TEXT OF(Sanitized)/SAIGON CABLE (Sanitized)DATED 18 DECEMBER 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700030019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 1, 2000
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
25X1
25X1
L3AI
cr_r?FT V____1
Approved For Release 2008/10/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R000700030019-8
-,moll NW -
NSC review completed
MEMORANDUM
. SUBJECT:
W
which discussed in this channel, we should not expect that ey .
d 4-447 in either names, nationalities or numbers of prisoners
i
Saigon Cablel (Dated 18 December 1971
Ambassador Bunker has reviewed 17 December NSC Staff message
concerning prisoner exchange channel and has following comments:
1. Conversational scenario outlined in para 6 of NSC message poses
no basic problems for us in terms of tone, style or technical details. Is
our view, however, that given other side's past record on items of substance
4.1-
,11 be
y g
precise in i en
for 25X1
that they they would release in exchange
and others. Please note that conversations with other side's in err-ediary
on 4 December and 27 November plowed essentially? this same ground o.' 25X1
specifics, i.e., our need for names, nationalities and numbers of prisoners
to be released by them. Response from other side was negative. They
simply would not discuss what interested us. Have no reason to believe
it will be otherwise in next call, for other side has been fundamentally
consistent throughout the use of this channel since 1967. For example,
they rejected, as we expected they would, our 4 December request for
face-to-face meetings and improvement of communications. This not
surprising to us in Saigon, for other side rejected idea of face-to-face
meetings previously and have never used more sophisticated communica-
tions facilities which were available to them for maintaining contact with
us. They have always stuck to pattern of telephone calls. In essence,
therefore, believe we must use formula for working this exchange channel
which gives appropriate value factor to what we know of other side and its
modus operandi. In short, while para 6 ploy could be implemented with
ease in technical sense of conveying it to other side if they call, it has
little prospect of success in our view, for other side not likely to spell
out details we want. Without these details see virtuall' no ros ect that. 25X1
Thieu would agree to release 25X1
As you wil recall, Thieu let us
know on 28 October via o on Binh that he would release if 25X1
f
d b r iside
ou
Unfortunately, in Vietnamese context, exchange 25X1
' . _ .r. ..4 l;lrcltr I- h1fl
equal value could be obtaine y
1.51 L1V1. ca~uu.i
cou be persuaded at this time to alter his basic position. Without change
in Thieu's position see no practical basis for implementing para 6 proposal,
for without Thieu's agreement proposal has no meaning and should not be
used.
DPMO review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
SECRET/
Approved For Release 2008/10/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R000700030019-8
 25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R000700030019-8
25X1
1W
2. Recommend therefore that we pursue following near term tactics.
25X1 A. Remain firm if other side contacts
us in next few days. If, in course of contact, other side remains adamant
25X1 that exchange must be for others, we can try
again to get specifics of who, how many, etc. and make point that without
this data deal not likely to be put together. This should keep channel
25X1 open while we work on trying to soften Thieu's position, or at least obtain
narkave approach along lines of
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
para 6 scenario as interim negotiating tactic.
Ii. If other side does not contact us by 29 December we should
initiate action designed to elicit response from them. First move on our
part would be to transfer
to maximum security facility in Saigon area as yet unse ec e .
ose of this action being provocation of other side by making them
Pur
p
wonder what is happening This move is predicated on plausible
assumption other side has resources in GVN who can monitor
we would discuss this tactic with Thieu as prelude to
softening him up for eventual request that he go along at later date in
negotiatin sense of offering other side as one package in
return for specific list of others. iven time to nudge Thieu
in this direction, be ieve we can persuade him to use ref para 6 scenario
as negotiating ploy. In using this maneuver we would remain clear,
however, that in final analysis Thieu is not likely to release E::~-nless
other side has given us assurances in specific terms which will be
suasive to Thieu that equal value is to be received by our side in this
exchange.
C. If move
produce responses from other side by 17 January l9 ( , we will run
ads in Saigon newspapers which other side has identified to us in past.
Ad would ask them to contact us. If they respond we would hope by then
to have moved Thieu to point where we could get his agreement in para 6
ploy.
3. Please advise concerning our para 2 proposal.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/10/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R000700030019-8