THE ARVN SETBACK IN THE QUE SON VALLEY OF MR 1

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700090014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 25, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

ID EU R f- 1.
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25 August 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The AR.VN Setback in the Que Son Valley of MR I
I.. A review of intelligence available prior to 19 August, when
Que Son district town and Fire Support Base (FSB) Ross were lost to
the enemy, indicates that the enemy's objectives and timetable during lieute these attacks in Que Son district werevosion, ewhohwas ecaptur don nt
from the 270th NVA Regiment, 711th Di
23 July, revealed the general timing of the enemy' s "curr ent drive and
nce of enemy tanksand Hers
spelled out the specific objected the each
and agents had earlier report Pre
artillery in northwestern Quang Tin province
These were to we re used
during attacks in the Quang Nam lowLarris. report
confirmed by Forward Air Controllers, and air strikes resulted in
numerous secondary explosions, as well as the reported
e a clear nce
of several enemy artillery pieces and tanks. This
Son weapons to Fppore the NVA
indication of the enemy's buildup of heavy
711th Division in further attacks in Que
interviews in late May with both the~2jndled tN D hivi ey tin Coaw cede the
and the Quang Nam province chief
enemy's objectives and strength even at that time.
2. Enemy activity in northern Quang Tin province and Que Son
district of Quang Nam province from April through June of this year
gave other indications that the 711th DL~anan`w Although the 2nd ARVN
to move into the coastal area south g rict Division failed to retake several fireb during HM yD theL2n Div s on's
quarters in northern Quang Tin province
55th and 6th Regiments later did hold F turn Ross until ended the 7lLlt'n D~ ision'slst
ARVN Independent Regiment. This in
first campaign to seize Que Son district town-and FSB Ross.
CL.ASSIFFIED
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3. Enemy movements and attacks in Que Son district during
late July and early August followed the pattern set earlier in May and
June. First, attacks in the mountains bordering Que Son district
inflicted heavy casualties on one battalion of the 6th ARVN Regiment
and a Ranger battalion, forcing other ARVN units back into the low-
lands. The enemy seized Outpost Lion, southwest of Que Son district
town, on 23 July. By 30 July, two of seven ARVN infantry battalions
from the 2nd Division and two Ranger battalions had been rendered
combat ineffective. Several RF/PF outposts were overrun or abandoned,
and continuing small-scale attacks by fire hindered ARVN movements
as enemy forces maneuvered into better attack positions. ARVN and
RF troops did conduct limited counterattacks at this time to regain .
lost outposts and claimed to have inflicted significant losses on enemy
forces. The 2nd Regiment, 3rd ARVN Division, reinforced ARVN
forces in northeast Que Son district during early August. Meanwhile,
the 711th Division's attacks in Que Son district were coordinated with
the Viet Cong Front 4's campaign .in the Quang Nam area, which
included a heavy rocket attack on Danang on 3 August. Attacks by
fire, ground probes; and harassment continued in Que Son district,
in coastal Quang Nam province, and in northeast Quang Tin province.
Gradually the NVA forces isolated ARVN and RF forces in Que Son
district by maintaining pressure against ARVN infantry units and
initiating scattered small-scale attacks.. Five ARVN attempts to
retake Outpost Lion, which dominates the area southwest of Que Son
town, between 24 July and 15 August failed.
4. Intelligence reports and enemy patterns of activity indicated the
enemy would conduct major attacks in Que Son district during the August
"high point. " Other reports indicated that activity in Que Son district
would be coordinated with attacks'.on Danang and other targets in the
Quang Nam lowlands on or about 19 August, the anniversary of the
proclamation of the DRV. The MACV Disum and Station sitreps carried
items on the increasing enemy pressure in the Quang Nam/Que Son
area almost every day over a period of weeks prior to the night of
17/18 August. On that night NVA forces infiltrated the area between
the 5th ARVN Regiment at FSB Ross and the Que Son district headquarters,
which was held by RF forces, effectively isolating them. On 18 August,
NVA 130mm' field artillery, firing for the first time in Quang Nam
province, demoralized the ARVN defenders of FSB Ross while the NVA
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31st Regiment pinned them down with continuous mortar and recoilless
rifle fire and the occasional use of SAGGER wire-guided missiles.
Three kilometers to the east, the 38th NVA Regiment blocked the GVN
line of communications. Relieving ARVN forces at FSB Baldy in
northeast Que Son district were pinned down by artillery and mortar
fire while the ARVN 2nd Regiment remained immobile in the northern
foothills of Que Son district. Other NVA forces enveloped the Ross-
Que Son town area from the south, cutting Route 534. Danang and
other GVN population centers and ARVN fire support bases within
supporting distance of Que Son district were hit with attacks by fire to
prevent the reinforcement of ARVN units already in the area. The
270th NVA Regiment, the 3rd Regiment of the 711th Division, and the
409th NVA sapper battalion reportedly cut Route 535 between the landing
zone near FSB Baldy and Que Son town, blocking ARVIN reinforcements.
Brigadier General Hiep, the commanding general of the 2nd ARVN
Division, requested permission from MR 1 Headquarters to abandon
FSB Ross at noon on 19 August, but was refused and was ordered to
hold the position.
5. By early i morning of the 19th, NVA soldiers had occupied.
two-thirds of the firebase, but were later reported to have been driven
out. Reports indicated that heavy artillery attacks demoralized the
ARVN defenders, who were further confused by a heavy tear gas
concentration when stored CS rounds were hit by artillery fire. The
NVA attackers gained control of FSB Ross through small ground probes
rather than by a large-scale assault. A report that ARVN had regained
control of Ross apparently caused a cancellation of air strikes which
might have hindered the enemy. Back at the landing zone near FSB
Baldy, a relief column scheduled to depart at dawn failed to move until
1600, apparently because of confusion and lack of coordination. By
then it was too late, since Que Son district headquarters was abandoned
by the RF/PF defenders at 1300 hours and at 1600 hours FSB Ross was
evacuated by the 5th ARVN Regiment.
6. A general retreat of GVN forces toward FSB Baldy occurred
during the night of 19-20 August. Some semblance of order was restored
during a lull in NVA activity which probably reflected a need to regroup.
Friendly losses appear to have been heavy. The 5th ARVN Regiment
was rendered combat ineffective; equipment losses included eight M-41
tanks, 22 artillery pieces, at least 16 APC's, and one TOW missile
launcher.
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7. On 21 and 22 August an ARVN counteroffensive made only
very limited progress despite preparatory B-52 and tacair strikes.
The 711th NVA Division appeared at this time to be regrouping for
further attacks on the flanks of friendly forces in eastern Que Son
district. Sensitive sources indicated that the 711th NVA Division
headquarters and its forward element had moved to within seven and
two kilometers respectively of the. landing zone near FSB Baldy. Enemy
130mrn artillery had apparently also moved forward and was registering
on Baldy with- light ABF:.
8. FSB Bally, which guards the gateway to the Quan Nam low
lands, was, as of 23 August, occupied by remnants of the 5th ARVN
Regiment and one battalion of the 6th Regiment. Six battalions from
the ARVN 2nd and 6th Regiments and three RF battalions formed a
defensive line about six kilometers east of FSB Ross. The situation,
had apparently stabilized, at least temporarily.
9. A major factor in the debacle probably has been poor
leadership of the 2nd ARVN Division. The commanding general,
Brigadier General Hiep, was rated as poor by U. S. advisors when he
commanded the 1st Armor Brigade. The 2nd Division itself was
considered a good unit because of low desertions and a seemingly
good combat record against VC local forces. However, there has been
consistent reporting suggesting that previous as well as current
Division and Regimental commanders have grossly exaggerated or
fabricated operational claims and minimized their own losses. The
lack of aggressiveness, poor coordination, failure to support RF/PF
units, and the collapse of the defense of FSB Ross can only be explained
by problems of leadership at the Regimental and Divisional level.
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