EXTRACTS FROM THE CIA PUBLICATION, ' AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS STRENGTHS, CAPABILITIES AND WILL TO PERSIST' DATED 26 AUGUST 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400150008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 26, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2006/11/01: CIA-RDP80RO1720R000400150008-0
Extracts from the CIA Publication,
"An Analysis of the Vietnamese Communists Strengths,
Capabilities and Will to Persist"
dated 26 August 1966
Deciasai?tad by~
Approved For Release 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP80R01720 C~048645E3848.O -w-
 Approved For Relea
20R000400150008-0
Extracts from the CIA Publication "An Analysis of the Vietnamese
Co=-,wnists' Strengths, Capabilities, and Will to Persist," dated
20 August 1966, Section II, Para. .,.Page 2.
4 This has required a drastic increase in the Co
i
t
un
s
invesl-
ment. On a population base of around 18 million, North. not is
supporting a military establishment of at least 4G0 ,C01 men. By mid-
.
196,-6 Hanoi was maintaining a force of at least 38,000 NorV_2 _ r
J to Y el.. t:ae3e
to fight in the South. We estimate that this figure w~ 11 rise to 60,000
by the end of 19666 and to 75,000 by mid-1967. curt: er.:ore, to sustain
its commitment in the struggle, Nor to Vietnam . ;,as undergone partial
mobilization and has had to divert at ?east 350,000 laborers to milita
r}r war-related tasks. North Vietnam's ~economy has be`n dislocated,
its transportation system disrupted and the personal lives of its
citizens adversely affected. To facilitate the dispatch of troops
to South Vietnam and the external supplies they now require, Hanoi
has had to develop and' maintain an elaborate road and trail network
through Laos in the face of continued interdiction and harassment.
Section II, Para. 5, Pages 2 and 3:
5. In South Vietn--n, the Communists have developed an insurgent
structure which includes an armed force es tip a ,ed to be around 232,000
in addition to the 38,000 North Vietnamese troops already mentioned.
This figure includes Viet Co,: Main and 16cal Force troops, political
cadre and. ,combat sumo ele m.ents and Souther- Communist irre~u'! ars .
the numerical strength of unese irregulars
rcw,carried at around 110,000) may require drastic upward revision.
To direct the execution of their insurgent ce _ aign, the Communists
have developed a part'1apparatus in tip: ~? a
Sout~: es-
ir~aU d ~o number around
1.00,000 members, su oport d. by a somewhat smaller youth a-xiliary. k.
Vile Communists have also probably enrolled a.,--curd 700, 000 people in
some component of t eir front or an:i.~.a-ion,. +?L. `:N 1 ' ?1 y
? the ~1~ ~_ona_ Front .for
the Liberation of South Vietnam." This total apparatus must be
controlled, funded and supplied, althoug r~OSt of its rey uire!."eats
may be met from resources within South Vietnam.
n t 2 zUzant g'veo 25x1
d a
a ~ ., pay U
#1?pvara U, S 1_n -n e -cut. 1 and o --L t
1 y, uS ;"G Li? h l::C 1_ic"1.:'y ;7:L11
a so r?Gu re C^ y2=':sa i nn- a.djustments, D- :":ails on
~7
or~~~t Lion -Ni n SA--' V'- c~ by
:. Around 25,000 party ~ ti--++?`v1u~1 J4J.J and
~+f - U?L~. ~. V 4.Yy4
.2 l5, 000 and
20, 000 members of the yoL: to auxllic'. iy are
no ~t 1 o +1 e J ng in e
Communist armed forces. T ey ;?70Ui.d be lnc .udec =11"'U'ne 1_il
s re '.1
uC)tc le l ?c C.l ed. If x1.;(2
2 i y (::Lt our es -, a be of the number of c
' t ni Y
ro
..~
Sul Z s proves to require u'.yward rovis' on, our estimate of i e
-
ry ...L L
Approved For Relea?f?39.(31=:4#S_E R01720R000400
 Approved For Release 2006~IACP8jdI R000400150008-0
Extracts from the CIA Publication "An sis Strengths, Capabilities and Will to Persist," dated of Au6 Vietnamese 19a6.
et66
August Annex III, Section II, Para. B, Page iii-5, III-6 and 111:7:
B. Party Numerical Strength
It is possibleto make oxilf a rough esti.-i3.te ? of current tarty a
strength in South Vietnam, since the evidence -"' nu..:~ricP1
the fog of captured on the sub~eCt, mainly in
Co, ,.waist membership lists, is extremely
No data of significance, for example inn delta,
are availanble for the .ekano delta,
long a Cow'-n~-st stronghold,
were party , menbe snd Presumably ;could be
high. The problem is
i'ureher complicated by the ccverx v nature of
1
rebe_ ship, even in some V a par ,,y
femlereip even ie Cong--controlled areas, and by t e pax uy's
is attested in captured doeum+ents--to develop its or ani-
zation and strength uniformly in all areas. g
Fortunately,
a firth figure for pa uy membership in the South at the
end of 19661 is available to use as a base for current estirtes.
comes from a Communist document produced early in 1963 t It
the party numbered 35,000 members in the South at which stated that
included members in the Viet Cong armed. athe end of 1901. This
included much . Since this doci=ent
other accurate info=,-_,,u-ion, it is probable
membership figure is reliable. that the
Taking this figure re r
as a foundation, we estimate on the basis of
evidence contained in captured doct LT ento and r?7oS S that party menbershwp in the South had acproxi ately doubled
by raid-1905 and that it stood at aroun
prisorMr inte-rro at, d 77,000.. "'Tye document's
S ons suggest that abou- and
opera-~ed .~ , 25,000 p imarily as members of the insu1ge . rmed o_ of forcess, t the buers
"ar ent Poli'ti_cal apparatus
which nigh'''., have been found in a largely Viet Conn area outside i,}ie
delta in mid-1.965. In January 1;x65, this . district had a population of
about 1"'0, 000. Except for -the _m ,e d ate area of t o district tcrrn, i t
was in Viet Con,--- hands. Prior to 1954,
e
area had been a Viet 2,11 inh
stronghold..
It is a largely Buddhist ~-'?egion, with a Ce tholi E minority
and a history of Catholic-Buddhist friction. As of :id--1965 there
were 100,000 refugees in Dish Binh, 1 0,000 of then: Catholic.
'``arese were bro