THE MOTIVATION, OBJECTIVES, AND INFLUENCE OF THICH TRI QUANG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500010012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 11, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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f.?1.
11 September 1964
liegistry
tiori, Objecttvea, and Influence of
Thich Tri Quang's political view and present political
influence have deep historical roots which must be appreciated
if his political position and power is to be understood.
Mar careful consideration of all available evidence, we do not
consider him to be a Communist or conscious Communist agent. He
to, however, a fanatic nationalist, strongly anti-Catholic and
prone to see the Catholics as a greater immediate danger than
the Communists. There are grounds for oonmiderable doubt about
the compatability of his ultimate aims and long term US
interests. Nonetheless, he is a force not likely to disappear
from the Vietnamese politica scene and one with which the anti-
Cammunist aide US and Vietnamese -- will simply have to
reckon.
1. ThICh Trl Quang's awn political views and the reasons
why he strikes such a responsive Chord in many non?Catholic
Vietnamese both have deep historical roots. Intense, frequently
xenophobic nationalism is a pronounced trait in the Vietnamese
dharaater. Traditionally -- and not entirely without Justifica-
tion non-Catholic Vietnamese have identified Catholicism with
"Thich" (literally "the Venerable") is a Vietnamese
title roughly equivalent to our 'Reverend."
_.-. _ _ _ _,,liaiin
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CZZ'
foreigner, and with foreign political dominatione
course of the pest three centuriev, nOn4etholic
e have developed an innate tendency to regard their
CatholiCcompatriots in effect, as quislings. Whatever the
obje ve merits of these views -- indeed, despite their
demonstrable falsity in many respects -- their widespread
existence (even though innerly Vietnemese they are more glib-
cOnsciously than consciously held) is apolitical fact which
COXIDAt be discounted or ignored.
2. The first Buropeans to become seriously intereated in
Vietnam were the Jesuits. After the Portuguese were expelled
from Japan in 161k? the attention of the Jesuit lathers in Macao
was turned to Vietnam. A mission vas esteblished neer Tourane
the following year. About a decade later (1627) another Jesuit
missionary, rather Alexandre de Modes we sent to Tonking to
estiblish a miesion at Hanoi. The efforts of this remarkable man
(who, among other things, invented the disoritieelly maeked roman
script in which Vietnamese is now written) set the aourse of
Vietnamese history for centuries to come. In l645, be obtained
permission from Pope Gregory XV to expand Catholic missionary
activity in Intledhinal if he could recruit the personnel and
raise the funds neceasary for these endeavors. A Trenchman by
birth., he turned to his cospatriats for assistance on both
counts, and thus, in large measure, initiated Trench interest
Ln and associatiem with Indochina.
3. By the aid eighteenth century Vietnamhad effectiVelY
sp1it into two kingdoms) during the latter part of tbat century
both were reeked by a series of insurrectiOns and civil wars
knOWn OA the Tay Son revolt. In these trotibled times, the pretender
to the eouthern throne -- Nguyen Anh -- made the acquaintance of
and vas sheltered by another remarkable Trenchnan? Mgr Pigneau
de Behaine Apnetolic Vicar of Coehin-China and titular Bishop of
Adran. Th; Bishop bacon. the pretender's advisor and vigorously
dhampioned his cause. With the ememdtet reluctant blessing of
Louis XVI, he organised a foreign m Ohidh enabled
Nguyen Anil to conguer all of Vietnam and in iSol, seat himself
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on a unified throne at Uue as the Emperor a fo ding
a dynasty which reigned until its last member,
so Dal, yes
deposed in 1954. Thus, in Vietnamese eyes, the Nguyen dynasty
seized paver with the aid of foreign arms raised by a French
Bishop.
4. Despite the indispensable assistance Gia Long elt
had received through the direct or indirect offiees of the
Catholic Church, his descendants and euccessors were prone to
virulent anti.fOreizeiaz Which, on nomerous ccs* tons, led than
to permit or initiate repression of Catholic misaionary activity
and pogroms against Vietnamese Catholics. These repressive acts
In turn, provoked ever sharper responses from the French govern-
ment. Over-simplifying considerably, the need for protecting
Trench prelates end their Yietromesse Catholic flanks provided the
occasion .. or, in many Vietnamese eyes, the pretext -. for
increasing French military inteTvention which, during the latter
half of the nineteenth century, ultimately resulted in the
establishment of French political control over all of Indochina.
5. To a large extent, the French exercised authority over
their Indochinese demeans, partiouls.rly at the local level, through
a complicated system of indirect contra, leering much ostensible
authority (withthe attendant onus of enforcing unpopular decrees)
in the hands of Vletnamase guided by trench "advisors". The
majority of the Vietnamese so used by the Frew* (and vho more or
less prospered under French rule) vere at least neataellyeetholic
partly because the education requisite for entry into this favored
class was almost exelusivel,y provided by Church controlled French
schools. Another basic French policy or political technique was
that of divide end rule. Localiem, particularimn, and squabbling
disunity attitudes to which the Vietnamese have been inherently
addicted throughout their history .. were deliberately encouraged
by the Trench. In this =intent, many French officials were not
displeased or overly disposed to discourage religious discord
between their Catholic end nen-Catholic sUbjeets. In sum, the
complex historical pattern outlined above engendered a deep.
seated attitude among ton.Cathoaic Vietnamese epitomised by the
traditional saying that "Vietnamese Catholics are the clams by
Which the Itendh crab has been able to creel across and devour
our land".
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6. Despite his own intense, auti-French natioualism. Ngo
dinh Diem was a member of the class of Vietnamese Catholic
mandarins who were favored and prospered under the French.
(While Diem was still a child, his own father was almost killed
by a Buddhist mob.) Though his name was known and respected
among all classes of educated, politically aware Vietnamese,
when he came to power in 1954 his active, organized supporters
were mostly Catholics from Central Vietnam. This group remained
one of his two principal mainstays, the other being militantly
anti-Communist refugees from North Vietnam-- another group whose
members were, in the main, Catholic. Even though this may have
been as much, if not more, by accident than design, as time
went on Diem's regime acquired, in non-Catholic Vietnamese eyse,
an increasingly Catholic cast. Its emi-covert political
mechanism, the Can Lao Party, was controlled by Catholics; its
official philosophy--"personalism" (developed by Ngo dinh
owed obviou extensive debts to French Catholic thinkers and
was expounded to all senior functionaries at an institute
presided over by Archbishop Thuo. In 1958, after lenglihy. and
elaborate ritual, Diem and his government formally dedicated
the country to the Virgin Mary. The extent to which Catholics
obtained preferment in civil and military his (something
actually due to many causes, frequently including better
education) generated the widespread belief that at least
nominal conversion to Catholicism was a requirement for advance-
ment.
7. In short, a plethora of incidents, events, practices,
and policies--many of them almost certainly unintentional or
accidental--laid the groundwork for a "religious issue" on
which criticism of and opposition to Diem could crystallize
and focus. Analysis of recent Vietnamese history and contem-
porary events often, almost invariably, speaks of "the Buddhist
dispute" or "the Buddhist affair." Actually, this is inaccurate
and in some ways dangerously misleading terminology. The
number of devout, actively practicing Buddhists in Vietnam
probably does not greatly exceed the number of practicing
Catholics. Most Vietnamese are religious eclectics adhering
to a vague mixture of animism, ancestor worship, and Confucian
ethical precepts. The politically important fact about
Vietnam's religious ecology, however, is that the overwhelming
majority of Vietnamese are not Catholic. In the so-called
"Buddhist" movement, therefore, educated and politically
conscious Vietnamese can voice their general (frequently
unconscious) opposition to the political aspects of Catholicism
and their particular opposition to the predominantly Catholic
political movement formerly headed by the Ngo family.
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S. This background of ancient and recent history shaped
Tri Wang's own political views and, even more importantly,
provided him with a large, potentially receptive audience.
His opportunity came at a time when many South Vietnamese were
ready, almost waiting for his message. In this lies one of the
prime reasons for his power and influence. However, Tri Wang
was also almost uniquely equipped to take advantage of his
opportunity when it came. An ambitious, skillful, ruthless
political manipulator and born demagogue, he is one of that
rare breed that all nations throw up occasionally but very
infrequently--a natural political leader. Politically, he seems
to be primarily motivated by ambition, intense nationalism,
and anti-Catholicism--though in his mind the latter two are
probably intertwined or, in a sense, seen as two sides of the
same coin. As is amply borne out in the addenda submitted along
with this memorandum, Tri Wang is deeply steeped in the tradi-
tional anti-Catholic attitude* outlined above. His political
successes since May 1963?including events for which he takes
credit as well as those he probably did help cause to occur-
have obviously fanned his ambition and whetted his appetite.
On the other hand, it seems almost equally obvious that despite
his desire for power, Tri Wang is loath to accept responsi-
bility. We seriously doubt if Tri Quang would accept the reins
of government, even if they are sincerely and genuinely offered
to him. Instead, we believe he prefers the role of a religious
eminence NT:, a person powerful enough to topple governments
, ?
he doesn' e and to exercise a de facto veto power over
their composition and policies but oni?liie from the burdens
and responsibilities of actual office.
9. About a person so controversial and complex as Tri
Wang, a myriad of rumors, charges and accusations inevitably
swirl. Many knowledgeable Vietnamese insist he is a leftist-
oriented neutralist; not a few claim he is a Communist and/or
Viet Cong agent. Not surprisingly, the latter charge was
often advanced by the Diem regime; but there are not a few
objective and well informed American official observers
inclined to this view. To the question of why Tri Wang wants
this power, for example, the Chief of Station, Saigon replies:
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"the most satisfying answer...is that he intends to
move SVN to the path of negotiation and neutraliza-
tion, possibly leading to a similar context for the
region of Southeast Asia, within which he would himself
be recognized as a leading force. In fact, the
recent upheaval and governmental surrender which Tri
Quang brought about, it can be argued, may comprise
the opening phase of the Communist response to the
Gulf of Tonkin, which response is of course most
likely to be embedded in a form of violent and
political subversion rather than in a more classical
25X1 military action." attachment 4 to this
memo)
10. The South Vietnam Working Group has given the question
of Tri Quang long and detailed attention. We have carefully
sifted all available evidence bearing on it. Despite the
complexity of the problem and the fact that at least some
support can be advanced for several contrary hypotheses, our
considered judgment is that Tri Quang is probably not a
Communist or a conscious Viet Cong agent. This is also the
viirrAnt official assessment of the Saigon Station as reflected
25X1 28 August 1964 (Attachment 3)--which, in this
respect, seems to differ from the personal view of Mr. De Silva.
Additionally, this is the position taken in the 1 September
1964 CIA Memorandum on "The Situation in South Vietnam" and
is the intelligence community view expressed in SNIE 53-64
of 8 September 1964.
11. On the matter of Tri Quang's alleged Communist
Bympathies or affiliations, two considerations strike us as
being, in the final analysis, overridingly persuasive. First,
none of his many Vietnamese enemies so anxious to blacken him
oLnd demonstrate that he is a Communist have ever been able to
provide anything that merits the name of hard evidence or
proof. Secondly, though when one is immediately immersed in
'current events the hypothesis that Tri Wang is playing a
devious, long-term Communist game can be made circumstantially
convincing, if we step back for a longer, broader view, almost
the reverse becomes the case. Events, particularly those of
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recent days, have taken such a turn that a Communist agent
54 strategically placed as Tri Wang would have had no need
of playing a long-term game. He could have fomented enough
continuing discord to rip the fabric of anti-Communist central
administration irreparably asunder and made an early Communist
political victory virtually inevitable. The fact that Tri
J;tiang has not done this--indeed, he has at least temporarily
lent his hand to the task of stabilizing the situation--seems
to us a strong argument indeed against the thesis that secretly
he is himself a Communist agitator.
12. This is not to say that we regard Tri Quang as a
primarily beneficient influence in Vietnamese political life;
for we do not. Nor does it mean that we consider his ultimate
objectives consonant with US interests; for they almost
certainly are not. Tri Quang is a fanatic nationalist
undoubtedly anxious to see the US out of Vietnam at the
earliest possible moment. Consequently, some negotiated or
neutralist solution which would expedite the US departure
must have considerable appeal in his eyes. While at the present
time this may not be his immediate goal, future events could
well increase its attractiveness. Though in the presence of
US officials he at least pays lip service to the need for fi ht-
mng the VC and the impossibility of negotiation until the VC
are under control, there is little doubt that he regards the
Catholics as a more pressing immediate danger to his own
concept of nationalism than the Communists. Nevertheless,
Tri Quang is simply a force that will have to be reckoned with
on the Vietnamese political scene. He is unlikely to go away.
Any attempt to remove him by force or stealth--especially if
r.e should be made a martyr in the process--would probably be
politically disastrous to those who undertook it. He will
often be unhelpful, but cannot be ignored. It might be
possible to isolate him or encourage more moderate religious
leaders as a counterweight to his extremism. Failing this,
however, Tri Quang will have to be placated and, to whatever
:mtent possible, used by any anti-Communist regime in South
Vietnam that is to stand a chance of surviving.
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13. Because Tri Quang is so important and controversial
a figure and because the evidence relating to him is so sus-
ceptible to varying interpretation, no answers to the questions
he raises can be made with any great degree of assurance. In
a sense, each interested official concerned with Vietnamese
affairs must answer them for himself.
14. This memorandum contains the answers of the South
Vietnam Working Group, but to it we are appending the more
important evidentiary documents available so that you may
form your own conclusions on these matters.
A-ix-
GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.
South Vietnam Working Group
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NOTE ON ATTACHMENTS:
We have appended seventeen key documents which shed light
on the motivation and objectives of Tri Quang and on the
problems he raises. The first five are the most informative
and important. The remaining twelve give additional insight
or information if you care to examine them. Briefly, these
documents are:
1. A 10 September 1964 Memorandum for the Record on Tri Trig
prepared
Saigon.
STAT
2.
3.28
overa
appended
A biographic resume especially
prepared for this folder.
Station's most recent
Tri Quamg. (To this we have
assessment that has been
August 1964, Saigon
review and assessment of
the TDCS version of this
distributed
to
the intelligence community.)
STAT
4.
8 September 1964.
COS, Saigon's most recent
personaA
reaaing
on Tri Quang.
5. Embassy Airgram A-338, 21 November 1963. A comprehensive
Embassy study of Tri Quang, his background, his attitudes,
the Buddhist movement, and his relations with the US--done
shortly after the overthrow of Diem and the end of Tri Quang's
period of asylum in the US Embassy.
7.
STAT a.
EMBTEL 685, 2 September 1964.
EMIL 558, 26 August 1964.
25 August 1964.
9. Embassy Airgram A-90, 3 August 1964.
10. Embassy Airgram A-727, 22 June 1964.
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11.
EMBTEL 2453, 11 June 1964.
STAT
12.
33.
Memo of Conversation, 30 May 1964.
STAT
14.
15.
Embassy Airgram A-632, 5 May 1964.
16. Note on Tri Quang's brother in North Vietnam, 6 April 1964.
17. Tri Quang's 9 September 1963 letter to President Kennedy
and Ambassador Lodge.
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