MEMO TO MR. RICHARD T. KENNEDY FROM GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800080018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 16, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

V1F' ' JAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF gp
A ~ ~ sic 9#0~~;J 'ACCI tANTELIPC~EN E17~r~R00
DATE: 16 May 1973
TO: Mr. Richard T. Kennedy
National Security Council Staff
Attached is a paper on the impact of a
Communist conquest of Cambodia
requested by Bill Stearrnan. It bears
some scars of coordination but I hope
it is of use..
Ge ge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/rnee
Orig - Addressee
cc's - as indicated above
1 jTn,_n
1 - GAC Chrono V
1 'NTH Special Projects
1 - VAS Chrono
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15 May 1973
THE IMPACT OF A COMMUNIST CAMBODIA*
A Communist takeover in Cambodia would have the following
The immediate effect in Saigon would be politically
and psychologically unsettling. The GVN would
feel vulnerable and isolated, even though the
South Vietnamese leaders would probably recognize
that the situation in Cambodia would have little
immediate impact on the Communist military
position in South Vietnam.
-- The fall of Cambodia would ease the logistic
problems of the Communists in supplying their
military forces in South Vietnam, and it would
in time give the Communists more flexibility in
developing and implementing their future
strategies to take over South Vietnam.
-- The GVN would almost certainly request additional
U.S. economic and military support, including
advance assurances of U.S. air support in the
event of a Communist offensive in South Vietnam.
-- In Thailand, the first reaction to a Communist
takeover in Cambodia would be to fall back on the
U.S. alliance. The U.S. position in Thailand,
however, could be adversely affected since
Bangkok tends to view U.S. policy in Cambodia
as a gauge of the reliability of the U.S.
commitment to Thailand.
*This memorandum assumes that the Communists take over Cambodia
under conditions where it is clear that the Communist regime is little
more than a stooge for Hanoi and that the U.S. did not find it
feasible to intervene to prevent the take
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1. Political and Ps cy holo
ical Implications: The most
immediate and damaging consequences of a Communist victory
in Cambodia would be the political and psychological fallout in
South Vietnam and, though to a lesser degree, in other neighboring
countries. The effect on Saigon would be highly unsettling,
producing a feeling within the GVN of greater vulnerability
and isolation. The GVN accepted the Paris Agreements with
reluctance (and only under considerable U.S. pressure);
Communist acquisition of control over Cambodia would be read
in Saigon as a sign that an essential element of the Paris
Agreements had been lost.
2. The degree of apprehension in the GVN would
depend on the precise circumstances of a Communist victory in
Cambodia, i. e. , how much . or how little the U. S. did to, prevent
it. The GVN would want to test what the fall of Cambodia
meant for South Vietnam. A request for new U.S. guarantees
of economic and military support would be almost certain, and
Saigon would also press for advance assurances of U.S. air
support in the event of a Communist offensive into South Vietnam
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from Cambodia. The GVN would anticipate Hanoi's use of the
sanctuary to position additional heavy military equipment and
personnel.
3. Despite their concerns and fears over Cambodia's
fall, the South Vietnamese leaders would probably also recognize
the fact that the situation in Cambodia would have little short-
term impact on the Communist position in South Vietnam. They
would not anticipate an early weakening of their military or
political strength as a result of a hostile regime in Phnom Penh,
though they would probably try to convince Washington otherwise.
4. One reaction of the Thieu government, uncertain about
the precise impact of a Communist Cambodia on the struggle in
South Vietnam, would be to tighten its own hand. This could
mean greater political restrictions at home and a less forthcoming
approach to negotiations in Paris with the Viet Cong -_ particularly
if Saigon thinks that U.S. support-is diminishing and its image
in the U . S. less critical.
5. The Effects in Laos and Thailand: The fall of
Cambodia would be discouraging to non-Communists in Laos,
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although the immediate impact on events there would be limited.
Both sides in Laos are basically observing the cease-fire and
appear to be seriously negotiating in the political arena.
6. The political and psychological impact in Thailand,
however, would be greater. Bangkok has made it clear that it
looks to the U.S. to prevent a Communist takeover in Cambodia.
As a result, Thailand tends to view U.S. policy in Cambodia as
a gauge of the reliability of the U.S. commitment to Thailand.
If Cambodia, shorn of U.S. support, went under to the Communists,
Bangkok's first instinctive reaction would be to fall back on its
alliance with the U.S. At the same time, there would be a
heightened tendency in Thailand for taking a harder look at the
relative advantages and disadvantages of allowing U.S. air bases
to remain in Thailand. The Thai leadership would want to see
some new and concrete assurances of U.S. support -- probably
in the form of greatly increased economic and military aid.
If, in the aftermath of a Communist victory in. Cambodia, the
U.S. did not respond in a manner satisfactory to the Thai leaders,
they might be prompted to undertake a basic reexamination of
Thailand's policy of close association with the U.S.
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7. Easing of Communist Logistic Burdens: The
greatest military gain accruing to the Communists from their
control of Cambodia would be an easing of their heavy logistical
burden. No longer would Communist fortunes in southern South
Vietnam depend so heavily on the long and costly overland
support corridor through southern Laos. and Cambodia. They
could begin to shift more of their logistic effort to a sea supply
route through southern Cambodia. Small-scale sea supply through
Cambodia is already possible since the Communists control or
have easy access to much of the Cambodian coastline and interior
adjacent to South Vietnam. A larger effort, however, would
be easier with the acquisition of Cambodia's port facilities.
But, Hanoi's ability to make extensive use of Kompong Sam in
this manner would depend, of course, on the willingness of Peking
and Moscow to provide the material and possibly the shipping for
such an effort. It would also depend on Kompong Sam's vulnerability
to air attack or naval quarantine.
8. The Communists would by no means abandon their
overland routes from the north. Indeed, they have already
improved their capability to resupply their forces in northern
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South Vietnam directly across the DMZ, and are at work on
developing routes that would allow them to resupply southern
South Vietnam while bypassing Cambodia and Laos. The
development of a Cambodian sea supply route would simplify
Communist military imports and assist this effort to deemphasize
their dependence on the Ho Chi Minh trail system. Some of the
North Vietnamese logistics force structure in southern Laos and
northeastern Cambodia could be released for duty elsewhere.
9. In addition to these logistical advantages, a takeover
of Cambodia by the Communists might give them a substantial
inventory of Cambodian government equipment, some of which
could be diverted to South Vietnam. In addition, the sizable
amounts of arms and ammunition stockpiled by the Communists in
Cambodia, which is designated for the fighting there, could be
made available to Communist forces in South Vietnam.
10. Immediate Military Impact on South Vietnam: A
Communist takeover in Cambodia would not result in a major shift
in the present balance of military power in South Vietnam, but
could in time give the Communists more flexibility in developing
and implementing their future strategy in South Vietnam. In a
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strictly military sense, the Communists already have more or less
what they need in Cambodia for continuing the war in South Vietnam.
A Communist takeover in Cambodia, however, would permit Hanoi
to divert additional military manpower to South Vietnam. The
Vietnamese Communists currently are estimated to have about 5,000
regular combat troops in Cambodia, though most of those are
already targetted against South Vietnam. A cessation of hostilities
in Cambodia would free the remainder for deployment to South
Vietnam. But the impact of such an augmentation in Communist
strength would not be great, since the NVA./VC combat strength
in South Vietnam's Military Regions (MR) 3 and 4 -- the areas
to which the units in Cambodia most likely would be deployed -
is now estimated to total about 54,000 troops.
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15 May 1973
THE IMPACT OF A COMMUNIST CAMBODIA
A Communist takeover in Cambodia would have the
following results:
It would be very unsettling politically and
psychologically to the South Vietnamese govern-
ment and the South Vietnamese population.
The GVN would feel increasingly isolated and
beleagured. It would regard a Communist
Cambodia as evidence of U.S. determination
to disengage from Indochina and a sign of U.S.
unwillingness to insist on Communist compliance
with the provisions of the Paris Agreements.
-- The U.S. position in Thailand would also be
adversely affected, because Bangkok views
U.S. policy in Cambodia as a gauge of the
reliability of the U.S. commitment to Thai
security.
-- The fall of Cambodia would markedly ease the
logistic problems of the Communists in
supplying their military forces in South
Vietnam.
-- It would in sum make it easier for Hanoi to
achieve its goal of taking over South Vietnam,
either by the political struggle route or by
a return to military struggle.
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1. Political and Psychological Implications. The most
damaging consequences of a Communist victory in Cambodia
would be the political and psychological fallout in South Vietnam
and other neighboring countries. The immediate effect on Saigon
would be highly unsettling, producing a feeling within the GVN of
greater vulnerability and isolation. The GVN accepted the Paris
Agreements with reluctance and only under considerable U.S.
pressure. To the GVN, Article 20 -- stating that all signing parties
would refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and Laos to
encroach on others' sovereignty and security -- was a central
element of the agreement, without which the GVN would have been
adamantly unwilling to sign an agreement that turned a blind
eye to the presence of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.
Communist acquisition of control over Cambodia would be read
in Saigon as a sign that Article 20 had been abandoned and the
GVN betrayed.
2. Saigon would make no precipitate moves, but South
Vietnamese leaders would be concerned that U . S. failure to
prevent a Communist takeover in Cambodia would presage total
U.S. disengagement from Indochina and a U.S. unwillingness
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to insist on Communist compliance with the Paris Agreements.
Even though the immediate military threat to South Vietnam might
not be markedly increased, GVN military leaders. would be very
fearful about the longer term threat to a Communist-surrounded
South Vietnam. On the diplomatic front, South Vietnam would
almost certainly request new U.S. guarantees of economic and
military assistance, and new assurances of U.S. air support in
the event of a major Communist attack. Saigon would react with
even greater alarm if Hanoi began to ship large amounts of heavy
military equipment into Cambodia or to develop and use Cambodian
air facilities.
3. The Effects in Laos and Thailand: The fall of Cambodia
would clearly be discouraging to non-Communists in Laos, although
the immediate impact on political events there would be fairly small.
The Laos settlement agreement has already guaranteed the Communists
indefinite control of eastern Laos and a major role in a new
coalition government.
4. The political and psychological fallout in Thailand,
however, would be much greater. For obvious reasons, Bangkok
has a sizable stake in neighboring Cambodia and Laos and has
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made it clear that it looks to the U.S. to prevent a Communist
takeover in either country. In other words, Bangkok views U.S.
policy in Cambodia as a gauge of the reliability of the U.S.
commitment to Thai security. If Cambodia, shorn of U.S. support,
went under to the Communists, Bangkok's first instinctive reaction
would be to fall back on its alliance with the U.S. and look to
Washington for protection. It would not be likely to take any
major military action, such as moving its forces into western
Cambodia without guarantees of full U.S. support.
5. A Communist Cambodia, however, would prompt a basic
reexamination of Thailand's close political and military ties with
the U.S. If, in Thai eyes, the U.S. "allowed" Cambodia to fall,
Bangkok, for one thing, would take a harder look at the relative
advantages and disadvantages of allowing U.S. air bases to
remain in Thailand. The Thai leadership would want to see
some new and concrete assurances of U .S .. support -- probably in
the form. of greatly increased economic and military aid To
date, the Thai government has for the most part ignored growing
domestic pressure to reconsider the U.S. alliance and move to a
non-aligned policy. If, in the aftermath of a Communist victory
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in Cambodia, the U.S. cannot respond sufficiently with new
aid and commitments to satisfy Thai doubts, these pressures
would escalate and jeopardize the existing close cooperation
between Washington and Bangkok.
6. Easing of Communist Logistic Burdens: The greatest
military gain accruing to the Communists from their control of
Cambodia would be an easing of their heavy logistical burden.
No longer would Communist fortunes in southern South Vietnam
depend so heavily on the long and costly overland supply corridor
through southern Laos and Cambodia. They could begin to
shift more of their logistic effort to a sea supply route through
southern Cambodia. There is nothing to prevent small-scale
sea supply through Cambodia at present since the Communists
control or have easy access to much of the Cambodian coastline
and interior adjacent to South Vietnam. A larger effort, however,
would require an end to the fighting in Cambodia and the acquisition
of Cambodia's port facilities.
7. The development of a Cambodian sea supply route could
in time give the Communists much greater flexibility in developing
and implementing their future military strategy in Vietnam.
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Large amounts of war material, including the heavy weapons
needed to mount a major offensive, could be brought in through
the port of Kompong Som much more quickly and with much less
warning than if delivered overland from the north. This was
precisely the advantage that the Communists enjoyed for several.
years prior to Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970, when Kompong
Som was the main port of entry for North Vietnamese military
supplies consigned to southern South Vietnam. Hanoi's ability
to make extensive use of Kompong Som in this manner would depend,
of course, on the willingness of Peking and Moscow to provide
the material and possibly the shipping for such an effort. It would
also depend on Kompong Som's immunity from air attack or
naval quarantine.
8. The Communists would by no means abandon their
overland routes from the north. Indeed, they have already
improved their capability to resupply their forces in northern
South Vietnam directly across the DMZ, and are 'apparently at
work on developing routes that would allow them to resupply
southern South Vietnam while bypassing Cambodia and Laos.
The development of a Cambodian sea supply route, however, would
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simplify Communist military imports and assist this effort to phase
out or deemphasize their dependence on the existing Ho Chi Minh
trail system. The largest part of the North Vietnamese force
structure in southern Laos -- which is logistics related -- could
be withdrawn without waiting for the development of overland
supply routes through South Vietnam to the south.
9. Immediate Military Impact on South Vietnam: Although
a Communist takeover in Cambodia would not immediately shift
the balance of military power in a major way, it would still improve
the position of VC/NVA forces significantly. The Vietnamese
Communists currently are estimated to have about 5,000 regular
combat troops in Cambodia, most of whom are already targetted
against South Vietnam. (This total also includes, however, sapper
and artillery elements operating with Khmer Communist units
and an unknown number of advisors.) A cessation of hostilities
in Cambodia would free almost all of these troops for deployment to
South Vietnam. Since the NVA./VC combat strength in South Vietnam's
Military Regions (MR) 3 and 4 - the areas to which the units in
Cambodia most likely would be deployed -- is now estimated to
total about 54 , 000 troops, this would be an augmentation of some
ten percent.
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10. In the longer term, the Communists would have access
to a jet airbase at Phnom Penh, as well as several smaller airfields
closer to the border which could be used to provide air support
in South Vietnam. Moreover, the Communists might acquire a
substantial inventory of Cambodian government helicopters and
propeller-driven tactical aircraft, naval craft, artillery, and other
hardware. In addition, the sizable amounts of arms and ammunition
stockpiled by the Communists in Cambodia, which is designated
for the fighting there, could be made available to Communist
forces in South Vietnam.
T- n r-
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