EXTRACTS FROM THE CIA PUBLICATION, 'THE VIETNAM SITUATION: AN ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE' DATED 23 MAY 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400150002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Extracts from the CIA Publication,
The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate"
dated 23 May 1967
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data
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Extracts from the publication "The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate -
Conclusions," dated 23 May 1967; SC No. 02230-67.
Section I. Paras. 6, 7, and 8 Pages 6 and 7:
6. The Enemy Force: Estimating the size, structure and effective-
ness of the enemy force in South Vietnam is a difficult intelligence task
complicated by methodological problems, the difficulty of acquiring hard
data in a timely fashion, and the presentational issues involved in re-
fining our data base in the light of new knowledge without giving data users
the false impression that the enemy force has suddenly ballooned or with-
out making new data difficult to relate to earlier analyses. There is, for
example, the inevitable tension between the need to apply stringent criteria
of confirmation and acceptability, which tend to produce inherently low
"assessments" (in the real estate taxation sense), with the need, particularly
on the part of unit commanders, for appraisals (in the real estate sales
sense) which indicate what allied forces actually may be facing. Over the
past year our methodology and data base have both improved markedly.
Further refinement is still desirable, but some problems, particularly
acquisition problems involving timeliness, are inherently insoluble
(unless, for example, Communist infiltrators start defecting sooner after
their arrival in South Vietnam).
7. Our review of all evidence available indicates that despite the allies`
increasingly effective operations and resultant Communist casualties, the
Vietnamese Communists have continued to expand the size of their main
force structure in South Vietnam, both by infiltration and local recruit-
ment. Though part of this main force expansion has been achieved at
the expense of lower-level Viet Cong military formations (provincial and
district units) and of the "political infrastructure," we believe the V,j,gt
Cong paramilitary and political organization is still probably far larger
tha of icia order of battle. st~ti.stics in.dic . We think the official
figure for main and local forces, currently 115, 000, is probably fairly
accurate, though lagging somewhat behind the actual input from North
Vietnam. We estimate, however, that the strength of the so-called
"administrative services" (and non-combat support troops) is in the
75, 000 - 100, 000 range, that the strength of the "irregulars" is in the
200, 000 range, and that the number of Viet Cong political personnel is
in the 80, 000 range. Thus the overall strength of the Communists'
organized force structure in South Vietnam is probably in the 500, 000
range and may even be higher.
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 8. We are not suggesting that the total Communist force structure has?
increased dramatically in recent months, but do believe an accumulation
of improvements in methodology and data indicates that the allies have
long been facing a total organized opposition far larger than accepted
official figures have indicated. We also feel that an appreciation of the
probable true size of this organized opposition will enable us to make far
more valid and useful interpretations of future input and loss statistics.
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Extracts from the CIA Publication "The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and
Estimate," dated Z3 May 1967, SC No. 01399/67.
Section I. Para 15 Page 11 and 12.
15. As the situation evolved favorably for the allies during 1966, the enemy's
confidence in his strategy was shaken. The subject was debated at length during
the last half of 1966 in party and military journals in the north, with one faction
calling for more emphasis on guerrilla warfare, and another pressing for a
further build-up of conventional military forces. Captured documents in the
south, dating from the latter part of 1966, reflected an awareness of deterior-
ating conditions (despite exaggerated claims of allied losses), which provided
fuel for the debate. By the first of this year, however, the debate apparently
was resolved in favor of developing a more balanced mix of guerrilla and con-
ventional capabilities. Thus, we have seen an apparent reinforcement of
guerrilla capabilities by local force, and, in some cases, main force units.
We have also seen an apparent reinforcement of main force capabilities in the
form of continued infiltration from the north, particularly in the DMZ area.
Section II. Summary Pages 1 and Z:
Despite increasingly effective "search and destroy" operations by the allies,
the Vietnamese Communists have continued to expand their Main Forces, both
by infiltration and by local recruitment. Part of the expansion has been at the
expense of low-level Viet Cong military formations and of the so-called Viet
Cong "political infrastructure. " In spite of the drain, however, the Viet Cong
paramilitary and political structure is still large -- probably considerably larger,
in fact, than carried in the official US Order of Battle.
Despite intensive efforts by COMUSMACV and US intelligence agencies, we
have been unable as yet to compute the full strength of the Viet Cong paramilitary,
combat support, and political elements with any real precision. The evidence on
the numbers of such personnel, and on their exact duties in relation to Communist
military operations, has been extremely scanty until the very recent period.
Captured enemy documents and prisoner interrogations are now indicating that
the strength in all these categories is almost certainly much higher than it had
appeared to be in the past. In most cases, however, the evidence is still in-
sufficient to indicate more than a broad range for strength in these categories.
In the case of the irregular forces, for example, the latest US order of battle
holdings list their strength at 113, 000.* Studies by COMUSMACV, however,
indicate that irregular strength is more likely in the neighborhood of 190-200, 000,
0 c'
although a final judgment has not yet been made. The strength of the so-called
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"administrative service" forces (staffs and non-combat support troops) are now
listed in the OB at 25, 000, but may be several times higher -- possibly in the
neighborhood of 75, 000-100, 000. The number of Viet Cong political personnel,
listed at 39, 000 in the OB, may be well over twice as high. Part of the difficulty
in estimating the strength of the above categories is that we are not sure to what
degree political cadre, for example, can be clearly delineated from irregulars,
in counting for OB purposes.
In any event, it appears that strength of the insurgent apparatus in South
Vietnam, instead of totalling 292,000 as listed in the 15 May 1967 OB, may
actually be in the half-million range. If the Communists have an organized
manpower base of anywhere near this size to draw upon for their combat units
it is hard to visualize how they can get into serious trouble in the near future
in obtaining the necessary replacement personnel, particularly when their capa-
city for recruitment in South Vietnam outside their organized apparatus is con-
sidered and when infiltration from the North is added. Current estimates place
these latter inputs at a maximum of about 14, 000 per month. Current losses
may be mounting close to this figure, but are probably not above it.
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While it appears that the Communists can continue to sustain their overall
strength during the coming year, it is unlikely at current loss rates that they
can add much to it, except in northern South Vietnam where the availability of
manpower from the North provides a seemingly plentiful supply. If, on the other
hand, the Communists check the erosion of their manpower base and possibly
even make inroads into allied-controlled areas as a result of military develop-
ments this year they may succeed in significantly expanding their overall force.
Section II. Summary Paras. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,+22, and 23; Pages 3 thru 10.
1. The Viet Cong - NVA Main and Local Forces have expanded considerably
since early last year. In January 1966, the MACV Order of Battle listed 85, 000
in these categories. As of mid-May this year the OB figures had increased 36
percent, to over 115,000.
2. The VC/NVA who comprise the Main and Local Forces are, for the most
part, serving in 196 battalion formations, of which 102 battalions are clearly
North Vietnamese Army units. One hundred and eight of the total. 196 battalions
are subordinate to 36 regimental formations -- 24 NVA and 12 Viet Cong -- which
"Main Force troops are those subordinate to the Central Office of
South A'k&~'c F PAg 4004P09/112 :cdIAbRD1590P, 17 80D g5?Q02,,gions, or
to command elements in the North. Local Force troops are subordinate
to Viet Cong provinces and districts.
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in turn are subordinate to the seven accepted NVA divisions and two Viet
Cong divisions. The, units above include those in the DMZ area which
have been accepted into the Order of Battle. In each case, they are either
operating in South Vietnam or in an adjacent area following operations in the
South. In addition to the above units, there are 207 separate companies
and 69 platoons listed in the OB, all of which are Viet Cong units.
DISTRIBUTION OF VC /NVA COMBAT
FORCES
(SVN)
Strength
Division
Regiments
Battalion
Sep Co
(VC)
Sep Platoon
(VC)'
I CTZ
31,780 4
11
61
42
(21, 340)
(4)
(43)
II CTZ
33, 045
2
10
57
56
31
(22, 650)
(2)
(10)
(44)
III CTZ
31,652 3
13
56
38
27
(8,590) (1)
(5)
(15)
IV CTZ
19,240
2
22
71
11
3. It is likely that the mid-May 1967 (OB) figure of 115, 000 men in the Main
and Local Forces is somewhat lower than the actual Communist force in the
field. This is due primarily to the inherent time lag, often up to six months, in
obtaining current information on newly arrived or recently created units. A
secondary reason is the strict acceptance criteria which demand highly credible
evidence before a unit is accepted into the order of battle.
4. Another factor influencing our belief that OB is somewhat low at this
particular point in time is the status of North Vietnamese infiltration to South
Vietnam. During the first four months of this year we were observing all of the
intelligence indicators which, from past experience, suggested that a new round
of large scale infiltration into South Vietnam was taking place. Within the past
two weeks MACV accepted another North Vietnamese division, the 325th, raising
the figure from about 110, 000 to its current level of 115, 000 men. There is a
significant amount of other information -- from captured documents and prisoners
suggesting that still additional units had arrived in South Vietnam before mid-May.
For example, documents captured by MACV on 12 and 13 May indicate that the
9th NVA Regiment from the 304th NVA Division arrived in South Vietnam in early
March and participated in an attack south of Quang Tri City on 6 - 7 April. To
date, however, the information available on this unit is not sufficient to warrant
its inclusion in the OB,
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5. It is currently recognized within the intelligence community that the number
of administrative service troops -- listed at about 25, 000'in MACVts April 1967
OB -- is probably substantially below their real strength, perhaps by as much as
50 - 75, 000 men. Information on such personnel was relatively scarce until US
military operations began to result in large numbers' of prisoners and captured
documents.
6. This has allowed us to begin to fill in some of the gaps in this category. -
Others still exist, however9 For example, although the administrative service
designation encompasses all VC province and district staffs, the OB lists fewer
than a dozen provincial staffs and no district staffs, partly because precise infor-
mation is still unavailable on many such units. We know, however, that the Viet
Cong have a total of 36 provinces broken down into over 200 districts. Since there
are almost certainly administrative service staffs in the large majority of these
districts, their inclusion would raise this category substantially. In sixteen pro-
vinces we have no detailed information at all on Communist administrative service
troops, although it seems certain that some of them are present in each province.
7. There are, moreover, other non-combat military personnel such as the
medical personnel subordinate to national, regional, provincial and district head-
quarters, smaller signal units, and personnel working in Viet Cong base areas
who are not yet picked up in any OB category. Such personnel include those per-
forming ordnance and quartermaster functions, repair and maintenance personnel,
and troops engaged in running such facilities as recruit depots, training centers
and POW camps. These individuals, as more information becomes available, will
be included under the administrative service category.
8. MACV is now reviewing its estimate of administrative service personnel and
attempting to include at least some of the additional elements. It is believed that the
MACV estimate of enemy strength in this category will be substantially raised, but
that it will still, due to the hack of precise information, be well on the conservative
side.
9. An unofficial estimate made in the Washington intelligence community on the
basis of extrapolations from a limited number of documents suggests that total
strength in the administrative service category may be in the neighborhood of
f o 00, 000, a figure roughly equivalent to Main and Local Force strength. This ratio
r full-time service and staff personnel to combat forces would not seem unreason-
able for a military apparatus of the present sophistication of the Viet Cong/NVA.=r*
Administrative Service Units are composed of military personnel in COSVN,
military region, military subregion, province, and district staffs and rear service
technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters.
The ratio of US combatant to US service and staff personnel in South Vietnam 125X1
at least six to one in favor of service and staff, That US forces should have
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proportionally so many more service and staff troops than the Communists can be
explained by the relatively high sophistication of US equipment and the higher
standard of living enjoyed by US'troops.
Irregulars*
10. On the basis of information received during the past year it is apparent that
our previous estimates of Communist irregular strength are also too low. Pending
complete examination of this information, theMACV order of battle continues to
list some 113, 000 irregulars. This figure was arrived at over a year ago and'has
remained unchanged since that time. Studies of the evidence by MACV as of
March 1967 tentatively arrived at what was thought to be a slightly conservative
figure of 198, 000 irregulars.
11. The basic problem in estimating irregular strength is that the-irregular
force structure does not lend itself to the precise measurements which can be
made for conventionally organized military units based upon unit nomenclature,
command structure, and unit historical data. Many of the captured Viet Cong
records are available for some provinces are obviously estimates rather than
statistical tabulations of strengths fDr irregular platoons and squads. In the absence
of more precise data, MACV's estimates of VC irregular strength are derived pri-
marily from the estimates provided by allied provincial officials. These estimates
consider the type of VC infrastructure, the density of population, the scale of enemy
military activity, and the extent of VC control in the various districts, villages and
hamlets comprising each province.
12. The unofficial MACV estimate of about 198, 000 irregulars is the result,
in part, of a new countrywide collection effort focussing on the sector level.
Estimates and supporting information developed at the sector are forwarded to
Saigon for review and comparison with information available there.
13. Despite the increased' emphasis on collection of intelligence on the Com-
munist's irregular force, we are still no
orfisent,that the figure of 198
000 is
accurate. The number of irregulars is probably not less than the 198 000 figure,
but it could be considerably more. ` ?- '
14. In any case, it is expected that the current OB figure of about 113, 000
will rise considerably in the near future. This will not indicate that actual ir-
regular strength has jumped, but only that we have refined our knowledge of it.
"Irregulars, by MACV's definition, are organized forces composed of guerrilla,
self-defense, and secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet
level VC organizations.
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Political Order of Battle'
15. The MACV Order of Battle lists 39, 000 VC political cadre in South Vietnam,
but this estimate, like those for administrative service and irregular personnel,
is probably also too low. The 39, 000 figure, arrived at in early 1965, did not,
partly because of the scanty information available, include those political cadre
at the hamlet level where the largest number would normally be expected to serve.
If hamlet cadres are included in the Political OB, an unofficial MACV extrapola-
tion from the available data shows the number of political personnel is between
80, 000 and 120, 000. Unofficial ARVN estimates put the number of political
personnel as high as 150, 000.
16. An on-going CIA study of one area of the political infrastructure -- the
security apparatus -- also suggests that the current figure of 39, 000 political
cadres is too low. This study concluded that there are probably at least 20, 000
VC security personnel alone in South Vietnam. Other personnel which belong in
the Political OB include those assigned to the Propaganda/Culture and Indoctrination
Civilian Proselyting, Military Proselyting, Postal Transport, and Communications
and Civil Health elements of the Viet Cong apparatus.
17. The basic problem in moving ahead to firm up the political OB is that we
do not know how many of the political personnel are already accounted for in some
fashion in either the Main/Local Force, Irregulars, or Administrative Service
personnel. Particularly at the lower echelons, it would seem likely that many of
the political personnel also fill in at military or paramilitary posts. Moreover,
there is unquantifiable evidence that the Communists during late 1966 and early
1967 cannibalized some of their political apparatus to get replacements for military
units; the extent of this is unknown at present.
18. Excluded from the Order of Battle altogether have been the Viet Cong Assault
Youths, whom the Communists created in early 1965, after their decision to em-
phasize "mobile warfare." any Assault Youths from COSVN to district level
appear to be full-time personnel, expected to perform logistic functions in support
of the Communist Main and Local Forces.
Their tasks include the transportation
of supplies. Partially armed and often uniformed, they have the secondary function
of acting as a manpower pool for Communist regular units. There are also Assault
Youths in Viet Cong-controlled villages and hamlets, but these are clearly part-
time personnel.
19. As yet no attempt has been made to estimate their over-all numbers, but
extrapolations from available documents suggest their total strength is in the low
tens of thousands.
''The Political OB is defined as the strength, and disposition of the command, and
administrative organization of the Viet Cong infrastructure, which embodies the
Communist control structure, and the leadership and administration of a parallel
front organization' (National Front for the Liberation of South V'
which extend, ggodft~ r2oo4lg.`a }~~1 - Pj (~1720R0004001 e0 ), both of 25X1 onoy
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Input Capabilities
20. There are two basic input factors to Communist strength in South Vietnam
recruitment of indigenous manpower and infiltration from the North. We cannot be
precise in our estimate of Communist capabilities and.present rates for either of
these factors.
21. MACV has developed what is believed to be a better estimate than in the past
of the maximum rate per month at which the Communists can obtain and train man-
power in South Vietnam for their armed forces -- currently 7, 000 men per month..
This estimate is based on an assessment of the percentage of the male population
available to the Communists and on a limited number of documents discussing in-
digenous recruitment from which an extrapolated rate for all of South Vietnam was
developed. It represents input both to the regular and irregular forces. Whether
or not the Communists are actually attaining this rate, or perhaps exceeding it, is
unknown. No numerical documentation, it should be noted, was available for the
delta in making the estimate. The delta, of course, has long served as a main
reservoir of manpower for the enemy.
22. The average monthly rate of infiltration into South Vietnam cannot be
determined with any real degree of confidence for the period after about September
1966 due to the overall lag in obtaining information. It does appear, however, that
the rate dropped substantially in the last months of 1966 and in early 1967, although
the exact extent of this and the reasons for it are not clear at present. The evi-
dence, as indicated earlier in the paper, strongly suggests that infiltration has
again increased in the last few months and is now probably at or above the prior
average rates. If the time from October of 1965 -- when a heavy round of infil-
tration began -- to the present is taken as a base period, the maximum infil-
tration reported (including confirmed, probable and possible) works out to a rate
in excess of 6, 800 per month.
23. Applying this rate of infiltration, together with the 7, 000 per month esti-
mated internal recruitment rate would give the Communists a total input capacity
of around 14, 000 men per month. When this is measured against estimates of the
Communist overall loss rate, it appears that the. Communists are still able to add
substantially to their overall strength in the South. It should be noted, however,
that our estimates of enemy losses are in many respects just as tenuous as our
estimates of enemy input. Moreover, much of the enemy input from infiltration
in the last year has been into northern South Vietnam and, while it has greatly in-
creased the threat in that area, has not added directly to the enemy strength from
II Corps southward.
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Section III Paras. 3 and 4 Page 4:
3. No systematic study of the size of the Communist infrastructure has yet
been published. Research indicates, however, that it has far more than the
39, 000 members carried in current political order of battle estimates. Un-
official estimates of its actual strength range from 80, 000, regarded as a rock
bottom minimum, up to 150, 000. These estimates are based on extrapolations from
captured documents, as applied to allied population control statistics. They exclude
those who are only casually connected to the Viet Cong, such as members of Frong
associations. -
4. Although the infrastructure is far larger than listed in the OB, it is probably
not as big as it once was. There has been, according to captured Viet Cong docu-
ments, a significant erosion of the Communist-controlled population base since
mid-1965. Many members of the infrastructure have fled, been killed, captured
or faded away. In some areas, such as in parts of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen
provinces and certain parts of the Delta, the infrastructure has partially dis-
integrated because of allied military pressure. In other areas, however,
particularly in I Corps, it appears to be as resilient and as strong as ever.
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