BREAKFAST NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800090018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: June 14, 1973
• Content Type: MF

SECS' 25X1
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
SUBJECT Breakfast Notes
1. Outlined below are several points you might want
to raise, discuss or allude to during your 15 June 1973
breakfast with Dr. Kissinger.
2. Overflight Ground Rules. Despite General Scowcroft's
13 June assurances, I am sti concerned that one bit of fall-
out from the most recent round of negotiations may be curtail-
ment (or, at worst, elimination) of the intelligence community's
present authorization to fly imagery collection 25X1;
flights over Laos, Cambodia and South ie na . Appended to
this memo is a note (prepared by I I on the specific 25X1'
consequences any such ground rule curtailment would produce.
This subject is a matter of direct concern to me since I am
still Chairman of WSAG Working Group C (Intelligence) and, as
such, responsible to Henry and the President for the adequacy 25X1'
of the community's overall Indochina coverage. I
No one, leas or al 1 , is c e
1s -- or, even more, the President's -- entire right to make
any policy decision deemed to be in the net national interest.
Any decision that severly curtails our present collection capa-
bilities, however, should not be backed into, sprung as a surprise,
or mad
ith
e w
out frontally facing and weighing the trade-offs in-
io'_ved. If there is any thought of curtailing the current
ground rules re use of Laotian, Cambodian and/or South Vietnamese
airspace -- plus flights over international waters in the Gulf of
Tonkin -- the President will be ill-served indeed if the com-
munity is not able to give him before any such decision is made
a precise and specific explanation o z?s coTE in terms ate' our
reduced capabilities to meet what we have been told are the
President's intelligence requirements.
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4. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare in Indochina.
Another area where the ground rules need clarification is that
of our political and psychological warfare efforts in Indochina..
At times past (particularly when negotiations were in process or
a new plateau therein, e.g. an agreement, had just been achieved),
Henry's position on this topic has tended to be delphically am-
bivalent (even for him). Our "guidance" has been on the order of
"hang your clothes on the hickory limb, but don't go near the
water." What we need to know is how vigorous and/or aggressive
the White House wants us to be. We can (and will) preach the
virtues of peace and reconciliation, the question is the extent
to which -- through unilateral action and/or discreet encourage-
ment of GVN efforts -- we should needle the North Vietnamese for
any of their lapses from virtue, stimulate debate and friction
within and among various components of the Communist structure
(North and South), and burr away imaginatively at the zest for
continued struggle of the DRV's population and the Party's and
army's rank and file. We will, of course, attempt anything our
political masters want tried, and eschew any tactics or themes
they want left alone.
5. We are not pushing or peddling anything. It is the
case, however, that our policy-level superiors often seem be-
mused by the delusion that the North Vietnamese respond posi-
tively to gracious gestures, whereas in-fact the Party usually
regards them as signs of weakness. Also, our masters often seem
reluctant to approve propaganda or psychological warfare gambits
that might irritate our adversaries -- something a successful or
worthwhile gambit invariably does. For example, the most dev-
astating leaflet we could drop would be one containing a picture
of Chairman Mao and President Nixon in friendly conversation.
When the GVN did just that (with telling effect) last year,
however, the White House was furious. Every time we have
floated this idea, it has been shot down in flames. The con-
cern or rationale seems to be that such a gambit might make the
Chinese mad and complicate burgeoning detente. The Chinese, of
course, do not share similar inhibitions and are past masters
(often successful ones to boot) at the art of sweet and sour
politics. I think we are much too.diffident or timid in this
arena, but -- as stated above -- we are not peddling anything..
All We need is direction, guidelines and indications as to the.
limits of permissibility, but we do need those rather badly.
6. Substantive Matters. Our OCI colleagues prepared some
briefing notes tor you w is they sent us in draft. Rather
than engage in heated debate, we simply suggested that they skip
the interpretative argument and give you early on the morning of
the fifteenth a factual resume of what had -- or had not --
happened in South Vietnam through midnight (our time) on the
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fourteenth, i.e. the implementation hour. for the "new" cease
fire. As you know, there are sharp internal splits within the
Agency on Communist priorities and probable near-term intentions.
My OCI and ONE colleagues -- whose views I respect even when I
cannot subscribe to them -- are convinced that in the foresee-
able future Hanoi plans to concentrate primarily (almost exclu-
sively) on political action/competition, employing military
force only for defensive purposes. I am far less persuaded
that the sizeable military machine the Communists now have in
South Vietnam was developed and strengthened (in flagrant viola-
tion of the 27 January Agreement) purely or even primarily for
defense.
7. I do agree that in the short run -- after the new cease
fire's implementation hour -- the Communists, for a time, are
unlikely to essay any significant offensive activity until they
test the political winds and temperature. Interpretative judg-
ments in this arena, however, are very tricky matters to offer
to Henry, particularly at this moment -- especially when several
of the key variables (e.g. matters on which there may have been
private debate or even tacit agreement at Paris) are unknowns
to us but may be knowns (or partial knowns) to him. The most
useful substantive support I think your colleagues can give you
in this area (at least for your breakfast conversation) is the
best possible update on the facts. You will know how far you
care to venture into the interpretative thicket, and your
credentials for playing that game are as good as anyone else's
(including Henry's).
8. NSC Support. If the mood seems right and an opportune
moment arises, you might want to take Henry's temperature on the
matter of the Agency's support to him and his staff. As you well
know, he is a complex individual whose preferences and desires
are multi-faceted. Some of the ideas and concepts we have con-
sidered as possible devices for improving our support to his
efforts might be welcomed by him, or his reaction to them might
be strongly negative. For example, a centralization and con-
centration of our efforts which would (at least theoretically)
improve their efficiency might be warmly received -- or might
be regarded as a potential threat. (Henry may not want any
ona office to be aware of all the various requests he and his
staff are levying on the Agency.) To do our own planning, we
need a feel for his preferences and a cordial, private break-
fast could well be an ideal occasion at which to float some
trial balloons.
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Approved For Releas
Geor A. carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
200WM$9'hiBl rfRDR8ORDi,7Q0e,H.Q4@8 0SOW8-Acing Gp C File
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