SINE 10-12-65: PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A US COURSE OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000200010008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 16, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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Attached are Annexes A and B to SNIE 10-12-65. They should
be attached to the published estimate, dated 10 December 1965.
JOSEPH SELTZER
Executive Officer
National Estimates.
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SNIE 10-12-65: PROBABLE CO 4MIST REACTIONS TO A US
COURSE OF ACTION
ANNEX A: PAVN INFILTRATION CAPABILITIES DURING 1.966
1965, there were an estimated nine PAVN regiments in South Vietnam --
Current PAVN Strength in South Vietnam. Regular PAVN combat
units began to rioire into South Vietnam late in 1964. As of 15 November
onfirrned, one probable, and one possible. Each regiment is
prised of three battalions of infantry, estimated to average 500
ei tforcement Capabilities. On `the basis' of an estimated total
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downgrading and
,4 dec].aesi.fica t ..
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atidn of nearly l8 miihion, NorthVietnam's manpower is calculated
b y t iou 1.;150, OOO is ;.the 1$
-14
un is deployed to South Vietnam at. str6nths considerably
P~Y ,~ l e full estimated TbO strength of units in North Vietnam
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subject to VC recruiting, there are probably about x+30,000 physically fit
males age 15-49.
,o.repalr.'damagdd LOCO is estimated at 50-100
percent'-of this figure would add 100,000 ti those fit for mill-
Probably an additional 175,000 men reach thee age of 15 each
zO.
probably members of paramilitary groups A.ndthe remainder local
3. lti.VC dominated areas of South Vietnam, where they are presumably.
. 4. DIW military forces are estimated at 297,000 men: 265,000 in the
regular army; 27,000 in the armed security forces; 2,500 in the air force;
and 2,500 in the navy. In addition, there is a militia of perhaps 200,000
men who are armed with rifles and light machine guns and have had some
Under coed bons of total mobilization, DRY military' forces could
Based upoa"an,assumed ratid of 30-60 laborers ;per mile.
praba x and ;to. about +75,000 within six months,.
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There may be a fu
ther 1,800,000 men. and women with
r
of military training.3/
security requirements as they nas+?probably see them, the
to retain.at home all the secuurity force, air
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roles; four infantry divisions (50,000), two infantry brigad
one artillery division(111,500), and one armored regiment
this basis,. a,; balance!.' of some 82,000 men -- ground troops`
15,000 of this number are already in South Vietnam and 9,000 in Laos., Th
available for deployment out of the country. It is, estimated: that ;ebout!'
number of PAVN troops available for service in GVN could be increased if
their place in the DRV was taken by Chinese troops.t
available to furnish instruction and training, about 36 new PAVN regiments
ments for infiltration to South Vietnam. With a force of this size
6. There are an estimated 38 Infantry regiments in the North
Vietnamese axy, of which 15 would probably be reserved for home defense.
Of the remainder, about half could be used to train new units and replace-
or regimental equivalents of approximately 1,500'men each could be trained
andInf.iltrated into South Vietnam during' 1966.
average of 9 battalion equivalents a month.
.+nur Bates concerning the allocation of DRV military torces;amotzg
the various missions set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 are based to as;
co isiderable extent on bur' Judgment of what wwould be `probable and
gas nable.rather than on any large body of,evidence as to actual
practice.
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7, Within South Vietnam, VC/PAVN forces .are cux?rort],y e" timated at
110 combat battalions, 2i including 27 PAVI battalions. ,_C are believed
capable of recruiting and training two new battlion.8, plus
8. In sum., therefore we estimate that VC/PAVN forces in 'South
Vietnam could receive reinforcements at a rate of 16 battalion equivalents
per month during 1966.
9. VC/PAVN combat losses are estimated at the rate of some 15,000
men (30 battalion equivalents) for each of the last two quarters of 1965.
Assuming further US buildup and an increased level of combat in 1966, this
loss rate could rise by as much as four or five battalion equivalents each
VC/PAVN strength by the end of 1966 could be in the neighborhood of 155
ybattalions. However, the strength of this force and its effectiveness
quarter. Based on this figure and the estimated VC/PAVN input capability,
,Could be greatly altered in either directi
duction of new weapons, battlefield .~nnovetione
There are also about 13,000 VC in separate companies and platoons in ,tle
local forces$,000 combat support troops,. 140, 000 in political/military
11
q fires and 100, 000 - 120, 000 guerrilas iii; ; the YC H structure iii tiSout
Vietnam., Only the 110 battalions of the main force are believed to
receive significant support from external eowrces~ therefore, the logic-
"meths or the VC/PAVN main force batte1ii
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VC/PAVN forces'in South Vietnam have only a minimum and irregular require
one-third of the basic load. of aumn inition each day of combat, the total
at the levels of most of 1965 (about once.in every 35 days) and expends
logistic support for some types of Class II (quartermaster), Class IV
(weapons) and Class V (anununition) supplies. If each of the 110 battalions
currently estimated to be in South Vietnam continues to be engaged in combat
supplies. They do, however, have a continuing requirement for external
mentfor external logistical support for Class I (food) and Class III"(POL)
.daily
If the var in Vie nom,esc$e tes to a level where each battalion
external logistic requirement for this entireforce would be about
d .in combat once in `7-days, the estex~nal logistical 81pp4
nt for jab battalion$ would beaver 70 ton per day.
auildup of
VC/PAVN forces' to 155
battalions by.theend of 1966
would bring about a substantial increase in their dependence on external
soutces?for,logistical support, and almost certainly in the scale of .combat'
If these 155 battalions were to engage in combat on a scale; of
o c in'? ery 3 days we wouldhem estimate' heir external logistical
requirement to be at least 165 tons daily.
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"%-cc 4o"u s two pgra graphs would
th
e
ed by t fie event to which the VC/PAVN feces ``Xou3.d lose their
o~istical Capability. The cumulative throughput' capability into
South Vietnam by means of the Lao corridor is estimated for the current dry
season at 150 to 200 tons daily. This capacity would be in excess of the
requirements of the current 110-battalion main force, even under the con-
ditions of increased combat described in paragraph 11. To meet these
requirements, the Communists would have to make maximum use of the routes
through Laos during the dry season (December - May) and to stockpile,
.maintain, and distribute materiel at the southern end with maximum
efficiency. Seasonal restrictions would make it extremely difficult to
tna requirements of a force of 155 battalions under-the conditions
such a case, the Commuunists, Ito sustain. their military
AV .
have to increase the csp4city and utilization of the
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t`these levels of combat to obtain their supplies, particularly
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A X B TUE rc r NTTAL OR USE OF SEA SHIpXgNT
CAMBODIA AS A
COT SUPPLY ROtFI*E
TO
oacwv:"lsm will triumph in South Vietnam. Though it cannot be eetab
lished that Sihanouk personally acquiesced or had knowledge, it is a
fact
that Cambodian territory has been covertly used to provide transit and
sanctuary for the VC. Indeed
, the northeast tip of Cambodia, where
Phnom Penh has never exercised real control, is a major Vietnamese Com-
munist base area, and on Hanoi's maps this territory is shown as a part
of Vietnam.:
1? Politico] Factors. Cambodia's ruler, Prince Sihanouk ban
frequently adopted strongly anti-Us attitudes, and he appears to believe
that
2. The use of the country's only significant seaport, Sihanoakrille,
as a point of entry for large amounts of military materiel to be moved
on' ward to. the VC in South. Vietnam or stockpiled for their future use would
be a ve
diction f o hisports and other transportation facilites and, possibly,
us MW 't T IP n.v 4 a_ ny
tremely high rick of bringing Cambodia into the war.. He would fear inter-
flagrant cooperation with the Vietnamese insurgency wooti1d :carry an ex
ry different matter. We believe that Sihanouk.+iot feel that such
or these reasons, Sihanouk would almost certainly not
arrangement, at least as long as the US/am 'retain any-
thing liketheir present capabilities for war in the Indochina area.
tratfOn and, ogiatics -South Vie+nnrn~-D 2k'7/A entitled "emu..
or a iacussion of current use of Cambodian territory in support
VC acivtties in South Vietnam see US Of,
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Over the past few years, in fact, Sihanouk has 'shod hiaaelt
be quite sensitive about the use of his country by the Coc nis S or
actions against South Vietnam. There have been a,n ber'.'of min
between Cambodian troops and VC, when theaatter saemed to be opera
:too freely in Cambodia. As recently as 7 December.,` Sihanouk requested
the ICC to consider placing a strict control on Sihanoukville end pub-
lishing the results of its observations.
creased by intensified operation. There are tvpy `xosds , hick cou.ld be used
4. Capabilities. If, contrary-to our estimate, Sihanouk opened his
territory to a major logistic effort, the amount of materiel reaching the
Communists in South Vietnam could be substantial. In calendar 1964, the
port of Sihanoukville handled some 800,000 tons, of which 220,000 were
imports. The port could handle additional imports of about 450,000 tons
per year, an average of about 1,200 tons daily. This figure could be-
Friendship highway and (2) the coastal, route direct to, So th
It should be-noted that the use.of th
act. almost wholly in the southern part
1arly;.r the Mekong delta region.
'- from Phnom Penh to Si henoukville has' been under 'coixtii6t46u
for, about five years, but a number of me4or' bridges and most of the
tree laying on the 160-mile route remain to be corpleted.
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in-to; clean, Sihanoukville.2 These are (1) the Sihanoukville-Phn
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season, henreve its capacity ' QTOa
Phnom` Perth, goods could be moved by either' h or i Wetezwe to
l rice Penh to
the South Vietnamese border. Three higtrva~ys
South Vietnam, the most important is Route 1, is 1ead* to the area
facing Tay Dinh prov#nce and has a capacity of 4,200 tCfls a day in the
dry season and 1,800 tons a day in the rainy season. The IN Or fnland
waterway is the Mekong River system, which has a capacity, with craft
readily available, to move at least 6,000 tons per day south to the border.
This capacity could be increased during the high-Water season. Su plies
could also be moved north on the Mekong to Stung Treng and thence by poor
roads and trails or minor waterways to VC/PAVN forces in Kontum and Pleiku
provinces, but this is a difficult route and has less capacity than the
Lao corridor.
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or 8 10 tons
The Sihenoukville-Phnom Penh highWaey hats a ~tY, ; 5
Y T?' 3' T': f L
a'day inthe dry season end 7,350 tons a day ia, "seas
The tai Sitinnouk4ille a d y weather capacity ot.
coos road 3'roIItt
the honest rases abaat 315 miles. Ia a
to be d9apere'
major routes so goods,
dross ngs of each or the ,
at some point short of the border and mat on lc l
tertiray~w . Qn Route 1, however, the bonder c oeeir g point ntly is
,ceder Viet Cong control, the nearest know Yietname dry units
1Y j m" J Ag
located about 15 miles 'to the northeast. kF y
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8. Thus, in the absence of efforts to interdict and assasning
sufficient trucks and drivers were made available, the total volume of
materiel which could be cleared through the port of Sihanoukville could
be moved forward to South Vietnam over the main routes. In addition,
supplies brought in through lesser ports along the Gulf of Siam could
be moved by coastal and inland water routes and over trails.
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