
Middle East. For example, this might mean that the Soviet
Union would work against any peace settlement to which it
did not have a major contribution, or which does not
afford the Soviet Union the opportunity to strengthen its
position in the region. The answer lies not in hoping that
detente will cause the US to gratuitiously grant the Soviet
Union a place in the Middle East sun, but in a return to the
basics of Soviet foreign policy, i.e., the vigorous support
of progressive forces and a vigorous opposition to their
enemies, all with a mind to shaping the objective realities
within the region in a way favorable to Soviet interests.
THIRD WORLD
. The problem of the Third World is not a front
burner issue in the Kremlin, but it is of considerable
interest both because of the ideological questions
that are raised with regard to the proper role of
the Soviet state in carrying the Communist message
to the developing states, and because the Third
World is frequently an area of rivalry between
the Soviets, the Chinese and the US.
The proponents of detente would argue that the new image
of equality and probity that is afforded by detente helps
the Soviet Union in Third World countries that are still
wary of dealing with the USSR. Detente helps reduce the
possibility that rivalries between the USSR and the US in
the Third World will, in any specific case, result in an
unacceptable and dangerous level of tension between the two
superpowers. The USSR can compete in the Third World with
less fear of drifting into high-risk situations. The
detente atmosphere allows and encourages Washington's con-
traction of its global presence and commitments, in turn,
affording the USSR opportunities for expanding its influence
in the Third World. While detente does not forestall the
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Soviet Union from making inroads into new areas`or from
selectively expending its influence in countries of
strategic location or natural resource value, detente
also makes it easy for the USSR to avoid frittering away
its resources in the Third World in a senseless competition
with the US.
The anti-detente forces would argue that the gains
cited by the proponents have little to do with detente.
The waning of Washington's interest and activities in the
Third World stems from the Vietnam war and domestic problems
of the US, and from the USSR's equal military footing with
the US. Although detente may make it marginally less risky
for the USSR to compete in the Third World, it also makes
it more difficult for the Soviets to spread its influence
there in a meaningful way. Insofar as the USSR becomes
identified with the US as having some special responsibility
in the world, then it loses its claim to having a unique,
historical, revolutionary mission, identifiable with the
revolutionary aspirations of the Third World..
Anti-detente elements would also point out, with some
circumspection, that the Soviet Union's identification with
the US makes it'easier for China to interpose itself as
a leader of the revolutionary Third World. in some areas
of the world, like sub-Sahara Africa, the Chinese are
actively and effectively challenging the USSR. The
Chinese-Algerian communique following Boumediene's
visit to Peking represented a step toward acknowledgement
that the USSR is now to be considered a part of the
technological and industrial world and can no longer claim
to speak on behalf of or as part of the developing nations.
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