CONFLICTING ESTIMATES OF THE PACIFICATION SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700090002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 30, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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30 August 1972
SUBJECT Conflicting Estimates of the Pacification
Situation in South Vietnam
REFERENCES: (A) South Vietnam: The Communists Strike at
Pacification. State Department, Bureau
of Intelligence Research, 2 August 1972
(B) Assessment of the Political and Anti-
Pacification Efforts of the Communists
During the Current Offensive. U, S.
Embassy Saigon 11464, 4 august 1972
1. The conflicting estimates found in the two referenced docu-
ments stem from basic differences in initial approach rather than major
discrepancies in data or information used. The assessment of the U. S.
Mission, which focuses on a comparison of the Communists' achievements
versus their intentions, concludes that the deterioration in pacification
has been a by-product of the NVA military offensive. The Mission views
the offensive itself as a phenomenon, arguing that when it has run its
course the Government of Vietnam (GVN) will again extend its influence
throughout the countryside. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR), on the other hand, views the events since April of this year as
an effort by the Communists to wrest control of the countryside and
defeat the pacification programs of the GVN. Thus, INR sees the de-
terioration in pacification as less of a temporary situation and more
of a long term Communist program that began before the military of-
fensive and will continue when the shock troops go to ground. With such
a discrepancy between the conceptual frameworks of the two papers, it
is impossible to reconcile them or to "average them out. 11 M,o-ree ve t*,
both papers contain a central thesis of considerable merit which would
be lost or neutered if the papers were to be merged.
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2. One of the principal arguments of INR is that the rural
pacification situation began to deteriorate prior to the offensive and
this deterioration merely continued at an accelerated pace after
30 March. From a strictly numerical standpoint, the first part of
this argument is correct -- GVN control of the rural population began
to slip in January and continued to decline in February. There were,
however, several factors which rendered this statistical evidence am-
biguous, both at the time it was first received and even in retrospect.
First, pacification declines are not unusual for that time of year. The
decline suffered in January-February 1971, for example, was greater
than that experienced over the same two months in 1972. Second, is-
suance of the GVN pacification plan this year -- which, among other
things, assigns priorities and resources -- was delayed due to the
fact that it encompassed four years rather than the usual one. This
delay induced a certain lethargy in the program. Third, the December
1971 ratings had been very high; showing unusual improvement over
the November figures. It is probable that at least some of the decline
in subsequent months represented adjustment of over-optimistic re-
ports, since the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was in a turnover
process (U. S. to Vietnamese) at the time. 1 / Lastly, much of the de-
terioration in pacification was more closely related to preparations
for the NVA offensive than to an expansion of Communist administra-
tive control. In particular, the high number of abductions which ad-
versely ^.ffected overall pacification ratings in January and February
was related specifically to Communist logistics efforts associated
with the coming offensive; and for even the Communists there are
limitations to the efficiency of winning hearts and minds via abduction.
3. The basic thesis of the Mission assessment -- that the
Communist leadership has been disappointed with the results of the
offensive, and in particular with the performance of the local forces --
has considerable credibility but should not be overworked. In the first
place, the reporting on these matters deals with various echelons of
the COSVN apparatus. Most of these documents deal with-district
level and provincial level organizations which are having problems
organizing their local force military and local political operations.
-1/ The district-level Vietnamization program for I-IES involved a
specific goal of A-B population prior to the actual turnover of the
system to the South Vietnamese. There is evidence that these goals
were met statistically prior to their being met in reality. On making
his first independent evaluation, the Vietnamese evaluator often re-
adjusted the figures downward to bring the ratings closer to the situa-
tion on the ground. This effect, however, by itself is not believed to be
a sufficient explanation of the aggregate decline in HES ratings in early
1972.
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Since it is clearly Hanoi that is running the show, however, it is Hanoi's
estimate of the situation that is the more important, but of this we know
considerably less. In the second place, reports of declining morale due
to shortages of personnel, medical supplies, food, etc. , are as old as
the war itself and should be treated more as a constant rather than as
indicators of significant change, at least when broad assessments are
to be made. Clearly, however, the major pacification losses to the
GVN have occurred where the NVA has hit the hardest, and the recovery
of pacification momentum will be most difficult where the NVA has dug
in and has some local support. The litany of trouble spots, with the ex-
ception of Quang Tri, is not much different now than it was a few years
ago -- it is a listing of provinces with strong Communist infrastructures.
The magnitude of the problem has increased with the insertion this spring
of fresh NVA forces.
4. As to the current pacification situation, there are two facets
which should remain in the forefront of any analysis. First, the offen-
sive is still in progress but to date has been reasonably well contained.
While the GVN has lost large tracts of territory to enemy control, much
of this territory was sparsely populated. Because of the substantial
territorial gains made by the Communists -- and the tenacity with which
they appear willing to defend them -- it is difficult to make direct com-
parisons with the Tet 1968 offensive or to intervening periods. On a
strictly iiemographic basis, however, the degree of GVN control over
the rural population now approximates what it was in August 1970.
While the consistency and fidelity of HES statistics have, over the years,
been subjected to a large amount of skeptical criticism, the comparison
of the present to the August 1970 period is probably reasonably accurate
if one bears in mind the wide disparity between population and territorial
control. A second facet of the situation is that in the population control
aspect of pacification, the decline due to the offensive may have levelled
off. (The June 1972 aggregate figures for population under GVN control
are up by one percent - - from 60 to 61 percent -- over May. )
5. In short, there is little question that pacification has been set
back and that the GVN is likely to have some difficult months ahead of it.
Nonetheless, the pacification effort thus far has not suffered irreparable
damage, and such damage does not appear likely over the next two or
three months. Beyond that period, however, there simply are too many
unknown and perhaps unknowable factors involved to make a confident
assessment. Pacification must be viewed in the context of the overall
mix of factors affecting the situation in Indochina. Perhaps the most
accurate though hardly earth shaking -- conclusion possible now is
that while pacification has been hurt, particularly in areas where the
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fighting has been most fierce and the NVA presence strongest, its
future depends in large part on events that have yet to run their
course (e. g., the current Communist offensive) and on future con-
tingencies (e, g. , a ceasefire), the likelihood of which we cannot
estimate at this time.
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