KEY FACILITIES IN THE HANOI AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000200020004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 2, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL 1NTELL1GENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT Key Facilities in the Hanoi Area
1. In connection with General Haig's recent request, I asked our
Imagery Analysis Service (IAS) -- on a very close hold basis -- to
survey sixteen selected key installations in the Hanoi area with the
object of determining what "major civilian facilities" (e . g . , hospitals
and schools) were located in immediate proximity (defined arbitrarily
as 200 yards for installations in the heart of metropolitan Hanoi and 500
yards for installations is ated in outlying areas).
2. Attached hereto is a table/spread-sheet (Attachment 1) and a
set of photographs (Attachment 2) which present the findings of this
survey. In forwarding this material to me, my IAS colleagues made the
following comments.
"The selected installations and major facilities
within the specified distances were analyzed on recent
aerial photography. The aerial photography was used
to identify the general function of the installations and
nearby civilian facilities and government offices. In
some cases we could identify the specific function of an
installation or facility solely from aerial photography,
i.e., radio communications stations, waterworks and
electric power plant. We used collateral material
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including maps, ground photography and information
reports to indicate a more specific function of some of
the other installations and nearby facilities. It should
be emphasized that it is impossible to determine or
confirm the specific function or use of many of the
installations and facilities from aerial photography.
"The attached table contains the information derived
from collateral material and our analysis of the selected
installations and nearby major facilities which is annotated
on the attached photo enlargements (Figures 1 through 16).
"
3. We did not even request a survey on one potentially lucrative
target -- the Hanoi Television Antenna and Probable Transmitter Site at
WJ883250 on Pho Quan Su Street -- because it is directly across the street
from the Ha Lo Prison, where the bulk of U.S. POWs are believed to be
held. We also did not call for a survey on National Police Headquarters
(WJ88912490) because it is known to be located in a very heavily built
up area.
4. Because of the need to mask the real purpose of this exercise,
we did not request surveys on facilities such as the following.
(a) Ministry of Foreign Trade (WJ89692465)
(b) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (WJ87402595)
(c) Ministry of Communications and Transport
(WJ89692465)
(d) Prime Minister's Residence (WJ87122652)
(e) Residence Office of the President (WJ87122634)
The first three ((a) through (c)) are also in heavily built up areas. The
last two (d) and (e) may merit some consideration. They obviously have
symbolic value and, more to the point, both are sited in relative isolation
in the middle of the botanical gardens.
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5. Our sixteen site survey is submitted for your information and
consideration, not as a package of target recommendations. Some of the
information in this study, in fact, would argue against picking some of
the surveyed installations. Lao Dong Party Headquarters, (WJ88252460),
for example, is not only in a built up area but is within 100 yards of a
hospital. The Government Communications Office is surrounded by the
staff living quarters and embassies of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
with the embassy compound of the USSR nearby.
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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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A recently available article on Vietnamese
Communist strategy, written apparently by a
spokesman for party First Secretary Le Duan,
highlights two themes that had been largely
absent from Hanoi's propaganda for months: the
virtues of tactical flexibility in the struggle
against imperialism, and the importance of "con-
solidating socialism" in the North. It reaffirms
Hanoi's continuing determination to defeat the
US, but it suggests that the North Vietnamese
are doing their best to come to terms with some
unpleasant international realities.
The article, authored by one Huong Nam,
appeared in the July-August issue of Tuyen Huan,
Hanoi's journal for propaganda and training cadres.
Quoting profusely from Le Duan, Huong Nam addresses
two broad topics: the balance of the forces, in-
ternal but more particularly external, that cur-
rently bear on the Vietnam struggle (Huong Nam's
tag for this i.s "correctly evaluating the enemy")
and "the strategic duties of both parts of Vietnam."
"Flexibility" and the "Balance of Forces"
Huong Nam asserts that the basic cause of
Hanoi's success is the "creative" use it has made
of revolutionary experience and Marxist-Leninist
doctrine. Later in the article he speaks approv-
ingly of the "principled" yet. "flexible" nature
of the party's line. "In the present world situ-
ation," he says, the struggle "will have to pass
through many transitional phases" on the way to
victory, but the Communists know how to defeat
the US "in a way most compatible with the balance
between our forces and the enemy's in each historic
phase."
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When he analyzes the "balance of forces,"
Huong Nam makes it clear that the Vietnamese
Communists are looking hard at international
factors. Lenin, he notes, "demanded that the
Communists pay constant attention... not only to
the domestic situation but also to all factors
of the international economy and international
political situation." Huong Nam is manifestly
unhappy with what he sees in this sphere. He
claims that the US has "taken advantage of
detente in the world and the division and op-
portunism in the world Communist and workers
movement," and that "the situation at home and
abroad is undergoing basic changes." (Another
article in the same journal expresses the un-
happiness more explicitly: "If the world situ-
ation were not facing such complex changes as
it is now, our success would certainly have
been even greater.")
Huong Nam indicates that Hanoi, willingly
or unwillingly, has had to accept the trend
toward big-power detente as a fact of life. He
even finds it necessary to confront the argument--
an argument very possibly used by Hanoi's own pa-
trons--that the Vietnamese "revolution" is a
threat to world peace. Quite the contrary, he
argues in good dialectical fashion: although
in the past Communist revolutions were indeed
associated with major world struggles, at the
present stage of history persistence in the re-
volution helps preserve world peace, and pro-
tecting peace fosters the development of the re-
volution.
The Continuing Struggle and the North's RoZe
Dialectics aside, Huong Nam leaves no doubt
that the struggle will continue. "There is no
other choice," in fact, even though the fight
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will be "protracted, hard, ferocious, and complex."
The party leadership has correctly gauged American
weakness, he claims, and the people in both North
and South are determined to press on. Huong Nam
portrays North Vietnam's role in this struggle,
however, in terms that differ from those used in
other North Vietnamese propaganda recently. Al-
though he asserts that the North does not for one
minute" waver in its support of the South, he goes
on to state .t, '_~the ._duty to achieve socialsf
revolution in the North is the most decisive duty
for the development of the entire Vietnamese re-
volution," while "the South must directly fulfill
the duty of liberating itself" from the US and its
agents. He laces this passage with extensive quo-
tations from documents of the third party congress
in 1960 that emphasize the complementary, mutually
reinforcing duties of the two parts of Vietnam.
Shifts in the Line over the Years
This notion of the complementary duties of
North and South, with the North's prime task being
to press on with "building socialism" at home, is
a staple which is never entirely absent from Hanoi's
propaganda. Like other components of the propaganda
inventory, however, it has received different treat-
ment at different points in the war. It was a
central theme from 1960 to 1964, but for the four
years or so thereafter the need to "build socialism"
was subordinated to the need to provide ever greater
direct aid for the struggle in the South. In that
period the slogan, "everything for the front line,"
seemed to provide the keynote. In 1969, after the
series of offensives that began at Tet 1968, the
emphasis on "building socialism" in the North re-
emerged. Although Hanoi continued to provide large
amounts of aid and manpower to the South during
this period, the absolute level, in relation to the
forces operating in the South during this period
was perhaps not as large as during the run-up for
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the 1968 offensives. The "building socialism" theme
was a propaganda fixture in one form or another
until late 1971 or early 1972, when the 20th party
central committee plenum appareiTE1 again sub-
oTtriated the needs of the North to the require-
ments of the upcoming offensive and "everything
for the front line" once again became the order
of the day. It may be noteworthy that Huong Nam's
article not only quotes heavily from 1960 party
congress documents on the parallel duties of North
and South, but fails to make any mention at all of
the 20th plenum.
Similarly, the notion that "creativity" and
"flexibility" are important factors in Hanoi's
success has received markedly greater emphasis at
some points in the war than at others. For reasons
which are still not clear, the theme was given heavy
emphasis in late 1969 and early 1970, notably in
a massive article by Le Duan himself in February
1970. Since then it has received some lip-service,
but the emphasis has been on the Communists' mili-
tancy and determination rather than on their flexi-
bility. Huong Nam's article thus is giving currency
to a topic that had been dormant for a year or more.
Exegesis is always a chancy thing where North
Vietnamese propaganda is concerned; witness the
still unexplained references to flexibility in
Le Duan's article of February 1970.. Still, Huong
Nam's renewed emphasis on the importance of build-
ing North Vietnam and on the value of revolutionary
"creativity" does seem significant, particularly
considering the nature of the journal his article
appears in. Tuyen Huan is less prestigious than,
say, the party's theoretical journal, but its
readers are propaganda cadres--people who must
actually deal with the misgivings of the party
rank and file and who therefore need a fairly com-
prehensible rendition of the. current line. For
this reason its articles sometimes come closer to
addressing the issues without obfuscation than.do
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 the more authoritative publications. Tuyen Huan,
for instance, provided a hint that Hanoi was em-
barking on preparations for a major military ef-
fort a full year before the offensive began last
March.
One almost certain purpose of his article is
simply to help the propaganda cadres answer popular
complaints that the regime is not seeing to the
needs.of the North. Beyond this, he could also
be alerting his readers to the possibility of a
change in emphasis on Hanoi's line on the war--a
change which seems to have been brought about
partly by the "complexities" of the international
situation. He makes it clear that nothing like a
capitulation by the Communists is in prospect, ``?
and the cautiousness of some of his language
suggests that the leadership was not entirely sure
that any change at all would actually occur. But
a seasoned North Vietnamese interpreter of the
nuances of Hanoi's line might easily consider
himself put on notice to be ready for some sort
of shift.
If Huong Nam was indeed sounding such an alert
in Tuyen Huan's July-August issue, the decision on
which it was based almost certainly came several
weeks earlier. His article thus provides indirect
confirmation of other tenuous signs that the
Communists' central committee met in June.
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JOURNAL DISCUSSES S'T'RATEGY TO DEFEAT U, S. IN VIETNAM
Hanoi TUYEN HUAN in Vietnamese No 7-8 Jul--?Auug '72 pp 2?-,j5 S
[Article by Hung Nam: Some Problems of Strategic Line"
[Text] "Car Vietnamese people are conducting the greatest resistance in their history,
For the independence and freedom of our fatherland and for the interests of the social-
ist camp, oppressed people and progressive mankind, we are f gh'.ting and defeating the
cruelest enemy in the world." CFO0tnote; From the 20 July 1968 appeal by President
Ho)
Our country is not large and our people are not numerc,.xs ; why then are we able to de-
feat the U.S. imperialists --the arch iirsperialist--and win the present great victories?
The causes of our victories are numerous. The basic cause, as pointed out by Comrade
Le Duan, is. "We know how to con olidate the considerable experiences of the Viet-
namese revolution since t:h.e foundation of our party--particularly the experiences of
the August revolution and the anti-French rea;istance-?-arid have applied them relatively
to the new situation to put forth correct lines and strategic trends. It may be said
that; we can draw from o it le.ason:a of vlct.cry this fact: While applying Marxism-
Leninism and Marxist military -,-science and learning from the revolutionary experiences
and revolutionary wars in our +r ':r ,.erly county tea ,. we should be creative in implementing
our lines, policies, aims and methods ? sb.luld think independently to discover revolu-
tionary rules and war rules for li;r country and should not and cannot use certain
formulas as unchangeable models and princ:;ples in conducting the revolution and war.
(Footnote; From the speech by Le Dun at the 19th VWP Central Committee Plenum)
Thus we can understand what the problem or creativity and independence in our party's
anti-U.S. :tine is, First? It is the problem Of creativity and independence in our
party's Vietnamese revolutionary line for more than =tO years, a part of which Is the
southern revolutionary line and the ant!-.U_9. national salvation line, The content
of the southern revolu,i'nary line and the anti'th S, national salvation line is very
broad, including many problems concerning revolutionary strategies and methods. In
this article we will begin to study ome problems of the strategic line with main
emphasis on the three folluwing p,o.nts: correctly evaluating the enemy, asserting
the strategic duties of both par.=.,-; of Vietnam and confirming the short-term objectives
of the revolution in the suuy.ri. We think these are the important strategic points
that reflect the creative any: 1'.n,3ependentt characteristics of our party's anti-U.S,
national salvation line,
For more than 40 years our party has led cur people in conducting the revolutionary
wars. These two revolutir'"ns-,ry wars resemble each other because they are in the realm
of national, democratic :revolution and are aimed at gaining independence and freedom
for the fathherland. Hr=we-er, in the second revolutionary war the en-my is completely
different.
Previously we star= ;g're,t against'. the French: I.mper_alists, who were old, decadent im-
p;r.I.alist;s ?ieminaci air =e pie in an old cr%ls;n:tali:st form.
Today our gain enemy
il; 't;he U.S. "vr are Inc ;r r>g er de., or the imperialist camp, have an
c ,nr-mic a' Al mtlii:a y,e the correct revolu-
tionary' lines, gu? i.lines, and, methods for defeating the IT, S. imperialist aggressors,
Our party has always understood clearly that the U. S. Imperialists, oar- peoples most
dangerous and cruel enemy, ar=e the imp ri.alist ri,+.gl aders, erne a1.Ly speaking,,
We must recognize that the Americans ace stronger Char; we in eocnomlc and military
potential. rr i Footnote L' f:,uano hoe W- ill Certainly Win , the Enemy will (erta?nl^'
Be Defeated i , Su That Publishing H'.ouase, 1965, P 181 tv-- U. S. imperialists ` war of
aggrezsion against South Ttetnam is parr of their gener=ai plot against Southeast
Asia and their global st_; ~.t *gy'o
13. S, imperialists have a powerful economy p:roduo Lreg tv z:i ic,:ads of ti llions of
dollars of goods each. year, tens of divisions t--ms of natal fl ,,-;ts, thousands of
military bases enciri'li.ng the socialist camp, modern iapo?ns of mass d., s`r'ucti,or, and
so forth. our party clearly sees that among these strcamgt.ns , which of cour, se the
Americans will use to implement their sc.h,em'e to inva'd;~ rur country' aria impose the-~ir
domination on the world, there also are w eakneesses, Sec " r: these w=.3knessees,
the 11, S, power is not boundless, but limit,:!, and out people, as w}11 as :any other
oppressed nation, can rise to fight r-nscl.utely ant de e,ar t,t- 11.3? imp. r.ri,alist
aggressors and regain independence and fre'-',l.om for the
struggle lines and methods,
characteristics and laws of deei lopm zt
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In Vietnam itself, although the U.S. imperialists have taken advantage of the
detente in the world and the division and opportunism in the world communist and
workers movement, it is not true that they can freely do as they wish and devote all.
U.S. economic and military potential to the war of aggression here. This situation
makes it possible for the national liberation movements to break the weak links in the
U.S. imperialists' neocolonialist system chain.
Although they are extremely frenzied and crafty, they have been unable to hamper
the mounting revolutionary movement. Since World War II U.S. imperialism has been
attacked everywhere, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin An.terica, and the Americans
have suffered the greatest defeats, defeats in China and Korea, defeats in Vietnam--
together with the French, defeats in Cuba, a retreat in Chile, and the, present
serious defeats in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Because of these continuous defeats the "U.S. imperialists have been on the defensive
and have had to change their global strategies one after another from the "massive
retaliation strategy" to the "flexible response strategy" and "the Nixon doctrine."
The contradictions within the United States and the imperialist camp headed by the
Americans have developed gradually and are weakening the U.S. imperialists.
The U.S. failure i.ri tho war of aggression against Vietnam has caused U.S. internal
contradictions to sharper, more vigorously than ever, A number of countries in the
imperialist camp have surged forward, but have clashed with U.S. expansion and have
seen that the Americans are being defeated in Indochina; therefore, the contradictions
between the United States and these countries have increased. Earlier, in the war
of aggression against Korea the Americans were able to ,bide themselves behind the UN
flag and drag in dozens of satellite countries to participate, but today, in the war
of aggression against Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists are really isolated and have
dragged in only a few satellite countries to participate, such as South Korea,
Thailand....
All these weaknesses have affected the U.S. imperialists' global strategy. To
implement this strategy the United States has applied neocolonialism and modernized
its traditional art of fighting to fit its aggressive scheme. However, U.S.
neocolonialism. quickly exposed its dirty face and weaknesses before the peoples,
liberation movement and the world people.
Our party has po.need out the nature and weaknesses of U.S. neocolonialism, In an
article observing ;he 50th anniversary of the Soviet Groat October Revolution,
Cn;i.rade Le Daan wrote. "neo:>(,,oloni:alism is a basic U.S. Policy designed so it can
p! ay role, of international gerdarme and rule the .entire wo.-ld, " However, it is
not `.ho i'X); o h,ce of a p-csition C)f o _reegth. " it is the product of itmp e.ria.11S.'. 's
we i+: .... , any a mo ai .)--pposire the offensive of re:vo%l.uttonnrv forces to
T.. , ot;;..sn an t. e acrid. !, it is an a cl icy
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It is a "policy designed to oppose the socialist camp's great influence of the
peoples' liberation movement and keep the peoples of var.ious count.Les within
the capitalist orbit," It is an "imperialist policy designed t: seize the
people's markets and raw materials as the balance of forces is taltLng in
favor of the revolutionary side," ;Footnote; Le Dua_ra;. "Enthus :zst;icaLly Move
Forward Under the Great Banner of the October Revolution," Su That kublis.hing
House, Hanoi, 1967, pp 16417-l8-.2o
In its direct struggle against U.S, imperialism, our-.party has un.dersco.od more
concretely U.S. weaknesses in South Vietnam. One can say that South Vietnam is an
infertile land for U.S. neocolonial:+.sm. South Vietnam is not a separ to entity
but is part of Vietnam, a country whose independence, sovereignty, unification, and
territorial integrity were recognized by the Geneva agreements, The southern people
and all our people have a 12-century tradition of struggling against foreign
invasion to regain independence. We are a people who successfully carried out
the August revolution, who have our own government, and who resisted the French
colonialists with arms for 9 years. The southern people, with a large force
of more than 10 million peasants, have enjoyed the national interests and genuine
democracy engendered by the revolutions Such a country, with such a nation, can
never be subdued by any power.
Although the U.S. imperialists have carried out their neocolonialism not through
direct rule but through a lackey admin.istrat?)n covered with a cloak of "fake
democracy," they cannot; deceive Our people,:Mo-ri= ver, the face of the U.S.
lackeys in South Vietnam, tcola of the neocolonialist administration, is very
dirty. They all were boc M tcke;:s of the French colnilists and :Japanese
fascists and were fostered it. the United States, This U.S. political prop is
a power that bears the seeds of its own failure.
In sum, one can say that the basis of neocolonialism in South Vietnam has
been. shaken from the begi.rnir..g, And the United States jumped into Vietnam from a
weak position, not from a position of strength.
The anti-U.S. national salvation. struggle has been waged under conditions where
half the country, that is North N:ietnam, has been liberated and is building
socialism. A member of the socialist camp, North Vietnam is the revolutionary
base area for the entire cca, n?: y and a steadfast rear base of the southern
revolution. The fruits of the socialist revolution in North Vietnam have
encouraged the revolutionary spirit of our people, especially our southern workers
and peasants, and at the some time have created a strong national defense potential
to aid South Vietna,
The southern battlefield developments over the past 10 years have revealed U.S.
imperialism's brutal strength, on the one hard, and all its weaknesses on the
other hand.
Using its brutal st.rergt.h, L;.S. imperialism mercilessly kicked out French colonialism
and cooperated with the Ngo Dinh Diem lackey clique to turn South Vietnam into a
(?,S., t
neocz'.,;ny and military base from which to at t; ck Iio^t: trtetr ., ut
mi.zt:
the sorc1.al.a.st .,amp, and provent the peoples' liberation movement from spreading to
;I theao .d.sia,
^3l uprising" movement of 1959-1960 completely disrupted this
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iyith its brut-al strength IT,. .tmpr :alts. hay asaala*;ed from one strategy to
arc t ae r, f r+om the "special war" strategy to the ' local. war" strategy, and then
to the "Vietnami.zati-gin" strategy. It has dropped u.n our country more than 10
million tons of bombs and sheiis, equivalent to 770 ;atnmi.c bombs of the type dropped
on y.iroshima in 1945, and five times the amount; of bombs and shells used or alt
battlef,leld-. in Western Europe, the 4`editerrsr.eam Sea, and the north Pacific
during W.:-)r1wft War 11, and 11. times the amount used In the U.S. -war of :aggro s:;.o.r.
against Korea ALE MONDE, 29 July i9?"1'
The United States failed in its "special war" and "local war" and its now sustaining
serious setb:~a.cks in its "Vet na'ni zed war," The United States failed In the previous
war of de t ss,t Ica against Nor h Vietnam and .it will surely fail pitifully in the
re-bombing and blockade of the north,
Each U.S. failure proves the cor.rectcnss of our party's view on t;.S. weaknesses
in Vietnam. Because our entire ,neo.ple nave correctly assessed U. S. strc.ngp!ci.nts
and weaknesses, they have remained. steadfast and are tr:iumphir.g over U.S. imperialism.
The first success for our party's creative anti-U.S. line was its correct evaluation
of the United States and its early awareness of the nature and weaknesses of U.S.
neocolonialism.
The path the southern revolution will follow can be none other than the path
chartered by Lenin for national liberation revolution. The present southern society
is a neocolonialist, semi-.feudal society. Its two basic contradictions are
between our people and the U.S, imperLalista and their lackeys, and between the
southern peoople--particularly the peasantry-=and the landlords. The southern
revolution should solve these two basic contradictior.s.
The southern revolution has the nature of a people's democratic and national
revolution, but it is taking place while the situation at home and abroad is
undergoing basic charges. In the present era the socialist, .independent,
rational and peace forces are preponderant and becoming increasingly stronger,
and their ability to prevent and suppress the imperialists' warmohgering schemes
and maintain and consolidate a lasting peace is increasingly developing. "The
basic interests of the proletariat, people, and rations all over the world lie
in how we can protect world peace while accelerating the revolution in various
countries." (Footnote; to Duan: "Under the Party's Glorious Banner and for
Independence, Freedom, and Socialism, Advance. Toward New Achievements," TUYEN'
HTJIN No 3=.4 1970, p 18)
Toe world situation is favorable for the Vietnamese revolution, but at the same
time it, has created tn.er problems for the southern revolution to solve. These
problems are how to accelerate revolution while protecting world peace, and
must the theory on the revolutionary situation be closely linked to the war waged
by the imperialists? Our party must be able to give an affirmative answer to
this problem. Is It possible for the southern revolution to break out and achieve
success while world peace is protected?
Prior to and after World War T, the revolutionary situation and thz~ outbreak and
success of _evs.ut:ior, wane usually linked in. one way or another to world wars
waged. by the im e:rial.ist The Soviet October Revolution broke out in 191.7, and
its successes were closely 11uked w_. `7 World War 1.. The wan caused o
!?.tr3G 11c t ions
in tne to r'
[ .._. r? G.. ,_e,
a(,h an at'!'`F. ;. thus SJ?_3kC.-:r'L rg the tsar.
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Taking advantage of this situation, Lenin advocated "turning the imperialist war
Into an :internecine revolutionary war," and he motivated workers, peasants, and
soldiers to revolt under the '"pease, bread, and land" slogan, The emergence of
numerous European socialist countr?.e:s after World War IL was also linked to the Soviet
victories against the fascists. The Chinese revolution achieved success by leaps and
bounds after the USSR defeated the Japanese fascists in World War II, Our August
revolution also availed itself of favorable opportunities when the Japanese
capitulated to the allies.
Now the situation has changed. It is in the interests of the Vietnamese people as
well as other world peoples to accelerate the revolution in the south while protect-
ing world peace. Protecting world peace is a revolutionary slogan,
In this situation our party contended: "In a situation where there is no world war
and it is necessary to protect world peace, revolution can break out and triumph,
The acceleration of the anti-imperialist revolution does not run counter to the
protection of peace but rather, as reality shows, is a very basic offensive thrust
directed at imperialism to really effectively protect common peace throughout the
world. Conversely, preventing world war and protecting peace are also very important
offensive thrusts directed at imperialism and which create more favorable objective
conditions for the development of revolutions in all countries," (Footnote: Le Dian,
op. cit, pp 17-18)
The two objectives of successfully protecting world peace and while accelerating
revolution "have an organic relationship, serve as mutual premises, and are definitely
achievable once the communists have firmly grasped the strategically offensive
impetus of the world revolution and have succeeded in forming a front uniting different
schools of the world revolution and all forces struggling for peace, national
independence, democracy, and socialism. These will resolutely defeat all wars of
aggression unleashed by imperialism, foil all warmongering policies and schemes of
imperialism, and will repulse imperialism step by step, topple it bit by bit, and
proceed toward completely toppling it,"
Thus, "a revolutionary situation is a product of the combination of many objectively
and subjectively vital factors" (Footnote: Le Duan, op, cit.-PP 17-18), and the
emergence of this revolutionary situation in each country must not necessarily be
linked with world war.
Comrade Le Duan said: "In the past 25 years many major changes favorable to the
revolution and peace have occurred in the international arena. The revolutionary
forces have gained a considerably more advantageous position and hold the initiative,
Under the favorable conditions of the struggle to protect world peace, a directly
revolutionary situation occurs continuously in one part of the world or another, and
the outbreak of revolutions is no longer linked with the outbreak of world wars. The
revolutionary struggle movements, unceasingly developed according to correct object-
ives and correct methods, do not increase the danger of world war. On the contrary,
these revolutionary struggle movements prevent the adventurous, warlike acts of
imperialism and create conditions for the world to advance gradually toward a firm,
lasting, and widespread peace." (Footnote: Le Duan: "Lenin.-Ism Illuminates the
Era1s Revolutionary Objectives," NHAN DAN, 12 May 1970)
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IV. 21 Sep 72 K 14
This correct and creative reasoning of our party is the theoretical foundation of
the anti-U.S. national salvation line, and it has illuminated the way for the southern
revolution to move forward.
This reasoning opened completely new prospects for our people. They did not sit
passively and idly by and wait for a world war to break out, but rather had to
develop their initiative positively and create conditions for directly attacking
imperialism and liberating their country.
This reasoning also equipped us with a theoretical basis for struggling against the
opportunist tendencies in the southern revolution.
Our people's anti-U.S. struggle has been developing under conditions where the north
has been completely liberated and is building socialism, It is the duty of both
zones to struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and achieve the
common and immediate objectives, which are liberating the south, defending the north,
and achieving national unification. The northern people have not for one minute
neglected their duty to the blood-sealed south. But it is not enough to stop after
simply affirming the common duty. We must clearly affirm the concrete role and
strategic duty of each zone in the anti-U.S. national savlation undertaking of our
people.
Has the north organized the march south as it did during the first phase of the war
of resistance against the French colonialists? Or did the south have to wait for
the north to successfully build socialism for it to rise up and struggle? Basing
itself on the general situation of our entire country and on the situation in each
zone, our party has pointed out the strategic duties of each zone us follows; The
duty to achieve socialist revolution in the north is the most decisive duty for the
development of the entire Vietnamese revolution and for achieving national unifica-
tion, and the southern revolution exerts a directly decisive influence on the task
of liberating the south.
"Generally speaking, the north has become the common rear for the revolution of our
entire country, because it has achieved the national democratic revolution, restored
independence, and set up a people's democratic administration, The more strongly the
north has advanced toward socialism and the more its forces have been strengthened
in all fields, the more advantageous the situation is for the liberation revolution
in the south, for developing the revolution in the entire country, and for maintain-
ing and consolidating peace in Indochina and the world,
The north is the common rear for the revolution throughout our entire country. The
continuous growth of the north has not only heightened the southern patriotic
compatriots' confidence and stimulated their revolutionary enthusiasm, but has also
tilted the balance between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces throughout
our country in favor of the revolutionary side, thus creating favorable conditions
for the southern revolution to develop strongly and win final victory,
"At the.same time, since the north Is the common rear for the revolution in our entire
country, the northern socialist revolution is aimed not only at building a new, free
and happy life for the northern people but also at laying the foundation for building
a new, free and happy life for the people throughout our country and realistically
preparing for the future development of our entire country,
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IV. ?1. Sep 72 K 15
"the (J.S. Imperialists and t e-.i.r lackeys are now actively preparing to launch a
new war of aggress ton, to conquer our country and turn it: into a sprir'gboard to
f:t'.4~JPrCe in
q,s.c'=?SP. .'.h#'. socialist r-arnt, destroy che movement 'movement for national. :1.X':d?p
3?u;zt.beast psi-a, ar.d destroy world peace. the more stro=ngly and firmly the north
is built and consoIid.ated, the greater w:lll be our car ac.ity to :frustrate the warlike
anal aggressive plots of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, co maintain and
consolt'da.r'e peace in. Indochina and the world to actively support the movement to
achieve na"ta's z .l in.depern.dence, and to make contributions to strengthening the socialist
forces,
"Tin short, by actively advancing the north toward socialism it is possible to
create conditions for the southern revo)l.ut,ion to develop strongly and win victory,
for the revolution throughout our country to Progress, and for full use to be
made of the forces of the Vietnamese rev;lution-in cooper.at on with one forces
of the socialist camp And of the peace and national independence movement---to
isolate and eventually defeat the cruelest and most dangerous enemies of our
people, the U.S. imtpe"ialisi:s; to achieve natinal unification; and to build a
peaceful, unified, inde.e:nden.t, democratic, prosperous, and powerful Vietuam.
Obviously the duty of the northern socialist r'evoluti.on is the most ~:eo wive
duty in developing the revolution in our entire country and in achie~v!n.g our
people's national unification,
"Clearly defining the role and respoosibil i.ty of the rt,.)rthezr which
must be thoroughly .imbued with the duty of maintain ing peace., bu ld:A,rg
and stimulating the progress of the southern revolution means al ir,, clearly defining
the role and responsibility of the southern revolution, which must directly fulfill.
its duty of overthrowing the ruling yoke of the U2S. ir_ip ria2 fists 1 1-a 3iceys
to liberate the south, aid complete the people's mat. on al dertocr;attc r:ev::3:i.uti.=c.n
througiaout the country. This is the only correct pat.;: for ach,evi.r.g ,at :nnai
uiv ficu.tion peaQe.fu.li.ye Tree U.S, imperialists and -their lackeys are the enemies
of ourpeople, They are against any plan to peacefully unify our cour_.try That is
why they have turned the south into a U.S. rieocolony and military base, have endeavored
to sabotage the Geneva accords, refused to hold a consultative coz:'f--eren.ce with ov
government, and refused to reestablish normal relations between the two zones. Only
by overthrowing their ruling yoke in the south will we achieve conditions for peacefully
unifying our country,
"On the other hand, to enable the north to build socialism in peace anal to maintai..r,
peace in Indochina and the world, the south must reso:i,utely struggle against the
U.S. lsnpe 1;a.Iists and their la-.keys, defeat their agg-essive and wa,.ic es, and
ove 'th;r'ow their or el ruling yoke. Thin is the only path to foll:zw,
south must directly ulf).7.:a the du`~y of lib _ e wt`rzx3 itsel.f .f rt> :7i -. .x .. .eg y:'ke
..,.~.
of the imperialists and their lac.k_ ys, It is fal:'s.y capable o)f fu:.f li.in.g ibis
gi_)r'?^".ou5 duty, because the :(?!).nhe."b, otc ha4 ,'.'-ed:.1 r,ed 3'd. w , .-:'eC p ,wit-, f .'o)m
the Japanese -!:as .ist# ar'd. ne-':icelly re sted t':e r_,. ,'ht ( gists .i.":' .J.
' ~i.?"'d ber.?-.us? the i. r...U l.'or' has be'n as
.
have o"ceme .1~1:?' _;~ 1.." ~1y weak Via:.d. 1s:,I ate;;, w'''i."ie t. e f.i,. .>
a n i he wort ) c' V iha sr
?7 , ~r :'.,~1. 1.5)13, ...~..t 1.-,~S i ..7).d ,;.;?r.:~,p... 3__:' d i .. .. .... .. ~ --,. _. -'.,. ,r `r
day by o is as it-u." ~..,a roe _.__el w_tra..
gF: _v D- les' have re 'iut'.'~;y-
r r.~.* 1"a,.y f'r:;?'~ =~ J
n_i -ce the 1.t : ..t. ..,A
overthrow 'them, r I^, .I C .te1 nil. i= yoke !a1 :,ea.. bee.rg ta-..?cie
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IV. 21 Sep 72 K 16 NORTH VIETNAM
This has been proven by many experiences drawn from the world national liberation
movement in the past few years.
"The southern revolution plays a very important role in the present revolutionary
movement in our country, It exerts a decisive influence the liberation of the
south from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, the
peaceful reunification of our country, and completion of the people's national
democratic revolution throughout our country.
"Although the socialist revolution in the north and the people's national
democratic revolution in the south are implemented through two different
strategies, because they have a common objective--achieving national unification---
these two revolutions are closely connected and interrelated, They help each
other progress. We must clearly understand that the socialist revolution
in the north exerts a decisive influence on the development of the revolution
in our entire country and on the task of unifying our country. But at the same
time we must clearly realize that the southern revolution exerts a decisive
influence on the liberation of the south and the task of peacefully achieving
national unification, Only then will we full understand the content and objectives
of our revolution in the present phase and will we have correct policies, methods,
plans and measures which we must carry out to build successfully a peaceful,
unified independent, democratic, prosperous and powerful. Vietnam." (Footnote:
"Congress Documents," Vol 1, published by the 1/14P Central Committee, 1960, pp 32-34)
Since the day the U.S. imperialists introduced their troops to invade the south
and used their air force and navy to attack the north, our party has pointed out
that the anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking is the sacred duty of all our
people, and that the south is the great frontline and the north the great rear.
Our party has advanced the policy of changing the trend of developing the northern
economy. At the same time it has emphasized that under any circumstances the
socialist north must be consolidated and defended, that it must defeat the U.S.
aggressors' war of destruction, and that it must do its best to aid the south,
After 10 years of struggle against the U.S. aggressors, the 19th Plenum of the VWP
Central Committee once more asserted the correctness of the task of defining the
strategic position of the two zones:
"The facts concerning the southern revolution and the great success of the ant.?U..S.
national salvation war of resistance prove tht our party is correct in advancing the
two revolutionary objectives for the two zones. It is obvious that during thy.:
dark hours in the .south between July 193'+ and the end of 1959, had we not promptly
:mobilized the ma.,sses to rise up and wage a revolutionary war, the southern revolutionary
forces might have been destroyed, the patro tic movement would have faced irremediable
coli.,p e , and the U S, Diemists would z e ,ed the their ground forces to invade the
a preparing to do, On the oth 'aand, ho.d
no Gh as they we.-,,e then. plannln nd
t i y north' quickly healed the war wounds of t:ez 9 year of resistance against
;:he ysu ch colrnialts's, :.~ avOzeC to b ild 7C, :L lism and further strengthened a'fs
cCno.,... 7.~.J. 711; 11 t' ry pot als, it Would have te`n unable to stand up fir-mly and
defeat fie. by tt,e r focus all
r r t the scut h, r . t.Iu-s the s.. ,t Ya o.11 d _:,z unable to
"s....7Z - 5.- war.
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in fact, the building of socialism in the nor.,h has strengthened, is stren.gtheni.ng,
and will s r'ength.en the i'u:r:es of our troops and people in both zones in ail s_c^.ts
to defeat the TJ.S.. aggressor's and the-ix- Lackeys," (Foo%i,.otes Lo i;s talks a.t
the 19th. Plenum. of the VWP CF,ntra:i. Corm:ustee )
National iridenendence, d.emo,:r?acy, and socialism are she greatest r;r--a.:hs of this era
and are laws governing the d.ev'e. lopmecit of all nations i,:n this era, This is the
political program of our p.;.rty. This is the path the north has .t'ollorred and our
entire country is following.
The third party congress asserted: "The basic, objecti7?es of the southern revolu-,
tion Is to liberate the south from the ruling yoke of the imperialists and
feu.dalists, achieve notional independence, bring land to the tillers, and help
build a peaceful, uni..ti.ed, independent, democratic, prosperous and power Vietnam"
(Footnote. "Congress Docume:nlts," Vol 1 published. by the I P Central Committee,
1960 pp 46?v50) No matter what Jiff cu.lties and .02. ships they may e'_^scJ'unrer, and
no matter how long the revolution may last, our Vietnamese people are a.ocermined
to achieve this objective. "Rivrers, can dry up.. Mountains can e.rodee. B' t. toe
will to unify the fatherland of our people thrc?J.gho'ot th.e ecuotrh c-.:nnot be shaken,
and in the end we will achieve victory, r' (Footnote "Co ress Doo'u en-s' Vol 1,
published by the VWP Central Committee, 1.960 pp 46-50)
The southern revolution must handle an enemy who is an as^"r,.?imperia:la.st, warlike,
and who has the greatest economic and military potential in the imperialist. camp,
The southern revolutionary forces are strong and are gra'3~.ia.l3,y defeetJli,g the TJLS.
imperia lists I war of aggression. However, the path to final victory ?.S still log;
In the present world situation the southern revolution--due to the balance between
our forces and those of the U.S. imper'ial.i.sts?a-will have to pass through many
tran.si.tional phases in order to achieve victory step by step. Its immediate
objective is: "Overthrow the U.S, imperialists and their lackeys, liberate the
south from the ruling yoke of neocolonialism, and build an independent, democratic,
peaceful and neutral South Vietnam."
Our people throughout the country are determined to strwoggle and force the U.S.
immperia.lists to end their war of aggression ire the south; abandon their "Vietnams."
nation" polioy; end their air, naval and other m_z:l.i.tar;v activities ga nst our
people in both zones; withdraw all U,S, and. satelli.t troops, ad~i.sers, and military
personnel from the south; end their support to too 1. ?ckey admaoni.stralion mrd
destroy its oppressive and c;oercIve mace tnery to p'+r e the way" for -he format ion.
of a broad gove:rument of national concord. responsible for organizing
,tree and democratic general electi.oo.:i.n the so?2th.
As long a.s the U. S. hriper'lalists pursue he._,r war or, a.ggcessiu 1
c'Yle'ir Y.eonol,osii? I.Y.sm to 7.t e s th['rn p.rt 'J.7' .),jr .f,l`ontcy Sr l y form, .)-a( 11.0
to struggle :i i r, .gems, e j.Ydepende-". ,e anl. .,t+d. ai.
"riot 'i,Yf.t~' .1 1n