NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON THE VIETNAM WAR SINCE OCTOBER 1964

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 11, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAFF N.EMORANDUM NO. 27-70
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Estimates on the
Vietnam 'Tar Since October 1964
I. AN OVERVIEW ............................a.. 1
Gen6ral ................................... 1
The Estimates ............................. 4
II. TOPICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF
THE ESTIMATES (AND SELECTED HIGH-
LEVEL MEMORPJTDA) ........................... 7
A. Hanoi's Will to Persist ............... ?8
B. Hanoi's Capabilities and
Intentions to Wage War .......... ....16
C. Ne got iati ons ............ .......... ... 22
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Dow,mgrading and
De clas s if is at ion
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
10 August 1970
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 27-70
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Estimates on the Vietnam,
War Since October 1964'
1. AN OVERVIEW
1. General. Since October 1964, there have been 33.
NIEs and SNIEs directly related to the Vietnamese war or to
Vietnam generally. Only three of these were general assess-
ments pointed toward estimates of Hanoi's "intentions" in the
situation. Five were focussed on Hanoi's "military capabilities"
to fight the war in South Vietnam and did not probe deeply into
options or intentions. Sixteen were on "communist reactions to
certain possible US courses of action"; three others were
The October date is chosen because SNIE 10-3-64, (9 October
1964) is a key estimate on our Vietnam work and provides an
excellent benchmark -- or, more accurately, nadir -- for this
study. It deals, among other things, with communist reactions
to sustained air attacks on North Vietnam.
.See Appendix for chronological listing of NTEs and SNIEs.
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification
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specifically on Chinese reactions to Vietnam-related activities.
Some of these were broad-gauged studies which examined Hanoi's
intentions with care, while others were fairly restricted in
their approach. Many of the reaction estimates, of course, were
never put to the test because the postulated US action was never
undertaken. The remaining six papers were on various subjects
such as the political situation in South Vietnam, pacification
prospects, and the general outlook for Southeast Asia after..
Vietnam.
2. In reviewing ONE work on the Vietnamese War, three
factors should be kept in mind. The first is that ONE'S drafts-
(after approval by the Board of National Estimates) must be
coordinated with. representatives of other agencies -- primarily
State/INR and DIA -- before presentation to the USIB. Thus, the
views expressed in the estimate as circulated to policy level`s
often represent a considerable modification of the original ONE/BNE
position. But we are not offering this as a disclaimer; all in
alnl, except perhaps on the broad "capabilities" estimates, the
recorded views seem reasonably close to those held by the Agency
drafters at the time. Indeed, the many footnotes attached by
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State and the military to these Vietnam estimates attest to our
steadfastness in meeting the criticisms surfaced at interagency
coordination sessions.
3. Another consideration is that the bulk of ONE production
on Vietnam has always been in the form of memoranda rather than
full-blown NIEs. Since October 196L+, we count some 27 important
pieces of work of this sort: most were produced as "Memoranda
for the DCI;" others sent forward to the DCI as "blind" memos;
one was produced at USIB direction as a coordinated CIA/DIA/State
piece. Except for this USIB effort, we cannot be certain which
of the 27 or so memos reached high policy levels. In thiF. review,
therefore, we will discuss only those memos which shed real
light on overall trends in ONE thinking about North Vietnam.
4. A final consideration is that much ONE production on
Vietnam since 1966 has been in the form of inputs (usually onFcom-
munist intentions) to broad Agency studies coordinated by SAVA
for the DCI -- e.g., the so-called McNamara papers and
0
See Appendix for chronological listing of memoranda.
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5.
The Estimates. Those who have estimated on Vietnam
have undergone a learning process over thepast five or six
years. In late 1964; and through most of 1965, our record on
the main issues of the war is not good? Unskilled at "reactions"
papers (despite the Laos exercise of earlier years), we fell into
some serious traps, many inherent in the "system." For example,
the consumer's main concern in requesting a reactions paper was
generally focussed on a single question: Mill the response to
the contemplated US (military) action be the one desired by the
US -- i.e., will Hanoi "cool it" or not? A related formulation
in the policymaker's mind: Will the communist response be. dramatic
or not? Thus, the way is open for ONE (and the community) to
advance into a dual trap in preparing its response: polarization
of the discussion around but two main options; and preoccupation
with immediate or short-term reactions.
6. Both deficiencies, unfortunately, led to a general
tendency in these early war years to underestimate Hanoi's
"will to persist". Even in the few 1964-65 estimates not in
the "reactions" category, Ol.E sometimes found itself addressing
communist capabilities and/or intentions over periods of "the
next month or so" or "the next four or five months". If these
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time periods were "given" by the requestor, the policymaker,
would have profitted if ONB had expanded the horizon a bit.
7. This is not to say that all estimates on Hanoi in
1964-65 were poor ones. Some would prove out reasonably well
in a court of law. But there was considerable uncertainty
and evasion within individual estimates and considerable back-
tracking in judgments in the sequence of estimates produced.
Thus, in our view, the lay reader of PTICs in 1964-65 would come
away with mixed feelings on the critical issues of the time --
Hanoi's "will to persist."
8. The record on this issue has been reasonably good since
ONE got on the track in December 1965, although a few key Ms
of the 1966-69 period are more noteworthy as discussion papers
than as purveyors of "judgments." The reluctance to forecast in
these papers may well be rooted in the extraordinary difficulty
during this period of coordinating anything of significance on
Vietnam with the military departments. Our "capabilities"
estimates were particularly pallid and hardly worth the fantastic
expenditures of time, energy and goodwill they seemed to require.
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9. This problem was evidently recognized by the community,
at least after the July 1966 struggle (NIE 14.3-66) which
examined Hanoi's capabilities up and down, and concluded that
Hanoi was being forced to consider either scaling down its
operations in SVN or increasing its infiltration rate from NVN
-- dealer's choice! Another bit of evidence is the obvious
decrease in community interest after July 1966 in NIEs and SNIEs
as such. And the ensuing flood of requested and self-initiated
ONE memoranda on the really tough issues. Other reasons, of
course, were operative: in particular, the fact that the Johnson
administration had already chosen its course in Vietnam anq was
not asking for many more "reactions" papers; and, possibly, that
Admiral Raborn who had great admiration for the military job
being done in Vietnam, left the Agency on 1 July 1966.
10. Whatever the reason for the few estimates, the memoranda
produced in ONE in this period (late 1966 - early 1969) for the
DCI and (hopefully) for top policymakers (e.g., McNamara, Clifford)
are generally of high quality in their argumentation and judgments.
One watershed is quite evident. Prior to Tet 1968, judgments
as to Hanoi's capabilities, options, and intentions tend to be
overly sanguine in keeping with the information being pumped
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out of Saigon at the time. After Tet -- another educational
milestone for ONE (and others) -- the memos, and there are many,
are better and more accurate; a few, produced in the spring of
1968 are clearly outstanding pieces of work and may have had
substantial impact in high circles in those decisive months.
11. The judgments in the February 1970 SNIE on "The
Outlook from Hanoi" have so far proven sound, despite the
subsequent confusions of the Cambodian situation.. Another
"Indochina" NIE is in the works for submission to USIB in
September, if schedules hold.
II. TOPICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF THE ESTIMATES (AND
SELECTED HIGH-LEVEL IEMORANDA)
12. For the purposes of this paper, three main topics
covered in the estimates (and certain high-level memoranda}
can be identified: (1) Hanoi's will to persist; (2) Hanoi's
capabilities to fight; and (3) Negotiations. National Estimates,
however, are seldom limited to a single finite subject; there
inevitably is a wide range of subjects covered. Thus, an estimate
about Hanoi's will to persist is almost certain to make reference
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to or be based upon Judgments concerning Communist military
capabilities and/or possible negotiating intentions.
it should be since the many factors making up the situation in
Vietnam are closely interrelated. Idith this caveat, the following
summaries address these three general catagories on a chrono-
logical basis.
A. Hanoi's (dill to Persist
13. 1964. The benchmark -- or, more accurately, the nadir
of the estimative record on Hanoi's will to persist in the
struggle in Vietnam was contained in an October 1964 SNIE
assessing Communist reactions to a program of gradually inten
sifying air attacks against North Vietnam. The SNIE, after
acknowledging the uncertainties in reaching any judgment, eon-
eluded (paras. 16-18) that if the air attacks were continued,
they would be more likely to cause Hanoi to stop the military'
attacks in South Vietnam for the "time being" and renew the
insurrection at a later date; the SLATE went on the note that
Hanoi might also then press for a cease-fire in the South and
SNIE 10.3-6L: "Probable Communist Reactions to a Certain
Possible US/GVN Course of Action," 9 October 196k.
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try to promote an international conference to pursue Communist
ends. I NR dissented from this judgment, holding that Hanoi
would be more likely to send its own armed forces on a large
scale to Laos and South Vietnam. Given subsequent US actions,
this SNIE was potentially important; it also was totally wrong.
14. 1965. in 1964, there were seven SNIEs which, inter
alia, touched on Hanoi's will to persist -- all seven were
reaction estimates. The mis-estimate of October 1964 was more
or less reaffirmed in two SNIEs prepared in February 1965 which
assumed sustained US bombing of North Vietnam. An 11 February.
SME (para. 14) stated that "If the US persevered ...and the
degree of damage inflicted on North Vietnam increased,, the
chances of a reduction in Viet Cong activity would rise.'!
15. One week later, the issue was faced again -- and led"
to an INR dissent -- and the judgment was reached (para. 9)
that in the face of sustained bombing, the communists were some-
what more likely to decide"to make some effort to secure a respite
SNIE 10-3-65, "Communist Reactions to Possible US Actions",
11 February 1965.
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from US air attack, especially if the US had indicated that such
a respite would follow a sharp reduction of Viet Gong activity,"
than they were to intensify their military effort in South. Vietnam.
To some extent, the SLATE covered itself by also noting in the
same paragraph that, "we think it extremely unlikely, however,
that Hanoi would concede so far to US demands that it would
entail abandoning its support of the insurgency in the. South
or giving up its intentions of unifying Vietnam under. Communist
control." Be that as it may, the judgments reached in the
February estimates were considerably off the'mark.
16. A March SNIE (para. ],) held that the introduction of
a South Korean combat division was unlikely to shake Hanoi's
will to persist, and a June SNTE (para. 4) stated that "the
odds are against the postulated US bombing of North Vietnamese
aircraft and SAM site leading the DRV to make conciliatory ,
'k SINE 10-3/1-65 "Communist Reactions to Possible US Courses of
Action Against I?orth Vietnam", 18 February 1965.
SLATE 10-4-65 "Probable Communist Reactions to Deployment of
a ROK Combat Division for Base Security Duty in South
Vietnam, '' 19 March 1965
*** SNIE 10-6-65: "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US
Actions", 2 June 1965.
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gestures to secure a respite from the bombing; rather we believe
that the DRV would persevere in supporting the insurgency in the
South." This judgment led to an Air Force dissent stating that
the action would "markedly enhance" the possibility of the
communists seeking a respite. The judgments in the two SN.IEs
were borne out by subsequent developments. Moreover, although
the bombing program assumed in the June paper was less than sus-
tained US bombing, the judgment reached reflected a shift in. our
view concerning the likelihood that Hanois w-111 to persist could
be shaken.
17. This shift was made clearly manifest in July when. an
SNIE held (para. 3) that:
We do not believe that inauguration of the US actions
LUS forces buildup to 175,000 by 1 November 1965, call
up of US military reserves, various other military
actions in South Vietnam, and possibly expanded US
bombing against North Vietnamm would basically alter.
expectations of ultimate victory [n Hano7 nor that
extension of air attacks to military targets in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area would significantly injure VC
ability to persevere in the South or persuade Hanoi
that the price of persisting was becoming unacceptably
high.
SNiE 10-9-65 "Communist andFree World Reactions
to a Possible US Course of Action," 23 July 1965.
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Subsequent events more than demonstrated the soundness of this
judgment against the Air Force dissent that such actions "could
well" persuade Hanoi that the cost of persisting was becoming
unacceptably high.
18. Unfortunately the estimates rather quickly departed
from the view that Hanoi's persistence level was high to a
position resembling that of late 1964. For example, in Sep-
tember Hanoi's reaction to an intensified US bombing program
was again considered. The SNIE* concluded (para. 7) that "we
think that this US course of action would be more likely in time
to move the North Vietnamese toward political and diplom wbic
initiatives than to cause them to escalate the war." INRR,
which dissented from the entire estimate, held that Hanoi would
be unlikely to move toward negotiations and whatever hesitancies
the Communists had would be resolved in favor of militant prose-
cution of the war. The majority view was completely in error
19. By December, the thrust of the estimative judgments
had changed again concerning Hanoi's willingness to take what-
ever ever the US might throw at it: an SNP at?ac held (paras. I and 15)
SN1E 10-11-65 "Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course
.of Action," 22 September 1965.
SNIE 10-12-65 "Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course
of Action", 10 December 1965
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,that heavier air attacks and a substantial buildup of US forces
in South Vietnam would not substantially alter Hanoi's strategy
toward the war. Although the thread of argument in the estimate
is vague and difficult to come to terms with, it appears that the
main underlying reason for the judgment was that Hanoi already
anticipated such stepped-up action and would, therefore, be un-
likely to do anything radically different until the results of
the assumed action were in. NSA and all the services dissented,
holding that over time the assumed actions might cause Hanoi to
seek a means to achieve a cessation of hostilities..
20. The December SNIS also addressed Hanois actiohs'should
the trend of the war clearly point toward Allied success; the
judgment (para. 28) was that the odds were better than even --
INR thought they were only "a little better than even" -- that the
Communists would choose some form of retrenchment rather than
There has been no way to determine the'
accuracy of this judgment; since 1965 there has been massive
escalation of the war, though not necessarily because the war
was going irretrievably against the communists; at the same time,.
our current judgment is that Hanoi has indeed retrenched, at
least since the spring of 1969, in part because of Allied successes
and momentum.
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21. 1966. There were no SNIEs or NIEs in 1966 that
touched directly on Hanoi's will to persist. A review of
pertinent ONE memoranda production during the year, however,
reveals that the basic judgment was that Hanoi was more likely
than not to persist, although by late November. some allowance
was being made that there was a better chance than anytime in
the past two years of a serious political move from the
22. 1967. ONE was mute concerning the communist will to
persist in 1967, particularly in formal estimates. A review
of pertinent memoranda suggests that ONE had moved rather
solidly to a position that Hanoi's most likely course of action
was continued struggle, come what may.
23. 1968. By 1968 -- particularly following the Tet
onslaught in February -- it was generally conceded through-
out the intelligence community that Hanoi's will.to persist
Cf. MEMORANDUM "Probable Reactions to a Postulated US Course
of Action," 23 March 1966; and PEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR,
"The View From Hanoi", 30 November 1966.
Cf. MEMORANDUMS FOR THE DIRECTOR "The War in Vietnam",
9 January 1967; ME MIORANDUM "Communist Policy and the Next
Phase in Vietnam," 12 April 1967; and MEMORANDUM "Reactions
to Various US Courses of Action," 12 May 1967.
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was formidable, despite tremendous costs and staggering set-
backs. Indeed, the question was hardly deemed worth the asking,
and this is reflected in the silence on the subject in the
estimates. Of course, 1968 also saw the opening of negotiations
between the adversaries in Vietnam, and some have argued that
this reflected a crack in Hanoi's will. The communists, however,
look at it in just the ,opposite manner. In any event, 1968 was
not a year when questions of the will to persist was a topic
of estimative concern.
24. 1969. The question of Hanoi's will to persist was not
"
the subject of estimative attention in 1969. There was nzi
question that the communists would persist -- and they did.
25. 1970. For various reasons, much of OM Is work on
Vietnam never left the Agency in 1970. In February, however,
an SNIE held (conclusion B and para. 10) that Hanoi, despite
increased problems and concern over the possibility of Viet-
namization working well enough. to give ARWN a chance,. still
SNIE 14.3-70 "The Outlook from, Hanoi: Factors Affecting
North Vietnam's Policy on the War in Vietnam", 5 February 1970..
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believed that its will to persist over the long haul remained
stronger than that of the US. As a result, the communists
were basically buckling down to and preparing for a prolonged
warfare approach to the struggle in Vietnam.
B. Hanoi's Capabilities and Intentions to Wage War
26. 1965. Throughout 1965, the SNIEs maintained that the
communists were not likely to resort to large-scale, all-out
military offensives in the wake of postulated increased Allied
actions or to attempt dramatic actions such as air strikes at
US ships or bases. For example, in February, in a "near-term"
intentions SNIE,* it was held (para. 5) that the communists were
unlikely to conduct surprise air raids against the northern
part of South Vietnam, although Hanoi will certainly use its
fighters against air strikes on North Vietnam. The SNIE went
on (para. 8) to state that "the chances are less than even ,that
the next four or five months will see prolonged offensives
employing larger units." These judgments were borne out in fact,
and they were reaffirmed from time to time in ONE memoranda.
T` SNIT 10-65 "Communist Military Capabilities and Near-
Term Intentions in Laos andSouth Vietnam," 4 February 1965.
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In September, an SNIE' held (para. 7) that in the face of a
stepped--up US air campaign against North Vietnam the communists
would still be unlikely to hit US bases or ships.
27. 1966. in general, the estimates and memoranda in 1966
concluded that Hanoi's most likely military course was to con-
tinue the'struggle without any substantial escalation or de-
escalation, particularly the latter. Further, it was concluded
that Hanoi's capabilities to do this were unlikely to be seriously
??sc
eroded. For example, in February an SINEwhich considered,
increased US action against North Vietnam (both with and without
~a
a closing of North Vietnam's ports) it was concluded (conclusion
A) that "with a determined effort, the DRV could still move sub-
stantially greater amounts than in 1965." A week later, in a
memorandum, this judgment was re-affirmed and made even stronger,
largely because the postulated US actions were more sweeping..
SNIE 10-i1-65 "Probable Communist Reactions to a US
Course of Action", 22 September 1965
SNIE 1o-1-66 "Possible Effects of Proposed US Courses
of Action on DRV Capabilities to Support the Insurgency
in South Vietnam," 4E. February 1966
MEMORANDUM "Possible Effects of Various Programs of Air
Attack Against the DRV", 11 February 1966.
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The memorandum stated (para. 3) that "we do not believe that even
the most extensive of the programs t;n uld prevent the movement of
men and supplies to the South in quantities sufficient to sus-
tain or even increase the scale of VC/PAVN activity." In July,
an NIE on Communist capabilities* concluded (para. 44) that by
the end of 1967 combat losses and possible increases in force
strengths will possibly exceed VC recruitment capabilities.
As far as can be determined, this was indeed what occurred.
28. 1,967. The general thrust of the estimates and
memoranda in 1967 was that the communists werb most likely to.
fight on, but there were few estimates on this particular,.-subject.
*
Cane SNIE, which had been months in preparation because of
inter-agency disputes over communist manpower strengths, reached
an implicit judgment (a common fault of capabilities estimates is
the lack of attention to what is likely) that protracted warfare.
was more likely in the future than was heightened military action..
This SIM was issued in November -- only two and a half months
NIE 14.3-66 "North Vietnamese Military Potential for
Fighting in South Vietnam", 7 July 1966.
SNIE 14.3-67., "Capabilities of theVietnamese Communists
for Fighting in South Vietnam," 13 November 1967.
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before the massive communist military effort at Tet 1968. That
the estimate does not look even worse in retrospect is testimony
to the lack of clarity and usefulness of capabilities studies
in the national estimative context.
29. 1968. Following the mis-judgment at the end of 1967,
the estimates and memoxandain 1968 were generally on the mark
regarding Communist intentions to fight; however, there was only
one SNIE that touched on the subject, the rest were various
memoranda prepared by ONE. In late February) for example, a
memorandum stated (para. 5) that :
The Communists wiLl maintain their offensive for the
next several months and be prepared to accept the high
losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses
indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be
capable soon again in launching repeated mass attacks
of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January.
But they are almost certainly capable of sustaining a
high level of combat, including major battles with US
forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocket and
mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.
30.. This assessment, almost to last jot and tittle, described
what the communists in fact did during the remainder of 1968.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, "The Outlook in Vietnam",
26 February 1968.
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11
By mid-year, in an SN]E, Ic. the judgment was that an early shift
in communist strategy was unlikely, but that if communist for-
tunes had not improved by year's end, Hanoi would probably be
obliged to review its options. A September memorandum carried
this thought on further by noting (para. 5) that "the Communists
can no longer have very high expectations that the objectives
can be advanced by large scale military attacks." While the SNJB
and memoranda did not go on to estimate what possible change, if
any, Hanoi might make, they did point in the right direction.
Some would argue that the communists actually began to change
their basic approach to the war in the fall of 1968, but there is
complete agreement that by the spring of 1969 (the Politburo
resolution on which COSVN Resolution 9 is based was passed in
April) Hanoi had opted for prolonged warfare.
31. 1969. Although there was considerable verbiage spent
on communist capabilities in 1969, little light was shed in
formal estimates on how that capability would be employed
SNIE 53-68 "The Vietnam situation", 6 June 1968.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR "The Coming Political
Struggle for South Vietnam", 16 September 1968.
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a common failing of capability estimates. In any case, in a
January SNIE' the judgment was made (para. 23) that the com-
munists would try to upset the pacification program; the SNIE,
did not specifically state how this might be done, but did list
various possibilities and concluded that consolidation of pacifi-
cation gains was likely to continue to be a slow and uncertain
process because of communist counteraction. In July, in a
"capabilities" SNIEthe communists were considered unlikely
to do more than they were then doing; but what they might
actually do was practically lost beneath vague balanced pre-
sentations concerning the pros and cons of doing less or,doing
about the same. As far as can be determined the SNIE never
arrived at a balancing out judgment.
32. 1970. There has been one published SNIE4`-'E* on corn-
munist intentions thus far in 1970. The SNIE, published in
February, held (conclusion C and para. 27) that an all-out
SNIE 2.4-69, "The Pacification Effort in Vietnam",
16 January 1969.
SNIE 14.3-69, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists
for Fighting in South Vietnam", 17 July 1969
SNIE 14.3-70 "The Outlook from Hanoi; Factors Affecting
North Vietnam's Policy on the War in Vietnam", 5 February 1970.
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communist military effort was unlikely because of the costs and
risks involved. Instead, (conclusion D and paras. 29-31) the
SNIE concluded that the communists were most likely to continue
to follow a prolonged warfare approach to the struggle, although
it was also pointed out that some fairly sharp fighting against
selective targets was to be expected. Of course, the final
returns for the year are not yet in, but the estimate thus
far has been on target, and the same basic Judgment was made
recently in a draft SNIE', disseminated outside the agency,
which was put in abeyance before fully coordinated.
C. Negotiations
33. 11 64-67. As noted earlier in this review (para. 11),
the issue of Hanoits willingness to negotiate (and its likely
posture in any negotiation) is inttermih,ed with the more
generalized issue of its' "will to persist." This is especially
so in the earlier Nll;s and memoranda, produced at a time when
the implications of the communist's "talk-fight" strategy had
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Draft SNIE 14-.3-1-70, "North Vietnamese Intentions in
Indochina," 26 June 1970.
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not yet become fully apparent to the community. Thus, in the
1964-67 period, we tended toward an "either-or" view of nego-
tiations: Hanoi would "cool it" by seeking a negotiated respite
from combat or Hanoi would "keep on doing what it's doing."'
In effect, then, we were estimating Hanoi's will to persist
in fighting rather than its willingness to use the negotiating
channel as a supplement to a continuing (though more limited)
military effort on the ground.
34. For example, a November 1966 Memorandum for the DCI'
cast Hanoi's outlook at the moment in terms of three possible
strategies: escalation; reversion to protracted warfare; or
negotiations. The final judgment -- that military options
probably look best to Hanoi -- is less significant than the fact
that the negotiating route is not clearly seen as one that
might also be combined with military moves of various sorts.'
35. 1968. A more sophisticated approach to the nego-
tiating issue is apparent from early 1968, a time when the
issue became a hot one in Washington. All the pertinent ONE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, "The View from Hanoi",
30 November 1966,
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work on this subject in 1968 is in the form of various memos
for the DCI, many of which were probably passed on to the
policymakers then grappling with the problem. An excellent
January paper presented a case for and against Hanoits seeking
a respite from warfare. It concluded with commendable fore-
sight that "in the months ahead, Hanoi will continue its military
effort but will probe more intently to discover what the shape
of a political settlement might be."
36. A more pointed memorandum (para. 9) completed on
l March 1968, declared that, "If the US ceased the bombing
of NVN in the near future, Hanoi would probably respond e}.a
It would begin talks fairly soon, would accept a fairly wide
ranging exploration of issues, but would not moderate its
terms for a final settlement or stop fighting in the South."
This assessment was not only timely, but was also right. on
target.
PEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, "Alternative Interpretations
of Hanoits Intentions," 18 January 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, "Questions Concerning the
Situation in Vietnam", 1 March 1968.
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37. After the cessation of US bombing over the Tonkin
x
region of NVN, there was an ONE Memorandum on Hanoi's motives
for deciding to negotiate. It concluded (para. 13) with.
reasonable precision that "Hanoi had probably not entered, the
negotiating process in any mood of conciliation, but had seen,
the US move as 'an opportunity' to press demands for an un.-
conditional halt to all b ombing...over NVN. Nevertheless, it
went on, "Hanoi probably wants to talk, and....will not seek
pretexts to back away from establishing contacts with the US."
A May memorandum * was even more on the mark,. holding that
Hanoi: would not yield on the bombing issue; would offer only,
tacit concessions to gain the total US bombing cessation;
would focus its demands on the "four points" and the coalition
issue; and would play it all by ear, meanwhile persisting in
its military actions in SVN. All in all, an excellent
forecast.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, "Speculation on Hanoi's
Motives", 8 April 1968.
Intelligence Memorandum, "Hanoi's Negotiating
Position and Concept of Negrtiations", 6 May 1968.
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38. In September, another memo's pointed the way toward,
the new drift of the war in foreseeing (para. 8) "a transi-
tional period" in which "the military aspects of the struggle
will gradually be overshadowed by the political aspects."
Relating Hanoi's tactics to the US political scene, the memo
correctly perceived that from Hanoi's viewpoint "the optimum
period for this settletient opened on 31 March and ...will
probably not last much beyond the first six months of a new
administration." The memorandum was also correct in stating
(para. 12) that if Hanoi failed to get a dead. from the
new US team, "Hanoi must face the prospect of reducing its
minimum terms of gearing its military strategy for a much
longer war..." A good formulation, in retrospect.
39. 1969-70. Under the NSSM concept utilized by the new
US administration, virtually all of ONE's work on the issue
of negotiations was in the form of inputs to SAVA-coordinated
papers (subsequently contributed to interagency groups).
MEMORAPJDUM FOR TIM DIirCTOR, "The Coming Political
Struggle for South Vietnam", 16 September 1968.
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SNIE 14.3-70 , however, "gave Hanoi three options, one a nego-
tiation course, and concluded correctly (at least so far) that
Hanoi would not pursue this course with any vigor under
existing circumstances.
SNIE 14.3-70, "The Outlook from Hanoi: Factors Affecting
IVN's Policy on the liar in Vietnam", 5 February 1970.
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APPENDIX
NIEs, SNIEs, and Selected Vietnam-Related Memoranda 1964-70
A. NIEs and SNIEs
1964
SNIE 10-3-64: "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
Possible US/GVN Courses of Action"
9 October 1964
1965
SNIE 10-65: "Communist Military Capabilities and.
Near-Term Intentions in Laos and South
Vietnam" 4 February 1965
SNIE 53-65: "Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam"
4 February 1965
SNIE 10-3-65: "Communist Reactions to Possible US
Actions" 11 February 1965
SNIE 10-3/1-65: "Communist Reactions to Possible US
Courses of Action Against North Vietnam"
18 February 1965
SNIE l0-4-65: "Probable Communist Reactions to Deploy-
ment of an ROIL Combat Division for Base
Security Duty in South Vietnam'
19 March 1965
SNIE 10-5-65: "Communist Reactions to Certain US
Actions" 28 April 1965
SNIE 10-6-65: "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
US Actions" 2 June 1965
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SNIE l0-6/1-65:
SNIE 10-7-65:
SNIE 10-2-65:
SNIE 10-9-65:
SNIE 10-10-65:
SNIE 10-11-65:
SNIE 10-12-65:
1966
SNIE 10-1-66:
SNIE 10-3-66:
NIE 14.3-66:
NIE 53-66:
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"Probable Reactions-to Certain US. Courses
of Action" 4 June 1965
"Implications of a Certain US Course of
Action" 4 June 1965
"Soviet and Chinese Communist Strategy
and Tactics in North Africa, the Middle
East, and South Asia" 15 July 1.965
"Communist and Free World Reactions to a
Possible US Course of Action" 23 July 1965
"Reactions to a Certain US Course of
Action in Southeast Asia" 10 September
1965
"Probable Communist Reactions to a US
Course of Action" 22'September 1965
"Probable Communist Reactions to a.US
Course of Action" 10 December 1965
4 February 1966
"Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course
of Action on DRV Capability to Support
the Insurgency in South Vietnam"
"Probable Reactions to a Possible Course
of Action in South Vietnam" 19 May 1966
"North Vietnamese Military Potential for
Fighting in South Vietnam" 7 July 1966
"Problems of Political Development in
South Vietnam Over the Next Year or So"
15 December 1966
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1967
SNIE 10-67: "Reactions to a Possible US Action"
5 January 1967
SNIE 10-1-67: "Reactions to a Certain US Course of
Action" January 1967
SNIE 11-11-67: "Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward
the Vietnam War" 4 May 1967
SNIE 13-10-67: "Chinese Reactions to a Certain US
Course of Action" 3 August 1967
SNIE 14.3-1-67: "Problems in Viet Cong Recruitment and
Morale" 3 August 1967
SNIE 14.3-67: "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists
for Fighting in South Vietnam"
13 November 1967
1968
SNIE 53-68:
SNIE 14.3-68:
"The Vietnam Situation" 6 June 1968
"Detection of Infiltration During a
Cease Fire in Vietnam" 25 July 1968
NIE 50-68: "Southeast Asia After Vietnam"
14 November 1968
1969
SNIE 14-69: "The Pacification Effort in Vietnam"
16 January 1969
SNIE 14.3-69: "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Com-
munists for Fighting in South Vietnam'"
17 July 1969
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1970
SNIE 1A.3-70: "The Outlook from Hanoi: Factors Affect-
ing North Vietnam's Policy on the War
in Vietnam" 5 February 1970
SNIE 13-9-70: "Chinese Reactions to Possible Develop-
ment in Indochina" 28 May 1970
SNIE 13-10-70: "Chinese Reactions to Certain Courses
of Action in Indochina" l1 June 1970
B. Selected Vietnam-Related Memoranda
1965
USIB Memorandum "Recent Indications of. Communist Inten-
tions in South Vietnam" 9 April 1965
Memorandum on Reactions to a US Course of Action in'
Vietnam, 21 April 1965
Memorandum, "Reactions to a Further US Buildup in South.
Vietnam" 10 June 1965
Memorandum for the Director "Effect on an Intensified
US Effort in Vietnam" 30 August 1965
Memorandum for the Director, "Reactions to a US Course,,.
of Action in Vietnam". 2 December 1965
1966
Memorandum, "Reactions to Continuation or Termination
of the Pause in Air Attacks on the DRV" 19 January 1966
Memorandum, "Possible Effects of Various Programs of Air
Attack Against the DRY" 1 February 1966
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Memorandum, "Probable Reactions to a Postulated US
Course of Action" 23 March 1966
Memorandum for the DCI, "The View from Hanoi" 20
November 1966
Memorandum for the DCI, "The War in Vietnam" 9 January
1967
Memorandum, "Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses
of Action" 6 February 1967
Memorandum, "Communist Policy and the Next Phase In,
Vietnam" 12 April 1967
Memorandum, "Reactions to Various US Courses of Action"
12 May 1967
1968
Memorandum, "Communist Reactions to Certain US Military.
Operations in Vietnam" 4 January 1968
Memorandum for the Director, "Alternative Interpreta-
tions of Hanoi's Intentions" 18 January 1968
Memorandum for the DCI, "The Outlook in Vietnam"
26 February 1968
Memorandum, "Questions Concerning the Situation In
Vietnam" 1 March 1968
Memorandum for the DCI, "Communist Reactions to Certain
US Courses of Action" 13 March 1968
Memorandum for the DCI, "Speculation on Hanoi's Motives"
8 April 1968
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Intelligence Memorandum, "Hanoi's Negotiating Position
and Concept of Negotiations" 6 May 1968
Memorandum for the DCI, "The Coming Political Struggle
for South Vietnam" 16 September 1968
1969
Memorandum for the Director, "Reaction to a US Retalia-
tory Air and Naval Strike Against North Vietnam Between
the DMZ and the 19th Parallel" 21 February 1969
Memorandum, "Probable Reactions to a US Attempt to Close
the Port of Haiphong" 27 March 1969
Memorandum, "The Current Lull in Communist Infiltration
to South Vietnam" 26 May 1969
1970
Memorandum, (CIA/DIA/INR)'"COSVN Resolution 9: What
Light Does It Shed on Hanoi's Future Course?"
9 January 1970
Memorandum for the DCI, "The Situation in Indochina"
2 April 1970
Memorandum for the DCI, "Stocktaking in Indochina:
Longer Term Prospects" 17 April 1970
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