REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE INDOCHINA CONFLICT AS PUBLISHED JANUARY 25,1972 BY THE WHITE HOUSE AND PRESENTED AT PARIS JANUARY 27, 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400090048-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: January 27, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Re% a 2004 4N7C 1FI5'TfFRgff 1 20R0 400090048-3
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND UNITED STATES PROPOSAL
FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE INDOCHINA CONFLICT
AS PUBLISHED JANUARY 25, 1972 BY THE NJHITE HOUSE
AND PRESENTED AT PARIS JANUARY 27, 1972
1. There will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all
U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the government of
South Vietnam within six months of an agreement.
2. The release of all military men and innocent civilians
captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with
the troop withdrawals mentioned in point 1. Both sides will present
a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held
throughout Indochina on the day the agreement is signed. The
release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will
be completed when they are completed.
3. The following principles will govern the political future of
South Vietnam:
The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South
Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside
interference.
There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South
Vietnam within six months of an agreement. This election will be
organized and run by an independent body representing all political
forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the
date of the agreement. This body will, among other responsibilities,
determine the qualification of candidates. All political forces in
South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candi-
dates, There will be international supervision of this election.
One month before the Presidential election takes place, the
incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will
resign. The Chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of the
government, will assume administrative responsibilities except for
those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the
independent election body.
The United States, for its part, declares that it:
-will support no candidate and will remain completely neutral
in the election;
-will abide by the outcome of this election and any other
political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people
themselves;
-is prepared to define its military and economic assistance
ment, we will have a continuation of what
happened in 1954.
People say they were tricked in 1954, I
don't want to enter that debate as to
whether they were or not. All I want to say
is if they feel that they were taken advan.
tage of, then within a foreseeable future the
war will start again. So it is in our interest to
have a settlement that takes this into ac-
cou nt.
Now the question is: Is there to be
another round of warfare? We believe that
we can contain the offensive, and it is even
possible, maybe even probable, that the
reason they make the offensive is as a
prelude to a subsequent negotiation. This at
least has been their pattern in 1954 and was
their pattern in 1968.
relationship with any government that exists in South Viet-
nam.
Both sides agree that:
-South Vietnam, together with the other countries of Indo-
china, should adopt a foreign policy consistent with the
military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords;
-reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of
discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam
without constraint and annexation from either party, and
without foreign interference.
4. Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on
Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign
intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese
peoples will be left to settle their own affairs by themselves.
5. The problems existing among the Indochinese countries will
be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect
for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-inter-
ference in each other's affairs. Among the problems that will be
settled is the implementation of the principle that all armed forces
of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national
fron tiers.
6. There will be a general ceasefire throughout Indochina, to
begin when the agreement is signed. As part of the ceasefire, there
will be no further infiltration of outside forces into any of the
countries of Indochina.
7. There will be international supervision of the military aspects
of this agreement including the ceasefire and its provisions, the
release of prisoners of v~_. and innocent civilians, the withdrawal of
outside forces from Indochina, and the implementation of the
principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must
remain within their national frontiers.
8. There will be an international guarantee for the fundamental
national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the status of all the
countries in Indochina, and lasting peace in this region.
Both sides express their willingness to participate in an international
conference for this and other appropriate purposes.
So this is an attempt to say to them once
again, "It is not necessary. Let's get the war
over with now." But our basic decision was
made at a time prior to the event....
Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you give us, sir, in
your judgment, the reason why the North
Vietnamese, in dealing with the United
States, would insist on the United States
reaching comprehensive solutions, including
a political solution? Why are they unwilling
to negotiate with us, in your judgment, on
the military issue and take their chances in
settling the political issues with the South
Vietnamese?
Dr. Kissinger: The only explanation
which I have, and there may be better ones,
is that they apparently are not confident
that if military and economic aid continues
to South Viet-Nam that they can win their
war with the South Vietnamese, because if
they were, there is no reason why they
should not accept our proposal, as you
indicated. What they are, in effect, asking
from us is precisely what the President said
yesterday:
They are asking us to align ourselves
with them, to overthrow the people that
have been counting on us in South Viet-
Nam. They are asking us to accomplish for
them what they seem not confident of being
able to achieve for themselves,
That is the only explanation I can give,
but I do not absolutely insist on it. It is a
curious phenomenon; that is, it is they who
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Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000400090048-3