LETTER TO MR. GEORGE A. CARVER, JR. FROM DR. D.W. CROWLEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500050059-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: December 12, 1966
• Content Type: LETTER

I'ELEPHbNE : r1w 0522?
AIRMAIL.
U;IIr Tmurroug of OrydnrJ
SYDNEY, N.S.W.
DEPARTMENT OF ADULT EDUCATION
Current Affairs Bulletin.
Mr. George A. Carver, Jrnr. ,
C/- "Foreign Affairs",
Council on Foreign Relations Inc.,
58 East 68th Street,
NEW YORK. NEW YORK 10021. U.S.A.
Dear Mr. Carver,
December 12, 1966.
rtainly not familiar with
t
ce
almos
You are CURRENT AFFAIRS BUllETIN, published by this department of
the uersity, but it is a fortnightly with a circulation of
about 55,000 an issue and ivsedll.sasi among thwid eegeneralnpublict
and as a school years
for for as publishing authoritative material and
It has a reputation y
draws heavily on academic contributions both in this country
and elsewhere. Each issue deals with one topic in a single
article of about 6,000iwords. The leases p.t50two pages SU. S.
for maps and illustr0
Given Australia' s commitment in Vietnam
government defence and
ly on aspects of te war naturally and been e
regularly our
on a p a
foreign policy. Three such issues are already in print; '
fourth, arguing an anti-commitment position,has just come to
hand.
to commission an article
ld like now
We wou which would look in more detail at the i ternal politics of
South Vietnam, in particular the your artticle,
on the editorial committee were familiar withtyour agreed
anas
"The Real Revolution in South Vietnam",
that your interest be invited in contributing the article
we have in mind.
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Briefly, as we see it, it would need to cover
the origins of Buddhism in South Vietnam; what distinguishes
it from that in any other Asian country; the extent to which
it can be seen as being true to important features in the
Buddhist tradition in behaving as it has in Vietnam, and the
extent to which this might be a departure forced on it by
considerations which had little force in the past. It could
then go on to look in more detail at the organisation of
Buddhism in South Vietnam and the ways in which it has become
part of political processes there. It would need to assess
also how it is likely to influence future events, however
the present conflict may issue.
The article could stunp up by re-stating what you
take to be the significance of Buddhist behaviour in South
Vietnam for other parts of the Buddhist world.
As I say, this is an indication of the way we think
of the topic here, but we would welcome any suggestions you
like to make if you agree to write it for us. Perhaps the
simplest thing in these circumstances would be to let us have
a brief outline of the article as you see it. This need not
.3
be very detailed, but should indicate not only the main he
sues to be
ut the i
--
i
w.
--------
- F%
ngs,
length of the major sections, as well as outlining the general
line of argument.
I am sending separately some copies of the publication,
which we regard as good of their kind and which should give you
some idea of CAB's general method and approach.
I would be pleased if you would consider this and
let me have a reply when it is convenient.
Y4u4s sincerely,
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VOL. 37, No. 12, MAY 2, 1966
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8 CENTS
PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY
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To CAB Subscribers -Important
This is a plea for your co-operation. As you have probably
noticed, copies of CAB do not appear on many bookstalls. ircu
reache ers
This is because almost our enrofCit inlation
bulk lots tosseparate
.through the post-a large part
'addresses.
When subscriptions are about to fall due for renewal,
you receive our renewal notice in good time before your sub-
scription lapses.
You can co-operate by making sure that your subscrip-
tion is renewed on time!
Most of our big subscribers always renew, but sometimes
they are not always prompt in doing so. We are reluctant to
cancel the subscription because we know people like to keep
their files of CAB complete. But we can do this only for a few
issues then we have to cancel.
Eventually the subscriptions come in, with the request
that they apply back to the date of lapse.
This causes problems:
O because the back copies are sometimes no longer available-
and this means incomplete files;
hen they are available, this places a heavy burden
? because, w
on our clerical and storeroom staff who have to reopen
accounts, and hand despatch large packages by bulk post;
s and subsequent late renewals mean
i
ll
on
at
i because cance
that our hard-worked distributor has to work harder to keep
to date
b
.
ers up
his records of our thousands of subscri
Please! A plea for your co-operation on this.
-The Editor.
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C urre~'it Affairs Bulletin
Editor: Executive Editor;
DESMOND CROWLEY JOHN RORKE
AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH-EAST
ASIA
Last year, CAB published two issues dealing with U.S.
policy in Vietnam and Australia's military commitment
in the conflict there.* In this issue, the author, a political
scientist working in an Australian university, shifts the
discussion to look at not only at the question of Aus-
tralia in Vietnam but at the wider political and defence
questions which confront Australia in South-east Asia.
T HERE are certain areas in the world that
are obviously of key importance in in-
ternational relations. For geographical, strat-
egic or economic reasons they are import-
ant because any considerable change in their
position would have wide-ranging effects on
the global balance of power. There are
other regions that have importance thrust
upon them because they become the testing
ground for trials of strength between ex-
ternal forces that intrude into them. In
which of these senses is South-east Asia
important? Though no clear-cut answer can
be given to the question, it is worth explor-
ing because it has been the source of a
good deal of the current controversy about
Western policy towards the area.
In doing so it will be as well to remem-
ber that the question how important an
area is in the general pattern of international
politics is a different one from how import-
ant that area may be for any particular
country close to it. The specific question
of the importance of South-east Asia to
Australia will be discussed later in this
CAB.
* Vol. 36, No. 10, "Commitment in Vietnam" (Sept. 27,
1965); Vol. 36, No. 11, "Commitment in Vietnam 2"
(Oct. 11, 1965).
Perspectives
There are some senses in which South-
east Asia is not an area of great interna-
tional importance. Its population of very
roughly 220 million is, by Australian, or
even European standards, large. It is, how-
ever, relatively small measured against the
more than 1000 million people who in-
habit the adjoining land masses of India,
Pakistan and China. The geographical and
political distribution of the peoples of South-
east Asia also tells against their importance
in world affairs. The population is very un-
evenly spread and the greater part of the
land area of the region is'lightly populated.
On the other hand, because six-sevenths of
the inhabitants of South-east Asia are
concentrated in approximately one-sixth of
the total area, there are certain areas like
Tonkin in North Vietnam, Java in Indonesia
and Luzon in the Philippines where the
population density is so high as to be a
source of weakness rather than of strength.
Politically, the South-east Asian population
is also unequally divided. With a popula-
tion of 100 million; Indonesia is the only
large country in the region, being three
times the size of the next largest countries
-Thailand and the Philippines and, if it
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I
were unified, Vietnam. The two smallest
states of the region, Laos and Singapore,
have populations in the region of two
million.
The Fact of Instability ...
As a region South-east Asia lacks solid-
arity. There are some who in fact assert
that South-east Asia is nothing more than a
geographical expression. This is perhaps an
exaggeration for there are forces that oper-
ate over large parts of the area and a change
in one part tends to make itself felt in other
parts. But even if it be agreed that South-
east Asia is a political system (or sub-
system), it is still true that it is a highly
unstable system. The instability of South-
east Asia considered as a region stems from
three closely-connected and continually in-
teracting factors:
? internal conflicts within most of the
states of the region;
? rivalries between many of the states
(between South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia, Thailand and Cambodia, Mal-
aysia and Indonesia and so on); and
? their dependence on a number of out-
side powers.
It is not relevant here to discuss the
very complex causes of this instability and
regional disunity. But they -include the
ethnic, religious and racial diversity of the
region that is, in varying degree, to be found
within each state but which also cuts across
state boundaries. Another important factor
is that the culture of South-east Asia has, to
a large measure, come from outside-from
India, China and Europe. In the case of
China, its influence is increased by the ex-
istence within all South-east Asian states
of Chinese minorities and, in Malaysia and
Thailand, of very large minorities. The
fact that the whole area, except Thailand,
was colonised by European powers has con-
tributed both to the dependence of the new
states and, because of the exclusive policies
followed by the colonial countries, to the
relative lack of interchange between the
territories formerly ruled by the British,
Dutch, French and Americans.
... Foreign Policies
From the international point of view, the
chief consequences flowing from the factors
mentioned are, first, that the foreign policies
of many South-east Asian states tend not
to be based on clearly defined national in-
terests. Their over-riding concern is the pre-
servation of national unity, and, since the
balance of internal forces is unstable,
foreign policy has constantly to be adjusted
in such a way as to restore the domestic
equilibrium. This process has been particu-
larly `noticeable in the case of Indonesia in
recent years.
Secondly, the issues that divide the South-
east Asia nations tend to be greater than the
common interests that unite them. Thus the
Cambodians' dislike of the Thais and of the
Vietnamese impels them to lean towards
China. In attempting to crush the Malay-
sians, Indonesia was prepared to enter into
dependence on Russia and China.
Thirdly, for the reason just mentioned,
third powers tend almost inevitably-some-
times against their will-to be drawn into
South-east Asian affairs.
Economically, South-east Asia is of im-
portance to the rest of the world as the
source of a limited number of commodities
like rubber, tin, copra and rice. It also pro-
vides a market of some value for the ex-
ports of Japan, India and the countries of
Western Europe. Generally, however,
South-east Asia is far more dependent on
the rest of the world than the latter is on
it. Moreover, the economic potential of the
area is not great. Partly because it lacks
the natural and human resources, partly be-
cause of the advantages possessed by coun-
tries like Japan, India and China, it is un-
likely to become a centre of major industrial
significance.
Strategically certain areas of South-east
Asia' are of considerable importance. Mal-
aysia and Indonesia together leave hardly
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more than a series of straits between the
Indian and Pacific Islands and either coun-
try, but especially Indonesia, could, given
sufficient power, seriously interfere with
established sea and air routes. The control
of Burma by a hostile power would also
subject India and Pakistan to strong pres-
sures and greatly reduce their influence
throughout South-east Asia. The strategic
importance to the West of the other coun-
tries of peninsular South-east Asia depends
on the truth or otherwise of the "domino
theory". It does, however, seem highly prob-
able that Burma, Malaysia and possibly
Indonesia would experience great difficulty in
resisting Communism and a relatively high
degree of Chinese hegemony unless Thai-
land either remains friendly to the West or
is effectively neutralised.
Great Power Interests
The imponderables everywhere present in
the South-east Asian situation account in
part for the caution and uncertainty that
have characterised the policies of most of
the great powers towards the region. With
the liquidation of their colonial empires,
the European powers now play down the
importance of the region. On the ground
that it is peripheral to the global balance
of power, they not only themselves avoid
involvement in the area but attempt to dis-
suade the U.S.A. from committing to it re-
sources that, in the European view, could
be used more usefully elsewhere.
In the immediate post-war period the
U.S.A. displayed little interest in South-east
Asia (except for the Philippines) and firmly
refused to enter into treaty commitments to
defend the peninsula. Only when the victory
of the Chinese Communists was followed
by the defeat of the French at the hands of
the Vietminh was the U.S.A. prepared to
enter into the SEATO Treaty. Even then for
almost eight years the Americans refused to
commit themselves to the defence of the
area by land forces. Still today there are
many in the U.S.A. who deny that South-
east Asia is worth the cost incurred in try-
ing to defend it and there are some who
fear that the cost will be so great that U.S.
power will undergo a decisive decline in
other parts of the world.
There is also evidence that the Com-
munist 4ountries, though they naturally
want a Communist South-east Asia, have
doubts about the risks and costs involved
in attaining that objective. After a militant
post-war start in the years after 1948, when
it supported Communist insurrections in
most South-east Asian countries, the Soviet
Union has, since the early and middle
1950s, and especially since the Sino-Soviet
split, displayed a good deal of caution and
even moderation towards these countries.
On the other hand, as its large-scale mili-
tary aid to Indonesia and its current involve-
ment in Vietnam shows, it is far from hav-
ing disengaged from the area. Though the
present disposition of some people in the
West is to welcome Russia as a counter-
weight to China, it would be premature to
conclude that its policies will not again
enter into a' new militant phase.
Because of history, geography and the
voluntary response they receive from im-
portant elements in the region, the Chinese
undoubtedly look to a Communist South-
east Asia closely adhering at least to their
line in foreign policy. Again, however, it is
doubtful whether the early achievement of
this objective has anything like an absolute
priority in their thinking. If this were not
so they would hardly have been a party to
the negotiated settlements on Indo-China in
1954 and on Laos in 1962. Nor, possibly,
would they have left Burma to continue its
course as a.. weak, non-aligned power.
For reasons connected with the dynamics
of the South Vietnamese situation, which
probably moved faster than they anticipated,
and with the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese
have possibly now entered into a new phase
of foreign policy based on the rejection of
further negotiated settlements. If so, the
reason is still probably not that they wish
to proceed without interruption to the com-
munisation of South-east Asia, but rather
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that they fear the negotiations would result
in a U.S.-U.S.S.R. accommodation which
would adversely affect the international bar-
gaining power of China and, indeed, its
status as a great power.
Complexities for Australia
To Australia, South-east Asia is ob-
viously of greater importance than it is to
most other powers. It is the only route by
which a land-based attack could occur
against Australia. A hostile South-east Asia
could interfere seriously, if not disastrously,
with vitally important Australian shipping
and air communications from east to west
and from south to north.
In addition, a hostile South-east Asia,
though it need not necessarily be a Com-
munist South-east Asia, could, with the
support of the rest of the Afro-Asian world,
subject Australia to a variety of indirect
pressures which, even if they did not
threaten its territorial integrity, might still
be highly damaging to its national interests.
In this connection, it must be remem-
bered that Australia's international position
abounds in anomalies and disparities. Aus-
tralia is a European country in an Asian
environment; an under-populated country,
practising an extreme form of immigration
restriction, in a highly populated area; a
wealthy country (on a per capita basis)
among poor countries; a colonial power
sharing, in the last days of colonialism, its
New Guinea border with the largest and
most rabidly anti-colonial power in the area.
It is by no means difficult to see how a
combination of moral indignation, resent-
ment and pursuit of national interest could
create concerted Afro-Asian pressure
against Australia.
The decision to initiate measures against
Australia and' the effectiveness with which
they could be implemented would, in con-
siderable degree, be determined by the atti-
tudes of the countries of South-east Asia.
This is one reason why Australian Govern-
ment policy has placed such strong em-
phasis on developing "good-will" towards
Australia in South-east Asia.
The means by which Australia may seek
to avert Afro-Asian pressures are varied.
On the one hand, it may build up indepen-
dent forces and cultivate Western alliances,
though, in the latter connection, it has to be
remembered that both the U.S.A. and
Britain are themselves under pressure not to
alienate the Third World and are `per-
haps not wholly sympathetic to the difficul-
ties in which geography and history have
placed Australia.
Possible Courses
On the other hand, Australia, whether by
way of grudging concession or positive re-
sponse, may seek to come to terms with the
Afro-Asian world. Modification of its im-
migration policy, trade concessions, in-
creased aid programmes, the willingness to
dissolve colonial ties and to encourage New
Guinea to become part of the Asian world
are examples of the ways in which this
objective can be approached. How a bal-
ance should be struck between these dif-
ferent approaches is not merely a technical
matter of devising the most effective means
of ensuring the security of Australia
(though it is often presented in these
terms). More fundamentally the striking
of the balance raises the moral and cultural
issue as to whether Australian civilisation
can develop better in relative isolation from
Asia or by absorbing Asian influences and
entering into close and continuing ex-
changes with its natural environment.
Having emphasised the relatively great
importance of South-east Asia to Australia,
it has to be made clear that it is by no
means all-important. Because of its cultural
ties and political sympathies Australia has
primary interests in Europe and America.
As a producer of temperate zone primary
products, especially wool and wheat, and
as an importer of manufactured products,
Australia's most important trading relation-
ships fall outside of South-east Asia, where
the population eats rice, wears cotton and
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does not in any marked degree engage in
secondary industry.* The bulk of Australia's
trade is with Britain, continental Europe,
the United States, Japan and China. For
these reasons Australia has a special interest
in the global order and, more particularly,
in those powers, the U.S.A. and Britain,
that are chiefly responsible for keeping open
the main world lines of communication.
Again, though it is true that South-east
Asia is the only route by which a land
attack could be launched against Australia,
it is not true that this is the only form that
an attack against Australia could take.
There could be an attack by sea and air or
by missiles with nuclear warheads. Nor is
it true that if South-east Asia as a whole or
Indonesia separately came under the domin-
ation of a hostile power, Australia's defen-
sive position would necessarily be unten-
able. Provided that Australia does not base
its defences too exclusively on the holding
of South-east Asia and provided the U.S.
alliance holds firm, there is little reason
why Australia should not hope to hold out
indefinitely against a hostile South-east Asia.
"South-North" Assessment
Finally, even though South-east Asia as a
whole is of some importance to Australia,
the southern areas of the region - Indo-
nesia, Singapore and Malaya-are obvious-
ly of far greater importance to Australia
than the countries of the north-Burma,
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, the two Viet-
nams and the Philippines.
The need for Australians to adopt a
"South-North" assessment of the import-
ance of the region is dictated not merely by
the geographical propinquity of Indonesia
and Malaysia nor by their obviously
strategic locations. In addition, Indonesia
as by far the largest country in the region,
is the only South-east Asian state that might
hope, out of its own resources, eventually
to be able to attack Australia. On the other
* This is not of course to deny that, as the European
powers lose something of their hold and as the econ-
omies of South-east Asia develop, potentially important
markets will be opened to Australia.
hand, because of its size and its predomin-
antly Malay population it is the power most
likely to offer resistance to Chinese pene-
tration. Again Indonesia is specially im-
portant to Australia because of the com-
mon border shared in New Guinea. Even
if New Guinea be granted full independence
at a future date, Australia will for long con-
tinue to be interested in its affairs and in its
relations with Indonesia.
Granted that Indonesia is of special im-
portance to Australia, why is this also true
of Malaysia? The answer is that there are
specially close inter-relationships between
the two countries based on close geographi-
cal proximity, trade, immigration and ethnic
similarity.
If Malaysia became Communist, its rule
would be based on Chinese predominance
and it might be expected to seek especially
close relations with Peking. Unless Indo-
nesia similarly aligned itself with China,
intense rivalry would probably develop be-
tween it and Malaysia-a rivalry based on
the differences between Communism and
non-Communism and between Indonesian
(Malay) and Chinese. The outcome of
such a rivalry is unpredictable, but the pos-
sibility that it would lead to the disintegra-
tion of Indonesia, whose unity is even now
precariously maintained, would be high. In
any case, the spread of instability through-
out the Indonesian-Malayan area would be
almost certain.
Confrontation Fallacy
One justification Indonesians sometimes
give of their confrontation of Malaysia is
that they wish to prevent its falling under
Chinese control. What they seem to forget,
however, is that, even if they were to suc-
ceed in crushing the present predominantly
Malay Government of Malaysia, they would
still have to crush approximately five million
Chinese (counting also those in Singapore).
The attempt to do this might well ruin the
economy of Malaysia. If, as is quite likely,
they failed to deal with the Chinese, who,
,183
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in these circumstances would almost cer-
tainly look to Peking for support, they
would have placed their own position
in jeopardy. It is for reasons of this kind
that Australia must regard the Indonesian-
Malaysian problem as one.
In the light of this discussion of the im-
portance of South-east Asia, it can be asked
whether Australia's current policies to-
wards and commitments in the area accord
with the priorities its national interests
would seem to demand.
In discussing this question, it will be as-
sumed that Australia has no option but to
approach the problems of South-east Asia
as a European power enjoying close treaty
relations with the U.S.A. and Britain. This
is so not only because Australia is a Euro-
pean country with global interests and with
close economic and cultural ties with
Europe and America, but also because
Britain and the U.S.A. themselves have
strong interests in Asia, and distinct Asian
policies, while the states of South-east Asia
have varying policies towards the West. In
the view of this writer, it is quite unreal to
think that there is any way in which Aus-
tralia could simply disavow its European
character and its ties with the West and
follow some abstractly conceived "Asian"
policy.
Special Considerations
To emphasise that Australia can develop
Asian policies only in the context of its
Western alliances is not to say that there is
an identity of interest between it and its
allies in their approach to Asian problems.
Geography alone-the fact that Australia is
permanently related to Asia-distinguishes
its approach to Asian problems from that
of the U.S.A. and Britain in three important
ways :
? First, both of those powers, having
other and more primary interests else-
where, have, on occasion, shown a dis-
position to employ more drastic meas-
ures to deal with immediate problems
than Australia could readily accept. Thus
in 1954 the U.S.A. considered using
atom bombs to save the French position
in Indo-China, while in the Laos crisis
of 1960-62 there was advocacy in
America for full-scale armed inteiven-
tion. Again, when Indonesia first
launched its confrontation policy against
Malaysia, the British were tempted to
adopt a rather stiffer attitude than Aus-
tralia thought wise.
? Secondly, as the West Irian dispute
showed so clearly, there may arise issues
which Australia will regard as of vital
importance, but which the U.S.A. and
Britain will treat as negotiable.
? Thirdly, if they should be placed
under sufficient pressure elsewhere, both
the U.S.A. and Britain might come to re-
gard South-east Asia as dispensable. It
is this contingency that constitutes the
greatest problem for Australian foreign
policy. That it is far from remote has, in
the case of Britain, been made clear, in
a modified form, by the British Minister
for Defence, Mr. Healey, and in stronger
form by Mr. Enoch Powell, the Conser-
vative Party's defence spokesman. In the
U.S.A., too, the "Europe Firsters",
especially since the intensification of the
Vietnam war, have been highly vocal
though, as yet, their numbers remain
small. The U.S. tradition, however, is
one of massive reappraisals in foreign
affairs and it would certainly be prema-
ture for Australia to assume that, as a
world power, America must inevitably
remain deeply involved in South-east Asia
or even South-west Pacific affairs.
The SEATO Failure
The problems arising out of Australia's
Western alliances have been aggravated by
the failure of SEATO to develop as a fully
effective defensive organisation. Australia's
primary hopes in entering SEATO were :
? it would serve as an effective means
for the co-ordination of British and Ameri-
can policy within the region;
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? by guaranteeing the Northern states-
Thailand and the "protocol" states of South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia-it would
shield the security of Malaya and Singapore;
and
? by encouraging the states of South-east
Asia to join together in a co-operative effort
of self-defence, it would make possible the
deterrence, by means of land forces, of
Communist aggression.
For a variety of reasons SEATO has
failed to realise these hopes. The Asian
neutrals have not only remained aloof from
it but some, like Indonesia, have remained
positively hostile to it. Malaya, although
under Communist threat and generally pro-
Western, preferred to withdraw from. the
treaty area on attaining independence in
1957. Cambodia voluntarily renounced the
treaty's protection and Laos was withdrawn
from it under the neutralisation agreement of
1962. Most seriously, from Australia's point
of view, SEATO failed effectively to co-
ordinate British and American policies.
From the beginning the U.S.A. and Britain
largely continued to go their own ways in
South Vietnam and Malaya respectively.
Between 1.954 and 1962, policy in the
rest of the SEATO area tended to be a
compromise between the harder American
and the softer British lines. The British
line, supported with some misgivings by
Australia, prevailed in the Laos crisis of
1960-62 and that country was neutralised.
In an important sense, however, the crisis
produced a parting of the ways between
British (more generally European) and
American policies in SEATO. Thailand,
disillusioned by the compromise over Laos,
threatened to seek an accommodation with
China, unless it received the firmest guar-
antees. The U.S.A. thereupon re-examined
the previously accepted unanimity rule for
SEATO decisions and offered Thailand a
unilateral guarantee reinforced by the
stationing of U.S. forces in Thailand. Aus-
tralia followed suit thereby decisively align-
ing itself with the U.S.A. and becoming
a "core" member of the newly interpreted
SEATO treaty. Britain acquiesced in the
new interpretation and even sent a token
force to Thailand, but did so in a spirit of
resignation rather than of whole-hearted co-
operation.
Military Commitments
The separate demands laid upon Aus-
tralia by its alliance relationships with the
U.S.A. and Britain increased during 1963
and 1964 when the military situation in
South Vietnam rapidly deteriorated and
when Indonesia entered upon the confront-
ation of Malaysia. Little is known of Aus-
tralian policy towards Vietnam during these
years except that generally speaking it fol-
lowed the lines being developed by the
U.S.A. It seems probable that Australia,
though clearly reluctant to become militarily
involved itself, urged the U.S.A., whose
policy was indecisive, to make a stand.
Judging the Indonesian threat to Malaysia
to be less serious and hoping until the last
to reach a negotiated settlement, Australia
urged restraint upon Britain. In 1965, how-
ever, Australia was forced to make two rela-
tively major military decisions, committing
combat forces first to Borneo and secondly
to Vietnam. The first decision was necessi-
tated by Indonesia's continuing determina-
tion to crush Malaysia and the second by
the fact that the position in South Vietnam
had deteriorated to the point where it was
on the verge of collapse.
In one sense the Government's two mili-
tary decisions of 1965 were perfectly com-
patible. Both decisions arose naturally out
of Australia's well-established alliances with
Britain and the U.S.A. and, though Aus-
tralian fighting forces were committed to
separate spheres, the two actions in which
they became engaged run parallel to each
other and have common objectives. Never-
theless, it is important to recognise that the
decisions made by the Australian Govern-
ment in 1965 arose not from a co-ordinated
scheme of common defence; not from an
agreed-upon division of military effort, but
rather from the competing claims laid upon
Australian assistance by the U.S.A. and
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Britain. Perhaps the prime question now
calling for consideration is whether Aus-
tralian policy can indefinitely continue along
its present lines or whether it should look
towards a more co-ordinated scheme of de-
fence involving a retraction of its commit-
ments to the northern SEATO area, more
attention to the southern area of Malaysia
and Indonesia and perhaps a greater con-
centration of inter-allied defence on Aus-
tralian soil.
Policy Lines
The preference of the Australian Govern-
ment, it would seem, is, as far as possible,
to maintain the present lines of policy giv-
ing priority to the security of the SEATO
area, especially South Vietnam, and trust-
ing that expedients* can be found to deal
with the Malaysian-Indonesian situation.
In his statements over the past year the
Minister for External Affairs has developed
two main themes in order to justify both
Australia's participation in the Vietnam war
and the need to accord a first priority to the
defence of the northern SEATO area.
The first theme is that the Vietnam con-
flict is far more than a merely local conflict.
It is rather a global conflict in which the
preservation of Asian peoples against ag-
gression by guerrilla warfare is at stake.
"We also believe," said the minister, "that
in their resistance to China (the United
States) are preventing an alteration in the
world balance of power which would in-
crease the risk of world war."
In support of this line of argument the
minister contends that the chief threat to
world peace is no longer Russia but China.
The practical import of the minister's global
analysis is to combat those in Europe and
in the U.S.A. who contend that China,
partly because of weakness, partly because
of the caution revealed in actual policies as
opposed to ideological crusades, is still a
secondary threat against which the U.S.A.
The chief "expedient" is to retain its present British
commitments to Malaysia for as long as possible.
should not squander resources. Now, as in
the Second World War, Australia is at-
tempting to tip the balance in favour of the
U.S.A.'s according a relatively high priority
to the defence of the Pacific and Asia.
Whatever may be thought about the
truth of the minister's rather simplified ac-
count of the global threat constituted by
Communist China, his practical objective is
one which, within limits, most Australians
would accept. There are, however, limits to
the extent to which Australia should try to
involve the U.S.A. in the affairs of the
Pacific and Asia. Too great an involvement
could, in the first place, provide opportuni-
ties for Russia which, in certain circum-
stances could affect the global balance of
power far more adversely than China.
Secondly, excessive American commitments
to South-east Asia could, especially if they
do not have the desired results, produce a
reversal of American policy involving an
abandonment of South-east Asia and a
weakening of American interest in Aus-
tralia.
"Dominoes . . ."
The minister's second theme assumes the
form of a modified version of the domino
theory. What this version of the domino
theory in effect asserts is that, in the actual
political-military circumstances now ob-
taining in South-east Asia, the fall of South
Vietnam would, over a period of time,
seriously endanger the survival of non-
Communist regimes in all other South-east
Asian countries. In this form the theory is
not based on any purely military or strategic
assumption about the key position of Viet-
nam. The assumption is rather that, rightly
or wrongly, South Vietnam has become the
arena of a decisive confrontation between
the Chinese type of revolutionary Commun-
ism and the U.S. championship of non-
Communist Asian regimes.
According to this line of thought, the
Chinese, as shown by their determination
not to negotiate, not to re-enact the Geneva
settlements of 1954 on Vietnam or of 1962
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on Laos, have clearly revealed their deter-
mination not to tolerate the existence of
social systems other than their own and to
make Vietnam the test case for the success
of their version of revolutionary Commun-
ism. The West, it is concluded, cannot re-
fuse to accept the Chinese challenge. If the
Chinese succeed at this time, their claim
to have won the test case will, for military
and psychological reasons, be accepted by
the other regimes of South-east Asia which
will either lose their will to resist armed
Communist subversion or, in order to avoid
subversion, will voluntarily align their
policies with that of Peking.
The unstated assumption underlying this
conclusion is that the non-Communist re-
gimes of South-east Asia possess a frail hold
on the allegiance of their peoples and are
everywhere threatened by Communist move-
ments ready to exploit and take over the
leadership of other dissident movements.
Only if the West can give the regimes a
guaranteed period of protection and support
can they hope to survive.
This form of the domino theory is, of
course, simply one part of the minister's
argument that China constitutes a grave
global threat. But it points up the direct
threat that faces Australia should the Com-
munists succeed in South Vietnam and it is
meant to show that Australia's national in-
terest is directly served by participating in
the Vietnam war.
"... and Implications?"
Granting that the minister's dramatically
expressed analysis has a degree of force,
what implications follow for Australian
foreign policy? It is frequently assumed
that, if China is the prime global threat and
if, more particularly, the domino theory is
true, present Australian foreign policy is
soundly based. Or at least it is assumed that
the only possible criticism of Australian
foreign policy is that it is not doing enough
to contribute to the Vietnam war and to
insist on peace conditions that will guaran-
tee the emergence of an independent, non-
Communist Vietnam. In fact no such clear-
cut conclusions follow for Australian policy.
One difficulty associated with the discus-
sion of American and Australian policy in
terms of the domino theory is that the
status of the so-called theory is far from
clear. If, as this writer believes, the domino
theory is a very rough and simplified model
of certain tendencies at work in South-east
Asia, the most it can be expected to do is
to point to broad possibilities that may serve
as guides to policy. To the extent that this
is so, there is no sense in which, given a
nation's objectives, policy can be deduced
from it. But, if more than this is claimed for
the theory, if it is to be regarded as consist-
ing of clear and definite propositions and as
having genuine predictive power, it is im-
portant to note that it will have double
implications especially for a country in Aus-
tralia's position.
If the chances of saving South Vietnam
are high, the theory will support the case for
lending it all our military support. If the
chances are low, the theory will support the
case for developing a new strategy that is
completely dissociated from South-east
Asia which, ex hypothesi, is likely to be-
come wholly indefensible.
Again, while the domino theory purports
to state only what is necessary, and not
what is sufficient, for the defence of South-
east Asia, it is sometimes used to suggest
that a victory in South Vietnam will guaran-
tee the security of the rest of the region.
Clearly, however, while the Vietnam war is
still being fought, Indonesia or Singapore
or Malaysia or Burma could go Communist
of their own accord or because of Peking's
activities towards them or because of neglect
by the West.
If, however, the Vietnam war is won and
South Vietnam emerges as an independent,
non-Communist state, it cannot be assumed
that North Vietnam and much less China
will be permanently deterred from promot-
ing subversion in other areas of South-east
Asia. It is true that if the U.S.A. does win
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a decisive victory in a situation as difficult
as South Vietnam and if it shows itself to
be prepared to act in the same way on a
future occasion, the Communist powers
might be effectively deterred. But, despite
its recent military progress, the U.S.A. may
still be far from anything like a victory.
Moreover, even if it wins an outright military
victory, it is still not clear that South Viet-
nam can emerge as an independent non-
Communist state.
Without a continuing U.S. military pre-
sence, which would have its own demoralis-
ing effects, South Vietnam's chances of con-
solidating itself would appear to be slim.
Declared U.S. policy, however, is neither to
maintain bases in South Vietnam after a
settlement has been reached nor to seek
them elsewhere in South-east Asia.
Questions and Alternatives
In view of the great uncertainties in the
position in South Vietnam and, more
generally, in the SEATO area, what should
A Gift Suggestion
the policy of the Australian Government be?
Should it press the U.S.A. to greater efforts,
discourage peace initiatives, stand firm for a
return to the Geneva Agreements and count
upon a continuing U.S. military presence
in the SEATO area which, after a period
of 30 years or so, will perhaps have
enabled the non-Communist states to have
consolidated their regimes?
Alternatively should it encourage or at
least anticipate a negotiated compromise
settlement, and perhaps explore the feasi-
bility of a less direct approach to the north-
ern areas of South-east Asia-an approach
involving both concession in the form of
neutralisation and deterrence, including the
threat of large-scale air attack, should the
neutralisation agreement be broken?
While the statements of the Government
provide no clear-cut answers to these two
sets of questions, they do, on the whole, in-
dicate a preference for the "harder line"
involving affirmative answers to the first set
of questions. At the same time the qualifi-
cations introduced into ministerial state-
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ADDRESS:
The Editor,
Current Affairs Bulletin,
University of Sydney.
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ments as a result of the U.S. peace initi-
atives, would suggest that the possible
consequences of a compromise settlement
are now receiving some attention by the
Government.
If the Government has been reluctant to
allow the possible and even likely outcome
of the Vietnam war to turn its thinking to-
wards alternative policies, the recent de-
cision of the British to reduce their com-
mitments East of Suez has forced it to
think along new lines so far as the defence
of the southern region is concerned. One
critical question is whether the Government,
in its absorption with the Vietnam war, will
give the British proposals the attention they
deserve.
Malaysia and Beyond
Although the British Government's re-
cently announced policy bears most immedi-
ately on the future security of Malaysia, it
also raises much more general issues about
the strategic conception upon which future
Australian defence is to be based.
The British decision to reduce or abolish
its standing commitments in Malaysia and
Singapore is, it is true, a fairly long term
one that may not begin to be implemented
for five years. Moreover, it is possible that,
provided adequate assistance and encour-
agement is forthcoming from Australia and
the U.S.A., the British commitment might
be extended for a considerable period.
The prospects that the situation in the
Malaysian territories will have consolidated
itself within a period of, say, five years are,
however, by no means bright. Given the
acute communal problems of Malaysia, the
strain between Malaya and Singapore (not
to mention the Borneo territories) and the
pressures of a cultural and political, as well
as of a military, kind that Indonesia can
exert against Malaysia, it is unreal to think
that Malaysia, whatever its exact territorial
extent may be, can become a stable political
entity in less than a generation or more.
There is, moreover, some evidence that, un-
like most other former colonial regions,
Malaysia has a chance of attaining stability
only if there continues to exist on its soil
a Western military presence which, apart
from giving it moral support against Indo-
nesia, can also hold the ring between its
competing communities and territories.
It may be argued that such a shaky struc-
ture is too weak an edifice on which to
base a policy. For the reasons given
earlier, however, this writer believes that
Australia has no option but to persevere in
the creation of a stable, non-Communist
Malaysia. Not to do so would be to risk
instability and possibly disintegration within
the Indonesian area.
There are, however, important reasons
why Australia alone should not attempt to
fill the vacuum left by British power. So
far Australia has acted simply as the junior
partner of Britain in contributing to Malay-
sian security. Not only has its position been
covered by British naval and air power, but
it has, by careful diplomacy, prevented itself
from becoming the primary object of Indo-
nesian hostility. Were Australia, acting
alone, to become the chief military power
supporting Malaysia, it would almost cer-
tainly incur the intense hostility of Indo-
nesia. Since Indonesia lies across Australia's
air and sea routes to Malaysia and shares a
border with Australian New Guinea, the
military problems involved in a unilateral
extension of Australian defence support to
Malaysia would be almost insuperable. In
addition, unless Malaysia's need for external
defence assistance were to be greatly re-
duced, Australia simply could not make
available the land forces that would be re-
quired.
Sharing Facilities?
By way of reducing these difficulties,
Britain would apparently be prepared to
continue to maintain a military presence in
the area provided that Australia were to
meet the costs involved in providing facili-
ties and bases for the British military estab-
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I
lishment which would, in due course, be
transferred from Singapore and Malaysia
to this country. Unofficial British sources
have also spoken of a quadripartite defence
arrangement embracing the U.S.A. and New
Zealand as well as Britain and Australia.
If such an arrangement came into existence,
it would, presumably, be, in considerable
part, based on Australia.
Whether the kind of "interdependent" ar-
rangement advocated by the British is feas-
ible is, of course, far from clear. Moreover,
it raises a host of technical issues connected
with the eventual transfer of British facilities
from Malaysia and Singapore-issues that
could be considered only by military ex-
perts. Apart from these, however, various
difficulties of a more political kind would
have to be overcome if the scheme were to
be effective.
In the first place before accepting inter-
dependence with Britain on the basis of
shared facilities in Australia, Australia
would need to be convinced that the British
presence here would be a lasting one,
that the process of retraction would not,
once having begun, accelerate. Secondly,
the U.S.A., even if it joined in the
interdependent relationship less fully than
Britain, Australia and New Zealand, would
still need to be closely involved in the ar-
rangement. It would hardly meet the re-
quirements of Australian policy if the
U.S.A. came to regard the British-Aus-
tralian-New Zealand relationship as suffi-
cient for the defence of the southern area
and were to direct its attention to the north.
Whether the U.S.A. is at present really
interested in an interdependent relationship
centred in Australia is doubtful. Moreover,
a precondition of the success of the interde-
pendent arrangement would be basic agree-
ment between the U.S.A. and Britain on
policies for the defence of South-east Asia.
Though their policies are now closer than
they were in the 1950s, they are far from
identical and will probably remain so while
the U.S.A. remains committed to its pres-
ent course in the SEATO area.
Many would object that, even if an inter-
dependent defence arrangement based on
Australia could be achieved, it still should
not be accepted. Objections to such a
scheme are :
? first, that it would make Australia a
war base and the centre of an exclusively
European defence club;
? secondly, that it would almost cer-
tainly involve the stationing of British
nuclear weapons on Australian soil;
? thirdly, that Indonesia would oppose
the scheme and would enter into per-
manently unfriendly relations with Aus-
tralia;
? fourthly, that Australia in entering in-
to interdependence with major European
powers and in granting them bases, would
lose all independent initiative in its
foreign policies towards Asia.
Though these objections are formidable,
they are not necessarily to be regarded as
decisive. For the reasons already given the
writer believes that there is little point in
Australia's attempting to disguise its strong
allegiance to British and American policies
in Asia or its desire that they should main-
tain a permanent military presence in the
area. That the arrangement would preju-
dice Australian-Indonesian relations is cer-
tainly unfortunate for, of all South-east
Asian nations, Indonesia is the one whose
friendship would mean most to Australia.
As recent events have shown, however,
there is no way in which that friendship can
be guaranteed. As a maritime country be-
tween the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Indo-
nesia will remain peculiarly vulnerable to
Western naval power so long as Western
influence continues in the region. Australia
can continue to seek, as it has done since
1962, to give all possible reassurances to
Indonesia, but relations between the two
countries will become close only if Indonesia
is prepared to come to terms with the West-
ern influences to which it is geographically
exposed. The fact that the Western military
presence was based on Australia need not
necessarily make the reconciliation more
difficult and, indeed, might facilitate it.
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in the current volume:
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-R R01720R0005000500.59-4
Long-term Policy
Again, it is not certain that, in entering
into interdependence on its own soil with
Britain and, to a lesser degree, with the
U.S.A., Australia would necessarily lose its
independent initiative in foreign policy. The
fact is that the scope for independent initia-
tives by Australia is, in any case, strictly
limited. Certainly, as the Vietnam war
shows, there is a high degree of dependence
involved in the present arrangement under
which Australia attempts to ensure its
future security by making token contribu-
tions to distant engagements over whose
outcome it has almost no control.
There are, indeed, some grounds for be-
lieving that an interdependent military
arrangement based on Australian soil would,
provided it had limited and clearly defined
political objectives, make it easier for Aus-
tralia to develop a coherent policy towards
the area to its immediate north and to press
the policy upon its Western allies.
This writer does not profess to know
whether the advantages of an interdepen-
dent defence arrangement based on Aus-
tralia, assuming that it be practicable, would
outweigh its disadvantages. And it will be
noticed that he has not even attempted to
discuss its nuclear implications. For the
purpose of this discussion the merit of the
British proposal is that it does throw up a
new strategic concept which concentrates
attention on the problem of the longer term
security of the Indonesia-Malaysian area
and which may have relevance to the con-
sequences of a compromise settlement in the
SEATO area should that come about.
Over the past few years CAB has published regularly on South-east Asian topics. The following( are still
in print and relevant to the discussion in this issue of CAB: "Laos" (Vol. 29, No. 5); "Thailand" Vol. 30,
No. 9); "Philippines" (Vol. 32 No. 10); "White Australia-Reform?" (Vol. 34, No. 4); "Taiwan and the
Nationalist Regime" (Vol. 35, To. 7); "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare" (Vol. 35, No. 10); "U.S.-China
Relations" (Vol. 35, No. 11); "Malaysia" (Vol. 36, No. 2); "Commitment in Vietnam I and II" (Vol. 36,
Nos. 10 and 11). In addition the followin? issue was published but is now out of print and available only
in library files: "Indonesia-from Neutralism to Confrontation" (Vol. 35, No. 8). A very comprehensive
list of references appears in these issues but attention is drawn to an additional work: The Security of
Southern Asia, D. E. Kennedy (Inst. of Strategic Studies, Land. 1965).
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