VIET CONG RECRUITMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500040008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 25, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500040008-1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500040008-1
 _.i O AN13UYi FCR: Mr. Robert W. Konier
Special Assistant to the President
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
00500040008-1
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
22 November 1966
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: Viet Cong Recruitment
SUi~:ti' ..RY
} Lard evidence on actual Viet Cong recruitment rates
scanty. An analysis of theoretical recruitment capabilities
and estimated manpower requiremc-nts, however, permits us
to frame an estimate of current recruitment rates which we
Lave checked against such evidence as is available. We believe
'11:a Viet Con; may have difficulty in meeting their overall
eruitnient but believe that the essential Communi:t
cjuire~~r.er:t of replacing VC main and local force losses is
~xtg met by recruitment within South Vietnam This recruitment
vera;in; 3, 000 to 4, 000 recruits per month -- is not only
within VC capabilities but is almost certainly being met in
actual practice.
1. In response to your request of 17 November, we-have taken a fres44l
look at Viet Cong capabilities for recruiting manpower within South Viet aara
and endeavored to assess the current rate at which South Vietnamese are
recruited and trained by the Viet Cong.
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 ApproRelease 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP81)"R000500040008-1
txic juc gments, met oaosogy an. ar ~ . entstioil of erect below
i; --e view Oi all coniponcn:::i of this Agency'' concerned with Vietnam0
request, hoviravcr, this paper has not -been discussed w ;li any
C1...1_;: co- nponant of the intelligence conninutlity. Thus it coi titutc:i a CIA
than a community appraisal, though we believe DIA and State would
be in substantial agreement with it.
3. As you are aware, hard evidence on actual Viet Con; recruitn-_c;nt
L is scanty. Hence in responding to your request we have analyzed t>.:.
.'lung's theoretical recrui ae.Lt capability, estimated their
::1" crit.?'. and, in Iigh of these, framed an estimate of Current r ecr Lt:
; G.;;:a.= his c1ds a total manpower reel cement
G
39
Y;
i
~
.
ng;
conna, dur
cy;:: ?c~ sen'~ from 95, O00 to 105, 000 personnel for Viet Co,z farces alone.
i i[ ion ale Viet Gong may be tasked with providing r eplaccxne:Lt for a
umber of "\Ort, Viotnernese losses. Depending On the n t' O,t.
;:e a Vi tnaa~-eso infiltrat:an, the Viet Conk could be called upon to ~rov~do
y as 15, 000 troops to compensate for northern losr-eS.
100 33"oti-rnat:e O' A..C [Z?c,~ ~iLl G?1t GC-Uj,MY Cnt R^tc.^,: The precise
e
4O ~C~rhica c11ece tnooretCal 11,-a Owen +equlrmefl'S are ac ma-, ~uiJ '~?i3d
We are rctitaonc".bly
5" ?:;' } determined On the basis of available evidence. cx Cta
he Viet Cong are having difficulty in mC'.ting "hei
.^ay -. ;,a;w co This is reflected in the increased srequoncy of repoit n: on
difficulties and increasing Communist recou:: ce to
conscription despite the adverse political effocty of such coercion,,
1 i It should also be borne in mind that the figures on VC manpower
do not directly translate to true military recruitment requiremcn' z
n of '`7rilated losses are probably civilians -- either
L .rnee number of the es.,
tion or labor engaged for log1 t3.C support
l t ry ac
victims Of m . and recruited or impressed only for short term period; .
"Ore,
socd here represent the perSOnneA input
re
-ai mOnt f;LUures Q1, w Lc,u^.`. d after allowance has been made for the infiltration of perco..rLe7~
o:-th Vietnam.
indvct?J .
,. 1 ~: ie e., the CIA) estimate Of manpower loaacc rapiers, deserters,
and seriously wounded porsOnne. in addition to the KIA figures
V
/
O
as casualties by J-2 MA-C
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Con- undoubtedly con en .ate for is lca st some of their military
by L"p aCHIng personnel a::cignad to lirrcgular unite (i.e.
,
116rn to rmin 8.nd local force units) rather than by direct
on ;he civil population.
1 a We believe the Viet Con- will consider it it 1'~e ativc to replace
. over locwe; curtained by their n ain a d local force units, our
:is :.that during; 1966 such forces will lowc some 35, 000 to 40, 000
a r eJult of Casualties, disease, desertion, etc. U the VC awe to
a ~,a?;>: :, tc for theco losses and, at the came time, expand their m do and
?s by 5, 000. tr oops during 1966, their manpower requirements
zzna local forces alone would be on the order of 3, 000 to 4, 000
a month or 36, 000 to 48, 000 new troops per year.
One of the few captured documents giving nlearningful at~OSre,gati e
;:._alual recruitment in a VC province indicates that total rccru+.tmeni;
.m.-:ounted to 1. 5%%3 of the total population controlled by the Vcr,
....._..~:~~~ ;, specifically for military purposes (including militia anc: defence s just over :: jo of the population. On a nationwide basis, 3 ecruit-
t ::rs rate would be insufficient to meet total estimated Vict Cong
-/ c:. i'equ i reriients', but recruitment at this rate, projected nationally,
>: evitae from 35, 000 to 50, 000 personnel annually -- or enough to
main force recluiremcnta outlined above. Z once this document
confirm our estimate of what the VC need to do and in fact w:: e doing
~. e. ..