MEMORANDUM RE THE WAR IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600040015-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM RE THE WAR IN VIETNAM
I am concerned that the Vietnam War is becoming "President
Nixon's War". This is unfair. In a way, it is unavoidable for any man
in high government office invariably finds himself responsible for all
that has gone before - even for actions initiated by predecessors and
frequently beyond his control.
however, there are other factors building up the false impression
that the Vietnam War is "President Nixon's War". The Democratic
leadership are determined to develop this image. The liberal press -
critical of President Nixon's policies in Vietnam and elsewhere - are
willingly assisting in every way possible.
On the other hand, Republican spokesmen are not keeping the
background of the Vietnam War in focus. Even Governor Reagan in-
advertently remarked recently that the Vietnam War was the result of
policies of prior administrations including President Eisenhower's. Reagan
failed to note that President Eisenhower adamantly refused to exceed the
restrictions of the 1954 Geneva Accord with respect to the number of
military advisors stationed. in South Vietnam.
What is never said today and has long since been forgotten by the
public is the fact that when President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon
left office January 20, 1961, the United States had less than 800 military
personnel as advisors in South. Vietnam, some 800 in the foreign aid staff
and., at that time, there had been no casualties. Eight years later,
January 20, 1969, when Mr. Nixon took office as President, there were
550, 000 military engaged in the war in Vietnam, there were untold thousands
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of civilians doing all sorts of things and 35, 000 were dead and over
150, 000 injured.
The public must be kept informed of these facts. President
Nixon's problem is to extract this country from the position created
by his two Democratic predecessors. He can be criticized. if his
policies to accomplish this extraction are not proper, but he cannot be
criticized for creating the conditions he found when he assumed office.
Unfortunately, the attack on his November 3rd speech by the
liberal press - an unfair attack, in my opinion - coupled with the
November 15th demonstrations, appear to have built up the concept in
the minds of the public that somehow and for some reason, the Vietnam
War is President Nixon's responsibility.
This charge must be answered. Otherwise, President Nixon will
soon find himself in the same position as President Johnson. He will be
unable to appear in public because of dangers from demonstrators and
radicals and the political consequences to him and the Republican Party
will be horrendous.
The attack centers on the past but it also centers on President
Nixon's present policy.
This policy is two-fold - negotiate a peace - and, if this is not
possible, turn the war over to the South Vietnamese under a playand a
time schedule that will permit the South to hold out against the North and
the Viet Cong. In other words - "Vietna.inization" of the war.
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Vietnamization of the war - turning over the war to the South
Vietnamese - having the ARVN carry the battle - has been a policy for
many, many years. It has never worked. Once the United States showed
up in force, the South Vietnamese failed to shoulder their share of the
burden and as our forces increased, the South Vietnamese's willingness
to fight decreased. They saw no necessity to do so. The South Vietnamese's
unwillingness defeated our Vietnamization efforts in the past but also
these efforts were defeated by our own military who were determined to
move in, clean up the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese who ventured
South, turn the country back to the South Vietnamese and move out.
Therefore, our military leadership rekufd to implement Vietnam-
ization policies even when instructed to do so by highest authority. This
is the history of Vietnamization efforts throught the Kennedy and the
Johnson Administrations and, until recently, the Nixon Administration.
Two rather important events changed this. The attitude of the
American public in their resentment of- the war is growing and. will.
continue to grow. Therefore, Vietnamization is a reasonable solution
to that substantial body of domestic and world public opinion critical of
our present conduct.
Secondly, the trend of the war in 1968 encourages Vietnamization.
The clashes of 1968, including the Tot Offensive, are often spoken of as
defeats to our side. History will prove that 1968 was a disastrous year
for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Therefore, it is quite probable
that the losses suffered by the other side in 1968 will make the Vietnamiza-
tion policy of the Nixon Administration feasible, wherein it was not feasible
in the past. It e x to me that this is a hope upon which the whole
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policy of President Nixon hinges.
The question is a matter of time and time is running in two
directions - one favoring us and the other favoring Hanoi..
With respect to our side, it is planned and hoped that, as time
passes, the South Vietnamese will become more proficient. They will
be better equipped, better trained and thus, they will be better able
to defeat the opposition. Given enough time, they might possibly develop
a military capability sufficient to defend their borders from Northern
intruders conning over the Demilitarized Zone or through Laos or
Cambodia. And, if their borders are secure, then the internal Viet Cong
movement would either disintegrate or could be destroyed. South Vietnam
would thus become viable as a result of its political structure and its own
military capability.
Hanoi, on the other hand, feels that time is running in their favor.
They appear to think that United States - and, for that matter, world -
opinion opposes American participation in the Vietnam War as it is today
or on any scale at all. The pressure of domestic and world public opinion
will eventually force sharp revisions in United States policy which will be
favorable to their side. Understandably, they wish to keep their losses at
a minimum but they and the Viet Cong will continue guerilla operations,
raids, mortar attacks, sabotage and occasionally, large scale (regimental
size) operations, all designed to inflict loss on us, to aggravate and to
disturb public opinion in the United States - but, at no time, severe enough
to cause a sharp reversal in United States policy such as the resumption of
bombing or the blockading of harbors and other drastic military actions on
our part.
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Thus, they reason, that if their losses are only a fractional part
of their annual manpower input ( young men turning 17 or 18 years, old)
and the disturbances to their economy while severe are acceptable, they,
Hanoi, can let the clock run, confident that time is running in their favor.
Thus, we are in the situation where both sides are depending upon
time running in their favor. The United States, feeling that with sufficient
time, the South Vietnam military will "shape up" and take over. Hanoi,
confident that this cannot happen before an angered. American public forces
a sharp reversal of United States policy.
In any event, there is a grave questions in my mind whether
"Vietnamization" will work - even given time for training and equipping
South'Vietnamese military.
My reasons are these.
The South Vietnamese are no novices in the war business. They have
been at it for a long, long time. Years and years and countless billions have
been spent in equipping them and training them but it hasn't produced results.
South Vietnam is war-weary. Their villages and hamlets and many
of their cities have been ravaged, their countryside bombed incessantly by
United States borrmbers, their country has been fought over now for a decade
or more and against this background, it is hard to believe that they are about
to "shape up".
Politically, South Vietnam has been a center of disunity. The factions
are many. The Buddahists, the Catholics, the Hoa-Haos, the Cao-Dais are
all powerful political entities that are only partially and, I believe, temporarily,
"cemented together" under the present government. Each of these groups ha,-N?e
in the past had their own political organizations, and, indeed, their own
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armies. It is difficult to believe that they will fight shoulder to shoulder
in the future.
Therefore, one can surmise that internal dissention within South
Vietnam and the traditional rivalry of political factions might frustrate
President Nixon's plan of Vietnarnization of the war.
Therefore, President Nixon must have some options open for
additional movements in the direction of peace or a fall-back if his plan
fails. There appear to be very few options available to him.
He might reintensify the war by resuming bombing of the North and
taking counter-actions against the North but I question whether public
opinion will support a policy decision of this kind.
On the other hand, he could deal in some way with a unilateral
cease-fire or accelerating,wi.th.drawls but in each of these moves, he must
seek and secure approval of the present South Vietnamese government and.
this is difficult.
He could intensify political action through the Soviets who so far
have ignored. all pleas for help or the French who might be useful because
of their traditional connections with Hanoi.
There may be other alternative actions open to him which only
intense study of current developments would reveal.
In conclusion, I believe that in the struggle against time, that Hanoi
has the best of it because opposition to the war will probably escalate and
the flaws in the "Vietnamization." are such that the chances are better than
even that it will not come off according to plan. Therefore, I believe the
outlook is grin for our side.
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 0 - 297-542
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