EVERYTHING SENATORS MIGHT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT PHOENIX AND YOU WERE AFRAID THEY WOULD ASK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800090012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 21, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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AVA 715--16-
21 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
Deputy Director for Operations
Everything Senators Might Want to Know
About Phoenix and You Were Afraid
They Would Ask
1. Attached is a package of material on Phoenix assembled to
help you should this subject arise during your confirmation hearings --
as it undoubtedly will. The package has two components:
a. A seven-page summary or overview drafted in a
form suitable for your use as a hand-out or as a statement.
b. A back-up notebook organized by topical category.
2. If much or most of the prose sounds familiar, it should.
We based this text on your previous statements, partly to ensure
consistency and primarily so any listeners familiar with your
earlier testimony would not think they were hearing anything new.
All the facts and figures, however, have been double checked. The
package is, of course, unclassified.
3. You will know best how you want to play your hand. If
you want to hit the matter frontally, you might want to think about
volunteering a flat statement along the following lines:
I am, of course, familiar with the charge that the
Phoenix or Phung Hoang program was an "illegal
assassination program" designed to "murder" innocent
Vietnamese civilians. This charge is false. I would like
to take this opportunity to explain briefly what the Phoenix
program actually was and to place in the record my own
appraisal of and feelings about the program.
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5X1
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4. Two sections in the notebook may be helpful if the going
gets sticky: the section on "Advisory Instructions" and the one on
"Interrogation." They give the guidelines and restrictions imposed
on US advisory personnel. The second paragraph on the next to the
last page of the "Organization" section might also be helpful. It ex-
plains in some detail how most of the VCI killed,. got killed, and why
"killed" does not mean "executed."
5. One other point you may also want to float is a little delicate --
but it is valid and, if properly handled, could be telling. One of the
best indicators of the Phoenix/Phung Hoang program's overall success
is the intensity of the worldwide Communist propaganda effort mounted
against it, a propaganda effort that has had its echoes (unwitting) in
the United States and even in the halls of Congress.
6. The Phoenix package is rounded out with a supplement
note
7. This package has been checked with our EA colleagues and
all other concerned offices. It is largely the work of my associates
5X1
25X1
5X1
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
25X1 C/DCI/SAVA: GAC&rver:kjs/mee
trig - Mr. Colby
l - VAS Chrono
l - JPH Chrono
l XK CAC Chrono
25X1 C. ;T/
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THE PHUNG HOANG OR PHOENIX PROGRAM IN VIETNAM
The Background and Inception of Phoenix
The war in Vietnam has been unlike traditional wars of
Western Europe and American history. One must understand
the Vietnam war's unique aspects in order to see the context in
which various responses to its demands and challenges were made.
Beneath the surface military struggle of conventional main force
units for terrain and position, there was also an organizational
struggle -- on the one-hand the GVN was trying to build a
national structure linking the people with the government,
while the Viet Cong on the other hand was trying to organize
the people under their own unique Party apparatus. Each
side in turn tried to disrupt the other side's organizational
effort.
To ordinary rural GVN citizens in a VC threatened area,
this type of warfare meant control over their movements by the
Communists; the confiscation and destruction of government
papers and identification cards; the execution -- called
"revolutionary justice" -- of hamlet and village officials, school-
teachers and government workers whose only crime was
representing the Saigon administration; heavy taxes; conscription;
forced labor in the construction of "combat. villages"; the
induction of youth into the Liberation Army; strict control
over the news media; forced labor in carrying ammunition and
supplies for combat units; and a constant barrage of propaganda
in study sessions vilifying "the American imperialists and
their country-selling Saigon puppet lackeys. "
The vanguard of the Communist people's war in South
Vietnam was the Viet Cong infrastructure. The term "Viet
Cong infrastructure" (VCI) was adopted as a generic label for
the leadership at every level of the complex Viet Cong political
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organization, which directed and supported the Communist
Party's organizational attack on the GVN. The term "VCI,
however, specifically excluded Vietnamese citizens forced to
assist the Viet Gong or forced to occupy village or hamlet
administrative positions in areas under Viet Cong control. The
VCI represented an elite leadership and cadre which provided
intelligence, logistics support, and recruited or conscripted
troops for Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army units. The
Viet Cong infrastructure was an integral part of the total
military and political force which was fighting and inflicting
casualties on American units in Vietnam during the time that
U.S. units were engaged in Vietnam.
The Saigon Government, on the other hand, tried to disrupt
this Communist apparatus in all ways which were permissable
under its constitution and laws. Over the years, the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam had developed a number of services,
programs and strategies to cope with the VCI threat. By late
1967, a plethora of government services were actively engaged
in intelligence collection and operations against the VGI. These
services included: National Police, Police Special Branch
(comparable to or FBI), Military Security Service, Regional
and Popular Forces, Chieu Hoi, Provincial Reconnaissance Units,
Revolutionary Development Cadre, Census Grievance Cadre,
and self-defense forces as well as the ARVN itself. In general,
these various governmental components' efforts against the VCI
were conducted independently of one another and seldom
coordinated. It is important to understand that these organizations,
which later were. drawn together under the Phoenix or Phung
Hoang program, were already legally participating in intelligence
collection and operations designed to capture, rally and, if
necessary, kill identified members of the VCI. The Phung
Hoang program did not create any of these responsibilities.
Since independent actions against the VCI were deemed
inefficient and ineffective, the Phung Hoang program was
conceived to unite and coordinate a total government effort against
the VCI. Its formation was more an evolutionary process
than a revolutionary one. As such, Phung Hoang represented
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an intelligence coordination mechanism -- in the form of
coordinating committees at the province, regional and national
level; and intelligence and operations coordinating centers
at the province and district level -- which aimed at a united
total governmental effort. against the VCI. Phung Hoang was
designed to enable the various security services to follow out
their assigned responsibilities in a concerted manner. It was
the sum of its parts . Phung Hoang was an organizational or
management effort. It was not a program of assassination or
terror in response to Communist terror, and the program did not
authorize torture, brutality or cruel methods in the interrogation
or handling of captives..
The United States, whose troops were engaged in Vietnam,
encouraged the Republic of Vietnam in the development of
intelligence coordination and exploitation against the VCI through
its advisory relationship. In 1967, a trial program had proven
successful in Quang Ngai province of Military Region 1. According
to a common Vietnamese practice this trial program was locally
termed "Phung Hoang," which in Vietnamese denotes a mythical
bird. The nearest English translation of this term was "Phoenix" also a mythical bird -- although the legendary Vietnamese bird
("Phung Hoang") did not consume itself in fire and then rise
renewed from its ashes. The term "Phung Hoang" came before
the translation "Phoenix." By mid-1968, the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam formally instituted the program on a nation-
wide basis under its original local (MR 1) name, Phung Hoang.
The U.S. side, under the title "Phoenix, " provided advisors,
management guidance and financial support for construction
and equipment expenditures of district and province centers.
This program was one of many placed under my overall control
as Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support (DEPCORDS) to COMUSMACV in November 1968.
As an aside at this point, I would like to point out that my
job in Vietnam really had two parts. The most important part
was that of encouraging and strengthening the local governmental
structure of the GVN at the province, district, village and
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hamlet level of South Vietnam. This was a positive process of
building rather than destroying. The emphasis here was on
efforts to bring the local non-Communist administrations
throughout South Vietnam into a position from which they could
compete effectively on their own -- and in peacetime -- with the
Communists. The other part of my job -- and I hope the less
important part in terms of its ultimate impact -- was to do what
could be done under the laws of the Republic of Vietnam. in ways
other than main force military action to help the Vietnamese to
blunts weaken and make ineffective the local administrative
organs of the Communists throughout South Vietnam. The Phung
Hoang program came under this part of my responsibilities.
How Phoenix Operated
As the Phung Hoang program developed, members of the
VCI were classified into two categories: (A) leadership; (B) cadre.
VC supporters (i.e., not active members) were classified category
(C) and were not considered VCI for the purposes of the program.
Combined Vietnamese/U. S. reporting procedures were introduced
to measure the effectiveness of the program in terms of the
number of VCI captured, killed or rallied. In what I must admit
was a mistake, the term "elimination" was initially used to
describe the cumulative total of VCI captured, killed and rallied.
Since the word "elimination" has unusually harsh connotations,
the word was later changed to "neutralization." This was not an
attempt to be euphemistic. It was an attempt to find a word that
would cover the gamut all the way from induced defection to those
killed in skirmishes while resisting arrest. As such, "neutralization"
applied to the infrastructure as a whole and not. specifically to
the individual VCI.
Within the Phoenix program, the capture or defection (rallying)
of VCI was the preferred method of neutralization because additional
operational intelligence could be obtained from interrogation.
This was not necessarily hostile interrogation. Except for the
innermost hard core Communist leadership, most captured members
of the infrastructure could be induced to talk freely about their
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associations if they were handled sympathetically. For interrogation
guidance, he Phoenix program in one of its internal publications
used Sir Robert Thompson's advice, "Well treated and carefully
interrogated individuals can provide a tremendous amount of
information. A situation gradually develops whereby any later
individual who is captured or surrenders can then be interrogated
on the basis of a mass of information already available to the
intelligence organization. This shocks the truth out of him far
more effectively than torture . "
In general,. the VCI came in two types:
(1) Unarmed VCI whose Party affiliation
was secret and who lived intermingled with the
GVN population; and,
(2) Armed VCI whose Party affiliation
was open but who lived in heavily defended
"fortified villages" or "secret zones" in the
highland jungles.. (This category encompassed
the top-level leadership, up to and including
COSVN.)
Each type of VCI called for a different response under Phung
Hoang and the two should not be confused. The VCI living among
the people were not summarily shot, they were (where possible)
arrested and tried.. The VCI in the jungle could not be arrested
and tried unless first captured through standard military operations.
The phoenix program reported a high number of captured
"legal" VCI, namely those VCI carrying bona fide government
identification cards and living among the population. In such
cases, VCI identification was established through carefully
prepared dossiers. A minimum of three separate intelligence
reports from different reporting agencies was required before an
arrest order was signed by an appropriate Vietnamese authority,
usually at the Province Chief level. It is important to realize that
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just as Phung Hoang did not create the responsibility for countering
the VCI, neither did Phung Hoang create South Vietnam's legal
system. The various security services who were organized
and managed under Phung Hoang employed the basic legal
system of the country. In some ways its standards did not match
our ideals and we worked to improve them.. There were -- as
in the application of any system -- regrettable excesses which
we sought to locate and ameliorate. It is wide of the mark, however,
to castigate the "legal procedures of Phung Hoang. " On the
contrary, in practice, the Phung Hoang program served as a
useful. vehicle to improve the basic GVN legal structure from arrest
through trial to detention and rehabilitation.. When unjustified
abuses took place, these were in direct violation of Phoenix
policy, which was designed to prevent abuses and install professional
intelligence and humane operations to meet the VCI threat.
Through Phoenix, pressure could be and was brought to bear
on individual GVN police and security services to correct abuses.
This is not to say that we eliminated all abuses, but I think we
did bring about a marked improvement.
Illegal VCI, however, those living in "safe areas" away
from the population -- underground in bunkered sanctuaries
protected by mines and booby traps with sizable Viet Cong or
North Vietnamese forces -- represented an almost inaccessible
target. Most of the illegal. VCI, therefore, had to be rooted out
of their sanctuaries by military force. The majority of the VCI
killed over the years were killed in such a manner. Both sides
suffered casualties. Such.deaths were combat losses, not
"executions.
The Present Situation
. The Phoenix/Phung Hoang program was officially disbanded
by the Republic of Vietnam with the signing of the 27 January 1973
Paris Agreements, one of whose signatories was the Provisional
Revolutionary Government, or the VCI. As long as the Viet Cong
pursue their "political struggle" in accordance with the constitution
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and laws, the Republic of Vietnam intends to follow Article 3 of
the Paris "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in
Vietnam." If, however, in spite of the Paris Agreements, the
Viet Cong forces continue their struggle through traditional
"illegal" tactics of assassination, abductions, tax extortion and
terrorism, the GVN intends to deal with them under criminal laws.
(For example, during the first week of May 1973, in Military Region 4,
the VC were responsible for 13 assassinations, 19 abductions and
a terrorist explosion. which killed or injured 32 people.) The
Republic of Vietnam.-has enforced existing constitutional criminal
laws applicable to all.Vietnamese citizens whether members of
the Provisional Revolutionary Government or legal subjects of the
Republic of Vietnam. To this end, the National Police have .
initiated an operation program known as the "Protection of People
Against Terrorism (POPAT)." This program is not directed
against VCI per se, as was the Phoenix/Phung Hoang program,
but against lawbreakers responsible for illegal acts such as
terror. Additionally, the Republic of Vietnam has published a
decree outlining judicial procedures applicable to detention,
confinement and isolation or persons dangerous to national defense,
security of the country and public order. In short, the Republic
of Vietnam is currently responding to VC violations of Article 3C
of the Paris Agreements by using existing constitutional laws
that apply to all of her citizens.
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22 June 1973
THE. PHOENIX PROGRAM
(Background Material)
. HISTORICAL SETTING
After the signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1954 which divided
Vietnam into two zones, the Communists withdrew 75, 000 native southern
Viet Minh cadres and troops -- who. came to be known as "regroupees" --
to North Vietnam. Another large pool of Lao Dong (Communist) Party
members (approximately 40, 000 to 50, 000) -- also infrastructure -- did not
regroup and remained in the South to spearhead the political struggle against
the newly-formed Diem government. The Party's early hopes and expecta-
tions of Diem's collapse were frustrated by his successes in holding the
newly formed State of South Vietnam together and maintaining it as an on-
going, steadily improving nation. By the late 1950's, the Party organization
in the South which had been left behind after Geneva was virtually paralyzed
and shattered. To arrest the decline, rebuild the Party apparatus, and
undermine the Diem government, the Lao Dong Party Central. Committee
in January 1959 at its 15th plenum resolved to initiate an armed struggle in
the South. The infiltration of regroupees began in earnest. The regrouped
cadres returned to their native areas, traveling through. Laos and Cambodia
and had the mission of reviving the weakened Party apparatus, rebuilding
the infrastructure, organizing the population into farmers' groups, women's
organizations, youth groups, etc. , and reestablishing guerrilla groups.
The Party's policy of armed struggle was formalized at the Lao Dong
Party's Third National Congress, which met in Hanoi in September 1960. In
his political report at the Congress First Secretary Le Duan called for the
establishment of the national united front in the South, and, several months
later on December 20, 1960, the National Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam was announced. The front was to be the overt vehicle under which
the liberation struggle would be waged, while the Lao Dong Party's actions,
controlling hand, and personnel would be concealed. In the execution, this
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policy failed as North Vietnam found in December 1963 (its 9th plenum)
that the war in the South could not be won without escalation to the stage
of introducing regular units of the North Vietnamese Army.
Following the creation of the NLF, there followed creation of the
People's Revolutionary Party in December 1961, the ostensibly separate
southern branch of the Lao Dong Party; in 1968, in the wake of the Tet
offensive, the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces was
established; and finally in June 1969, the so-called Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam was formed. Several high
ranking personnel in key positions at the COSVN level hold positions on the
Lao Dona Central Committee which interlocks leaders of the PRP and Hanoi.
Together, the leaders and cadre of all of these organizations and
their subordinate units throughout South Vietnam make up the Viet Cong
Infrastructure (VCI). Collectively their task is to organize the South
Vietnamese people into a Communist state.
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2. PURPOSE OF THE PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX PROGRAM
The VGI lays down the caches for the troops coming from the
border sanctuaries; it provides the guides and intelligence for the North
Vietnamese strangers; it conscripts, taxes, terrorizes and -- in Communist
controlled areas -- governs. The VCI has been an arm of Communist
aggression. in South Vietnam. just as much as North Vietnamese main force
military units have been. Protection against the North Vietnamese main
force battalion or even the Vietcong guerrilla group does not give South
Vietnamese citizens real security if the elected village chief is assassinated
by terrorists of the VCI, or if the grenade explodes in the market place, or
the traitor shoots the self-defender in the back.
During 1969, for example, over 6, 000 South Vietnamese were killed
in such terrorist incidents, over 1, 200 in selective assassinations, and
15, 000 wounded. Among the dead were some 90 village chiefs and officials,
240 hamlet chiefs and officials, 229 refugees and 4, 350 of the general
populace. This killing was the work not of Communist main force military
units, but of the VCI.
The main object of the Phung Hoang/Phoenix program was to identify
members of the Viet Gong Infrastructure and the Viet Cong apparatus of
terrorism from the national down to the grass roots level. It was supposed
to identify members of the VCI for apprehension and detention according
to Vietnamese law. The goals of the program were to capture, induce the
defection of, or kill members of the enemy apparatus through the normal
government, police and judicial structure of the Vietnamese Government.
The program was not in any way intended to "combat terror with terror"
nor was it a program of "assassination". It represented (a) an intelligence
collection mechanism, in the form of coordinating committees at the province,
regional and national level; and (b) intelligence and operations coordinating
centers at the province and district level, which aimed at a united total
government effort against the VCI.
One of the major lessons we have learned about the Communist
concept of the "people's war" has been the key role the infrastructure plays
in it. This Communist apparatus has been operating in Vietnam for many
years and is well versed in covert techniques. Since the VCI is a sophisticated
and experienced enemy, experts were also needed to combat it. To fight the
war on this level, the government of South Vietnam with U. S. assistance, started
the Phung Hoang/Phoenix program in 1967, in order to bring together the
police, and military, and the other government organizations to contribute
knowledge and act against this enemy infrastructure. The aim of the program
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was to coordinate the acquisition of information about the enemy organization,
the identification of individuals active in that organization, and the planning
and execution of operations against them.
These operations were varied in kind, form and size. They might
consist of two policemen walking down the street to arrest an individual
identified as a member of the enemy apparatus or they might involve a
three-battalion attack on a jungle hideout of a district or province committee.
As a result of this program, members of the Communist apparatus
were captured, induced to turn themselves in as ralliers, or were killed
in fire fights. The U. S. government provided advisory assistance and support
to this internal security program through the police, the administration, the
information services and the intelligence services. Such support was parallel
to and similar to the U. S. support of the military effort against the North
Vietnamese battalions and Viet Corn guerrilla groups through the Vietnamese
military forces.
Basically, however, the Phoenix/Phung Hoang program was a
Government of Vietnam (GVN) effort to centralize and coordinate the activities
of all military and civilian agencies engaged in the neutralization of the Viet
Gong Infrastructure (VCI). The overall program contained four elements:
an intelligence program to identify the members of the VCI, an. operational
program to apprehend them, a legal program to restrain them, and a
detention program to confine them. Open announcement of the heretofore
classified program was made by President Thieu on lOctober 1969. This
announcement pointed out to the people that Phung Hoang was a program
aimed at protecting the people against terrorism and political, paramilitary,
economic and subversive pressure from the VCI. In the area of terrorism
alone, the following statistics on killing and abductions committed by Viet
Con., terrorists indicate the magnitude of the problem faced by the GVN.
Persons Killed or Abducted by VC
Terrorists in South Vietnam
Killed
Abducted
1966
1,732
3,810
1967
3,706
5,369
1968
5,389
8,759
1969
6,097
6,097
1970
5,951
6,872
1971
3,537
5,006
1972
4,405
13, 119
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3. ORIGIN OF THE PHUNG HOANG/ PHOENIX PROGRAM
The United States, whose troops were engaged in Vietnam, encouraged
the Republic of Vietnam in the development of intelligence coordination and
exploitation against the VCI through its advisory relationship. In 1967, a
trial program had proven successful in Quang Ngai province of Military
Region 1. This trial program was called "Phung Hoang", which in Vietnamese
denotes a mythical bird. The nearest English translation of this term was
"Phoenix", although the Vietnamese Phoenix has no tradition of rising from
the ashes Phung Hoang came before Phoenix. By late 1967, the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam instituted a nationwide program under the same
name, Phung Hoang. This program was then made official in June 1968 by
a decree by the President.
Implementation of the nationwide concept, endorsed by the Presidential
decree, led to the creation of a structure designed to collate information
about the Vietcong infrastructure, coordinate the collection of such information
and also to coordinate action against the VCL
During this period, the U. S. side had its own organizational problems.
In virtually every province, there were two parallel U.. S. organizational
structures: one civilian, one military. Despite good will and cooperation
on the part of many U. S. officials (civilian and military), there was an
enormous amount of institutional redundancy and overlap in the American
provincial effort, particularly in the efforts of various components with
intelligence responsibilities -- where these organizational and coordination
shortcomings engendered the twin problems of duplication in some areas
and (simultaneously) coverage gaps in others.
,' To tackle this mix of organizational problems, the U. S. encouraged
the formation of entities known as District Intelligence and Coordination
Centers --- DIOCCs. (During the 1967-early 1968 pilot stage, there were
two such centers in 1 Corps and five in 3 Corps.) On an experimental
basis, all agencies responsible for intelligence were put in one location,
that is, had their input come to one location at (in) which representatives for
all those agencies were present. The same center had authority to task an
array of responsive units that could go out and react to the intelligence it
developed or unearthed.
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The civilian side of this civilian-military mix was primarily
concerned with the infrastructure, the enemy's governmental members.
Heretofore, most of the intelligence seriously and/or systematically
considered had related only to tactical military matters, that is, the
enemy's combat units.
When these early DIOCC's were formed, emphasis was placed on
the important role of getting the intelligence on the enemy's organizational
structure and secret governmental apparatus which was actually controlling
and calling the shots for the enemy's tactical units.
In these pilot DIOCC's, the concept worked so well that efforts were
soon made to expand the number of district centers, and to do the same thing
at several other levels, i. e. at province, corps and national levels.
Formally, then, Phung Hoang came into being by government decree in
1968. Under the title "Phoenix", the U. S. provided advisors, management
guidance and financial support for construction and equipment expenditures
of district and province centers.
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4. ORGANIZATION OF PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX
(1), Vietnamese side -
All elements of the government participated in the Phung Hoang program
through a series of Phung Hoang Committees whose function was to direct the
program at their respective levels from national to district. It was the responsibility
of the Phung Hoang Committees, at the national, regional and provincial levels,
and the District Intelligence and Operation Coordinating Center (DIOCC) at the
district level, to coordinate the activities of the various military and civil
agencies involved. In theory, these committees supervised the orderly
collection, collation and distribution of information on individual members of
the VCI and planned operations against identified Viet Cong operatives, using
the appropriate police, military or paramilitary forces. These centers were
advised by U.S. personnel.
It was at the district level that the coordinated intelligence effort against
the VCI became most concentrated, and the main mechanism was the DIOCC.
The Vietnamese District Chief was the DIOCC Chief; though he normally delegated
responsibility for daily operations of the DIOCC to his deputy or Chief of Police.
The District Senior Advisor (usually a United States Army Major) was the
District Phoenix Coordinator. Also assigned to the advisory team was a trained
intelligence officer who served as the full-time Phoenix advisor to the DIOCC. This
officer advised and assisted the District Chief on DIOCC operations primarily in
the area of *organizational and management techniques and procedures of
intelligence collection and files (i.e. Name Index Files, Dossiers, Area Files),
first-level analysis and dissemination of intelligence.
At the national level, the Chairman of the central Phung Hoang Committee
was the Minister of Interior; the Vice-Chairman was the Director General of
the National Police. Its membership contained senior representatives of the
Rural Development Ministry, the Military Security Service of the Army, the
Special Police Branch, the Police Field Forces and the Joint General Staff. The
composition of each of the lower level committees in the Military Regions and
provinces was essentially the same. While all elements of the government
participated in the Phung Hoang program, a leading role was played by the.
National Police, with the support of the Special Police, National Police Field
Force (NPFF) and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs).
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The primary responsibility of the National Police
was to maintain law and order throughout the populated
areas of Vietnam. It was the agency charged with the
primary responsibility for protecting the people from the
Viet Cong Infrastructure. The National Police was advised
by CORDS Public Safety Advisors at the national, corps and
province levels.
B. Special Police -
The Special Police were responsible for collecting,
collating and evaluating intelligence pertaining to the Viet
Cong Infrastructure, and coordinating available information with
Phung Hoang centers at various levels. The Special Police also
reacted to intelligence collection requirements levied by
the Phung Hoang centers.
C. National Police Field Forces (NPFF) -
The National Police Field Forces were the paramilitary
action arm of the National Police. They were responsible
for protecting the people from terrorism by conducting police
operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The NPFF
participated in anti-infrastructure operations generated by
Province Phung Hoang centers (PIOCCs) and by District
Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCCs.).
They operated alone or in conjunction with military units.
Once the Viet Cong Infrastructure had been driven from an
area, the NPFF had the primary responsibility of preventing
a resurgence. The final mission of the NPFF was to safeguard
the extension of the uniformed National Police presence into the
rural areas.
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D. Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) -
Provincial Reconnaissance Units were small platoon and
company sized units operating under the control of Province
Chiefs against the VC Infracture. They were funded by the
United States until 1972 but in 1969 were placed under the
national control of the Director General of National Police, with
a Vietnamese Army officer in charge as national commander to
collect intelligence on and conduct operations against the
VC Infrastructure.
The RVNAF participated in the Phung Hoang program through its
intelligence and security services and through the operations of its Regular,
Regional and Popular, Forces.
The People's Self Defense Force, the Information Services, local
officials and all other elements further contributed to the effort.
(2) U.S. Role -
To coordinate and manage United States assistance and support to the
GVN Phung Hoang Program, the Commander, United States Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) developed an advisory structure known
as the Phoenix program. The advisory and assistance program was under the
staff supervision of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). There were some 450 United
States military advisory personnel involved in the Phoenix program. Of this
number, 262 served at district and city levels, which were the key operational
elements, with the remainder of the personnel serving at the national, regional
and province levels.
On the U.S. side, the concept of a coordinated intelligence effort against
the VCI had its beginning in July 1967, when COMUSMACV established a joint
civilian/military activity entitled "Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation
(ICEX)" with the specific mission of assisting and supporting the GVN in a
coordinated attack on the VCI. Initially this program received little official
GVN attention and support. However, in December 1967, recognizing the need
for a coordinated intelligence effort against the VCI, the GVN formally initiated
the Phung Hoang program. At that time, COMUSMACV changed the name of its
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advisory activity from ICEX to Phoenix. The term Phoenix was in turn dropped
in 1970 and the word Phung Hoang was used thereafter.
The U.S. role with 'respect to Phung Hoang was one of advice and
assistance. This relationship .was maintained by CORDS under COMUSMACV.
American Phung Hoang officers were present in most District Operations Centers
and U.S. staffs were present at province and at the national level, to work
with the appropriate GVN Phung Hoang committees at those levels. These
officers worked closely with their Vietnamese counterparts in the Province
Operations Centers/District Operation Centers, which operated on a 24-hour
basis, receiving, collating. verifying and coordinating intelligence on the
VCI from all sources on the one hand, and on the other hand facilitating the
exploitation of the intelligence by the various action arms of the Phoenix program.
The U.S. officers also obtained and coordinated U.S. technical; material
and fire support for the Province and District Operations Centers and its action
arms. Most of the American personnel were military. In addition to those
American personnel working directly with Phung Hoang committees and DIOCC's,
other American personnel were closely involved with many of the GVN services
participating in the program, such as the military, the police and others.
On 15 October 1969, a memorandum was distributed to members of the
Phung Hoang U.S. staff and forwarded for inclusion in the training of Phung
Hoang advisors in Vietnam and at Fort Holabird, Maryland. It pointed out that the
Phung Hoang program against the VCI was an inherent part of the war effort in
Vietnam and that U.S. personnel were under the same legal and moral constraints
with respect to operations under this program as with respect to military operations
against enemy units in the field.
To reduce the threat of the VCI, the GVN had established VCI operational
goals for the Phung Hoang agencies in each geographic area of South Vietnam.
These goals were based on the estimated strength of the VCI, local security
situations and the capabilities of the various GVN agencies. These goals could
be met by counting VCI who rallied or were induced to rally, those who were
captured and sentenced and those who were killed in the course of security
operations. The desirability of capturing VCI was stressed, for the intelligence
and other values they can offer. Hoi Chanh (ralliers) frequently provided
important intelligence and their information served as the basis of many operations.
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Ways in which the GVN attempted to neutralize and exploit intelligence
on the VCI within the concept of the Phung Hoang program were, in order of
priority, defection, capture and exploitation, and discreditation or compromise.
It must be recognized that some VCI were killed unavoidably during the normal
course of combat reaction operations; however, the.overall percentage was
quite low. For example during 1968 when some 15,000 VCI were neutralized,
72 percent were captured, 13 percent defected and only 15 percent were killed.
Defection and capture were the preferred methods of neutralization as the
individuals often provide highly useful information which could lead to
additional neutralization and in locating arms and supply caches.
With respect to those killed, one further element of background context
should be understood. The targets of Phung Hoang operations -- members of
the VCI and, particularly its leadership -- were actively engaged in waging war
against the GVN, endeavoring to overthrow it by force of arms. Members of the
VCI were often armed, with the more senior leaders being protected by platoons
or even companies. Major VCI installations, especially command headquarters,
were usually located in Communist-controlled areas garrisoned and protected
by troops. Capture operations, hence, usually involved an exchange of shots,
often involved sharp firefights, and sometimes involved platoon or company
size military operations. The bulk of the VCI "killed" were killed in combat
situations. They were not, repeat not, murdered or executed as, or while,
unarmed, defenseless prisoners.
In order to focus. activities on key VCI personnel, Phung Hoang guidance
designated certain elements for priority attention. These included all personnel
operating at district level or above and specialists assigned to these four key
components of the Viet Cong organization:
Revolutionary Committees
Current Affairs Committees
Security Sections
Finance and Economy Sections
Specific goals were set for higher level VCI, rather than permitting the entire goal
to be met with lower level VCI.
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(3) Popular Participation -
In October 1969, the GVN decided to mobilize, the people in the attack on
the Viet Gong Infrastructure. Under the slogan of "protection of the people against
terrorism," the GVN publicized the program, the' enemy against which it is
aimed, and the assistance the average citizen could give it. In addition to
general explanations, local Phung Hoang activities had been explained in more
specific terms, in leaflets and posters featuring photographs of the neighborhood
VCI. In a number of cases this had resulted in capture of a wanted person through
information provided by the public, or in the individual turning himself in as a
Hoi Chain because of the pressure generated against him.
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5. TRAINING
The training of U. S. Phung Hoang/Phoenix advisors was conducted at
Port Holabird, Maryland. During training, the Phung Hoang program was
introduced as an integral part of the total war effort in Vietnam and it was
emphasized that U. S. personnel engaged in it were under the same legal
and moral constraints that applied to conventional military operations against
enemy units in the field.
The U. S. Army Institute for Military Assistance (IMA) also conducted
a twelve-week course (six weeks of language training included) for officers
assigned to the Phung Hoang/Phoenix program. This training was desigre-d
to provide selected military intelligence officers with a working knowledge
of the fundamentals and techniques of general advisor functions in the Republic
of Vietnam and of the fundamentals and techniques of intelligence, the Phung
Hoang program, and specialized intelligence skills as they applied to duties
as a Province or District Intelligence Operation Coordination Center (PIOCC/
DIOCC) advisor.
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6. INSTRUCTIONS TO PHOENIX ADVISORS
Advisors to the Phoenix program were issued specific directions
in MACV 525-36 relative to policies and responsibilities for all U. S.
personnel participating in, or supporting in any way, Phoenix/Phung Hoang
operations. The policy guidance was:
"The PHOENIX program is one of advice, support, and
assistance to the GVN Phung Hoang program , aimed at reducing
the influence and effectiveness of the Viet Cong Infrastructure
in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong Infrastructure is an inherent
part of the war effort being waged against the GVN by the Viet
Gong and their North Vietnamese Allies .. The unlawful status
of members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (as defined in the
Green Book and in GVN official decrees) is well established
in GVN law and is in full accord with the laws of land warfare
followed by the United States Army.
Operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure include
the collection of intelligence identifying these members, inducing
them to abandon their allegiance to the Viet Cong and rally to the
government, capturing or arresting them in order to bring them
before Province Security Committees for lawful sentencing and,
as a final resort, the use of military or police force against them
if no other way of preventing them from carrying on their
unlawful activities is possible. Our training emphasizes the
desirability of obtaining these target individuals alive and of
using intelligent and lawful methods of interrogation to obtain
the truth of what they know about other aspects of the Viet Cong
Infrastructure. U. S. personnel are under the same legal and
moral constraints with respect to operations of Phoenix character
as they are with respect to regular military operations against
enemy units in the field. Thus, they are specifically not authorized
to engage in assassinations or other violations of the rules of land
warfare, but they are entitled to use such reasonable military force,
as is necessary to obtain the goals of rallying, capturing, or
eliminating the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the Republic of Vietnam.
If U. S. personnel come in contact with activities conducted
by Vietnamese which do not meet the standards of the rules of land
warfare, they are certainly not to participate further in the activity.
They are also expected to make their objections to this kind of
behavior known to the Vietnamese conducting them and they are
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expected to report the circumstances to next higher U. S. authorities
for decision as to action to be taken with the GVN.
There are individuals who find normal police or even military
operations repugnant to them personally, despite the overall legality
and morality of these activitities. Arrangements exist whereby
individuals having this feeling about military affairs can, according
to law, receive specialized assignments or even exemptions from
military service. There is no similar legislation with respect to
police type activities of the IS. S. military, but if an individual finds
the police type activities of the Phoenix program repugnant to him,
on his application, he can be reassigned from the program without
prejudice.
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(a) Quotas
One of the problems in Vietnam had been motivation of various
governmental forces to do things. The Vietnamese, responding to.knowledge
of their own people, decided to establish a quota system to get a real push
against the infrastructure. Such quotas were used as a management tool to
measure the effectiveness of the Phung Hoang/Phoenix program in the
districts and provinces of Vietnam. Goals were established according to
identified enemy strength and the ability of GVN forces in the area.
(b) Incentives
Some informants were paid through GVN and U. S. intelligence channels
according to the value of their information. The payments ranged from nothing
for citizens who contributed information out of a sense of public duty to large
amounts for critical information concerning members of the enemy apparatus
provided at great risk to the informant. In addition to informant payments,
rewards were offered for information leading to the apprehension of identified
VGI personnel. Careful restrictions were instituted to ensure accuracy, to
encourage capture rather than attack and to offer the individuals the option
of rallying under the Chieu Hoi program.
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8. CLASSIFICATION OF DETAINEES
In a series of directives, the GVN's Central Phung Hoang Committee
classified all members of the Communist movement into three categories:
Category A included only the leading officials of the VCI; Category B included
other VCI members who held important but not leading positions; and Category
C included those individuals classified as r'followerst' but who were not con-
sidered as members of the VCI.
All Viet Cong listed in Category A were also People's Revolutionary
Party members. Category B VCI members held important positions in
the various front groups, and in party committee organizations, but they
were not People's Revolutionary Party members.
According to the working definition used in the field, the following
were members of Category C and were not to be considered as members
of the VCI at all: (a) Rank and file guerrillas; (b) Rank and file members of
front organizations; (c) Soldiers and members of organized VC/NVA military
units; (d) Persons who pay taxes to the VC; (e) Persons who perform mis-
cellaneous tasks for the VC; and (f) Members of the populace in VC-controlled
areas.
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The Government of Vietnam took positive steps to ensure justice. In
Ministry of Interior Decree 2212 of 20 August 1969, a detailed procedure was
established by which information would be assembled and recorded to
warrant the arrest of an individual member of the VCI. The 1970 Pacification
and Development Plan, Annex II on Protection Against Terrorism, stated the
importance of treating the population and detainees in a fair, current and
humane manner and set out requirements for the implementation of the
program. Prime Minister's Directive No. 1293-Th. T/PCI/M dated
27 November 1968 outlined a set of regulations for rapid screening of their
cases. The government engaged in a program of improving and upgrading its
detention facilities for detainees. Higher ranking VCI were sent to maximum
security detention facilities on Con Son Island. Other specialized national
correction centers were designated for women. While the Geneva Convention
does not require it, the GVN permitted the International Red Cross to inspect
facilities where VCI detainess and convicted VCI were held.
From a legal standpoint, members of the VCI were subject to two legal
procedures:
1. Prosecution for crimes against national security.
These involved full judicial proceedings in military courts,
and resulted in criminal convictions to sentences in
accordance with law.
2. Administrative detention under emergency
powers (an tri). These were similar to emergency measures
used by other countries such as Malaya, Kenya and the
Philippines during periods of insurgency or national
emergency and in both Great Britain and the United
States in times of war. (See U.S. Code Title 50, Section
812 et seq.) Detention was determined by a Province
Security Committee, comprising the Province Chief, the
Province Judge, the Chairman of the Provisional Council
and other officials.
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Ministry of Interior Decree 757 of 21 March 1969 provided specific
definitions of classes of Communist offenders and outlined the appropriate
periods of detention, depending upon their Party status and responsibilities.
The preamble to this decree stated "the government policy is to completely
eliminate the VCI by capturing as many as possible, while the lenient
rehabilitation policy was aimed at releasing as many as possible.
The administrative detention procedure (an tri) was limited to a two-
year maximum sentence, although this was renewable on reconsideration at the
end of the two-year period. Military courts could sentence offenders to any
period. of time, including death. Sentences were for a determined period of
years. The justification for release while the war is still going on was found
in the government's program of rehabilitation. The government had sought
to rehabilitate its prisoners and detainees and release those it believed
rehabilitated.
Technically, subordinate elements of the VCI, such as the security,
military proselyting and military intelligence sections. of various Viet Cong
Party Committees, had specific clandestine missions to collect, under false
pretenses and without uniform, information on government military operations.
'Therefore, under the Geneva Convention of 1949, such members qualified
as spies and were not entitled to protection under the Geneva Convention relative
to civilian persons captured in time of war because Article 3 applies only
"to persons taking no.active part in the hostilities." VCI civilians actively
and directly taking part in the hostilities were thus not entitled to any protection --
including sentencing by a regularly constituted court -- as provided for in
Article 3 of the Convention. In spite of this, the Government of the Republic.
of Vietnam elected to ensure humanitarian treatment of captured VCI
regardless of whether the individual was considered a protected person
within the meaning of the Convention.
Of the VC captured, five to ten percent were tried by military court and
received an average sentence of five to six years. Of those sentenced under
the administrative detention procedure, the average sentence was nine to twelve
months.
In South Vietnam, a person suspected of an offense against the national
security could be arrested and taken into custody and held up to 24 hours for
questioning and investigation by an apprehending agency other than the
National Police; though he had to be placed in National Police custody no later
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than 24 hours following. apprehension. All arrests were made pursuant to a
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, which included Province
Chiefs, Mayors, District Chiefs and Police Chiefs. An arrest made without
a warrant, however, could later be "corrected" by issuance of a warrant
ex post facto by an official having authority to do so initially. U.S. personnel
were not authorized to arrest GVN citizens. Only the following could execute
an arrest order:
a. Judicial police;
b. Military police;
c. Military Security Service (MSS);
d. National Police (NP; which includes individuals
of the National Police Field Force (NPFF); and
e. Any person who witnesses the commission of
a crime, "in flagrante delicto," -- citizen's arrest.
Once an individual had been turned over to the National Police, that agency had
to complete its preliminary inquiry and identification processing within two
days. Following that, a maximum of three more days could be allowed for
transfer of the suspect to an Interrogation Center, where a supplementary
investigation could continue for as long as 30 days. The Province Chief next
could expend three days in reviewing the dossier for adequacy, after which
the case was forwarded to the Province Security Committee, which was required
to sentence, release or refer the individual for trial by military court. The
Committee had seven days within which to act. Deviation from the foregoing
time schedule had to be authorized by the Ministry of Interior.
Phoenix advisors were instructed to frame their advice as to the
classification of detainees as civil defendent or PW according to MACV Directives
381-46 and 20-5. VC and NVA military personnel had to be accorded PW status
and the rights of a PW under the Geneva Convention. Civilian PRP members and
VCI cadre were considered civil defendents. Certain members of the VC/NVA
military could be occupying positions within the VCI. When captured these
military VCI were to be accorded PW status but were to be reported as
neutralized VCI even though retained in PW channels.
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10. DETENTION OF VCI
The detention of VCI was the responsibility of National Police.
In 1963, a U. S. program of advice and assistance to the GVN prison
system was initiated, which was taken over by CORDS in 1967. The
program initially focused on a vocational skills training program. In 1967,
the problems of overcrowding because of the war and loss of prisoners to
VC attacks became serious. Thus, a substantial program of fortification
and expansion of prison facilities was undertaken. To.this was added a
variety of programs to improve facilities and procedures in the correction
and detention systems, both before and after the Con Son incident of 1970.
Advisory attention to these centers had been increased using both civilian
and military personnel, including six members of the United States Federal
Bureau of Prisons. As a result of the overall program (and the more
stringent standards of apprehension established under the Phoenix program),
overcrowding was eliminated except in a few facilities, the death rate in
the correction centers had dropped from 1.56 per thousand per month in
1967 to .36 per thousand per month in 1970, medical care had substantially
increased and feeding and sanitary facilities had been improved. U. S. advice
and assistance improved the GVN's operation of detention centers, as well
as the circumstances of their inmates.
VCI captured by U. S. military forces were turned over to the GVN
civil authorities for disposition under GVN laws.
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11. INTERROGATION
In instructing and training the Vietnamese, the U. S. side
emphasized good systems of interrogation. Except for the innermost
hard core Communist leadership, most captured members of the infra-
structure could be induced to talk freely about their associates if they
were handled sympathetically. For interrogation guidance, the Phoenix
program used Sir Robert Thompson's advice, "Well-treated and carefully
interrogated individuals can provide a tremendous amount of information.
A situation gradually develops whereby any later individual who is captured
or surrenders can then be interrogated on the basis of a mass of information
already available to the intelligence organization. This shocks the truth
out of him far more effectively than torture.
U. S. personnel were primarily advisors with respect to GVN
interrogation of Viet Gong or North Vietnamese Army suspects. Thus
they were sometimes present and sometimes not during interrogation
sessions. There was no fixed rule in this regard, other than that of
helping GVN personnel to meet professional (and ethical) interrogation
standards. If U. S. personnel came in contact with activities conducted by
Vietnamese which did not meet the standards of land warfare, they were
directed to:
(1) Not to participate further in the activity.
(2) To make their objections to this kind of behavior
known to the Vietnamese conducting them.
(3) To report the circumstances to the next higher U. S.
authority for decision as to action to be taken with the GVN.
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12. FINANCIAL EXPENDITURES TO PHOENIX
expenditures for the Phoenix/ Phung Hoang
1968
1969
1972
1.53 million
1. 46 million
.38 million
40 million
24 million
4. 01 million
This total was expended in support of U. S. civilian personnel and
for necessary supplies and equipment for U. S. Phoenix advisory staff
officers. This sum does not include the pay and allowances of U. S. military
personnel assigned to the Phoenix program. These costs did not include
U. S. support of other programs such as the RF/PF, National Police,
intelligence services, information services, etc., which participated in
the Phoenix effort. It is not possible to segregate the portion of those costs
devoted to Phoenix since Phung Hoang/Phoenix was a program designed to
coordinate and consolidate the efforts of a number of different agencies
against one of the several aspects of the Communist attack against South
Vietnam.
United States financing of the Phung Hoang program should be con-
sidered during two distinct time periods.. The first period covered the time
from early 1968 to 1 July 1969, while the second covers the time from 1 July
1969 to the end of 1972.
Prior to 1 July 1969, financial and logistical support to the Phoenix/
Phung Hoang.program by the Office of the Special Assistant to the
Ambassador (OSA) was limited to one-third of the cost, with MACV paying
two-thirds. MAC.V used assistance in kind (AIX) funds generated through
Public Law 480. OSA financial support was for such items as OSA
managerial personnel, office space, air transport and communications.
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On 1 July 1969, management and support responsibilities for the
Phung Hoang program were officially transferred from OSA to COMUSMACV,
who assumed responsibility for providing or arranging monetary and logistical
support through American channels. It was directed that the primary method
of monetary and logistical support would be the use of Vietnamese piasters
for the purchase of local commodities and services through local procurement.
GVN financing had primarily been in the form of the wages paid GVN
officials by their parent agencies. No precise information is available
concerning the extent of this financing. The best estimates of direct
expenditures available from, classified Vietnamese sources are as follows:
- 1969: The Ministry of Interior (MOI) was directed
to support Phung Hoang in 1969. The MOI contributed approxi-
mately 500, 000 piasters in the form of supplies and the renovation
of a few facilities provided for the use as Phung Hoang centers.
- 1970: The MOI was assigned budget responsibility for
Phung Hoang in 1970 and expended 1, 800, 000 piasters for
support of Phung Hoang.
- 1971: The MOI, although responsible for support, did not
budget or spend funds for Phung Hoang. However, the National
Police Command (NPC) estimates that it expended a total of
1, 704, 000 piasters for the Phung Hoang program, principally
for office supplies, and to a smaller degree for psyops in
support of the Phung Hoang program.
- 1972: Neither the MOI nor the NPC budgets contained
funding provisions to support Phung Hoang. However, NPC
estimated it would spend over 1,800, 000 piasters in support of
Phung Hoang, primarily for office supplies and miscellaneous
expenditures. Additionally, 12, 000, 000 piasters were authorized
for psyops in support of counter-terrorism information activities.
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13. EFFECTIVENESS OF PHOENIX/ PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM
The Phoenix program was an essential element of Vietnam's
defense against VCI subversion and terrorism. While some unjustifiable
abuses occurred over the years, as they have in many countries, the
Vietnamese and U. S. Governments worked to stop them, and to produce
instead professional and intelligent operations which would meet the VCI
attack with stern justice, with equal stress on both words. Considerable
evidence had appeared from enemy documents and from former members
of the enemy side that, despite some weaknesses, the program had reduced
the power of the VCI and its prospects for conquest of the people of South
Vietnam. Phung Hoang/Phoenix was an essential part of the GVN's defense
as the VCI is to the Communist attack. U. S. support was fully warranted.
Members of the VCI were counted as neutralized in three ways:
when rallying to the Government's side, when captured and receiving either
a sentence by a court verdict, or when killed. Neutralization results
during the past several years are as follows:
Year
Rallied
Captured/ Detained
Killed
Total
1968
2, 229
11, 288
2,259
15,776
1969
4,832
8,515
6, 187
19, 534
1970
7,745
6, 405*
8, 191
22, 341
1971
5,621
5,012".
72057
17,690
1972
1, 586
2, 138
2, 675
6, 399
Totals
22, 013
33,358
26, 369
81,740
Aside from the direct losses of personnel captured, rallied or killed,
there is considerable evidence that the VCI operated under considerable
limitations as a result of concern for exposure and capture under the Phoenix
program, that its organizational structure in a number of areas was reduced
to skeleton status instead of its previous full panoply of committees--and
members, that it had difficulties maintaining contact in manyvillages,
et cetera.
Beg inning in 1970 only those VCI receiving sentences or administrative
detention of at least one year were counted as a VCI neutralization.
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The best statements of the e ffec tine s s (or lack of it) of the Phung
Hoang program comes from captured documents and the testimonies of
railier s . These have indicated that the size and activities of the VCI had
been reduced considerably in many areas, although the essential
leadership structure was relatively intact: They also state, however, that
the VCI could carry on many of its earlier activities at a much reduced
level and serve as a base for future expansion. Internal VCI documents
and Hoi Chanh also have reported morale problems for the VCI. stemming
from the existence and effectiveness of the program,
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 -; AJi-- lAMESE AFFAiPS STAFF
oFFic oF TH Approve For1e1!ase'O4/AN CIA-RD
r +
DATE: 29 June. 1973
To: Mr. William E. Colby
De . ut Director for Operations
25X1 r=ROM:
Deputy SA VA
svDJEGT: Annex to the Phoenix Package
1. Attached are the answers to your
questions on current VCI strength, current
VCI prison population, and releases.
2. The material has been prepared in
the form of an additional chapter (14) which
can be inserted in the package sent to you on
21 June.
25X1
Depu- Special Ass,~Itant
for Vietnamese Affairs
OR800090012-8
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 i\JF-IDEI TIAL
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A. VCI Strength
The last official CIA estimate of VCI strength was 80, 000 - 100, 000,
made in March 1970. The last estimate by MACV, before reporting on the
VCI was discontinued, was 65, 000 in December 1971. Since MACV used a
somewhat narrower definition. of the VCI than did. OER, the office then making
CIA's estimate, the apparent deterioration in.. VCI strength since mid-1970
has been more gradual than is suggested by a comparison of the two estimates
above.
No U. S. agency has been keeping monthly estimates of VCI strength
since the 1971 MACV estimate, but U. S. and South. Vietnamese. intelligence
services currently accept VCI strength as slightly below late 1971 figures.
The range of current estimates is roughly from. 50, 000 to 70, 000. The
upper range,. 70, 000, represents OER's estimate, and the higher total is
again accounted for by the broader definition of VCI to include certain cate-
gories of persons, such as couriers or suppliers, who may be fully committed
but perform, only part-time operations for the party. The lower range of the
estimate is that of the South Vietnamese Phung Hoang Committee, operating
under the guidance of the National Police. That estimate is based on various
evidence available to GVN intelligence, indluding rock-bottom identification
of at least 26, 000 VCI.
Unquestionably, there has been some, fluctuation in VCI strength
since mid-1970. Some overall. deterioration during 1971 and 1972 is accepted,
although within that period there. probably was a considerable recruitment
effort in early 1972 prior to the Communist spring offensive. The extent to
which VCI strength declined as a result of the offensive is primarily conjecture.
OER, for example, believes losses due to military activity were relatively
low In view of the widespread arrests by the GVN -- despite subsequent
releases -- and other evidence that the Communists view themselves as
politically weak, OCI believes that there may have been considerable
deterioration in 1972.
There is agreement in CIA that VCI strength almost certainly has been
increasing in 1973. This is due to increased emphasis on recruitment and
a lowering of some of the party membership criteria by COSVN order since
the cease-fire, and presumably to tapping the population in areas to which the
Communists gained access as a result of the 1972 offensive. In addition,
many of the 5, 000 - 6, 000 infiltrators in special purpose groups this year
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~1 ~
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are believed to be civilian political and economic cadre sent to flesh out
the VCI. The GVN estimate of current VCI strength apparently does not
take into account a recent increase from these various measures and
sources, but it is likely that the VCI may have grown by several thousand.
B. Prison Population in South Vietnam
(1) According to State telegram 097601 of 29 May 1973, the best
estimate of pri son capacity in RVN between 40, 000 and 45, 000.
(2) During his visit to the United States in early April 1973, President
Thieu in a public statement placed the total number of civilian prisoners at
approximately 38, 000, i. e. 21, 000 common criminals, 5, 000 Communist
criminals. and 12, 000 persons awaiting trial. State believes these to be
reasonable estimates.
(3) Parenthetically, GVN claims that the other side is holding
60, 000 civilian prisoners.
C. Releases of Prisoners by GVN
(1) The number of enemy prisoners of war offered by the GVN to
the other side is 26, 750. The number actually released is:
9,812 NVA POWs
16, 063 VC
633 Regroupees
26, 508
In addition:
COINEIDENTIA!
238 refused repatriation
1 died during release
3 still in hospital
Ten thousand nine hundred eighty-one New Life" VC PW's were
released by GVN to Chieu Hoi prior to 27 January.
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