THE MEO MEMO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700060059-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: March 1, 1972
• Content Type: MF

1 March 1972,
25X1
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Carver
Herewith your annotated copy of the
memo. I have a couple of problems.
1. Top of page 18. We have not
mentioned the Agency specifically anywhere
else in'the memo and I would suggest to
delete here.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Meo Memo
Attached, per your request, are my comments and recommenda-
tions on the Meo memo plus my suggested editorial changes. After some
reflection, I decided the best and fairest thing to do would be to show my
comments and proposed changes to Dick Lehman so that he would at least
know what I was recommending to you with respect to this piece on which
his office has labored so long. Dick's remarks are attached below. I
agree with his first point and have already made the change. I disagree
with his second point, since I regard the sentence as speculative and
unhelpful. I also disagree with his', third point though paragraph 77
bothers me somewhat less than paragraphs 78, 79, and 80.
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2. Page 32, last sentence of para-
graph 73. This seems to me a useful
thought and I think it should be retained.
3. Your proposal to drop paras 77-
80. I could readily sacrifice 79 and 80
and reluctantly 78, but I think 77 should
remain, if !"t to summarize the problem.
(DATE)
RICHARD LEHMAN
.1 NO.
JO S4
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1 March 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Comments on "The Meo of Northeast Laos: The Waning
of a Tribe"
25X1 1. Per your 28 February request, I have read the latest
(28 February) version of the Meo memo with great care. As you know
an earlier draft was telepouched to the field for comment b
and the
vienriane Station. This latest version reflects the field comments and
corrections. I have discussed this latest version with who
shares my thoughts as outlined below.
2. The Meo memo is a first-class, very impressive piece of
research, analysis and writing. As all who have read it (both here
and overseas) have noted it does gyrea, it to those who put it
25X1 together -- especially its principal drafter,
who drew on a lot of good work done by the Vietnamese Station. The
question before the house, however, is not the quality of the paper as
a piece of analysis (undisputably excellent) but whether it should be
disseminated externally as an Agency memorandum and, if so, to whom
and under what controls.
3. Laos, as you well know, is a complex topic on which there
is a wide spectrum of strongly held views within and, particularly, out-
side the U. S. Government. The Agency's role in Laos is a topic of
special complexity and controversy. It is clearly our duty to do what
we can to enlighten the policy levels of the U. S. Government on im-
portant matters of major policy concern. It is not our duty, however,
to cut our own throat or hand our critics ? sharp instruments to facili-
tate their doing so. Also -- a fact of life that cannot here be ignored --
the practical likelihood of controversial official documents on Indochina
leaking, especially ones relating to Agency activities, has to be recog-
nized as very high at the present time. Hence, we have to be particu-
larly careful about publishing documents with passages or material
that could be used as ammunition in an attack on the U. S. Government,
its Indochina policies, or the Agency's role therein.
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4. The above considerations are germane to your decision
on dissemination of the Mco memo because it perforce treats two
particularly controversial and highly charged matters:
a. The Meo's traditional role as growers of poppies
and producers of opium as their major cash crop..
b. A key cause/effect argument on whether (1) U.S.
(Agency)-backed military operations in north .Laos
were necessitated by aggressive Communist
pressure directed and increasingly supported from
Hanoi or (2) these operations were not necessary
and, in fact, prompted or stimulated Hanoi's
energetic intervention thus, in effect, causing
the Meo to be destroyed as a people.
5. I urge you to read the memo carefully yourself and make
your own judgments. As you will note, I have made a number of
editorial suggestions. These have two objects:
a. To tailor the prose on the opium question to avoid
statements against interest, without masking facts
or tampering with the truth. It is clearly not in
our interest to publish an official Agency document
containing prose that in or out of context could be
used to support the charge that we have been
directly or indirectly subsidizing the production
of or traffic in opium.
b. To adjust statements on the causality issue in
order, again, to avoid comments clearly against
interest but (I hope) without doing violence to the
author's basic arguments and judgments.
6. In addition to the editorial fixes offered for your considera-
tion, there are four paragraphs -- 77, 78, 79, and 80 -- that I simply
do not agree with and think should be dropped. I may be wrong -- and
am sure the memo's able author would argue that I am -- but these
paragraphs contain a line of analysis I personally do not buy. Basically,
I think these paragraphs ignore certain essential factors to a degree
that makes them unrealistic. Rather than belaboring the point here,
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 however, I v~gilbreir~If3~00X"1~8~@3PAt1~8!}1DFIib60Q~~0~0~9-1
further oral or written argument for them should you desire it.
7. My net recommendation is that with editorial fixes along the
lines suggested, the memorandum should be given limited dissemination
to -- and only to -- Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird,
Admiral Moorer, and Mr. Sullivan. It should go out with a cover note
personally signed by you that stresses the memo's political sensitivity.
If handled this way, I think it will make a helpful contribution and do
the Agency credit. If it is given any wider dissemination, however, it
is almost certain to reach hostile hands in the press or Congress and
be used as a source of ammunition against the Government and the Agency.
25X1
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
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MEMORANDUM FOR: SAVA
SUBJECT : Meo
25X1 C/FE, successfully argued me out of my
original reaction to this memorandum on the Meo (see attached
draft memorandum to Mr. Walsh). I was not aware of the degree
of review the memo has had. I have not signed it and will not.
2. I agree with the thought that we are basically differing on
a chicken-and-egg proposition. The one thing I can comment on
with certainty is U.S. motivation in 1962, as I was a major partic-
ipant in it. Governor Harriman, then Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern matters, had to be convinced to continue any
assistance at all to the Meo. The sole basis upon which he agreed
was that we could not just turn away and leave them to the mercies
of the North Vietnamese. We had no desire to move ahead and
conduct paramilitary operations in that area until after the North
Vietnamese had demonstrated their contempt for the 1962 Geneva
Agreements.
3. 1 certainly don?t want to varnish a sad story. I do believe,
however, that we have nothing to be ashamed of in our support of the
Meo. Freedom and independence are well worth the costs they
involve, not only to the U. S. but also in this case to the Meo. Thus
I have real trouble with the last sentence of memo, and
correspondingly with a bit of the tone of the basic DDI memo.
W. E. Colby
Executive Director -Comptroller
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As stated
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director -Comptroller
Intelligence Memorandum No.
0844/72
"The Meo of Northeast Laos:
Waning of a Tribe"
The
1. Some background on the work which has been done on the
paper might he useful. When the first draft was sent to us we had
some problems with it which eventually resulted in its being sent
to the Field for careful review by both the Vientiane Station and
those officers who were most intimately familiar with our early
involvement with the Meo. The draft was gone over by
all of whom made minor corrections,
but none o whom o jecte to the basic interpretations in the paper.
The Vientiane Station management said they had no problems with it.
At the time all this was going on, George Carver and I suggested to
the Director that we hold off on distribution of the paper until we
had the Field comments and that distribution be carefully limited
inasmuch as we obviously had a document which had political over-
tones. The Director agreed. After the return of the paper, it was
subsequently further revised by George Carver to eliminate objection-
able phrasing. In short, a great deal of work has been done on this
paper by a number of knowledgeable people who do not object to the
final outcome.
2. Perhaps if we had written the paper we would have adopted
a somewhat different tone. The question of tone really boils down to
whether the Meo originally sought our assistance and therefore we were
involved in supporting them in their battle with the North Vietnamese or
whether we encouraged them to accept our assistance for our own purposes
which is essentially the argument in this paper. This is something of a
chicken and egg proposition, but from our reading of the record what
the U. S. found in the Meo was an anti-North Vietnamese element (they
had been chased out of North Vietnam by the North Vietnamese Army)
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which we supported initially for intelligence purposes and later
because they represented an element of anti-Communist strength
in the Laos equation. The Kennedy Administration authorized us
Jo support the Meo prior to the Geneva Accords for the specific
purpose of harassing the communist and neutralist forces then on
the Plain of Jars. This was to be a diversionary or supplemental
effort to the plans of the U. S. to support the Royal Lao Army's
efforts to march north and retake the Plain. Thus I have no
particular problem with the page 1 comment.
3. With regard to your comment in paragraph 3 b, certainly
the North Vietnamese and specifically the Lao Dong Party, were
directing the Pathet Lao forces and providing them with advisory
and logistics support. But until 1967, the activities of the Meo were
f the interests, in the
not particularly troublesome to North Vietnamese
1967 and 68?
With the expansion of our program of support
and the establishment of a Tacan site at Phou Pha Thi near Sam Neua,
plus an increase in Meo harassment activity, the North Vietnamese
apparently decided to up the ante and take over the fight against the
Meo in north Laos with regular North Vietnamese units.
4. Compared to their position in 1967, the Meo have lost heavily
in territory. Although they have been the fact is thatethto get e they back on the Plain of
t almost all the
Jars during the wet season
territory they held in Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang provinces. The
paragraph in question seems reasonably accurate to us. The Meo have
lost territory and been turned largely into a nation of refugees. The
real argument is whether this would have happened anyhow had we not
involved ourselves with them.
5. Re the top of page 10, I don't agree that the U. S. motivation
in 1962 was primarily one the Nothwalking
Vietnamesenas we had tup to that pio nt
own devices in the face of
been playing the Meo as a supporting force to other efforts to preserve
the Royal Lao Government. With the signing of the Geneva Accords which
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forced the withdrawal of the MAAG, our capability to covertly continue
support of the Meo became a key element in resisting PL/NVA advances
against the neutralist and rightist forces in Laos. I doubt very much
that we were motivated by any overwhelming feeling of obligation
to the Meo forces.
6. Re paragraph 27, this is part of the chicken and egg
argument but I believe it is obviously true that had the Meo fight not
been of interest in Washington we would not have supplied them with
the wherewithal to continue the fight.
7. Re paragraph 50, it is certainly true that the North Vietnamese
have expended a great deal of energy and effort in their campaigns against
the Meo particularly since 1968. They have underestimated the resiliency
25X1
of the Meo and have never been able to devote the effort and force needed
to completely eliminate them. Nevertheless, the Meo are largely finished
as a fiahtina force and are now .incapable of defending MR -II
who are sitting up north of Xieng Khouangville doing very little. The
strength figures on Meo armed forces are grossly inflated.
8. If we had not involved ourselves in support of the Meo it is
probable that they would largely have been left to their mountain ways
by the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese who would have certainly
attempted to control them politically, but who might well have settled
for a tacit live and let live policy with occasional skirmishes to keep
them from encroaching too much on their lines of communication.
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Certainly the war would have affected them but probably would not
have created the large refugee population which now exists.
9. On balance, we feel that the Meo paper is a reasonably
honest and accurate presentation of the situation. It might have
been presented in a somewhat more positive fashion but to do so would
be a questionable attempt to varnish what is an essentially sad story.
I am unable to bring myself to feel that the Meo would be necessarily
much worse off had we left them alone.
25X1
Chief, Far East Division
Attachment:
Your Memo of 27 March,
Same Subject
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MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Paul V. Walsh
Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Intelligence Memorandum No. 0844/72
"The Meo of Northeast Laos: The Waning
of a Tribe"
1. May I commend the initiative in writing the attached review
of the Meo and their present prospects.
2. This being said, I have real trouble with some of the con-
tents. Perhaps it is chiefly the Introduction (and summary) which set
me off, but I do feel it represents an example of the argument that U. S.
aid and involvement with another people is a two-part equation leading
to a negative result. I always thought there was another factor in the
equation, i. e. , the enemy, and that U. S. involvement was the result
of that factor rather than an independent action.
3. Some specifics:
a. I question whether the Meo "provided the U. S. with a
means of monitoring and harassing the Communists", (Page 1).
Rather, I think the United States provided assistance to the Meo
fighting the Communists' efforts against them. Our monitoring
was something that we could have done with considerably less
effort, and the harassing took place only when the Communists
came into the Meo country.
b. I would call North Vietnamese involvement in North
Laos somewhat more than "limited to advisory and logistic
support for the indigenous Communist forces and periodic dry-
season appearances by elements of the North Vietnamese 316th
Division. " (Page 1). I think the North Vietnamese were manip-
ulating and operating the operation to a much higher degree, and
their degree of frustration with their puppet Pathet Lao must
have been monumental, to say the least.
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c. Since early 1968 the Communists have not "steadily
rolled back the territorial gains of the Meo. " (Page 2). You
mention later in the paper the very substantial reverse move-
ment of the Meo into the Plaines des Jarres in 1969. The key
characteristic of the war in northern Laos has been the seasonal
ebb and flow. You say the last two dry seasons ended with the
North Vietnamese menacing Long Tieng. True, but we could
also say that the last two wet seasons. have ended with the Meo
a considerable distance into Communist territory.
d. As for the alternatives in your penultimate paragraph
of the Introduction, I would add somewhat more specifically the
points you make later in the paper that the Meo also have another
option - - inclusion in an over-all negotiated settlement in Indo-
china, which we of course have been trying to achieve for many
years.
4. Other points:
a. Page 4 - para 5- "Many" young Meo have- not become
highly effective fighter pilots in a matter of months. Some
have, which is pretty amazing in itself, but we need not overdo
b. I got a little lost in the contrast between paragraphs 6
and 7.
c. Top of page 10. The U. S. motivation in 1962 was
primarily one of not walking away and leaving the Meo to their
own devices in the face of the North Vietnamese. Also, we
flew in nonmilitary supplies until the North Vietnamese began
their attacks there.
d. Para 27. Again, I rather question the degree to which
the Meo were "successfully serving the interests of Vientiane
and Washington, " as against the degree Washington was helping
them do something they wanted to do, i. e. , resist the North
Vietnamese.
5. Para 50 on page 16 is an example of my difficulty. I won-
der what the author in Hanoi or Peking might write. It might come to
something like:
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"The North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao have spent
enormous amounts of blood and treasure to try to overcome
the infuriating Mco and the support they have received from
the Americans over the years. Starting with the use of
Pathet Lao elements, guided and stiffened by North Vietnamese,
a series of attempts to conquer these people were made. This
has included the work of a regular North Vietnamese division
and, in 1969, two regular North Vietnamese divisions. Despite
this effort, the Meo have managed to retake a large amount of
territory the North Vietnamese have taken. Each year the
question boils down to the long-term determination of the Meo
r- I
to maintain themselves (with U. S. assistance,
fact that the Meo have real troubles, the long-term profit in the
exercise to the North Vietnamese does not seem at all clear.
If it is not successful in 1972, and it must be realized that it
is badly off schedule and still has not been able to make a deci-
sive capture of Long Tieng (despite the fact that it was announced
as taken in January), there is some question whether the con-
tinued effort is worth the candle. Perhaps it would be better
to settle for a buffer zone of Sam Neua and the. area around
Route 7 and leave Meng Khouang Province to this irritating
bunch of people, so long as the Americans or the Vietnamese
would not use the area as a base of operations against North
Vietnam. "
as against the long-term determination of the North
Vietnamese to suppress them. At this juncture, despite the
6. The discussion of the change in mores (paras 59-63) is an
example of the acceleration of development which war brings to primi-
tive peoples. It will be recalled that somewhat the same experience
was suffered by a number of the South Pacific peoples from 1942 to 1945.
This made major temporary changes in a number of these areas, but
they seem to have survived. As for the chances that the frustration
can lead to a return to the old leadership, it seems much more likely
that dissatisfaction, if it is such, with VargPao could lead to another
type of military leader as long as the war threat persists.
7. Page 23, pars 69. I really question that Vang Pao ever really
promised them that "all will be well. "
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The discussion from paragraphs 73 to 81 bothers me.
The may begin to qucstion,?
e as,
estimative languag vid
well wonder," "There is no firm eence?tha
such fuzzy leaves
"The Mco "Another 11 and "They might try.
-But," "Another possibility is,
an impression but is hardly definitive.
What I really am expressing is a
9 , pardon ne nitpicks.
I stand second to none in MY
concern as to the tone of the paper* by
of the enormous cost the Meo have suffered and my s
appreciation I have been much impressed
f
pathy for them. At the same time,
and would hope that no a s s e s srnent o our a
their courage and tenacity ought to react rather
would shortchange them on the basis of how they At the same time,
than how these magnificent People have reacted.
full co the de aira~11 t ility hof a full a s se s amen
e negative factors and
ncurrence with
I repeat MY fof this experience, including adequate recog-
and recording paper gives. adeq
I just wonder whetherethi a have
shown
uncertainties, over the years.
ibles which the s e people
nation to the intang
E. Colby
troller
Executive Director-COMP
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