NOTES FOR BRIEFING SHEET FOR CONVERSATIONS WITH SENATOR RUSSELL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600090062-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: October 28, 1970
• Content Type: NOTES

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Approved For Release 20 0%12 OQ600090062-5
28 October 1970
Notes for Briefing Sheet for Conversations with Senator Russell
1. Indochina is an area troubled by the legacies of a turbulent
history. The people who live in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and
North Vietnam are clearly all beset with complex and deep-rooted
economic, social and political problems. But these are not the primary
cause of the particular form of turmoil and bloodshed that has plagued
Indochina for the past decade. Instead, as events of the past year have
clearly shown, the main cause of trouble throughout Indochina is the
aggression waged and directed by the Politburo of the Vietnamese
Communist Party in Hanoi, which has completely controlled the
government of North Vietnam since that country was established, is
endeavoring to gain equal control over the government of South Vietnam,
and is also trying to reduce the governments of Cato=dta and Laos into
satellite subservience.
2. Thus you do not have separate, unrelated problems in South
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. You have an overall Indochina problem
which manifests itself in different guises or forms in the three non-
Communist Indochina states (I. e.. South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos]
but the roots of the problem in all its manifestations run back to the
Politburo in Hanoi,
3. The relation of North Vietnamese action in south Laos and
Cambodia to the struggle in South Vietnam is readily apparent. The
relationship between the situation in South Vietnam and Hanoi's actions
in north Laos, far removed from the Ho Chi Minh trail, is less
immediately apparent but equally germane. Hanoi's moves in north
Laos are keyed to affecting the overall political climate in Indochina In
ways that can facilitate the conquest of South Vietnam. For example,
North Vietnamese military pressure in north Laos, if successful,
could and would be exploited by Hanoi in an effort to force the Royal
Lao Government to alter its political stance and call for an end to the
borrbitg of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Or Hanoi may attempt to score in
north Laos the kind of tactical success with political overtones it badly
needs to register some where in Indochina and may not be able to achieve
in South Vietnam or Cambodia. Thus, if Hanoi is to be contained and
Induced to move Into serious negotiations, it must be checked throughout
Indochina, not just in those areas in close proximity to South Vietnam.
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Typed for C/FE clearance prior to DCI and GAC talking to Senator Russell in Georgia
on Friday, 30 October 1970
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000600090062-5
25X1