TRANSMITTAL OF MEMORANDUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500030047-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: April 12, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Rel ase 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR049500030047-9
12 Apr 66
D/CI
George A. Carver, Jr.
Transmittal of Memorandum
The attached memorandum was
requested at a White House meeting on
Friday, 8 April. Copies were sent on
I1 April to Mr Rostow, Mr. Bill Moyers:
Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary
Bundy and Axubassador Unger.
cc: DCI
DDCI
DDP
C/FE
C/ FE/ VNC
D/NE
DDI
'E'9 /0 c
White House Liaison
State Liaison
VAS Chrono /
Mr. Carver ChronoY
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030047-9
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30: CIA-RDP80R01720RA' 0500030047-9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
11 April 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Leonard S. Unger
Attached is the memorandum requested at last Friday's
White House session on what South Vietnam's overn rent n- ht
look like if the current crisis should end with a complete Buddhist
victory.
GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
cc Walt W. Rostow
Bill D. Moyers
William P. Bundy
George W. Ball
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030047-9
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000600030047-9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
i l April '. 966
=vi EMORANDUM FOR: George W. Ball
Attached is the memorandums requested at last Friday's
White Hiiouse session on what the ?'outh Vietna=m government might
look like if the current crisis should end with a complete Buddhist
victory.
GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.
Vietna'iiese Affairs -Staff
cc - Walt W. Rosto
Bill D. Moyers
William P Bundy
Leonard S. Unger
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030047-9
 Approved ForRelease 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172CR000500030047-9
25X1
C
testa the
it 1966
F esrtee aee dirt otlttcaer victory in Soutb View-
tIcax victory in the currant Vietaa ne$e cri to
25X6
for or re pre 6
ts. th*r do have a a +
t any *lee to Vt*tmrjl ~r
theft i
b their
these Buddhist :
w"er their ce
#t gtne.
amt if the tr*eaitl
e rrce a t h e I
~H,RET
entail a temporary 'Setbaact t'* U. a. ob ecuv
-
neteseaaril arteod tow dieaeter f
,i *r to our$,
t c*uee . he sd
tr- l* Vietnam Sot be over, however,
period can be weathered *ad Ole i tial probie11ds
ld
seq'tse*Cea of a iOei*t vxcta a-o
aa
tz to an r as *
5X1
Approved For Release 20,
at ea+ r% are not al on t*nt*tae a
T,IA-RDP80RO1720R000500030047-9
 Approved For Release 20Q 'CIA-RDP80RO1720RQ,Q0500030047-9
mp+se u4&"Q .
ing said herein should be construed as questioning the desirability
eservtnw t" fl{MAlMNf..wIr___`a__ - -Y
9r$ durn is exercise in hypa~ti
,current crisis should end in a complete political victory for the Buddhists.
?
Taking a Buddhist victory as a hypothetical 'lgivout , this
memorandum addresses itself to such problems *a: What would the
ltwtu C:SM 1--U 1s'!_ _ a~. _..:.. . f
Y' What Internal stresses would
the Buddhists succeed in toppli* the present GVN &ftA
policies wee d it endesvorr follow,, petrttculaer4 via -&-via the war
and the Visit ~ -1 How would U. S. interests be affected? What
of lever*gte would the U. S. hive, pea#x is
options would be
n to U. S. *ad which ones should be followed?
w4wa..,1}, Va net result will be, it v Cto
e n......_
who wild. b$com* at least tarriporarixv the mnmt ,
TA Lang and His Objectives
em.plax crisis U. S. interests would be beast served
` set forth Ambassador Lodgee5 II could
d through with reasonable success. Nor should
id as a prediction that this course of atctiox
. We are simply attempting a specu ativi ~n:hrr 4
u e. - n might look I" if it does fai; s i f
sects would it have? HOW eff tiVe 11,/t1. it gun:
rather
x rs Quang wants *ad how effective he can be is dire
ti
ng
c
posing a political structure.
art aUS 10 to idly complex and uniquely Vietnamese. He
]equ&t*o "the peQplost!, w'she, with his own Prestige. and
Illy enjeyc playing the game of politics for its Own sake. He is
Untie to the point of xenophobia, a conaurn to master of the arts
tion and pressure. and without question the most effective
I new active in South Vietnam. No one really knows what he
is conczet* terms, and he himself probably could not spell out
Ave objectives with any great degree of precision.
Approved For Relea
25X1
 Approved For R ase 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01720RW0500030047-9
SECRETi
25X1
objectives for Yietnasm and his, Zven
t of what Tzl quang wants, however,
he is reluctant to aceept resp ilbUlty and
d capacity for directing protest is not matched by
capacity for construe vie management. His
ism will inevitably complicate his attitudes
States and the net result of his coons -- wl atever
-? may ultimately prove of greater benefit to
in South Vieta' m. Nonetheless,
AM* future, Tri a ng will remain a
ctor Vietnamese politics which the U. S. and any GVN
to recognise and, somehow, rockon with.
5X1 I
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030047-9
 Approved For Rel a e 2004/08/30: A- ITP80RO1720RQQ500030047-9
25X1
.-s..., wee. "'Os' =W and the Caa Dal would also be disturbed, thoug
probib ,y eae intensely so th:ri f,.,
Y s-hards, but finis is a judgment that cannot be
wMm"Ta ee Choice of the Buddhists or the Viet Cong and would probably
apt for the B? d+ tafis. over the repo
t
r
run, at least, the unity a
1 iifl.tP lR1^ttN tts ay/ t~ t~tt Ar __ 6?l.. -
degree of at least IaL-_~-.,.?~.+~a.~ y ~+s4'sctA i4stl. Given the
e lor l+ ss severe than Something Uke the secession
n of politicei, power would cause damn
pose the Buddhists and reassert milit
ar
Y ,ruaee. There
y be periods of tension and unrest
On b
t
.
a
ancee we are
uibt if a new Buddhist government could soon be over-
ttjk. di
p*IW49 V AIW'K thee Budd=St. prevalent throughout
azneesee il4m..
fi
bl
enti
be~tieve that, once in power
th
,
e
3 be more s+ionolithic than any other V4-+*--
55,
are already nbviey>:lt d vrisjo
.
a
Y es
a
ishme t {P*rttculanly - enlisted
' are restive at according primacy within the
e an
doe. T .i aai~~eaee in which minority To
upee ar
y strongg (a. g., the :a ~AControlied delta
rovi
om the
Lee --- __
central goverurnemx t tbough r is 'lxl#YI.1yy the total peliti,cal consequences of such local
4'. g., *& 'h'hO Truyen and his supporters)
Approved For Release 200 108130 - - P80RO172OR000500030047-9
-- vow tv,:~~ ,Y northern t`ofoweera (now settled
"'~?
IMight be an even
125X1
L
 Approved For Rase 2004/0
r, but if a E3uddh,st government were
eelsewheerem, for eX*Mple within the civil rights
rT.^it...s
a
tad of struggle mode~ratee voices are muted (a _
~ppy with Tri Cm's current pressures csnx
l
xovenlent itself would display internal
V.
Ak"
d government such as we heave described
exert effective centralized authority
be beset with squabbling, irresolution
,
paraanaunt earl zxeaxxtsry body. Thera would
uy_chocked and the impletrieent Eon of current
the burden of containing the
. S. and armed forces.
y;
many inroads during the per.
ry strength could prey
latent strengths and assets a
pa of the ctesrtniargeency effort would most
y into play.
Buddhist ,tad regime might then
Approved For Release 20
d de cien a which
Ly be permanent. If U. S. and allied
t the Communists from m*ki to,
)d of unsettled transition, ce>r~
 Approved For Release 20=R CIA-RDP80RO1720 000500030047-9
establishment, .,would be far long effective in proses stir ;the ? ar and
the course of social developmatat than the present red irne. As
indicated above, there would be a very sticky and dangerous period
of transition durin; which only U. S. and allied military il,i=,ht ;"Ould
prevent a Communist seizure of power. Given the latent popular
base that a Buddhist :over .ent would have, however, and the
organizational talents which the Buddhist leadership has displayed,
it is not inconceivable that from this shaky be nnltng there could
evolve a uniquely Vietnamese government %,,.hich, over the Ion,.-, run,
would not only be tolerably effective but ,:,jould enjoy solid popular
support. The road would be rocky indeed, but it could ultimately
lead to something approaching, ge ine political stability.
Approved For Release 2004/0
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR900500030047-9
X1
ypothetical situation postulated as the basis
t by a Buddhist-dominated government--the U. S.
to discussion--the: downfall of the present G and
tv* essentially three policy options:
a. To work with dissident military groups,
Catholics, and other anti-Buddhists in an attempt to
to > ew government and install **me form
y military) not under Buddhist control.
To write Vietnam oft as lost and attempt to
withdraw as rapidly and gracefully on
a. To work with the now government and see
how thins develop while deciding on the best course
of future action.
app (a) would have rtually.no chance of su
the course assumed for the purpose of our di
at government could not deposed unless the U.S.
is direct hand in Vietnamese interaaa affairs in
IX. 1T. S. olic tiones
a way that could neap be concealed. We would probably have to employ
U. S. fps to put our chosen instruments back in power. Such action
action
WVAd enable the Common sts to tar os with the charge of being Sur -
they have never yet
iseed: to diet
opposiag us, the common enemy. Such action would fatally flaw
the whole rationale of our position and virtually ensure our political
Communists--would iax ediatoly join forces
fie tram.
Option (b) is not politically or technically feasible at t
. U we tried to adopt it we would be openly Justifying the position
have criticized our present Vietnamese position over
. The not result would be a political debacle,
and Peiping which would has political repercussions
y interne tiously but also domestically within the United States.
45X1
Approved For Release 2004/08/3,0 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000500030047-9
 Approved or Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R6*!20R000500030047-9
25X1
Option (c}, chancy and unpalatable as it may be, thus constitutes
our only realistic course of interim action. For it to be pursued with
any hope of success we must be entirely realistic about the Buddhists
organizational strengths and weaknesses, their ambitions, and the
diffifcultie s and frustrations that will inevitably be involved in trying
to work in association with them. At the same time, however, we
must at alit costs avoid being maneuvered into the position where the
Buddhists or key Buddhist leaders (e, g., Tri. Quang) become our
"adversaries'". We must also recognize that the intense and sincere
nationalist sentiments found within Buddhist ranks give us our best
points of leverage. With great finesse, we will have to keep the
Buddhists constantly aware of the fact that their aspirations would
be doomed were the Communists ever to gain control of South Vietnam
make them mindful of the fact that Communist victory is inevitable
without continued U. S. support, and make them equally mindful of the
fact that such support is contingent upon a modicum of responsibility
and sensible behavior on their part.
5X1
Approved For Release DP80R01720R000500030047-9
 Approved For^Release 200"830:-RDP80R0172GR000500030047-9
5 April 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Donald W. &opa
National Security Staff
Executive Office Building
SUBJECT
2 April 1966 Vietnam Memorandum
4 is a burn copy of the Vietnam memorandum
I wrote for the DCI an 2 April 1966. A copy of this was shown
to Assistant Secretary William Bundy in draft form an 2 April
at his request. Per your request. I am forwarding this memo
for your information. Please understand that It was written as
an internal Agency document and not intended for general
circulation.
GEORGE A. CA&VE&, JR.
Actin Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
Two (2) copies of memorandu
0/ DCI: SAVA/ VAS:CACarver, Jr:mee
Distribution
Original & 1 w/atts - Addressee
1 - White House Special Projects
1 - VAS Chrono
I - Mr. Carver Chrono
Approved For Release 2 9 1 J 164 iclA-RDP80R01720R000500030047-9